Thursday, 16 May 2024 – In this webinar, two long-time experts on India and Thailand’s relations with Myanmar provided insights into the country’s relations with India and China since the February 2021 coup.
MYANMAR STUDIES PROGRAMME WEBINAR
The Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS invited Mr. Angshuman Choudhury, Associate Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and Dr. Bhanubhatra Jittiang, Vice Dean for Academic and International Affairs, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, to discuss Myanmar’s relations with India and Thailand. Moe Thuzar, Coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme, moderated the session and served as discussant for the presentations.
The key discussion points are summarised below:
- India’s policy towards Myanmar has not changed much since the coup. India engaged with the SAC as it previously did with any regime that ruled Myanmar, but it was initially a subtle engagement.
- India started to pursue more open engagement with the SAC, especially after it appointed a new ambassador in 2022 because India realized that the SAC would stay in power for many years to come. A local currency regime recently established between the SAC and India is an example of growing cooperation. Accordingly, India started emphasizing economic and strategic cooperation over democracy and other concerns in joint statements as their relations became closer in 2022.
- Despite the growing cooperation, as India’s policy towards Myanmar centers around security, it decided to shut the borders after Operation 1027 to prevent any spillover effects in bordering states. This decision was influenced by the fact that India’s policymakers perceive the Myanmar conflict as somehow tied to the instability in Manipur.
- Thailand’s response to the 2021 coup could be characterised as “reactive,” and its engagement in Myanmar continued business as usual. Thailand-Myanmar relations were discussed in terms of military-to-military and government-to-government engagement.
- Before the coup in 2021, there had been quiet engagement between the two militaries, which continued after the coup. Meanwhile, their government-to-government engagement focused on economic cooperation, and Thailand’s decision to engage with the SAC was influenced by its economic interests in Myanmar.
- As Thailand did not disengage from Myanmar, ASEAN pressured them to do more to end the crisis in Myanmar. As such, Thailand has been trying to develop Track 1.5 diplomacy and consult more with different stakeholders in Myanmar, but there has not been a remarkable change in Thailand’s policy towards Myanmar because Thailand continues to engage primarily with SAC officials.
- The domestic political environment in Thailand has changed since the election in 2023 because the main opposition party, the Move Forward Party, gained influence over several key parliamentary committees, including the committees on national security and foreign affairs. As the Move Forward Party promotes more engagement with opposition groups in Myanmar, Thailand might increase its engagement with them over time.
- Thailand and India’s approaches towards Myanmar balance idealism and pragmatism, influenced by domestic interests and pressures. For example, Thailand integrates refugees from Myanmar to address its ageing population and faces challenges like drug and cybercrime concerns. India’s Mizoram state accepts refugees due to ethnic affinity with the Chin people, despite federal opposition, and deals with Northeast India security issues and soldiers fleeing from Myanmar.
- Historically, realism often triumphs over ideology in Thailand and India’s engagement with Myanmar, particularly given China’s growing influence. Initially ideological, Delhi’s post-1962 coup response evolved into pragmatic cooperation based on mutual interests. Conversely, Bangkok’s stance alternates between ideology and accommodation, depending on the government in power.
- Meanwhile, strategic interests related to China and the need to maintain a presence in Myanmar drive connectivity projects and investments. However, the escalating conflict has caused Thai businesses to pause future investments.
The webinar ended with a Q&A session, during which the speakers shared their thoughts on India’s counterinsurgency operations near the border, subnational diplomacy, Thaksin’s meetings with opposition groups from Myanmar, the role of ASEAN, and why a stable Myanmar is important for both India and Thailand.