EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Many Southeast Asian countries have made significant strides in developing their digital infrastructure and rolling out e-government services. However, along with these advances have been signs of regression in terms of internet freedom, in line with global trends.
- This Perspective provides a deeper analysis of the current state of digital repression in Southeast Asia. Specifically, it examines the various states’ capabilities to exercise digital repression and their actual practice of it.
- In terms of the capacity to control digital infrastructure, most Southeast Asian countries seem to have bolstered their capabilities in the past decade; and there seems to be no discernible divide between high-income and low-income countries, or even regime types.
- This corroborates findings that digital repression is ubiquitous as well as reinforcing the “need-based” logic of state repression – i.e., that political control and survival drive states to repress their people, or, in this case, build capacity in anticipation of security threats.
* Surachanee Sriyai is Visiting Fellow with the Media, Technology and Society Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is also the interim director of the Center for Sustainable Humanitarian Action with Displaced Ethnic Communities (SHADE) under the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD), Chiang Mai University.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/65, 27 August 2024
INTRODUCTION
Many Southeast Asian countries have made significant strides in developing their digital infrastructure and rolling out e-government services. The region’s E-government Development Index (EDGI) in 2022[1] was higher than the world average. Furthermore, over half of the region saw an improvement in its EDGI score in this round of the survey. However, along with these advances, there have been signs of regression in terms of internet freedom, in line with global trends. Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net (FOTN)[2] reported in 2023 that global internet freedom has been on a downward trend for 13consecutive years, coinciding with the observable democratic erosion worldwide.[3] Countries were rated based on three key aspects of digital development: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. Countries that score between 100-70 are considered to be “Free”; whereas those that score between 69-40 are “Partly Free” and scores of 39-0 are categorised as “Not Free” countries. Based on the report, the bulk of Southeast Asian countries were classified as “Partly Free”. Among the eight ASEAN countries listed in the data, Malaysia and the Philippines scored the highest while Myanmar scored the lowest.
It appears that while states have improved their digital architecture to provide better public services and develop their digital economy, the bolstered digital capacity can also be used as an instrument of state repression to infringe on citizens’ rights. While the literature, markedly by works of Davenport,[4] highlights the use of violence as a central feature of state repression, defining it as “the threat or use of physical violence by state actors against civilians in response to perceived challenges to the ruling regime”, its contemporary iterations emphasise the broader repertoire of state actions, including non-violent methods such as surveillance, censorship, and control of information flows. The term digital repression thus encompasses a range of actions and policies employed by governments to suppress opposition, including the use of digital technologies.
Table 1 below further explores the state of digital freedom in Southeast Asia. Most Southeast Asian countries either saw a drop in FOTN scores from 2022 to 2023 or no progress, except for Malaysia and Cambodia. There also seems to be variations in how countries perform in different aspects of digital freedom once we look at the composite indexes. For instance, Malaysia has seen a 2-point improvement in its FOTN score and now ties with the Philippines as the best-performing countries in the region due to its ability to reduce the obstacles to online access by expanding 4G mobile connection and ensuring access to stable internet connection nationwide.[5] The number of individuals given prison terms or held in pretrial detention for online activities has decreased, leading to an improvement in the parameter measuring violations of user rights.[6]
Table 1: FOTN Score and its Composites in Southeast Asia, by Country[7]
| Country Name | FOTN Total Score | Obstacles to Access | Limits on Content | Violations of User Rights | ||||
| 2022 | 2023 | 2022 | 2023 | 2022 | 2023 | 2022 | 2023 | |
| Cambodia | 43 | 44 | 13 | 13 | 18 | 17 | 12 | 14 |
| Indonesia | 49 | 47 | 14 | 14 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 16 |
| Laos | ||||||||
| Malaysia | 59 | 61 | 18 | 19 | 22 | 22 | 19 | 20 |
| Myanmar | 12 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| Philippines | 65 | 61 | 17 | 16 | 26 | 23 | 22 | 22 |
| Singapore | 54 | 54 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 |
| Thailand | 39 | 39 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 9 | 9 |
| Timor-Leste | ||||||||
| Vietnam | 22 | 22 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
Source: Raw data from Freedom House excluded Laos and Timor-Leste; table compiled by the author
Note: Green means a year-over-year (YoY) improvement; red means regression; and yellow/amber means no change
This Perspective provides a deeper analysis of the current state of digital repression in Southeast Asia. Specifically, it examines the various states’ capabilities to exercise digital repression and their actual practice of it.
DIGITAL REPRESSION: TYPES AND MEASURES
According to The Rise of Digital Repression, digital repression tactics can be grouped into five categories: surveillance, censorship, social manipulation and disinformation, internet shutdowns, and targeted persecutions of online users.[8] This article draws on data from the Digital Society Project (DSP)[9] to discuss developments pertaining to digital repression for all ASEAN member states plus Timor Leste between 2010-2023. (Note: The data set excludes Brunei Darussalam.) However, for the purpose of this paper, these tactics have been regrouped bi-dimensionally based on the level at which the manipulation takes place. Furthermore, the indicators of DSP also distinguish capacity from actual actions, which is particularly useful; just because a certain state has a high digital repression capacity does not mean that it will practice such tactics more frequently than its lower-capacity counterparts, and vice versa. The measurements[10] used to benchmark the trend of digital repression in this paper are laid out on Table 2.
Table 2: Types and Measures of Digital Repression
| Level of Manipulation | ||
| Infrastructural | Informational | |
| Capacity | . Internet filtering capability . Internet shutdown capability | . Social media monitoring capability |
| Practice | . Internet filtering practice . Internet shutdown practice . Social media monitoring practice | . Domestic dis/misinformation campaigns by state |
Source: data from the Digital Society Project; categorisation modified from Feldstein[11]
In brief, infrastructural manipulation as a tactic of digital repression refers to states attempting to capture the digital infrastructure in order to control the information/communication grid of the nation. On the other hand, informational manipulation—commonly known as information operations (IOs)—is a method used to alter the information architecture with dis/misinformation. So, while informational manipulations influence what kind of information individuals get, infrastructural tactics aim to control how/whether they get that information.
Southeast Asia Trends
Figure 2: Infrastructural Repressive Capability Metrics
In terms of the capacity to control digital infrastructure through internet shutdowns, filtering and social media monitoring, most Southeast Asian countries seem to have bolstered their capabilities in the past decade; especially since 2015. While different countries may experience digital development differently, one of the global phenomena of that decade was the emergence of social media in the political arena, particularly as a tool for social movements. The Arab Spring that saw the overthrow of some dictators in 2010 serves as an archetypal example of digital activism. For a region-specific case, one can look to the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) protest in Thailand in 2013 to see how social media was used to mobilise and coordinate collective actions against the sitting government.[12] As we know, governments are quick learners when it comes to what concerns their survival. Therefore, it is plausible that the empowering potential of the internet and social media for ordinary citizens to go up against their government incentivised the enhancement of infrastructural controls in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, data shown in Figure 2 does not illustrate a discernible divide between high-income versus low-income countries, or even regime types. Myanmar, the poorest ASEAN country in 2023,[13] has almost the same capability of internet filtering and shutdown as Singapore, the region’s richest country; and even surpasses it in social media monitoring capability. This corroborates existing studies showing that digital repression is ubiquitous as well as reinforcing of the “need-based” logic of state repression that political control and survival can drive states to repress their people, or in this case, build their capacity in anticipation of security threats.[14]
However, having high capacity does not ascertain action. Particularly, having the ability to block access to websites or shutting down the internet entirely does not mean that a government would act accordingly. Figure 3 below compares the repressive capacities with the breadth of practices.
Figure 3: Comparison between capacity metrics and practice metrics
Overall, most countries tend to avoid internet shutdowns and blocking of websites despite having the capacity to do so. Once again, the data confirm that states make a cost-benefit calculation when employing digital repression tactics. Particularly, there are socioeconomic tradeoffs to be considered when using overt and broad-based tactics like shutting down the internet or blocking access to certain websites, such as the risk of losing economic productivity and raising social tension. Table 3 below used calculations from Internet Society’s NetLoss Calculator[15] to model the loss in GDP(PPP) and FDI for all ASEAN countries should they decide to shut down their internet or blocking services for just one single day.
Table 3: Calculation of Economic Losses from a Day of Internet Shutdown/Blocking of Services
| Country | Internet Shutdown | Service Blocking | ||||
| GDP Loss | FDI Loss | Unemployment | GDP Loss | FDI Loss | Unemployment | |
| Myanmar | 1,586,741 | 196,114 | 4 | 423,131 | 52,297 | 1 |
| Cambodia | 528,344 | 330,569 | 0 | 140,892 | 88,152 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 23,742,542 | 2,008,655 | 119 | 6,331,344 | 535,641 | 31 |
| Laos | 426,141 | 101,721 | 0 | 113,638 | 27,126 | 0 |
| Malaysia | 6,466,296 | 1,764,668 | 15 | 1,724,346 | 470,578 | 4 |
| Philippines | 6,742,179 | 998,128 | 11 | 1,797,914 | 266,168 | 3 |
| Singapore | 4,229,311 | 10,010,731 | 1 | 1,127,816 | 2,669,528 | 0 |
| Thailand | 8,943,008 | 1,153,586 | 3 | 2,384,802 | 307,623 | 0 |
| Timor-Leste | 48,620 | 8,097 | 0 | 12,965 | 2,159 | 0 |
| Vietnam | 7,576,592 | 1,486,084 | 11 | 2,020,424 | 396,289 | 3 |
| ASEAN Average | 6,028,977 | 1,805,835 | 16.4 | 1,607,727 | 481,556 | 4 |
Note: currency in US Dollar and unemployment counts in person(s)
With socioeconomic risks substantiated, it is intuitive for states to resort to an internet shutdown only when necessary. Such necessity, from a state’s perspective, can be seen in post-coup Myanmar. The Myanmar junta has been facing harsh criticisms and fierce resistance from the public. As such, shutdowns are needed not only to cut the information channels from within and outside of Myanmar but also to make it more difficult for the revolutionary forces to communicate and coordinate against the junta. Myanmar citizens have been experiencing vast, intermittent internet shutdowns since the coup in 2021. The longest complete shutdown lasted for a total of 72 days and service blockage (e.g., blocking access to social media, VPNs, some websites, etc.) has been ongoing for 1,091 days since the coup.[16] Consequently, the country has foregone US$953,631,077 on GDP(PPP) and US$117,864,732 on FDI since the beginning of the coup in shutting down the internet. Other SEA governments seem to prefer softer, more imperceptible approaches such as social media surveillance and censorship for infrastructural control.
As for informational manipulation, as shown in Figure 4, all states appear to engage in some level of disinformation campaigns or information operations, though the magnitude varies. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the reasons or incidents in each country that drive the selection of such a tactic from the data alone. On aggregate, state-sponsored information operations are more prevalent in countries in which the situation requires the government to seek approval and support or convince the populace of something—usually of its legitimacy or performance. It is also imperative to note that one of the factors contributing to the popularity of dis/misinformation campaigns is that it is relatively more affordable compared to other types of digital repression. Therefore, a “cybertroopers” phenomenon has become rampant in the past few years.[17] Furthermore, it can be further supplemented by regulatory frameworks and laws that aim to suppress dissent. For instance, someone who posts on social media criticising the government in Thailand runs the risk of being charged under the Computer-Related Crime Act B.E. 2550 (2007); and if they criticise the royal family, the prosecutor can add Article 112—known as lèse-majesté law—on top of that, too.
Figure 4: Domestic Dis/misinformation Campaigns
This Perspective has presented an overview of the digital repression landscape in Southeast Asia over the past decade. Evidently, the region has followed the global trend towards the narrowing of digital space; and, ultimately the global erosion of democracy. It is crucial for the citizenry to view digital repression as the alter-ego of digital development; after all, states tend to justify the need to bolster digital capabilities by citing national security interests, repackaging it as cybersecurity measures. However, it is equally important to understand that states do make a cost-benefit calculus before engaging in digital repression, just like they do with traditional repressive measures. Most governments prefer to quietly monitor social media activities or use information operations before they block access to websites or go off-grid entirely, since the ensuing socioeconomic costs can be considerable.
Finally, the findings reported here are not without limitations. First, the Digital Society Project dataset relies on an expert-rating method of indexing—which means that the indicators might be intrinsically biased due to the individual expert’s subjective worldviews. However, this is the dataset with the best cross-sectional time series coverage and is widely used by scholars in the field. Secondly, since this paper focuses on regional trends of digital repression, some country-specific nuances might have been overlooked, albeit that the clear anomalies are mentioned. Particularly, it is out of the scope of this paper to discuss in detail why country X engages in more/less digital repressive tactics than the rest of the region. As such, it relies on the “need-based” logic as a catch-all explanation. Future research is indeed required to deepen the understanding of any country-specific digital repression.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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