# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EDITORIAL NOTES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>FIVE DECADES OF ASEAN’S EVOLUTION</td>
<td>Hoang Thi Ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DEFINING SOUTHEAST ASIA’S GEOPOLITICAL IDENTITY</td>
<td>Bilahari Kausikan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>THE FUTURE OF ASEAN</td>
<td>Tham Siew Yean, Cassey Lee, Sanjay C Kuttan, Tan See Seng, Ashvin Dayal, Michael Vatikiotis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>THE GENESIS OF ASEAN CENTRALITY</td>
<td>Termsak Chalermpalanupap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>ASEAN CENTRALITY 2.0: NO PICNIC OR TEA PARTY</td>
<td>Aileen Baviera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ASEAN IN FIGURES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>THOUGHTS FROM THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL</td>
<td>Ajit Singh, Rodolfo Severino, Ong Keng Yong, Surin Pitsuwan, Le Luong Minh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR ASEAN</td>
<td>Syed Hamid Albar, Delia Albert, Narongchai Akrasanee, Marty Natalegawa, Osman Patra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>ASEAN LEADERS CELEBRATE ASEAN50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>10 FACTS ABOUT ASEAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CHAMPIONS OF ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION</td>
<td>Nur Aziemah Aziz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>DIALOGUE PARTNERS SPEAK ...</td>
<td>Brendan Taylor, Marie-Louise Hannon, Xu Bu, Francisco Fontan Pardo, Shivshankar Menon, Hitoshi Tanaka, Lee Jaehyon, Stephanie Lee, Victor Sumsky, Daniel Shields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>A MAP OF ASEAN’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) is an autonomous organisation established in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute's research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) and Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre (NSC) and the Singapore APEC Study Centre.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has come a long way since its establishment way back in 1967. During the past fifty years, it has weathered the “hot” conflicts of the Cold War, domestic strife and turmoil in almost all of its Member States, economic recessions and resurgences as well as headwinds from beyond the region to become a credible regional organisation for Southeast Asia, and one of the more successful ventures of regionalism in today’s turbulent world. Even as it bats criticisms from near and far as ineffectual and elitist, ASEAN has managed, to some extent, to wiggle past the obstacles placed by domestic pressures to stand up for a more integrated region free from undue foreign interference. Because of this, ASEAN stands tall among its counterparts of regional organisations in other parts of the world.

The ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute has had a busy year organising a slew of events in commemoration of ASEAN’s 50th anniversary. To celebrate this golden jubilee, we are also releasing this Special Issue of ASEANFocus to not only look back at the past fifty years, but to also start a discussion on what’s next for ASEAN. As we face a future even more uncertain than before, and confront new and unconventional challenges such as climate change as well as fundamentalist and protectionist sentiments, whether ASEAN can continue to persist in the next decades will depend on our creativity and courage to think of new ideas and solutions for a better ASEAN.

In this issue, we have assembled a gathering of luminaries to share their thoughts on ASEAN as it crosses the threshold of its golden jubilee. We begin with overviews of ASEAN’s journey over the past five decades as well as the evolving geopolitics of Southeast Asia. We then feature six short thought pieces on issues ranging from trade and e-commerce to climate change, human rights and energy for “The Future of ASEAN” segment, as well as a discussion on the concept of ASEAN centrality by two eminent scholars.

We are also honoured to present the views of three groups of eminent personalities who have been instrumental to ASEAN’s journey. The first is ASEAN’s Secretaries-General – men who have been in the thick of the action leading the organisation in the various stages of its history. The second is a collection of former ministers and senior policymakers from across the region who have interacted with ASEAN and their regional counterparts at some point in their illustrious careers. Last but not least, some of the foremost thinkers and practitioners from ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners share with us their thoughts on what ASEAN means to their respective countries’ relations with Asia and the world.

We have also compiled an assortment of facts, figures and infographics on ASEAN then and now, and a feature on some of ASEAN’s corporate titans. We hope that this Special Issue of ASEANFocus commemorating ASEAN’s 50th anniversary would be a good compendium on the regional organisation for people in Southeast Asia and beyond.

From everyone at the ASEAN Studies Centre, we wish ASEAN many happy returns as it continues the work of not only advancing the region’s interests in an everchanging geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, but also imbibing a true ASEAN Community spirit among its more than 640 million inhabitants.
ASEAN has come a long way since its founders signed the Bangkok Declaration half a century ago. Like any organic body, it has evolved and adapted to stay alive and relevant. The following is a broad stroke of key transformations over the past five decades that help define ASEAN today.

ENLARGEMENT

ASEAN started as a sub-regional grouping among non-communist states, but its evolution has been driven more by pragmatism than ideology. The Bangkok Declaration confirmed just that by opening membership to all Southeast Asian states subscribing to ASEAN’s purposes and principles. ASEAN nevertheless had to wait until the end of the Cold War to complete its Southeast Asian footprint, starting with Vietnam’s admission in 1995, then Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

Enlargement is perhaps the most consequential evolution of ASEAN, linking mainland to maritime Southeast Asia, overcoming the ideological fault-lines and connecting diverse political, economic, cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds in between. This process also consolidated the coming together of Southeast Asia as a nascent region, giving ASEAN countries a physical space and a sense of region-ness distinct from their two towering neighbours and civilisations – China and India.

Enlargement helped ASEAN unpack its historical baggage, and at the same time cast the ‘burden of diversity’ upon the now bigger but less compact organisation. Consensus building, which never came easy among the ASEAN-5, has gotten even more daunting within ASEAN-10.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

ASEAN’s embrace of deeper economic integration in the early 1990s was another important paradigm shift of the grouping. The forces for globalisation unleashed by the end of the Cold War brought together hitherto different economic orientations and development patterns under the unifying banner of market-driven and export-oriented economy. Economic
cooperation injected a new sense of purpose for ASEAN, as manifest in the famous phrase of “Turning Indochina from battlefields to marketplaces” by then Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan.

This paved the way for the conclusion of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1992 aimed at eliminating all tariff lines in intra-regional trade. AFTA today may appear modest in scale and substance, but from a historical perspective, it was a very crucial step in re-inventing ASEAN with economic integration to sustain its relevance. AFTA and subsequent ASEAN economic projects provided the building blocks for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) launched in 2015. Still a work in progress, the AEC will very much define the success and sustainability of ASEAN in the future.

INSULATION TO ENGAGEMENT

The early decades of ASEAN saw the pursuit of regional autonomy by Indonesia and Malaysia, largely driven by their nationalism and suspicions of big power machinations. This quest for “regional solutions to regional problems” culminated in the signing of the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ZOPFAN however still remains an aspiration rather than a reality. This is not only because all the ASEAN-5 states, except for Indonesia, had some form of formal security cooperation or alliance with one or another external power. Fundamentally, Southeast Asia is at the crossroads of strategic interests of major powers. This is both a geographic and historical reality, and any attempt to break free from it would be illusionary.

After the ineffectual experiment of ZOPFAN, the 1990s saw ASEAN transition from insulation to inclusiveness in its regional security outlook. From a prevailing mindset of regional autonomy to stay away from the Cold War entanglements, ASEAN is proactively engaging all major powers to promote an open and inclusive regional architecture in which ASEAN serves as the hub. The notion of ASEAN centrality is most manifest in the fact that it is the architect of various regional frameworks including the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus, ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit. The conundrum of engagement that ASEAN must tackle now is how to enmesh big powers with regional conventions and frameworks while at the same time guarding against entanglement in their unfolding power rivalries.

GOING RULES-BASED

Although ASEAN is traditionally known for its preference for informal arrangements, the organisation has become more rules-based and institutionalised over the years. This is a natural and gradual evolution in response to integration and community building needs, and a result of growing levels of comfort, trust and political maturity among ASEAN member countries. The drive to strengthen ASEAN institutions has gathered pace especially after the advent of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 which codifies a legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.

From a minimal structure centred around the annual meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers in its early years, ASEAN now encompasses hundreds of sectoral and coordination mechanisms across various political security and socio-economic areas. ASEAN has also become more rules-based with the number of ASEAN legal instruments, both in force and waiting for entry into force, increasing from 32 by 1990 to 179 in 2017.

PEOPLE-CENTRED?

This comes with a question mark since much remains more in rhetoric than reality. ASEAN by nature is intergovernmental, and is often complained as being ‘elitist’ and ‘out of touch’ with ordinary people. Over the past decade, ASEAN has been trying to connect to the grassroots through consultation and engagement with many stakeholders, especially the business people and civil society, to get their views and feedbacks in making regional policy. However, many such consultations still focus more on form than substance, especially at the Summit level.

Despite many limitations and constraints, ASEAN cooperation projects are increasingly geared towards bringing more benefits to the people. These range from simple but visible ASEAN lanes at international airports of member states to more substantive initiatives like the ASEAN Single Window or ASEAN Open Skies for freer flow of goods, services and people in the region.

After the Brexit that shook the European Union to its core last year, much has been said about the lesson learned for ASEAN that regional building projects must enjoy broad public support to sustain its endurance. But that lesson had been presciently coined four decades ago by then Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn: “ASEAN is more than the sum total of governmental and bureaucratic interaction. It is ultimately all of the peoples in all of the countries.” What is needed now is a sense of urgency and a culture of implementation to translate that aspiration into reality.

Ms. Hoang Thi Ha is Lead Researcher II (Political and Security Affairs) at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
Defining Southeast Asia’s Geopolitical Identity

BILAHARI KAUSIKAN examines Southeast Asia’s dynamic history of nation- and region-building to gauge its geopolitical future.

In the face of the unfolding major power rivalries, ASEAN is often called upon to exercise neutrality or ‘not taking sides’. But ‘not taking sides’ oversimplifies the core issue: what is Southeast Asia and who defines Southeast Asia? These are no longer simple questions susceptible to simple answers. During the colonial period, through the Second World War and during much of the Cold War, ‘Southeast Asia’ was defined almost solely in accordance with the competitive interests of external powers. Indeed, the component polities had no or only a weak sense of ‘region’ or of ‘state’. The formation of ASEAN was the first serious attempt by the newly independent states to define the region in terms of their own national interests, which necessarily meant simultaneously defining themselves as states.

ASEAN did not end major power competition, but it did add another layer of complexity to the pattern of external and regional relationships. For external powers, it could no longer be just a matter of imposing a definition on the region, but a more complicated attempt to capture and harness the emerging region’s own dynamics to their ends. This is a fundamental change. Moreover the target was moving. The meaning of ASEAN has evolved over the last fifty years and will continue to evolve, driven by the agency of its members. Nor did ASEAN supersede the continuing efforts of its members to define their own national identities and hence interests. Singapore’s first Foreign Minister, S Rajaratnam, drew attention to these realities when he pointed out that regional interests must form a part of the definition of national interests.

What Mr. Rajaratnam did not explicitly say, perhaps because he took it for granted or thought it politic to leave it implicit, was that the relationship between these various elements is in continual flux. Identities are never stable; neither are they uni-dimensional. ‘Nation-building’ and ‘region-building’ are processes with no end which act and react on each other in complex and continually shifting dynamics. Internal and external ‘patron’ and ‘client’ relationships are only one element of this dynamic. And it remains a contested element both internally and externally, by the would-be ‘patrons’ among themselves as well as by those that they seek to make their ‘clients’.

At present, Cambodia is the only one ASEAN member state that seems willing to embrace an almost unqualified subordinate role. As it is the most personalised polity, generational change will almost certainly see the emergence of a different definition of Cambodian identity and hence of Cambodian interests. The diversity of the region and the complexity of the interplay between national and regional interests, and between regional and external actors, continually frustrate attempts by external powers to impose a simple pattern, and have done so throughout the region’s history. In the latest phase of this process which began circa 2010, neither China nor the US has been able to shape Southeast Asia entirely in accordance with their will.

In the end, Southeast Asia may be defined by the ebb and flow of these processes, rather than a single static outcome. What is crucial is to avoid a fatalistic frame of mind – the dynamics of these processes are as much psychological as material – and to understand that we are never entirely without agency. Certainly, regionally as well as nationally, identity will not be defined by just laying low and hoping for the best. We must not lose faith in ourselves.

Mr. Bilahari Kausikan was former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore.
ASEAN is blessed with an abundance of natural resources, a dynamic population and political stability that provided the backdrop for its phenomenal economic growth. This grouping of ten countries is already the world’s sixth largest economic entity, and is poised to climb up three more notches by 2050. Success is not guaranteed, and ASEAN faces a promising but challenging future ahead. In this section, we have assembled experts from their respective fields to discuss the challenges and opportunities that ASEAN will have to grapple with in the future. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the issues ASEAN faces as a region, but it reflects the increasingly diverse range of concerns which will determine policymaking, economics and societies across the region in the long run.
Low Numbers Belie Strength in Intra-ASEAN Trade Intensity

**THAM SIEW YEAN** explains that the ASEAN’s stagnating share of intra-ASEAN trade does not tell the full story of the ASEAN Economic Community.

Since 2007, the share of intra-ASEAN trade has plateaued at around 24% of total trade. Some view this as a sign of weak integration, especially in comparison with the extensive intra-regional trade achieved by the European Union (EU) or the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Others consider this as a sign of stagnation in the economic integration process despite the formal establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at the end of 2015.

The comparison with the EU and NAFTA is unwarranted since ASEAN does not aspire to be integrated in the same fashion. For example, ASEAN has no aspirations to become a customs union. Furthermore, ASEAN explicitly recognises the importance of extra-ASEAN economic linkages by including outward orientation and working with external partners in the AEC 2020 and AEC 2025 visions. Extra-ASEAN trade will therefore continue to play an important role in the AEC.

Moreover, alternative indicators such as the trade intensity index (TII) show that trade flows between countries in the region are larger than expected, given ASEAN’s share in world trade. Studies have shown that the trade intensity index for ASEAN since 1993 is higher than that for EU and NAFTA for data available up to 2014. According to Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), ASEAN’s 2014 intra-regional TII stood at 3.54, which was higher than the EU’s (2.04). This index shows that the region’s trade is more oriented towards each other than to the rest of the world, which is not surprising given the pervasiveness of regional production networks and parts and components trade that criss-cross the region.

However, the trade intensity index has fallen since its peak in 2007, which was also the peak for the share of intra-regional trade, thus far. This can be attributed to global conditions external to ASEAN as well as internal conditions within ASEAN. Globally, trade growth has fallen due to sluggish recovery in the demand in the more developed economies after the global financial crisis. It can also be attributed to the moderation in China’s growth and a generally slower pace of expansion in global and regional value chains. In fact, world trade volume appears to have plateaued around 2015 corresponding with a rise in global protectionist attitudes.

Increasing protectionism in the form of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) is also affecting ASEAN’s internal and external trade as earlier improvements in intra-ASEAN trade and trade intensity are mainly due to falling tariffs.

In addition, the slow pace of integration within ASEAN has also contributed to the current state of intra-regional trade. For example, ASEAN has targeted to remove NTBs in the AEC 2015 Blueprint, but has yet to achieve this goal. In fact, as the global environment shifts towards beggar-thy-neighbour policies, implementing the agreed goals for integrating within as stated in the AEC 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan has become even more important, lest the share of intra-regional trade starts to fall, instead of increasing. ASEAN must work harder on internal economic integration to counter increasing hostilities in global commerce. It is indeed a case of ‘together we rise, divided we fall.’

**Dr. Tham Siew Yeun** is Senior Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, on behalf of ASEAN, convenes the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM 1) in Bogor to mediate a settlement for the Cambodian conflict.</td>
<td>JIM 2 in Jakarta agrees on a framework for the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Vietnam agrees to complete its military withdrawal from Cambodia by 30 September 1989.</td>
<td>ASEAN accords Sectoral Dialogue Partner status to the Republic of Korea (RoK) which later becomes a full Dialogue Partner in July 1991.</td>
<td>The Soviet Union announces its military withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ASEAN economic cooperation, for a long time, meant reductions in trade and non-trade barriers (NTBs). Achievements in the former have been noteworthy – about 99% of intra-ASEAN import duties have been eliminated. Efforts are now focused on reducing NTBs and trade facilitation. Aside from these “traditional” topics, e-commerce has become an increasingly important area of economic cooperation for ASEAN countries. ASEAN-level initiatives to develop e-commerce is scattered across a number of blueprints and strategic plans.

In the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint for 2008-2015, early efforts were focused on the implementation and harmonisation of e-commerce related laws. The next phase of regional cooperation, as documented in the Consolidated Strategic Action Plan for AEC 2025, puts emphasis on deeper harmonisation of e-commerce laws in consumer protection, cyber security, dispute resolution and personal data protection. Running parallel to these initiatives is the ASEAN ICT Masterplan 2020 which will, if implemented effectively, strengthen the ICT ecosystem for e-commerce.

These ASEAN medium-term initiatives to develop e-commerce are clearly on the right track but many ASEAN countries are likely to move ahead faster. After all, e-commerce in Southeast Asia is forecasted to grow very fast – 32% annually (CAGR) over the next ten years according to recent estimates by Temasek and Google. The pace has picked up this year with large investment inflows from a number of e-commerce giants based in China and the United States. These include Alibaba’s additional investment of US$1 billion in Lazada, the launch of Amazon Prime in Singapore, Expedia’s US$350 million investment in Traveloka, Tencent’s US$100 million investment in Go-Jek and Alibaba’s US$1.1 billion investment in Tokopedia. Governments have also initiated direct link-ups with e-commerce giants as exemplified by the Malaysian government’s collaboration in the country’s Digital Free Trade Zone.

These investments are clear indications that foreign investments in the region are moving ahead quickly and not waiting for regional e-commerce laws to be harmonised. Due to different regulations, infrastructure and logistics quality, language and market size, the e-commerce strategies of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) are more based on country-driven markets for now. However, these are likely to morph into sub-regional market strategies in the future that focus on key countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. These countries have the greatest market potential in the region based on both internet and broadband mobile penetration, transport and logistics quality, income per capita, and demographics (population size and age profile). The future growth of e-commerce in these countries will also be dependent on the regulatory and policy responses of the government.

On the other hand, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos appear to lag behind due to poor ICT infrastructure and accessibility, with internet penetration rates hovering around 20% compared to over 80% in Singapore or 71% in Malaysia. Given the diversity amongst ASEAN countries in all of the above dimensions, the growth of e-commerce is likely to be very uneven across the region. There is a real possibility that a new developmental gap will emerge amongst ASEAN countries in terms of e-commerce growth and development. Thus, ASEAN countries need to begin discussing the new digital divide in e-commerce soon after the ink on proposals on implementation and harmonisation of e-commerce laws has just dried.

**Dr. Cassey Lee** is Senior Fellow and Co-Coordinator of the Regional Economic Studies Programme at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
Despite all the good intentions and “green proclamations”, the energy transition of ASEAN countries from conventional sources to renewables will not be easy in this highly heterogeneous region.

First of all, there are barriers in the availability and distribution of sustainable energy resources. Geothermal power in Indonesia and the Philippines is abundant, but requires a long lead time of around 15-20 years to develop and harness. Some coastlines and areas of Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Myanmar will be developed to exploit wind energy, but its share of the total mix will be modest given the region’s proximity to the Equator. Solar power is easily deployable and has decent irradiance, but the high cloud level and the resulting intermittency pose technical challenges albeit surmountable.

The availability of sustainable energy resources is not comprehensively mapped across the region. Some are available far from major load centres, therefore increasing the transmission and distribution cost of renewable energy. There are also encumbrances in leveraging current infrastructure to facilitate the proliferation of renewable energy resources. The aging or over-burdened power infrastructure in some regional countries needs system upgrades, including grid codes and inter-operability guidelines, to facilitate the integration of intermittent renewable resources.

Nuclear power will not feature soon in ASEAN’s energy mix for at least the next 20 years given its high costs and safety concerns. Vietnam, once the region’s pioneer, last year abandoned its plan to build nuclear power plants for exactly the same reasons. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have been studying nuclear energy as a possible solution to their energy security but no final decision has been made. The Fukushima accident and Vietnam’s reversal may have prompted these countries to re-think or shelve their nuclear energy programme to a much later date.

Then comes domestic political dynamics. The pressure from incumbent conventional energy suppliers to maintain the status quo is strong since significant capital investment has been committed to build infrastructure for the exploration, production and transportation of conventional energy resources. Furthermore, the electricity generation industry is generally buffeted by heavy subsidies, keeping the price of electricity unnaturally low and creating an inequitable playing field for the development of alternative sustainable energy. Pragmatic energy policies, environmental emission and pollution limits are hamstrung by these pressures.

ASEAN has set the target of securing 23% of its primary energy from renewable sources by 2025, which requires an astonishing two-and-a-half-fold increase in the renewable energy share compared to 2014. At the same time, power generation will double by 2025, and overall energy demand will grow by almost 50%. ASEAN can only potentially meet this target in 2040.

Meanwhile, coal continues to figure importantly in ASEAN’s energy mix over the coming decades. The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts coal to overtake gas as the primary fuel to supply electricity by 2020, with its share in electricity generation increasing from 32% now to 50% in 2040. Since coal is not to be phased out anytime soon, low-emission coal offers the way forward to address the dual needs of economic development and environmental sustainability. Coal and Clean Coal Technology therefore is a key strategic priority in the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2016-2025.

Getting the “right mix” of various energy sources will be critical to meet ASEAN’s growing thirst for energy. Towards this end, the challenge is how to balance the short-term socio-political pressures versus the long-term impacts on the environment, including on food, water and health security of the people in the region.

Dr. Sanjay C. Kuttan is Programme Director at the Energy Research Institute @ NTU (ERI@N), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
The paradox facing ASEAN today is that the consensus norm that has contributed to its success as a regional institution has become a problem. This, if unattended to, could lead the institution towards irrelevance. Nowhere is this more evident than the weak and ineffectual decisions undertaken hitherto by ASEAN vis-à-vis the South China Sea (SCS).

A growing number of observers have proposed that in order to advance intra-regional security cooperation, ASEAN should consider applying its “ASEAN minus X” principle, which enables economic liberalisation between two or more ASEAN states so long as the remaining member countries agree to come on board at a later stage. This has already happened. In 2011, the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, established in 2007, entered into force upon ratification by just six member countries even though it was fully ratified only in 2013.

However, as ASEAN’s failure to issue a communiqué in July 2012 in Phnom Penh showed, achieving a full consensus on the SCS is a different proposition altogether, not least because of China’s manifest influence over some ASEAN members. Previous applications of “ASEAN minus X” had been done in a highly ad hoc and flexible way until its formal inclusion in the Charter. This codification risks transforming “ASEAN minus X” into a rigid principle based on unanimity rather than flexibility.

One plausible way out of the consensus conundrum is for like-minded ASEAN states to collectively promote and pursue security cooperation on a “minilateral” basis (i.e. issue-based collaboration among subgroups of larger multilateral actors), without the backing of a formal ASEAN consensus. There have been a number of historical precedents. Since 1976, several ASEAN countries have maintained bilateral border security agreements and intelligence exchanges with one another. In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore formed Operation MALSINDO, comprising trilateral maritime patrols by their respective navies – with each navy restricted to patrolling its own territorial waters – to interdict piracy and smuggling in the Malacca Straits. An air element, the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative, was included in 2005. Thailand joined the enterprise in 2008, whereupon MALSINDO became renamed as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols. Furthermore, in June 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines launched the Tri-lateral Maritime Patrol (INDOMALPHI), which involves trilateral patrols in the Sulu-Sulawesi seas, long a hub for transnational organised crime and militancy.

Diplomatically and functionally, minilateral maritime security collaboration on the SCS makes good sense, given the shared security concerns among the littoral countries. Crucially, such cooperation is not intended to replace existing ASEAN-based initiatives, but to complement them. For example, like-minded states could develop maritime safety initiatives among themselves that leverage on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and, in time to come, the Code of Conduct jointly agreed to by China and ASEAN. They could go further than the China-ASEAN CUES by including in their initiative the participation of non-naval vessels such as coast guard boats and fishing trawlers.

As Ghazalie Shafie, the former foreign minister of Malaysia, once observed in the ASEAN context, “The limitation of regional cooperation within a formal framework should not prevent countries of the region from trying to forge the closest possible links on a bilateral basis with one another”. At a time when consensus has become more of a bane than boon for ASEAN, the same logic can and should be applied to intra-ASEAN minilateral collaboration or the prospect for such. ASEAN needs it.

Minilateralism: A Way out of ASEAN’s Consensus Conundrum?

TAN SEE SENG looks beyond the constraint of consensus to advance ASEAN security cooperation.

Dr. Tan See Seng is Professor of International Relations and Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Cambodia obtains Observer status at the 28th AMM in Bandar Seri Begawan. Cambodia and Myanmar accede to the TAC.

1995 NOVEMBER

The ASEAN University Network is established with the signing of the Charter of the ASEAN University Network (AUN).

1995 DECEMBER


ASEAN inks the Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) to eliminate restrictions in services, enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN services suppliers and support their effective operations across borders.
Southeast Asia, with its 81,000 miles of low-lying coastline, is arguably the region most exposed to increasingly frequent and intense weather events, posing very real risks to food production, energy security, natural ecosystems and population balance. With climate change threatening to undermine economic growth and even reverse development gains earned over many decades, ASEAN countries must commit to making this a central focus in national-level policymaking.

Shoring up our infrastructure and other vital systems against extreme climate events is key to sustaining the region’s remarkable growth. One only needs to look at the estimated US$45 billion in economic losses during the 2011 Thailand floods, or how the series of super typhoons that barrelled the Philippines that same year cost the country 2% of its GDP, to see how climate change can cripple economies.

The Asian Development Bank highlighted that the region’s urban centres are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. With 60% of the region’s population expected to live in cities by 2050, ASEAN will only be able to weather a less hospitable climate in the next two decades if national governments provide the right policy and financial support to ensure their cities can not only protect, but also enable their growing populations to thrive. And increasingly this will also be good economic policy. Investing in resilience yields quantifiable dividends, according to a model developed by the RAND Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Encouragingly, while cities represent the greatest concentrations of risk, they are also at the forefront of innovating to be more resilient in the future. In the coastal city of Da Nang, Vietnam, almost 300 homes upgraded to be storm- and flood-resilient in a project supported by the Rockefeller Foundation sat alongside many more when Typhoon Nari hit in 2013. Thousands of homes that had not been upgraded suffered significant damage, while those built to withstand Nari’s ferocity remained undamaged. Expanding that project to a nationwide effort across Vietnam’s extensive vulnerable coastline could have monumental effects in saving lives, preserving infrastructure, and enabling quicker recoveries.

Although we cannot prevent severe climate events from occurring, we can assess and take concrete action to be better prepared. Facing up to the perils of climate change today will help us minimise damage in the future, but it can also be a precious opportunity for ASEAN member states to plan more resilient and sustainable cities, meeting the highest standards in infrastructure, connectivity and green living. In Southeast Asia, a network of cities has banded together under the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) and 100 Resilient Cities, both pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation, sharing learnings and expertise as they build a more resilient urban future. Deepening this collaboration and institutionalising these city innovations into national planning will be critical if ASEAN is to sustain positive economic momentum for its next 50 years.

Ashvin Dayal is the Associate Vice President and Managing Director (Asia) of The Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. Ashvin Dayal posits that planning and preparation are key to managing and overcoming downside risks of extreme climate change.

The Basic Agreement on the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO) is signed.

China and Russia become Dialogue Partners of ASEAN.

The Asian Financial Crisis wreaks havoc on regional economies and ASEAN’s credibility. Laos and Myanmar join ASEAN, a day before the 30th AMM in Subang Jaya, Malaysia.
ASEAN Needs to Embrace Human Rights

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS discusses the importance of protecting the human rights of ASEAN’s citizens.

On paper, ASEAN formally embraces the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 2009, ASEAN established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Article 10 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, framed in 2012, recognises all the civil and political rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

But in reality, ASEAN Member States, especially in recent times, have demonstrated a poor understanding and respect for human rights. Even at the time of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, there were concerns over the insertion of a clause that indicates that rights must be considered in light of “regional and national contexts.” According to Amnesty International, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) “is constricted by rules requiring consensus for any decision it makes, which has had a paralysing effect on its actions.”

It is important, however, for ASEAN not to lose sight of the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, which in its preamble declares respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. One key reason for this is that for ASEAN to continue to serve as the cornerstone of regional socio-economic cooperation and security, there must be a framework of norms and values to which member states are expected to adhere.

This is not only to protect political rights and freedoms, but just as importantly to ensure basic social standards. ASEAN citizens increasingly enjoy mobility – both in terms of what goods and services they can acquire, and where they can move to. This raises the demand for basic standards, in terms of quality, safety and the assurance of transactions. Ensuring that these standards are provided and enforced is also a basic right.

For member states, the provision of social and economic rights can be seen as a measure of insurance against instability, as citizens will be less likely to rock the boat and protest if their rights are respected. The problem today is that many people living in the region are facing a choice between basic rights and freedoms and security.

Growing insecurity in society stemming from economic uncertainty and income inequality has fuelled the rise of divisive identity politics that is sowing fear of unrest. As a result, Muslim Indonesians have demonstrated a tendency to support applying Islamic Shariah law, which erodes basic human rights. Neo-authoritarian populist leaders like Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines have used strongman tactics such as extra-judicial killings and martial law, which garners popularity because it provides basic security. On 12 September, the Philippine House of Representatives voted 119 to 32 in favour of a motion to allocate 1,000 peso (equivalent to less than US$20) to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for 2018. What message does this say of ASEAN’s commitment to human rights when the ASEAN Chair and a founding member seeks to effectively abolish the Commission?

Geopolitical trends would suggest the need for ASEAN to re-examine the need to reinforce human rights. The rise of China has started to impinge on the internal affairs of many countries in the region. Indonesia and Thailand have both been at the sharp end of Chinese extradition demands that indicate a broad definition of extra-territoriality for people of Chinese descent, though not necessarily Chinese citizens. Chinese security has also started to intrude in mainland Southeast Asia along the Mekong River.

If these trends develop, ASEAN could well find itself needing to refer to elements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a means of defending sovereignty, not just the rights of its people.

Human rights is a litmus test of ASEAN’s declared goal of creating a rules-based community of shared values and norms. The gains of community-building would be futile if ASEAN fails to provide fundamental safeguards and protection for its peoples.

Dr. Michael Vatikiotis is Asia Regional Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) and author of Blood and Silk: Power and Conflict in Modern Southeast Asia (2017).
The Genesis of ASEAN Centrality

TERMSAK CHALERMPALANUPAP examines how the concept of ASEAN centrality came about.

Centrality is one of ASEAN’s most important organising principles, and paradoxically, it is also one of the least understood. As seen from within the region, centrality calls for ASEAN to uphold its relevance in the wider East Asia region and for its member states to prioritise ASEAN in fulfilling all of its regional commitments. External partners would affirm ASEAN centrality in recognition of ASEAN’s function as the primary driving force for peace, security and prosperity in Southeast Asia.

While the origin of ASEAN centrality remains unclear, its genesis was heavily influenced by three seminal events in the first decade of the new millennium.

In the first instance, ASEAN’s pride in inaugurating the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 was clouded with a sense of foreboding that ASEAN may lose control of this leaders-led strategic forum to external parties which are economically stronger and harbours bigger political ambitions.

The second wake-up call came from Australia Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s grand idea of a new Asia-Pacific Community (APC) in June 2008 with Australia as the central organizer but without recognising ASEAN. In the APC formulation, ASEAN member states would have lost their collective voice and identity as membership in the new entity was organised on an individual basis.

Soon afterwards the leaders of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held the Trilateral Summit in Fukuoka, Japan in December 2008. This development was worrisome for ASEAN as it could realign the attention of three of ASEAN’s closest Dialogue Partners from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, while probably undermining the prospects for future ASEAN Plus Three cooperation.

Fortunately, ASEAN’s concerns passed without much cause. The fear of China’s dominance in the EAS was rendered moot when Russia and the US joined the fold in 2011. The EAS became too large for any single external power to dominate.

The APC proposal fizzled out, proving that the “convening power” is not an attribute that can easily be acquired by any upstart. The trilateral cooperation failed to gain significant traction due to power politics and historical hang-ups. ASEAN was safe but not out of the woods yet. Centrality was a direct response to these perceived challenges.

The earliest formal articulation of “ASEAN centrality” was found in the Joint Communique of the 39th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) issued on 25th July 2006, where the Foreign Ministers “reiterated the importance of maintaining ASEAN centrality in the context of ASEAN related regional architectures to support the attainment of the objectives of the establishment of the ASEAN Community…”

In retrospect, ASEAN centrality’s lineage could be traced to the Chairman’s Statement of the 2nd ASEAN Regional Forum issued on 1 August 1995, which stated that “a successful ARF requires the active, full and equal participation and cooperation of all participants. However, ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force.” The idea of ASEAN being in the driver’s seat was inscribed in the Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting circulated on 9 May 2006.

Although ASEAN continues to face sceptics who paint centrality as an empty vessel, the regional organisation has maintained a successful track record in holding onto its “convening power” to manage regional processes for dialogue and cooperation. It is immaterial if centrality is achieved by default as the only party acceptable by all other middle and major powers in the region. It only matters that ASEAN remains relevant and has some influence over its future by exercising its centrality in four major aspects: membership criteria and selection of participants, modality, agenda setting, and outcome documents.

Dr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Lead Researcher I (Political-Security Affairs) at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Mr. Zul Hazmi Nordin who recently completed his internship at ASC provided research assistance for this article.
As ASEAN commemorates its 50th anniversary, the grouping finds its centrality in regional affairs being severely tested. For over two decades since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN’s norms, consultative and cooperative approach, and neutral and non-threatening posture, allowed it to play a constructive role as a convener of regional security dialogues. It presided over a collective search for mutual assurances, where countries were able to sow the seeds of multilateral cooperative security arrangements. However, the rise of new powers – eventually prone to muscle-flexing – and the perception of relative decline of established powers led to a resurgence of geostrategic competition which threatened to sideline ASEAN.

Apart from changes in its environment, ASEAN centrality has also been weakened by internal division and the lack of a common strategic vision for the broader region among its members. For ASEAN to reclaim centrality, it must reinvent itself and begin by putting its own house in order. There are five requisites that ASEAN must achieve on the road to Centrality 2.0.

First, ASEAN member states must muster their collective and individual political will to place ASEAN back at the front and center of order-building efforts. This is easier said than done, with the ruling elite in most ASEAN countries preoccupied with domestic priorities. However, failure to manage difficult power transitions on the larger Asia-Pacific stage can threaten ASEAN’s hard-won peace and prosperity. ASEAN needs to act and moreover share this responsibility with other moderate middle powers who have as much to lose should major power conflicts erupt in the region.

Second, ASEAN must continue to exercise and assert its autonomy, and it can only do so by not allowing one or the other major power from undermining its unity or controlling the group from within. Neither should ASEAN or its member states fall for competing enticements by contending powers (in the form of economic and military assistance) that might turn the region once again into an arena for bipolar conflict.

Third, ASEAN must work for and deserve recognition by others of its centrality. Indeed, post-Cold War ASEAN centrality arguably arose because a leadership role by any major power was deemed unacceptable to other major powers. ASEAN Centrality 2.0 must mean more than that. It must be an embrace of the norms and principles of multilateralism, non-confrontation, and reliance on consultative and cooperative approaches, not only because they are “good” but because ASEAN can prove them more effective than the alternatives.

Fourth, ASEAN has proven capability in the management of meetings and agreements; now it must show itself capable in quick response decision-making and in the implementation of commitments and targeted action plans to move security cooperation forward. Among the biggest challenges to ASEAN centrality is a credibility deficit, which may be addressed at the institutional level by capability building efforts.

Finally, and this is the rub: ASEAN needs to develop basic foreign policy consensus among its member states, particularly on issues where the region’s “core interests” lie such as the need for an equilibrium among the major powers, or how to best manage maritime disputes in the South China Sea. For without this basic agreement, what is the point of centrality?

In the building of a new regional order, ASEAN faces inevitable marginalisation if it maintains a “business as usual” approach. Without putting its own house in order, ASEAN will have a hard time asserting centrality in an increasingly fluid strategic environment.

Dr. Aileen S. P. Baviera is Professor of Asian Studies at The University of the Philippines, Diliman and Editor-in-Chief, Asian Politics & Policy.
ASEAN: Then and Now

3.4X ASEAN’s total population in 2016 is 634 million, which is 3.4 times bigger than the combined population of the original five ASEAN members in 1967.

+15 Life expectancy in ASEAN increased by 15 years from 56 years in 1967 to 71 years in 2016.


33X The GDP per capita in ASEAN in 2016 is US$4,021, a 33-fold increase from US$122 in 1967.

228X ASEAN’s total trade with each other and with the rest of the world increased 228 times from US$9,707 million in 1967 to US$2,218,534 million in 2016.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The share of ASEAN population living below their national poverty lines dropped from 31% in 1990 to 14% in 2015.

Almost three-quarters of ASEAN population lived in rural areas in 1967, whereas 49% now live in urban areas in 2016.

The infant mortality rate in ASEAN dropped from 57 per 1000 live births in 1990 to 20 per 1000 live births in 2015.

Life expectancy in ASEAN increased by 15 years from 56 years in 1967 to 71 years in 2016.

The percentage of underweight children under 5 years in ASEAN halved from 36% in 1990 to 18% in 2015.

81% of the ASEAN population have access to improved drinking water whereas only 56% did so in 1990.

The incidence of malaria in ASEAN decreased from 745 per 100,000 population in 1990 to only 90 per 100,000 population in 2015. Brunei and Singapore were almost malaria-free during 1990-2015.

ASEAN’s tertiary education enrolment rate almost doubled from 18.2% in 1999 to 36.1% in 2016.
ASEAN’s combined GDP has quadrupled from 1999 to reach US$2.55 trillion in 2016, becoming the 3rd largest in Asia and the 6th largest economy in the world.

ASEAN’s GDP accounted for 6.2% of the world’s GDP in terms of purchasing power parity in 2016, almost doubling its share in 1967 at 3.2%.

FDI flows into ASEAN grew from US$27 trillion in 1999 to US$96 trillion in 2016. Intra-ASEAN FDI accounts for 25% of the total FDI to ASEAN in 2016.

The combined share of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam in ASEAN’s total GDP rose from 8% in the late 1990s to 12% in 2016.

The percentage of Internet users in ASEAN increased from 4% in 2005 to 26% in 2015.

ASEAN’s exports and imports of goods increased by 220% and 270% respectively from 1999 to 2016, reaching the total trade value of US$2.1 trillion.

Intra-ASEAN trade forms the largest proportion of ASEAN’s total trade, accounting for 25% of total exports and 22% of total imports in 2016.

ASEAN’s share of global exports almost quadrupled from 2% to 7.2% and its share of global imports almost tripled from 2.3% to 6.6% from 1967 to 2015.

The number of international visitor arrivals tripled from 30 million in 1995 to 118 million in 2016. 42% of the visitors to ASEAN in 2015 were from the ASEAN member states, 17.1% from China and 8.8% from the EU.

ASEAN countries account for a quarter of global fish production, with Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam being among the world’s top 10 largest fish producers. (WEF 2016)

ASEAN’s forest coverage shrunk from 72% in 1970 to 42% today to make way for agricultural and commodity production. (WEF 2017)

The total defence spending of the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) states increased almost ten times from US$3.3 billion in 1976 to US$32 billion in 2016. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017)
The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China is signed on 4 November 2002, paving the way for the establishment of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).

ASEAN and India hold their first Summit on 5 November 2002, on the sidelines of the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh.

2003 APRIL

The ASEAN Business Council (ASEAN BAC) is launched to provide private sector feedback to ASEAN to promote regional economic integration.

A Special ASEAN Summit on the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is convened in Bangkok on 29 April 2003. ASEAN Leaders also meet with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on this occasion to discuss cooperation to cope with SARS.
With respect to external relations, it is necessary to first build trust among leaders attending the EAS. This mechanism for strategic and trending exchange needs a substantive track record to consolidate its value proposition. Canada and the EU are the two ASEAN Dialogue Partners not yet formally in the EAS. Yet, they can still engage the EAS in specific areas to increase comfort level among all participants. The challenge is to identify the relevant proposal to get started.

Amb. Ong Keng Yong is Executive Deputy Chairman of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, and was Secretary-General of ASEAN from 2003 to 2007.

Surin Pitsuwan

... on the imperative for change

ASEAN was established 50 years ago as a “foundation for peace, progress and prosperity in the region,” and it has succeeded and indeed survived many political, security, and economic challenges well. It has grown in stature and earned respectability and confidence as a premier platform for the wider Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

For it to maintain its centrality, efficacy and relevancy in the next half century, it will require more solidarity and effective integration among its Member States. The ASEAN enterprise cannot remain the invention of the elites, or a diplomatic feat of a few, but it will have to be an open space for interaction of the majority of its peoples.

To reap all potentiality inherent in its human and natural resources, and to become more competitive in the global market place, all member states will have to allow more ownership, participation and contribution of their citizenry through an inevitable democratic transformation. The agitated younger generation, the “posterity” that the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 promised to serve, is demanding for change. The hitherto marginalised “bottom millions” are expecting their share of prosperity. The external conditions of geo-strategic and economic competition are putting tremendous pressure on the ASEAN platform.

To continue to thrive in the next 50 years, ASEAN will have to be more equitable in its prosperity, egalitarian and democratic in its domestic power relations, and cohesive in its posturing towards global challenges. ASEAN’s golden jubilee should not be only a time for celebration of past achievements, it should also be an occasion for reflection on what has to be done, and done differently.

Professor Emeritus Dr. Surin Pitsuwan is Chairman of the Future Innovative Thailand Institute, and was Secretary-General of ASEAN from 2008 to 2012.

Le Luong Minh

... on the hopes and aspirations for ASEAN

The biggest challenge comes to ASEAN when its member states, in the pursuit of their national agenda, fail to take into account the broader regional interests, thereby undermining ASEAN unity and credibility. By nature, national interests take precedence over regional ones, but uncompromising individualism without due regard to ASEAN will backfire in the long run, especially in the geo-political sense. ASEAN as a whole is stronger and does more good for the regional order than its Member States “going it alone”. The longstanding political commitment by the member governments to the ASEAN project must therefore be constantly nurtured and reaffirmed.

In addition, I would like to see the fruits of the ASEAN community-building, especially in the socio-economic realms, be harvested and shared among the population at large to encourage their sense of belonging of and support for ASEAN. Moving forward, the human dimension of ASEAN cooperation and integration to enrich its people from all walks of life will become indispensable to the ASEAN project. That is the essence of a truly people-oriented, people-centred community that ASEAN is striving to achieve.

Amb. Le Luong Minh is the incumbent Secretary-General of ASEAN.
What the Future Holds for ASEAN

Some of ASEAN’s most distinguished former ministers and senior policymakers share their views on ASEAN’s journey thus far and beyond.

... on the need for ASEAN to strengthen institutions and inclusivity

We can take pride that in embracing ASEAN’s golden jubilee, the region is principally stable and peaceful. This could be attributed to the cautious approach of Member States amidst its microcosm of religion, language, ethnicity and culture. ASEAN should now focus its attention on building a united and cohesive body with trust and understanding among each other to create a feeling of collectivism and an ASEAN identity. Towards this end, it has to take steps to move away from its institutional and government-centred characters of the past to become a more inclusive community through the participation of its people and civil society.

The challenge would then be to empower the Secretariat as well as establish mechanisms and enforcement tools that can compel Member States to play by the rules. It is imperative that for ASEAN to exist in the future, it must be innovative and creative to tackle existing challenges, and sustain itself as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in order to avoid becoming a theatre of major power rivalry.

ASEAN has to find a new equilibrium that will further elevate its position and standing on the global stage where it could effectively champion the causes of humanity and justice in a collective manner. Only then will ASEAN become an integrated, united, caring and people-centred community.

Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Dr. Syed Hamid Albar was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia from 1999 to 2008.

... on the future of ASEAN consensus

The challenge for ASEAN into its next 50 years will continue to be on how we can accomplish the task of building a real ASEAN Community. Pursuing peace, stability and prosperity for the region requires consensus, and ASEAN operates on this principle. The experiences of the past 50 years have shown us that forging consensus among a grouping of such diversity is anything but easy. Because we belong to this region of Southeast Asia, there is a certain cultural element and imperative of not wanting to hurt others’ feelings. Despite the policy of non-interference, we still want to help each other. ASEAN was born out of the need to respond collectively to both internal and external threats to peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and banding together enables us to address a lot of ensuing issues. Perhaps, one has to look back to look forward.

Amb. Delia Albert was Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 2003 to 2004.
... on the challenges of economic integration in ASEAN

Economic integration by means of trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation provides all ASEAN economies with the potential for optimum resource allocation to improve and upgrade the welfare of the people. The model adopted by ASEAN is not exclusive and does not require the establishment of a customs union. All ASEAN economies are open to the rest of the world, and every member state can leverage on this model to enhance their competitiveness and fine-tune their comparative advantages. Thailand, for example, has been able to build its world-class automotive industry based on this model.

Is ASEAN economic integration a realistic goal? Yes, to a certain extent, but not ultimately. Full integration encompasses product (goods and services) as well as factor markets. Since almost all goods are tradable, there is not much problem with this market. But services are not fully tradable, and factors of production are mostly not tradable. Thus, there will always be concerns about these markets. Evidence of this problem is found in the movement of workers, be it skilled or unskilled. These sectors fall within the realm of political economy, which are often the most resistant to full economic integration.

Even though ASEAN economic integration is a desirable goal, it would be challenging and unrealistic to achieve complete integration at this stage of ASEAN’s development, despite the adoption of the ASEAN Economic Community.

Dr. Narongchai Akrasanee is Chairman of the Seranee Group, and was Minister of Commerce and Minister of Energy of Thailand.

... on ASEAN’s transformation imperative

ASEAN’s contributions over the past five decades have been nothing short of transformative: positively altering the dynamics in relations among the countries of Southeast Asia; earning for its Member States a central role in the affairs of the wider region; and ushering a more people-centred region anchored in the betterment of its people’s economic welfare and the promise of greater adherence to human rights and democratic principles. Such gains have not come about by accident. They are the results of clear, deliberate and purposeful policies. They reflect the ASEAN Leaders’ foresight and strong commitment to regional peace and prosperity in not shying away from exercising leadership through cooperative partnerships for the common good of the region.

At this critical time and juncture for the region and much of the world, ASEAN must not be found wanting. It must continue to exercise leadership and to aggressively wage peace and prosperity. Geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainties are inevitable. However, a sense of “drift” is not. The latter is a consequence of policy inaction, inconsistencies and contradictions. To remain relevant, ASEAN must continue to be transformative.

Dr. R. M. Marty Natalegawa was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia from 2009 to 2014.
**... on engagement with ASEAN’s future torch bearers**

At recent ASEAN Summits, there have been regular interactions between Leaders and the representatives of the region’s younger citizens, our young leaders. Such a high-level commitment – made collectively and in their individual capacity – sends a clear signal that we need to address the concerns of the youth. In view of ASEAN’s community-building and the changing global landscape, a renewed approach is required owing to the size and potential that this sector of the region’s population could contribute in further consolidating peace, progress and prosperity within ASEAN.

In upcoming Summits, the Leaders should articulate their vision for the youth, outlining coherent and long-term policies instead of simply “promoting” ASEAN’s awareness. Indeed, our young people are bound in kinship and mutual stake in the process of community-building, an integral partner in the identity and destiny of ASEAN. The vision should also underscore ASEAN’s commitment to work together in equipping them with the necessary means and capabilities to ensure their security and well-being as well as to increase access to education, employment, and healthcare. Likewise, the youth, who presently and in the future will assume leadership responsibilities in all areas of political, economic and socio-cultural actions, are the vanguard of ASEAN’s future success in managing the challenges of anti-globalisation sentiments; promoting open and freer trade; combating the effects of climate change, natural disasters, extremist ideologies and terrorism; and embracing the fourth technological revolution, thereby achieving ASEAN’s objectives as stipulated in the three community pillars.

*Pengiran Dato Paduka Osman Patra* was Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Brunei Darussalam, from 2002 to 2011.
ASEAN adopts the Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint which “aims to transform ASEAN into a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy by 2015.”

ASEAN marks a historic milestone with the signing of the ASEAN Charter on 20 November 2007 on the sidelines of the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. The Charter enters into force on 15 December 2008.

2007 NOVEMBER

ASEAN and Japan complete the signing of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP).
10 Facts about ASEAN

ASEAN Secretariat
Established in 1976, the Secretariat based in Jakarta has undergone significant transformations to meet the evolving needs of ASEAN cooperation. Its professional personnel were originally seconded by the Member States until 1993 with the arrival of the first batch of openly recruited staff. Its operational budget – equally contributed by every member state – is around US$20 million in 2017. Its current structure features 445 positions, of whom about half are Indonesian local staff.

ASEAN Motto
The ASEAN Motto is “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”. It was the theme of the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, and was then instituted as the ASEAN Motto under Article 36 of the ASEAN Charter.

Secretary-General of ASEAN
The first Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat is Indonesia’s Hartono Rekso Dharsono who was appointed in 1976. The original term of this post was two years, then extended to three years since 1985. Since 1992, this post was re-designated as the Secretary-General of ASEAN (SG) with ministerial status for a five-year term. The SG is appointed by the ASEAN Summit in alphabetical rotation among ASEAN countries. The incoming SG will be from Brunei Darussalam, succeeding Le Luong Minh from Vietnam in 2018.

ASEAN Funds
Each ASEAN member contributes US$1 million to the ASEAN Development Fund which is used as seed-funding for ASEAN’s strategic projects. Another major fund is the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund of US$485.3 million to support

2008 MAY
Cyclone Nargis devastates large swathes of Myanmar’s delta areas, prompting the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to convene a special meeting on 19 May in Singapore and establish an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism to provide humanitarian assistance for Myanmar.

2008 NOVEMBER
ASEAN adopts “The ASEAN Way” as the official anthem, which is written by Kittikhun Sodprasert, Sampow Triudom, and Payom Vatalaipat from Thailand.

2009 FEBRUARY
The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) agreement is concluded. The agreement enters into force in January 2010. ASEAN concludes the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which enters into force in March 2012, replacing the earlier AIA.
regional connectivity. The oldest fund in ASEAN is the ASEAN Cultural Fund established in 1978. ASEAN also maintains other sectoral funds in science and technology, human rights, energy, and ICT sectors.

**ASEAN Day**
8 of August, the day on which the ASEAN Declaration was signed in Bangkok in 1967, is observed as the ASEAN Day. On this day, Member States customarily organise events and activities such as addresses delivered by ASEAN leaders, ASEAN Day receptions and ASEAN flag hoisting ceremonies to mark the occasion.

**Voting in ASEAN**
The 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone is the only instrument in ASEAN in which failing consensus, a decision can be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Elsewhere in ASEAN, the standard mode of decision-making is by consultation and consensus.

**ASEAN Flag**
The ASEAN Flag features a red circle containing ten yellow rice stalks on a blue background, representing all ten ASEAN member states bounded together in peace and prosperity. The current flag was adopted in 1997, building upon the original 1994 flag which had only six rice stalks. The ASEAN Flag is displayed at the ASEAN Secretariat building, ASEAN meetings, and diplomatic missions of ASEAN member states alongside their national flag.

**ASEAN Anthem**
The ASEAN Anthem is “The ASEAN Way” adopted in 2008 from an ASEAN song contest. Composed by Kittikhun Sodprasert and Sampow Triudom, its lyrics was written by Payom Valaipatchra. The anthem is played at ASEAN formal meetings and activities.

“Raise our flag high, sky high
Embrace the pride in our heart
ASEAN we are bonded as one
Look-in out-ward to the world.
For peace, our goal from the very start
And prosperity to last.

We dare to dream we care to share.
Together for ASEAN
we dare to dream,
we can to share for it’s the way of ASEAN.”

**Legal Personality of ASEAN**
Article 3 of the ASEAN Charter confers legal personality on ASEAN as an intergovernmental organisation. Under the domestic laws of every ASEAN member, ASEAN now has the capability to enter into contracts, acquire and dispose of properties, and sue and sued in court. ASEAN can also conclude international agreements with external parties.

**Over 1,000 Meetings per Year**
The growing scope of ASEAN cooperation has led to a steady increase in the number of ASEAN meetings over the years. Since 2010, the number of ASEAN meetings annually has exceeded 1,000 due to the creation of new ASEAN bodies as mandated in the ASEAN Charter or required by the intensification and expansion of ASEAN cooperation.
Champions of ASEAN Economic Integration

NUR AZIEMAH AZIZ introduces a sampling of top ASEAN firms who have not only succeeded in raising their national and ASEAN flags, but spearheaded economic integration and bridged cultural differences with their presence in the region.

The booming and increasingly integrated ASEAN economy is teeming with opportunities for many business owners, big or small, to expand beyond their national boundaries and venture into neighbouring countries. This in turn is a stepping stone for them to eventually enter the global market more confident and resilient. Introducing home-grown products to diversify the regional and even global marketplaces, many once local companies have made their marks in various sectors from food and beverage to pharmaceuticals, aviation, finance and high technologies, featuring the intellect, expertise and flavours of their home countries and Southeast Asia in general.

Venturing out however does not happen overnight, and is fraught with many challenges. Businesses have to conduct intensive research on the market, understand its consumers and needs, look at the administrative and legal procedures from licensing to tax payments on top of learning the unique cultural and religious sensitivities from other countries.

Managing and operating more than 9,000 7-11 stores all over the country, CP Group is also famous for their delicious pre-cooked quick meals and fresh produce distributed in many markets all over the world.

**Indofood**

**YEAR FOUNDED:** 1990  
**SECTOR:** Food solutions  
**ANNUAL REVENUE:** US$5.04b

Indomie, the popular instant noodles produced by Indofood, is no stranger to Southeast Asians. A favourite staple for a quick fix meal for many people in the region, it is also available in various countries across continents and even has a factory in Nigeria. The company was established in 1990 with the original name of PT Panganjaya Intikusuma before being renamed as PT Indofood Sukses Makmur in 1994. It has grown from producing instant noodles to creating other popular products that showcase Indonesia’s cuisine from potato chips to food seasonings. Indofood aims to be a total food solutions company participating in every stage of the food manufacturing process from research and development to production of flour for pasta and noodles and right to the final lap of distribution.

**British India**

**YEAR FOUNDED:** 1994  
**SECTOR:** Fashion, Lifestyle, Home Furnishing  
**ANNUAL REVENUE:** NA

Fashion house British India is often assumed to be the brainchild of a Western company, but the true blue Malaysian lifestyle brand was established in 1994. Its clothing designs focus on comfort and effortlessness catered to customers residing in the warm tropics of Southeast Asia and beyond. From its base in Malaysia, British India has ventured overseas...
with more than 40 outlets in the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. British India is also known beyond the region since its presence in many shopping malls has captured the attention of tourists all over the world.

**CDL Group**

**YEAR FOUNDED:** 1963  
**SECTOR:** Real Estate  
**ANNUAL REVENUE:** US$2.90b

The CDL Group is a Singapore-owned real estate firm. It started out as a residential property developer in 1963 before rising to be Singapore’s largest property developer and landlord. A global player with presence all over the world – it owns and manages many residential and investment properties. It also owns hotel assets through Millennium & Copthorne Hotels, one of the world’s largest hotel chains whose estates are located in prime areas of many big cities. In Southeast Asia alone, it has built more than 50 years of positive track record and numerous success, CDL seeks to continue championing green and sustainable buildings and achieve their ultimate goal of making a better home for everyone to live.

**CIMB BANK**

**YEAR FOUNDED:** 1974  
**SECTOR:** Banking & Finance  
**ANNUAL REVENUE:** US$3.83b

With a clear vision to become a leading ASEAN company, Malaysia’s CIMB is the fifth largest banking group in ASEAN with its total assets worth RM500.9 billion. A banking powerhouse with the widest retail banking network in ASEAN, CIMB is present in nine out of 10 ASEAN member countries, except the Philippines. It has won numerous awards from Best Bank in Asia to Best Retail Bank. Many of its banking programmes such as Mobile Banking, Digital Banking and Credit Card initiatives are well received in Southeast Asian countries. Consciously putting ASEAN at the heart of its business strategies as well as marketing campaigns, CIMB is known as an active champion for ASEAN economic integration with many initiatives such as the CIMB ASEAN Research Institute, the CIMB ASEAN Stock Challenge and the CIMB ASEAN Scholarship, among others.

**FPT Group**

**YEAR FOUNDED:** 1988  
**SECTOR:** ICT  
**ANNUAL REVENUE:** US$1.78b

The FPT Group is one of Vietnam’s largest multinational information technology companies, with four business sectors covering technology, telecom, tech products distribution as well as education. Established in 1988 in Hanoi with the original name of Food Processing Technology Company, it was later renamed to Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology with a strong core business focus on IT. Over a decade later, the corporation entered the overseas markets by exporting IT softwares and remains as Vietnam's top software exporter. It has a strong regional presence with offices in nine out of 10 ASEAN countries including Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Outside of the region, it has set up offices in Europe, North America, Kuwait, Japan and Bangladesh. Its annual revenue has grown significantly year after year with 1.7 billion US dollars recorded in the year 2016 alone.

**Jollibee**

**YEAR FOUNDED:** 1975  
**SECTOR:** Fast food  
**ANNUAL REVENUE:** US$2.24b

Jollibee earned the moniker of Asia's “McDonald’s” for incorporating Western fast food with a twist of Filipino flavours. Jollibee's most famous delight is its fried chicken. Established in 1975, Jollibee is now the Philippines' largest fast food chain with 1,000 stores sprawling all over the country as well as overseas. It ventured into Southeast Asia with its first outlet overseas in Brunei Darussalam in 1987, and then gradually expanded to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. With ASEAN's trade liberalisation programmes, the company is able to have access to affordable supplies and manpower in other regional countries. For example, Jollibee sources its spices and other ingredients from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and at the same time enrich the taste buds of their ASEAN fellows with the Filipino fast food cuisine.
The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) begins operations in Singapore to support regional macroeconomic and financial stability through conducting macroeconomic surveillance and supporting the implementation of the regional financial arrangement.

AirAsia will always be known as the low-cost carrier that revolutionised traveling in Southeast Asia. Founded in 1993, AirAsia’s success finally took off in 2001 under CEO Tony Fernandes, who took over the company, turned its fortune around, and expanded its footprint beyond Malaysia, Southeast Asia, and then beyond Asia. AirAsia has bagged numerous awards and accolades, from “world’s best low-cost airlines” to “Asia’s Top 200 Companies”. It has an extensive network of affiliations across Asia and Australia. It operates domestic flights in neighbouring countries such as Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, and also offers low-cost long-haul travel from its hub in Kuala Lumpur under the AirAsia X brand. AirAsia has constantly expanded its business realms with other travel services, including car rentals, flight and hotel packages.

Established in 2003, Thai Beverage Public Company Limited (ThaiBev) is Southeast Asia’s largest beverage company. It has distilleries in Thailand, Scotland and China with the total sales revenue of 172 billion Baht in 2015. ThaiBev’s most famous product, Chang beer, instantly conjures the image of elephant, the majestic animal which holds a significant cultural and historical value in the country. These days, one does not need to make a trip to Thailand to enjoy the alcoholic beverage that has bagged numerous awards and international recognition. It has since expanded and diversified into other business sectors including frozen food products, dairy products like fresh and canned milk and other non-alcoholic drinks. ThaiBev is also managing a chain of Japanese restaurants under the Oishi Restaurant Company since 2000, serving sushi, ramen and shabu-shabu.

A young low-cost carrier with its first flight taking off in December 2011, Vietnam’s VietJet has experienced impressive growth over the recent years. Vietjet has indeed enabled easier and more affordable travel for passengers nationwide to many different parts of Vietnam. It has also stretched its wings to include flights to other Asian countries, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, China and South Korea. The company group has a stake in the Thai VietJet that operates from Suvarnabhumi airport in Bangkok and flies to destinations not only around Thailand and Vietnam but even to Hualien, Taiwan and Gaya, India. Just like Air Asia and other low-cost carriers in the region, VietJet stands to harvest substantial gains from the increasingly integrated ASEAN aviation market thanks to the ASEAN Open Skies agreement.

Ms. Nur Aziemah Aziz is Research Officer at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
The 45th AMM in Phnom Penh fails to issue the Joint Communique for the first time in ASEAN history. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers later adopt the Statement on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea on 20 July. The EU becomes the first regional organisation to accede to the TAC.

ASEAN Leaders adopt the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).

ASEAN Leaders launch the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR).

ASEAN and its six FTA partners commence talks on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

Pride of ASEAN

63 Southeast Asian publicly-listed companies are featured on the Forbes Global 2000 rankings based on their market value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>PTT PCL</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>DBS Group</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Overseas–Chinese Banking Corp.</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330</td>
<td>SingTel</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332</td>
<td>United Overseas Bank</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386</td>
<td>Bank Rakyat Indonesia</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388</td>
<td>Wilmar International</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390</td>
<td>Maybank</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>490</td>
<td>Tenaga Nasional</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>494</td>
<td>Bank Mandiri</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>564</td>
<td>Bank Central Asia</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>592</td>
<td>Broadcom</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>604</td>
<td>Siam Cement</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>616</td>
<td>Siam Commercial Bank</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>632</td>
<td>Public Bank</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>642</td>
<td>Kasikornbank</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>653</td>
<td>Telkom Indonesia</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>671</td>
<td>CIMB Group Holdings</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>672</td>
<td>Krung Thai Bank</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>791</td>
<td>Sime Darby</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804</td>
<td>Bangkok Bank</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>823</td>
<td>SM Investments</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>924</td>
<td>Bank Negara Indonesia</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>948</td>
<td>CapitaLand</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>985</td>
<td>CP All</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>992</td>
<td>Singapore Airlines</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1018</td>
<td>BDO Unibank</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1026</td>
<td>PTT Global Chemical</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1107</td>
<td>ThaiBev</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>Flextronics International</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1138</td>
<td>Keppel</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1149</td>
<td>Charoen Pokphand Foods</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1151</td>
<td>JG Summit Holdings</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1170</td>
<td>Global Logistic Properties</td>
<td>VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1176</td>
<td>Ayala</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1196</td>
<td>Advanced Info Service</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1228</td>
<td>Top Frontier Investment Holdings</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1259</td>
<td>Genting</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1319</td>
<td>Petronas Chemicals</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1353</td>
<td>Airports of Thailand</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>Gudang Garam</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1405</td>
<td>RHB Bank</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1414</td>
<td>Olam International</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1472</td>
<td>Hong Leong Financial</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1509</td>
<td>Thai Oil</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1510</td>
<td>Axiata Group</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1531</td>
<td>Metropolitan Bank &amp; Trust</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1543</td>
<td>MISC</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596</td>
<td>Maxis</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1633</td>
<td>Vietin Bank</td>
<td>VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam</td>
<td>VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>Commercial Bank For Investment &amp; Development Of Vietnam</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1719</td>
<td>City Developments</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757</td>
<td>Indorama Ventures</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771</td>
<td>AmBank Group</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>Frasers Centrepoint</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793</td>
<td>Aboitiz Equity Ventures</td>
<td>PH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>Golden Agri-Resources</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>ST Engineering</td>
<td>TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Petronas Gas</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Vietnam Dairy Products</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>China Aviation Oil</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>BDO Unibank</td>
<td>MY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Manila Electric</td>
<td>PH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dialogue Partners Speak ...

In this section, we invite views from our ten Dialogue Partners on the way forward for their relations with ASEAN.

ASEAN IN AUSTRALIA’S WORLDVIEW
Australia sees an Asian strategic balance that is becoming more contested and increasingly multipolar. As the economic and strategic weight of a growing number of Asian powers increases, Australia’s ability to influence that balance and its traditional status as a middle power are likely to come under challenge. Closer strategic relations with Southeast Asia are already forming an integral part of Canberra’s response to these developments. Historically, Australia has traditionally seen Southeast Asia both as a protective barrier from Asia’s major power machinations and as a bridge through which to deepen Australia’s engagement with the wider region. Consistent with these objectives, ASEAN-led institutions have also been viewed by Canberra as mechanisms for diluting major power dominance in Asia and for ensuring Australia is included as a member of this region’s economic and security architecture. These historical themes in Australian foreign policy are already re-emerging and are likely to intensify during the coming decades.

Dr. Brendan Taylor is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, the Australian National University.

CANADA LOOKS TO INCREASE ITS ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN AND THE REGION
As Canada celebrates 40 years of relations with ASEAN, we are building on our strong bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia with a focus on new regional programs. Our engagement is based on a fundamental understanding that Asia matters to Canada. We are a Pacific nation. What happens in Southeast Asia affects Canada. We recognise the central role that ASEAN plays in guaranteeing peace and stability in the region that has allowed for unprecedented regional economic growth and development. This is good for Asia and it is good for Canada. But we can and are doing more. We are working together to combat terrorism, to make our borders safe and secure, to mitigate the effects of climate change, to empower women and girls, and to facilitate trade.

To this end, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland announced our new five year, C$10 million Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development in August. Citizens of all ASEAN member states are eligible. In September, Parliamentary Secretary Pamela Goldsmith-Jones and ASEAN Trade Ministers announced the launch of exploratory talks for a free trade agreement. This is how we are moving our relationship forward. We are ready for more. That is why we are enthusiastic to join the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. Is ASEAN ready for Canada?

Ms. Marie-Louise Hannan is Ambassador of Canada to ASEAN.

ASEAN AND CHINA ARE NATURAL PARTNERS IN REGIONAL COOPERATION
Action speaks louder than words. The fact of the matter is China’s support for ASEAN is firm and enduring. The broad-ranging cooperation on both sides has delivered many tangible results and bound our futures ever closer. As close neighbours linked by land and sea, ASEAN countries are a priority in China’s neighborhood diplomacy and primary partners for the Belt and Road Initiative.

With a stable and peaceful ASEAN in the driving seat, the region’s interests and concerns can be best represented and addressed. ASEAN-led mechanisms have been instrumental in facilitating discussions and collaboration among countries in and outside the region to address common challenges and share in its growing prosperity. These mechanisms are also useful platforms for policy dialogues and exchanges on strategic
and security issues among the major powers. China-ASEAN relations have benefited profusely in many ways as well.

Since the beginning of dialogue relations in 1991, and in particular, the strategic partnership in 2003, we have witnessed deepening mutual political trust and closer cooperation in various fields. President Xi Jinping’s proposal in 2013 to build a closer China-ASEAN community of shared future has borne fruit. In 2016, two-way trade reached US$452.2 billion and people-to-people interactions featured 38 million exchanges.

China has also scored many firsts. It is the first Dialogue Partner to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, establish a strategic partnership, ink an FTA, and express the willingness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. These initiatives are testaments to China’s strong support for the ASEAN centrality.

Although the South China Sea remains an issue between China and several ASEAN countries, the matter is handled through a dual-track approach, which has helped to provide stability to the region. China has, undoubtedly, one of the most vigorous and dynamic relationships with ASEAN among its Dialogue Partners.

That being said, ASEAN should recognise that ASEAN centrality hinges on its continued adherence to the ASEAN way of dialogue and consensus at the comfort level of all parties concerned. It is in ASEAN’s interest to forestall any attempt by an individual country to pursue one’s own gains at the cost of ASEAN unity and the overall interest of regional cooperation.

Mr. Xu Bu is Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN.

THE EU AND ASEAN STAND TALL AND STRONG TOGETHER

ASEAN and the European Union (EU) are the most prominent regional integration projects in the world today, making them natural partners with many shared interests. These include peace and security, prosperity and a rules-based global order that unlocks the full potential for open economies with deep global connections. In the EU, we believe that the best way to advance these interests is to protect and promote the values that underpin them.

The EU is committed to free and fair trade, because we value openness. We advance regional integration because we value stable and friendly relations among neighbouring countries. We promote multilateralism because we value predictable outcomes based on the rule of law. And we support inclusive and sustainable development, because we value human rights and the protection of our environment. Our values go hand in hand with our interests.

As ASEAN and the EU celebrate 40 years of relations and look back upon many joint successes, we also increasingly face an unpredictable world with many new challenges. While the arrival of globalisation has brought many benefits to both of our regions, it should never come at the expense of our core values. Together, we must support and harness the benefits globalisation, including free trade, robust sharing of ideas and cultural exchanges. At the same time, ASEAN and the EU should stay vigilant in not allowing negative forces that aspire to undermine these mutually beneficial relations. We must work hand-in-hand to shape these forces and its manifestations rather than merely submitting to them. The EU is committed to growing cooperation within and between our regions, and we are confident that the engagement with ASEAN will continue along an upward trajectory.

Mr. Francisco Fontan Pardo is Ambassador of the European Union to ASEAN.

STRATEGIC CONGRUENCE IS KEY TO ASEAN-INDIA PARTNERSHIP

When India first announced her Look East policy in 1992, she recognised the mutual Indian and ASEAN interest in cooperating and prospering together. That reorientation was part of the general shift in her foreign policy with India’s liberalisation, reform and opening up after 1991. Now called Act East, the policy has worked well in practice, and its results are evident in increased trade and investment and cooperation.
Increasing congruence between India and ASEAN has resulted in cooperation extending from the economy to political, defence and security aspects. The policy has also built successfully on the legacy of cultural and civilisational comfort created by centuries of common history.

This strategic congruence – for it is now no less – will grow with time, fed by the complementarity created as India and ASEAN continue to develop and grow, and as we head towards an increasingly multi-polar Asia. India and ASEAN will be partners not only in growing prosperity but in ensuring the secure region that continued prosperity demands. That will be best served in a complicated world by a regional architecture which is open, inclusive and multipolar, with ASEAN and India playing their role.

*Mr. Shivshankar Menon* is Distinguished Fellow at Brookings Institution, and was Foreign Secretary and National Security Adviser of India.

### ASEAN IN JAPAN’S APPROACH TO REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

Japan would like to step up to provide sound leadership in Asia, not just in the economic but in the political and security spheres as well. Japan’s steady economic and technological cooperation with ASEAN Member States for the purposes of nation-building will continue over the long term. Recent security cooperation, including maritime security capacity-building, will also be expanded. In order to substantiate its leadership role in the region, however, Japan requires clear policy directives.

First, Japan must ensure the continuation of US security commitments in the region as it expands its own security role. Second, Japan must promote a vision in which it pursues a constructive relationship of mutual trust and cooperation with China. Third, Japan must make use of its extensive extra-regional partnerships, including with the G7 nations, for the stability and prosperity of the region. It is Japan’s hope that ASEAN nations will be forthcoming in articulating their desired regional leadership role for Japan.

*Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka* is Chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, and was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

### MOON RISES ON ASEAN-KOREA RELATIONS

There is a rising hope in Korea that ASEAN-Korea relations is entering a new phase under Moon Jae-in’s leadership. Mr. Moon is the first presidential candidate to include ASEAN-Korea relations in his election manifesto. President Moon has since made good on this promise, and one of his major foreign policy initiatives is to make Korea’s relations with ASEAN on par with that of the major powers.

President Moon’s promise reflects the existing reality of ASEAN-Korea relations – a strategic partnership between Korea and its second most important economic cooperation partner. One of his policy buzzwords is “responsibility,” which in foreign policy terms translates into Korea’s commitment in fulfilling its expected duties towards its regional partners. Therefore, President Moon is likely to emphasise development cooperation with ASEAN, Korea’s contribution to ASEAN connectivity and the success of the ASEAN community, and joint efforts between the two partners for the peace and prosperity of the region.

There is a consensus among Koreans that Korea has to deepen its ties with ASEAN. In addition, there is political will at the highest level to translate this consensus into policy. The only obstacles are the ever-present security concerns on the Korean Peninsula, which constantly distracts the new administration from its original promises. Nevertheless, President Moon is likely to roll out his vision and policy towards ASEAN at the regional summits later this year.

*Dr. Lee Jaehyon* is Research Fellow and Director of the Center for ASEAN and Oceania Studies at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Republic of Korea.

### NEW ZEALAND AND ASEAN BOUND BY SHARED INTERESTS

In very simple terms, what is good for ASEAN is good for New Zealand. It is our near neighbour and our fourth largest trading partner which is young, dynamic and fast-growing. We share common goals, concerns and aspirations. It is very much in New Zealand’s national interest that the ASEAN region is peaceful, stable and prosperous, because our futures are inextricably linked.

---

2016 April

*The ASEAN Open Skies agreement comes into effect with the full ratification by all member states.*

2016 June

*The Special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting is convened on 14 June in Kunming, China. The meeting is marked by the absence of a joint press conference and press statement.*

2016 July

*ASEAN confers Sectoral Dialogue Partner status on Switzerland and Development Partner status on Germany during the 49th AMM in Vientiane.*

2016 September

*ASEAN adopts the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025) and the IAI Work Plan III at the 28th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane.*

---
For New Zealand, what is important is not just that the 10 countries in ASEAN are successful in their own right but that they are integrated and connected with each other as a Community. When peoples and economies are deeply entwined and are in the habit of talking together and understanding each other, they are more invested in each other’s success. And they are better able to work through differences. Good things flow from that: trade, knowledge, culture, development, and security.

New Zealand celebrates ASEAN’s 50 years of achievement and recognises ASEAN centrality as the defining force in regional architecture. We are proud to be a 42-year dialogue partner and now a strategic partner of ASEAN. As the Māori proverb says: he waka eke noa – we’re in this canoe together.

Ms. Stephanie Lee is Ambassador of New Zealand to ASEAN.

RUSSIA REMAINS STEADFAST IN DEEPENING RELATIONS WITH ASEAN

Elevating relations between Russia and ASEAN to a strategic partnership level is a common objective expressed by both parties during their Sochi Summit in May 2016. More than that, Russia and ASEAN made this pledge with the unstated but obvious understanding that the present-day world is strikingly different from what it was just a while ago. By seeking closer ties at a time when each of them faces very serious (if not existential) challenges, ASEAN and Russia’s desires for this partnership tell us a lot about their mutual trust and respect. But we cannot ignore the fact that a more substantive engagement between the two will not be good news to a number of players whose names are too well-known to be mentioned here. Above anything else, working for a strategic partnership will be a matter of consistency and struggle.

Is Russia ready for that? Judging by the political and economic resilience it has displayed in response to Western sanctions, it is. With this in mind, I am quite optimistic about the future of ASEAN and Russia as genuine strategic partners.

Dr. Victor Sumsky is Director of the ASEAN Centre at MGIMO University, Russia.

US-ASEAN RELATIONS RUN DEEP

ASEAN lies at the heart of the Asia-Pacific region, which is diplomatically, economically and strategically central to U.S. interests in the 21st century. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the United States’ dialogue partnership with ASEAN. The relationship is stronger than ever, as reflected by the establishment of a Strategic Partnership and our ongoing economic engagement.

American economic engagement with ASEAN is based on a premise of mutual prosperity. ASEAN is a significant trade and investment partner for the United States. It is America’s 4th largest trading partner. The United States cumulatively invested over US$274 billion in ASEAN by 2015: more than in the Chinese, Indian, Japanese and South Korean economies combined. American exports to ASEAN member nations already support more than 550,000 jobs in the United States and almost 42,000 U.S. companies export more than US$100 billion in goods and services to ASEAN nations every year.

U.S.-ASEAN Connect remains our strategic framework for economic integration, rallying public sector cooperation and private sector partnership in its four areas of Business, Policy, Energy, and Innovation. Our partnerships on the digital economy have been particularly strong, focusing on technology policy, as well as training on disaster communications, ICT policy and regulation, emerging technologies, and internet governance.

By upholding a rules-based order, ensuring the lawful and unimpeded flow of commerce and encouraging the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of disputes, the United States will continue to work closely with ASEAN to increase two-way trade and investment, promote free and fair trade and maintain peace and stability. Under President Donald Trump’s leadership, the United States is taking steps to strengthen our partnership with ASEAN and deepen our collaboration. Vice President Mike Pence announced in Jakarta in April that President Trump will attend the U.S.–ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit in the Philippines and the APEC Leaders Meeting in Vietnam in November 2017. President Trump’s visit to the region in November is one among many tangible indicators of the U.S.’ continuing and long-standing commitment to deepening ties with ASEAN and the peoples of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Daniel Shields is Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Mission to ASEAN.
THE WORLD IS ASEAN’S OYSTER

A Map of ASEAN’s Engagement with the World

Sources: ASEAN Secretariat; UNCTAD; OpenFlights

Notes:
- AMS: ASEAN Member States
- NA: Not available
- The figures for total trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are for 2016. The 2016 FDI inflows data is preliminary.
- “FDI stock” refers to the total cumulative value of investment by the partner country in ASEAN. The FDI stock figures are for 2012, the latest available data compiled by UNCTAD.
- The figures for tourist arrivals refer to the number of landings from the referent country to ASEAN in 2015.
- Air connectivity refers to passenger flights between AMS and the partner country operated by their respective national carriers.