“Can Malaysia Eliminate Forced Labour by 2030?” by Lee Hwok Aun and Adrian Pereira
“The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): Implications for ASEAN-EU Relations” by Melinda Martinus and Kanin Laopirun
2023/1 “Dangerous Unintended Consequences Loom in the Wake of Thailand’s Hasty Legalisation of Marijuana” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Thailand has hastily ventured into the legalisation of marijuana and hemp without first putting in place necessary control measures.
- The push to legalise the two cannabis plants was led by the Bhumjaithai Party, whose leader is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Health Anutin Charnvirakul.
- Legal ambiguities have led to confusion and widespread concerns about illicit trade and abuse of “legalised” marijuana, especially among young Thais. Follow-up legislation on marijuana and hemp to close the existing loopholes has met serious opposition in the House of Representatives.
- Democrat Party, the third largest party in the ruling coalition underpinning the premiership of General Prayut Chan-o-cha, has joined opposition parties in opposing the revised law, which was drafted chiefly by Bhumjaithai Party. The disagreement between the Democrat Party and Bhumjaithai Party is destabilising the Prayut Administration, and delaying crackdowns on abuses of “legalised” marijuana
- The confusing and dangerous marijuana situation in Thailand threatens to disrupt ASEAN’s regional effort to create a “drug-free” community. It has drawn international attention to Thailand’s apparent failure to fulfil its commitments under the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is a Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Previously he was a researcher on ASEAN political and security cooperation at the Institute’s ASEAN Studies Centre.
ISEAS Perspective 2023/1, 9 January 2023
INTRODUCTION
Thailand’s hasty legalisation of marijuana and hemp,[1] mainly for medicinal use, has produced several adverse unintended consequences. Worst of all is a lack of necessary control measures to safeguard against illicit trade and abuse of marijuana.
Serious disagreement within the ruling coalition on how to impose necessary control of these two cannabis plants is endangering Thai society, and undermining unity of the fragile Prayut Administration. Major opposition parties want to roll back the legalisation of marijuana and hemp, and to return them to the official list of banned narcotics.
Since 9 June 2022, marijuana and hemp, and their resin extracts with less than 0.2% of the THC (Tetrahydrocannabinol, the substance that gets people “high”), have no longer been classified as narcotics in Thailand. Instead, they have become “controlled herbs” under the law of 1999 on protection and promotion of Thai folk wisdom in traditional medicine. Under this law, the minister of public health shall determine what are “controlled herbs” and how to regulate their use in traditional Thai medicine.
A great deal of the confusion stemmed from misinformation spread by Bhumjaithai (BJT) Party’s vigorous campaign for “free marijuana” (กัญชาเสรี, “ganja seri”) prior to the March 2019 general election. BJT leader Anutin Charnvirakul, who is now a deputy premier and minister of public health, could be seen in one video clip extolling the benefits of legalised marijuana – including smoking it for recreation at home.[2]
Later on, during a no-confidence debate in the House of Representatives in July 2022, Anutin apologised for “joking” about smoking marijuana, insisting that he did not and will not advocate the recreational use of marijuana.[3]
However, the continuing ambiguities about “free marijuana” remain a serious public health threat to Thai society. Talking about marijuana and hemp in the same breath also tends to create more confusion, because they are different things—marijuana has more of the intoxicating THC substance than hemp, whose fibres have wide industrial use.
Thailand’s hasty legalisation of the two cannabis plants also threatens to disrupt ASEAN’s regional effort to create a “drug-free” community; the other nine ASEAN members still treat marijuana as a banned narcotic. Thailand’s lack of control measures of the “free marijuana” may even violate UN conventions on narcotic control which Thailand has joined out of concern for “the health and welfare of mankind”.[4]
SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
Thailand signed the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 on 24 July 1961, and ratified it on 31 October 1961. It also ratified on 21 November 1975 and 3 May 2002, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, respectively.[5]
Cannabis plants were narcotic drugs in Schedule I and Schedule IV of the 1961 Single Convention. If a country permits the cultivation of these plants, Article 28 of the Single Convention requires the country to put in place a “system of controls” as had been done for the opium poppy, including setting up a national agency to regulate cultivation, designating cultivation areas, issuing licences to cultivators, and allowing the purchase of cannabis plants only from the licenced cultivators. The national agency shall also be in charge of importing, exporting, wholesale trading, and maintaining stocks.
In November 2018, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD) recommended, among other things, deleting cannabis and cannabis resin from Schedule IV of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The recommendation was subsequently conveyed to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in January 2019, who requested the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) to consider the deletion of cannabis and cannabis resin from Schedule IV.
WHO’s experts believe that cannabis and cannabis resin have medicinal potential. And in order to encourage worldwide research into their medicinal benefits, cannabis and cannabis resin should be removed from Schedule IV, a list of dangerous narcotic drugs with little or no medicinal properties, such as heroin, which are subject to very strict control measures.
Established under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the CND has 53 UN member states on a rotational membership. On 2 December 2020, a slim majority of the CND endorsed the recommendation of the ECDD in a vote of 27 in favour, 25 against, and one abstention (Ukraine). Thailand was among the 27 member states voting for the deletion of cannabis and cannabis resin from the Schedule IV.[6]
Singapore, which was not on the CND, expressed its disappointment with the decision. Its Ministry of Home Affairs issued a statement warning that the move could “fuel public misperception, especially among youths, that cannabis is no longer considered to be as harmful as before, despite strong evidence showing otherwise. …” And the Ministry of Home Affairs also stressed that the CND’s move “will not impact Singapore’s zero-tolerance stance towards drugs. …”[7]
In fact, cannabis and cannabis resin have remained on Schedule I of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, a list of substances including LSD, methcathinone, and heroin, which are highly addictive and liable to abuse, and are therefore subject to national and international controls.
For Thailand, the CND’s decision created a new impetus to speed up legalisation of marijuana and hemp. Unfortunately, the haste to liberalise marijuana and hemp cultivation, and failure to institute necessary control measures have created legal ambiguities and loopholes. This has led to widespread concerns about illicit cultivation and trade, and abuse of marijuana among Thai youths.
CONTROLLED HERBS ARE NOT NARCOTICS
Marijuana can be found in rural Thailand, especially in the north-eastern region where locals have used it in cooking, treating certain illnesses, and undoubtedly smoking for recreation. But in fact, marijuana was outlawed since 1934 under the Marijuana Act of B.E. 2477. The law prohibited, among other things, the smoking of marijuana.
Subsequently, marijuana was classified as a narcotic in the Marijuana Act of B.E. 2522 (1979), which prohibited its cultivation, distribution, import, export, and possession, unless with the permission of the Minister of Public Health on a case-by-case basis. The 1979 law was superseded by the Narcotic Drugs Act (7th edition) B.E. 2562 (2019), which opened the door wider for the cultivation and the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. And the Minister of Public Health has continued to be the authority for issuing licences, including the permit for marijuana cultivation.
Additional liberalisation of marijuana and hemp took place on 9 June 2022 when “every part” of the cannabis plants and their resin extracts with less than 0.2% of THC or CBD (Cannabidiol)[8] were declassified as narcotic drugs.
As a consequence of the legalisation of marijuana, all those who had been convicted in marijuana cases were immediately released. A spokesman for the Ministry of Justice reported that 3,071 marijuana convicts were released on 9 June 2022. All pending marijuana cases in court or under police investigation are to be dropped; and confiscation of marijuana can no longer be done. Owners of marijuana and properties confiscated in arrests prior to 9 June 2022 may apply for their return.[9]
Marijuana and hemp have been reclassified as “controlled herbs” under the Ministry of Public Health’s Announcement of 16 June 2022. They are no longer under the purview of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB).
EVERY HOUSEHOLD CAN GROW MARIJUANA
All Thais who are 20 or older can possess, use, look after, transport, and sell marijuana legally. Those who need the cannabis for treatment of some illnesses may be in possession of the “controlled herb” or its resin up to 30 days for their medicinal needs.
However, still prohibited under the 16 June 2022 Announcement are: smoking in public places, the use of marijuana by women who are pregnant or breast-feeding, and the selling of marijuana to these women and to youths under 20 years of age.[10]
Every Thai can freely cultivate marijuana and hemp for personal and medicinal use without any cultivation permit, except to register with the Foods and Drugs Administration (FDA) of the Ministry of Public Health through its “Plook Ganja” (marijuana cultivation) app.
As of 6 December 2022, the FDA had received about 1.12 million applications, to which 1.08 million permits had been issued. The FDA’s website for the registration had received more than 49 million hits.[11]
However, cashing in on planting marijuana for sale is actually difficult. On the one hand, resin extracts of marijuana and marijuana products with more than 0.2% of THC are still regulated. Permits are needed to plant high-grade marijuana or to use it in products for sale. Commercial-grade marijuana with a high percentage of THC needs careful attention in a temperature-controlled greenhouse. Ordinary people may not have enough money or technical know-how to invest in the necessary facilities and to plant high-grade marijuana successfully.
Moreover, marijuana with high content of THC can be sold only to a government agency which is to be set up for marijuana trade. Export and import of marijuana are also highly regulated, and not open to ordinary people. International trade of marijuana and its products is also tightly control under the UN conventions.
Unfortunately, marijuana has appeared in foods, ice cream, cookies, drinks, herbal medicines and ointments, and cosmetics in Thai markets and online platforms – sometimes without clear labelling and warning on its possible adverse side-effects. Existing laws and regulations seem inadequate to provide the necessary safeguard for public health and for protecting vulnerable young Thais.
The confusing and dangerous situation alarmed the Thai Medical Council (TMC) to such an extent that it had to mobilise all of its members to warn the Thai public of the dangers of marijuana, and to oppose all forms of recreational use of marijuana. The TMC also issued its proposals on Thailand’s marijuana policy, and reiterated its objection to recreational use of marijuana, even though it continued to support careful use of marijuana for medical purposes.[12]
Buddhist,[13] Islamic,[14] and Christian bodies in Thailand all have voiced their objections to “free marijuana” and warned their followers to stay away from it. The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defence have banned marijuana and hemp from all schools, provincial government offices, and military areas, respectively.
Sensing that the rampant abuse of “free marijuana” was getting out of hand, Public Health Minister Anutin issued on 11 November 2022 a new regulation to tighten control of topping buds and flowers of marijuana, which tend to contain a high percentage of the intoxicating THC substance.
However, several problems remain unresolved. For example: How to prevent children and youths from smoking home-grown marijuana? This failure to protect children from marijuana is a violation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 33; or how to determine which crop of marijuana, or which food products have how much of the THC substance? Furthermore, some available test kits cost 4,000 baht per set. Sending a sample to a government lab will incur a test fee of 5,000 baht.[15]
Thai police and highway patrolmen cannot yet determine on the spot whether a motorist in a road accident is under the influence of THC or not. Foreign tourists smoking marijuana in Thailand or bringing marijuana or marijuana products back home may face arrest on arrival, even though those products are legally sold in Thailand.[16]
NEW MARIJUANA LEGISLATION BLOCKED
The Prayut Administration’s government policy announced in the parliament on 25 July 2019 included, as one of 12 “urgent policy issues”, the promotion of research and development of marijuana and hemp as herbs for medicinal use and medical industry and for creating economic opportunities and income generation for the people. In order to follow up on the legalisation of the cannabis plants, Public Health Minister Anutin and his colleagues submitted a bill on marijuana and hemp on 27 January 2022.
On 8 June 2022, the House of Representative accepted the bill for further consideration. The approval vote was overwhelming: 373 for, 7 against, and 23 abstentions.
Subsequently, however, many MPs, including those in the Democrat Party, the third largest government party, have changed their minds. Others on an ad hoc House committee scrutinising the draft bill have proposed many new provisions to create additional control measures. Consequently, the revised draft bill has expanded to 95 articles from the 45 found in the initial draft.
The revised draft bill will, among other things, allow every household to grow up to 15 marijuana plants for personal use, and to cultivate hemp up to 5 rai (about 6,400 squares metre). Those who wish to sell marijuana or hemp must apply for permission from the FDA. And smoking the cannabis in public places will remain prohibited.
However, the proposed bill has no role for the ONCB, the main anti-narcotic agency of the Thai government.
The revised bill returned to the House for its second reading on 14 December amid threats of a sizeable number of MPs – including those from the Democrat Party on the government side – to scuttle it on the grounds that it will not prohibit recreational use of marijuana. MPs from the top two opposition parties, Pheu Thai, and Move Forward have vehemently criticised the proposed law, and have vowed to return marijuana to the list of controlled narcotic substances if they are in the new government after the next general election.
For Democrat Party, its ulterior motive in trying to undercut the BJT’s legalisation of marijuana is partly because the two parties are bitterly competing for support in Thailand’s southern provinces, where 55 House seats will be at stake in the next general election.
Some opposition MPs have raised the question whether Minister Anutin has some unlawful conflict of interest in pushing for the legalisation of marijuana and hemp, since his family’s business included a subsidiary involving in hemp cultivation.[17] The head of the House ad hoc committee scrutinising the draft bill, Supachai Jaisamut of the BJT, deplored the lack of support from fellow government MPs, calling it a “political game” to undermine his party. He also emphasised that the draft bill is the government’s legislation effort – not just the BJT’s.[18] He claimed that the proposed law will impose necessary control measures to regulate the marijuana business, which is estimated to be worth at over 70,000 million baht a year.[19]
In his introduction of the revised bill in the House on 14 December, Supachai emphasised the need to further support medicinal use of marijuana with the proposed comprehensive new law. He claimed that before the legalisation of marijuana, only about 16% of those who needed marijuana as medicine could get it from safe and legitimate sources. A large majority of them had to buy marijuana from unreliable sources on the black market at high prices.[20]
Due to serious opposition from many MPs, the House Speaker initiated a new solution on 22 December, with concurrence of the chief government whip and the opposition whip, to postpone the further reading of the revised draft bill to January 2023. This will avoid wasting too much time on debating the controversial bill; and the House could then turn its attention to finalising five draft bills that have been revised by the Senate.
The current final regular session of the House ends on 28 February 2023. Should the revised draft bill fail to pass into law, BJT leader Anutin has vowed to continue to highlight legalisation of marijuana and hemp in its election campaign in the next general election. In his capacity as the public health minister, Anutin has assured the Thai public that adequate control measures have been put in place, and additional measures can be added to plug all remaining loopholes.
Efforts by Anutin and the BJT suffered a new setback on 21 November when the Central Administration Court accepted for further hearing a petition from a group of opposition MPs and critics of his “free marijuana” drive. The group is asking the court to put marijuana and hemp back to the official list of narcotic drugs.
ASEAN DRUG-FREE COMMUNITY?
As early as in July 1998, ASEAN foreign ministers put forth a lofty vision of a “Drug-Free ASEAN”. In their Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN, they called for “all modalities to eradicate illicit drug production, processing, trafficking and use in ASEAN by the year 2020.[21]
The 2020 target has been missed. But ASEAN cooperation to create the drug-free regional community remains on course (at least on paper) under the 2016-2025 ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs, and in the Blueprint of the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) 2025.
In the chairman’s statement of the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in Phnom Penh, issued on 11 November 2022, ASEAN Leaders “reaffirmed our commitment towards a drug-free region. We also remained steadfast in realising this commitment amidst global attempts to reschedule certain types of illicit drugs. …”[22]
However, Thailand has already ventured into its own way of marijuana legalisation, whereas the other nine ASEAN members still consider marijuana as a dangerous narcotic which must be eradicated from the ASEAN Community if it is to become “drug-free”. How ASEAN members are going to tackle this serious discrepancy is not yet clear.
As things stand now, the Prayut Administration’s approach seems to focus first on securing necessary control measures of marijuana and hemp domestically. Regional commitments to support the creation of the Drug-Free ASEAN, and to fulfil its international commitments to protect the “health and welfare of mankind” under the UN’s Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs will have to wait.
CONCLUSION
Anutin and his BJT have been blamed for recklessly promising too much regarding “free marijuana” during the 2019 election campaign. Serious confusion and legal ambiguities followed after marijuana and hemp stopped being considered narcotic drugs under Thai law, starting on 9 June 2022. Furthermore, mentioning marijuana and hemp together has tended to create more confusion; the two are in fact quite different things.
Illicit trade and recreation use of marijuana have created serious concerns not only in Thailand, but also among fellow ASEAN members for whom marijuana remains a banned narcotic.
Slow follow-up legislation on control measures on marijuana and hemp will continue to haunt Thai society, and aggravate rivalry between the BJT and Democrat Party in the unstable Prayut Administration.
Whether or not continued legalisation of marijuana and hemp will become a hot campaign issue in the next general election remains to be seen.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the the pdf document here.
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“The Indonesian Military Enjoys Strong Public Trust and Support: Reasons and Implications” by Burhanuddin Muhtadi
2022/120 “China-educated Malaysians and China’s Educational Outreach to Malaysia” by Ngeow Chow Bing and Fan Pik Shy
FaceBook Page of Xiamen Univeristy Source: https://www.facebook.com/xmumalaysia. Snapshot taken on 22 December 2022.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- There are at least four different kinds of China-educated Malaysians: Malaysians pursuing university education in China; Malaysians doing short-term training courses in China; Malaysians learning Chinese language at Confucius Institutes within Malaysia; and Malaysians studying at Xiamen University Malaysia.
- Those Malaysian students studying in China universities are associated with two different circles, the non-Chinese-educated (mostly Malays) and the Chinese-educated (mostly ethnic Chinese Malaysians). Both circles exhibit clear differences in terms of financing, size, social impact, fields of study and career tracts. Due to an active alumni network, the Chinese-educated circle possesses more social influence within Malaysia and stronger connections with China.
- Confucius Institutes and Xiamen University Malaysia provide opportunities for Malaysians to experience China’s education in Malaysia. The former focuses on basic language training while the latter is a comprehensive institution offering a wide range of courses.
- Short-term training courses for foreign participants are another cost-effective way for China to project its educational soft power and outreach.
- From the perspective of China’s soft power, all categories of “China-educated Malaysians” generally hold positive views of China. However, they remain a minority group among Malaysians receiving foreign education. Additionally, there are still no important political leaders, top civil servants, or think tank analysts in Malaysia that have a China education background.
* Ngeow Chow Bing is Director at the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. Fan Pik Shy is Senior Lecturer at the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/120, 27 December 2022
INTRODUCTION
Education is a “soft power” resource, and China has been investing in its universities for decades, and utilizing its higher education sector for educational outreach. Malaysia is one of the countries which have a large group of students receiving education provided by China. This has especially been the case after 2011, when Malaysia and China signed an educational agreement on mutual recognition of their university degrees.
Malaysians who receive China-provided education are not confined to those who pursue university education in China. Broadly speaking, “China-educated Malaysians” can be grouped into the following categories: Malaysians receiving university education in China; Malaysians undertaking short-term courses in China; Malaysians receiving basic Chinese language training within Malaysia (Confucius Institutes); and Malaysians receiving China’s university education within Malaysia (Xiamen University Malaysia).[1] This paper discusses these “China-educated Malaysians,” their demographic characteristics, their social impacts and their views on China.
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN CHINA
China emerged as an important choice for Malaysian students in the late 2000s. Table 1 below provides data on the numbers of Malaysian students studying in China’s universities in recent years. There are discrepancies between the data provided by Malaysia’s Ministry of Higher Education and China’s Ministry of Education, however; in some years the numbers provided by both countries differ by a wide margin, and in other cases the numbers match, but appear in different years.
Table 1: Malaysian Students Studying in China’s Universities
(Sources: For Malaysian statistics, the annual volumes of Statisik Pendidikan Tinggi are available at: https://www.mohe.gov.my/muat-turun/statistik; For Chinese statistics, these are compiled from sources such as China’s Ministry of Education and China Association for International Education)
Malaysian data display two categories: “sponsored” and “self-sponsored”. Generally, the Malaysian students who are under the “sponsored” category generally (but not exclusively) come from a non-Chinese-educated background (mostly Malays); they are sponsored by the government, government-owned companies, public universities and private sector companies. In contrast, the students under the “non-sponsored” category are mostly Chinese-educated ethnic Chinese Malaysians. Hence, among Malaysian students receiving higher education in China, there is a clear distinction between the two different circles (see Table 2).
Table 2: Non-Chinese-Educated and Chinese-Educated Malaysian Students Studying in China
| Non-Chinese Educated | Chinese-Educated | |
| Financing | Public and private sector sponsorship | Self-sponsorshipCommunity sponsorship |
| Size | Small, a few hundred at most | Large, at least in the thousands |
| Ethnicity | Mostly Malays | Overwhelmingly ethnic Chinese (Chinese-educated and Chinese-speaking) |
| Fields of Study | Basic Chinese language trainingTeaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (TCSOL) Economics and business-related | Diverse fields Popular majors: Chinese Studies/Chinese Literature (中文系), Journalism, Business, Engineering, International Relations, Natural Sciences, Medicine |
| Universities | Mostly concentrated in these universities: Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) and Beijing Language and Culture University (BLCU) | More diverse and in different cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Hangzhou, etc. |
| Social Organization and Connections | Informal connections and circles among graduates of BFSU and BLCU Limited social impact so far | Associations of Graduates from Universities and Colleges in China, Malaysia Various alumni organizations (Jinan, Peking, Tsinghua, Huaqiao, Zhejiang, etc.) Vibrant participation in community affairs as Chinese community organizations (huatuan/华团) Alumni bodies’ continuous engagement with the Chinese government’s “Overseas Chinese Affairs System” (侨务系统) |
| Career prospects | Mostly public sectorGovernment schoolsChinese language teaching centers | Mostly private sectorChinese schools |
The non-Chinese-educated circle is small compared to the Chinese-educated one. They are mostly funded under several programmes initiated by the Malaysian government, and mostly study at Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) and Beijing Language and Culture University (BLCU). These programmes are meant for non-Chinese-educated students to learn the Chinese language as a second language and to specialize in an academic major known as “Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages” (TCSOL). The goal is to train Chinese language teachers to serve in Malaysia’s national primary and secondary schools (but not the local Chinese schools of Malaysia). Some of these students also undertake advanced training (master or even doctoral training in the TCSOL field). The students with post-graduate TCSOL degrees will often come to teach at public universities,[2] with some opening up private Chinese language tutoring businesses.
The Chinese-educated circle are mostly self-funded or funded by the community (such as clan associations). Because of their natural Chinese language ability, these students are exempted from taking the Chinese language standard test in the admission process for China’s universities. Since the learning of the Chinese language is unnecessary, the fields of study pursued by Chinese-educated Malaysians are much more varied. Unlike the non-Chinese-educated circle, many of the graduates in the Chinese-educated-circle end up working in the private sector.
Another notable and important aspect of this circle is its active alumni network; there are several alumni organizations formed among the graduates of various China’s universities (Peking, Xiamen, Fudan, Jinan, etc.). There is also the umbrella organization known as the Associations of Graduates from Universities and Colleges in China, Malaysia (commonly known as Liu Hua 留华).[3]
Liu Hua is actively involved in Chinese community affairs in Malaysia and plays a major role in maintaining and advancing people-to-people ties between China and Malaysia. It is the main organizer of the “China Winter Camp” activity, which brings thousands of ethnic Chinese Malaysian youths to visit China, especially their ancestral hometowns. Liu Hua actively promotes universities in China to the Chinese-educated Malaysians and was one of the most active organizations lobbying for the recognition of Chinese university degrees by the Malaysian government. It also plays a role in connecting the Malaysian educational sector to their Chinese counterparts, for example, by organizing field trips for Malaysia’s education officials, school officials (headmasters), and school board members to China for educational exchanges and collaboration. Several teachers’ training programmes are also conducted under the coordinating role of Liu Hua. Moreover, Liu Hua maintains a productive working relationship with the Overseas Chinese Affairs organizations of China, including the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Offices, and Zhigong Party (致公党). It collaborates with these entities in educational, cultural and youth activities.
With a much larger group of students and the support of various alumni organizations, the social impact of Chinese-educated Malaysians is considerably stronger than that of the non-Chinese-educated Malaysians. Interactions between these two circles of China-educated students, however, while growing, appear to be limited.
SHORT-TERM TRAINING COURSES IN CHINA
In addition to the formal multi-year higher education, various entities in China also encourage and provide funding and opportunities for Malaysians to undergo short-term training. These courses last from either a few weeks to a few months in China’s universities or other training institutions, and the subjects range from technical/engineering training to language training and political governance (especially under party-to-party cooperation). Due to their diverse and decentralized nature, there is no known total tally of the training programmes that Malaysians participate in.
This kind of short-term training programme is very useful for China’s soft power. Compared to the conventional academic scholarships that usually cover tuition fees and stipends that last for several years, sponsoring foreign course participants in short-term training programmes is less costly and easier to organize. Course participants in short-term programmes are mostly mid-career individuals who are not able to undertake a lengthy period of leave to pursue conventional higher education in China. Hence, by sponsoring short-term programmes, China has an opportunity to extend its educational outreach beyond university-age youths. The relatively short duration of these programmes allows participants to experience China in an extended time frame beyond a short tourist visit, allowing them to form a lasting – and hopefully for China – a positive impression of the country.
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES IN MALAYSIA
China’s most popular soft power project is the Confucius Institute. Its main task is to teach the Chinese language to non-native speakers. As of today, six Confucius Institutes have been established in Malaysia.
Table 3: Confucius Institutes in Malaysia
| Confucius Institute | Year | Partnering institution of China | Official Website/social media | Number of students |
| Kong Zi Institute University of Malaya | 2009 | Beijing Foreign Studies University | http://www.kongzium.edu.my/ https://www.facebook.com/KZIUM/ | In 2021, students totalled 14,221. |
| Confucius Institute, SEGi University | 2015 | Hainan Normal University | https://university.segi.edu.my/?page_id=18172 https://www.facebook.com/Segiconfucius/ | Each year: 250 |
| Confucius Institute, Universiti Malaysia Pahang | 2011/2018 | Hebei University | https://ci.ump.edu.my/index.php/en/ https://www.facebook.com/Confucius-Institute-100623258174139/ | Around 1,600 students annually registered in both credit and non-credit courses. |
| Confucius Institute, Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) | 2019 | Changsha University of Technology | https://www.ums.edu.my/ci/ https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100064972362454 | NA |
| Confucius Institute, University College of Technology Sarawak | 2020 | North China University of Water Conservancy and Electric Power | https://confuciusinstitute.uts.edu.my/about-us/ | NA |
| Confucius Institute at Shen Jai Education Group | 2022 | Xidian University | https://ci.shenjai.edu.my/newsite/?page_id=8 | NA |
Among these Confucius Institutes, the most well-developed is Kong Zi Institute at the University of Malaya (KZIUM). Established in 2009 with a first batch of 300 students enrolled in 2010, by 2021 the student body had grown to 14,221 in number (see Figure 1).
What is notable about KZIUM is that it has teaching sites all over Malaysia, essentially making itself an equivalent to several functional Confucius Institutes. All teaching sites are hosted within public universities and a handful of secondary national schools, with the number of students ranging in the hundreds and sometimes thousands. Many of these teaching sites are also located in relatively rural or remote areas outside the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan region, within satellite campuses of public universities that otherwise have very little formal engagement with China’s universities or entities. The presence of KZIUM teaching sites in these remote campuses provide opportunities for KZIUM to connect China’s universities with institutions hosting these teaching sites, therefore increasing China’s soft power in the more remote regions of Malaysia.[4]
Figure 1: Annual Numbers of Total Registered Students at KZIUM
(Source: Annual Report of Kong Zi Institute 2018, Annual Report of Kong Zi Institute 2019 and through personal contacts with Kong Zi Institute)
The vast majority of KZIUM students are university students. However, it is worth noting that most of them had only completed HSK 1 or HSK 2, whereas the basic requirement of entry into China’s universities for foreign students is HSK 5. Before the pandemic, KZIUM also provided Chinese language training to selected officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Royal Malaysian Police and the Immigration Department. These courses were designed in a specialized way to cater to the professional needs of these agencies and differed from the standard curricula that follows the HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi or 汉语水平考试) standard and the “Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages” (TCSOL) teaching structure.
KZIUM also engages more with the industry by creating a “Chinese language +” structure where students who have undergone training can be readily hired by China’s enterprises. This structure also allows for local employees of China’s enterprises to undertake basic Chinese language training at KZIUM. In this regard, the Confucius Institute at Universiti Malaysia Pahang has done better. Benefitting from its location (Kuantan), where there is a major China-backed industrial park (the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park) and China-backed railway (the East Coast Rail Link), the Confucius Institute at Universiti Malaysia Pahang is highly involved in several joint degree programmes (with Beijing Jiaotong University) related to engineering.[5]
XIAMEN UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA
Malaysia also hosts the most ambitious international branch campus project undertaken by any Chinese university. This is Xiamen University Malaysia. Xiamen University Malaysia has a 150-acre campus in a town on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, accommodating up to 10,000 students. As of 2022, the student body numbers around 6,000 students, one-third of which come from China. The rest are mostly Malaysian students, predominantly from the ethnic Chinese community. In contrast to the Confucius Institute, Xiamen University Malaysia does not offer Chinese language teaching. Instead, it is a truly comprehensive university, offering a wide range of academic programmes ranging from the humanities and business studies to natural sciences and engineering. More interestingly, most courses are taught in the English language.
Xiamen University Malaysia enrolled its first batch of students in 2016. From 2019 to 2021, three batches of students – totaling 2,140 students –graduated from the university. Among them, 1,285 are Malaysians (see Table 4). In his convocation speech in 2022, Professor Wang Ruifang, the president of Xiamen University Malaysia, said that after graduation, many of its graduates had been able to join renowned private sector enterprises (some of which are Chinese companies such as Huawei or Bank of China) or to continue post-graduate studies in other prestigious universities in the world such as Oxford, Columbia, London School of Economics or others.[6] As of now, not many graduates of Xiamen University Malaysia have joined the public sector, an employment pattern similar to that of the ethnic Chinese students graduating from universities in China.
Table 4 Number of Graduates of Xiamen University of Malaysia[7]
| Year | Malaysian Students | International Students (mostly from China) | Total |
| 2019 | 242 | 129 | 371 |
| 2020 & 2021 | 1,043 | 726 | 1,769 |
| Total | 1,285 | 855 | 2,140 |
(Source: Sina News 2019; Sinchew Daily 2022)
CONCLUSION: CHINA-EDUCATED MALAYSIANS, THEIR INFLUENCE AND CHINA’S SOFT POWER
Among the four groups of “China-educated Malaysians.”, the largest and the most transformative group (in terms of personal immersion in China) are those who pursue higher education to obtain a university degree. There are two different circles within this group: the non-Chinese-educated (mostly Malays) and the Chinese-educated (mostly ethnic Chinese). Each circle has its own characteristics, demography, career track, social impacts, and influences. The most influential “China-educated Malaysians” almost certainly are those from the Chinese-educated circle; this circle possesses a longer history, has a larger community, and boasts an active alumni network vigorously engaged in community affairs and in people-to-people ties between China and Malaysia. The most influential alumni organization is Liu Hua, which serves as an organizational platform to connect members, articulate and magnify their voices and interests, mobilize resources, and liaise with other bodies and entities, including those from China.
All these categories of “China-educated Malaysians” generally (though not necessarily entirely) hold positive views about China. Particularly those who have been to China are in general impressed by China’s rapid development economically and technologically, the orderliness of its cities, and the dynamism of its people and society. Some, however, do note the growing political restrictions within China and feel uncomfortable about this trend. For the Malaysians who experience China’s education within Malaysia (Confucius Institutes and Xiamen University Malaysia), although the exposure to China at the personal level is limited, China is still largely perceived positively, albeit at a more superficial level.
Although increasing, “China-educated Malaysians” remains a minority group among the many Malaysians receiving foreign education. Notably, there are still no important political leaders, top civil servants, or think tank analysts in Malaysia who have a China education background. Outside of the ethnic Chinese community, no notable Malaysian businesspersons are known to have a China education background. However, this could change in the future.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the the pdf document here.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2022/119 “The Promise and Peril of Patronage Politics for Authoritarian Party-Building in Thailand” by Napon Jatusripitak
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Palang Pracharath Party’s (PPRP’s) decision to mobilise support through patronage politics in the 2019 general election has resulted in its failure to develop a strong and coherent party organisation with effective control over its MPs and durable ties to its local electoral base.
- This outcome is best understood as an enduring consequence of how the PPRP’s tacit alliance with the military regime both empowered and encouraged the party to co-opt leaders of vote-canvassing networks at the subnational level to substitute for party-building.
- The PPRP’s use of candidate selection to share power with its factions, and these factions’ capacity to leverage their party affiliation to consolidate power locally saw the emergence of an anarchy of factions with growing autonomy from the party.
- In the face of a looming threat posed by the Pheu Thai Party and an ongoing factional strife stemming from a rift between the party leader, General Prawit Wongsuwan, and Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the PPRP may be vulnerable to a mass exodus by its factions and MPs to other parties.
*Napon Jatusripitak is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is a PhD Researcher at Northwestern University.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/119, 14 December 2022
INTRODUCTION
Despite significant changes in Thailand’s political landscape since 1997, many Thai political parties and candidates continue to compete for votes in general elections by offering money, favours, jobs, and preferential access to government resources to their constituents.[1] This practice, called patronage politics, has long been organised in Thailand through vote-canvassing networks (rabob huakhanaen) made up of local government officials, politicians, and influential leaders.[2] Reaching deep and wide, these networks are typically entrusted to deliver selective benefits to voters who may be expected, or persuaded, to vote for candidates preferred by the networks in return.[3]
The prevalence and persistence of patronage politics and vote-canvassing networks in Thailand may be interpreted in several ways: as a result of longstanding inequality and extreme concentration of resources; as a symptom of weak parties and ineffective institutions, or as a pattern set in motion by contingent historical events related to the country’s uneven and interrupted democratisation. Nonetheless, the ills of Thailand’s patronage democracy—corruption, nepotism, factionalism, and money politics—have largely been blamed on provincial politicians who appear to have bought their way into power, and on the recipients of their handouts, primarily the rural poor, who have come to be viewed as victims of these vote buyers or, worse, their accomplices.[4]
This point of view, shared by many Bangkok-based and reform-minded elites and widely publicised in the mainstream media and anti-vote-buying campaigns, served as the moral underpinning for the design of the 1997 Constitution.[5] In 2006 and 2014, this viewpoint became part of the rhetoric used to justify the overthrow of democratically elected governments.[6] Democratic failure in Thailand was once again pinned on patronage politics—but with a sleight of hand. The quintessential patron deemed responsible for hijacking democracy in Thailand had now taken the form of the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his party, despite evidence that their electoral dominance was built on a new kind of party-voter linkages fostered through populist leadership and policies rather than through traditional vote-canvassing networks alone.
Given this background, the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP)’s heavy reliance on vote-canvassing networks in the 2019 general election marked the comeback of old strategies for sharing and consolidating power.[7] At the risk of alienating urban and conservative supporters who had previously expressed discontent with patronage tactics, the party was unabashed in its attempt to co-opt old-style politicians, families, and factions, many of them former allies of Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party. The party exploited its links to the military regime, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), to secure the backing of these individuals, promising them assistance and protection in return for their support. Taking advantage of an uneven institutional playing field and the regime’s influence over the state apparatus, it empowered these individuals’ vote-canvassing networks. In short, rather than curtailing patronage politics, the PPRP took it to new heights, fostering the kind of democracy whose dysfunction provided the rationale for authoritarian solutions in the first place.
This article provides an overview of the PPRP’s engagement in patronage politics, and how its strategy of co-opting provincial and local elites unfolded and with what consequences for the party and democracy in Thailand. Based on this analysis, it makes the case that the resurgence of patronage politics under the current electoral-authoritarian framework may destabilise the regime’s capacity to maintain power through elections.[8]
DOMINANCE THROUGH CO-OPTATION
In parallel to building its party brand on policies already implemented by the NCPO government and on the personal appeal of the NCPO leader-cum-prime minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the PPRP formed strategic alliances with provincial and local political elites, factions and families.[9] These individuals’ networks laid the groundwork for building support for the party at the local level, notably in regions such as the North and the Northeast, where the party could not campaign on its overt pro-military stance, or in constituencies where awareness of the newly-formed party was lacking.
Tapping Provincial and Local Constellations of Power
Actual recruitment occurred long before formal candidate selection and, in many cases, even before the party was officially launched. Sontaya Khunpluem, leader of the Phalang Chon Party and Chon Buri’s dominant Khunpluem family, was the first of many big names to join the alliance that eventually became the PPRP. Sontaya was appointed as a political advisor to the prime minister and Mayor of Pattaya in 2018 under the authority of Section 44 of the Interim Constitution. The move was designed to signal that the NCPO was eager to work with politicians and that a military-backed party was in the works.[10] Sontaya’s group eventually joined the PPRP and fielded candidates under the PPRP’s banner in Chon Buri.
At around the same time, former TRT cabinet ministers and Wang Nam Yom faction leaders Somsak Thepsutin and Suriya Juangroongruangkit, along with Anucha Nakasai and Pirom Pholwiset, formed the Sam Mitr (“Three Allies”) faction. The Sam Mitr faction’s deal-making and recruiting activities made national news on a regular basis, sending shockwaves across Pheu Thai, whose MPs, particularly in the upper-Central, lower-Northern, and Northeastern provinces, had personal links to Sam Mitr’s leaders. The group also succeeded in bringing on board Preecha Rengsomboonsuk, former Pheu Thai cabinet minister and MP, and his faction in Loei Province, demonstrating the strength of Sam Mitr’s connections as well as Pheu Thai’s failure to stop its political heavyweights from defecting.[11]
By September 2018, the PPRP had secured the backing of over a hundred former MPs from various political parties, drawn from more than a dozen factions and influential families. Beyond the factions already mentioned, the PPRP recruited Varathep Rattanakorn’s faction in Kamphaeng Phet, Virat Rattanaset’s faction in Nakhon Ratchasima, Supol Fongngam’s faction in Ubon Ratchathani, Santi Prompat’s faction in Petchabun, Pinit Jarusombat’s Wang Phayanak faction, Suchart Tancharoen’s Ban Rim Nam faction, Aekkarat Changlao’s faction in Khon Kaen, the Thianthong family in Sa Kaeo, the Asavahame family in Samut Prakan, and the Teekananond family in Udon Thani.[12]
This patchwork of factions and families, spanning laterally across Northern, Northeastern, and Central Thailand and extending down to the local level, was put together in a relatively short period of time—less than one year before the March 2019 election. Substituting for the party infrastructure, it served as a “political power grid” for the party that not only attracted former MP candidates and local politicians from the region and neighbouring provinces, but also filled the gap between the party and voters.[13]
An Unholy Alliance
From the party’s perspective, mobilising support through vote-canvassing networks appeared vital for success.[14] Despite its attempt to create a party brand in advance by adopting the name pracharat (ประชารัฐ a civil state) from policies implemented long before the party’s founding, the PPRP had no local roots. Worse, in a landscape marked by a sharp ideological divide between pro-Thaksin and pro-military parties, the PPRP could not count on the ebbs and flows of voter sentiments (krasae) to work in its favour, especially in areas where Thaksin’s popularity remained strong.
Against this backdrop, reliance on factions controlling vote-canvassing networks conveyed a sense of assurance and predictability, comparable to “pushing a button,” in terms of producing a favourable election outcome or at least one that was acceptable to the junta. Accordingly, relying on polling instruments and intelligence from military officers, police officers, and bureaucrats, the party checked for the popularity of prospective candidates as well as the credibility of their vote-canvassing networks, which were treated as metrics for determining the amount of informal financial support promised to each candidate or faction.[15]
The incentives for joining the PPPR, on the other hand, ranged from a general desire to be part of the future governing coalition, and thereby secure access to patronage, to protection and legal assistance from the military regime. First, the PPRP was situated as a party backed by the NCPO, which oversaw the appointment of the 250-member Senate, which would participate in the selection of the prime minister in a joint session involving both Houses. This generated an air of certainty that the PPRP would be in the lead in terms of approving a prime minister of its own choosing and forming the government. Second, the NCPO was widely associated with “total and exclusive access to state power,” wielding influence over the courts, regulatory agencies, and the bureaucracy—an impression that the PPRP capitalised on in order to “to persuade, coerce or offer protection to targeted individuals that had potential.”[16] Therefore, no matter how diverse the incentives for joining the PPRP were, they were inextricably tied to the PPRP’s tacit alliance with the military regime.[17]
THE ROOTS OF PARTY FRAGMENTATION
A grand coalition large enough to ensure that no defection by any single faction can jeopardise the coalition as a whole may, in principle, bring stability to a party’s organisation.[18] In the case of the PPRP, however, the amalgamation of factions, political dynasties, and provincial elites that formed the party produced splinters and infighting so intense that the party leadership had to be reshuffled on three occasions.[19] Individual faction leaders’ ambition to attain cabinet positions served as the impetus for intra-party struggles, something that was characteristic of most Thai political parties. Yet, these struggles could not have resulted in large-scale party overhaul unless the party structure was fragile to begin with.[20] This fragility is best understood as a long-term by-product of how the PPRP empowered itself using patronage and military backing. The use of candidate selection as a power-sharing arrangement, combined with a campaign strategy that allowed factions to entrench themselves locally, saw the emergence of an anarchy of factions with growing autonomy from the party.
An Anarchy of Factions
The PPRP delegated candidate selection in several provinces to the leaders of the faction recruited by the party.[21] This arrangement shared power among the factions who had made an early investment in the party—in a start-up like fashion—allowing the party to be built quickly. However, where factions had overlapping claims and interests, this strategy produced tensions and disputes that were settled, not through party channels but through internal competition and shifting alliances involving the PPRP’s factions and the party’s stakeholders.
This dynamic is best illustrated using the case of Kamphaeng Phet Province. One of the Sam Mitr’s leaders, Somsak Thepsuthin, advocated for his own team of candidates to run in all four constituencies in the province. This raised concerns among members of Varathep Rattanakorn’s faction, many of whom were incumbent MPs in the province, and had already deserted Pheu Thai to run as PPRP candidates. The faction requested that party leaders intercede on its behalf, but no agreement was reached. Finally, the conflict was resolved in favour of Varathep’s faction via bargaining with a third faction in the region, balancing out Sam Mitr’s influence in the process.[22]
This seemingly isolated dispute between factions reflects a broader trend in which the party distanced itself from intraparty struggles in order to divide and rule. This pattern is not uncommon for larger parties in Thailand, but the situation was even more complicated in the case of the PPRP since affiliates of the NCPO and the military were also actively pulling the strings behind the scenes, in some cases to determine which individuals should be the party’s nominees.[23] As a result, each faction competed for nominations and candidate selection not only by balancing power amongst themselves but also by leveraging ties to influential figures in the party and, in many cases, above the party. These informal adaptations bolstered the impression that real power in the PPRP was vested not in the party executive committee but in elite settlements involving factions in the party and influential party stakeholders operating from the shadows. Ultimately, the party was but a hollow shell designed to give the illusion of a robust party organisation; in reality, accommodating factional differences and interests often meant undermining or bypassing the party.
Faction-building, not Party-building
On the surface, the PPRP’s aggressive recruitment activities reflect its overwhelming bargaining power over politicians. At the local level, however, the factions that joined the PPRP were adept at using the party’s association with the military regime to strengthen their political base under the guise of building support for the party. During the election campaign, this affiliation played to many factions’ advantages, including turning former foes—the military’s Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC)—into powerful allies, overcoming local rivals, and unifying previously divergent loyalties among local officials and vote canvassers. These manoeuvres were, of course, aligned with the party’s immediate interests and priorities in 2019. Yet, the factions’ success in consolidating power locally also signifies the PPRP’s failure to establish local roots independent of these factions’ support in the long run.
To revisit the case of Kamphaeng Phet, the faction that joined the PPRP from Pheu Thai was contesting in areas populated by Pheu Thai’s supporters. Campaigning for a party associated with the junta that deposed Pheu Thai was political suicide. To address this challenge, the faction selectively played up and downplayed its connection to the military. To its vote canvassers and local leaders in the province, the faction warned that those who failed to support the PPRP could be targeted by security officials or even removed from office.[24] However, when appealing to voters, the faction emphasised local unity and continuity of the faction’s leadership and contribution to Kamphaeng Phet, making little to no mention of General Prayut, the PPRP’s prime ministerial candidate, throughout the campaign.[25] With this two-pronged strategy, the faction was able to offset the PPRP’s negative image of being a military-backed party while also exploiting the party’s ties to the military to cement its own influence over local government officials, politicians, and community leaders in the province.[26] In short, the faction used its alliance with the PPRP to ensure its political survival without necessarily developing a genuine local support base for the party.[27]
IMPLICATIONS
Despite its military backing, the PPRP has not been able to avoid the usual pitfalls of garnering support through reliance on patronage politics and vote-canvassing networks. Its co-optation strategy, unmatched both in ambition and scale, produced yet another under-institutionalised and incoherent electoral vehicle, reminiscent of numerous Thai parties in the past. Neither did the strategy translate consistently into strong electoral performance in regions where the party was most successful at recruiting political heavyweights.[28] Furthermore, the party was plagued by continual struggles among factions to obtain or buy the support of nearly half of elected PPRP MPs who had no strict factional allegiance from the beginning—a practice known as “fishing in each other’s pond.”[29] Ultimately, in the case of the PPRP, the long-run trajectory of party development was shaped more by the party’s initial organisational contour than the immediate results of the election.
While the PPRP has remarkably survived the symptoms of its ill-fated party-building strategy for four long years, these symptoms have visibly worsened due to a crisis of leadership emanating from an ongoing rift between the party leader, General Prawit Wongsuwan, and General Prayut. After General Prawit’s takeover of the party and former secretary-general Captain Thammanat Prompao’s attempt to unseat Prayut in a no-confidence debate, the PPRP’s allegiance to General Prayut has become questionable. Furthermore, since Prayut is eligible to serve for only two additional years into the next term, the PPRP may or may not nominate him as its candidate for prime minister.[30]
The Ruam Thai Sang Chart Party (รวมไทยสร้างชาติ United Thai Nation), formed by former Democrat and PPRP member Pirapan Salirathavibhaga and former Democrat MP and PDRC leader Akanat Promphan, has emerged as Prayut’s new electoral vehicle. While it remains unclear whether Ruam Thai Sang Chart will be able to muster enough support to propel Prayut back to power under the new electoral rules,[31] the party is well-poised to attract MPs from other parties, including those in the PPRP who remain loyal to Prayut or have feuds in the past with Captain Thammant’s faction, which is expected to re-join the PPRP.[32]
Meanwhile, the Pheu Thai Party, which many factions in the PPRP were originally part of, has vowed to deliver a landslide victory in the next general election, doubling down on its promise by revamping the party image and placing the party under a more centralised, though informal, leadership by members of the Shinawatra family. The new set of electoral rules is also expected to work in the party’s favour and against smaller parties seeking to gain seats primarily by winning party-list votes. This combination of internal strife and external pressure has created a high level of uncertainty that has left the PPRP vulnerable to a mass exodus by its factions and MPs to other parties.[33]
Ultimately, the PPRP’s faltering struggle to maintain unity reflects a failure to forge enduring loyalties either to voters, or to the military regime and the conservative establishment. While the party succeeded in co-opting the regional, provincial, and factional leaders of vote-canvassing networks, this success was accomplished only by empowering and giving autonomy to such leaders which have long-term ramifications for party development.
The result of combining patronage politics with authoritarian legacies and an uneven playing field is this: an electoral vehicle with no real connection to the populace other than through factions whose devotion to the party is only as strong as the backing the party receives from the regime, and that regime’s hold on power. The upcoming general election will determine whether Thailand’s military regime can continue to count on the PPRP, or some other parties, to maintain the status quo. If not, the military/conservative establishment will be backed into a corner which may prompt it to withdraw from politics or, more likely, seek to dominate the political system through other means, including, quite possibly, another coup d’état.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the the pdf document here.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
Temasek Working Paper No. 5: 2022 – Neither Indigenous nor Foreign: Reconceptualising the Port Cities of Southeast Asia by Jeff Khoo
““STANNING” NAJIB: Fanning a Personality Cult in Malaysian Politics” by Clarissa Ai Ling Lee and Amirul Adli Rosli
“Real Exchange Rate and Firm Productivity: The Case of Vietnamese Manufacturing” by Minh Hong Phi
2022/118 “The Struggle for International Recognition: Myanmar after the 2021 Coup” by Joanne Lin and Moe Thuzar
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 created huge diplomatic repercussions, throwing into uncertainty the country’s international position and representation.
- The coup’s unconstitutional basis and the resistance to military rule in Myanmar also presented challenges for international and regional bodies to engage with stakeholders in Myanmar.
- The United Nations and ASEAN have approached these challenges on the basis of existing procedures and guidelines. Although the UN’s existing guidelines seem to favour democratic legitimacy, it prefers not to be perceived as taking sides in Myanmar’s representation.
- ASEAN, lacking similar guidelines regarding credentials and representation, has created its own precedents regarding the level of representation at key political meetings. Neither the UN nor ASEAN have accorded outright recognition to the State Administration Council (SAC) or the parallel National Unity Government (NUG), although individual member states have exercised unilateral initiatives to engage in dialogue with the NUG. Additionally, some members and dialogue partners of ASEAN have turned to existing treaty practices that allow arrangements for non-recognition disclaimers in concluding regional treaties and agreements involving Myanmar.
- Differing views and interests among member states at either UN or ASEAN tables also add to the continued ambiguity on engaging Myanmar. This de facto de jure divide in and on Myanmar seems likely to continue in 2023, with the SAC’s election plans likely to exacerbate tensions.
* Joanne Lin is Co-coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS, and Lead Researcher (Political-Security) at the Centre. Moe Thuzar is Acting Coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS, and was previously a lead researcher at the ASEAN Studies Centre. The authors thank Dr Marcus Brand of International-IDEA for insights added to this paper.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/118, 1 December 2022
INTRODUCTION
The coup mounted by Myanmar’s military on 1 February 2021 has thrown the country’s international representation into ambiguity and confusion. The State Administration Council (SAC) regime, headed by Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who also appointed himself head of a caretaker government on 1 August 2021, asserts that the SAC is the sole representative and voice of the country.
However, the SAC’s creation as an instrument of arbitral military rule and the legality of its assertions were unconstitutional. While the coup leaders physically prevented the imminent convening of the Hluttaw, Myanmar’s legislature, the parliament nevertheless proceeded to swear in its members and establish a Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH; Committee Representing the Union Parliament). Three days after the coup, about 70 lawmakers-elect from the incumbent National League for Democracy (NLD) proceeded to take their oaths of office, as an act of upholding the 2020 election results and their legislative commitments.[1] The CRPH eventually grew to 20 Members, with the support of 80 percent of the elected MPs, and it has been extended recognition in inter-parliamentary cooperation, including by the European Parliament and the International Parliamentary Union. Legal experts have highlighted the coup’s unconstitutionality,[2] particularly the military’s unproven and implausible claims of electoral fraud as a reason to justify declaring a state of emergency and deposing and detaining the internationally recognised leaders and senior officials, including President Win Myint, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, the Chairman of the Election Commission,[3] Chief Ministers and senior cabinet members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government.
Since the coup, and particularly since the appointment in April 2021 of the National Unity Government (NUG),[4] which draws its legitimacy both from the elected CRPH and a wider group of appointed representatives, both the SAC and those opposing military rule have put considerable effort into gaining international recognition by asserting the extent of their domestic reach and control as well as in their respective external engagements.[5]
The physical control of government buildings and the state machinery gave the military an initial upper hand, although mass resignations, strikes, and protests by an estimated 400,000 civil servants[6] hampered the military’s efforts to exercise administrative power.
The issue of representation and recognition presents challenges internationally and regionally. Both the United Nations (UN) and ASEAN operate on the basis of what they refer to as “recognising states rather than governing entities”. While Myanmar’s status as a member state is not in doubt, recognising the competency of a representative acting on behalf of a state presents a challenge in the post-2021 coup scenario.[7]
For the time being, the UN Credentials Committee has agreed that the incumbent Myanmar ambassador to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun, would continue to represent Myanmar, and has deferred further decision.[8] In October 2021, ASEAN made an unprecedented decision to limit the SAC’s attendance at the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits to a “non-political representative”,[9] upholding this for ASEAN’s special summits with China in November 2021 and with the United States in May 2022, respectively. In February 2022, ASEAN further expanded the non-political representative application to foreign ministers’ meetings. The practice was extended to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus on 23 November 2022.[10] However, for all practical purposes, ASEAN interacts with Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies which are under SAC control.
At the same time, in February 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) resumed hearings of the case brought against Myanmar by the Gambia regarding the Myanmar state’s responsibility for preventing genocide towards the Rohingya population, under the Genocide Convention.[11] The ICJ hearings proceeded with the SAC in the defendant’s seat.[12]
In August 2022, international civil society/rights organisations supporting the UNESCO World Education Summit, mistakenly addressed the SAC chief as head of government.[13] Even in ASEAN, other than the Summit and foreign ministers’ meetings, other sectoral and functional meetings and activities have continued with SAC representatives.
There is thus a level of ambiguity surrounding the accreditation and acceptance of Myanmar representatives to ASEAN and international meetings, and in dealings with the various regional and international instruments to which Myanmar is a party.
APPROACHES TO RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE ISSUE OF CREDENTIALS
As a member of the UN and ASEAN, Myanmar’s statehood is clear and undisputed. Myanmar meets the legal requirements of statehood under the 1933 Montevideo Convention.[14] What is of greater concern, however, and particularly for ASEAN, is the recognition of competent representatives acting on behalf of a State, especially when the SAC and the NUG are both asserting their right to Myanmar’s ASEAN seat.[15]
Under international law, the recognition of government (as opposed to states), is largely left to individual members’ discretion. Most states or international institutions often resort to the Estrada Doctrine[16] to avoid accusations of meddling with sovereignty when different parties contest authority in a country. This bears some resemblance to ASEAN’s non-interference principle, as it is based on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination. Even so, considering the Estrada Doctrine in the context of the February 2021 coup in Myanmar runs the risk of condoning unconstitutionality. ASEAN member states had recognised the NLD’s second landslide victory in 2020. The ASEAN Chair’s statement on 1 February 2021 also emphasised the importance of “adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” and a “return to normalcy in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar”.[17]
The general preference to recognise states and not governments does not resolve the question of recognising governments, especially concerning the establishment of embassies, the accreditation of ambassadors, or the signing of agreements.[18]
Thus, when the recognition of a new government needs to be considered, three criteria are usually referred to, namely: (i) the entity’s effective control of the territory; (ii) its democratic legitimacy; and (iii) its adherence to international law.[19] Before 1990, UN Credentials Committees usually referred to the traditional criterion of effective territorial control for recognising a government.
Apart from these three criteria, states may also consider moral considerations, based on whether a government gained effective control legitimately or otherwise, preferences for values or systems such as democracy, or asserting control through violence and authoritarian means. Such considerations are important, as they help to ensure that the coup in Myanmar is not a fait accompli.[20] The UN’s credential practices post-1990 have also demonstrated the importance of these values, including factors such as human rights records.[21]
In the 21st century, democratic legitimacy has emerged as having a greater claim to recognition than the earlier characteristic of effective control. The UN chose to recognise democratic legitimacy in Cote d’Ivoire (2011) and Gambia (2017).[22]
States may sometimes also use the terms de facto or de jure when the authority in a country is contested. Governments with de jure status are considered legal and constituted. In contrast, a de facto government may be in control of the political/executive affairs of the state although not legally recognised or enjoying a legal mandate.[23]
In the case of Myanmar’s representation at the UN, the 76th UNGA Credentials Committee[24] has deferred its decision indefinitely, based on the understanding that the incumbent, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun (appointed by the NLD government in 2019) retains Myanmar’s seat.[25] Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun states that he represents the NUG when participating in UN procedures and votes on UNGA resolutions. Inconsistent with the UN’s own precedents and requirements, this position has not been reflected in other UN bodies, such as the secondary seats in Geneva and Vienna, or Myanmar’s representation at ESCAP in Bangkok.
ASEAN does not possess a similar mechanism to examine the credentials of member states’ representatives. The established rules in ASEAN do not have any guidelines to deal with cases in which appointments or credentials are contested, let alone the competency of the government that issues them. As such, in light of the non-recognition of the SAC’s authority by some member states and dialogue partners, ASEAN has faced an unprecedented challenge of finding options for the conclusion (and entry into force) of ASEAN instruments and agreements.
In ASEAN, treaty practices[26] allow arrangements to consider the issue of non-recognition in concluding treaties. For example, states can issue a statement that their accession to a multilateral treaty does not imply or confer recognition to certain state(s). This practice allows ASEAN member states or dialogue partners that do not recognise the SAC as the government of Myanmar to introduce a statement or declaration as a non-recognition disclaimer. Admittedly, this disclaimer may have more to do with a country’s position rather than a legal effect on the document.
Several member states and some dialogue partners of ASEAN have taken this approach in ratifying the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. Similarly, in consideration of external parties’ accessions to ASEAN’s foundational document, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the ASEAN parties to the TAC now submit individual written consent to the depository, replacing the previous (pre-February 2021) established practice of physical signatures to indicate consent.
SAC AND NUG: THE LEGITIMACY QUESTION
Although the SAC considers itself the ruling entity, and has styled itself as a provisional government since August 2021, experts have highlighted the military’s deposing and detention of existing officeholders as unconstitutional.[27] The SAC had justified the military takeover under the 2008 Constitution, but that same document contains provisions that charges relating to impeachment can only be initiated by the Union Parliament. Furthermore, the President has to inform the Union Parliament of a decision to declare a state of emergency, which did not happen in February 2021.[28] Senior NLD leaders and party members were also detained without charges presented against them (lists of charges were only presented after detention). In this aspect, the military’s actions cannot be considered as actions of a de jure government.
Apart from the unconstitutional basis of the takeover, the use of lethal force, extra judicial killings, and using the legal system to carry out the first judicial executions in decades, add to the violations of international law (in addition to the earlier legal action brought by the Gambia against Myanmar over atrocities against the Rohingya in Rakhine State).[29]
The nationwide protests and coordinated civil disobedience movements across the country following the coup, the breakdown of SAC-controlled local administration in several parts of the country, and the escalation of a cycle of violence in response to the military’s harsh crackdowns (which include airstrikes), also point to the reality that the SAC is unable to fulfil the criterion of “effective control” of the country.[30]
However, the SAC regime seems to enjoy some measure of pragmatic acceptance by China and to a lesser extent India, and outright strong support by Russia.[31] ASEAN has come under scrutiny for engaging the SAC to negotiate the cessation of violence in the country and facilitating humanitarian assistance, even as ASEAN members seek to differentiate engagement and acceptance. As at May 2022, four ASEAN member states – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, have not appointed/replaced their ambassadors to Myanmar. Thailand accepted the credentials of an SAC-appointed Myanmar ambassador to Thailand in June 2022.[32]
ASEAN’s negotiation of the Five-Point Consensus with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Jakarta in April 2021 at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, working with the SAC-led Myanmar National Task Force to deliver humanitarian assistance,[33] accepting the SAC’s defence minister General Mya Tun Oo’s presence at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting,[34] and the 2022 ASEAN Chair Cambodia’s approach to engaging the SAC could be construed as ‘normalisation’ of military rule in Myanmar.[35]
The NUG was formed out of a coalition of NLD law-makers, representatives of several ethnic nationalities, and members of civil society. Appointed in April 2021, it is part of a political roadmap outlined in the Federal Democracy Charter adopted by the CRPH—a body of lawmakers, largely from the NLD who had received the people’s mandate through the 2020 democratic election.[36]The NUG’s goal is to restore democratic rule and uphold the results of the 2020 election.[37] It also commits to a vision of an inclusive federal democracy.
The NUG seeks to: (i) gain formal recognition from the international community by collaborating with international governments and international organisations including the UN; (ii) work on ratification of international conventions and treaties that will protect the nation in line with international laws; (iii) collaborate with partner countries; and (iv) work through diplomatic approaches to bring effective sanctions of the international community against the council of the military junta.[38]
The NUG has spared no effort to establish its diplomatic presence despite its constraints. To date, there are NUG representatives in Australia, Czech Republic, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Norway. However, NUG representatives do not have diplomatic accreditation.[39] Several countries have dialogues with the NUG but have not officially recognised it. In this vein, various NUG ministers have held meetings with lawmakers from Canada and Spain, as well as senior government representatives from the US, Germany and Sweden.[40]
The NUG has tried to justify its legitimacy, and capacity to govern, by stating its adherence and commitment to international norms. For example, in addition to its withdrawal (in February 2021) of objections on the case against Myanmar at the ICJ,[41] the NUG has accepted the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction and role in reviewing the crimes committed by the military against the Rohingya people since 2002, including the alleged genocide in 2017.[42]The NUG has also offered potential citizenship to the Rohingyas.
At the UN and at international fora, the NUG continues efforts to highlight the SAC’s atrocities and illegitimate claims and to prevent/deny SAC participation in these platforms, through Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun’s statements and meetings with the UN officials and member state representatives. Despite the obvious challenges to gaining formal recognition from the international community, the NUG seems nevertheless to have gained an advantage from existing UNGA rules that stipulate “the incumbent ambassador keeps the seat if there is a credentialing dispute”.[43] However, this does not translate into the UN recognising the NUG. In the absence of a firm decision by the Credentials Committee, the UN does not want to be seen as taking sides on Myanmar.[44]
The NUG is also emphasising the ‘responsibility to protect’ as justification for its capacity to prove a responsible counterpart for dialogue towards a federal system in Myanmar.[45] In this endeavour, the NUG also recognises the importance of an ASEAN member state’s obligations. It has appointed an Ambassador to ASEAN,[46] who has been urging the regional bloc to uphold the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and to at least recognise the duality of competing political forces in Myanmar.[47]
Notwithstanding the public meeting between Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Dato’ Saifuddin Abdullah and NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, on the sidelines of the ASEAN-US Special Summit in Washington DC in May 2022, the NUG is aware that attaining formal recognition from ASEAN will be extremely challenging.
Limited support for the NUG may stem from perceptions of its limited long-term strategies and structural maturity, as well as uncertainty over the extent to which the NUG can represent the diverse populations in Myanmar (and their aspirations).[48] Operationally, the NUG is also limited in its ability to deliver public and consular services (including for Myanmar citizens abroad), such as issuing identity cards, passports, or visas to foreign visitors.[49]
Furthermore, several ASEAN member states (especially those that share a border with Myanmar) remain disinterested in putting further pressure on Myanmar’s military government nor do they seem keen to improve human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy in Myanmar.
CONCLUSION
The self-appointed nature of the SAC has limited justification to be recognised as the legitimate government of Myanmar. The sustained nature of the resistance against military rule close to two years after the coup also shows that the SAC has not proven able to establish effective control over the country. Furthermore, sanctions targeted against SAC elites and associates by the US and EU, among others, show that it is the SAC, rather than the Myanmar government, whose actions are unacceptable. Similarly, ASEAN’s decision to invite only non-political representatives from Myanmar to ASEAN’s high-level meetings, and the non-recognition disclaimers used by several ASEAN members in regional legal instruments indicate a disinclination to accord the SAC recognition.
The NUG’s democratic legitimacy and its status as the entity broadly representing the forces for democracy in Myanmar, and its stated commitment to uphold international obligations and standards of human rights, are being increasingly viewed as important in considering credentials in international settings.[50] Even in the ASEAN setting, the argument that ASEAN has used in the past concerning the SAC, i.e. that engagement does not necessarily constitute conferring legitimacy, could also be applied to the actions of any member state seeking to engage with the NUG, as illustrated by Malaysia’s action and proposals. Additionally, the Five-Point Consensus’ provision that the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair meets with “all parties concerned” indicates that ASEAN does not necessarily need to seek further permission to carry out that mandate. The ASEAN Leaders have now given the special envoy of the ASEAN Chair more leeway to proceed accordingly.[51]
Although NUG may seem to be the more popular choice for the international community, the path ahead for its formal recognition remains uncertain. China and Russia’s veto power at the UN Security Council and differing preferences in ASEAN may continue to provide SAC with the expectation that it could still pursue recognition and legitimacy via its plans for an election in 2023 under the SAC’s five-point roadmap. Scepticism abounds on whether this planned election will be free and fair. Even so, seasoned Myanmar watchers are cautioning that the military will doggedly continue its election plans, most likely limiting polls to areas that it deems sufficient to make the vote “legitimate”.
Members of the international community that have clearly stated their rejection of the February 2021 coup will maintain their positions, while the SAC will continue to find ways to retain its participation in ASEAN and strengthen its ties with countries such as Russia. Finally, even with stricter measures by ASEAN related to the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus,[52] and a more favourable attitude towards unilateral engagements with the NUG, the NUG may still find itself still in need of exploring diplomatic tools and opportunities for wider recognition by the international community.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the the pdf document here.
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