Seminar on “Assessing the Future of Thailand’s Military”

Thursday, 27 June 2024 – In this hybrid seminar, Dr Paul Chambers, a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, shared his insights concerning the Thai military’s role in national politics.

THAILAND STUDIES PROGRAMME SEMINAR

This seminar explored how the Thai Military continues to be a leading political institution. Multiple coups have demonstrated this power, most recently in 2006 and 2014. With major reshuffles in the Thai military leadership expected in the coming October, including new commanders-in-chief for the army and navy and a new permanent secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the impact on Thai politics will be significant. The seminar attracted the attention of 90 attendees.

Speaker Dr Paul Chambers (right) with moderator Dr Termsak Chalermpalanupap. (Credit: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)

Dr. Chambers began his presentation by highlighting that the Thai military has always been a key institution alongside the regal establishment and operates independently of the civilian administration. The military has periodically ruled the country through multiple coups, demonstrating its political influence. Additionally, the military has significant economic interests, often called “Khaki capital,” which incentivise its continued involvement in Thai politics.

Since establishing a modern military in 1852, the regal authority has relied on its strength to thwart any European attempts at colonialisation. After the military and civilian wings of khana ratsadon (People’s Party) overthrew monarchical absolutism in 1932, it became a dominant institution alongside civilian bureaucrats. Under Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, the military monopolised power as the cabinet became packed with military men. After a military coup by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1958, Thailand witnessed a resurgent monarchy which began to confer legitimacy to military rule. In the 1980s, Thailand entered a period of a “guided democracy” led by General Prem Tinsulanonda until Thaksin Shinawatra came to power with his innovative popularism and challenged the military-regal partnership.

Thaksin, a former police lieutenant colonel, leveraged his wife’s connections to dominate the police and an army faction, even securing for his cousin, General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, the position as army commander-in-chief (1 October 2003 – 30 September 2004). However, he was ousted by a military coup in September 2006. Following political unrest, in December 2008, politicians backed by the Privy Council appointed Abhisit Vejjajiva as prime minister, while Generals Prayut, Prawit, and Anupong collectively known as “the 3P” gained influence. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s efforts to appease the military failed, leading to her Pheu Thai-led coalition government in another coup in May 2014.

Under General Prayut’s premiership, the anti-Thaksin faction regained power, revitalising arch-royalists, stabilising the royal succession, and consolidating the dominance of the “Eastern Tigers” faction under the Queen’s Guard, led by General Prawit Wongsuwan. This curtailed the civilian political space, reinforced the military’s central role in Thai politics, and preserved pseudo-absolutist militarism.

The 2017 Constitution, drafted under General Prayut’s administration, allows the military junta to appoint the 250 Senators. These appointed Senators helped select the prime minister, who can be unelected, and one-third of the Senate must approve any constitutional amendments. The electoral formula also prevents any single political party from forming a majority government, ensuring that no party aligned with Thaksin can regain power.

The Constitution enables the military to retain power through measures like the ambiguous 20-year strategy and the reshuffle rule in the 2008 Defence Act. This act requires service chiefs and the permanent secretary to be vetted by a committee dominated by military officials. This voting system heavily favours the military, allowing it to consolidate more power.

The Thai military has several laws at its disposal, including the Martial Law Act, Section 44 of the Constitution (allowing repeated detention of individuals), the Internal Security Act of 2008 (which reinvigorated the Internal Security Operation Command, or ISOC), and the lèse majesté law in Section 112 of the Criminal Code. Additionally, the Thai military controls significant financial resources and is the largest landowner in the country, further reinforcing its independence.

Following the 2023 general election, several significant changes occurred in Thai civil-military relations. Besides a civilian coalition led by Pheu Thai taking office, Thaksin returned to Thailand from exile and received a royal commutation of his jail term, cutting from eight years down to only one year. A civilian, Sutin Klungsang was appointed as  Defence Minister.

Since then, the Thai military has faced two major challenges: the return of Thaksin and a potential rise of the pro-Thaksin faction within the military.

As opposition, the Move Forward Party (MFP) has also been pushing for drastic military reforms to reduce the military influence in politics. Proposed reforms include placing the military under direct civilian authority, dissolving ISOC, returning military-held lands to the people, and abolishing conscription.

Before leaving office in August 2023, General Prayut appointed his favoured Generals Charoenchai Hinthao and Songwit Noonpakdee to key military positions to maintain the power of traditional elites and the regal institution. However, General Charoenchai will retire at the end of September, allowing the Srettha government to influence his successor. Meanwhile, current police chief Torsak Sukvimol, and his likely successor, Police General Kittirat, are both believed to be pro-monarchy.

Thailand has three potential candidates for army commander-in-chief, all from the sub-factions of the Eastern Tiger faction: General Ukrit Buntanon (Green Rim faction), General Tharapong Malakam (Red Rim faction), and General Pana Klauplaudtuk (Red Rim faction), the most junior but with close ties to the regal institution. General Pana might secure the promotion if the civilian government or Thaksin tries to influence the military.

If Thaksin kept provoking the Thai military, a coup could potentially happen before General Charoenchai retirement in September this year. However, the Thai military is less likely to stage the coup if the reshuffle takes place smoothly.

The audience raised questions about Thailand’s Myanmar policies, the potential for a military coup, the role of influential retired generals, including ex-army chief General Apirat Kongsompong, the Thai military’s business interests, the influence of Thaksin, and how the Thai military could continue to maintain its power.