Monday, August 19, 2024 – In this webinar, three analysts shared their insights on how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has responded to the crisis in Myanmar since the 1 February 2021 military coup, and looked ahead to considerations for future approaches.
MYANMAR STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR
The Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS invited Ms Sharon Seah, Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute; Dr Lina Alexandra, Head of the Department of International Relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies; and Ms Liliane Fan, Joint Head of the Secretariat of the Malaysian Advisory Group on Myanmar, to discuss on ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis since 2021. The conversation, moderated by Ms Moe Thuzar, Coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme, highlighted how regional diplomacy and differing views within ASEAN influenced its engagement with various political actors, and ASEAN’s position on the escalating conflict in Myanmar. The session attracted the attention of 114 attendees.
The key discussion points included:
- The ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on 24 April 2021 discussed and adopted ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) on Myanmar with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who attended the meeting as Chair of the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime following the coup. The 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits in November 2021 restricted the SAC’s attendance at the Summit to a “non-political representative” due to the SAC’s non-compliance with the 5PC priorities. Since then, the nine ASEAN heads of state/government have further reviewed the 5PC’s implementation twice, at ASEAN Summits in November 2022 and September 2023. These reviews reaffirm the 5PC as ASEAN’s “main reference” to monitor the 5PC’s implementation in its entirety. The 2022 review called for a specific implementation plan, which has yet to materialize. The 2023 review upheld the “non-political representative” criterion decided upon in 2021, and also decided that the 2026 ASEAN Chairmanship would be assumed by the Philippines (skipping Myanmar’s turn).
- However, the “non-political representative” criterion applies only to ASEAN summits (starting November 2021) and foreign ministers’ meetings (starting with the foreign ministers’ retreat in February 2022). Apart from these meetings, Myanmar continues to participate in other ASEAN sectoral ministerial meetings.
- At the start of Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2022, Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Myanmar. The 2022 ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy visited Myanmar three times that year. During Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, no such high-level visits occurred. However, Indonesia implemented a new approach of engaging different stakeholders in Myanmar, including the SAC and representatives of forces resisting military rule. Indonesia facilitated over 300 such engagements in 2023. Meanwhile, in 2023, Thailand started Track 1.5 meetings on Myanmar involving participants from some ASEAN members and ASEAN Dialogue Partners neighbouring Myanmar. The present ASEAN Chair Laos seems to have continued with Indonesia’s approach, with its Special Envoy also visiting Myanmar twice. In 2024, the SAC has started sending a non-political representative to the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings held under Laos’ chairmanship.
- Laos has also organised a “tripartite informal consultation” among the past, present, and incoming ASEAN Chairs in July 2024. This can be considered an activation of the ASEAN Troika mechanism on Myanmar, which was established during Indonesia’s ASEAN Chair year. However, the Troika or tripartite mechanism may need to expand beyond the three Chairs to also include other interested (and willing) member states. With “Myanmar fatigue” setting in among various ASEAN members, the Troika may need to adopt a more flexible, open format allowing broader participation.
- This “fatigue” is discernible in the most recent State of Southeast Asia survey conducted by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. The 2024 survey findings show waning interest in the Myanmar crisis among regional policy elites, and differing opinions on ASEAN’s approach and the way forward. Many regional respondents agree that more inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders is necessary, but that ASEAN’s response to the escalating conflict and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar remains too slow.
- Indonesia’s initiative to hold numerous engagements with diverse Myanmar stakeholders has laid some groundwork for identifying necessary points to be included in an implementation plan for the 5PC. However, the drafting of that plan remains incomplete. Indonesia’s decision to establish an office of the special envoy was to create an entity and process that focussed solely on Myanmar without distractions of competing priorities. Typically, the foreign minister of the country holding the rotational ASEAN Chair, is given the responsibilities of the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy. It would be challenging for the foreign minister to devote attention focus on a single issue, however important. The annual rotating chairmanship limited Indonesia’s ability to progress with a more sustainable, institutionalised approach on Myanmar. Without a separate (and more permanent) office dedicated to the Myanmar crisis, efforts for long-term resolutions remain challenged.
- Beyond ASEAN, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General Dr Noeleen Heyzer visited Myanmar in August 2022 (before ending her term as Special Envoy in June 2023). The UN Secretary-General has appointed former Australian foreign minister Ms Julie Bishop as Special Envoy on Myanmar in April 2024. She has since met with various ASEAN senior officials and ASEAN Dialogue Partners. In terms of statements on Myanmar, the UN Security Council resolution in December 2022 and the UN General Assembly resolution on Myanmar in June 2021 both urge an end to violence and its support for ASEAN’s 5PC.
- In 2024, 18.6 million people in Myanmar require humanitarian aid and the numbers will increase with escalating conflict. To date, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre on Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) had coordinated/ provided US$1.1 million aid for Myanmar in medical supplies in 2021, US$27 million in pledges in 2022, and US$1.6 million in 2023. An ASEAN aid convoy was attacked in 2023. Thailand initiated a humanitarian corridor in 2024 to expand cross-border humanitarian assistance. ASEAN has been criticised for directing much of the aid through SAC-controlled areas. However, with limited resources and its intergovernmental nature, ways to support and complement the AHA Centre’s role and efforts would need to be among the considerations of incoming ASEAN Chairs, such as Malaysia in 2025.
- Expanding the scope and nature of humanitarian assistance delivery and engagement with different actors also becomes a consideration in view of the current on-ground situation in Myanmar. The launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023 was followed by a second offensive in June 2024 which resulted in SAC losing more administrative control and an important regional command. The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar have gained more territory, advancing toward providing administrative and other services in the areas under their control. While humanitarian assistance delivery along the Thai-Myanmar border seems more accessible, humanitarian needs along Myanmar’s borders with Bangladesh (and India) are not so. The Rohingya refugee crisis remains a pressing issue, worsened by the escalating conflict in Rakhine State. Additionally, growing distrust among communities raises the risk of reigniting further conflict in the future.
- ASEAN will thus need to consider working with Myanmar’s neighbours such as Bangladesh, India, and China, to improve the delivery of humanitarian aid to conflict zones and manage refugee flows. Incoming chair Malaysia can contribute to these efforts, drawing from its experience with cross-border humanitarian assistance in Gaza.
- Malaysia’s upcoming ASEAN Chair year could also consider expanding stakeholder engagement to include more dialogue and discussion on the impact of the conflict on women and children. Dialoguing with different Myanmar stakeholders/actors is necessary to emphasise the importance of addressing transnational crimes, which are on the rise and are affecting the region by exploiting Myanmar’s current instability. The nexus of non-traditional security threats and the conflict situation in Myanmar is an emerging area of concern for ASEAN regional security.
- ASEAN’s centrality in the region (and beyond) is also being increasingly viewed as a measure of its unity in addressing internal challenges of which Myanmar is the current priority. ASEAN centrality – with regard to upholding principles of democracy and good governance as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter – will also be put to the test in determining to what extent ASEAN should or could be involved in Myanmar’s transition to democracy.
In the Q&A session, speakers further addressed questions related to the idea of a dedicated permanent team of ASEAN member states working on Myanmar, the 2025 Myanmar election, the 5PC’s future and implementation status, the negative impacts of the Myanmar crisis on the regional economy, and Malaysia’s role (as ASEAN Chair) in addressing the crisis.