Tuesday, 16 July 2024 – In this seminar, Professor of International Relations at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), National University of Malaysia (UKM) Dr Kuik Cheng Chwee shed light on Malaysian foreign policy under the Anwar Ibrahim administration.
MALAYSIA STUDIES PROGRAMME SEMINAR
Dr Kuik started by talking about the three ‘C’s in Malaysian foreign policy, the first two being continuity and change.
On continuity, since 1957 till Anwar the 10th prime minister today, Dr Kuik said that there have been three pillars that remained constant in Malaysian foreign policy: pro-active regionalism, pro-active equidistance and pragmatic statecraft.
On proactive regionalism which starts from Southeast Asia, he said that Malaysia has been one of the key players and promoters of regionalism, a characteristic part and parcel of Malaysian foreign policy since day one, which continued with ASEAN-5 in 1967, after Brunei joined in 1984 and in the post-Cold War years where it has worked together with ASEAN regionalism in concentric circle across different sides of spectrum. He further noted that from the 1990s, Malaysia has been proactive in engaging countries beyond Southeast Asia, with efforts like the ASEAN+3 in 1997 and East Asia summit in 2005. Such proactive regionalism, Dr Kuik noted, has continued under Anwar Ibrahim. For example, one of the first things he did was visit immediate neighbours outside of maritime Southeast Asia. He highlighted that regionalism today is not limited to ASEAN but also Northeast Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand.
On pro-active equidistance, Dr Kuik said that Malaysia has been pursuing prudent equidistance. This does not mean being equally proximate but not taking sides. He said that contrary to the common narrative that Anwar is tilting towards China, there is evidence that suggests otherwise. In his view, Malaysia under Anwar’s leadership continues to pursue prudent neutrality vis-à-vis the US and China.
On pragmatic/ proactive statecraft, Dr Kuik said that there are three types of countries that are part of Malaysia’s pragmatic statecraft: Muslim countries, non-aligned countries since the early 1970s and larger developing countries; the “Global South”.
Dr Kuik then turned to look at what has changed. He noted that change does not entail being completely different, but that there are some old elements with adjustments and calibrations. He drew attention to threes ‘A’s of Malaysian foreign policy under Anwar: active and assertive, ambivalent and aspirations despite more apprehensions.
On the first point, Dr Kuik said that Malaysia’s foreign policy today is more active and assertive in contrast to Anwar’s two predecessors Muhyiddin and Ismail Sabri. Following 61 years of the same ruling coalition and five years of five governments which coincided with the time of unprecedented pandemic challenges, Malaysia was out of the international arena. He said that Anwar brought back active elements in a new context such as the Asian monetary fund and ASEAN-GCC relations. On the second point, Dr Kuik said that there are many paradoxes observed in Malaysian foreign policy, with more ambivalence manifesting in relations with big powers under Anwar’s leadership. As a Muslim-majority country, Malaysia has been critical about the US-Israel nexus over Gaza—that Washington DC has not done enough on what is going on despite emphasis on the rules-based order and human rights. On the other hand, although Malaysia is not an ally of the US, it is the most robust defence partner of the US. He observed that even as Malaysia is still critical of US, we still witness institutionalised collaboration added to the long-standing and robust partnerships, with defence MOUs signed even at present. The US has also been a long-standing and robust development partner for Malaysia’s economy. The semiconductor industry in Penang comprises primarily US firms for example. Dr Kuik noted that the same ambivalence can be seen in Malaysia-Europe and Malaysia-Australia ties. Describing Malaysia-US and Malaysia-Australia relations as “alignment without alliance”, he said there while there is no mutual defence commitment like the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), these are long-standing ties that are robust. Similarly, on relations with the European Union, he noted that while many Malaysians are unhappy about palm oil issue, there have been many high-level visits under Anwar. The EU as a group has also been promoting global gateway as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Malaysia is open to. Contrary to reports in the media, Dr Kuik noted that Malaysia is not tilting towards one, but the reality is more complex.
On the third ‘A’, more aspirations despite more apprehensions, Dr Kuik said that there are aspirations in areas such as Malaysia-Japan and Malaysia-Korea relationships being more robust and comprehensive today. However, these aspirations also come with anxiety. He said that some aspects of Malaysia’s engagements are not presented in a nuanced and balanced way, creating an impression that Malaysia is tilting towards one side. Nonetheless, he noted some commendable efforts, such as Anwar’s high-profile meeting with the US ambassador weeks before the Chinese premier’s visit to Malaysia, signalling a commitment to Malaysia-US relationship.
Moving on to the third ‘C’, Dr Kuik said that it could be complexities, complex contradictions or causes for complex contradictions. These causes according to him are what explains the continuities, changes, ambivalence and paradoxes—on the one hand sending positive signals and on the other hand chaotic and negative signals. He said that rather than being contradictory, efforts like maintaining and enhancing defence partnerships is logical and a survival strategy for Malaysia as a weaker country. It is also a relevant logic for others in the Global South. He pointed to three causes for complexities: leadership, structural causes and domestic factors.
Leadership might be a factor but he noted that it is more about style than substance. Anwar’s leadership style is more active and articulate, but the long-standing continuities suggest that there are other reasons beyond leadership. He then elaborated on the second point: structural causes, which are systemic and beyond control. An example is the US-China rivalry which is not new but just a latest version of old elements of big power rivalry. The structural risks, he said, are entrapment into possible big power conflicts over the South China Sea or Taiwan. Despite Malaysia being a claimant country to the South China Sea, the fact that Malaysia’s policies has been described as “low profile and non-confrontational” is an indicator of it continuing the enduring policy with a new vigilance as the risk of big power entrapment is greater than before. He then expanded on the third cause, domestic factors. Drawing on recent commentaries that argue that the US-China rivalry is benefitting countries like Malaysia, Dr Kuik noted that in the semiconductor industry for example, Malaysia has benefited, which benefits domestic politics. There are two cards particularly important for leaders like Anwar: performance and identity to survive politically at home. Performance refers primarily to economic performance, as economic growth and jobs are important for all countries. As a democracy, he said that electoral legitimacy is in the backdrop for any government in Malaysia. How to win the next election is dependent on economic performance. The concern, therefore, is not about who will be the winner in big power rivalry, but which power would bring benefits, corporations and good news that can be brought to the audience at home to show that Malaysia is moving to the right direction under their leadership. To Anwar, the largest political problem is not about South China sea but how to win the next elections. Performance is necessary but insufficient. Dr Kuik highlighted that to win back the political support of the largest group of voters, identity is necessary. Anwar’s stance on issues like Gaza is mainly for domestic consumption. The ambivalent relationship with the West can be explained by scoring points for the identity card but also hurting the performance card.
Dr Kuik ended by saying that it is unclear for how long and at what price the current situation will last. If Washington were to impose greater export control and restrictions targeted at Chinese elements outside of China including in Malaysia, benefits could stop, be reduced or reversed.
The seminar proceeded to a Q&A session. Dr Kuik fielded questions including: whether there have been any pivotal foreign ministers in Malaysia’s history, Malaysia’s position on the Rohingya policy, the importance of affinity in foreign policy, counter-examples to the common narrative of Malaysia tilting towards China, what we can expect under a possible return to a Trump presidency in the US, and Malaysia’s tech foreign policy. Malaysia Studies Programme Coordinator Dr Francis Hutchinson moderated this seminar, which attracted 104 participants.