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Articles & Commentaries

2022/109 “The State of Indonesia’s Digital Economy in 2022” by Siwage Dharma Negara and Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

 

A Gojek rider makes a delivery in Surabaya on 17 May 2021 as Gojek and Tokopedia unveiled a merger to form GoTo Group, creating the largest tech firm in the world’s fourth most populous country. Photo: Juni Kriswanto/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Indonesia’s digital economy has boomed amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. The e-commerce sector has dominated as consumers and merchants increasingly take to online platforms to buy and sell products and services.
  • Some changes in consumer behaviour, including how they shop, work, learn and play, will endure after the pandemic. Hybrid online and offline activities, and the rise of omnichannel platforms signal that behavioural changes will endure. Players are anticipating this and are strategising their marketing and innovation methods accordingly.
  • Consumers’ satisfaction with their online experience is key to winning the post-pandemic market. This, along with severe competition, has led to innovation and the consolidation of platforms, such as with the e-commerce platform, Tokopedia, and the ride-hailing app, Gojek. The super-app now positions itself as a one-stop platform that can address the wide-ranging needs of its customers.
  • The government is tightening regulations to address rising concerns about antitrust practices in e-commerce, content moderation on social media, and financial risks posed by fintechs.
  • To sustain the growth of the digital economy, Indonesia needs to continue investing in both software and hardware infrastructure technology. This includes more effective regulation and enforcement to address illegal and fraudulent online activities, increasing public awareness of the darkside of going online and promoting digital literacy, especially outside Java. 

* Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana is Lecturer at Bakrie University and the School of Government and Public Policy Indonesia, and Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. We thank Manggi Habir, Hui Yew-Foong and Cassey Lee for their comments and suggestions. All errors are the authors’ responsibility.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/109, 8 November 2022

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BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the growth of the digital economy in Indonesia, as it has done elsewhere in the region. According to a report by Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company (2022), Southeast Asia’s digital economy grew by 67 per cent between 2020 and 2022. The gross merchandise value (GMV) increased from US$116 billion in 2020 to US$194 billion in 2022. The report also projects Southeast Asia’s digital economy to surpass US$330 billion by 2025.

Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, has seen the value of its digital industry grow significantly from US$41 billion in 2019 to US$77 billion in 2022.[1] The figure is expected to increase to US$130 billion by 2025, driven primarily by e-commerce (Figure 1). Such projections cast a powerful spotlight on the potential of the country’s digital economy.

Figure 1: Indonesia’s Digital Economy Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) (US$ billion)

Source: Google, Temasek, & Bain Company (2022)

Several factors are behind the rapid growth of Indonesia’s digital economy. Firstly, a substantial young population that is digital savvy has been significant. Secondly, the relatively high mobile penetration facilitates the frequent use of e-commerce and social media sites to buy and sell products and services. Thirdly, The growing popularity of digital payments has also correlated with the increase in online consumption. Finally, the government has introduced supportive policies to boost the digital economy, accompanied by improvements in the digital infrastructure. The number of users has increased greatly during the pandemic, from 150 million users in 2019 to 203 million in 2021 (Figure 2). This reflects a considerably high 73.7 per cent internet penetration rate for the total population.

Figure 2: Internet users (million) in Indonesia

Note: (*) as of April 2022. Source: Katadata[2] and BPS

In line with this rapid growth, the government has the ambition to promote the country as a digital hub in Southeast Asia. For this, it plans to increase investment in the digital infrastructure, e.g., building data centres and digital talents.[3] Moreover, the government is also targeting more and more micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to enter the digital market, reaching 30 million MSMEs by 2030.[4]

This short essay examines how the digital sector has transformed Indonesia’s economy during the pandemic. Specifically, it tries to analyse the characteristics of users and the popular digital services, such as e-commerce, digital payment, etc. Then, it looks at which changes are likely to remain and which are likely to disappear or be diluted in the post-pandemic period. Finally, it discusses the government’s efforts to regulate the sector.

PANDEMIC-INDUCED DIGITAL GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION

A Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company (2021) report on Southeast Asia’s “e-conomy” predicts that Southeast Asia will become a US$1 trillion digital economy by 2030.[5] Five leading sectors will be driving the growth, namely, e-commerce, financial services, online travel, online media, and transport and food.

E-Commerce

E-commerce is often the most significant component in a digital economy. It already accounts for almost 70 per cent of the sector’s gross merchandise value (GMV) in Southeast Asia. The pandemic has further boosted this sector and pushed businesses, regardless of their size and products, to online sales channels for survival.

Indonesia, the biggest digital economy in the region, has shown a 13 per cent increase in digital consumers during the pandemic.[6] This was largely in e-commerce, which grew by more than 60 per cent during the pandemic (Figure 1).

Interestingly, the pandemic has been a catalyst for the frequency of using online services. According to the Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company (2021) report, about 88 per cent of internet users were pushed to adopt e-commerce, especially MSME owners, because of the pandemic. In fact, about 28 per cent of merchants in Indonesia believe they would not have survived Covid-19 if they had not moved to digital platforms.[7] 

Some major established players, e.g., physical stores such as Matahari, supermarkets like Hero and banks with branches, are responding to this online shift. Traditional brick-and-mortar businesses often already have the customer base and capital for online platforms to be the next strategic innovation. There have also been cases where online players with considerable capital have tried to acquire traditional companies. A case in point is GoTo’s acquisition of Hypermart shares.[8] This move has created a hybrid entity with both online and physical presence.

In observing the rapid growth in e-commerce, more merchants are going online. Moreover, compared to pre-COVID levels, there are substantially more users in food delivery now. As much as 64 per cent of internet users in Indonesia increased the frequency of food delivery orders compared to the pre-COVID period.[9] Going forward, food delivery services will remain promising, yet highly competitive; incumbents are expanding rapidly even as new entrants join the contest.

Working, Entertainment and Learning

Lockdown and social distancing measures have accelerated the use of online platforms for working, learning, entertainment, playing and communicating.[10] These behavioural changes are not a one-off phenomenon, and, by all accounts, users are highly likely to continue using digital platforms.

With people being forced to stay at home, work and play shifted online. Consumer interest in video subscription services continues to soar. The figure below shows more people searching for Netflix, and using zoom during the pandemic (Figure 3). Also, platforms offering training services, such as Coursera and Udemy, have become popular (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Netflix and Zoom Users in Indonesia (Score)

Source: Google via CEIC

Figure 4: Coursera and Udemy Users in Indonesia (Score)

Source: Google via CEIC

Working from home has become the new normal among some companies, especially in the tech and knowledge industry, and in the education sector. But for some companies, such as those in healthcare and the manufacturing and retail industries, working from home will not be feasible. Major employers such as Starbucks or McDonald’s, for instance, are unable to have work-from-home arrangements for their employees. Workers in management, business and financial operation occupations are more likely to work from home than people in sales, construction, office administration, services, repairs, transportation and factory-floor production.[11]

Fintech

Another important trend after the pandemic is the increase in fintech adoption. In Indonesia, this change has been driven by a significant portion of the population being unbanked and by the lower-income groups in urban areas.[12] According to an Asia Bank report, 65 per cent of e-commerce users prefer the e-wallet as their payment method, with 90 per cent of transactions being below Rp500 thousand (US$45).[13] As much as 69 per cent of internet users order food online using e-wallet and cash-on-delivery (COD) methods.[14]

Moreover, the increase in e-money transactions was also driven by the expansion and convenience of the digital payment system as well as the acceleration of digital banking (Figure 5).

Figure 5: E-commerce and E-payment transaction values (Rp Trillion)

Note: *) estimated figure. Source: Bank Indonesia.

A recent ISEAS survey (2022) found that Indonesia’s most popular e-wallet platforms (GoPay, OVO, DANA, and ShopeePay) are used by lower-income groups, or those with monthly expenditures of less than Rp4 million (US$265).[15] While lower-income groups are more likely to use e-wallet apps, higher-income groups prefer mobile banking apps (e.g., BCA m-banking and Mandiri m-banking).

The survey also shows that the use of e-wallet, buy-now-pay-later (BNPL) and multi-finance apps (e.g., FIF Group, Adira, and BCA Finance) is increasing. It also finds that men are more likely to use investment apps (e.g., Koinworks, Ajaib, and Bibit), while women are more likely to prefer lending apps (e.g., Shopee paylater, GoPay paylater, and Kredivo).[16] Also, Generation Y and Z are more likely to use e-wallet and investment apps than the older generation (Gen X). Those with higher education (post-senior high school) are more likely to use fintech, especially the investment and donation apps (e.g., Kitabisa and Rumah zakat), than those with lower education. And while most internet users are concerned about data leaks and fraud, this does not deter digital adoption due to the fact that fintech platforms provide easy-to-access financial services, business financing—and convenience.

PARTS OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY THAT ARE PERSISTING

The digital economy will continue to attract new consumers, merchants and startups. After the pandemic, customers are more health-aware and health-concerned. Hence more people prefer contactless payment. Hybrid models will become more prevalent in various environments. Uni-channel transactions will continue to make way for multi-channel and omnichannel transaction models.

The popularity of digital wallet apps for food and beverage purchases is likely to stay the same. Indonesia’s most popular e-wallet platforms for meals and rides, such as GoPay, GrabPay, OVO, and ShopeePay, will continue to attract the lower-income group (i.e., those with monthly expenditures of less than Rp4 million).

Food delivery will continue to boom. This is because urbanites have become used to purchasing food and beverages online for day-to-day consumption, and consider them affordable. About 69 per cent of users order food online using e-wallet and cash-on-delivery (COD).

Interestingly, despite the popularity of e-wallet transactions, customers will continue to rely on cash after the pandemic. Those who pay through COD are likely to increase post-pandemic because buyers are already returning to work, including daily labourers and gig workers who are paid by cash. In fact, the share of firms paying in cash increased from 58 per cent in 2020 to 60 per cent in 2021.[17] It appears that there will be no trade-off between digital and cash payments. The two seem to complement one another and people will prefer to have options for transactions. 

In addition, growing population, increased demand for healthcare services and technological innovations will continue driving Indonesia’s healthtech market. Convenient and speedy healthtech apps (e.g., Alodokter, Halodoc, and Grabhealth) are likely to create more demand.

The healthtech growth is expected to remain robust over the next few years owing to the entrance of new international startups and investors and an increase in product awareness. Collaborations between existing providers and healthtech startups are gradually taking place, moving towards deeper integration, and can potentially overcome the fragmentation that presently exists in the health system.

For instance, Klinik Pintar, one of the startups trying to integrate the healthtech industry with conventional clinics, has created a digital ecosystem that links offline clinics with suppliers of medical equipment and health products such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, syringes, and gloves. Its business idea is to provide accessible, standardised and effective health care to customers.[18]

Each year, around 1.5-2 million Indonesians go on Umrah and Hajj pilgrimage. They need health services such as medical check-ups, meningitis vaccine injections, and PCR.[19] A new digital health platform, Medzit under Gaido Digital Medika Ltd, is trying to tap into this market by integrating travelling with digital health services.

Indonesia’s growing middle class is a potential market for investment platforms (e.g., Ajaib, Bibit, Koinworks, and Indodax). These platforms have been gaining market shares during the pandemic. They are widely accessible and are used among professionals, private and public sector employees, university students, etc. In Indonesia, it is common for a person to invest in two or three platforms simultaneously. For the middle class, these platforms provide complementary options beyond saving and depositing their wealth in conventional assets, e.g., properties. The challenge for the platforms lies in maintaining the trust of different groups in society. An ISEAS survey shows that many people tend to use illegal online lending and not well-regulated social donation apps. As a result, they have suffered fraudulent activities.[20]

Finally, while Netflix is slowly becoming saturated in terms of new potential market segments, other digital entertainment, such as YouTube, YouTube Music, Spotify, and Apple Music, are gaining traction among the young and tech-savvy population. Moreover, online mobile games, and e-sports have also become more popular. The growth of this industry is also expected to continue, given consumer demand for unique content.

PARTS OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY THAT WILL DIMINISH

E-commerce users are however likely to decrease in frequency and duration of use after the pandemic. Specifically, MSME owners who previously relied solely on e-commerce are now using both off and online methods. This will dilute e-commerce and fintech apps for e-commerce payments.

During the pandemic, online shopping in Indonesia accounted for 58 per cent of online users. This number should decrease as mobility is restored and competition with offline retailers increases. As the economy slowly emerges from lockdowns and other restrictions, the shift to digital commerce will evolve across industries. An IMF study found that during the pandemic, the share of online spending rises more in economies where e-commerce already had played a large role—and the increase reverses as the pandemic recedes. Specifically, it shows that, on average, the online share of total spending rose sharply from 10.3 per cent in 2019 to 14.9 per cent at the peak of the pandemic but then fell to 12.2 per cent in 2021.21]

Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) apps, in conjunction with e-commerce marketplace apps, are more likely to compete and be diluted with offline credit schemes, which can be paid through mobile banking or auto-debit payments. These BNPL apps were used to purchase furniture, household utilities, electronic appliances, and motorcycles during the pandemic.

The edtech startups boom during the height of the pandemic appears to be easing off as well, as users decrease in numbers with the resumption of physical learning.[22] Nevertheless, there is still room for the industry to grow as demand for new learning opportunities for young people and adults grows, a trend that is strongly expected to kick in. This will require edtech startups (e.g., Ruangguru, Zenius Education, and HarukaEdu) to reinvent their roles and improve their innovations to keep up with the demand for better learning options. There is growing interest in vocational training, in digitisation and in learning management systems among educational institutions.[23] Edtech firms should promote partnerships with academia and governments in order to establish better standards for performance and cost-effectiveness and to rigorously evaluate some of the current leading products.[24]

POLICY AND REGULATIONS

In anticipating future growth in the consumer tech market, Gojek and Tokopedia, Indonesia’s leading ride-hailing and e-commerce companies, decided in May 2021 to merge and create the biggest technology group in the country. The newly established group, GoTo, is worth US$18 billion, and has become the first platform in Southeast Asia to combine e-commerce, on-demand services and financial services. However, the authorities remain unsure about the implication of such a merger to the competitive landscape in the industry.

Following the trends in the US and Europe,  there will be greater scrutiny by the authorities for anti-competition behaviour among big tech companies. There is precedence to this. In 2020, Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) fined Grab, a ride-hailing platform, for allegedly conducting anti-competition practices by discriminating against non-driver-partners.[25]

After the incident, President Joko Widodo asked KPPU to pay close attention to anti-competition practices in the digital economy in order to protect MSMEs.  Given the inequality in bargaining position between online platforms and MSMEs, there is potential for unfair business competition practices and the implementation of partnerships that are not in accordance with the provisions. [26]

In response to local businesses’ concerns about cheap imported goods that have soared through the e-commerce platform, the government will revise the Trade Minister Regulation Number 50 of 2020 on electronic transactions. The high number of imported goods and the ‘unfair’ price competition are blamed for hurting domestic business entities that use e-commerce platforms. The new regulation will provide clarity on predatory pricing that prevents competitors from entering the market through the use of price subsidies, dumping, or similar practices.

For the fintech industry, the govt issued a more stringent regulation that requires higher fintech lending capital to be deposited (to get the permit), from Rp 2.5 billion to Rp 25 billion (US$1.57 million).[27] It also states that fintech lending companies must have equity of Rp 12.5 billion (US$833K). In addition, the maximum limit for funding by each lender and its affiliates is a maximum of 25 per cent of the final funding position at the end of the month. Finally, fintech lending players are also required to submit funding transaction data to the OJK (Financial Services Authority) fintech lending data centre. This is done by integrating the operator’s electronic system into the fintech lending data centre.[28]

For the health and edutech sectors, the government is still preparing the regulations. It will take time and be very challenging given the existing capacity of the institutions overseeing the sectors, i.e., the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education and Culture. In addition, digitalisation in the two sectors is relatively laggard compared to the e-commerce or fintech sector.

Finally, Indonesia recently required tech companies to register under new licensing rules.[29] The rules are meant to ensure that Internet service providers protect consumer data, and that online content is used in a “positive and productive” way. With the new regulation, the government can force companies to reveal the communications and personal data of specific users. Specifically, they target big tech electronic system providers such as Google, Twitter and Meta to allow the authorities to order platforms to take down content deemed unlawful or that “disturbs public order”. Failure to comply will lead to these tech companies being disallowed from operating in Indonesia.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While the country’s regulatory framework plays catch-up, growth and innovation in the digital economy continue. There will be an increase in the number of digital platforms offering a range of integrated services to consumers. At the same time, market consolidation will also intensify, and many tech companies will fail.

For a tech company to be successful, several factors are critical. First, it needs to secure capital to cover the initial innovation stage (trial and error) before coming out with the service platform. Second, it must be able to quickly scale up the business volume in order to enjoy economies of scale. This is important given that the fixed costs (innovation, technology, security, data acquisition, linking with various ecosystems) are large while margins are thin. This is why many will fail and consolidation will happen. Third, it needs the ability to navigate the changing regulatory environment. Finally, it must have the technological capability to innovate and invest enough in cyber security, consumer data protection, cloud systems, etc. Naturally, larger big-tech firms have the advantage.

One key area for Indonesia to focus on to sustain the growth of the digital economy is the improvement of the country’s digital infrastructure, both software and hardware. This includes more effective regulation and enforcement to address illegal and fraudulent online websites providing financial services, increased public awareness of the darkside of going online as well as promoting digital literacy, especially outside Java. The latter can be done through free or discounted online courses and digital literacy workshops. Furthermore, regulatory institutions need to ensure those providing online services apply sufficient protection against cyber attacks, cybercrime and leakage of personal data. On infrastructure technology, there is considerable room to further expand online services to remote and sparsely populated areas. Other areas in infrastructure technology that need particular attention include cloud computing, which is expected to grow by more than US$500 billion post-pandemic.[30]

No sector is immune to the digital phenomena, including the more established traditional industries. And, as the digital economy spreads it will be interesting to see how businesses adjust, adapt and adopt available digital tools to their daily activities and, ultimately, how the whole economy becomes more digitally inter-connected going forward.

REFERENCES

Asia Bank report, 2021. Asian Xendit online payment report, DSInnovate Indonesia Paylater report.

Google, Temasek, Bain & Company, 2021. E-Conomy SEA 2021 Report.

Google, Temasek, Bain & Company, 2022. E-Conomy SEA 2022 Report. https://economysea.withgoogle.com/report/.

Habir, Manggi, 2021. “The Pandemic’s Benefits for Indonesia’s Fintech Sector”, ISEAS Perspective No 100. /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-100-the-pandemics-benefits-for-indonesias-fintech-sector-by-manggi-taruna-habir/

IFC, Lazada, Kantar Public, European Commission, 2021. Women and E-Commerce in Southeast Asia. World Bank, Washington DC.

Meilasari-Sugiana, Astrid, Negara, Siwage Dharma, Hui, Yew-Foong, 2022, Financial technology adoption in Greater Jakarta : patterns, constraints and enablers,  Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 22, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. /wp-content/uploads/2022/05/TRS9_22.pdf.

World Economic Forum, 2022. How Digitalization is Accelerating the Growth of MSMEs in Indonesia, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/digitalization-growth-indonesia-msmes/

ENDNOTES


[1] Google, Temasek, Bain & Company, 2022. E-Conomy SEA 2022 Report, https://economysea.withgoogle.com/report/.

[2] https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/03/23/ada-2047-juta-pengguna-internet-di-indonesia-awal-2022.

[3] https://opengovasia.com/indonesia-promotes-digital-technology-for-economic-recovery/

[4] https://en.antaranews.com/news/245589/indonesia-to-be-largest-digital-economy-in-se-asia-by-2030-minister

[5] Google, Temasek, Bain & Company, 2021. E-Conomy SEA 2021 Report, https://economysea.withgoogle.com/report/.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Google, Temasek,  Bain & Company, 2021. op.cit

[8] https://dailysocial.id/post/goto-akuisisi-saham-matahari-putra-prima

[9] Asosiasi Fintech Indonesia, 2019/2020. Annual Member Survey. Jakarta, Indonesia.

[10] https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/how-covid-19-is-changing-consumer-behavior-now-and-forever

[11] https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/04/coronavirus-highlights-who-can-and-cant-work-from-home.html

[12] Meilasari-Sugiana, Astrid, Negara, Siwage Dharma, Hui, Yew-Foong, 2022, Financial technology adoption in Greater Jakarta : patterns, constraints and enablers,  Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 22, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. /wp-content/uploads/2022/05/TRS9_22.pdf

[13] Asia Bank report, Asian Xendit online payment report, DSInnovate Indonesia Paylater report, 2021

[14] IFC, Lazada, Kantar Public, European Commission. Women and E-Commerce in Southeast Asia, 2021. Women and E-Commerce in Southeast Asia. World Bank, Washington DC.

[15] Meiliasari et al., ibid. This is in line with the findings of an earlier study by Habir (2021). /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-100-the-pandemics-benefits-for-indonesias-fintech-sector-by-manggi-taruna-habir/

[16] Meilasari et al. op cit.

[17] https://fulcrum.sg/cash-payments-in-post-pandemic-southeast-asia-phasing-out-or-coming-back/

[18] https://dailysocial.id/post/klinik-pintar-secures-58-billion-rupiah-series-a-funding

[19] Investor ID. 2022. Digital Hospital Segera Rilis Platform Kesehatan Terlengkap di Indonesia. https://investor.id/it-and-telecommunication/306657/digital-hospital-segera-rilis-platform-kesehatan-terlengkap-di-indonesia

[20] Meilasari et al. op cit.

[21] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/01/28/E-commerce-During-Covid-Stylized-Facts-from-47-Economies-512014

[22] https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/asias-edtech-rise

[23] https://techcollectivesea.com/2021/05/17/5-edtech-startups-indonesia/

[24] Bhardwaj, R., and Yarrow, N. with Calì, M. 2020. EdTech in Indonesia: Ready for Take-off? Jakarta: World Bank Group.

[25] https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/pertimbangan-kppu-menghukum-grab-indonesia-dan-pt-tpi-dengan-denda-rp-49-miliar

[26] https://www.kompas.id/baca/ekonomi/2021/07/06/presiden-jokowi-minta-kppu-dalami-ekosistem-bisnis-baru-ekonomi-digital

[27] /wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_100.pdf

[28] https://money.kompas.com/read/2022/07/18/091000726/ojk-keluarkan-aturan-baru-soal-fintech-lending-modal-pendirian-minimal-rp-25?page=all

[29] https://www.kompas.tv/article/310037/penjelasan-kominfo-soal-ancaman-blokir-layanan-meta-twitter-telegram-hingga-google

[30] https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/09/01/the-tech-winners-and-losers-of-the-pandemic      

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2022/108 “Climate Resilience of Energy Infrastructures in Southeast Asia” by Mirza Sadaqat Huda

 

This photograph taken on 3 February  2021 shows a general view of a floating solar power farm on the Tengeh reservoir in Singapore. Photo by Roslan RAHMAN AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Energy infrastructures in Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly vulnerable to extreme weather events.
  • The impact of global warming on energy systems will vary across sectors. Thermal systems will be affected by heat waves and droughts, while grids and renewable energy technologies will be vulnerable to flooding, heavy winds and storms.
  • More regional cooperation on climate modelling of energy infrastructures will make predictions more accurate and generate consensus on adaptation priorities.
  • A regional adaptation strategy can improve the resilience of cross-border renewable energy infrastructures to climate change.

* Mirza Sadaqat Huda is Lead Researcher in the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme (CCSEAP) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/108, 7 November 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Energy security and environmental sustainability in Southeast Asia hinge on the development of energy systems that are low-carbon and resilient to the impacts of climate change. The immediate priority of Southeast Asian governments is mitigation, as demonstrated by ASEAN’s goal of increasing the share of renewables in primary energy supply to 23% by 2025.[1]  At the same time, scientific evidence[2] suggests that climate change will undermine the efficiency, reliability and physical security of energy infrastructures. This calls for urgent policy action on the adaptation of energy systems. Currently, extreme weather events already pose significant challenges to energy infrastructures in North America, Europe and Asia.[3] Between 2000 and 2017, extreme weather events caused 74% and 37% of total power outage in the United States and Europe respectively.[4] While there is less data on the link between extreme weather events and blackouts in Southeast Asian countries, present studies highlight the increasing vulnerability of the region’s energy infrastructures to heavy winds, floods and rainfall[5].

Due to the enormity of these threats, climate adaptation is becoming increasingly relevant in the development of energy projects. The need for early policy intervention is particularly important in Southeast Asia, given the assumption that the region will need to invest USD 80-150 billion annually by the late 2020s to meet its clean energy targets[6].

This article provides an overview of the impact of climate change on energy infrastructures in Southeast Asia. It also outlines best practices in climate modelling and adaptation of energy systems, with the help of multiple examples. The final section provides policy recommendations.

IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON ENERGY SYSTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Global Climate Risk Index[7] ranks several Southeast Asian countries as being extremely vulnerable to climatic shocks. As shown in Figure 1, the Philippines is considered the second most vulnerable country in the world, while the rest of the region faces moderate to high levels of risk to extreme weather events. Four of the top ten countries in the world which were most affected by extreme weather events between 1999 and 2018 were from Southeast Asia, namely  Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand.[8] Between 2009 and 2020, natural hazards resulted in more than 33,000 fatalities and over USD 97 billion in economic damages in the region.[9]

Figure 1: Climate Risk Index 2020 of Southeast Asian Countries[10]

Hawchar et al.[11] proposes that a key factor for determining a society’s climate change resilience is the preparedness of infrastructures to withstand natural shocks. While the intensity of natural shocks in Southeast Asia is certainly daunting, the weak resilience of energy infrastructures to these threats is also a cause for immediate concern. The University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)[12] reveals some interesting trends about adaptation in Southeast Asia. It illustrates a country’s vulnerability to climate disruptions as well as its readiness to leverage private and public sector investment for adaptive actions, measuring the vulnerability of a country through six indicators: food; water; health; ecosystem services; human habitat; and infrastructure. The score for the infrastructure indicator is developed through data in six areas: projected change of hydropower generation capacity; projected change of sea-level rise; dependency on imported energy; population living under 5m above sea level; electricity access; and disaster preparedness. As shown in Table 1, while Singapore receives a high rank in the overall ND-Gain country index, it received a much lower score for energy infrastructure, as its dependence for energy imports makes its vulnerable to crises. At the same time, according to the ASEAN Risk Monitor and Disaster Management Review (ARMOR), Singapore has high coping capacity towards adverse climatic conditions.[13] Meanwhile, the energy infrastructures of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia received low scores, indicating high levels of vulnerability to climate change.

Table 1: ND-GAIN Country Index and Infrastructure Score of Southeast Asian Countries[14]

Evidence of the impact of extreme weather events on the region’s energy infrastructures has been increasingly apparent. The 2021 floods in Malaysia caused the closing down of 333 electricity substations,[15] while in 2020, more than a million people in Vietnam were left without electricity after storms destroyed power lines.[16] In 2019, Cambodia’s hydroelectricity production dropped by 30% due to severe drought.[17] Regional data on the link between extreme weather events and blackouts in Southeast Asia are scarce. There is, however, a study by Handayani et al. which provides a historical analysis of the impact of severe weather events on the power sector in Indonesia. The researchers found that between 2014 and 2015, heavy precipitation caused 1,048 power outages in the Java-Bali region, resulting in an estimated loss of 0.5 million USD and impacting more than 3.1 million people.[18]

In any case, for Southeast Asia, there is limited planning[19] for future scenarios stemming from increased global warming. Insights into climatic impacts of energy infrastructures in Southeast Asia can be implied and obtained from global studies on climate modelling of energy infrastructures which use a range of technological tools to predict future energy-climate scenarios.

These studies predict that the intensity of climatic threats to energy systems will vary across sectors and geographic regions.[20] The greatest threat to thermal power systems[21] will be from heat waves and droughts influencing the temperature and availability of water required for cooling. Transmission grids and renewable energy technologies will be more vulnerable to cold waves, wild fires, flooding, heavy winds, landslides and storms. Very high and low temperatures are predicted to reduce the efficiency of electricity transmission systems.[22] Climate change is also likely to decrease the potential for solar energy.[23] According to Patt et al,[24] the efficiency of photovoltaic modules could drop by about 0.5 percent for every 1°C increase in temperature.[25] Many of these scenarios have important repercussions for energy systems in Southeast Asia, although specific data are available only for a few sectors, such as hydropower. The International Energy Agency predicts that inconsistent waterflows with more intense rainfall and droughts will reduce hydropower capacity in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. If global temperature increases exceed 4°C, hydropower capacity in 2060-2099 is projected to be 8.2% lower than in 1970-2000.[26]

BEST PRACTICES IN CLIMATE ADAPTATION OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURES

Energy infrastructures in Southeast Asia can be made more resilient through two broad policy measures. First, climate modelling tailored specifically to Southeast Asia can be used to assess the impact of future climatic conditions on energy infrastructures. Second, adaptation measures based on the models can reduce climatic impacts. In the next paragraphs, these two areas are explored with reference to best practices and relevance to Southeast Asia.

Climate Modelling

Currently, climate modelling of energy infrastructures uses multiple methodological tools such as quantitative techniques, economic tools and artificial intelligence. Three types of climate modelling have gained prominence in recent years: dynamic downscaling, satellite imagery and remote sensing, and big data. These are briefly described below:

  • Dynamic downscaling is the process of obtaining high-resolution data on climate change for a particular region from global but coarse estimates generated by Global Climate Models. This process has become an important element in addressing climate-driven environmental changes at the regional level and can be used for planning the adaptation of infrastructures, including electricity grids and renewable energy plants.[27] For example, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Argonne National Laboratory recently collaborated with the telecommunications company AT&T to develop the ‘Climate Change Analysis Tool’ which predicts risks to infrastructure from extreme winds and heat. The Tool uses models developed by downscaling global climate projections to local scales.[28] In recent years, the Centre for Climate Research Singapore (CCRS), a research department of the Meteorological Service Singapore (MSS), has collaborated with the National Supercomputing Centre to downscale global climate models to develop regional climate models for Southeast Asia.[29] Such technologies can be used to identify threats to electricity grids and power plants and generate consensus on the need for urgent action.
  • Satellite imagery and remote sensing are increasingly used to make informed decisions on infrastructure development, given that high-resolution images are able to provide reliable information on optimal location and routes of roads, railways and pipelines.[30] Currently, satellite imagery is used to analyse electricity access and identify key features of power plants and transmission lines. This technology can also be used to identify climatic risks to energy infrastructures. For example, policymakers can use hazard maps supported by satellite imagery to design climate-resilient energy infrastructure that can respond to climatic risks.[31] Satellite imagery and remote sensing can also facilitate assessment of damages to energy infrastructure from natural disasters with a high level of accuracy and without the risks of manned emergency missions.[32] For example, the Norwegian company DNV uses satellite-based remote sensing to monitor the vulnerability of energy infrastructures to natural hazards such as floods and fires.[33] These technologies can be used by Southeast Asian policymakers to access real-time data on the structural integrity of energy infrastructures, which can facilitate timely responses during natural disasters. There is great scope within the region for improving response times to natural disasters through the use of remote sensing imagery and AI machine learning. Such technologies can detect infrastructural vulnerabilities in flood-prone cities.[34]
  • Big Data, or large datasets that are computationally processed to reveal patterns, are another important tool in climate adaptation polices. Big data can be used to measure carbon emissions, improve sustainability in supply chains and inform the utilization of natural resources.[35] One example of the use of Big Data to counter climatic threats in Southeast Asia is Haze Gazer, a crisis analysis tool that helps disaster management units to visualize haze crises in Indonesia.[36] The tool uses advanced data mining and analytics to inform decision-making efforts in areas affected by fire and haze events.[37] These data analysis technologies can potentially be used for developing climate resilient energy infrastructures in Southeast Asia. A study by Ji et al.[38] claims that data collected by Distribution System Operators (DSO)[39] can identify vulnerabilities of energy infrastructures from climate change and natural disasters. Regional collaboration can facilitate the development of reliable datasets and analysis tools on existing domestic and cross-border energy infrastructures in Southeast Asia, which can inform adaptation policies.

Climate Adaptation Measures

Climate adaptation involves the use of legislative, technical and financial means to increase the resilience of energy systems. Some of these mitigation measures are currently being implemented in Southeast Asian countries. For example, Indonesia has implemented flood control systems in power plants, altered hydropower operation patterns and increased monitoring of energy systems. However, Handayani et al.[40] argues that these adaptation responses are reactive and fragmented and not part of a national strategy. In this context, Finland provides an interesting case study for climate adaptation. The Finnish Electricity Market Act requires the electricity network to be designed so that storms or snow load do not cause more than 6 hours of breakdowns in town areas or more than 36 hours breakdowns in other areas.[41] This incentivises Finnish energy companies to invest heavily in underground electricity cables that are less vulnerable to climatic threats. Elenia, the second largest electricity distribution system operator in Finland, has 41% of its cabling underground, with a 75% target for 2028.[42] A study by the Asian Development Bank shows that in some contexts, it may not be feasible to change entire distribution networks from overhead to underground, and underground cables can be used along with overhead systems to improve resilience of energy systems[43]. However, the Finnish example highlights the fact that overarching frameworks such as national policies or legislation can facilitate a proactive rather than a reactive approach to mitigation.

Not all successful examples of resilient energy systems are from the developed world. Tonga, for example, invested heavily in upgrading its electricity infrastructure, which enabled the county’s transmission systems to withstand the impact of Cyclone Gita in 2018. Some notable adaptation practices included the installation of aerial-bundled conductors and underground cables and the moving of transformers above the maximum possible sea flood levels.[44] Mitigation efforts can also be enhanced through international cooperation. For example, in 2020, the United States Agency for International Development undertook a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability of the Lao power sector to climate hazards, and developed a resilience plan to address identified challenges.[45] In addition to the examples mentioned, existing energy systems can be made more resilient by the ‘hardening of infrastructure’ or retrofitting existing assets to enhance their resilience. For example, wind turbines can be made more resilient to high winds through the use of shorter blades, and transmission lines can be strengthened through the use of concrete or steel poles instead of wooden ones.[46]

CONCLUSION

Southeast Asian countries have made some progress in recent years towards enhancing climate adaptation. Singapore has initiated important initiatives on climate modelling, which has provided key insights on weather patterns in the coming decades. However, climate modelling is a complex and resource-intensive process and unilateral efforts may not be sufficient. In fact, climate models that specifically focus on energy systems in Southeast Asia are not widely available. A collaborative regional approach to climate modelling of energy systems can inform the development of effective adaptation policies.

In terms of adaptation measures, Southeast Asian countries have also taken steps to strengthen existing infrastructures, including international cooperation on designing better cooling systems and retrofitting existing infrastructure.[47] Yet, a lot more needs to be done to enhance the resilience of energy infrastructures at the national level. In addition, given increasing energy cooperation in the coming decades, a regional strategy on climate adaptation may benefit the development of cross-border projects.[48] Greater dialogue and exchanges by ASEAN will be crucial to the enhancing of the resilience of the region’s energy infrastructures.

ENDNOTES


[1] Seah, S., McGowan, P. J. K., Low, M. Y. X., Martinus, M., Ghoshray, A., Lorusso, M., Wong, R., Lee, P. O., Elliott, L., Setyowati, A., Rahman, S., and Quirapas-Franco, M. J. (2021) Energy Transitions in ASEAN, (p. 34). British High Commission and the COP26 Universities Network.

[2] Yalew, S.G., van Vliet, M.T.H., Gernaat, D.E.H.J. et al. (2020) Impacts of climate change on energy systems in global and regional scenarios. Nat Energy 5, 794–802.

[3] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2016) Protecting Electricity Networks

from Natural Hazards. Vienna, Austria.

[4] Nicolas, C., J. Rentschler, A. Potter van Loon, S. Oguah, A. Schweikert, M. Deinert, E. Koks, C. Arderne, D. Cubas, J. Li, E. Ichikawa. (2019) Stronger Power: Improving Power Sector Resilience to Natural Hazards. Sector note for LIFELINES: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity. World Bank. Washington DC, United States.

[5] Handayani, K.; Filatova, T.; Krozer, Y. (2019) The Vulnerability of the Power Sector to Climate Variability and Change: Evidence from Indonesia. Energies (Basel) 2019, 12 (19), 3640.

[6] The International Energy Agency. (2022) Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2022. Paris, France.

[7] Eckstein, D., Winges M., Künzel V., Schäfer L. (2019) Global Climate Risk Index 2020. Germanwatch e.V.

[8] Ibid

[9] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2021) State of Climate Change Report. Jakarta, Indonesia.

[10] Map developed by Beatrice Celine Zamora Riingen with data from Climate Risk Index 2020, accessed through Resource Watch, www.resourcewatch.org.

[11] Hawchar, L., Naughton, O., Nolan, P., Stewart, M.G., Ryan, P.C. (2020) A GIS-based Framework for High-Level Climate Change Risk Assessment of Critical Infrastructure, Climate Risk Management 29, 100235.

[12] The University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022). Notre Dame, United States. Available at: https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/

[13] AHA Centre. (2020). ASEAN Risk Monitor and Disaster Management Review (ARMOR) 2nd edition. Jakarta: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre).

[14] The University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022). Notre Dame, United States. Available at: https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/. The infrastructure score for Lao is not available. Countries are ranked from 1 – 182, with smaller numbers indicating better performance.

[15] Sohile F. (Dec 19 2021) 333 electrical substations closed in several flood-hit states. New Straits Times.

[16] Radio Free Asia. (Oct 30 2020) Death Toll Climbs in Vietnam, Laos Heavily Flooded Following Major Storm.

[17] Weatherby, C. (2021) Lower Mekong Power Developments: Drought, Renewable Disruptions, and Electricity Trade. Stimson Center.

[18] Handayani K., Filatova T., Krozer Y. (2019) The Vulnerability of the Power Sector to Climate Variability and Change: Evidence from Indonesia’, Energies (Basel), 12(19), 3640

[19] Lammers K, Bertheau P, & Blechinger P (2020) ‘Exploring requirements for sustainable energy supply planning with regard to climate resilience of Southeast Asian islands’, Energy policy, 146, 11177.

[20] Yalew, S.G. et al. (2020).

[21] Thermal power generation consists of using steam power created by burning oil, liquid natural gas (LNG), coal, and other substances to rotate generators.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Nicolas, C., J. et al (2019).

[24] Anthony, P., Pfenninger, S., Lilliestam. J. (2013) Vulnerability of Solar Energy Infrastructure and Output to Climate Change. Climatic Change 121 (1), 93–102.

[25] Yalew, S.G. et al. (2020).

[26] The International Energy Agency (2021) Climate Impacts on South and Southeast Asian Hydropower. Paris, France.

[27] Chandramowli, S., Felder, F. (2014) Impact of climate change on electricity systems and markets – A review of models and forecasts. Sustainable Energy Technologies and Assessments 3, 62-74. 

[28] Koppes, S. (2019) AT&T leverages Argonne’s climate modeling and infrastructure resilience expertise to benefit Southeastern U.S. Argonne National Laboratory.

[29] Tan, A. (Aug 9 2021) Singapore developing climate model to localise findings of IPCC report. Straits Times.

[30] Marshall, B., Driscoll, A., Ermon, D., Stefano, E. (2021) Using satellite imagery to understand and promote sustainable development, Science 371 (6535).

[31] Argyroudis, S. et al. (2022) Digital technologies can enhance climate resilience of critical infrastructure. Climate Risk Management, Volume 35, 100387.

[32] Ibid

[33] For more information please see https://www.dnv.com/

[34] AHA Centre. (2022). ASEAN Risk Monitor and Disaster Management Review (ARMOR) 3rd edition.

Jakarta: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA

Centre)

[35] Sebestyen, V., Czvetko, T., & Abonyi, J. (2021) The Applicability of Big Data in Climate Change Research: The Importance of System of Systems Thinking. Frontiers in Environmental Science, 9.

[36] Ospina, A. (2018) Big Data for resilience storybook: Experiences integrating Big Data into resilience programming. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

[37] Ibid

[38] Ji, C., Wei, Y.,Poor, H. V. (2017) Resilience of Energy Infrastructure and Services: Modeling, Data Analytics, and Metrics. Proceedings of the IEEE, 105(7), 1354–1366.

[39] Distribution System Operators (DSO), are the entities responsible for distributing and managing energy from the generation sources to the final consumers

[40] Handayani, K. et al. (2019)

[41] De Rose et al (2018) Climate change adaptation of major infrastructure projects: A stock-taking of available resources to assist the development of climate resilient infrastructure. European Commission. Brussels, Belgium.

[42] Climate-ADAPT. (2019) Replacing overhead lines with underground cables in Finland.

[43] The Asian Development Bank (2022) The Story of Lanka Electricity Company. Manila, Philippines.

[44] Nicolas, C. et al. (2019).

[45] Stout, S., Lee, N., Vogel, J., Giangola, L. (2020) Lao Power Sector Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Action Plan. United States Agency for International Development. Washington DC, United States.

[46] Ibid

[47] The Asian Development Bank. (2012) Climate Risk and Adaptation in the Electric Power Sector. Manila, Philippines.

[48] Huda, Mirza Sadaqat (2020). Energy Cooperation in South Asia: Utilizing Natural Resources for Peace and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge).

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2022/107 “GE15: Parti Amanah Negara’s Strong and Volatile Seats” by Mohd Faizal Musa

 

Facebook Page of Parti Amanah Negara, Accessed on 1 November 2022. https://www.facebook.com/amanahnegara.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) entered Malaysia’s political scene in 2016 as an underdog. As a splinter party formed by dissidents from Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and championing a more progressive approach to Islam, Amanah won 11 parliamentary seats in GE14 in 2018, mostly located on the peninsula’s west coast. It was part of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration during the 22 months that it held power.
  • For GE15, Amanah is considered safe in five of the 11 seats it now holds. These seats—Pulai (Johor), and Hulu Langat, Shah Alam, Kota Raja, and Sepang (all in Selangor)—are multi-ethnic constituencies with considerable numbers of non-Malay voters, which were won in GE14 with a large majority, or which had already been in the candidates’ hands since their days in PAS. Support from its PH partners such as Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), played an important role in Amanah’s success.
  • With multi-cornered fights expected in several constituencies in GE15, Amanah has its work cut out for it. The six seats that are relatively unsafe are Pokok Sena (Kedah), Parit Buntar and Lumut (Perak), Temerloh (Pahang), Kuala Selangor (Selangor), and Tampin (Negeri Sembilan).
  • Beyond these cases, Amanah has a chance in winning several other seats, such as Kuala Terengganu (Terengganu), Kota Bharu (Kelantan), Alor Gajah (Melaka), Tasik Gelugor (Penang), and Titiwangsa (Federal Territory).
  • The effect of Malaysia’s lowered voting age on all parties remains unknown, and given the crowded field populated by coalitions like PH-Amanah, UMNO, Bersatu-PAS and Pejuang-GTA, one should expect some surprises in the outcome.

* Mohd Faizal Musa is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Research Fellow at the Institute of the Malay World and Civilization (ATMA), National University of Malaysia (UKM).

ISEAS Perspective 2022/107, 4 November 2022

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INTRODUCTION

On 16 September2015, Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) was officially formed.[1] The party’s members consisted of those who were previously with Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), but who were defeated during party elections for their differing approach to Islamist politics. While PAS remains conservative and exclusivist, Amanah can be characterised as a progressive Islamist party with reformist aspirations. Six Members of Parliament (MP) and seven state legislative assemblymen from six states left PAS to join Amanah.[2] Later that year, Amanah, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) joined forces to form Pakatan Harapan (PH). Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s party, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), joined the alliance in 2017, while Sabah’s Parti Warisan (Warisan) allied itself with PH in 2018. The bloc, referred to as PH-Plus, made history when it won Malaysia’s 14th General Election (GE14) in 2018, securing 121 of parliamentary 222 seats.[3] Amanah contributed 11 of those seats.

However, since then, the Malaysian political scene has become more crowded. With the departure of Bersatu and several PKR MPs from the alliance, the PH administration fell in March 2020, making way for the formation of Perikatan Nasional (PN), a third bloc in Malaysian politics. PAS is now part of this coalition. That same year, Mahathir Mohamad left Bersatu to form his own party, Pejuang.[4] There is also Ikatan Demokratik Malaysia (MUDA) headed by Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman, who was formerly with Bersatu and who served as a minister in the PH administration. PH has agreed to an electoral pact with MUDA to contest in GE15.[5]

In his 2017 monograph Parti Amanah Negara in Johor: Birth, Challenges and Prospects, Wan Saiful Wan Jan surmised that Amanah had the potential to win in multi-racial constituencies where Chinese voters constitute 30 to 45 per cent of the population.[6] Although he situated his argument within the context of Johor, it appeared that his hypothesis held water in the rest of the country. This was confirmed in GE14, where “95 percent of the ethnic Chinese population and 70-75 percent of the ethnic Indians voted for PH.”[7] To be sure, Amanah also received significant support from urban Malay voters.[8]

This now leads to questions about the fate of Amanah in the upcoming GE15, which may witness multi-cornered fights unless all opposition parties come to a common understanding. Short of such an agreement, there is doubt that Amanah will be able to defend its 11 seats.

In GE15, Amanah will be contesting in as many as 54 seats. Based on recent experience and the high probability of multi-cornered fights, the party faces an uphill battle, as demonstrated in the Johor state election where Amanah dropped from holding nine state assembly seats to only one.

Nevertheless, the results of GE15 remain unpredictable. This Perspective considers the re-election prospects of Amanah’s incumbents, and studies the few constituencies that hold out a relatively positive outlook for the party.

STABLE SEATS

Of the 11 seats won in GE14, Amanah is arguably rooted in only five of them. There are three reasons for saying this. Firstly, these are the number of seats which they won with a big majority. Secondly, the Amanah candidates in these seats, all of whom attained prominence while they were members of PAS, retained popular support despite their new affiliation. Finally, the state constituencies within these seats made strong contributions to their victory and have been occupied either by Amanah, PKR, or DAP. The five strong seats are (P codes for parliament seats, N for state assembly seats):

  1. Pulai P161

The incumbent MP is Salahuddin Ayub, the former Minister of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry during PH’s administration. He is currently Deputy President of Amanah and a holding member of the state constituency of N13 Simpang Jeram in Johor.

Salahuddin won this seat in GE14 with a majority of 28,924 votes. He won 55,447 votes against the United Malays National Organization’s (UMNO) Nur Jazlan Mohamed who received 26,523 votes, and PAS’ Mohd Mazri Yahya, who came third with 4,332 votes.[9]

2. Hulu Langat P101

The MP is Hasanuddin Mohd Yunus, who is one of the party’s vice presidents. Hasanuddin won this seat in GE14 with a majority of 25,424 votes. He won 49,004 votes against UMNO’s Azman Ahmad who received 23,580 votes and PAS’ Che Rosli Che Mat who had 15,663 votes.

One of the state constituencies within the Hulu Langat federal constituency is N23 Dusun Tua, which DAP’s Edry Faizal Eddy Yusof won with a huge majority in GE14. He received 22,325 votes against UMNO’s Mohd Zin Isa’s 11,903 votes, and PAS’ Razaly Hassan’s 7,771 votes.[10] DAP’s hold on Dusun Tua may therefore contribute to Amanah’s strength in Hulu Langat.

A new development is that, in the upcoming GE15, Amanah is sending Mohd Sany Hamzan, a member of the Selangor State Legislative Assembly, to defend the seat.

3. Shah Alam P108

Khalid Abd Samad, a well-known leader of Amanah, has held this seat since GE12. Khalid was Minister of Federal Territories during PH’s administration. In GE14, he attained a majority of 33,849 and received a total of 55,949 votes against UMNO’s Azhari Shaari who had 22,100 votes and PAS’ stalwart, Mohd Zuhdi Marzuki, who had 15,194 votes

In GE13 he defeated UMNO’s Zulkifli Noordin, winning 49,009 votes against Zulkifli’s 38,070 votes, for a majority of 10,939.[11] Two of the state constituencies in Selangor, N40 Kota Anggerik and N41 Batu Tiga, are both PKR strongholds which have strong support for Khalid or for anyone replacing him.[12]

In the upcoming election, Azli Yusof, Khalid’s right-hand man will be contesting here.

4. Kota Raja P111

The incumbent in Kota Raja is none other than Mohamad Sabu, the President of Amanah and Minister of Defence during PH’s administration. Mohamad first contested in this seat in GE14, during which he won 90,697 votes, with a majority of 71,142 votes. He defeated PAS’ Mohamed Diah Baharun who had 19,555 votes, and Barisan Nasional’s (BN) candidate, Gunalan Velu (from the Malaysian Indian Congress, MIC), who had 17,874 votes.

In the two elections prior to GE14, Kota Raja was represented by a member of PAS’ reformist bloc, Dr Siti Mariah Mahmud, who later became a leader of Amanah’s women’s wing. In 2018 she contested under Amanah in the state constituency of Seri Serdang.[13] Thus, given the longstanding popularity of Amanah members in Kota Raja, the seat is considered a safe seat for any Amanah candidate who runs there.  

5. Sepang P113

The incumbent in this seat is Mohamed Hanipa Maidin who won for the second time in GE14. Mohamed Hanipa was Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in charge of legal affairs during PH’s administration. In 2018, he won 46,740 votes with a 18,705 majority against UMNO’s Marsum Paing who won 28,035 votes and PAS’ Sabirin Marsono who won 15,882 votes.

However, Hanipa is not in good health and will be giving way to a younger candidate.[14] Amanah Women’s Wing chief, Aiman Athirah Al-Jundi has been confirmed to replace her.

There are three state constituencies within the federal constituency of Sepang in which PH component parties have a satisfactory majority. These are N54 Tanjong Sepat, N55 Dengkil, and N56 Sungai Pelek.[15]

A number of Amanah leaders expressed during fieldwork interviews that all five of the above-mentioned seats are safe seats for the party.[16] Given the confidence that they have in these seats, Amanah hopes to hold on to the 11 seats that they have, out of the 54 that they will be contesting in. It is worth noting that Amanah is viewed by some as the party that will fill in the gap left by Bersatu, as well as the party that can counter PAS’ narrative on Islam.[17] 

It is crucial to note that these are multi-ethnic constituencies. For example, Pulai comprises of 39.4 per cent Chinese voters and 10.5 per cent Indian voters.[18] Kota Raja has 27.8 per cent Chinese voters and 28.1 per cent Indian voters.[19] Similarly, Sepang has 20.2 per cent Chinese voters and 14.2 per cent Indian voters.[20]

IN HOT WATER

In contrast to the five safe seats, Amanah’s remaining six seats are more volatile and vulnerable in a multi-cornered fight. This is due to several factors. Firstly, these constituencies comprise of a smaller number of non-Malay voters. Secondly, PAS or UMNO has had a persistent strong presence in these constituencies. Thirdly, UMNO or PN may be fielding strategically strong candidates for these seats.

These seats are:

  1. Pokok Sena P008

The incumbent MP is Mahfuz Omar, who is one of Amanah’s vice presidents and who served as Deputy Minister of Human Resources during PH’s administration. Of the five times that he had competed in this seat, he won three times.

Pokok Sena constituency was established in 1995, in the year of GE09. That year saw Mahfuz losing to BN, with the former receiving 20,667 votes and UMNO candidate Wan Hanafiah Wan Mat Saman winning 25,285 votes.

In GE10 in 1999, Mahfuz won the seat, getting 27,466 against Wan Hanafiah’s 23,829 votes. BN successfully wrested back Pokok Sena in GE11, with Mahfuz attracting only 22,440 votes against UMNO’s Abdul Rahman Ibrahim’s 29,740 votes.

Mahfuz reclaimed the seat in GE12 in 2008, by winning 29,6g87 votes against Abdul Rahman’s 23,956 votes. He retained the seat in GE13 with 36,198 votes against UMNO’s Shahlan Ismail’s 32,263 votes. His winning streak continued in GE14, when he extended the winning margin to 5,558 with 28,959 votes against PAS (23,401 votes) and UMNO (18,390 votes).

From these numbers, it is evident that Mahfuz has been ahead in these fights by approximately three to five thousand votes, whether they are one-on-one or multi-cornered fights. In the case of Pokok Sena, this difference in the number of votes may be attributed to the fact that two of its state constituencies, N009 Bukit Lada and N10 Bukit Pinang are led by PAS but only with a small margin.[21] Furthermore, his ability to retain Pokok Sena in 2018 could have been due to the fact that DAP won N11 Derga in 2013 and 2018. Whatever the case, this seat is considered volatile, and there is no certainty that Mahfuz will retain it if he runs in GE15.

2. Parit Buntar P057

The incumbent MP of this seat is Mujahid Yusof Rawa, another of Amanah’s vice presidents. He served as Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in charge of Religious Affairs during PH’s administration. Prior to him, the seat was occupied by PAS’ Hasan Mohamed Ali after GE10, and was reclaimed by UMNO in GE11.[22] Mujahid took the seat in GE12 in 2008 with a majority of 7,551, winning 21,221 votes against UMNO’s Abdul Rahman Suliman’s 13,670 votes.

In GE13, his majority rose to 8,476 when he gained 26,015 votes against UMNO’s Mua’amar Ghadafi Jamal Jamaludin, who received 17,539 votes. In GE14 in 2018, Mujahid won with a majority of 3,098, gaining 16,753 votes against UMNO’s Abdul Puhat Mat Nayan’s 13,655 votes and PAS’ Ahmad Azhar Haji Sharin’s 12,312 votes. One possible reason Mujahid managed to retain this seat was because two state constituencies under Parit Buntar were led by PH component parties. These are N09 Kuala Kurau which has been held by PKR since 2008, and N08 Titi Serong which Amanah won in 2018, although only with a majority of 140.[23] However, in 2020, their representative Hasnul Zulkarnain Abd Munaim left Amanah to join Bersatu, and in 2021 declared himself an independent candidate.[24]

Parit Buntar is considered an unsafe seat as Titi Serong voters might be the deciding factor in a multi-cornered fight. Nevertheless, Mujahid may retain Parit Buntar, and the likelihood of this may increase since PH appears determined to gain the parliamentary upper hand in the state of Perak, with Anwar Ibrahim running in Tambun.

3. Lumut P074

The existing MP is Dr Mohd Hatta Ramli, who is currently Amanah’s secretary-general and who served as Deputy Minister of Entrepreneur Development during PH’s administration.

In GE14, Mohd Hatta defeated UMNO’s Zambry Abd Kadir (who was Chief Minister of Perak) with a slim majority of 400 votes. Mohd Hatta received 21,955 votes while Zambry got 21,555 votes. PAS’ Mohd Zamri Ibrahim received 10,135 votes.

Lumut is a highly contested seat. In GE13, PKR’s Mohamad Imran Abd Hamid won this seat with 40,308 votes against BN’s Kong Cho Ha who gained 32,140 votes. In GE12, Kong won with 25,698 votes, defeating PKR’s Suwardi Sapuan who had 25,400 votes. This gave Kong a slim majority of 298 votes.

Nevertheless, there are a number of factors that may give the advantage to Hatta in this seat. Firstly, Hatta is born in Sitiawan, near Lumut. Secondly, Lumut is home to the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) military base. Data from GE14 show that there were 11,223 early voters who were RMN personnel.[25] Thus, given the recent controversy concerning the RM9.13 billion Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) contract which involves the RMN, Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd (BNS), and the current government, Hatta might stand to retain the seat.[26] Thirdly, one of the state constituencies under Lumut, N51 Pasir Panjang, is occupied by a well-known local, Yahaya bin Mat Nor. He won the seat in 2018 with 14,123 votes against UMNO’s Rashidi Ibrahim who got 12,904 votes and PAS’ Rohawati Abidin who got 7,795 votes.

The challenge for Hatta will be Zambry Abd Kadir, should the latter decide to run again. It should be noted that Zambry has a launching pad as he also occupies N52 Pangkor, which is within the Lumut parliamentary seat. He won that state seat with a majority vote of 1,626, winning 8,378 votes against PAS’ Zainal Abidin Saad’s 3,638 votes and Bersatu’s Nordin Ahmad Ismail’s 6,752 votes. While Bersatu and PAS are now in the same camp and will field only one candidate among them, Hatta might instead have to face an additional candidate from Pejuang.

4. Temerloh P088

In GE14, 70-year-old Mohd Anuar Tahir, one of Amanah’s founding members and former secretary-general, was parachuted to run in Temerloh. The constituency had been considered an UMNO fortress, but in GE13, Nasrudin Hassan from PAS had defeated Saifuddin Abdullah with a small majority of 1,070 votes.

Although an unknown to the constituents, Mohd Anuar managed to get 23,998 votes to win the seat with a majority of 1,904 votes. UMNO’s Mohd Sharkar Shamsudin had received 22,094 votes while PAS’ Md Jusoh Darus got 14,734 votes. Mohd Anuar was Deputy Minister of Works during PH’s administration.[27]

However, there are concerns about Amanah’s ability to defend the seat. At least one state constituency in Temerloh has been comfortably won by UMNO. N31 Lanchang is traditionally an UMNO seat; it is now represented by Mohd Sharkar Shamsudin, who is part of the Pahang State Executive Council. This may give him greater visibility. N32 Kuala Semantan was previously held by PAS but was snatched by UMNO in GE14 with a majority of 474 votes.

Amanah is fielding Mohd Hasbie Muda, its current Youth Chief. Hasbie can retain this seat if voters in the state constituency of N30 Mentakab continue to throw their support behind DAP, as they did in GE14.[28] Mentakab has a large number of Chinese voters and this may help Amanah retain Temerloh if they field a strong candidate there. It is expected that concurrent state elections to be held in Pahang during GE15 will help to boost support for the parliamentary candidates. For example, the thrill of a fight between heavyweights Young Syefura Othman of DAP and Liow Tiong Lai of BN in Bentong P089 may spill over to seats in which Amanah will be contesting, including Temerloh, Bentong’s neighbouring constituency.

5. Kuala Selangor P096

The MP of this seat is Dzulkefly Ahmad, a highly-praised 66-year-old toxicologist who served as the Minister of Health during PH’s administration.

Dzulkefly first captured the seat with a slim majority of 862 votes in GE12 in 2008, when he was a member of PAS. He won 18,796 votes against UMNO’s Jahaya Ibrahim’s 17,934 votes. UMNO recaptured the seat in GE13, when Irmohizam Ibrahim won 27,500 votes, just 460 more than Dzulkefly’s 27,040 votes.

Dzulkefly reversed this result in GE14 and won 29,842 votes against Irmohizam’s 21,344 votes and PAS’ Haji Fakaruddin’s 8,535 votes. This time, he won with a larger majority of 8,498 votes. Three state constituencies under Kuala Selangor were grabbed by PH. PKR won N10 Bukit Melawati and N11 Ijok, while Bersatu won N12 Jeram.[29]

However, despite that success, it will be an uphill battle for an Amanah candidate to win this seat in GE15. Rumour has it that UMNO plans to field PN’s Minister of Finance, Tengku Zafrul Tengku Abdul Aziz, there.[30] This spells additional trouble for competing candidates, especially since Zafrul is known to be close to the monarch.

6. Tampin P133

The current MP of Tampin is Dr Hasan Bahrom, an Islamic scholar who joined Amanah in 2016. In GE14, Hasan received 22,435 votes against UMNO’s Shaziman Abu Mansor who received 21,433 votes and PAS’ Abdul Halim Abu Bakar who received 4,958 votes. Prior to Amanah’s victory, Shaziman had held this seat since GE10 in 1999. For GE15, Muhammad Faiz Fadzil, member of Penang State Legislative Assembly for Permatang Pasir will be running here.

History illustrates Tampin as a safe seat for UMNO. In GE11, Shaziman won the seat with 23,936 votes against PAS’ Abdul Razakek Abdul Rahim who received only 5,852 votes. This was a large majority of 18,084 votes. In GE13, Shaziman won 29,390 votes against Abdul Razakek’s 18,228 votes. It was again a large majority, this time of 11,162 votes.

There are currently three state constituencies under Tampin. These are N34 Gemas which has traditionally been occupied by UMNO with a large majority; N35 Gemencheh which was won in GE14 by Bersatu’s Saiful Adly Abd Wahab with a slim majority of 351 votes; and N36 Repah which was won by DAP’s Veerapan Superamaniam with a majority of 4,758 votes. DAP’s success in this seat in GE14 could be attributed to the significant number of non-Malay voters there. It is the only safe seat for PH in Tampin.

A win for Amanah is not impossible as there is a large number of non-Malay voters in these seats. For example, Lumut P074 comprises of 14.8 per cent Chinese voters and 11.4 percent Indian voters; Pokok Sena P008 has 15.3 per cent Chinese voters, and 2.4 per cent Indian voters;[31] Parit Buntar P057 has 25.6 per cent Chinese voters and 4.7 per cent Indian voters; while Kuala Selangor P096 has 12.8 per cent Chinese voters and 20.9 per cent Indian voters.[32]

OTHER POTENTIAL SEATS

There are other must-watch seats where strong Amanah candidates have a chance. These have either historically been held by a current Amanah leader when they were in PAS, or may be up for grabs due to several uncertainties. Such seats include Kuala Terengganu P036 and Kota Bharu P021 which were contested in GE14 by Raja Kamarul Bahrin Shah Raja Ahmad and Husam Musa respectively. Raja Kamarul will make another attempt, while in Kota Bharu, Hafidzah Mustakim, a well-known medical doctor is the flag bearer.

Adly Zahari, who was Chief Minister of Melaka from May 2018 to March 2020 may have a chance in the state, and is regarded as a well-performing leader. He will be contesting in Alor Gajah P135 which is currently held by Mohd Redzuan Md Yusof of Bersatu.

Another possible seat for Amanah to grab is Tasik Gelugor P042 in Penang. This seat was won by UMNO’s Shabudin Yahya in GE14 with a small majority of 81 votes. He won 18,547 votes against Bersatu’s Marzuki Yahya who had 18,466 votes and PAS’ Rizal Hafiz Roslan who gained 14,891 votes.[33] Amanah is assigning Nik Abdul Razak Nik Md Ridzuan, Amanah Deputy Youth Chief to contest here.

Amanah is also strategising to field top party leaders such as Khalid Samad to wrestle Titiwangsa P119 away from Bersatu. This will be an interesting seat to watch as UMNO may once again field Johari bin Abdul Ghani, an MP who held the seat for only one term before he was defeated in GE14. Titiwangsa has historically been a highly-contested seat which saw battles between UMNO and PAS. In GE13, Johari defeated PAS here with a small majority of 866 votes, while in GE12, as a progressive female leader from PAS, Lo’Lo’ Mohamad Ghazali had unexpectedly won the seat.

CONCLUSION

As noted earlier, Wan Saiful Wan Jan surmised that Amanah was capable of winning in multi-ethnic constituencies which comprise of at least 30-45 per cent Chinese voters. He further noted that in the context of Johor, Amanah would need a large sum of Malay votes in order to gain a few seats in GE14. He was proven right when Amanah won nine out of the 12 seats that they contested in Johor’s state election. They were also victorious at the parliamentary level, winning Pulai with an overwhelming majority.

However, the Malay vote continues to be crucial and will see an even greater split in GE15. In 2018, “the ethnic Malay vote was split between PH (25%-30%), BN (35%-40%) and PAS (30%-33%).”[34] However, this year, the vote will be split between UMNO, PH, PN, and GTA. This might make things more difficult for Amanah, as GTA’s presence could cause further splits in votes. Nevertheless, if non-Malay voters continue to reject the Malay elite as represented by UMNO, Bersatu and PAS the way they did in 2018, Amanah could survive GE15 comfortably, albeit with reduced seats.

Apart from the ethnic composition of constituencies, another factor that may affect the outcome of GE15 is Undi18 which lowers the voting age from 21 to 18. In GE14, young voters made up 41% of the total voter base, and they played no small role in toppling the BN government.[35] Thus, the addition of more young voters to the voter base may lead to unexpected outcomes.

Amanah will be contesting in as many as 54 seats in GE15. Their work seems cut out for them,[36] in fact, more than half of these seats, being located in the Malay heartland, will be tough-going for them.

ENDNOTES


[1] Maszlee Malik. “Rethinking the Role of Islam in Malaysian Politics: A Case Study of Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah)”, Islam and Civilisational Renewal 8, no. 4 (2018): 459.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Andreas Ufen. “Opposition in Transition: Pre-Electoral Coalitions and the 2018 Electoral Breakthrough in Malaysia”, Democratization 27, no. 2 (2020): 179.

[4] Together with Barisan Jemaah Islamiah See-Malaysia (BERJASA), Parti Bumiputera Perkasa Malaysia (PUTRA), and Parti Perikatan India Muslim Nasional (IMAN), Mahathir formed a new coalition called Gerakan Tanah Air (GTA), which he leads.

[5] Junaidi Awang Besar. “Evolusi dan Dinamika Geopolitik dan Sosiopolitik Gerakan Politik di Malaysia”, Jurnal Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan 18, no. 2 (2021): 21-23.  

[6] Wan Saiful Wan Jan. Parti Amanah Negara in Johor: Birth, Challenges and Prospects, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 9/2017 (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017), p. 28.

[7] Andreas Ufen, “Opposition in Transition”, 179.    

[8] Muhamad Helmy Sabtu and Muhamad Nadzri Mohamed Noor. Persaingan Ideologi PAS & Amanah Dalam Politik dan Pilihan Raya. (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2018), p. 139-140.

[9] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran. Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia: Tanding Pilih Menang Tadbir (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 2021), p. 601.

[10] Ibid., pp. 489-490.

[11] “Perkasa Veep Zulkifli Noordin Takes on Khalid Samad”, Malaysiakini, 16 April 2013, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/226935 (accessed 10 October 2022).

[12] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran, Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia, pp. 503-504.

[13] Irwan Muhammad Zain. “Pakatan Harapan Letak Mat Sabu di Kota Raja”, Astro Awani, 22 April 2018, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/pakatan-harapan-letak-mat-sabu-di-kota-raja-173560 (accessed 10 October 2022).

[14] “Hanipa Pengsan Ketika Himpunan Bulanan JPM”, Malaysiakini, 9 July 2018.  https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/433293 (accessed 15 October 2022). See also Bernama, “Pengsan Dalam Dewan, Ahli Parlimen Sepang Dikejarkan Ke HKL”, Mstar, 4 April 2016, https://www.mstar.com.my/lokal/semasa/2016/04/04/pengsan-dalam-dewan (accessed 15 October 2022).

[15] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran, 2021. Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia, pp. 513-514.

[16] Author’s interviews with Amanah leaders: (a) Adly Zahari, 20 October 2022. He is one of Amanah’s Vice Presidents; (b) Muhammad Faiz Fadzil, 16 September 2022. He is a member of Penang’s State Legislative Assembly, representing Permatang Pasir; (c) Salahuddin Ayub, 5 June 2022. He is Amanah’s Deputy President, and the incumbent MP for Pulai.

[17]“The Progressive Islamists: Can Amanah Triumph Against PAS?” Fulcrum Commentary, 25 October 2022,  https://fulcrum.sg/the-progressive-islamists-can-amanah-triumph-against-pas/, (accessaed 26 November 2022).

[18] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran, Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia, p. 601.

[19] Ibid., p. 508.

[20] Ibid., p. 513.

[21] Ibid., pp. 297-299.

[22] “YB Datuk Dr Hassan Ali”, Perak Today, 21 December 2011, https://peraktoday.com.my/2011/12/yb-datuk-dr-hassan-ali/ (accessed 16 October 2022).

[23] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran, Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia, p. 405-406.

[24] Faris Danial Razi, “Bersatu Pecat Adun Titi Serong, Hasnul Zulkarnain”, Astro Awani, 23 March 2021, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/bersatu-pecat-adun-titi-serong-hasnul-zulkarnain-289623 (accessed 16 October 2022).

[25] “Early Voting in Lumut, Perak”, The Sun Daily, 5 May 2018, https://www.thesundaily.my/archive/early-voting-lumut-perak-YUARCH545426 (accessed 17 October 2022).

[26] “Spotlight on the LCS Scandal”, The Edge Markets, 27 August 2022, https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/spotlight-lcs-scandal (accessed 17 October 2022).

[27] Cynthia Ng, “Anuar Tahir: Former Agitator, Now Legislator”, Astro Awani, 6 July 2018, ttps://www.astroawani.com/berita-dunia/anuar-tahir-former-agitator-now-legislator-223967 (accessed 16 October 2022).

[28] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran, Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia, pp. 464-645.

[29] Ibid., pp. 480-482.

[30] Ahmad Fadhullah Adnan, “Tengku Zafrul Mungkin Bertanding di Kuala Selangor”, Utusan Malaysia, 2 August 2022, https://www.utusan.com.my/nasional/2022/08/tengku-zafrul-mungkin-bertanding-di-kuala-selangor/ (accessed 17 October 2022).

[31] Ibid., p. 297.

[32] Ibid., p. 405, p. 480.

[33] Ab Rashid Ab Rahman and G. Manimaran, Pilihan Raya Demokrasi Malaysia, p. 374.

[34] Andreas Ufen, “Opposition in Transition”, p. 179.

[35] Sara Chinnasamy and Norminaliza Mohamed Azmi, “Malaysian 14th General Election: Young Voters & Rising Political Participation,” The Journal of Social Sciences Research no.4 (2018): 125.              125-138

[36] Bernama, “Amanah to contest 54 parliamentary seats in GE15”, The Edge Markets, 30 October 2022, https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/amanah-contest-54-parliamentary-seats-ge15 (accessed 17 October 2022). To an understanding of Malay heartland voters, see Serina Rahman, 2019. ‘The Rural Malay Voter in GE-14: Expectations, Surprise, and Misgivings’. In The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or late Surge, edited by Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun. (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing), p. 153-190.

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2022/106 “Polarised but Hopeful: How Malaysia’s Gen Zs May Vote, and Why” by James Chai

 

Twitter page of Parti Muda at https://twitter.com/partimuda. MUDA is a multi-racial and youth-centric party formed by Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • A recent survey shows that most Gen Zs (62%) in Malaysia read political news a few times a week, and answer questions on political facts well (above 68% correct). However, they score themselves lowly in political awareness, either from low confidence or from the perception that there is much in politics that they are not knowledgeable about.
  • A majority of Gen Zs hold low trust in the political actors that are running the country. They are frustrated with how the government works, are disgusted with political parties, and suspect that politicians will do anything to win elections, including lying.
  • Though disappointed, Gen Zs are still engaged, and a high 79% of them say that they will most likely turn out to vote in the coming election.
  • Gen Z voters are split in their support of the three major coalitions, Pakatan Harapan+MUDA (PH+MUDA), Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN). The combined support received by PH+MUDA puts the coalition slightly ahead of BN, with the PN trailing further behind.
  • At the same time, BN has the highest portion of potential swing voters, either to PN or to PH+MUDA. For PN, the swing is potentially to a Malay-Muslim coalition like BN, whereas a swing away from PH+MUDA most likely would result in undecided votes or non-participation.  
  • Besides their own preference for a particular party or coalition, parental influence emerges as a moderately strong factor in Gen Zs’ voting choices. About 61% of Gen Zs follow their parents’ voting choice while the rest – 39% – prefer something else. BN households have the highest intergenerational rebellion, with MUDA being the most attractive for rebels, followed by PN. This implies that this group of Gen Z voters may be envisioning a future ideologically distant from their parents’. The more conservative shift to PN, while the more progressive would favour PH+MUDA.

* James Chai is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a columnist at MalaysiaKini and Sin Chew Daily.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/106, 2 November 2022

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INTRODUCTION

The Malaysian workforce is still recovering from a triple crisis in health, economics and politics. Where the young are concerned, they are paid less than their regional peers;[1] one-third of them consider getting a house “seriously unaffordable”,[2] and; only 16% find it easy to save.[3]

The past few years have been a politically unstable period, triggered by the “Sheraton Move”, a large-scale party-hopping initiative undertaken by MPs horse-trading for a place in government. The federal government fell twice in two years, with each successive government surviving on a wafer-thin majority. Unprecedented challenges of Covid-19, supply-chain disruptions due to the Ukraine War and tensions between major superpowers only exacerbated the uncertainty youths are feeling about their future. 

At the same time, Malaysian youths have never been as politically enfranchised as they are now. In the 15th General Election (GE15) to be held on 19 November 2022, all Malaysians who are 18-years-old and above are automatically eligible to vote. The six million voters aged below 30 who now make up 29% of the total electorate (~21 million) are sufficient to shake up the electoral situation.[4]

To provide further details on this new group of voters, this paper is divided into two parts:

  • Will the youths vote?
    Questions on knowledge, motivation, and sentiment are probed in Part 1.
  • Who will the youths vote for?
    Choices are dissected and traced to their origin(s) in Part 2.

METHODOLOGY

In this paper, only youths between the ages of 18 to 24 in 2022 are covered, this being the group that intersects the categories of first-time voter[5] and Generation Z (Gen Z).[6] A total of 45 questions were put to 805 respondents in a telephone survey conducted in September 2022.[7]

Part 1: Not Fired Up but Still Ready to Go: Gen Zs’ Survey Turnout Levels 

Contrary to popular belief, Gen Zs are aware and well-equipped to judge what politicians and the government are doing to address their concerns.

Chart 1: Gen Zs’ consumption frequency and medium of current affairs news

According to Chart 1, a majority of respondents (62%) kept abreast of political news at least a few times a week. In contrast, respondents who rarely read political news – monthly readers and non-readers – amounted to a minority 39% of total respondents. Though the rise in popularity of TikTok is prominent among youths, it was only the third most-used platform for current affairs (18%), with Facebook (29%) and Instagram (25%) still acting as primary platforms for political goings-on in Malaysia. 

Clearly, the “Daily” and “Almost Daily” readers were those most interested in politics, reading about political news a few times a week is nevertheless considered sufficient for the making of informed political decisions such as voting.

When asked how they would score in an exam about politics, a majority (65%) scored themselves 50% or below, and 9% of them gave themselves the lowest quartile scores of 0% to 20% (Chart 2). At the same time, only 9% confidently rated themselves at the highest quartile of 80% to 100%. 

Chart 2: Respondents’ self-assessed exam score on politics

To test this, the survey subsequently quizzed respondents on the current political landscape.[viii] Depending on the respondents’ location, the two-wrongs-one-right question pools were as follows:

Table 1: Quiz on basic political knowledge

All responses were designed to be current but not too recent, obvious but not simple, and nuanced but not subjective. The assumption was that only respondents who pay sufficient, albeit not complete, attention to politics could answer these questions with ease. In all instances, the correct response is “B”.

Chart 3: Gen Z’s political quiz results

Invariably, Gen Z respondents did well, with a clear majority selecting the right response and only approximately 20% picking the wrong one. Notably, certain nuances threw some respondents off. In West Malaysia, a small portion of Chinese and Malay respondents selected “C”, perhaps because they were more familiar, and thus more easily confused, with the non-Malay former Minister of Finance and his party background. A similar confusion was found in Sarawak where a few respondents selected “A”, wrongly assuming that Taib Mahmud was still the governing figurehead, perhaps due to his continued presence in a different capacity, as governor of the state.

Arguably, while respondents knew political facts, they still scored themselves lowly on the “political exam” (Chart 2) because they assumed that there was more about politics than they know.

Beyond knowledge on political facts, we wanted to also gauge how Gen Zs felt about political actors in general.

The survey asked three sets of questions to assess Gen Z’s political sentiment given the political instability in recent years. More generally, these questions were designed to gauge the level of (dis)trust Gen Zs have for political actors who were often seen as deprioritising public interest against private gains.

The questions were divided into three actors: Politicians, Government, and Political Parties.  Every respondent was presented with two statements about these three actors, of which they were to pick the one that seemed closest to their beliefs (Table 2).

Table 2: Questions to gauge Gen Zs’ sentiments on key political actors 

In Chart 4 below, a clear majority (averaging 63%) were not happy with what the politicians, government, and political parties were doing. The highest dissatisfaction was registered for politicians, with 64% feeling that they may do anything to win elections, even lie to the public. This deep distrust for Politicians may have stemmed from the large-scale party-hopping in 2020, largely seen as being due to a pursuit of personal gains, and for ministerial positions and riches. When it came to Government and Political Parties, 62% were both frustrated with how government works and disgusted with political parties today.

Chart 4: Gen Zs’ sentiments on key political actors

However, there were nuances in the responses on Chart 4. Muslim Bumiputera in East Malaysia was the only ethnic group that registered a majority (52%) in a positive impression of politicians, whereas Chinese and Indian respondents showed the lowest positive responses (10% and 11% respectively) for the same question. Additionally, Chinese respondents also registered an unusually high “Unsure/Refused” (28%) on Political Parties, perhaps due to positive impressions for a few parties and disgust for the others. Overall, 52% Chinese respondents recorded disgust for political parties.

It is entirely possible that Gen Zs used the three political sentiment questions to vent their frustrations with the material conditions of low pay, unemployment, and high cost of living, and the broad political actors served as a good proxy for that frustration. They may have found people in power responsible, regardless of which actor they represented.

Notwithstanding these frustrations, Gen Zs still believe in the value of voting and are ready to vote when the election comes.

The literature on the subject suggests that the best method for assessing voter turnout for a cohort is by asking the Sunday question, in the form of “If the General Election is held this Sunday, how likely are you to vote?” This question is effective because it captures the most immediate voter sentiment and removes the logistics challenge, to some extent, by naming a weekend instead of a weekday. Our survey adopted that same question to ask.

Chart 5: Sunday turnout question

Respondents were asked to rate their turnout likelihood on a scale of 1 to 4 with 1 being “very unlikely” and 4 being “very likely”.[ix] Encouragingly, 79% of respondents said that they would likely vote in the next general election; 56% of these returned the top answer—“very likely”, implying a virtual certainty in voting participation. This is comparable to Malaysia’s highest turnout levels historically,[x]and higher than recent turnout survey responses by the general Malaysian voter population,[xi] proving that Gen Zs are not more disengaged and uninformed than other age cohorts.

There are two potential drivers to the high turnout responses. One is political efficacy. Essentially, political efficacy questions are designed to see how empowered respondents feel about affecting the outcome. Disillusionment with the political situation or the election system like malapportionment and fraud may threaten this sense of efficacy. Surprisingly, Gen Z respondents turn out to be optimistic about the impact of their votes.

Table 3: Questions on voter efficacy

In three similar-themed questions (Table 3), Gen Z respondents appear convinced that their votes will make a difference to the outcome of the election and their lives.

Chart 6: Questions on political efficacy

According to Chart 6, 75% and 78% of Gen Zs believe that their votes will make a difference to how the country caters to youths and to who wins the elections, respectively. Notably, Chinese respondents appear to be the most disillusioned and pessimistic group, with only 63% (vs. 75% overall) and 69% (vs. 78% overall) sharing the optimism on the first two efficacy questions, respectively. 

Additionally, 43% of respondents believe that their chosen party will win the election. This makes sense in this view would validate their sense of efficacy. Though 43% is lower than the responses in the previous two efficacy question, it still ranks highest among all responses. This makes voter efficacy a strong reason why Gen Zs appear ready to vote on polling day.

The second, and more persuasive reason for high turnout responses was the respondents’ sense of duty.

Chart 7: Voting as a duty

Every respondent, regardless of ethnicity, religion, income, education level, region and employment status, believes strongly that it is every Malaysian citizens’ duty to vote. Even among the most disillusioned and pessimistic group, the Chinese, 85% believe it is a duty to vote. While it is not clear where this sense of civic duty comes from, since this is not actively instilled at school, it seemed to be a decisive reason for all respondents.

A final caveat ought to be applied before we conclude this part. The actual turnout levels of Gen Zs need to be compared to the turnout responses in this survey, for fear that the respondents’ answers here may be prone to social desirability bias on their part in that they wish to be perceived as a good and participative citizen.

In summary, Gen Z respondents read about politics a few times a week and are knowledgeable about political facts. However, they score themselves lowly in a hypothetical “political exam”, either out of low confidence or an awareness that their knowledge is limited. Though Gen Zs are obviously disappointed with political actors today, they are not entirely disillusioned by the political process. Instead, they are hopeful that voting is powerful enough to make a difference, and the vast majority of them are ready to exercise this new enfranchisement come election day.

Part 2: Rebels at Home: Voting Choice and Parental Influence

In this survey, we also asked the question on would be on everyone’s minds: Who will the youths vote for? Similar to other party choice questions, the number of respondents who choose “Unsure/Refused/Don’t Know” will naturally be higher than other questions, due to privacy and fear. However, that also means that respondents who return a positive answer would likely have done so honestly, thus giving us directional clues of the political sentiment of the overall Gen Z population.

As a caveat, the list of options we provided was not comprehensive enough to cover the many political parties in East Malaysia, thus leaving an East Malaysian analysis incomplete. Further studies focused specifically on East Malaysian political sentiments is greatly encouraged.

Chart 8: Gen Z’s voting choice

As expected, Chart 8 shows that 42.9% of the respondents answered Unsure/Refused/Don’t Know. It is not possible to clearly ascertain how many of these were genuinely uncertain about who to vote for, or whether they were simply preferring to keep their party choice a secret.

Beyond that, the party choices of Gen Z respondents seemed split between BN, PN, PH, and the new youth party, MUDA. BN leads the group with 19% of support, followed by PH (11%), PN (11%), and lastly MUDA (9%). The support level for Pejuang is too low to warrant any serious discussion here. The last party, Parti Kekuatan Semenanjung, is a fake party inserted into the option list as a secondary test of knowledge and respondent honesty.[xii] Almost no respondent picked that choice, indicating that most Gen Zs are knowledgeable enough to know it was a decoy and that they answered the other questions faithfully.

Since PH has agreed to enter into an electoral pact with MUDA, it seems sensible at the time of writing to merge their support levels into one. One obvious limitation of this exercise is that we could not ascertain the vote dissipation from this PH+MUDA merger, i.e., a PH supporter refusing to vote for MUDA in a MUDA-assigned seat, and vice versa, which may reduce the overall PH+MUDA support level.

A revised breakdown of support by party is shown on the right of Chart 8. PH+MUDA, with 20.5% support, is now the leader of the race, with PN a distant third.

However, it is essential to ask if the support for each party is stable or whether they are susceptible to swings. This is why the survey asked a follow-up question:

If you were given a second vote, which party will be your second choice?

For this question, respondents were allowed to select the same party as their first choice. Although theoretically it did not matter which party the respondents’ second choice was in a first-past-the-post system where voters only get one choice each, it could help establish the level of loyalty that Gen Z respondents have for their chosen party. In other words, respondents with a second choice different from the first are potential swing voters.

Table 4: First-Choice and Second-Choice Parties: Support Base and Potential Swing Votes

Note: Bolded numbers represent core supporter base; italicised numbers represent the potential swing vote; respondents who answered “Others/Unspecified” as their first choice and answered the same for second-choice are excluded from this analysis.

Table 4 shows each coalition’s support base and the potential swing votes. PN has the most stable core support (50.6%), followed by PH+MUDA (40.3%) and BN (31.2%). Thus, half of PN’s supporters will not switch to another party, while only approximately one-third of BN supporters will stick around.

It is surprising that BN has the lowest core supporter base among Gen Zs; it is after all the oldest and most experienced coalition, with the largest party membership. Its swing voters to PN (32.5%) exceed its own support base; its swing voters to PH+MUDA is also high (25.3%). This puts the BN coalition at unexpected levels of vulnerability in this voter cohort.

On the other hand, PN’s core voters is led by loyal PAS supporters who continue their parents’ legacy of strong attachment and affinity to the Islamic party even though it is now in coalition with Bersatu. Interestingly, a PN swing voter will almost certainly choose to support a similarly minded coalition, i.e. BN (33.7%), and will only consider PH only under exceptional circumstances (5.6%).


Lastly, for PH+MUDA, its main risk factor among swing voters is whether they will vote at all. A substantial portion of its swing voters (27.1%) are still undecided. This lends credence to the claim that PH+MUDA’s supporters are most inclined to not vote, making low turnout, and not BN or PN, the coalition’s main enemy. 

Taking this into account, a clearer breakdown of support is shown in Chart 9.

Chart 9: Gen Z’s voting choice (accounting for core and potential swing voters)

If we compare only the core supporters, the race is tight among the three competing coalitions. While PH+MUDA can take comfort in knowing they have the largest core supporter base, the election outcome is likely to be decided by the swing voters, as in every other election. While BN and PN’s biggest risks lie in vote swinging between each other, PH+MUDA’s turnout risks may relegate it to second or third place, denying them a victory that would otherwise be theirs. However, if PH+MUDA succeeds in mobilising its supporters, the coalition will likely emerge the winner in the Gen Z pool.

When asked the top reason for choosing one party over the other, a majority of respondents (53%) say it is because they like the chosen party’s ideas and/or policies (Chart 10). Since a political party’s proposed policies are not always visible or clear, this answer can best be taken only to mean that respondents preferred, in a broad sense, the ideas that the chosen party represents i.e., PAS represented Islamic politics, PH a multiracial future, and MUDA a youth-led multiracial offer.

Chart 10: Top reason for voting a party/coalition

The second and third most popular reasons were “Others are worse” (14%) and “Candidate” (11%). An unexpected racial split is found in these two answers, where the second choice for non-Muslim minorities, i.e., the Chinese, Indian, and Non-Muslim Bumiputera respondents, is “Candidate”, in contrast to the Muslim population’s “Others are worse” second-choice. This could be explained by the possibility of Muslim respondents believing that non-Malay or multiracial parties are detrimental to the country, and thus, they have to make do between the choices of BN and PN.

For Gen Z respondents, it matters less which coalition or party they vote for, as these answers record only 6% and 5% respectively. In other words, it does not matter to them which party makes up PN other than PAS and Bersatu; as long as the coalition represents an Islam- and Bumiputera-centred vision, that is sufficient.

Another explanation for the respondents’ political choices emerged: Parental influence.

Before the question about the respondents’ party of first and second choice, we asked a question of what the respondents’ parents voted for in the last general election (GE14). Granted, there were limitations to this question as the parties and coalitions were different then compared to GE15. To this, we made reasonable inferences. For instance, a PN supporter now would be considered following the parents’ choice if the parents had voted for Bersatu or PAS in GE14. Similarly, a MUDA supporter now would still be considered following the parents’ choice if the parents voted for PH in GE14. Besides this, there was also the limitation on the respondents’ ability to recall their parents’ voting choices accurately.

Nonetheless, we accepted the respondents’ answers since the purpose of the question is to gauge the difference in choices between the respondents and the parents, if any, rather than the accuracy of the respondents’ recall.

The results are fascinating. 61% of respondents follow their parents’ choices, classified as “compliance”, whereas 39% of respondents are willing to go the other way, termed “rebellion” (left of Chart 11). Generally, parental influence remains a dominant force in a child’s thinking, and their concept of politics is also not spared.

Chart 11: Rebels at Home: Gen Zs’ voting choices vs parents’

Although compliance is strongest in BN households, contributing 27%, the rebellion is also the strongest, (18%). PH’s households appear most stable, with high compliance (20%), and relatively low rebellion (10%).[xiv]

The right side of Chart 11 breaks down each party’s Gen Z supporters’ first-choice into whether this is the same or different from their parents’ choice. Unsurprisingly, MUDA is found to be the hothouse for rebels, where more than half (54%) of supporters depart from their parents’ non-PH choice in GE14. Politically, this makes sense as MUDA is a new option catering directly to the youth after years of elite politics focused primarily on aged politicians fighting for positions. This makes MUDA a good destination for anyone wanting change from their parents’ generation. Following this pattern at far second is PN, where 21% of supporters divert from their parents’ choice.

Under both instances (MUDA and PN), most of the rebels have BN-supporting parents, implying that the biggest generational shifts are happening in BN households where the children choose ideologically more distant options: PN (conservative) or MUDA (progressive).

Through hidden parental influence and a broad conception of what a party or coalition represents, Gen Zs’ votes are split between the three major coalitions, with a substantial portion ready to swing. PH+MUDA seems to have a slight edge over the other coalitions but remains burdened by the low-turnout tendency of its swing voters who may decide to stay in on polling day. At 39%, youths who want to vote differently from their parents remain substantial, and this fight for the future is likely going to be carried out fiercely at the ideological opposites of Malaysian society.

CONCLUSION

Youths have been given the vote at a unique time. Elections are getting more competitive than ever; GE15 will only be the second election where nationwide multi-cornered contests, with at least three competitors each, are held, and this will likely persist in elections to come.

Secondly, politics is reaching an inflection point where BN’s dominance is no longer the norm. The survey also shows that nearly half of youths are ready to depart from their parents’ chosen party, signifying an ongoing detachment from the past. Lastly, the move away from BN in search of more conservative (PN) or progressive (PH+MUDA) choices may lay the ground for an ideological battle in the future.

This context likely elevates the value and meaning of a youth vote. Not only will a voting youth determine who wins an election, but also how the future will be shaped.

ENDNOTES


[1] Shankar, A.C. 2019. Malaysian employees are not being paid enough, BNM says.  https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/malaysian-employees-are-not-being-paid-enough-bnm-says

[2] Jaafar, S.S. 2020. BNM Annual Report 2019: Relative to income, Malaysian house prices remain seriously unaffordable. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/bnm-annual-report-2019-relative-income-malaysian-house-prices-remain-seriously-unaffordable

[3] Nair, J. 2019. Millennial Malaysians Savings Aspiration. https://vase.ai/resources/millennial-malaysians-savings-aspiration/

[4] Data source from Election Commissions of the electoral roll as of August 2022. (Revised 9 October 2022).

[5] The previous general election, GE14, was held on 9 May 2018, at a time when the minimum voting age was 21 years old, making the youngest second-time voter 25 years old in 2022. 24-year-olds are thus the oldest first-time voter cohort for GE15, which was not eligible to vote in GE14. 

[6] Generation Zs are born between 1997 to 2012 (10-25 years old in 2022). See Dimock, M. 2019. Defining generations: Where Millennials end and Generation Z begins. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/

[7] Survey questionnaires were designed and piloted with 50 respondents (20 Malays, 10 Chinese, 10 Indians, 10 East Malaysian Bumiputeras) to finalise questionnaire formats, especially relating to answer scales, before rolling out the full survey to the 805 respondents. At the start of the survey, respondents were informed of their data confidentiality and that their voluntary participation could be withdrawn at any point of the survey. The technical details of the survey are as follows:

  1. Survey Timeline: 5-30 September 2022
  2. Sample Size: n=805
  3. Sampling Method: Multi-stage Design
  4. Margin of error: ±3.45%
  5. Interview Method: Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI)
  6. Interview languages: English, Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, Iban and Kadazan
  7. Questions: 45, excluding the age-filter question
  8. Average call length: 17 minutes

A survey house was procured to carry out the CATI survey, which was subsequently responsible for the data processing and quality control throughout (verified for compliance, completeness, clarity, and proper classification of responses.

[8] This referred to the political landscape at the time of call, which was September 2022.

[9] A 4-point scale was used to remove the middling value. 

[10] International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Election Guide (Malaysia). https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/131/

[11] Statista. Share of registered voters who intend to participate in the next general election in Malaysia from December 2020 to February 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1231928/malaysia-likelihood-of-participation-in-next-election/

[12] The fake party name was invented after vetting through the registered political party name list in Malaysia, in order to select something obviously different from any legal and valid party.

[13] The swing propensity of PH+MUDA is calculated using the median of PH and MUDA’s swing to the respective swing destination. For instance, the 17.4% swing propensity from PH+MUDA to BN is calculated using the median of PH’s swing to BN, 16.7%, and MUDA’s swing to BN, at 18.1%, giving 17.4%. For instance, the 16.9% propensity to swing from PH+MUDA to BN is calculated from the median of PH’s swing to BN, 20%, and MUDA’s swing to BN.

[14] For this analysis, PH-MUDA switches are not considered rebellion as the parties are in an electoral pact and largely aligned on policy direction. However, departures from parents’ choices to the “Unsure/Refused/Don’t Know” category are included, as these may indicate an early sign of rebellion.

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2022/105 “Managing Indonesia’s Commodity Windfall for Long-Term Benefits” by Maria Monica Wihardja and Suryaputra Wijaksana

 

An aerial photo shows vehicles driving along a major roadways during morning rush hour in Jakarta on September 28, 2022. Photo: BAY ISMOYO/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Despite the adverse economic shocks in the global economy, inflation in Indonesia is still relatively under control and growth is returning to the pre-pandemic trajectory although a looming global economic recession next year and geopolitical uncertainties continue to pose a threat to the economy.
  • Indonesia has benefited from a commodity windfall. By the third quarter of 2021, its current account balance had flipped over into positive territory from a long-term deficit. The windfall increased the government’s fiscal revenues, especially from export taxes and non-tax revenues on natural resources.
  • At the same time, government fiscal expenditure is expected to increase by IDR357 trillion (USD23 billion) beyond what was previously budgeted, mostly due to increased fuel subsidies to compensate consumers for rising fuel prices. The latter will reach 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2022, the highest level since President Jokowi took office in 2015.
  • Concerned about the fiscal burden from subsidies, more than 70 percent of which goes to the middle and upper classes, the government decided to increase fuel prices in early September and instead, divert some funds to targeted social assistance programmes.
  • Indonesia may be able to carefully manage the commodity windfall for long-term benefits amid the uncertain and unfavourable global economy and geopolitics by:
    • diverting the costly fuel subsidies to targeted social assistance programmes;
    • promoting foreign direct investment to support its transition to a green economy;
    • saving the windfalls for a rainy day and for future generations through a sovereign wealth fund;
    • continuing to reform its social registry to improve the targeting of its social protection programmes.  

ISEAS Perspective 2022/105, 1 November 2022

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INDONESIA’S PERCEIVED IMMUNITY FROM GLOBAL ECONOMIC WOES

The global economy is still clouded by an uncertain and unfavourable economic and political climate. High inflation – mostly in food, energy and fertiliser – is resulting from supply chain disruptions related to Covid-19, which started in mid-2020, and a post-pandemic uptick in demand (see Figure 1). This high inflation has been compounded by the war in Ukraine – which has particularly affected wheat, maize, vegetable oil, and fertiliser (Vos, 2022) – and extreme weather. Although food inflation had tapered off by mid-2022 to pre-war levels, the risk of price surges and continued volatility in food, energy and fertiliser prices remains high.

Many central banks, including the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, are responding to the high inflationary environment by increasing interest rates to reduce demand.[1] As a result of tighter monetary policies, some countries are showing signs of stagflation, with rising inflation and declining GDP growth. This includes the US and European Union (Figure 2) as well as many emerging countries such as Thailand, China, Brazil and South Africa (Annex Figure 1).

Despite the gloom in the global economy, the World Bank projects Indonesia’s economy to grow by 5.1 percent in both 2022 and 2023 (World Bank, 2022). In fact, the country is set to return to its pre-pandemic growth trajectory of 5 percent (Figure 3). This is relatively high compared to the case for other G20 countries, which, as a group, is predicted to only grow by 2.5 percent this year and 2.1 percent in 2023 (Moody’s Investor Service, 2022). Moreover, inflation in Indonesia is still under control, at least until recently.

On 3 September, the government decided to cut some fuel subsidies and increased fuel prices by about 30 percent. After the subsidy cut, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank revised Indonesia’s projected inflation from 3.6 to 4.3 percent (World Bank, 2022) and 4.6 percent (ADB, 2022) respectively (Figure 4). The government of Indonesia has also revised its projected inflation for 2022 from 3 percent to between 4.5 and 4.8 percent in 2022 (Liputan6, 2022). Compared to the projected 5.2 percent inflation for Southeast Asia and 4.5 percent for developing Asia in 2022 (ADB, 2022), Indonesia’s inflation is considered relatively manageable.   

COMMODITY WINDFALL HELPING INDONESIA MANAGE GLOBAL SHOCKS

Given Indonesia’s relatively high projected economic growth and manageable inflation, its economy can be said to be doing quite well so far although a looming global economic recession next year and geopolitical uncertainties continue to pose a threat to the economy. The economic resilience so far could be partly attributed to the high commodity prices that have supported growth through higher export earnings, boosted fiscal revenues, and mitigated the social impacts of rising fuel and food prices through energy subsidies.       

In short, Indonesia has benefited from the recent high commodity prices (Figure 5). According to the State of Commodity Dependence Report 2021 (UNCTAD, 2021), in 2018-2019, 55.6 percent of Indonesia’s merchandise exports were commodities.[2] The country has experienced two major commodity booms before: one dominated by oil in the 1970s and another by coal and palm oil in the 2000s, though the second commodity boom also featured more diversified sources of commodity income, including forest resources (such as timber), minerals, natural gas and oil (see Annex Figure 2; also see Hill and Pasaribu, 2022).

Due to the recent high commodity prices, Indonesia’s current account balance has flipped over into positive territory from a long-term deficit (Figure 6, top panel). Most of the additional export revenue reflects price increases rather than volume increases. Coal and fossil fuel contribution to total export revenue increased between four to five percentage points in June 2022 compared to June 2019 (Figure 7). While a current account deficit is not necessarily bad or good[3], it needs to be financed through net foreign financing (Ghosh & Ramakrishna, n.d.).[4] Having a current account surplus helps ease Indonesia’s balance of payment and stabilise the Rupiah. 

The windfall from the commodity boom has also contributed to the government’s fiscal revenues. Both export taxes (the majority came from natural resource exports) and non-tax revenues on natural resources increased in 2021 (Figure 6, bottom panel). By June 2022, revenues collected from exports had reached IDR23 trillion (USD1.5 billion), making up 62.8 percent of the government’s full-year target (Ministry of Finance Indonesia, 2022a). The commodity windfall has helped the government reverse its high pandemic-level fiscal deficit and slowly begin returning to the pre-pandemic level of below 3 percent as mandated by the law. It is predicted that in 2022, the fiscal deficit will shrink to IDR868 trillion (USD56 billion) or 4.85 percent of GDP (Ministry of Finance, Indonesia, 2022b) from 6.14 percent in 2020 but slightly increase from 4.57 percent (unaudited) in 2021 (Ministry of Finance, Indonesia, 2022c).  

POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF THE WINDFALL

Despite their short-term benefits, commodity booms are often associated with potential downsides, such as rising terms of trade and real effective exchange rate that adversely affect other non-booming tradables (the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’) and in turn may lead to protectionist policies on these non-booming tradables. In this section, we will discuss three potential long-term negative impacts from the current windfall, namely (1) uneven distributional consequences, (2) environmental effects, and (3) macroeconomic and fiscal instability. We will then discuss how Indonesia could manage them.

Uneven distributional consequences

In 2022, government fiscal expenditure is expected to increase by IDR357 trillion (USD23 billion) more than previously budgeted, largely due to an increase in subsidies, which are expected to reach 2.8 percent of GDP in 2022. This is the highest level of subsidies since President Jokowi took office in 2015 (Anas et al., forthcoming 2022).[5] The government had tripled the size of energy subsidies since Semester 2, 2021, when the state budget for 2022 was prepared, from IDR152.5 trillion (USD9.8 billion) to IDR502.4 trillion (USD32.4 billion) (President’s Secretariat, 2022).[6] This is expected to continue to increase to IDR653 trillion (USD42.1 billion) by the end of the year, even with the assumption that oil prices will go down from USD99 to USD90 per barrel until December, due to increased consumption of subsidised fuels than previously projected.

For successive governments, the fossil fuel subsidy has been a large part of the state budget. Nevertheless, the government stated that more than 70 percent of the current fuel subsidies have benefited the middle and upper classes (President’s Secretariat, 2022).[7] Poorly targeted energy subsidies could have been used for more pro-poor and pro-environment spending.   

In early September, the government cut some fuel subsidies to reduce the fiscal burden. The IDR24.2 trillion of budget saved has been diverted to various targeted social assistance programmes including direct cash transfers to 20.65 million poor households, wage subsidy for 16 million workers, and social protection programmes delivered through local governments (President’s Secretariat, 2022). However, fuel subsidies are still very high and will increase.

Although diverting some fuel subsidies to targeted social assistance programmes is a welcome move, Indonesia’s social registry that is used to target the poor and vulnerable households – called the unified database or Data Terpadu Kesejahteraan Sosial (DTKS), which was first set up to support poor and vulnerable households when fuel subsidies were eliminated in 2005 – is still mired with many weaknesses, including challenges faced by local governments to update data and the quality of the data itself (World Bank and the Australian Government, 2022). This poses challenges in channelling commodity windfalls to the most needed households amidst rising fuel and food prices.   

Environmental impacts

High coal prices and concerns over energy affordability and availability during the European winter encouraged Indonesian coal miners to increase production (Maulia et al., 2022). This might pose a risk to Indonesia’s energy transition target to cut coal-powered energy production from 60 percent to 45 percent by 2030. To make matters worse, in February 2021, the Indonesian government delisted coal waste from a list of hazardous waste (Siregar, 2021). This regulation is a derivative of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, passed in 2020 to improve the investment climate and to create jobs.

Moreover, by using the windfall to subsidise fuel consumption that mostly benefits the middle and upper classes, Indonesia will have to face at least three dire consequences. First, subsidies encourage people to increase their consumption of fuels – they lack the incentive to conserve energy as subsidies hide the true cost of fuel (Li et al, 2017). Without blanket fuel price subsidies, relative price of fossil fuels to other renewable energies becomes more expensive, and Indonesia could use this momentum to accelerate its energy transition towards renewable energy instead (World Bank, 2022). Second, lower petrol prices have also contributed to more people purchasing private vehicles, which contributes to traffic congestion and pollution (Ardiansyah, 2012). And, third, subsidised fuel may act as a disincentive to energy producers to reduce production costs by adopting more efficient technology.

Macroeconomic and fiscal instability

Under an open capital account regime, commodity booms may not only lead to real exchange rate appreciation, affecting the term of trade and the performance of other tradeable sectors, but also crowd out the traded sector in terms of resource allocation, which may cause permanent de-industrialisation and a growth trap (Alberola and Benigno, 2017). Commodity-rich countries may suffer from currency depreciation during commodity busts and struggle to build back productivity and develop potential even during commodity booms.

Moreover, using most of the windfall from the commodity boom as fuel subsidies means the fiscal policy is pro-cyclical – more is spent during good times (booms) and less during bad times (busts). If commodity prices fall and income from the commodity windfall drops at a time when fuel subsidies are difficult to phase out politically, the government will soon run out of budget for other social assistance programmes, potentially resulting in lower economic growth due to muted demand. Moreover, even if other commodity prices fall, oil and gas prices are likely to remain high due to limited global supplies because of Russia’s gas sanctions and OPEC+ cutting oil production. Runaway inflationary expectations and labour shortages could also contribute to protracted high global inflation. Lower economic growth, combined with high global inflation, could trap Indonesia in a stagflationary spiral.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS: MANAGING THE WINDFALL FOR LONG-TERM BENEFITS

Although the Indonesian government has cut some fuel subsidies starting 3 September, public demand for them will continue, especially as revenues from the commodity boom are continuing to pour in and targeted social assistance programmes are constrained by weaknesses in the social registry data system. The main policy threat from the commodity windfall is that the government may lose sight of necessary long-term reforms, including climate change mitigation. A few policy recommendations follow:

Move away from the trap of reliance on commodities by attracting foreign direct investment towards a green economy

A significant shortcoming of Indonesia’s development model, which contrasts with other ASEAN five economies (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines) ­is the relative lack of foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Annex Figure 3), particularly in the non-extractive, export-oriented manufacturing sector, to finance Indonesia’s structural current account deficit (during non-boom periods). A significant share of Indonesia’s FDI goes to extractive sectors, accounting for 41.2 percent of total FDI in 2021 (Figure 8).   

FDI promotion could be focused on attracting green investment. Transition to a green economy and achieving the target of net-zero emissions by 2060, which Indonesia aspires to, will need a lot of financing – estimated at USD150-200 billion dollar per year until 2030 (IFG Progress, 2022).[8]

Indonesia has tried to move away from exporting raw commodities and to increase value addition by having downstreaming as one of its economic strategies. Export ban on nickel might soon be expanded to asphalt, tin, bauxite, and copper. However, the success of Indonesia’s current export ban on nickel ore – part of its downstreaming policy – is still debatable, notwithstanding that President Jokowi has already proclaimed it a success (Mariska, 2022; Gupta, 2022). Processing nickel apparently has also had detrimental impacts on the environment (Ruehl and Leahy, 2022). Hence, downstreaming minerals (alone) is unlikely to help solve economic and environmental problems in the long term.  

Use a sovereign wealth fund to save and invest in windfalls

Windfalls from commodity booms could be saved for a rainy day and be used to meet the infrastructure, human capital and financial investment gaps in the long run through a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). Indonesia established a new SWF in February 2021, named the Indonesia Investment Authority (INA). But it is unconventional as it aims to attract domestic and foreign investment into the government’s infrastructure projects instead of using internal revenues to fund it. It is modelled more closely to India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (Habir, 2021) than more traditional SWFs that are usually funded by commodity export revenues (or trade surpluses) or foreign-exchange reserves held by the central banks. Moreover, so far, INA has mostly been used to purchase assets, such as toll roads, from heavily indebted infrastructure-related state-owned enterprises (similar to privatisation of heavily-indebted government assets), instead of investing globally.

INA is in contrast with the Norwegian Oil Fund, where the source of funds comes from oil revenues that are invested for wealth creation, preservation of future generation, and supporting the government budget during a rainy day (Habir, 2021). In Chile, the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund was established to stabilise the economy during periods of volatility in copper prices (UNDP, 2015). When copper prices are high, a portion of the copper export revenues are directed to the fund and invested in low-risk assets. When copper prices are low, the accumulated resources are added to the government budget.      

In the longer term, INA could be modelled more closely to the Norwegian Oil Fund or Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund to help Indonesia industrialise and move towards a greener economy, including by accelerating its investment and programme to use more efficient and cleaner coal-fired technology since coal will continue to account for a significant share of energy production in Indonesia.  

However, there are challenges. Although it is theoretically possible to allocate commodity windfalls to SWF for investment, be this earmarked for green investment or not, most governments tend to use them to subsidise domestic fuel prices because it is more publicly popular. Moreover, as green investment might not be profitable at least in the short term, it might be contradictory to the goal of wealth creation, which makes it challenging for SWF authorities to put funds in green investment for fear of losing state money.    

Improving data quality of the social registry to improve the targeting of social protection programmes

The windfall could be used to help poor and vulnerable households if social assistance could be properly targeted. The government has diverted some fuel subsidies to targeted social assistance programmes, which should be welcomed. However, Indonesia’s social registry to target poor and vulnerable households (DTKS) is still mired with many weaknesses (World Bank and the Australian Government, 2022). Therefore, reforms in the social registry of Indonesia’s DTKS will be critical to help distribute the commodity windfall to poor and vulnerable households that are disproportionately impacted by the high fuel and food prices.

REFERENCES

Alberola, Enrique and Gianluca Benigno. 2017. ‘Revisiting the Commodities Curse: A Financial Perspective.’ National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/papers/w23169

Anas, Titik, Hal Hill, Donny Narjoko and Chandra Putra. Forthcoming 2022. ‘The Indonesian economy in turbulent times.’ Presentation at the Australian National University Indonesia Update, September 18, 2022.

Ardiansyah, Fitrian. 2012. ‘Bearing the consequences of Indonesia’s fuel subsidy.’ East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/04/26135/

Asian Development Bank. 2022. ‘Asian Development Outlook. Economic Forecasts.’ https://www.adb.org/outlook

Bank Indonesia. N.d. ‘Inflation target.’ https://www.bi.go.id/en/statistik/indikator/target-inflasi.aspx

BKPM. (2022, April). BKPM. Retrieved from FDI realization: https://www.bkpm.go.id/id/statistik/investasi-langsung-luar-negeri-fdi

Borsuk, Richard. 2022. ‘Surprise court ruling: Jokowi’s Omnibus Law hits snag.’ RSIS: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/surprise-court-ruling-jokowis-omnibus-law-hits-snag/#.YvW2rHZBy5c

Calderón, César, Alberto Chong and Norman Loayza. 2000. ‘Determinants of current account deficits in developing countries.’World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. World Bank, Washington, D.C.. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19825/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

CNBC. 2022. ‘Smooth Revenues, Fiscal Deficit 2022 Is Predicted to Decline to 3.9% of GDP’. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220701102353-4-352049/setoran-lancar-defisit-apbn-2022-diramal-turun-ke-39-pdb

Dartanto, Teguh. 2013. ‘Reducing fuel subsidies and the implication on fiscal balance and poverty in Indonesia. A simulation analysis.’ Energy Policy 58: 117–134, July. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.02.040

ECB (European Central Bank). N.d. ‘Key ECB interest rates’. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html

Federal Reserve. N.d. ‘Policy tools: open market operations’. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm

FRED Economic Data, n.d. ‘Federal funds effective rate’. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS

Ghosh, A., & Ramakrishna, U. (n.d.). ‘Current Account Deficits: Is There a Problem?’ IMF. Retrieved from Current Account Deficits: Current Account Deficits: Is There a Problem? (imf.org)

Granado, Javier Arze del, David Coady and Robert Gillingham. 2010. ‘The unequal benefits of fuel subsidies: A review of evidence for developing economies.’IMF Working Paper. Microsoft Word – DMSDR1S-4157337-v14-Working Paper–The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies_ A Review of Evidence for Developing (imf.org)

Gupta, Krisna. 2022. ‘Indonesia’s claim that banning nickel exports spurs downstreaming is questionable.’ The Conversation, March 30. https://theconversation.com/indonesias-claim-that-banning-nickel-exports-spurs-downstreaming-is-questionable-180229

Habir, Manggi Taruna. 2021. ‘Indonesia’s First Sovereign Wealth Fund (INA): Opportunities and Challenges.’ ISEAS Perspective. /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-63-indonesias-first-sovereign-wealth-fund-ina-opportunities-and-challenges-by-manggi-taruna-habir/  

Hill, Hal and Donny Pasaribu. 2022. ‘Some reflections on Indonesia and the resource curse.’ Australian National University’s Australian Council of Dean of Education seminar presentation, 12 April.

IFG Progress. 2022. ‘Energy transition and financial sector in Indonesia.’ https://ifgprogress.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Econ.-Bulletin-Issue-4-Green-Economy_24-Jan-2022-F.pdf

Li, Yingzhu, Xunpeng Shi and Bin Su. 2017. ‘Economic, social and environmental impacts of fuel subsidies: A revisit of Malaysia.’ Energy Policy, 110, 51–61.

Liputan6. (2022, August 24). Liputan6. Retrieved from ‘The Government Predicted Inflation 2022 Maximal 4.8%’ (Pemerintah Proyeksi Inflasi 2022 Maksimal 4.8%). https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/5050725/pemerintah-proyeksi-inflasi-2022-maksimal-48-persen-masih-aman

Mariska, Diana. 2022. ‘Nickel export ban has benefited Indonesia: Jokowi.’ TheIndonesia.id, 3 January.

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Ministry of Finance Indonesia. 2022a. State Budget Realization per 30 June 2022. https://djpb.kemenkeu.go.id/portal/id/berita/lainnya/pengumuman/153-apbn/3944-realisasi-apbn-per-30-juni-2022.html

Ministry of Finance Indonesia. 2022b. Budget Monthly Press Release. September 2022. https://youtu.be/IAdzdGUpo1g

Ministry of Finance Indonesia. 2022c. ‘Macro Economic Framework and Fiscal Policies, 2023’. https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/informasi-publik/apbn?tahun=2023

Moody’s Investor Service. (2022). Global Macro Outlook 2022-23 (August 2022 Update). New York: Moody’s. https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-cuts-global-economic-growth-forecasts-as-financial-conditions-tighten–PBC_1340740#:~:text=Moody’s%20Investors%20Service%20has%20reduced,to%202.1%25%20from%202.9%25

President’s Secretariat. 2022. Press Conference by President Jokowi and related Ministers on fuel subsidy diversion. https://youtu.be/gsL6-YtDObA

Ruehl, Mercedes and Joe Leahy. 2022. ‘Indonesia’s unexpected success story.’ Financial Times. September 22, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/f179df5b-1dc7-46f4-88dc-97ddfe1d2fe4

Siregar, Kiki. 2021. ‘Declassifying coal power plant ash as hazardous waste sparks concern in Indonesia,’ 22 April, Channel News Asia.

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World Bank and the Australian Government. 2022. ‘Improving Data Quality for an Effective Social Registry in Indonesia.’ The World Bank publication, Washington, D.C..   https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/38157

ANNEX

 

ENDNOTES


[1] For example, by mid-September 2022, the US Federal Reserve had already increased its Federal Open Market Committee’s target Fed Funds Rate by 200 basis points this year to 2.25–2.5 percent (Federal Reserve, n.d.) and is expected to increase it again for the fifth time this year. The actual Fed Funds rate has increased six times this year, reaching 2.33 percent by August 2022 (FRED Economic Data, n.d.). Likewise the European Central Bank has also increased its interest rate to combat rapidly rising inflation resulting from the phasing-out of Russian gas and oil (ECB, n.d.).

[2] Meanwhile, Indonesia’s regional peers such as Vietnam, India and the Philippines depend less on commodity exports, which comprise only 14.6, 37.4 and 18.5 percent, respectively, of their merchandise exports.

[3] A higher domestic output growth rate is found to have a positive effect on the current account deficit in 44 developing countries studied between 1966 and 1995 in Calderón et al. (2000). 

[4] Foreign financing could come, among others, in the form of portfolio investment and foreign direct investment (FDI).

[5] For successive governments, the fossil fuel subsidy has been a large part of the state budget. In 2013, during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, it was as much as 3-4 percent of GDP (Anas et al., forthcoming 2022). The Jokowi administration initially eliminated the subsidy, but slowly reintroduced it in 2017, albeit via compensation channelled through state-owned enterprises.

[6] Most of the energy subsidy increase comes from the increase in compensation (off-the-book subsidies channelled through state-owned enterprises, mostly oil and natural gas enterprise, Pertamina) instead of direct subsidy. Compensation is projected to increase from IDR93.1 trillion in 2021 to IDR293.5 trillion in 2022, while the energy subsidy is expected to increase from IDR140.4 trillion in 2021 to IDR208.9 trillion in 2022 (President’s Secretariat, 2022; Anas et al., forthcoming 2022, based on Presidential Regulation No.98/2022 on revised budget).

[7] Granado et al. (2010) found that globally subsidies benefit the wealthiest 20 percent of the population who disproportionately enjoy 43 percent of the benefits, while the poorest 20 percent only enjoy 7 percent of the benefits. In Indonesia, 72 percent of the fuel subsidy was enjoyed by the top 30 percent of income earners between 1998 and 2013, and it accounted for 63.8 percent of all subsidies over that period (Dartanto, 2013).

[8] To promote FDI, Indonesia needs to invest more in basic infrastructures such as electricity, roads, and ports to access areas where investment is targeted. Also, it needs to provide regulatory certainty for investors. The controversy surrounding the Job Creation Law remains unresolved after the Constitutional Court’s decision to ask the government to revise it within two years (Borsuk, 2022). However, the real problem is that hundreds of local regulations are still not aligned with national regulations.

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2022/104 “A Granular Analysis of the 2022 Johor State Polls: Implications for Malaysia’s Impending General Election” by Francis E. Hutchinson and Kevin Zhang

 

A recently installed banner featuring Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri promising the provision of subsidies totalling RM 77.7 billion in 2022, which would be the largest subsidy bill in Malaysian history to control inflation for the rising prices of goods. Photo taken on 23 October 2022 in Pontian, Johor, by Kevin Zhang of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Perspective looks at data from the 2018 and 2022 state elections in Johor to understand evolving trends in voter behaviour and what they portend for the upcoming Malaysian General Election. Rather than looking at state assembly seats, it analyses data from polling districts (PDs) within these seats for greater granularity.

Johor is a good bellwether state due to its level of urbanisation and ethnic heterogeneity, which map well onto national averages. It is also the first state to hold elections following the lowering of the voting age and introduction of automatic voter registration. The key findings are as follows:

  • The conventional wisdom that voter behaviour differs for parliamentary and state elections is only partially true. There is strong evidence that Barisan Nasional (BN) supporters consistently turn up to vote regardless of the type of election. For Pakatan Harapan (PH), voter turnout is much more variable.
  • While BN obtained a massive number of seats in the 2022 election, there is still worrying news for the coalition. Notwithstanding its formidable campaign machinery, high-profile appearances by Najib Razak, and an influx of younger Malaysians, the coalition did not break any new ground over the past four years.
  • The 2022 state election was disastrous for PH. The number of votes for the coalition plummeted due to disillusionment, pandemic-related fears, or difficulties for outstation voters to return. PH has areas of reasonably solid support in urban areas that enabled it to secure some seats, but, as with BN, it did not break new ground.
  • Compared to 2018, support for all PH component parties dropped. The Democratic Action Party (DAP) remained the most solid, with Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) a surprising second. Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) performed particularly poorly.
  • Despite netting few state seats, Perikatan Nasional (PN) did surprisingly well. PN ate into Pakatan Harapan’s support base. Of key importance, the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) did better out of the partnership than did Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia(Bersatu), with its votes shooting up dramatically from 2018 when it campaigned by itself. Bersatu performed slightly worse compared to 2018 when it was part of PH.
  • Unlike BN and PH which have key support bases, PN pulled in a significant number of votes from many different groups. However, under Malaysia’s first-past-the-post system, vote share alone does not translate into seats. If it campaigns by itself, PN is likely to struggle – but may still be a kingmaker.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/104, 27 October 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Now that parliament is dissolved, Malaysia is barrelling towards a General Election. While COVID restrictions are being loosened and campaigning may revert to normal, important structural differences mean that the polls and ensuing results may differ significantly from those held in the past.

Since 2008, elections have been contested by two national coalitions, Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Rakyat/Harapan. While PAS played a regional role in the 2018 election, the upcoming parliamentary election will be the first to be contested by three national coalitions. In addition to multi-cornered fights producing unexpected results, it is likely that the parliamentary majority will be narrower than in the past. The ‘rules of the game’ have also changed, with the voting age lowered from 21 to 18 and with automatic voter registration (AVR) enabling more Malaysians to vote.

In order to explore the impact of these changes, this Perspective will compare and contrast voter preferences from the Johor state elections of 2018 and 2022. It will use an overlooked but highly valuable source of voting behaviour – polling district results. In particular, it will explore changes in support for the three coalitions and their component member parties across the two elections, before delving into support by urbanisation status.[1]

Johor is a good bellwether state for national trends and dynamics. With 3.8 million inhabitants, it is the third-largest state in the country, and its level of urbanisation is roughly at par with the national average. Johor has both large urban constituencies in and around Johor Bahru, as well as very rural areas along the eastern seaboard. The state is also diverse, and its ethnic composition maps well onto national averages.

Johor is also quite important politically, with parties such as UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association, and Bersatu having deep connections to the state. The state’s political trajectory has also closely mirrored the federal government’s. Johor is part of a group of ‘heartland’ states that were ruled continuously by BN up until 2018. That year, as with the federal government, PH secured control of the state. Following the Sheraton Move which saw Perikatan Nasional (PN) attain power, Johor was the first state to revert to PN/BN control. 

The 2018 state elections in Johor were held concurrently with the 14th General Election, which saw Pakatan Harapan win at the national and state levels. The 2022 state election was held in March and was the first election to take place following the lowering of the voting age and establishment of AVR.

Following this introduction, the next section will provide a broad overview of voting trends in Johor by analysing patterns in state seats from 2004 to the present. The subsequent section will then draw on polling district data to explore changes and continuities in voter behaviour across the two elections. The fourth and final section will draw out the implications for GE-15.

OVERVIEW OF STATE SEATS

Barisan Nasional has traditionally dominated Johor, enjoying an average of ten percent greater support in the state relative to the national average. This is due to several factors such as: the founding of UMNO in the state; the limited appeal of PAS due to the state’s traditionalist version of Islam; a legacy of large-scale rural development projects; and the dispersion of the Chinese electorate across more seats than in states such as Selangor and Penang.[2]

This translated into extensive control of the state assembly, with BN traditionally netting 90 percent of seats or more. This began to change in 2008 when Pakatan Rakyat, the precursor to Pakatan Harapan, made its first inroads in Johor (Table 2). This was led by the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in urban mixed constituencies. While an important change, this trend lagged notably in comparison to other urbanised states such as Selangor or Penang which fell to the opposition that year.

The trend was accentuated in 2013, when most urban and mixed seats that had been held by smaller BN parties, such as MCA and Gerakan, fell to Pakatan Rakyat. Nonetheless, the number of rural Malay-majority seats in the assembly meant that Barisan Nasional retained control.[3] Indeed, while the smaller BN parties suffered in 2013, UMNO performed largely as it had in the past. Seen from a historical perspective, 2018 was an aberration for BN and specifically for UMNO. From more than 30 seats, Malaysia’s grand old party was only able to secure 17 seats.

Insofar as PH is concerned, 2013 was key for the DAP as it secured 13 seats that year. In 2018, it only secured one additional seat, with the other PH member parties Amanah, Bersatu (then part of PH), and PKR securing nine, eight, and five seats, respectively. In addition to the urban centre around Johor Bahru and Muar which DAP has held since 2013, PH made headway for the first time in large swathes of North and Central Johor, which are much less urbanised (Map 1).

While the period 2008-2018 was one of steady progress for Pakatan Harapan, the 2022 state election was very much a slide backwards (Map 2). From 36 seats in 2018, PH retained a mere 12 four years later. The DAP weathered the onslaught in better shape, holding 10 seats while losing four. Amanah and PKR’s inroads were almost completely reversed, leaving one seat for each of the two parties. The Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA), which had an electoral understanding with PH in 2022, won one more seat. These seats were, almost in their entirety, urban centres.[4]

For the newly-formed Perikatan Nasional, the 2022 election was underwhelming. PAS equalled its 2018 performance of one seat and Bersatu’s holdings tumbled from eight seats to two.

For BN, the 2022 election seemed to herald a return to its glorious past. The coalition more than doubled its seats from 19 to 40, with UMNO netting no less than 33. Even the MCA and MIC, which had been virtually wiped out in 2018, seemed revitalised.

However, when votes – rather than seats – are analysed, the picture is rather different. Despite the passage of electoral reforms and the increase of Johor’s electorate from 1.8 million to 2.6 million votes, roughly the same number of people voted in the two elections, meaning turnout tumbled from 83 per cent to a mere 54 per cent. The election was affected by the pandemic, with health concerns prompting many to stay away, despite safety protocols.[5] There was also a cap on the number of people who could use the Vaccinated Travel Lane to cross from Singapore to vote.[6] And, despite postal voting being available for Johoreans resident overseas, only 7,800 ballots were requested – due to a lack of awareness as well as the short period for registration.[7]

Despite its impressive number of seats, BN garnered almost exactly the same number of votes in 2022 as it did in 2018. Bearing in mind that 2018 was the coalition’s worst electoral performance and took place amidst the widespread rejection of GST and the Najib Razak administration, it should worry the coalition that it only secured an additional 17,000 votes despite the total vote bank growing by 800,000.

Despite BN’s middling performance in terms of votes, the picture was very different for PH. 2022 was an unmitigated disaster, as the coalition netted less than half the number of votes it did in 2018. In contrast, PN did very well, coming within a hair’s-breadth of matching PH’s number of votes and more than tripling PAS’s total votes in 2018.

POLLING DISTRICT RESULTS

Analyses of Malaysian politics usually focus on parliamentary or state seats which, while determinant for securing power, aggregate voter preferences at a very high level. In practice, votes are collected at the polling district (PD) level. Given that individual votes are kept secret, PDs are the smallest unit of aggregated election data available for analysis. While Johor has 56 state seats, the state has 949 polling districts – giving us an average of 17 PD per seat.[8] Thus, using PD data is akin to magnifying the resolution by a factor of seventeen, allowing for more detailed findings. In addition, PDs can be grouped according to variables of interest, such as degree of urbanisation and ethnicity to explore voter preferences.

Map 3 provides an illustration of how the parliamentary seat Tanjong Piai as well as its state seats of Pekan Nanas and Kukup – all within Johor – are divided into polling districts. Each coloured polygon represents a PD, and as can be seen from the hues of lilac, ethnic composition varies tremendously across PD even within the same state seat.

Overall Support by Coalition and Party[9]

What, then, do the results at the polling district reveal for the three coalitions and parties?

At first glance, BN’s performance in 2018 and 2022 is indistinguishable (Figure 1). In both cases, the median vote share across PDs was under 50 per cent, although it was marginally higher in 2022. The top of the ‘box’ or upper quartile (marking 75 per cent of all PDs) remained unchanged at 60 per cent. There is a slight decline at the top of the upper whisker (which indicates BN’s best performing polling district) in 2022, although this still remained above 90 per cent. This remarkably similar performance across the two years indicates real discipline by BN grassroots networks at mobilising people to vote regardless of the occasion. The result is also impressive given pandemic worries and the greater number of parties contesting in 2022. 

Looking at the result by component party (Figure 2), the consistency in performance is provided by the largest BN party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). This stabilising performance is magnified by the fact that UMNO contested in about two-thirds of seats in both elections. Turning to the other coalition partners, MCA did marginally better in 2022 than it did in 2018, perhaps due to votes that would have gone to its former coalition partner, Gerakan. The Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) did substantially better in 2022 than in 2018, but the impact was limited given that it only contested in four seats.

While BN’s results denote consistency, PH’s indicate very variable performance (Figure 3). In 2018, the coalition performed spectacularly, with the median PD value just a shade below 50 per cent – marginally higher than BN’s. And the upper quartile (or 75 per cent) of PDs was 70 per cent – 10 per cent than BN’s. In some PDs, as indicated by the upper whisker, the coalition netted nearly 100 percent of votes. However, in contrast to BN which garnered at least 20 per cent of the vote in its worst-performing PDs, PH secured zero votes in a number of polling districts.

2022 was a catastrophe. The median value across the polling districts dropped by more than half – to a mere 20 percent. In other words, Pakatan Harapan obtained 20 per cent or less of the votes in half of the polling districts. What saved PH from a complete rout was its performance in the top quarter of PDs, with vote shares between 45 to 90 per cent. This one quarter of districts is largely concentrated in urban and mixed seats, which then translated into majorities in 13 seats.[10]

All component parties underperformed in 2022 relative to their 2018 showing. Even the DAP, the most consistent performer, saw its median vote share fall from almost 70 per cent to under 50 percent. In 2018, the party managed to net some votes even in the most inhospitable PDs where it contested. However, in 2022, it received close to zero per cent vote share in some districts. This was not confined to DAP, as all PH component members had PDs where they received almost zero per cent vote share.

In terms of median vote share for polling districts, the other parties performed much worse. PKR did not perform particularly well in 2018, receiving a median 30 per cent vote share. However, this collapsed to 10 percent in 2022. Interestingly, despite PKR being the lead party in PH, Amanah performed substantially better in 2018 and 2022. Its median vote share was 50 per cent in 2018, before collapsing to just under 20 per cent in 2022. Indeed, even the newly-minted party, Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA) performed better than PKR in 2022 – with a similar median value of ten per cent but a higher upper quartile.

Turning to PAS, it performed poorly in 2018, as it had in previous elections in Johor (Figure 4). The Islamist party only contested in 41 of the 56 seats and averaged about 10 per cent of the vote share in the PDs within the seats where it contested.

However, the partnership with Bersatu paid off in 2022. Through pooling candidates, Perikatan Nasional was able to contest all seats and actually had a median support level of 30 per cent, similar to PH. However, unlike PH, its top 25 per cent of PDs had a much lower vote share – meaning that it was not able to secure majorities in a significant number of seats. When the results for PN by party are analysed, PAS actually outperformed Bersatu, with a slightly higher median vote share (Figure 5). The contrast with its performance in 2018 is striking (Figure 4). 


Voter Preferences and Urbanisation Status

The Election Commission provides information as to the ethnic breakdown of each PD, and by looking at aspects such as physical size and population density, it is possible to establish the degree of urbanisation of each PD.[11] The proportions of rural, semi-urban, and urban PDs are as follows: 40.6; 28.6; and 30.9, respectively. It is possible to have rural PDs within an urban seat, and semi-urban PDs in rural seats.[12]

With regard to electoral performance in rural, semi-urban, and urban PDs across the two years for BN, three things stand out (Figure 6). First, as is to be expected, BN polls much better in rural districts and its level of support trends down in line with greater urbanisation. Second, its performance across the different types of PD in the two years is remarkably consistent – with little to no change. Third, despite UNDI-18 and automatic voter registration, there is no perceptible effect on BN’s level of support. 

Conversely, there is a very strong link between support for PH and urbanisation status, which also holds across both years (Figure 7). However, unlike for BN, support levels dropped across the board in 2022. While support dropped from a median of 70 per cent in urban areas in 2018 to a little under 50 per cent in 2022, there was enough majority support in sufficient PDs to secure a number of state seats. However, support dropped in semi-urban areas with median values under 50 percent; in rural areas it halved from 20 to 10 per cent. 

Figure 8: Vote Share by Polling Districts’ urbanisation status for PH in 2018 (left) and 2022 (right)

Turning to PAS in 2018, while support was consistently low across all types of PD, there is slightly more discernible support in rural areas (Figure 8). In 2022 and with the partnership with Bersatu, this relationship is more visible. As with BN, there is greater support for PN in rural areas, followed by semi-urban and urban areas, with median voter share descending from 30 percent in the case of the first down to 20 percent in the case of the third. This increase in support for PN across the three areas is roughly consistent with the vote share that PH lost in 2022 and is particularly marked in rural areas. This points to the unusual shift in votes in these areas to PH due to the role of senior Bersatu leaders in 2018 that was then lost in 2022.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GE-15

This analysis of voter preferences provides important indications of voter behaviour ahead of GE-15.

Given the remarkable consistency in BN’s performance across time and in the different types of PDs, there are grounds to anticipate that the coalition and its grassroots networks will be able to produce a similar performance in the upcoming parliamentary election. What is worrying, though, is that BN does not seem to have moved on from its nadir of 2018, with virtually no new supporters – despite the influx of nearly 800,000 eligible voters.

For PH, the heady atmosphere of 2018 has dissipated and its supporters are markedly less consistent than BN’s. The opposition coalition’s platform of good governance and institutional integrity plays well in urban areas. However, lacking the grassroots networks that BN does, PH is largely reliant on people to organise their own transport to vote. As with BN, the coalition does have solid pockets of support and this enables it to secure a certain number of seats. But, in 2022, turnout for the coalition was decimated. While BN can rest assured that its supporters will turn up to vote regardless of the occasion, PH needs to hope that its supporters treat state and parliamentary elections differently. It really needs to hold onto its urban pockets and work the ground in semi-urban constituencies to drive up support.

Despite flying below the radar, Perikatan Nasional did well in 2022. Its partnership with Bersatu allowed it to dramatically expand its scope and net 24 per cent of the vote. Broadly, while PH was affected by many people choosing not to vote, its performance was also really affected by part of its previous vote swinging to PN. However, unlike PH, PN lacks the unshakeable support in certain types of constituency that would allow it to secure seats.

Barring unforeseen events, BN’s performance will be solid but this ultimately depends on the relative success or failure of its competitors.

ENDNOTES

[1] This is the first of two Perspectives comparing the 2018 and 2022 Johor state elections. The second will examine voting patterns by ethnicity, turnout, and the lowering of the voting age.

[2] Hutchinson (2018) GE-14 in Johor: The Fall of the Fortress? ISEAS-Trends 2018-03, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute; Zhang, Choo, and Fong (2021) The Democratic Action Party in Johor: Assailing the Barisan Nasional Fortress, ISEAS-Trends 2017-01, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

[3] Hutchinson and Zhang (2022) The Johor State Election: A Spiderweb of Splits, Spats, and Surprises. ISEAS Perspective 2022-23.

[4] There are ten districts in Johor (inclusive of Johor Bahru district) and almost all the PH seats outside of Johor Bahru district are in district capitals. Mengkibol, Tangkak, Bentayan, Penggaram, Senai, Jemantah are within the district capitals of the Kluang, Ledang, Muar, Batu Pahat, Kulai and Segamat districts, respectively.

[5] See this link:

[6] See this link:

[7] See this link:

[8] Johor has 56 state seats, but the results from one state seat, N51 Bukit Batu, have been discounted for 2022 due to contested election results. Thus, the results from 2018 refer to 949 polling districts and those from 2022 refer to 933 districts.

[9] The terms used in the Box and Whisker figures are as follows:

[10] Skudai is an example of a DAP urban stronghold, which the party has held since 2008. In 2022, Marina Ibrahim from DAP won with a majority of about 14,000 out of the 45,000 votes cast. In three quarters of the 21 polling districts within Skudai, DAP had an average vote share of at least 60 per cent.

[11] The following parameters are used to determine the urbanisation status of polling districts: Global Human Settlement Layers, World Population Density, projected trends for cities from the Statistics Department of Malaysian, and area verification from the Town and Country Planning Department.

[12] For instance, Kota Iskandar is an urban seat which encompasses parts of Johor Bahru. Nonetheless, there are also rural PDs within Kota Iskandar such as Kampong Pulai, Tiram Duku, and Tanjong Kupang. The rural seat of Paloh also has semi-urban PDs including Bandar Paloh Utara, and Bandar Paloh Selatan.

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
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Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/103 “A Ground-Up Approach to Climate-Resilient Agriculture in Southeast Asia” by Prapimphan Chiengkul

 

A rice farmer salvages crops from a paddy field following flooding in Munje village in Lhoksukon, Aceh on October 12, 2022. (Photo by Azwar Ipank / AFP).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • For decades, sustainable farmers and their networks have been experimenting and practicing farming techniques that increase climate resilience in agricultural production. Their experiences suggest that, in addition to changes in production methods, climate-resilient agriculture should also seek to address socio-economic concerns facing small- and medium-scale farmers. This will help to expand sustainable agricultural production and retain labour in the agricultural sector in the long run.
  • It is important to develop multiple market channels at local, national and international levels for sustainable agrifood products. This helps to diversify sources of farm incomes and increase resilience in agrifood chains. Support networks and fair prices for consumers and farmers are also essential to the continuation and expansion of sustainable agricultural production. Amongst other supportive measures, Southeast Asian governments should increase investments on education and research on sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture.
  • This article contributes to discussions about climate-smart and climate-resilient agriculture by highlighting important policy insights that can be drawn from experiences of farmers and other grassroot actors in sustainable agriculture movements in Southeast Asia.

* Prapimphan Chiengkul is Visiting Research Fellow with the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, Assistant Professor at Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University in Thailand, and Honorary Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in the UK.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/103, 25 October 2022

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INTRODUCTION

It is widely recognised that current agricultural production models are not ecologically sustainable (see Chiengkul 2017, 11; Clapp et al. 2022; FAO 2021c, 7-23; Nicholls and Altieri 1997). Current agricultural practices are pushing the sustainability limits of land and water resources, and they are also becoming less productive due to climate change (FAO 2021c, 7-23; GCF 2021, 1). For these reasons, many scholars and international organisations have called for transitions to climate-resilient agrifood systems, which can be defined as “the capacity over time of agrifood systems, in the face of any disruption, to sustainably ensure availability of and access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food for all, and sustain the livelihoods of agrifood systems’ actors” (FAO 2021b, 9).

Public discussions of these challenges often focus on the roles of governments, the private sector and high-tech innovations in promoting climate-smart or climate-resilient agriculture. Scholars have warned, however, that some “climate-smart” technological solutions might reinforce current industrial agrifood models that are responsible for environmental unsustainability and vulnerability to disruptions in the first place. These include techniques and technologies that promote dependency on agrochemicals and a small variety of patented plant seeds, as well as increased usage of fossil-fuel powered machineries in farmlands (Clapp and Ruder 2020, 57-58; Newell and Taylor 2017). Genetically modified seeds, for example, have sometimes been promoted as a solution to global food security. However, such gene-editing technology has widely raised ecological sustainability and socio-economic concerns (see Chiengkul 2017, 11-16; Clapp and Ruder 2020, 57-58; Newell and Taylor 2017, 122).

Farmers and other actors in sustainable agriculture networks are essential to the promotion of climate-resilient agriculture in Southeast Asia. For decades, these actors have been experimenting and practising sustainable farming techniques that improve climate resilience. Through trial and error, they have also developed many forms of market channels for sustainable agrifood products that aim to offer fair returns to farmers. For these reasons, their experiences can significantly enrich academic and public discussions on climate-resilient agriculture in Southeast Asia.

SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Sustainable farming practices have been labelled under different names, such as agroecology and organic farming. General principles include the promotion of biodiversity in farmlands and sustainable land management, and common techniques include the use of intercropping, crop-livestock integration, a variety of traditional/local seeds, and organic inputs instead of agrochemicals (Clapp et al. 2022, 6; FAO 2021a; GCF 2021, 15-16; IPCC 2019, 23-24; Mbow et al. 2019, 499-501). Agroecology, in particular, is committed to the production of diverse agrifood products based on the understanding of ecological interactions between plants, insects and other organisms, which help to increase climate resilience (Altieri and Nicholls 2020; Clapp and Moseley 2020, 1410). Biodiverse agroecosystems improve soil fertility and naturally control for pests and weeds, and studies have found that agroecological practices can increase yields of staple food crops such as maize (Altieri and Nicholls 2020, 890-891). Moreover, local traditional knowledge are often important building-blocks for farmers in developing sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture (FAO et al. 2018, 102). Integrated rice-fish systems, for example, are used by farmers in Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos and Thailand. Inspired by traditional knowledge, these production systems have reportedly increased rice yields and reduced agrochemical usage in paddy fields, since fishes help to control weeds and pests (Frei and Becker 2005, 139). Producing both rice and fish also helps farmers earn extra income and source protein from fish. However, more research is needed on minimising methane emissions from paddy fields (FAO 2001, 2022; Frei and Becker 2005). 

Scholars and international development organisations have also recognised that traditional crop varieties can potentially increase climate resilience, household food security and farm incomes (FAO et al. 2018, 98-99). Over generations, traditional crop varieties have adapted to suit local conditions, and they tend to have greater resilience to droughts and other climate stresses. They require less water, no chemical pesticides and fertilisers, and are often found to be high in nutrients (Altieri and Nicholls 2020, 884; FAO et al. 2018, 102). There are sustainable farming groups in Southeast Asian countries that have been saving, exchanging and developing traditional seeds, which has helped to promote agrobiodiversity and climate resilience for decades. In the Philippines, for example, the Farmer-Scientist Partnership Development (MASIPAG) has been helping farmers transition to organic farming as well as promote traditional rice varieties (Heckelman et al. 2022, 13, 15). Further examples of sustainable agricultural production practices from Thailand and Vietnam are discussed in Box 1 and Box 2 below.

  Box 1: Examples of sustainable agricultural practices from Thailand   The sustainable agriculture movement in Thailand has been inspired by domestic, regional and transnational sources of ideas and practices, including traditional farming knowledge, natural farming principles of the Japanese farmer and philosopher Masanobu Fukuoka, effective micro-organism soil improvement technology, food sovereignty and organic agriculture movements in other countries. They use various terms to describe their practices, such as diversified farming, agroecology, agroforestry, natural and organic farming  (Chiengkul 2017, 87-97). Many farmer groups and civil society networks, such as the Khao Kwan Foundation, Tamor natural farmer group in Surin province, and the Kammad sustainable agriculture group in Yasothon province, have been preserving and developing rice strands for many decades to promote agrobiodiversity and challenge corporate control over seeds. They have also found that planting a variety of seeds reduces labour costs and production risks from extreme weather patterns (Chiengkul 2017, 96-97).  
  Box 2: Examples of sustainable agricultural practices from Vietnam   Since floods are occurring more frequently due to climate change, some farmers in Vietnam have adapted to the changing environment by developing ratoon rice cropping methods[1] based on indigenous knowledge. Since the ratoon system quickens growth time, rice can be harvested before flooding begins (Sen and Bond 2016, 277, 279). Another interesting example is how ethnic minority groups in Vietnam have developed and implemented intercropping and integrated crop-livestock methods, based on indigenous knowledge and modern knowledge provided by government agencies, which have increased biodiversity and reduced soil erosion (Huynh et al. 2020; Son et al. 2020, 11). In the northern mountainous district of Ba Be in Bac Kan Province, climate change has caused longer periods of drought as well as flash floods, landslides and abnormally cold weather. Ethnic minority farmers have tried to adapt by producing multiple native crop varieties (such as hilly sticky rice, green bean, red peanut, tangerine) and heritage livestock, which have high pests and disease resistance, as well as high adaptability to local climate and weather patterns. Native crop varieties also reduce production costs because farmers do not have to purchase seeds and agrochemical inputs from companies (Son et al. 2020, 8-19).  

For sustainable agriculture movements in Southeast Asia to survive and expand, it is important that strong support networks and market channels that provide premium or fair prices to sustainable farmers are developed. In Thailand, successful sustainable farming groups have received support from NGOs, academics, consumer groups, the media, government agencies, green social entrepreneurs and international buyers in organic and Fairtrade movements. These actors provide financial support (such as pre-payment for products), technical advice, skills training, and also help with the development of local, national and international market channels for sustainable agrifood products (Chiengkul 2017, 87-104, 111-112). Similarly, studies from the Philippines suggest that small-scale organic farmers require adequate training, access to production inputs, and secure markets for their products (Heckelman et al. 2022; Salazar 2013). Civil society networks such as MASIPAG in the Philippines have also helped to empower sustainable farmers and connect them with NGOs, scientists and church-based organisations who share similar visions (Heckelman et al. 2022, 6).

To encourage farmers to keep practising or making transitions to sustainable agriculture, it is also crucial that they are able to voice their concerns regarding production problems, pricing and fair returns. Many sustainable rice farmers in Thailand have formed cooperatives or social enterprises to increase their bargaining power and share profits. Some groups have also invested in rice mills to process their own paddy, which allows them to capture the value-added from vertical integration. They usually sell their rice through domestic and international organic and Fairtrade markets in large quantities. However, in many provinces such as Chiang Mai, Surin and Yasothon, local green markets and community-supported agriculture (where consumers subscribe to receive a box of produce on a regular basis) also serve as important market channels for seasonal agrifood products. These local market channels have created more jobs in the community and substantially helped to increase and diversify sources of farm incomes (Chiengkul 2017, 97-104). There are also many examples of socially-conscious agribusinesses in Southeast Asia that have helped to find markets for sustainable agrifood products, whilst respecting farmers as partners. In Indonesia, for example, Javara Indigenous has utilised local wisdom and modern business management techniques to develop and market a diverse range of organic agrifood products. Javara also includes farmers in the price setting decision-making process (Mahita et al. 2015).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In sum, this article has suggested that climate-resilient agriculture should be based on sustainable agriculture and that it is important to address socio-economic concerns facing small- and medium-scale farmers. This includes creating support networks and developing multiple market channels for sustainable agrifood products where prices are fair to both consumers and farmers. Not only will this help to promote poverty reduction and social justice, it will also help to expand sustainable agricultural production and retain labour in the agricultural sector in the long run. More specific policy recommendations are discussed below.

  • Climate-resilient agriculture significantly relies on farmers who should be given sufficient training on agroecology and business management (FAO 2021a, 7; see also Huynh et al. 2020, 18). Research in Thailand suggests that the knowledge- and labour-intensive nature of sustainable agriculture is one of the most important reasons that has discouraged many farmers from adopting such production methods (Chiengkul 2017, 102-105). Therefore, Southeast Asian governments should increase investments in education and research on traditional plant varieties and sustainable production methods. This includes increased support for farmer field schools, vocational schools and universities (FAO 2021a, 11).
  • Governments should also encourage research collaborations between academics and farmers to gain farm-level insights (see examples at: Chiengkul 2017, 97, 114). Moreover, it is important to develop technologies for small- to medium-scale agrifood production and processing which help farmer cooperatives/social enterprises reduce their labour and fixed costs (Chiengkul 2017, 108). Research should also focus on reducing the costs of production and distribution of sustainable agrifood products to make them accessible to consumers at all income levels.
  • Government support for sustainable climate-resilient agriculture should go beyond easily quantifiable short-term programmes, such as one-day trainings and free handouts of organic fertilisers (Chiengkul 2017, 113). Southeast Asian governments should look into supportive policies that will reduce production risks, such as weather index insurance programmes (GCF 2021, 16-17), and also use public procurement to support sustainable agrifood products (FAO 2021a, 9).
  • Both governmental and non-governmental actors in Southeast Asia should help promote local, national and regional green markets, as well as community-supported agriculture. These markets create jobs, increase and diversify farm incomes, and reduce farmers’ dependency on export markets. These markets also increase the resilience of agrifood supply chains, in support of local and national food security (Chiengkul 2017, 98, 104, 108; Clapp and Moseley 2020, 1409-1410; FAO 2021a, 7-9).
  • At the regional level, ASEAN should actively support the production and trading of a diverse range of sustainable agrifood products. It should be noted that, globally, people’s diets mainly rely on three crops – wheat, rice and maize. Production failure in any of these crops can be detrimental to global food security (Altieri and Nicholls 2020, 883-884). Therefore, increased crop diversity in Southeast Asia will increase resilience in agrifood supply chains and promote food security in the region.
  • More farmers can potentially be encouraged to adopt sustainable or organic production if there are guaranteed markets for their products (Chiengkul 2017, 110). There are already some examples of contract farming arrangements where farmers are also given advice on sustainable production methods. The Khao Kwan Foundation in Thailand, for example, has helped to draw up contract farming arrangements between sustainable rice farmers and a local rice mill in their area (Chiengkul 2017, 110).
  • It is important to educate consumers about agroecological principles and the production difficulties facing small-scale sustainable farmers. Urban consumers in Thailand, for example, often seek to purchase cold-climate vegetables despite the fact that these tend to be water-intensive and not very suitable to local conditions. This increases farmers’ production risks and costs (Chiengkul 2017, 106-107). Producer-consumer networks, community-supported agriculture and farm visits can also help create long-term supportive social relations between farmers, retailers and consumers (Chiengkul 2017, 110).
  • Organic and Fairtrade certification costs can be prohibitive for small-scale farmers, so NGOs and farmer organisations often have to bear the costs. A study in Laos, for example, suggests that obtaining organic certificates for farms in remote areas can double the usual fees (UNCTAD 2020, 6-7). However, the development of local certification bodies can help to reduce costs. A good example is that of the Northern Organic Standard in Thailand (Chiengkul 2017, 109).
  • Successfully transitioned farms in Thailand have reported lower costs of production and comparable yields to conventional farming. However, farmers will likely face many technical issues and receive lower incomes in the first few years following their transition into sustainable agriculture (Chiengkul 2017, 102-105). Gaining organic certifications will allow farmers to receive higher prices for their products, but adequate technical and financial support should be given to them during the transition period. Since sustainable farmers create positive environmental externalities through their production methods, they could also be given direct payments for ecosystem services in addition to incomes from the sale of their products (FAO 2021a, 11).

Overall, this article has highlighted how actors in sustainable agriculture movements in Southeast Asia, such as farmers, consumer groups and NGOs, play important roles in promoting climate-resilient agriculture. It is important to explore different paths to climate-resilient agriculture to avoid technological “lock-ins” where reliance on a few technologies serve to encourage monopoly concentrations in agrifood systems and suppress alternatives that might be more promising (Clapp and Ruder 2020, 59). Moreover, as Clapp et al. (2022, 3-4) has argued, the ability of individuals and groups to have a say in the governance of their agrifood systems should be recognised as an important dimension in food security.

REFERENCES

Altieri, Miguel A., and Clara I. Nicholls. 2020. “Agroecology and the reconstruction of a post-COVID-19 agriculture.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 47 (5): 881-898. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2020.1782891.

Chiengkul, Prapimphan. 2017. The Political Economy of the Agri-Food System in Thailand: Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, and Co-Optation of Oppositions. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Clapp, Jennifer, and William G. Moseley. 2020. “This food crisis is different: COVID-19 and the fragility of the neoliberal food security order.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 47 (7): 1393-1417. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2020.1823838.

Clapp, Jennifer, William G. Moseley, Barbara Burlingame, and Paola Termine. 2022. “Viewpoint: The case for a six-dimensional food security framework.” Food Policy 106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102164.

Clapp, Jennifer, and Sarah-Louise Ruder. 2020. “Precision Technologies for Agriculture: Digital Farming, Gene-Edited Crops, and the Politics of Sustainability.” Global Environmental Politics 20 (3): 49-69. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00566.

FAO. 2001. Integrated agriculture-aquaculture: A primer. https://www.fao.org/3/Y1187E/y1187e00.htm.

—. 2021a. COVID-19 building back greener and more resilient: Contributions of agroecology to a “new normal” in Asia and the Pacific. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), (Bangkok). https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb3114en.

—. 2021b. In Brief to The State of Food and Agriculture 2021. Making agrifood systems more resilient to shocks and stresses. FAO, (Rome).

—. 2021c. The state of the world’s land and water resources for food and agriculture – Systems at breaking point. Synthetic report 2021. FAO (Rome: FAO). https://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/CB7654EN/.

—. 2022. “Case study C1.14 Local innovation and indigenous knowledge to diversify production and build resilience in Laos People’s Democratic Republic.” Climate Smart Agriculture Sourcebook: Enhancing capacities for a country-owned transition towards CSA. Accessed 19 August. https://www.fao.org/climate-smart-agriculture-sourcebook/enabling-frameworks/module-c1-capacity-development/c1-case-studies/case-study-c114-local-innovation-and-indigenous-knowledge-to-diversify-production-and-build-resilience-in-laos-peoples-democratic-republic/en/.

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. 11 September 2018. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018. Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition. FAO, (Rome). https://www.wfp.org/publications/2018-state-food-security-and-nutrition-world-sofi-report.

Frei, Michael, and Klaus Becker. 2005. “Integrated rice-fish culture: Coupled production saves resources.” Natural Resources Forum 29: 135-143.

GCF. 10 September 2021. Sectoral Guide Consultation Version 1: Agriculture and food security. Green Climate Fund. https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/sectoral-guide-agriculture-and-food-security.

Heckelman, Amber, M. Jahi Chappell, and Hannah Wittman. 2022. “A polycentric food sovereignty approach to climate resilience in the Philippines.” Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene 10 (1): 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2020.00033.

Huynh, Chuong Van, Tung Gia Pham, Tan Quang Nguyen, Linh Hoang Khanh Nguyen, Phuong Thi Tran, Quy Ngoc Phuong Le, and Mai Thi Hong Nguyen. 2020. “Understanding Indigenous Farming Systems in Response to Climate Change: An Investigation into Soil Erosion in the Mountainous Regions of Central Vietnam.” Applied Sciences 10 (15). https://doi.org/10.3390/app10155091.

IPCC. 2019. Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems. https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/chapter/summary-for-policymakers/.

Mahita, D. R., D. N. Rifa, and H. Taruli. 2015. “Sustainable Agribusiness for Indonesia’s Farmers’ Economic Well-Being: Case Study of Javara Indonesia.” 15th Indonesian Scholars International Convention, King’s College London, 3-4 October.

Mbow, C., C. Rosenzweig, L.G. Barioni, T.G. Benton, M. Herrero, M. Krishnapillai, E. Liwenga, P. Pradhan, M.G. Rivera-Ferre, T. Sapkota, F.N. Tubiello, and Y. Xu. 2019. Chapter 5 Food Security in Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems. IPCC (IPCC). https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/.

Newell, Peter, and Olivia Taylor. 2017. “Contested landscapes: the global political economy of climate-smart agriculture.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 45 (1): 108-129. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1324426.

Nicholls, Clara Ines, and Miguel A. Altieri. 1997. “Conventional agricultural development models and the persistence of the pesticide treadmill in Laitn America.” International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 4 (2): 93-111.

Salazar, Robert C. 2013. “Going Organic in the Philippines: Social and Institutional Features.” Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 38 (2): 199-229. https://doi.org/10.1080/21683565.2013.833155.

Sen, Le Thi Hoa, and Jennifer Bond. 2016. “Agricultural adaptation to flood in lowland rice production areas of Central Vietnam: understanding the ‘regenerated rice’ ratoon system.” Climate and Development 9 (3): 274-285. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2016.1149440.

Son, Ho Ngoc, Aaron Kingsbury, and Ha Thi Hoa. 2020. “Indigenous knowledge and the enhancement of community resilience to climate change in the Northern Mountainous Region of Vietnam.” Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 45 (4): 499-522. https://doi.org/10.1080/21683565.2020.1829777.

UNCTAD. 2020. Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Sustainable Commercialisation in the Coffee Value Chain. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (Geneva). https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctabinf2020d2_en.pdf.

ENDNOTES


[1] Second rice crop grown from rice stubble that is left behind after harvesting the first crop (see more explanation in Sen and Bond 2016, 275).

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
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Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

“Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: The Situation and Attitudes of “Deviant” Muslim Groups” by Mohd Faizal Musa

 

2022/102 “Malaysia’s Artisanal Fishermen: Political Ecology and Survival” by Serina Rahman

 


Fisherman Pak Ali Ketam of Mukim Tg Kupang with his daily boatload of blue flower crabs. Photo taken by Serina Rahman on 18 November 2018. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Artisanal fishermen have sustained countless communities that mushroomed along the Malay Peninsula’s coast throughout history, and even today, they make up 60% of those involved in the fisheries industry. Should they be allowed to die out, generations-old fishing heritage, local knowledge, maritime expertise and climate change observations will be lost.
  • Artisanal fishermen are at the bottom of the fishing hierarchy. At times, access to aid and assistance is blocked by those who purport to represent them, but who have their own vested political interests. Some community groups have however been able to bypass these representatives to attain direct assistance from the Department of Fisheries.
  • The artisanal fisheries sector supports poor rural and coastal communities economically in more ways than just through local incomes and livelihoods. Upstream and downstream industries are also dependent on these fishermen, and the supply chain as a whole supports a myriad of small-scale businesses, entrepreneurs and industries. Fishing is also a safety net for many of the bottom 40 economic percentile of communities (B40), especially during times of unexpected crises like the Covid-19 pandemic.
  • Artisanal fishermen in Malaysia make up the majority of professional seamen, but bring home the least catch, earn the least income and garner the least subsidies. Support of the industry is vital for long-term fisheries sustainability, as well as for better resilience and adaptation to climate change.
  • Local knowledge of and input from the fishing community is important for more effective policy-making, as well as for ensuring that the community participates in and takes ownership of these initiatives. Fishermen should also be roped in as active partners and actors in the implementation and protection of Community Conservation Areas (CCAs).

* At the time of writing, Serina Rahman was Visiting Fellow at the Malaysia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This publication is the second in a series on Malaysian Artisanal Fishermen based on a 14-year immersion in an artisanal fishing community in southwest Johor, Malaysia. Serina is indebted to this community for their patient sharing of knowledge, heritage and time for the publications that resulted from this long-term fieldwork.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/102, 21 October 2022

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INTRODUCTION

As with almost everything else across Malaysia, seafood prices have been rising. Myriad media reports of upcoming and ongoing coastal developments have highlighted the resultant habitat damage on small-scale traditional fishermen. Yet, at the same time, environmental reports paint a gloomy picture of declining global fish stocks, inspiring some to tweak the age-old adage “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime” to “Teach a man how to fish and he empties the seas; teach him to farm instead”.

This paper examines the political ecology of Malaysian artisanal or traditional fisherman in order to identify oft-overlooked factors that affect their livelihoods and future.[1] The rich heritage of these fishermen is briefly explored before the governance and hierarchy they live under are examined. An understanding of the politics of the fisheries system is then used to explain the economic limitations that they face. The paper closes with an examination of the long-term sustainability of fisheries communities.[2]

Malaysian artisanal fisheries heritage

Artisanal fishermen are nearshore (coastal) or inshore (within rivers) fishermen. They travel within straits, estuaries and rivers for less than a day within five nautical miles from shore, using floating gill nets, cast nets, traditional long-lines (a single fishing line with many hooks), traps and the simple fishing rod.

These fishermen are essentially descendants of the traditional, small-scale fishermen who had plied the Malay peninsula’s coasts long before Malaysia was formed. Their vessels are usually less than 22 feet long (6.7 metres) with engines of up to 40 horsepower. The key to being successful is the ability to read the currents, tide, water temperature and weather. This comes from generational experience and first-hand exposure to the elements, combined with an ability to read barely discernible signals of impending storms and other dangers. In addition, an acute awareness of species seasonality, migration patterns and spawning behaviour are also needed.

There is furthermore a unique heritage tied to fishing communities that is often forgotten as the natural resources die out, or when organised religion forces the elimination of fishing rituals, spiritual practices and consciousness of taboos. Some of these ‘superstitions’ actually harbour community-derived means of protecting species from depletion, such as guidelines to stop harvesting shrimp, articulated as a means to prevent the appearance of a crocodile spirit. Social bonds and informal organisations born of the camaraderie and mutual assistance found in seafaring communities also fade as people stop looking out for each other.

Governance, hierarchy and politics

While the immediate physical threats to fishermen and their livelihoods are important to consider, there is an even greater need to understand the many structural and institutional issues standing in the way of artisanal fishermen’s well-being and survival. Figure 1 below illustrates the structure under which fishermen in Malaysia function.

Figure 1: Governance structure of Malaysian Artisanal Fishermen

Note: The presence of community fishing groups, My Fisheries Community organisations and fishing associations are unique to every location that may have fishermen. In some cases, fishermen numbers are so small that they are not organised in any way, and may just fall under the purview of jetty or village heads.

Source: Author’s ethnographic observation of artisanal fishing communities (2007-2022)

The above figure demonstrates that there is quite a distance and multiple layers between a rural coastal fisherman and the government agency that oversees or governs him.

The Department of Fisheries (DoF) and its state branches oversee all issues in relation to fishery resources and fishermen, and have a number of other agencies under it that support this role.[3] The Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia (LKIM) is an agency that is also parked under the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry which assists fishermen with economic development and infrastructure (such as the building and maintenance of jetties, etc.).[4]

The average fisherman is often unable to tell the difference between the two agencies, and often has no desire to understand the details.[5] In many locations, a fishing association purports to represent the fishermen of the area, and may work closely with LKIM for fishing licenses, jetty building and repairs, and financial assistance. However, it is often the case that in lobbying for access to funds, land and other opportunities for the fishermen, these associations become political, or are heavily influenced by or tied to political entities. Sometimes, they then serve other interests than those of actual fishermen.[6]

In Mukim Tanjung Kupang, Johor for example, some fishermen have set up their own registered clubs or unregistered informal groups to oversee fishermen’s matters, usually tied to the jetty they share. While, for the most part, they are able to function independently of the fishing association in the area, some matters are believed to only be possible through the association given its history in the area, long relationship with fisheries agencies, or influential politicians and their parties.

This then makes it difficult for groups who may not be on good terms with the dominant fishing association in the area to gain access to license applications, promised aid from the government and other opportunities. This situation is sometimes due to a lack of understanding of the actual roles of the fisheries agencies above them. Direct engagement with the Fisheries Department can help to reduce this confusion, but access to it is not always available to the average fisherman.

One jetty in this sub-district, with fishermen officially registered as a social enterprise and a cooperative, have also signed up as MyKomuniti Perikanan (MyKP), a DoF initiative that deals directly with fishermen to help them diversify their sources of income, as well as support fisheries-related economic activities (such as downstream seafood processing and product development, as well as ecotourism). This has thus enabled them to bypass the fishing association that many of the younger, part-time fishermen have been at loggerheads with due to perceived cronyism and a lack of transparency, to request for fishing licenses and other aid. There are now 153 MyKP groups across Malaysia since the programme’s launch in 2021; an indication of the desire of small-scale fishermen to mobilise and engage directly with the Fisheries Department.

There are other observed areas in Peninsular Malaysia where inland or coastal fishing communities are able to work together to improve their lot. Communities in these locations are characteristically less interested in personal gain, are not manipulated by entities with political vendettas, and are able to successfully and seamlessly cooperate (usually under a visionary village head) to strengthen local incomes, protect natural habitat areas and preserve their livelihoods.[7]

Unfortunately, the former scenario is far more common. In Penang, for example, there are multiple fishing entities and associations claiming to represent the fishermen there, especially in the face of coastal development. However, these groups do not necessarily share the same intentions or interests, and there are always individuals who feel that their needs are not being met or spoken for, as well as disagreements between the groups. At times, they dispute decisions made on their behalf by the fisheries agencies.[8]

Added to the quagmire is village politics which may come in the form of a village or district head or other community committees that may not have the same goals as the fishermen groups. These complications often arise in areas that are already substantially developed, have residents who depend on other sectors (and not just fishing) for a living, and for whom fishing is fast becoming a dying trade. At times, family or village feuds (in larger sub-districts) add to the lack of cohesion or tension between groups.[9]

It is for this reason that fishermen are sometimes inadequately represented, or are unable to get the assistance they are entitled to. As rural residents largely in the bottom 40 economic percentile (B40), they have little to no voice on their own. While the rural base is an important electorate, this has decreased in value over the past few elections, informed by disenchantment with political processes and machinations.[10]

Often disparaged as “stubborn locals” who get in the way of economic progress, and publicly derided by some political leaders as being “lazy” for not wanting to take up other professions,[11] fishing communities often do not have the money, power or political clout to defend their right to preserve a long-held craft or protect the marine and coastal ecosystems they depend on.

The economics of the artisanal fishery

Traditional, small-scale fishermen make up the majority of the entire Malaysian fishing industry, yet they land the smallest volume of catch (in comparison to large industrial trawlers)[12] and earn minimal incomes for being at the bottom of the sales and purchasing hierarchy.[13]

Given the lower costs that they are perceived to bear given their smaller boats and simpler equipment, they also receive less subsidies overall. Figure 2 below provides a comparison of selected boat expenses, subsidies and earnings between Zones A, B and C, based on a 2019 review (Lee, W.C. & Viswanathan, K.K. 2019).

Figure 2: Comparison of Selected Expenses, Subsidies and Earnings between Selected Boats in Different Fishing Zones.

ZoneABC
    
Trips per month18138
    
Livelihood subsidy per monthRM220RM225RM200
BR1M[14] (Direct financial aid)RM54RM54
Fuel subsidy per monthRM382RM4,334RM4981
Total subsidies citedRM656RM4,613RM5,181
    
Cost of fuel per monthRM7250RM11,600RM40,455
Fuel as a percentage of operating cost66.79%32.94%63.69%
    
Estimated total costs per month*RM10,854RM35,215RM63,518
Subsidies percentage of estimated total costs*6%13%8%
Average net income per month per boatRM211.64RM1,945.45RM10,676.27
    

Note: Zone A fishermen are coastal, nearshore and inshore fishermen that use traditional boats and equipment and travel up to 8 nautical miles from shore, including anchovy purse seiners. Small-scale fishermen usually travel alone or in pairs, while the larger vessels can take up to 10 crew members. These fishermen do many more trips to sea for shorter periods of time. Zone B fishermen ply waters between 8 to 15 nautical miles from shore, in trawlers and purse seiners. Zone C vessels include trawlers, purse seiners and long-liners that travel beyond 15 nautical miles from shore; they are almost always manned by migrant labour. Zone B and C fishermen stay out at sea for longer periods of time. (SEAFDAC: http://www.seafdec.org/fisheries-country-profile-malaysia/). Fisheries subsidies are allocated via the Ministry of Agriculture, through the Department of Fisheries or LKIM.

*Calculated and added to the table based on figures provided in the source publication

Source: Figures extracted from: Lee, W.C. & Viswanathan, K.K. 2019. Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector of Malaysia: Impact on Resource Sustainability. Review of Politics and Public Policy in Emerging Economies. 1(2): 79-85 (Table 4 on p.83). Table is author’s own.

The figures above indicate that while the costs of the boats in Zones B and C are higher (as are their associated incomes), the accompanying percentage of assistance that they receive is higher, and they would usually be backed by large companies with substantial funds at hand. Artisanal fishermen on the other hand, do not have access to such monies, and also receive less assistance (based on this study at this time). It can be argued that the Zone A small-scale fishermen are the segment of fishermen that need this assistance most in order to survive, yet may not have access to it.

This assessment becomes even more dire when the income contribution effect is taken into account. Given that Malaysian traditional fishermen often fall into the B40 category, the actual value of every Ringgit earned is far higher than its numerical monetary value (Béné, 2006). This is because of the difficulties faced by these communities in raising cash. Earning cash (either through subsidies provided for boats, equipment, petrol etc.) enables fishing families to have access to basic services and other consumption needs (food, health, education, clothes etc.). A pre-determined average income effect multiplier for Malaysian small-scale fishermen of 0.703 (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010) indicates that every Ringgit earned by a fisherman has almost twice its actual value.

The health of the seas also determines the fishermen’s ability to access this cash (by heading out more frequently, or diversifying their target species to boost their cash incomes). The sea becomes a ‘bank’ that people can turn to in times of difficulty (Béné, 2006). This was seen in Mukim Tanjung Kupang during the Covid-19 period, as several of those who lost their factory or other jobs as a result of pandemic lockdowns turned to fishing.[15] For rural and poor communities then, the seas become a safety net when there is nowhere else to turn for a source of food or income.

The above discussion highlights the importance of financial or other support to artisanal fishermen for their personal livelihood and wellbeing. In addition, the artisanal fishery also supports several upstream and downstream small-scale industries, such as net-making and engine repairs (upstream), and fish processing or production (downstream). The actual value of this fishery is therefore far higher than the monetary value calculated in mere landing values once it includes upstream Economic Input Values (EIV), (World Wildlife Fund-Malaysia, 2013) and Downstream Economic Values (DEV), (Teh and Sumaila, 2010).

It is especially important to note that industries made up of small-scale participants continue to support other small-scale (often also B40) entities both upstream and downstream, meaning that they are vital components of marginalised and rural economies that cannot be ignored or allowed to collapse (Teh and Pauly, 2018). In a case study of one jetty in Mukim Tanjung Kupang, calculation of the actual value of the local artisanal fisheries economy taking into account the EIV and DEV resulted in a total value of RM1,458,049 (USD327,174) per year, a value that is almost six times the recorded fish landing value of RM244,743 (USD54,914) per year.[16] This indicates how valuable the artisanal fishery is to a rural coastal community. 

Artisanal Fishery Sustainability

Much discussion has already gone into the usual threats to artisanal fishery habitats.[17] However, issues such as climate change and coastal developments are beyond the control of traditional fishermen; instead, they are at the receiving end of its impacts. This does not mean, however, that the fishermen are unable to do anything at all to protect their long-term livelihoods and target species.

While acknowledging that some change and decline is inevitable due to decisions and events beyond their ken, one jetty (Pasar Pendekar Laut) in Mukim Tanjung Kupang has put into place a sustainable fisheries programme to ensure that its fishermen do what is within their control to protect local endangered species. Seafood caught and sent to the jetty have to meet minimum size and quality requirements and endangered species such as shovelnose rays, eagle rays and sharks are released if still alive in their nets or on their lines. The fishermen document the species’ weight, length, sex and location, and report the information at the jetty for local records. They are also spotters for other charismatic species such as dugongs, seahorses, dolphins, whale sharks and otters for which ongoing community research is being conducted.

This is just one of myriad community initiatives where fishermen are roped in as habitat experts to not only release species that should be protected, but to also be involved in their documentation and monitoring. There are many inland fisheries’ community efforts such as this, which protect species such as toli shad (ikan terubok) so that they can recover from near extinction to breed. At times, controlled capture is allowed, but only when spawning season has passed.[18]

While these are laudable grassroots initiatives, they are often hampered by the capture of the same specimens by fishermen not involved in the programme, or who are entering the area from other jetties. This often results in tension between community members, as well as complaints from those involved in the catch and release initiative who find it hard to reconcile their species release with the ability of others to land their catch.

The Fisheries Department needs to be able to support such initiatives with the implementation of fines or punishment of those who catch and land endangered species. However, this can only be possible if Malaysia ratifies international conservation laws to begin with (many are not ratified),[19] and if the department has enough manpower to enforce conservation regulations, once they are put into place.

The involvement of fishermen in the protection of Community Conserved Areas (CCA) stipulated in the Malaysian National Policy on Biological Diversity,[20] as the examples above have illustrated, is the way forward in protecting artisanal fisheries areas. It also provides traditional fishermen with additional incomes for their contribution as marine rangers in CCA protection and monitoring.

A multi-stakeholder platform that brings together all entities in an area (from developers to agencies to local communities) to work together to monitor local changes, mitigate habitat damage and act quickly to ratify environmental problems or accidents can ensure that CCAs are genuinely effective in ensuring the sustainability of multiple-use resources areas for all parties involved.[21]

Small-scale fisheries have been recognised as the way forward in the fight against climate change due to their ability to adapt and remain resilient by evolving catch methods to pursue target species (Green et al. 2021). This sector has also been highlighted as the way forward in protecting dwindling fish stocks, with less wastage for every catch made, and for the limited damage incurred by traditional equipment and boats (Hendricks, S.L., 2022). The trend towards increased demand for authentic artisanally-caught seafood (deemed sustainable and chemical-free) speaks towards this growing consciousness and desire for responsible consumption.

CONCLUSION

While Malaysian artisanal fishermen are bound by somewhat complicated hierarchical structures which at times can restrict their access to financial aid and fisheries support, myriad groups have proven that they are able to find a way around institutional obstacles to access opportunities and demand their dues. Fishing cooperatives such as the one set up in Mukim Tanjung Kupang now pay the fishermen twice the price of that paid by middlemen, ensuring better comparative incomes even as fish landings decrease.

Grassroots efforts to protect the natural resources that their livelihoods depend on have established the first steps in habitat protection, but now needs to be reinforced with effective implementation of existing policies, and the establishment and enforcement of species protection regulation.

The economic analysis above demonstrates that less support is actually given to small-scale fisheries in spite of the value that they bring to poor, rural and coastal communities. The extent of the positive economic impact that the small-scale fisheries sector brings to these B40 communities has also been shown to be six times the value of their catch. Countless international organisations and climate change resolutions have lauded the value of local knowledge in the fight for long-term sustainability. Inputs from these fishing communities are vital at all levels of decision-making for effective policy implementation and positive impact.

This deconstruction of the Malaysian artisanal fishery through a political ecology lens may help to identify the factors to consider in ensuring long-term financial and ecological sustainability for poor coastal communities. As the world moves towards resilience and adaptation in responding to climate change, Malaysia too can take more innovative measures to assist those who need help the most.

REFERENCES

Béné, C. 2006. Small-scale Fisheries: Assessing their contribution to rural livelihoods in developing countries. FAO Fisheries Circular number 1008 (FIPL/C1008). Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, Rome, Italy.

Dyck, A.J. and Sumaila, U.R. 2010. Economic impact of ocean fish populations in the global fishery. Journal of Bioeconomics 12: 227-243. Doi:10.1007/S10818-010-9088-3.

Green, K.M.; Selgrath, J.C.; Frawley, T.H.; Oestreich, W.K.; Mansfield, E.J.; Urteaga, J.; Swanson, S.S.; Santana, F.N.; Green, S.J.; Naggea, J. and Crowder, L.B. 2021. How adaptive capacity shapes the Adapt, React, Cope response to climate impacts: insights from small-scale fisheries. Climatic Change 164: 15. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-021-02965-w.

Hendricks, S.L., 2022. ‘Sustainable small-scale fisheries can help people and the planet’, Nature.com. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01683-2.

Lee, W.C. & Viswanathan, K.K. 2019. Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector of Malaysia: Impact on Resource Sustainability. Review of Politics and Public Policy in Emerging Economies. 1(2): 79-85.

Teh, L.C.L. and Pauly, D. 2018. Who Brings in the Fish? The Relative Contribution of Small-Scale and Industrial Fisheries to Food Security in Southeast Asia. Frontiers in Marine Science, 5: 1-9. DOI: 10.3389/fmars.2018.00044.

Teh, L.C.L. and Sumaila, U.R. 2010. Quantifying the overlooked socio-economic contribution of small-scale fisheries in Sabah, Malaysia. Fisheries Research 110: 450-458. Doi:10.1016/J.FISHRES.2011.06.001.

World Wildlife Fund-Malaysia. 2013. ‘An Assessment of Fisheries and Marine Ecosystems in Peninsular Malaysia’. WWF-Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

ENDNOTES


[1] The information presented here is based on the author’s long immersion in and ethnographic observation of fishing communities, mainly in the western Tebrau Strait, as well as in other parts of Peninsular Malaysia. Examples from Mukim Tanjung Kupang, Johor are provided to corroborate cited published information.

[2] This paper is the second in this series and will focus on the aspects of governance, economy, history and society on artisanal communities. While the first paper has already evaluated attempts to alleviate the difficulties faced by artisanal fishermen, this publication will discuss the viability and necessity of keeping small-scale nearshore fishing traditions alive for long- term fisheries sustainability and climate change adaptation. The earlier publication by this author examined climate change and Covid-19 impacts on this community. Refer to: Malaysian Artisanal Fishermen: Rahman, S. 2022. The Endangered Malaysian Artisanal Fisherman: Battered by Climate Change and Covid-19. Perspective 2022/60. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-60-the-endangered-malaysian-artisanal-fisherman-battered-by-climate-change-and-covid-19-by-serina-rahman/

[3] Refer to the Department of Fisheries, Malaysia website at: https://www.dof.gov.my/en/

[4] Refer to the Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia website at: https://lkim.gov.my/en/

[5] Personal communication and discussions with various fishermen between 2007-2022.

[6] Author’s ethnographic observation and documentation of fisheries communities between 2008 and 2022, as well as personal communication, and formal and informal interviews with several fishermen over the study period.  

[7] One such community observed by the author is the Lenggong Valley fishing community (also a registered MyKP) in Hulu Perak, Malaysia.

[8] Refer to: Mok, O. 17 Sept 2021. “Veteran fishermen plead for Penang three island project to be approved for the sake of future generations,” Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/09/17/veteran-fishermen-plead-for-penang-three-island-reclamation-project-to-be-a/2006169. And Harbinson, R. 2017. “Is the new development boom in Malaysia leading to fisheries bust in Penang?” Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/04/is-a-property-boom-in-malaysia-causing-a-fisheries-bust-in-penang/

[9] Author’s ethnographic observation and documentation of fisheries communities between 2008 and 2022, as well as personal communication, formal and informal interviews with several fishermen over the study period. This is the situation in Mukim Tanjung Kupang, Johor. 

[10] Refer to: Rahman, S. 2018. Malaysia’s General Elections 2018: Understanding the Rural Vote. Trends in Southeast Asia 2018/9. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. And Rahman, S. 2018. “Rebellion and regret: Talking to rural voters after GE14,” New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/rebellion-and-regret-ge14/

[11] Refer to: Malaysiakini. 6 September 2019. “Blaming other races won’t resolve issues faced by Malays, says Mahathir.” https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/490906

[12] Refer to: Teh, L.C.L. and Pauly, D. 2018. Who Brings in the Fish? The Relative Contribution of Small-Scale and Industrial Fisheries to Food Security in Southeast Asia. Frontiers in Marine Science, 5: 1-9. DOI: 10.3389/fmars.2018.00044. Note that a decrease in comparative catch volumes occurred after the government began to focus on open and deep-sea trawling after a series of National Economic Plans in the mid-1960s.

[13] Author’s ethnographic documentation of fisheries communities, especially fish markets in Mukim Tanjung Kupang between 2016 and 2022, as well as personal communication, formal and informal interviews with several fishermen over the study period, and almost daily observation and interaction with fishermen, buyers and middlemen at the Pasar Pendekar Laut fish market in Mukim Tanjung Kupang during the 2.5-year -long Covid-19 lockdown period (2020-2022).

[14] BR1M stands for Bantuan Rakyat 1 Malaysia – a form of direct aid to poorer communities initiated by the Malaysian government when Najib Razak was Prime Minister.

[15] Refer to Rahman, S. 2022. The Endangered Malaysian Artisanal Fisherman: Battered by Climate Change and Covid-19. ISEAS Perspective 2022/60. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

[16] Refer to Rahman, S.A. and Yaakub, S.M. 2020. Socio-economic valuation of seagrass meadows in the Pulai River Estuary, Peninsular Malaysia, through a well-being lens. Marine and Freshwater Research 71: 877-891.

[17] Refer to Rahman, S. 2022. The Endangered Malaysian Artisanal Fisherman: Battered by Climate Change and Covid-19. ISEAS Perspective 2022/60. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

[18] Refer to: Bakeri, N.A.; Marikan, A. and Abdullah, A.M. 2019. Perception of local communities towars the conservation of Terubok. Journal of Public Administration and Governance 9(3): 143. DOI: 10.5296/jpag.v9i2.15232. And Awg Kasim, A.A.; Wong, P. and Kairulniezawaynie. 2012. The Terubok (Tenualosa spp.) Rehabilitation Integrated Program (TRIP) and conservation in Sarawak. UMT 11th International Annual Symposium on Sustainability Science and Management. 9-11 July, 2012. Terengganu Malaysia. https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/19978854/the-terubok-tenualosa-spp-rehabilitation-integrated-program-

[19] Personal communication with Department of Fisheries Johor staff, 19June 2022 (staff names withheld)

[20] Refer to https://www.ketsa.gov.my/ms-my/pustakamedia/Penerbitan/National%20Policy%20on%20Biological%20Diversity%202016-2025.pdf

[21] These areas are not preserved as Marine Protected Areas because they are already designated as industrial, residential or other multiple-use areas – yet they are also the backbone of local traditional livelihoods such as the artisanal fishery.

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2022/101 “The Authoritarian Electoral Blueprint of Thailand’s Palang Pracharath Party May No Longer be Effective” by Napon Jatusripitak

 

Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha walks through the Government House in Bangkok on 22 August 2022. Photo: Jack TAYLOR/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Although Thailand’s authoritarian structures remain intact, regime-backed parties are unlikely to succeed in the next general election by following Palang Pracharath’s authoritarian electoral blueprint from 2019.
  • Palang Pracharath’s success in the 2019 general election was built on its unique status as a party for and by the military regime, which enabled it to outcompete its rivals at co-opting political heavyweights, secure the advantage of an uneven playing field, and tilt the electoral outcome in its favour.
  • Ongoing internal struggles among pro-regime forces and external challenges coming from Pheu Thai under a new electoral system have introduced new uncertainties that will make it difficult for regime-backed parties to replicate Palang Pracharath’s success.
  • Palang Pracharath’s control over its MPs is contingent on its capacity to offer access to privileges, protection and spoils of government, which comes with its status as a ruling party and a party backed by the regime.
  • Should Palang Pracharath fail to exhibit credible commitment to this offer, the party stands to lose the support of political elites, factions and influential families to other parties such as Bhumjaithai Party or Chart Thai Pattana Party.

*Napon Jatusripitak is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is a PhD Researcher at Northwestern University.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/101, 18 October 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) was founded from the mission of extending the lifespan of the military regime that seized power following Thailand’s May 2014 coup. In the 2019 general election, the PPRP secured 116 seats, becoming the leader of a governing coalition that not only excluded parties affiliated with Thaksin Shinawatra but also kept regime leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha in power. These accomplishments testify to the PPRP’s success in turning authoritarian legacy into votes, and elections into instruments that prolonged authoritarian rule.

This article re-examines the making of this success and assesses whether it can be replicated in the next general election in light of recent developments in Thai politics. A confluence of factors played an important role in turning the tide in the PPRP’s favour in the 2019 general election. These included, for example, a misstep by Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, a strong turnout by pro-establishment conservatives in response to Thaksin’s ploy to involve the monarchy in politics, and the appeal of General Prayut under the slogan “Choose Peace, Choose Prayut” (“เลือกความสงบ จบที่ลุงตู่”) in the final stretch of the election campaign.[1]

None could compare to the PPRP’s designated status as a party for and by the regime. This status enabled the PPRP to take advantage of the uneven playing field created by the regime, form strategic alliances with powerful players with vested interests in the regime’s survival, and leverage the regime’s influence to co-opt political elites, factions and influential families to form the party’s electoral base where none had existed before and where support for Thaksin still runs deep. Yet, due to ongoing internal struggles among pro-regime forces and changes in the electoral system, the same blueprint that contributed to the PPRP’s success in 2019 is unlikely to produce similarly successful results in the next general election.

AUTHORITARIAN ROOTS

To understand how the PPRP became the regime’s solution to electoral politics, one must first situate the party’s emergence within the broader context of post-2014 Thailand. After taking power in May 2014, the regime established and exercised power through an array of appointed institutional bodies designed to elicit support from a narrow group of military and civilian elites. These institutions include, for example, the Cabinet, the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), the National Reform Council (NRC), and the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC). The result was an “embedded military regime” that sank its teeth deep into polity and society, correcting the mistakes of the previous group of coup-makers who failed to curb Thaksin’s influence after the September 2006 coup.[2] These institutions were however not enough to maintain a grip on power amidst pressure to democratise. Anticipating that a return to some form of democracy was inevitable, the regime chose to install safeguards – the 2017 Constitution and the Transitory Provisions[3] – that would preserve its dominance despite elections being held.

A regime-backed constitution was not, however, the only innovation that manifested from the need to “make democracy work” for royalist-conservative elites.[4] Shortly after the constitutional drafting process, from within and outside the regime’s inner circle, ideas to form a political party that would take advantage of the Constitution emerged.[5] Initially, General Prayut was indecisive about forming and leading a party directly,  or merely presiding over the Thai parliament in the same manner that General Prem Tinasulanonda had done during his premiership from 1980 to 1988.[6] This window of opportunity saw multiple parties being set up in anticipation of, and to capitalise on, the regime’s need for allies in the House of Representatives.[7] Among other contenders, the PPRP was chosen to carry the torch for the regime.

ELECTORAL-AUTHORITARIAN BLUEPRINT

Although the PPRP was formed in an ad hoc manner just before the general election in 2019, this did not prevent the PPRP from positioning itself as an extension of the regime and channelling the regime’s resources for its own ends. This positioning played a crucial role in turning the party into an instant political powerhouse, giving the party unfair institutional advantages, and tilting the outcome in its favour.

Carrots and Sticks

Leveraging the regime’s backing, the PPRP engaged in an aggressive strategy of roping in provincial and local elites, factions and influential families with a proven track record and patronage-oriented linkages to the electorate.[8] In constituencies where it could not count on the appeal of policies made or its prime ministerial candidate, General Prayut, the party relied instead on these individuals’ networks to deliver the votes. Although this co-optation was by no means a strategy exclusive to the PPRP, the party was unusually well-equipped to undertake it on a large scale, thanks to its affiliation with the regime.[9]

In terms of recruiting politicians, the PPRP faced little resistance thanks not only to its deep pockets but also to Section 44 of the Interim Constitution.[10] Although Section 44 had been invoked for a wide range of purposes, it was routinely used to order the appointment, transfer and suspension of government officials and local political office holders.[11] This did not occur at random, however – it was instead deployed as part of a broader strategy to root out opposition at various levels of government or, better, turn these individuals against their former patron, Thaksin. This was done by getting them, their family or faction to pledge allegiance to the PPRP in return for protection.[12] This legal instrument worked in tandem with activities by the military, operating under the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), to monitor and keep people affiliated with Pheu Thai (PT) Party in check.[13]

From the standpoint of politicians, joining the PPRP guaranteed that authoritarian powers, legal or coercive, would not be used against them. Instead, these powers would grant them unparalleled advantages in key dimensions that matter in Thai election campaigns. These include, for example, recruiting vote canvassers, preventing defection, deterring challengers, bending the rules, securing financial backing, and forging alliances with local government officials and office holders.[14] In turn, their support gave the PPRP what it needed to project an image of a robust party organisation despite being newly formed.

The Constitution Was Designed for Us

Establishing itself as a party that received the regime’s blessing, the PPRP borrowed the term pracharath (the people’s state)from policies already implemented by the military government several years before the party was founded—a time when no parties were allowed to operate, let alone campaign. It strengthened the credibility of this ready-made political brand by positioning itself as a party that was primed to win by design, thanks to its association with the regime that invented the rules.

This was seen and heard when Somsak Thepsuthin, one of the PPRP’s leaders, famously declared that “this Constitution was designed for us,” delivering a powerful message that the party intended to reap the (unfair) advantages offered by the new constitutional framework.[15] Implicit in this message was the notion that supporting the PPRP would guarantee favourable ties to the future governing coalition and, by extension, entitlement to the spoils of government.

Somsak’s bold declaration did not come out of thin air. The 2017 Constitution and the Transitory Provisions established a bicameral parliament consisting of an elected 500-member House of Representatives and, for the first five years, an appointed 250-member Senate that would participate in the selection of the prime minister in a joint session involving both Houses.[16] Since all but six senators were handpicked by a committee chaired by members of the military regime, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), this produced a body that was more representative of the NCPO’s network than any other group in society.[17]

This concentration of parliamentary power in the hands of the NCPO via an appointed Senate was combined with an electoral system designed to blunt the dominance of Pheu Thai Party. Under the new system, called Mixed-Member Apportionment (MMA), voters cast only one ballot which functioned not only as a vote for a candidate competing in one of the 350 single-member districts, but also as a vote for that candidate’s party in a 150-seat party-list proportional representation.[18]

This system removed any bonus party-list seats that would have been awarded to Pheu Thai Party under the previous Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) system. It also made single-party absolute majority unlikely, and encouraged a multi-party coalition in which the PPRP, whose backer held sway over 250 appointed senators, had a major head start in terms of accumulating seats to approve a prime minister.[19]

Friends in High Places

Apart from the appointed Senate, the PPRP benefited from actions taken by institutions with vested interest in the regime’s survival. Among these were the Constitutional Court and the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT), whose members were appointed or had their tenure extended by the NCPO.

First, the Constitutional Court accepted the recommendation of the ECT and ordered the dissolution of the Thai Raksa Chart Party (TRC) for nominating Princess Ubolratana as candidate for prime minister.[20] This dissolution proved detrimental to the pro-Thaksin camp since the Pheu Thai Party had deliberately fielded candidates in only 250 of 350 districts to avoid contesting in the same districts as the TRC.

Second, the Constitutional Court ruled that the ECT’s interpretation of the method for allocating party-list seats did not violate the Constitution. The method in question granted one parliamentary seat to parties which otherwise would not have won any seats had a different formula been used. Most of these micro-parties eventually joined the PPRP-led coalition.[21]

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEXT ELECTION

There is little doubt that the PPRP’s proximity to the regime gave the party unsurpassed advantages that proved instrumental to its success. This raises an important question concerning whether the PPRP, or other parties that claim the regime’s backing, can produce similar results in the next general election by tapping into Thailand’s authoritarian structures in the same way that the PPRP did in 2019.

On the one hand, although the NCPO was formally dissolved and, along with it, the powers of Section 44, the same structures that empowered the PPRP remain very much alive and well.[22] While the appointed Senate is nearing the end of its five-year term, it retains the power to select every new prime minister until May 2024, and thus remains a key player in the formation of the next ruling coalition. On the other hand, important shifts in the Thai political landscape have introduced new uncertainties which did not exist in 2019 and which cast doubt on the PPRP’s viability and the prospect of parties coming to power by following its model.

Since 2019, the PPRP’s reputation and credibility have been tarnished by its failure to deliver on policy promises, inconsistent performance in by-elections and local elections, and intense factional strife. Above all, the party’s unquestioning allegiance to General Prayut was shattered after party secretary-general Captain Thammanat Prompao conspired to unseat General Prayut in a no-confidence debate in September 2021. Although Captain Thammanat’s failed attempt culminated in his dismissal from the Cabinet and from the PPRP, he remains a close ally of the PPRP leader and Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan who was allegedly aware of but turned a blind eye to Captain Thammanat’s scheme. Captain Thammanat formed and led a new party called Thai Economic Party which is comprised of his faction of 16 MPs who defected from the PPRP.[23]  General Prawit’s brother, Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, a former national police chief, also serves as an advisor to the party, underscoring the informal alliance between Captain Thammanat and General Prawit that exists despite the clash between Captain Thammanat and General Prayut. Captain Thammanat recently resigned as party leader amid ongoing rumours that he and his followers will join another party, presumably Pheu Thai Party.

Captain Thammanat’s manoeuvres created a widespread impression that General Prayut has outlived his usefulness for the PPRP under General Prawit’s watch. This impression was subsequently reinforced by uncertainties over General Prayut’s eligibility as prime minister. Prayut was suspended from duty as prime minister on 24 August, pending the Constitutional Court’s decision concerning his term limit. On 30 September, the Court ruled that he has yet to reach his eight-year term limit and that his tenure began when the current Constitution came into effect on 6 April 2017, meaning that General Prayut is eligible to serve as prime minister for only two additional years into the next term— until mid-2025.[24] It is unclear whether the PPRP will nominate or find someone to replace General Prayut as candidate for prime minister in the next general election, considering his soon-to-expire eligibility and waning popularity.

To substitute for the PPRP, whose commitment to General Prayut has become uncertain, a new party was formed to accommodate whatever remains of General Prayut’s support base. The new party, called Ruam Thai Sang Chart, is led by former Democrat and PPRP member Pirapan Salirathavibhaga and former Democrat MP and PDRC protest[25] leader Akanat Promphan. However, given General Prayut’s expiry halfway through the next four-year term and the absence of a viable successor in place, the new party has little control over its own fate.

Whether or not ongoing tension between General Prayut and General Prawit amounts to a fracture in the regime, one thing is abundantly clear – neither is in a position to take advantage of the authoritarian levers backing them. Even if these levers remain operational, when pulled in different directions, they are as good as unusable.

A case in point is the recent reversal to an electoral system that adopts “100” as the basis for allocating party-list seats—General Prayut at first reportedly preferred the “500” system but revisions towards that system were thwarted, presumably in accordance with General Prawit’s wishes.[26] Unless the two sides can reconcile their differences in the presence of a common threat – a “landslide victory” of the PT and an imminent return to Thailand of exiled Thaksin – they will not succeed in using authoritarian powers to shape electoral politics. Uncertainties about which party, a sinking ship versus a life raft, will ultimately be empowered by the underlying authoritarian structures should be enough to deter political heavyweights from putting all their eggs into the regime’s baskets.

The replacement of the single-ballot MMA system with a two-ballot parallel voting system has also increased the odds of a victory for PT; this has made party switching and realignment according to factional priorities at the expense of the PPRP more likely.[27] The new system will remove some of the advantages that the PPRP enjoyed in 2019. Since voters will cast two separate ballots, one for a constituency candidate and one for a political party, the PPRP will not be able to win additional party-list seats by accumulating constituency votes. Furthermore, due to an expected increase in the threshold of party-list votes per seat, the PPRP will face more constraints in terms of engaging in a divide-and-rule tactic to co-opt small parties and micro-parties in forming a coalition government.

By contrast, under these same rules, the PT now stands a good chance of winning enough seats, when combined with other opposition parties, to counterbalance the votes of the appointed Senate during the selection of the next prime minister. Capitalising on its previous track record, the PT has already predicted a landslide victory in the next general election.[28] The party has backed up this prediction by reconsolidating the party under the informal but visible leadership of Thaksin’s ex-wife Potjaman and quite possibly putting forward a candidate for prime minister bearing the Shinawatra family name, Ms Paethongtarn. Adding credibility to its bold claim, the PT has also successfully produced “mini” landslide victories for its candidates in the by-election of Chief Executive of Provincial Administration Organization (PAO) in Kalasin and Roi Et.[29]

These developments suggest that the safest option for politicians with an independent electoral base who are currently aligned with regime-backed parties is to jump ship to parties that have the best chance of being part of the future governing coalition no matter who is in power, be it Bhumjaithai Party and Chart Thai Pattana Party, for example. Given the right price, some of these politicians may even join the PT, which many were originally a part of.

CONCLUSION

Since 24 September, the House has entered its final 180 days, and by-elections will no longer be held to fill vacant seats. This allows constituency MPs to resign and join other parties without facing penalty. Based on the rules that require MP candidates to be affiliated with a political party at least 90 days before the election day, party switching will take place before 8 February.[30]

If General Prayut dissolves the House instead, which is widely anticipated to occur after he hosts the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in November, an election will be held at least 45 days but no later than 60 days after the House dissolution. Should that be the case, MP candidates are required to be part of a political party within 30 days in order to be eligible to run in the next general election.

Unless the PPRP successfully revamps its image or imposes party discipline using whatever means available, it looks as though a mass exodus from the PPRP to other parties will happen at some point before the end of this year or at the beginning of next year.[31]


Ultimately, the PPRP’s control over its MPs has always been provisional. Their loyalty to the party has been contingent on the party’s capacity to offer access to the benefits that come with its status as the chief ruling party and a party backed by the regime.[32]

Unless the PPRP, or other regime-backed parties, can credibly commit to uphold this arrangement, the regime’s experimental success with party and electoral politics may be at an end, even if that regime remains a key player in Thailand’s political landscape.

ENDNOTES


[1] Abhisit Vejjajiva declared in early March that he would not support General Prayut as candidate for prime minister. His stance likely alienated many voters who felt the Democrat Party was an ineffective antidote to the Thaksin problem, leading them to support the overtly pro-military PPRP, the bitter medicine, instead. As for Thaksin, he made two political miscalculations that concerned the monarchy. First was nominating Princess Ubolratana as Thai Raksa Chart’s candidate for prime minister, which led to Thai Raksa Chart being dissolved. Second was putting the spotlight on Princess Ubolratana during the wedding in Hong Kong of Thaksin’s youngest daughter Paethongtarn just two days before the general election, sparking royalist and conservative outrage which likely translated into a strong turnout in favour of the PPRP. The choice to try to bring the monarchy into politics proved disastrous on both occasions. Finally, General Prayut’s personal appeal under the slogan “Choose peace, choose Prayut” most likely worked in favour of the PPRP, especially in Bangkok and the South where the party won in constituencies that were previously dominated by the Democrat Party. The slogan sent a signal during the final stretch of the campaign that, as Abhisit stood idly by while Thaksin added fuel to fire, General Prayut was the only viable solution to Thailand’s longstanding political turmoil.

[2] Prajak Kongkirati and Veerayooth Kanchoochat, “The Prayuth Regime: Embedded Military and Hierarchical Capitalism in Thailand,” TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 6, no. 2 (July 2018): 279–305, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2018.4.

[3] One key innovation here is the role of the 250 senators – who were mostly hand-picked by the regime – in participating along with elected MPs in the selection of every prime minister over the next five years, until May 2024.  In the race for the premiership after the 2019 general election, 249 senators voted for General Prayut, who won with 500 votes (251 from MPs in 19 parties in the PPRP-led coalition).  Only the Senate President, Dr Pornpetch Wichitcholchai, abstained out of political correctness.  

[4] Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

[5] According to a technocrat who worked with the NCPO, interview with the author, Bangkok, 20 July 2021.

[6] According to a technocrat who worked with the NCPO, interview with the author, Bangkok, 20 July 2021.

[7] These include, for example, Paiboon Nititawan’s People’s Reform Party and People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) leader Suthep Thaugsuban’s Action Coalition for Thailand Party.

[8] These include, for example, Chonburi’s Khunpluem faction, Sam Mitr (“Three Allies”) faction, led by Somsak Thepsutin, Suriya Jungroongruangkit, Anucha Nakasai, and Pirom Pholwiset, Preecha Rengsomboonsuk’s faction in Loei, Varathep Rattanakorn’s faction in Kamphaengphet, Virat Rattanaset’s faction in Nakhon Ratchasima, Supol Fong-ngam’s faction in Ubon Ratchathani, Santi Prompat’s faction in Petchabun, Pinit Jarusombat’s Wang Phayanak faction, Suchart Tancharoen’s Ban Rim Nam faction, Aekkarat Changlao’s faction in Khon Kaen, the Thianthong family in Sakaew, the Asavahame family in Samut Prakan, and the Teekananond family in Udon Thani. Where the PPRP failed to recruit dominant political families or factions, the party left matters in the hands of individuals it designated as regional leaders. For example, in several provinces in Northern Thailand, the PPRP enlisted Captain Thammanat Prompao. In the South, it sought the support of Colonel Suchart Chantarachotikul, General Prayut’s old friend from military cadet school. The three southern-most border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat were left under the care of Anumat Amat, a pro-regime former senator.

[9] The PPRP was also a well-oiled party machine with significant financial backing. It was infamous for having raised funds at a banquet in December 2018 where each of the 200 tables at the event cost 3 million baht in donations. The party reportedly raised almost 650 million baht. In spite of the media uproar, this number only constituted a small fraction of the party’s actual funding receipt, according to an anonymous source. In a counterfactual scenario where the PPRP did not have the regime’s backing, it is unlikely that the party would have been as successful in terms of securing financial support.

[10] General Prayut as head of the NCPO had the “power to order, restrain, or perform any act, whether such act has legislative, executive, or judicial force; the orders and the acts, including the performance in compliance with such orders, shall be deemed lawful and constitutional under this Constitution, and shall be final.” See (Unofficial Translation) Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim), B.E. 2557 (2014) (Bangkok: Foreign Law Bureau, Office of the Council of State, 2014).

[11] iLaw, “Report on the Exercise of Power under Section 44 of the Interim Constitution of Thailand,” iLaw, November 18, 2015, https://ilaw.or.th/node/3938, accessed 30 September 2022.

[12] For example, among those suspended from local political office, pending investigation, were Boonlert Buranupakorn, Anusorn Nakasai, and Soontorn Ratanakorn, all of whom were allowed to resume their duties as chiefs of the Provincial Administrative Organization, presumably after agreeing to switch their allegiances, for the time being. Another obvious example was the case of Khunpluem family, a prominent political dynasty in Chon Buri. After Itthiphon Khunpluem had completed his term as Mayor of Pattaya, General Prayut appointed Police Major General Anan Charoenhawasri as the new mayor on 16 February 2017, using the power of Section 44. On 25 September 2018, he again used Section 44 to appoint Itthiphon’s brother, de facto leader of the family and Phalang Chon Party, Sontaya Khunpluem, as Mayor of Pattaya, replacing Anan. Sontaya eventually served as an advisor to the Prime Minister while Itthiphon was appointed Minister of Culture in addition to being a member of the PPRP’s executive committee. In the 2019 general election, Itthiphon and other former Phalang Chon Party MPs joined the PPRP, underscoring the possibility of a quid-pro-quo deal. It is rumoured that the deal was brokered by Sontaya’s long-time friend, then Army Commander General Apirat Kongsompong, the Secretary General of the NCPO.

[13] Fieldnotes compiled during a visit to Kamphaeng Phet province, November 17, 2020.

[14] A PPRP MP and member of the Sam Mitr faction, interview with the author, Bangkok, February 24, 2020.

[15] “‘สุริยะ’ โว พปชร.ยิ่งใหญ่กว่าไทยรักไทย ‘สมศักดิ์’ ชี้ รธน.นี้ ดีไซน์มาเพื่อพวกเรา,” [‘Suriya’ boasts that the PPRP is greater than Thai Rak Thai, saying the Constitution was designed for us] Matichon Online, November 18, 2018, https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_1232373, accessed 30 September 2022.

[16] Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, BE 2560 (2017), Section 272.

[17] To be precise, there were three groups of appointed senators. 194 members were chosen from a pool of 400 candidates nominated by a 9-person selection committee. 50 members were chosen by the NCPO from a shortlist of 200 candidates voted on by fellow nominees and applicants among occupational and social groups. The final six seats were filled ex-officio by commanders of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Armed Forces (the Supreme Commander), the national police commander, and the Defence Ministry Permanent Secretary.  For additional details, see iLaw, “รวมข้อมูล 250 ส.ว. แต่งตั้ง: กลไกหลักสืบทอดอำนาจจากยุค คสช.,” [‘Data on the 250 appointed senators: the central mechanism for prolonging power of the NCPO’] iLaw, August 20, 2014, https://ilaw.or.th/node/5366, accessed 30 September 2022.

[18] Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, BE 2560 (2017), Section 83.

[19] In technical terms, a quota representing the share of seats that each party is eligible to receive—how many MPs a party “deserves” to have—is calculated by dividing each party’s votes by the total number of votes casted for all parties divided by the total number of seats (500). Party list seats are then allocated to parties on top of their constituency seats until their share of seats meets this quota. In 2019, the PT, having already exceeded this quota by winning constituency seats, did not get any party-list seat.

[20] “Thai Court Accepts Party Dissolution Case over Nomination of Princess Ubolratana as PM Candidate,” Straits Times, February 14, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thai-court-accepts-party-dissolution-case-over-princess-pm-gaffe, accessed 30 September 2022.

[21] One exception was People Power Party who joined the opposition from the beginning.

[22] Other authoritarian appendages that still remain might include, for example, the 2017 Constitution, Constitutional Court, the ECT, and other organisations with linkages to the now-dissolved NCPO.

[23] In technical terms, they did not resign but were ousted from the PPRP; the “expulsion” enabled them to hold on to their positions as MPs and join another party without losing their parliamentary membership.

[24] Patpicha Tanakasempipat, “Thai PM Stays in Power as Court Finds No Breach in Term Rule,” Bloomberg, September 30, 2022, Asia Edition edition, sec. Politics, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-30/thai-court-ruling-to-decide-prayuth-s-fate-as-election-nears, accessed 30 September 2022.

[25] PDRC is the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, which led the bloody street protests in Bangkok against the Yingluck Administration that ruled from November 2013 to May 2014, which eventually led to the coup by General Prayut on 22 May 2014.

[26] It is also rumoured that General Prawit has been in talks and cutting deals with the PT and Thaksin, using Captain Thammanat as a proxy. Captain Thammanat used to belong to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party.

[27] At the time of writing, the Constitutional Court is reviewing two cases, one from a group of senators, and another from a group of MPs from small parties and micro-parties, concerning two proposed revised organic bills on the election of MPs and on political parties, and whether these contradict the Constitution.

[28] “Pheu Thai’s Big Names Kick Off Landslide,” The Bangkok Post, September 11, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2388921/pheu-thais-big-names-kick-off-landslide-bid, accessed 30 September 2022.

[29] “Pheu Thai Win at Roi Et Polls Fuels Party’s Landslide Hopes,” The Bangkok Post, September 26, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2400638/pheu-thai-win-at-roi-et-polls-fuels-partys-landslide-hopes, accessed 30 September 2022.

[30] This is based on the assumption that the next general election will take place on 7 May 2023, as officially scheduled by the ECT.

[31] This is already happening to an extent. Sixteen MPs joined Captain Thammanat’s Thai Economic Party, three MPs moved to Sang Anakot Thai (Futurise Thailand Party), a new party led by former PPRP party leader Uttama Savanayana and former PPRP secretary-general Sontirat Sontijirawong, and one joined the Democrat Party.

[32] The PPRP’s track record in terms of “protecting” their MPs from lawsuits has been inconsistent. In February 2021, Buddhipong Punnakanta and Nataphol Teepsuwan, leaders of the Bangkok faction in the PPRP and former leaders of the PDRC, were found guilty of insurrection for staging an anti-government protest that led to the cancellation of the general election of 2 February 2014, and which offered a pretext for the May 2014 coup. Buddhipong and Nataphol had to resign from their posts as Digital Economy and Society Minister and Education Minister respectively. Sira Janejaka, Bangkok MP, was disqualified by the Constitutional Court from holding public office after it was discovered that he had previously been convicted of fraud. Sira will also have to compensate for the salaries and benefits he received as MP, totaling around 8 million baht. Pareena Kraikupt, Ratchaburi MP, was disqualified for her illegal use of public land in Ratchaburi. Virat Rattanaset, PPRP senior deputy leader and chief whip of the ruling coalition, was suspended in November 2021, pending an investigation by the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions, for his role in a corruption scandal involving the taking of bribes in the construction of futsal fields in the north-eastern provinces. His wife Tassaneeya and her younger sister Tassanaporn also shared the same fate. All three are PPRP MPs.

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