27 September 2024, Friday – In a webinar held by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Ms Marites Vitug, Dr Tina S. Clemente, and Ms Hoang Thi Ha explore the evolution of Philippines-China relations from the Duterte to the Marcos Jr. administration, examining the motivations, potential impacts, and responses to the shifts in the Philippine’s economic policies, infrastructure projects and strategic approach in the South China Sea.
REGIONAL STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES PROGRAMME AND PHILIPPINES STUDIES PROGRAMME
Ms Vitug noted that Rodrigo Duterte was the “first Philippine president in contemporary history” to openly embrace China. His first visit to China as president in October 2016 marked a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy, when he announced at the Great Hall of the People his “separation from the United States” and his intention to rely on China. She noted that this move was a pragmatic one, motivated by Duterte’s need for Chinese investments, loans, and aid to strengthen the country’s economy, as well as his disdain for the United States, which had criticized his war on drugs. Duterte, acting unilaterally and in line with his “autocratic” tendencies, did not consult key cabinet members.
While the president is the “architect of foreign policy”, Ms Vitug caveated that Duterte faced significant challenges in shifting the strategic thinking of the defense and security establishment, as well as the foreign affairs department, toward a more China-friendly stance. This is because these institutions had been anchored in over 70 years of a security alliance with the United States, making it difficult to realign their long-standing policies and perspectives in favor of closer ties with China. Nonetheless, Duterte viewed China as a rich and powerful friend, especially since China remained silent on his controversial war on drugs, his flagship domestic initiative. She further highlighted Duterte’s personal rapport with President Xi Jinping, whom he visited five times during his six-year term and met frequently at APEC summits. This contrasted with former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s approach, who, while fostering economic ties with China, maintained a close relationship with the US by joining the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ in the Iraq War, thus balancing both relationships.
Ms Vitug explained that Duterte’s pivot to China was influenced by three factors. First, Duterte’s upbringing in Davao City exposed him to close relationships with Chinese migrants and Filipino-Chinese businessmen who supported his economic and security programs, which made him comfortable with them. Secondly, Duterte’s disdain for the United States stemmed from both “official and personal reasons”. Third, Duterte “claimed to have socialist leanings”, noting that his college professor, Jose Maria Sison, the founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, influenced him. Overall, Ms Vitug emphasised that Duterte was not a “strategic thinker”, as his foreign policy was largely shaped by “personal likes and dislikes” rather than careful planning. His animosity extended beyond the United States to include the European Union, which also condemned his war on drugs. Rather than attempting to “balance relations between China and the US”, Duterte grouped the EU and the US together as adversaries, prioritising his personal grievances over a more nuanced diplomatic approach.
Ms Vitug noted that despite Duterte’s efforts to appease Beijing, China continued its aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea, a part of the South China Sea within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). During his administration, the Chinese coast guard blocked and used water cannons on Philippine vessels attempting to resupply troops stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II ship grounded at Second Thomas Shoal. Additionally, around 200 Chinese ships, including maritime militia, swarmed Julian Felipe Reef within the EEZ, intimidating both the Philippine Coast Guard and local fishermen. In another provocative move, Chinese fishing vessels, accompanied by the People’s Liberation Army Navy frigates and Chinese coast guard ships, surrounded Sandy Cay, a sandbar near Pagasa Island occupied by the Philippines. Ms Vitug caveated that these incidents came to light not due to government transparency, but through a party-list congressman and former marine officer who revealed the information to the media.
Ms Vitug highlighted that following Duterte’s October 2016 state visit to China, his administration announced China’s pledge of $24 billion in investments and soft loans for various infrastructure projects. However, six years later, by the time Duterte stepped down, only three projects had materialised: a dam still under construction, a completed irrigation project, and a bridge connecting Davao to Samal Island, which remains unfinished. Duterte’s ambitious plan to build a mega railway project in Mindanao, along with two other large-scale railway initiatives, never came to fruition. Ultimately, Duterte’s efforts to align the country more closely with China were thwarted by pushback from his foreign affairs and defense secretaries, as well as widespread public opposition. The unpopularity of his pro-China stance made it difficult for him to gain sufficient support, leading to the failure of his broader China-focused agenda.
Ms Vitug outlined the three impacts of Duterte’s China pivot.
First, Ms Vitug emphasised that Duterte’s presidency emboldened “pro-China voices”, enabling a small group of academics and media commentators to coalesce and become active proponents of Chinese propaganda. Initially, they supported Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (hereinafter Marcos) during his election campaign, anticipating he would continue Duterte’s China pivot. However, when Marcos shifted away from this policy, they became critical of him, whereas Duterte remains joined by key figures, including Senator Imee Marcos, the president’s sister, who continue to amplify pro-China propaganda. Disinformation campaigns target Marcos and government officials critical of China, with the narrative suggesting that opposing China would lead to war. Ms Vitug also highlighted Rappler’s investigative reporting, which uncovered that these disinformation efforts have shifted their focus towards civil society, specifically the coalition Atin Ito, which led civilian missions to support Filipino troops and fishermen in contested areas such as Scarborough Shoal. The disinformation aims to undermine the legitimacy of these activists and organizations, further embedding pro-China sentiment in national discourse.
Second, Ms Vitug noted that Duterte’s pro-China pivot significantly reinforced his administration’s disregard for the rule of law. During his presidency, the government frequently took shortcuts to expedite infrastructure projects funded by China. This tendency became particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Duterte and his administration openly flouted established protocols. For instance, the presidential guards and certain cabinet members received early vaccinations with the Chinese vaccine, Sinopharm, despite health frontliners being the designated priority for vaccination. This decision sparked public outrage, especially as Duterte himself received the Sinopharm vaccine, which had not yet received approval from the Philippine health department at the time. Furthermore, the preferential treatment extended to Chinese suppliers was evident in the procurement of personal protective equipment and masks, where Chinese firms were favoured over Philippine companies, even when the latter offered lower prices.
Third, Ms Vitug highlighted that Duterte’s pivot towards China resulted in the “extension” of China’s influence into Philippine politics. Vice President Sara Duterte, his daughter, has notably refrained from publicly criticizing China’s aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea, consistently remaining silent when questioned about the country’s provocative behavior in the area. Despite this reticence, she remains one of the most popular national politicians, positioning herself as a likely candidate for the presidency in 2028. Given her familial ties and the precedent set by her father, there are concerns that Sara Duterte may also realign the Philippines’ foreign relations back towards Beijing.
Ms Vitug observed that since taking office in 2022, President Marcos has actively sought to counter Beijing’s influence, which is a notable pivot away from his predecessor’s pro-China stance. This shift has garnered support domestically, as well as from Western nations and some Asian countries. Influenced in part by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — an event that unfolded just months before his inauguration — Marcos’ foreign policy reflects a heightened awareness of global geopolitical dynamics. Notably, he made no mention of China during his inauguration speech, warning that “if the great powers draw the wrong lessons from the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine, the same dark prospect of conflict will spread to our part of the world.” Since then, Marcos has reestablished the Philippines’ strategic alliances by granting the United States access to four additional military bases and strengthening the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). He has presided over the largest joint military exercises between the Philippines and the US to date and has visited the United States four times in two years, becoming the first Philippine president to visit the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii in 2023. Washington has welcomed the Philippines’ consistent emphasis on upholding international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as a framework for resolving maritime disputes. Marcos’ administration has also embraced transparency regarding clashes with China, frequently calling out Beijing’s aggressive behavior to rally domestic and international support.
Moving forward, Ms Vitug cautioned that President Marcos must clearly articulate the threat posed by China’s incursions while allowing for diplomatic engagement. She pointed out that Marcos’s pro-Western stance has resonated well with the public and garnered support from countries like Canada, France, and New Zealand, while forming trilateral and quadrilateral partnerships focused on security with Japan and Australia. Despite this backing, China’s aggressive behavior remains unchanged, and ASEAN’s tepid response underscores the need for unity among member states. Domestically, Ms Vitug urged that Marcos must exhibit decisive leadership and ensure cohesive interagency coordination, particularly through the National Maritime Council, to effectively address security challenges in the West Philippine Sea and avoid disunity among top officials.
In examining the “imprint of Philippines-China economic relations” across different administrations, Dr Clemente noted a significant pivot towards China during President Duterte’s tenure, which prioritized economic cooperation while sidelining the arbitral ruling and minimizing disputes in the South China Sea. This approach was ironically framed as an independent foreign policy, based on the assumption that “warmer ties” would yield substantial economic benefits. In contrast, under the Marcos administration, foreign policy shifted toward a more balanced strategy, maintaining robust economic ties with China while simultaneously enhancing security and economic relations with traditional allies.
Dr Clemente highlighted that another notable area of comparison between the Duterte and Marcos administrations lies in their respective infrastructure programs. Duterte’s flagship initiative, the “Build! Build! Build!” (BBB) program, aimed to leverage Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, resulting in significant commitments for infrastructure development, including dams, bridges, and railways. For instance, during his initial state visit to Beijing, China pledged approximately US$24 billion in loans and investments. In contrast, Marcos’ “Build Better More” (BBM) initiative intends to build upon the projects initiated under Duterte while diversifying funding sources. Despite the numerous pledges made under Duterte’s administration, Dr Clemente pointed out that the anticipated number of completed projects fell short, with only a few, such as the Intramuros Bridge and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project (CRPIP), achieving full completion by the end of his term. Moreover, these projects faced public scrutiny and opposition, particularly the CRPIP and the ongoing Kaliwa Dam project, due to socio-economic concerns, including environmental impacts and the displacement of indigenous communities.
In terms of trade relations, Dr Clemente noted that China has consistently been the Philippines’ largest trading partner, a position it has maintained through both the Duterte and Marcos administrations. The structure of this trade relationship has not undergone significant changes, with dominant commodities remaining largely the same, including “electronics, minerals, and agricultural products”. Tourist arrivals from China peaked in 2019, exceeding 1.7 million visitors; however, Dr Clemente cautioned that “this figure needs qualification” as it occurred before the onset of the pandemic and still fell short compared to arrivals from other ASEAN nations. Additionally, the establishment of the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (Pogos) attracted a substantial influx of Chinese workers, initially seen as a potential catalyst for economic activity.
Dr Clemente noted that several challenges emerged regarding infrastructure projects in the Philippines, notably the slow disbursement of funds. While some may attribute the sluggish progress to “political factors”, she emphasised that it is essential to consider the role of “institutional capacity” in addressing these challenges. The experience during Duterte’s administration highlighted that, even in favourable economic conditions, translating opportunities into tangible outcomes remains a complex task. Another challenge relates to the quality of infrastructure projects. The preference for Chinese funding was often based on the assumption that such projects would be expedited. However, Dr Clemente questioned if “faster” merely denoted “efficiency” in processes, or “laxity” of essential protocols necessary for project implementation.
Under Duterte’s administration, Dr Clemente pointed out that there was a decline in strategic development considerations, as “warmer ties” contributed to a lack of urgency engage in market diversification and the cultivation of critical industries, such as minerals, to enhance the Philippines’ position in global value chains. Dr Clemente noted that restructuring supply chains is inherently challenging, and while tensions may not directly catalyse change, the current administration is now more actively exploring critical minerals development, such as nickel processing. These initiatives, which were largely sidelined during Duterte’s time, are being revisited, particularly in light of escalating tensions with China and potential security concerns.
Ms Hoang noted two different reactions to the escalating tensions in the South China Sea between the Philippines and China.
First, she explained that there is a “deep frustration” from the Philippines and its strategic partners, specifically the US, with what they perceive as “ASEAN’s lack of unity and collective resolve” in supporting the Philippines, a fellow ASEAN member state that is coming under intensifying Chinese coercion. From their perspective, “ASEAN’s inability to present a united front” with the Philippines reflects ASEAN “perennial weakness” in confronting China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Second, while ASEAN foreign ministers have issued a joint statement in December 2023 to reaffirm the usual principles of peaceful resolution of disputes and calling for self-restraint, she pointed out that the reaction from ASEAN and also its member states still remains “very largely muted”: no other member states has either openly sided with the Philippines or directly criticized the Philippines for standing up to China. Beneath this public silence, concerns have also been “simmering over the potential consequences” of these escalating tensions. Implicitly, there are questions about whether Manila may be risking too much in escalating the tensions with China for potentially “too limited gains”, and there is a fear that such a confrontational approach could backfire, escalating into an armed conflict which could put ASEAN in a very difficult position. At the same time, other Southeast Asian claimants states have taken a markedly different approach from the Philippines, one that still holds on to their territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea as allowed for under the UNCLOS, but tries to avoid taking a confrontational approach and not making the South China Sea issue the “sole determinant of their relationship with China”. For example, Vietnam, the country that has the most extensive disputes with China in the South China Sea, welcomed President Xi Jinping for a state visit in December 2023. Vietnam’s new party chief To Lam also made his maiden overseas trip to China in a state visit just a month prior. Similarly, Indonesia’s president-elect Prabowo chose China for his overseas visit in April this year. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has notably downplayed the disputes in the South China Sea with China many times in his public statements.
Ms Hoang stated that these responses have “undermined ASEAN’s credibility and strategic relevance” in the eyes of many, especially those from the US and the Philippines, in terms of its ability to manage the security flashpoints happening in its own region, and also its efficacy in moderating Chinese behavior. However, she pointed out that this is actually a “familiar reality” for long-time observers of ASEAN and the South China Sea issue. Particularly, ASEAN is not a “hard security organization” and it does not operate on the principle of collective security, with each member state retaining sovereignty over its foreign policy and security decisions. Ms Hoang caveated that this form of “decentralization or looseness”, ironically, is both a limitation but also a source of resilience for ASEAN. It further underscores the reality that ASEAN unity is not an “inherent fact but rather an ongoing work in progress” with varying degrees of achievement or underachievement depending on the issue at hand. Ms Hoang therefore emphasised that unity within ASEAN is “fluid and contingent” — it is more easily achieved on certain issues especially when it comes to development or economic cooperation where member states’ interests align, but it is “very much illusive” on sensitive security issues especially the South China Sea dispute. This is because, according to Ms Hoang, not only is there “no common threat perception of China among ASEAN members states”, but even when there exists certain shared perception among member states vis-a-vis China as a security challenge, there is still “no consensus on the best way to respond”. Notably, while the Philippines under the Marcos administration puts emphasis on deterrence and transparency, other member states strive to keep an “amicable diplomatic facade” to prioritise practical economic cooperation.
Ms Hoang noted that this does not suggest that ASEAN “lacks a shared foundation or reference framework” to build certain common position — strategic cohesion within ASEAN does exist, but only around “very broad principles and objectives”, such as preserving peace and preventing the outbreak of conflict, maintaining an open and inclusive regional architecture that welcomes the “involvement of all major powers for an equilibrium of balance of influence and power”, and promoting adherence to international law. But beyond these general principles, when confronted with specific challenges such as the ongoing tensions between China and the Philippines, the decisions are shaped by “individual interests and priorities of member states”, as well as the approaches preferred by the leadership of ASEAN countries. As an illustration, major leadership changes in Southeast Asian claimants sates — from Jokowi to Prabowo in Indonesia, from Nguyen Phu Trong to To Lam in Vietnam and from Mahathir to Anwar in Malaysia — all reflect a shared common trend: these leaders have made a deliberate choice to prioritize cooperation with China and set aside territorial and maritime disputes.
Ms Hoang noted that the rising tensions in the South China Sea have significantly affected the Code of Conduct (COC) process in two key ways. First, they dispel the Chinese narrative that the South China Sea was generally peaceful and stable, revealing instead the ongoing instability in the region. Second, the Philippines has adopted a firmer stance in the COC negotiations; however, Ms Hoang caveated that the core challenge lies in the fundamental disagreements between China and Southeast Asian littoral states regarding China’s so-called historic claims and its recent establishment of strategic baselines around disputed features, which clearly contravene UNCLOS. Another implication of these developments is the erosion of trust among Southeast Asians in China’s capacity to act as a “benevolent and responsible power”. Incidents involving Chinese sailors brandishing knives and axes, as well as Chinese vessels using water cannons against smaller Philippine ships, have severely undermined China’s efforts to portray itself as a peaceful actor committed to regional harmony. Lastly, escalating tensions between the Philippines in China has contributed to further fragmentation in the regional order, characterized by the ineffectiveness of ASEAN multilateral diplomacy in addressing regional flashpoints and an increasing reliance on deterrence-focused minilateral coalitions. Within ASEAN, the Philippines has emerged as a splintering party. In recent years, Manila has not only reinforced its alliance with the US but also actively participated in US-led minilateral initiatives involving other regional powers, particularly Japan and Australia.
The webinar was attended by an online audience of around 200 people and concluded with a Q&A session. Among the inquiries addressed were the utilisation of minilateralism in the Philippines to counter China’s aggression in the South China Sea, minilaterals’ economic dimensions beyond defense postures, the potential impact of the new US president on Philippines-China relations, and the “friend-shoring” of production bases from China to the Philippines.