2022/100 “Can an International State University of Confucianism be Established in Indonesia? ” by Leo Suryadinata
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Joko Widodo administration recently announced plans to establish the International State University of Confucianism in Bangka Belitung province. This plan has however been strongly opposed by the local Aliansi Ulama Islam (Islamic Ulama Alliance, or AUI).
- Confucianism (agama Khonghucu) is one of the six officially recognised religions in Indonesia today. Suharto’s New Order regime rescinded Confucianism’s status as a state religion on the grounds that it would inhibit the assimilation of Chinese Indonesians into Indonesian society.
- The Abdurrahman Wahid administration was more sympathetic to Confucianism, and the relationship between the Supreme Council for the Confucian Religion in Indonesia (Matakin) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) during that time was cordial.
- The proposed university for Confucianism in Indonesia would be a much-needed boost for the quality of textbooks and teachers for the religion, and for Indonesia’s status as a democratic country that upholds religious freedom for minorities. However, prospects for the university are uncertain, given the opposition of the local Islamic group and possibly other conservative and radical Muslim forces in the country.
- The success of the plan to establish an International State University of Confucianism is probably contingent on whether Joko Widodo remains in power. Should a conservative Muslim politician be elected as the next president, it is unlikely that this university will be built.
* Leo Suryadinata is Visiting Senior Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He would like to thank Tan Chee Beng, Adjunct Professor of Hong Kong Chinese University, and Chang Yao Hoon, Associate Professor of Brunei Darussalam University, for their helpful comments.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/100, 17 October 2022
INTRODUCTION
The Pancasila (meaning Five Principles) forms the backbone of the Indonesian state ideology. Religious freedom is assured through the first principle — “Belief in One Supreme God”. Although there is no specific religion that one needs to follow, the Indonesian government officially recognises only six religions, namely Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. In theory, these religions have equal status and treatment, and are included in the national religious education curriculum administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Confucianism, however, was the last to be included into the curriculum and is therefore the least developed. Qualified teachers of Confucianism have been greatly lacking.[1] The recently announced plan by the Joko Widodo administration to establish an International State University of Confucianism in Bangka Belitung province will definitely help enhance the quality of Confucianism education in the country.
BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFUCIANISM (AGAMA KHONGHUCU) IN INDONESIA
In 1965 — before Suharto came to power — Indonesia recognised Confucianism as one of the six official religions (agama). But before December 1963, Confucianism was called Khong Kauw Hwee (the Hokkien pronunciation of 孔教会）which means “Confucian religion association”.
The establishment of the Khong Kauw Hwee was linked to the Confucius Revival movement in mainland China under the leadership of Kang Youwei（康有为）and his disciple Chen Huanzhang（陈焕章).[2] In 1912, Chen set up Kong Jiao Hui (the Mandarin pronunciation of Khong Kauw Hwee孔教会) in Shanghai. The Indonesian version was established in 1918 in Solo (Surakarta) by Peranakan Chinese and it had no formal links with the Kong Jiao Hui in China.
Prior to this, there was a Confucianist movement in Java represented by the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK) organisation in Jakarta, which was established in 1900. Although THHK promoted Confucius teachings, it never institutionalised itself as a religious organisation.[3] Instead, it functioned as an educational association promoting Chinese-medium schools, and by 1928, its focus had shifted from Confucian teachings to Chinese nationalism.[4] Nevertheless, it should be noted that some of the concepts of Confucianism in Indonesia were developed during this time by Lie Kim Hok of the THHK, and these were later adopted by Khong Kauw Hwee.
Over time,Confucianism in Indonesia was influenced by Christianity, Islam and more importantly, the Indonesian language and culture — so much so that by 1963, Confucianism was no longer referred to as ‘Khong Kauw’ but ‘Agama Khonghutju’ (or ‘Agama Khonghucu’ after 1972). Up until 1965, during the Sukarno era, Confucianism was recognised by the Indonesian government as one of six official religions.
Soon after, the 930 movement (G-30-S) in 1965 caused the downfall of Sukarno, the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI) and the rise of General Suharto. According to the official version of history, the 930 movement was a coup attempt initiated by the PKI. Since communists were seen as atheists, the new regime considered anyone not following any religion to be communists or supporters of communism. They therefore required all Indonesians to profess a religion.
AGAMA KHONGHUCU DURING THE SUHARTO ERA
In 1967, Gabungan Perkumpulan Agama Khonghucu Se-Indonesia (the Indonesian name of Khong Kauw Hwee that was adopted in December 1964) became the Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia (Indonesia’s Supreme Council of the Confucian Religion, abbreviated as Matakin). This entailed the formalisation of Confucianism as an institutionalised religion and required the enshrining of components common to other officially recognised religions in Indonesia, namely having one Supreme God (Tian or Thian 天), a prophet (Khonghucu or Kong Zi孔子), a religious text (Su Si or Kitab yang Empat), a Confucian church called Litang (Lithang 礼堂), and priesthood (three categories of Confucians — Kauw Sing (教生), Bun Su（文师）and Hak Su（学师).
This remodelled Confucianism in Indonesia into an organised religion (agama), conforming to the first principle of the Pancasila — belief in one Supreme God. A similar transformation and Indonesianisation also occurred in the case of Buddhism. As Buddhism did not originally have the concept of one Supreme God, it only became an organised religion (agama) by adopting the concept of Adi Buddha as the equivalent of Supreme God.[5] Many Chinese Indonesians, especially the Indonesian-speaking Peranakan Chinese, have become adherents of Agama Khonghucu in order to retain their Chinese identity.
When the Suharto government first came to power, it wanted to mobilise all religious forces to combat the ‘atheist’ PKI. Therefore, Agama Khonghucu was embraced.[6] Nevertheless, in the 1977 general elections, Golkar won another landslide victory, indicating that the Suharto government had consolidated its power and no longer needed the support of Agama Khonghucu followers. The government went for total assimilation, and in perceiving Confucianism as an obstacle to the assimilation of the Chinese Indonesians, decided to de-recognise Confucianism, arguing that Confucianism was not a religion even in China.[7] In February 1979, the Matakin had to cancel its congress after failing to gain a permit for gathering.
Followers of Agama Khonghucu now chose to reflect themselves in their Indonesian identity cards as professing Buddhism. In 1995, towards the end of the Suharto rule, some Confucianists started to rebel against the government decision. One young couple even sued the chief of East Java Civil Registration Office in Surabaya for his office’s refusal to register a Confucian marriage.[8] The high-profile court case attracted national attention, including that of Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) — then the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) — who was sympathetic to the followers of Confucianism. However, the court concluded in favour of the chief of Civil Registration Office.
Despite the derecognition of Confucianism, the Matakin leadership managed to maintain good ties with the moderate Muslim community such as the NU, so much so that towards the end of the Suharto rule, Matakin was allowed to hold its 1998 annual congress at a hall within the Ministry of Religious Affairs office. The hall was usually reserved for Muslim pilgrimage gatherings.[9]
AGAMA KHONGHUCU AFTER THE FALL OF SUHARTO
Only after the fall of Suharto did Agama Khonghucu become officially recognised again. Nevertheless, the number of Confucianists has drastically declined. In 1971, the Indonesian census showed that only 0.7 per cent of the Indonesian population was registered as Confucianists. In the 2020 Census, the number had dropped even further, to 0.05 per cent.[10]
Since the era of Reformasi, Matakin has become active again. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has also begun to pay attention to Agama Khonghucu, including preparing textbooks on the religion. However, the long suppression has led to a shortage of well-researched textbooks and qualified teachers. In 2013, towards the end of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, it was reported that the plan to establish a Confucian university was mooted. Nothing materialised, however, and it was only during the Joko Widodo presidency that the plan resurfaced. It has however encountered opposition from conservative and radical Muslims.
Despite the opposition, Chinese Indonesians, especially the Peranakan Chinese, set up a foundation to establish a privately funded college of Confucianism (Sekolah Tinggi Khonghucu Indonesia, or STIKIN) to train and churn out qualified religious teachers in Confucianism. Although their initial plan to establish STIKIN in Semarang failed, they were able to obtain a permit to build the college in Purwokerto, Central Java. The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Nizar Ali, attended the inaugural ceremony in February 2021.[11] This private college is headed by Suharjono Tan, a Chinese Indonesian.[12] Currently, it has only 38 students, and it is difficult to assess if the college will become a major institution. However, once the International State University of Confucianism is established, the quality of Confucian education in Indonesia should improve. The prestige of such a university will likely attract more and better resources.
THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE UNIVERSITY
On 13 April 2022, the governor of Bangka-Belitung (Babel) province, Erzaldi Rosman Djohan, announced that President Joko Widodo had selected the province as the centre for developing Confucian education due to its reputation for enjoying “highest degree of religious harmony in Indonesia”.[13] He also revealed that, prior to Lunar New Year 2022, he and the leadership of the Matakin had met the President who expressed his hope that an International State University of Confucianism (Perguruan Tinggi Negeri Internasional Agama Khonghucu, abbreviated as PTN Khonghucu) should be established by 2023. It was reported that the government has allocated two plots of land for this purpose.[14] Once established, this would be the only Confucian religion university in the world, and would attract global attention.[15] The initiative to establish such a university shows that the Indonesian government is moving towards acknowledging “religious citizenship” — or the state recognition of religious minorities.[16]
The establishment of this state-funded international university of Confucianism had in fact been decided in 2019.[17] However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government could only offer a plot of land of 2.9 hectares to the Bangka-Belitung government in April 2022 for the university campus.[18] According to local officials, the government has also prepared the budget for foundational works to begin in 2023.
This decision was opposed by the local Aliansi Ulama Islam (Islamic Ulama Alliance, AUI) of the Bangka-Belitung province, coordinated by Firman Saladin.[19] On 31 May 2022, they went to the provincial parliament to lodge their dissatisfaction and threatened to launch a movement mobilising Muslim followers if the central government did not accept their demand.
OPPOSITION AND SUPPORT FOR PTN KHONGHUCU
According to various reports, the objection of the ulama against the building of the PTN Khonghucu was based on the following arguments: Bangka-Belitung province comprises of a Muslim majority population. If PTN Khonghucu were to be built, students from China and other foreign countries would come to the province to study, which would offer an opportunity for Chinese students to migrate to Indonesia and affect the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, which would sour the good relationship between the two communities.[20]
The AUI suggested that such a university should instead be established in West Kalimantan where there is a large ethnic Chinese population.[21] However, they failed to mention that Chinese Indonesians form the second largest group in the Bangka-Belitung province. Interestingly, AUI claimed that their rejection was not due to ‘hatred’ but to their love ‘for religious harmony’.[22]
The Indonesian public has been divided on this issue. While some agree with the views of AUI, others support the establishment of PTN Khonghucu in Bangka-Belitung. Those who agree with AUI are mainly conservative and radical Muslims, while those who oppose AUI tend to be moderate Muslims, intellectuals, Chinese Indonesians, and social media personalities. For instance, a social media influencer Ade Armando who has 1.8 million followers on his Cokro TV programme,[23] maintained that Indonesia is a democratic country based on Pancasila and that Confucianism is one of the religions recognised by the government; thus, Confucianism deserves to be treated fairly. He emphasised that, since the central government has established an International Islamic University of Depok in West Java, establishing a PTN Khonghucu, which is also an international university, appears to be a natural and logical move. This would also enhance the status of Indonesia among the international academic community. Likewise, the influx of Chinese students to study at the PTN Khonghucu should be welcome and would benefit Indonesia both culturally and economically. Addressing the argument that Chinese nationals would migrate to Bangka-Belitung province in large waves, Armando pointed out the absurdity of it. In Armando’s view, anti-PTN Khonghucu sentiments are based on exclusivism and xenophobia, and these should not be encouraged. He urged the central government to not abandon the plan to establish the PTN Khonghucu just because of the opposition of a few Islamic clergymen.
Perhaps the most interesting argument was put forward in an open letter written by Herza, a young lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the Bangka-Belitung University.[24] Herza is an indigenous Muslim who graduated from the Bangka-Belitung University and received a master’s degree from Waseda University in Japan. He presented an academic argument using the notion of “Homo Sacer” as argued by a Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.[25]
In the letter, Herza likened the Chinese community in Indonesia to a homo sacer — a person of the minority group whose political right is deprived[26] by the religious and political elite of the majority group who collaborate to remove the political right of the minority group. Herza criticised the AUI, alluding that their actions resemble those of the elite described by Agamben.
Herza also highlighted that in the Bangka-Belitung province where the Muslim population form the majority, there is more than one state-run Islamic university and the Muslims there can enjoy the freedom to express, perform and practice their religion. However, the Chinese, who form the second largest population in the province, do not have a single Confucian university. Thus, they do not have the opportunity to learn about their religion in depth and as a result, they do not have sufficient knowledge about their own religion.
Herza argued that the freedom to enjoy life in accordance with one’s religion is the political right of any citizen in a democratic country, thus a Confucianist should be allowed to receive religious education on Confucianism. He further posited that “the Chinese in Bangka-Belitung are not new migrants. They have been in these areas since the 18th century for many generations.
Nevertheless, the nature of the proposed Confucian university is unclear: will it merely teach Confucius philosophy and Chinese religious thoughts, or also secular subjects? From official statements, it can be assumed that the government leans towards the former. If this turns out to be the case, the university would be very specialised and unique — which forms the basis of the opposition of the AUI. However, even if the proposed university offers secular subjects, it is doubtful that the response of the AUI would have been any different.
Will the PTN Khonghucu be eventually established? It appears that the realisation of this plan is contingent upon Joko Widodo being in power. In other words, the university should be built before Joko Widodo steps down. If not, should a conservative Muslim politician be elected as the new president, it is unlikely that this university will be built anytime in the near future.
ENDNOTES
[1] “Jokowi Tunjuk Bangka Belitung Jadi Pusat Pengembangan Pendidikan Konghucu [Jokowi Appoints Bangka Belitung as Center for Confucian Education Development]”, VOI, 13 April 2022 <https://voi.id/berita/157225/jokowi-tunjuk-bangka-belitung-jadi-pusat-pengembangan-pendidikan-konghucu>(accessed 31 August 2022).
[2] “(张颂之) 孔教会始末汇考 – 儒家网 [(Zhang Songzhi) An examination of the beginning and end of the Confucian Church]”, Rujiazg, <https://www.rujiazg.com/article/5951>(accessed 11 August 2022).
[3] For a detailed discussion on the THHK movement and its relationship with Confucius, see Kwee Tek Hoay, “Atsal Moelanja Pergerakan Tionghoa Modern di Jawa” (The Origins of Modern Chinese Movement in Java), Moestika Romans, 1936-38. Reprinted in Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa dan Kebangsaan Indonesia: Empat Karya Kwee Tek Hoay, Jilid 4, Jakarta: KGP, 2001, pp. 395-534.
[4] Tio Ie Soei, Lie Kim Hok 1853–1912, Bandung, Good Luck, C. 1959, p. 65.
[5] Iem Brown, “Contemporary Indonesian Buddhism and Monotheism”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 18, no.1 (March 1987), p. 110.
[6] Leo Suryadinata, The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia, Singapore: Times Book International, 1997, pp. 161–62.
[7] There are two schools of thought on Confucianism in China, one school considers Confucianism (Ru Jiao儒教) as a religion as there were numerous Kong Miao (孔庙the Confucian temple), while the other regarded it as a philosophy （哲学）or social teachings （Ru Xue, 儒学）. The teachings, organisation and practice in Ru Jiao in China are different from those are proposed by Matakin. For a concise study on Confucianism in Indonesia, see Liao Jianyu, Yinni Kongjiao Chutan ( 印尼孔教初探，A preliminary Study of Indonesian Confucian Religion). Singapore： CHC 2010。
[8] For a brief description of this case, see Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Identities: In The Globalizing Malay Archipelago, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2022, p. 200.
[9] Chandra Setiawan, The History of Confucian Religion in Indonesia, Jakarta: Matakin, (pamphlet), no publication date.
[10] “Agama [Religion]”, Laman Resmi Republik Indonesia < https://indonesia.go.id/profil/agama> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[11] Y Prayogo, “Sekolah Tinggi Konghucu Indonesia (STIKIN) Pertama Diresmikan di Purwokerto [First Indonesian Confucian College (STIKIN) Inaugurated in Purwokerto]”, Kaldera News,20 February 2021 <https://www.kalderanews.com/2021/02/sekolah-tinggi-konghucu-indonesia-stikin-pertama-diresmikan-di-purwokerto/>(accessed 31 August 2022).
[12] Cokie Sutrisno, “Diresmikan, Sekolah Tinggi Khonghucu Pertama di Indonesia Ada di Purwokerto [https://lensabanyumas.pikiran-rakyat.com/banyumasan/pr-241462881/diresmikan-sekolah-tinggi-khonghucu-pertama-di-indonesia-ada-di-purwokerto]”, Lensa Banyumas, 19 February 2021 <https://lensabanyumas.pikiran-rakyat.com/banyumasan/pr-241462881/diresmikan-sekolah-tinggi-khonghucu-pertama-di-indonesia-ada-di-purwokerto> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[13] “Jokowi Tunjuk Bangka Belitung Jadi Pusat Pengembangan Pendidikan Konghucu [Jokowi Appoints Bangka Belitung as Center for Confucian Education Development]”, VOI, 13 April 2022 <https://voi.id/berita/157225/jokowi-tunjuk-bangka-belitung-jadi-pusat-pengembangan-pendidikan-konghucu>(accessed 31 August 2022).
[14] These two areas are: Tanjung Bunga and Kejora with a land area of 4.5 hectares. But later it was revealed that the university will be built at Batu Berlubang, on 2.9 hectares.
[15] Yudi Wahyono, “Pemerintah RI Tunjuk Bangka Belitung Sebagai Tempat Pendidikan Agama Khonghucu Dunia [The Government of Indonesia Appoints Bangka Belitung as a World Confucian Religious Education Place]” Sonara, 19 May 2022 <https://bangka.sonora.id/read/503287287/pemerintah-ri-tunjuk-bangka-belitung-sebagai-tempat-pendidikan-agama-khonghucu-dunia> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[16] For a discussion on the concept of “Religious Citizenship”, see Lyn Parker and Chang Yao Hoon, “Secularity, Religion and the possibilities for Religious Citizenship”, Asian Journal of Social Science, 41 (2013) pp. 150-174.
[17] “Pembangunan PTN Khonghucu di Bangka Tengah Ditolak Kelompok Masyarakat [Community Group Rejects Construction of Confucian State University in Central Bangka]”, Kompas, 02 June 2022 <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2022/06/02/110345378/pembangunan-ptn-khonghucu-di-bangka-tengah-ditolak-kelompok-masyarakat> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[18] “Lahan Telah Siap, PTN Khonghucu Pertama di Indonesia Dibangun di Babel [Land Ready, First Confucian State University in Indonesia Built in Babel]”, Kompas, 07 June 2022 < https://www.kompas.com/properti/read/2022/06/07/173000721/lahan-telah-siap-ptn-khonghucu-pertama-di-indonesia-dibangun-di-babel?page=all> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[19] Gerkanpis, “Perguruan Tinggi Negeri Konghucu Terancam Dibatalkan | Cindy Florencine [Konghucu State College is Threatened to Cancel | Cindy Florencine]”, YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZnBV55_091A&ab_channel=Gerakanpis (accessed 31 August 2022).It is revealed in this video that Firman Saladin was a leader of the banned Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and has advocated the establishment of the Khilafah (caliphate) via his twitter: “Bersatu dalam satu barisan membangkitkan kembali perisai ummat islam #BersamaPerjuangkanKhilafah #qiyu [Unite as one to revive the shield of the Islamic ummah]” <https://twitter.com/SaladinFirman/status/1242341054772207617> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[20] “Soal Penolakan Berdirinya PTN Konghucu: Bukan Benci, Tapi… [Regarding the Rejection of the Establishment of the Confucian State University: Not Hate, But…]”, Babelpos, 02 June 2022 < https://babelpos.sumeks.co/2022/06/02/soal-penolakan-berdirinya-ptn-konghucu-bukan-benci-tapi/> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[21] “Pembangunan PTN Khonghucu di Bangka Tengah Ditolak Kelompok Masyarakat [Community Group Rejects Construction of Confucian State University in Central Bangka]”, Kompas, 02 June 2022 <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2022/06/02/110345378/pembangunan-ptn-khonghucu-di-bangka-tengah-ditolak-kelompok-masyarakat>(accessed 31 August 2022).
[22] Cici Nasya Nita “Aliansi Umat Islam Babel Menolak Rencana Didirikan PTN Khonghucu di Bangka Belitung [Babel Muslim Alliance Rejects Plan to Establish Confucian State University in Bangka Belitung]”, Bangkapos, 31 May 2022, <https://bangka.tribunnews.com/2022/05/31/aliansi-umat-islam-babel-menolak-rencana-didirikan-ptn-khonghucu-di-bangka-belitung> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[23] The TV program first aired on 8 June 2022.
[24] “Menemukan Harapan Dan Semangat Baru Di Kampus Biru Universitas Bangka Belitung [Finding Hope and New Spirit at the Blue Campus of Bangka Belitung University]” 1001 Biografi Motivasi, 3 November 2016 < https://1001biografimotivasi.wordpress.com/2016/11/03/menemukan-harapan-dan-semangat-baru-di-kampus-biru-universitas-bangka-belitung/> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[25] Herza “Tertanggalnya Hak Politis Warga Tionghoa Bangka Belitung” [The Political Rights of the Chinese Citizens of Bangka Belitung have been deprived]”, Detik News, 28 June 2022 <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-6151359/tertanggalnya-hak-politis-warga-tionghoa-bangka-belitung> (accessed 31 August 2022); See also Herza, “Kita yang Non-Tionghoa dan Khonghucu di Bangka Belitung Semestinya Mendukung! [We Non-Chinese and Confucians in Bangka Belitung Should Support!]”, TIMES Indonesia, 28 June 2022 <https://www.timesindonesia.co.id/read/news/416240/kita-yang-nontionghoa-dan-konghucu-di-bangka-belitung-semestinya-mendukung> (accessed 31 August 2022).
[26] Homo sacer – Oxford Reference; To be sure, Herza does offer his own interpretation of Homo Sacer.
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2022/99 “How Recipient Countries in Southeast Asia Manage ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ Projects” by Chanrith Ngin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The agency exercised by BRI-recipient countries can affect the outcomes of BRI infrastructure projects. Host countries do exercise their bargaining powers to shape projects to meet their local economic and political needs better. How they do this hinges on the internal dynamics of their political institutions and the presence of political opportunities.
- A common motivator for sound management of BRI projects is economic growth, which is needed to support regime legitimacy. The imperative to tackle local concerns is another incentive.
- Recipient countries employ a range of approaches to bargain, including proactive proposals, ‘strategic selection’, tactical delays, and threats of cancellation. The utility of these approaches is contingent on capacity and mechanisms in place as well as available political space.
- Even when not all demands are met, the agency exercised by recipient governments has somewhat culminated in national and local needs being met more beneficially, at least in economic terms.
* Guest writer, Chanrith Ngin, is a former Wang Gungwu Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Honorary Academic at The University of Auckland, New Zealand. The author thanks Tham Siew Yean, Siwage Dharma Negara, and Cassey Lee for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/99, 10 October 2022
INTRODUCTION
Next year marks the 10th anniversary of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) since Chinese President Xi Jinping announced it in 2013. An official list shows that by mid-2022, China had signed over 200 BRI cooperation documents with about 150 countries and 32 international organisations, as well as established over 90 bilateral cooperation mechanisms within the BRI remit.[1] It is estimated that total foreign direct investments (FDI) from China to the countries engaged in the initiative exceeded US$90 billion between 2013 and 2018, chiefly focusing on infrastructure development.[2] By the end of 2021, China’s non-financial investments in 57 BRI countries topped US$20.3 billion.[3]
Southeast Asia has captured a significant share of BRI projects.[4] Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, China has continued to make steadfast progress in BRI projects in Southeast Asia. Specifically, 95 BRI projects financed by China have remained active since January 2021.[5] In addition to existing hard infrastructure schemes, China has also focused on soft infrastructure, particularly health services and digital economy projects. Despite the slight change in its composition, the effects of the BRI are anticipated to remain controversial.
The BRI has rendered mixed results. While BRI investments have contributed to economic growth in some host countries,[6] their adverse impacts have also manifested simultaneously.[7] Social and environmental costs, especially loss of local livelihoods, land grabbing, and deforestation, have stood out as main negative repercussions. Other pitfalls have included economic unviability, huge debts owed to China, and a likelihood of falling into a ‘debt trap’.[8] A global study recorded about 700 incidents of human rights abuses linked to more than 10,000 Chinese companies involved in BRI projects from 2013-2020.[9] Almost a third of these abuses occurred in Southeast Asia, specifically in Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia.
Much has been blamed on China for the negative economic, social and environmental impacts of the BRI. Based on four case studies, this essay argues that host countries do have some agency to steer BRI projects to meet their development priorities and reduce the adverse impacts of such projects. In other words, BRI projects can be better managed by recipient countries in accordance with their local economic and political demands. This article discusses some of the enabling and disabling factors.
WHAT DETERMINES THE EFFECTS OF BRI PROJECTS?
Many factors contribute to the performance of BRI projects. On the investor side, Chinese firms involved in renewable energy projects and those listed in stock exchanges have been more responsive to complaints of abuses in host countries.[10] This is because investors in renewable energy are more committed to the agenda of ‘green’ BRI (set after 2019) and thus uphold their operation standards to address conflicts.[11] For companies listed on stock exchanges, the incentive to solve disputes is also high. A conflict would tarnish their corporate image and consequently their stock value. Other influencing factors include the function of NGOs (with unified vs conflicting agendas)[12] and the performance of affected communities (with cohesion vs. fragmentation).[13]
On the host-country side, BRI projects are more likely to have negative effects in countries with ‘weaker governance and where Chinese investments are dominant’.[14] Some studies suggest that countries with weak political institutions or with authoritarian regimes have tended to facilitate China’s ability to influence policies in its favour.[15] Host-country governments need to secure economic growth to sustain their legitimacy, and should therefore endorse projects with high growth potential and strive to manage such projects properly. Further to this economic rationale, political considerations are often at play: hard infrastructure projects provide concrete evidence to convince the electorate about growth and prosperity. Below are four case studies showing how different actors in recipient countries exercised their agency.
‘STRATEGIC SELECTION’ OF PROJECTS IN MYANMAR
Before the coup in 2021, the Myanmar government renegotiated BRI projects approved by the previous military regime to reduce costs and gain greater control.[16] The case in point was a deep-sea port and a related Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to be built in Kyaukphyu, at an initial cost of US$7.5 billion and US$2.7 billion, respectively.[17] The renegotiation was done by a new committee comprising relatively young and ‘better-qualified’ technocrats. The committee worked for two years with various Myanmar and Chinese institutions to reach a new agreement, which substantially reduced the scope of the port and its cost to US$ 1.3 billion.[18] Other key features of the new agreement included less borrowing from China and a reduced sovereign guarantee by the Myanmar government. Instead, the financing of the port was to be mainly through equity that would be raised by a Chinese-Myanmar consortium. The Myanmar government also succeeded in increasing its share of the projects from 15 per cent to 30 per cent and in securing funding through a ‘land concession and landscape and excavation work’, with a condition that the concession would not be transferred if the projects failed. Moreover, the new agreement divided the projects into three different elements—a port, a SEZ, and a residential area—with a provision that the subsequent component can only start if the preceding one proves commercially viable.
Three main reasons drove the Myanmar government to renegotiate the projects. First, there had been several protests by local communities against the projects over fears that the projects would not benefit villagers and would culminate in land grabbing and resource exploitation without fair compensation and a loss of livelihood.[19] Second, the original high costs of the projects and the need to reform the macroeconomic management for better growth urged the government to reconsider the projects. Finally, the huge borrowings from China plus the sizeable amounts of debt incurred by the earlier junta government raised concerns about Myanmar falling into a ‘debt trap’. Hence, the imperative to address local concerns and facilitate economic growth played a big part in the renegotiation despite the power asymmetry between the two countries.
Another mechanism employed by the Myanmar government to ensure that BRI projects meet its development priorities was a ‘strategic selection’ of projects.[20] This mechanism was executed under a memorandum of understanding secured with China, which allowed the Myanmar government to seek financing from international institutions, include international tenders, and choose projects it needs.[21] A high-level ‘Implementation Steering Committee’, chaired by the Head of State and with ministers as members, was specifically established to carry out this mechanism. The committee scaled down the number of BRI projects from thirty to nine priority ones in 2020.
Further, as an overarching coordination framework, the Myanmar government created a ‘Project Bank’, an apparatus to assess viability, suitability, and priority of proposed projects, both BRI and non-BRI.[22] This mechanism contains three phases: screening, appraisal and selection, and prioritisation. The screening phase scrutinises implementers’ accountability, project rationale, and strategic alignment with development plans. The appraisal and selection stage examines sources of funding, affordability, and financial sustainability. In this phase, counterproposals from other companies and financial institutions are solicited to ensure the competitiveness of projects. Finally, projects are prioritised and endorsed based on social and environmental, financial and economic, risk, and national agenda indicators. Before the 2021 coup, this mechanism shaped bargaining with China and other investors/donors which ensured the selection of viable projects that meet its economic needs with minimal social and environmental negativities.[23]
INTERNAL PARTY DISCUSSIONS IN LAOS
Another case that exemplifies a recipient country’s gainful bargaining with China is the Laos-China High-Speed Rail. The project links Laos’ capital Vientiane and the northern town of Boten bordering the Yunnan Province of China.[24] This project was proposed by the Lao government in the early 2000s to take advantage of China’s ‘going-out strategy’ at the time. In 2009, both countries started negotiations over the project. In 2012, when the Lao National Assembly approved the project, the government proposed to borrow US$6.8 billion from the Export-Import Bank of China to finance the project. Although the project was negotiated and approved before 2013, it was later classified as a signature BRI scheme by both governments.
The project had a high price tag, was potentially unsustainable financially, and lacked transparency. Under a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2010, the two countries established the Laos-China Railway Joint Venture Company to manage the project. The Lao state railway owned only 30 percent of the company stake while Chinese state-owned firms owned the rest. Moreover, China’s loan would be guaranteed by all of the income and assets of the railway, and two mining areas.
These controversial issues delayed the construction of the project until late 2016.[25] There were also disagreements between Laos and China over worker arrangements, social and environmental impacts, and loan details such as the interest rate. The issues were discussed and negotiated within Chinese authorities as well as the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. For example, in 2011, the party postponed the project due to concerns over the terms of the contract which included the hiring of a massive number of Chinese workers. The lengthy gap between the MoU signing and the start of the construction was due to the difficult negotiation process with China and a tedious decision-making process within the Lao ruling party.
Eventually, the Lao government decided to proceed with the project using Chinese technical standards and equipment after China had agreed to improve the loan conditions (including interest rates) and increase the number of local workers.[26] The National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016-2020) identified the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects as the top priority since the country was land-locked and desperate for better connectivity with the region and beyond.[27] Such a rail link would improve transport connectivity, attract investment, and stimulate growth in multiple sectors. Despite the concerns over the financial sustainability, economic viability, and other risks of the project, the ruling party endorsed the project because it needed economic growth to ensure its political legitimacy and survival.
The railway was completed and opened in December 2021. As of July 2022, about four million passenger trips had been made and five million tons of cargo (including around 840,000 tons of cross-border goods) transported using this railway.[28] Over 20 Chinese provinces have used the railway to export goods to over 10 regional countries, including Malaysia and Thailand.[29] The railway project’s impact on Laos’ economic growth has not been studied. The project has imposed significant financial burden on Laos, which is currently facing a huge budget deficit and a high level of public debt, standing at five per cent and 66 per cent of GDP respectively in 2021.[30] Specifically, the country has incurred a US$1.9 billion debt from the railway project, while the total public debt was US$14.5 billion (of which 50 per cent is to China) in 2021.[31]
OPPOSITION TO PROJECTS BY NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL BODIES IN INDONESIA
Another factor that influenced the design and implementation of BRI projects are the internal political tensions in a host country. This is reflected in the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail (HSR) project in Indonesia.[32] This US$ 5.5 billion, 150-km railway scheme was proposed by the Indonesian government in 2015, with the construction starting in 2018. The financial structure of the project comprised 75% in loans and 25% in equity. The equity was to be shouldered by an Indonesia-China joint venture company (KCIC) which was 60% Indonesian-owned. The project was expected to generate 39,000 new local jobs with Chinese labour inputs being limited to experts and supervisors.[33]
The delay in the implementation of the project was a result of political opportunism and renegotiations as well as political clashes between national and subnational institutions. Japan had initially conducted a feasibility study on the HSR in 2009.[34] After President Jokowi won the election in 2015, the project was awarded to a Chinese state-owned enterprise, China Railway Group Limited (CREC), for two reasons. First, under the Japanese plan, the Indonesian government was to provide a financing guarantee which the Chinese plan did not require. Jokowi sought to diversify diplomatic and investment relations away from Japan, which had been a top investor and donor since the 1980s, particularly in infrastructure and transportation sectors. This was because Japanese investment and aid programmes had strict and rigid conditions, especially concerning sovereign guarantee and completion dates.[35] Japan’s strictness and inflexibility made China’s non-conditionality and accommodative financing terms attractive to Jokowi. Second, the CREC promised that it would complete the project before Jokowi’s re-election bid in 2019. This would have enabled Jokowi to fulfil his political pledge to improve infrastructure and win over his constituents’ hearts for the re-election. In the event, the CREC failed to complete the project as promised; this did not affect the election results however, and Jokowi was re-elected.
Moreover, the project suffered from political tensions at both the central and subnational levels. While Jokowi’s allies firmly supported the project, it was opposed by the then-Minister of Transportation and the military as well as the West Bandung Regent at the subnational level.[36] The Minister had complained that his ministry had not been sufficiently consulted on the project and only played an auxiliary role in the implementation since the Minister of State-owned Enterprises (a Jokowi ally) led the project. Furthermore, he raised concerns about the project’s long-term feasibility (including safety and quality) rather than the cost-efficiency that Jokowi and allies endorsed. The former Minister of Transportation also had close ties with Japan and had been lobbying Japanese firms to improve Indonesia’s public transportation system.[37]
This central-level opposition was intensified by the West Bandung Regent’s calls for additional concessions from the KCIC (including more facilities, enlargement of an existing road, a new stadium, and free farming land for affected locals), all of which had not been included in the original negotiation between Indonesia and China.[38] While acknowledging that the project was crucial to the national economy, the Regent demanded that the benefits needed to be distributed fairly to his local constituencies. This demand made the central government accuse this subnational authority of stalling the project by delaying the issuance of local construction permits.
Another opponent to the project was the Indonesian military which perceived the Chinese venture to be posing a potential interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs and carrying a national risk due to their communist ideology.[39] This perception stemmed from a long-held distrust of China for their role in supporting the communist movement in Indonesia in 1950s-1960s. Moreover, the military complained of the encroachment of the HSR into its land holdings at the Halim Perdanakusuma airbase in East Jakarta, which could potentially interfere with its ability to perform air transportation duties.[40] Hence, the Air Force Chief of Staff proposed relocating one of the HSR stations to another place.
The bargaining by the West Bandung Regent and the opposition by the military made local land acquisition for the project challenging and lengthy since these entities held decentralised powers to approve it. In short, the Regent and the military leveraged their bureaucratic control over land issues to bargain with the national government.
The dissent by the military was exploited in his presidential campaign by opposition leader Prabowo, a former special forces general.[41] Targeting the HSR as not being in line with Indonesia’s national interests, this politician promised to thoroughly review, renegotiate or annul the project if he won the election. However, he lost.
Although it was not clear if all the demands were met by the central government, these political contestations surrounding the project reflected the agency and tensions among actors in Indonesia’s administrative system. Subnational institutions’ enhanced powers, backed by local constituencies, enabled them to bargain with national bodies for better local benefits from the project. The country’s history also played a role in the military’s opposition to the project. Finally, the space for opposition politics at the central level provided opportunities for challenging the government to improve the deal and implementation of the project, making the government rethink the project deal and implementation.[42] This indicates that BRI projects are prone to the agency of internal politics and power play in host countries, which affects the project process and implementation.
RENEGOTIATIONS OF PROJECTS BY NEW GOVERNMENTS IN MALAYSIA
A BRI project that was affected by changes in the host country’s political regime was the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project in Malaysia.[43]This was launched in 2016 when then-Prime Minister Najib Razak visited China. The building contract was awarded to China Communication Construction Company Ltd. (CCCC), while the financing was secured from the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank). In the project, China would undertake the detailed engineering and design of the railway, procure materials and equipment, as well as finance and build the 688-km rail link.[44] Once in full operation, the project was expected to contribute around 2.7 per cent to economic growth of the country.[45]
The railway would link the East coast states of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Pahang to Port Klang in the Greater Kuala Lumpur area. The project was controversial due to its high estimated cost of US$13.1 billion (RM65.5 billion), lack of transparency, and its link to Najib’s 1MDB corruption scandal.[46]
The ECRL also suffered from subsequent changes in the federal government. Najib’s Barisan Nasional (BN) government well-supported the project and lauded it as one that would accelerate development along the planned stations. After the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition defeated the BN in the 2018 elections, the new Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended the ECRL and two China-related pipeline deals.[47] The new government had initially wanted to cancel the ECRL because of its huge cost and its link to the 1MDB scandal. But the penalty cost stipulated in the original agreement—at RM21.78 billion—was too high.[48] Thus, it decided to renegotiate the project with China. In 2019, the Malaysia Rail Link signed a Supplementary Agreement with the CCCC, which substantially reduced the project cost from RM65.5 billion to RM44 billion.[49] The new agreement also changed the project’s southern alignment, i.e. bypassing Bentong and Gombak and instead rerouting the southern Section C (from Mentakab to Port Klang) through Negeri Sembilan. The total length of the rail link was thus reduced from 688 km to 640 km. Moreover, the CCCC was required to repay RM3.1 billion to Malaysia due to the abandonment of the northern extension of the project. The completion date was changed to December 2026.
The project hit another change in 2020 when the Muhyiddin Yassin-led Perikatan Nasional (PN)-Plus government toppled the PH government following Mahathir’s resignation. While the new Muhyiddin-led government proceeded with the ECRL, it reviewed Section C, reverting it to the original northern alignment.[50] This would reverse the renegotiated deal reached by the preceding regime. In December 2021, the Transport Minister confirmed that the project would proceed with a revised northern alignment.[51] Previously, the Selangor government (still controlled by PH) had insisted that the southern alignment, which would run longer through Selangor, was better because it would be cheaper and generate more economic gains and incur fewer socio-environmental costs.[52] However, after the federal government had settled several issues related to the northern alignment, including environmental concerns.[53] the Selangor government stopped opposing the project.[54]
The ECRL case indicates how political changes and project governance can alter and disrupt the design and execution of BRI projects.[55]
CONCLUSION
BRI-recipient countries approve projects for their potential contribution to economic growth and do make efforts to manage the projects soundly, given that the projects’ viability and positive impact on economic growth are important for political legitimacy. This is particularly true when a new government inherits a poorly-functioning economy from the preceding regime, as in the Myanmar case. When NLD took control of the Myanmar government, the economy was not healthy in part due to existing huge debts to China and the new government wanted to better manage the economy to boost growth. This was a key factor that influenced the renegotiation of the project. In the Indonesia case, the political opportunism tended to focus on starting and finishing the HSR project in time for elections as well as demanding more benefits for or realigning routes that benefited local constituents. The pressure to address local concerns induced recipient governments to bargain.
Internal political dynamics, such as change in government and opposition politics, also enabled project renegotiations for better conditions and benefits at both national and local levels, at least in economic terms. Proactive proposals, ‘strategic selection’, tactical delays, and threats of cancellation have been the key approaches that host governments employed to exercise their agency. However, in so doing, these governments have tended to focus on the economic aspect of projects and paid less attention to social and environmental impacts in some cases. In conclusion, while the bargaining power of recipient countries is relative, and not absolute, vis-à-vis China, it can make positive changes to projects, particularly in economic terms.
ENDNOTES
[1] “Belt and Road Portal,” www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn, accessed on 23 June 2022; Fresh News, “Editorial: Cambodia is a New Model of International Cooperation on Belt and Road Initiative” (in Khmer), Fresh News, 13 June 2022, http://www.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/localnews/245702-2022-06-13-06-16-39.html.
[2] Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, “Going out responsibly: The human rights impact of China’s global investments,” 2021, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2021_BHRRC_China_Briefing.pdf.
[3] Wang Zheng, “Assessing the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia amid the COVID-19 Pandemic (2021-2022),” ISEAS Perspective 2022/57, 26 May 2022, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-57-assessing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-southeast-asia-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic-2021-2022-by-wang-zheng/.
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] Chao Wang, Ming K. Lim, Xinyi Zhang, Longfeng Zhao, and Paul Tae-Woo Lee, “Railway and road infrastructure in the Belt and Road Initiative countries: Estimating the impact of transport infrastructure on economic growth,” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 134 (February 2020), 288-307.
[7] Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, “Going out responsibly: The human rights impact of China’s global investments,” 2021, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2021_BHRRC_China_Briefing.pdf.
[8] Kong Tuan Yuen, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Responses from ASEAN Countries,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4 (November 2019), 24-33.
[9] Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, “Going out responsibly: The human rights impact of China’s global investments,” 2021, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2021_BHRRC_China_Briefing.pdf.
[10 ibid
[11] A bulk of Chinese overseas energy investments are in renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro). The share of renewable energy in the overall energy investments rose from 38% in 2019 to 57% in 2020. See Christoph Nedopil Wang, “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2020,” 2021, https://green-bri.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2020/?cookie-state-change=1661751301347.
[12] NGOs aiding affected communities to fight companies can have diverse or conflicting agendas and approaches. Some NGOs use peaceful approaches (such as negotiations and legal means), while others prefer confrontational approaches (such as protests). Sometimes, these differing approaches can divide communities and weaken their collective action. See Human Rights Watch, “Underwater: Human Rights Impacts of a China Belt and Road Project in Cambodia,” 2021, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/08/cambodia0821_ web.pdf; Personal communication with a Cambodian NGO Director (20/07/2022).
[13] Affected communities can be divisive, with some wanting quick compensation regardless of fairness and others wanting a fair compensation and prolonging their struggle. When communities are fragmented, they lose to companies. See Diana Suhardiman, Kanokwan Manorom, and Jonathan Rigg, “Institutional bricolage (re)shaping the different manifestations of state-citizens relations in Mekong hydropower planning,” Geoforum, Vol. 134 (August 2022), 118-130.
[14] Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, “Going out responsibly: The human rights impact of China’s global investments,” 2021, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2021_BHRRC_China_Briefing.pdf.
[15] See, for example, Daniel C. O’Neill, “Dividing ASEAN and Conquering the South China Sea: China’s Financial Power Projection,” 2018, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
[16] This case is mainly based on: Sandhi Governance Institute, “Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone,” 2021, https://www.brimonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/CS_KPSEZ.pdf; Linda Calabrese and Yue Cao, “Managing the Belt and Road: Agency and development in Cambodia and Myanmar,” World Development, Vol. 141 (May 2021), 105-297; Jenn-Jaw Soong and Kyaw Htet Aung, “Myanmar’s Perception and Strategy toward China’s BRI Expansion on Three Major Projects Development: Hedging Strategic Framework with State-Market-Society Analysis,” The Chinese Economy, Vol. 54, No. 1 (August 2021), 20-34; David Morris, “In the Middle of a Perfect Storm: Political Risks of the Belt and Road Project at Kyaukphyu, Myanmar,” Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2 (December 2021), 210–36.
[17] The projects were announced in 2013 and the EIA process started in March 2020. The construction was expected to start in 2020 but has been delayed until now. In August 2021, the junta government invited bids from consultancy firms to provide legal services for the projects. In September 2021, an agreement was reached between the government and a firm to conduct preliminary investigation work on the projects. See The Irrawaddy, “Agreement Moves Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu Port Project a Step Forward,” The Irrawaddy, 20 September 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/agreement-moves-myanmars-kyaukphyu-port-project-a-step-forward.html.
[18] Yet, there was no indication about how the Myanmar government would ensure that the reduced cost would not affect the quality of the project.
[19] Skylar Lindsay, “A Chinese Special Economic Zone is deepening conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” ASEAN Today, 17 May 2019, https://www.aseantoday.com/2019/05/a-chinese-special-economic-zone-is-deepeningconflict-in-myanmars-rakhine-state/; Min Thein Aung, “Activists Stage Protest to Demand Right to Control Resources in Myanmar’s Rakhine,” Radio Free Asia, 27 November 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ activists-stage-protest- todemand-right-11272018165100.html.
[20] Nan Lwin, “Gov’t Spells Out Conditions for Signing BRI Deals with China,” The Irrawaddy, 30 May 2019, https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/govt-spells-conditions-signing-bri-deals-china.html.
[21] Linda Calabrese and Yue Cao, “Managing the Belt and Road: Agency and development in Cambodia and Myanmar,” World Development, Vol. 141 (May 2021), 105-297.
[22] ibid
[23] Yet, if this institution still works or has been changed after the coup is not known. Meanwhile, the junta government has approved more BRI projects after the coup (see Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2021). In May 2021, the government restructured the SEZ management committee to move the project forward. See Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Myanmar junta expedites work on China funded Kyaukphyu port,” The Economic Times, 09 August 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/myanmar-junta-expedites-work-on-china-funded-kyaukphyu-port/articleshow/85167272.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
[24] This case is mainly based on: Tham Siew Yean, Ngeow Chow-Bing, Kuik Cheng-Chwee, and Zhang Miao, “Belt and Road Initiative,” 2021, Santiago: Chile Pacific Foundation; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Laos’s Enthusiastic Embrace of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 45 (January 2021), 735–759; Simon Rowedder, “Railroading land-linked Laos: China’s regional profits, Laos’ domestic costs?,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 61, No. 2 (December 2020), 152-161; Wanjing Kelly Chen, “Sovereign Debt in the Making: Financial Entanglements and Labor Politics along the Belt and Road in Laos,” Economic Geography, Vol. 96, No.4 (September 2020), 295-314.
[25] The construction was planned to start in 2011 and finish in 2015. See Roseanne Gerin, “High-speed Rail Project Will Force Thousands of Lao Families to Relocate,” Radio Free Asia, 22 November 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/high-speed-rail-project-will-force-thousands-of-lao-families-to-relocate-11222017143941.html.
[26] The details of loan terms and the increased number of local workers were not publicly disclosed, but it was reported that the original interest rate of three per cent had been reduced. The demand for local workers was estimated at over 7,000 people. In 2017, over 3,000 people were employed, earning US$200-800 a month (see Roseanne Gerin, 2017).
[27] Ministry of Planning and Investment, “8th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016-2020),” 2016, Vientiane: Lao PDR.
[28] Chu Daye, “China-Laos Railway encapsulates tangible benefits of growing economic link under the BRI over the past decade,” Global Times, 07 July 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1269991.shtml.
[29] ibid
[30] World Bank, “Lao PDR economic monitor,” 2022, Vientiane: World Bank.
[31] ibid
[32] This case is mainly based on: Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272; Siwage Dharma Negara and Leo Suryadinata, “Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail Project: Little Progress, Many Challenges,” ISEAS Perspective 2018/02, 4 January 2018, /images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_2@50.pdf; Agatha Kratz and Dragan Pavlićević, “Norm-making, norm-taking or normshifting? A case study of Sino–Japanese competition in the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail project,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November 2019), 1107-1126.
[33] As of mid-August 2022, the construction had been about 70 per cent completed and China had shipped the first trains to Indonesia. The project is expected to be fully operational in June 2023. See Xinhua, “China begins shipment of high-speed trains to Indonesia,” Xinhua, 21 August 2022, https://english.news.cn/20220821/c8f6b7998a43472ca865e8350480c413/ c.html.
[34] Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272; Agatha Kratz and Dragan Pavlićević, “Norm-making, norm-taking or normshifting? A case study of Sino–Japanese competition in the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail project,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November 2019), 1107-1126.
[35] ibid
[36] Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272.
[37] Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272; Agatha Kratz and Dragan Pavlićević, “Norm-making, norm-taking or normshifting? A case study of Sino–Japanese competition in the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail project,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November 2019), 1107-1126.
[38] Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272.
[39] ibid
[40] ibid
[41] ibid
[42] ibid
[43] This case is mainly based on: Tham Siew Yean, Ngeow Chow-Bing, Kuik Cheng-Chwee, and Zhang Miao, “Belt and Road Initiative,” 2021, Santiago: Chile Pacific Foundation; Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272; The Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), “East Coast Rail Link (ECRL),” 2021, Kuala Lumpur: IDEAS; Tham Siew Yean and Kevin Zhang, “Assessing Challenges Facing the ECRL’s Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs),” ISEAS Perspective 2021/90, 06 July 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ISEAS_Perspective _2021_90.pdf.
[44] Tham Siew Yean, Ngeow Chow-Bing, Kuik Cheng-Chwee, and Zhang Miao, “Belt and Road Initiative,” 2021, Santiago: Chile Pacific Foundation.
[45] Rahimy Rahim and Tarrence Tan, “PM: ECRL significant in improving country’s transport sector,” The Star, 24 June 2022, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2022/06/24/pm-ecrl-significant-in-improving-countrys-transport-sector. However, according to an analysis, the project would drain the national budget, and it would take decades to recover costs (see Tham and Zhang, 2021).
[46] Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, “WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals,” The Wall Street Journal, 07 January 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-flexes-its-political-muscle-to-expand-power-overseas-11546890449.
[47] Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272.
[48] Chester Tay, “Terminating ECRL will cost Putrajaya RM21.78b, says Dr M,” The Edge Markets, 15 April 2019, https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/terminating-ecrl-will-cost-putrajaya-rm2178b-says-dr-m.
[49] Tham Siew Yean, Ngeow Chow-Bing, Kuik Cheng-Chwee, and Zhang Miao, “Belt and Road Initiative,” 2021, Santiago: Chile Pacific Foundation.
[50] Guanie Lim, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Why is it so hard to push Chinese railway projects in Southeast Asia? The role of domestic politics in Malaysia and Indonesia,” World Development, Vol. 138 (December 2021), 105-272.
[51] Hazlin Hassan, “Malaysia’s Transport Minister says no more changes to East Coast Rail Link route,” Straits Times, 02 December 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-transport-minister-says-no-more-changes-to-ecrl-route.
[52] ibid
[53] The agreed alignment will not encroach into the Klang Gates (Gombak) Quartz Ridge—which will be listed as a United Nations heritage site–-and will not be built near the Batu Dam, which supplies water to Selangor residents (see Hazlin Hassan, 2021).
[54] By July 2022, the construction had been 30 per cent completed. See Railway Technology, “ECRL project in Malaysia reaches 30% construction completion,” Railway Technology, 11 July 2022, https://www.railway-technology.com/news/ecrl-malaysia-30-completion/.
[55] Kevin Zhang, “Commentary: Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link alignment is anything but settled,” Channel News Asia, 15 April 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/malaysia-east-coast-rail-link-alignment-politics-china-perikatan-220786.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha. Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“Concepts and Patterns of Chinese Migration, with Reference to Southeast Asia” by Leo Suryadinata and Dorcas Gan
2022/98 “The U.S. Coast Guard in the South China Sea: A Vietnamese Perspective” by Nguyen The Phuong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The future of Vietnam-U.S. defense and security cooperation relies on meaningful policies that can meet both sides’ needs in the South China Sea and beyond. A deeper engagement of the U.S. Coast Guard in Southeast Asia can be a promising avenue toward that end, especially given China’s “grey zone” tactics to gain de facto control over disputed waters in the South China Sea.
- A comprehensive engagement by the U.S. Coast Guard in the South China Sea can be seen by Vietnam as a catalyst that effectively enhances the bilateral relationship and contributes to the evolving regional security architecture.
- As a leading power with a network of allies and security partners, Washington should demonstrate that it can find innovative ways to deal with unprecedented challenges. But to engage effectively with Vietnam, the United States should be patient and needs to diversify its engagement methods, including through multilateral coast guard cooperation arrangements.
- For Vietnam, strengthening its security partnership with the United States requires bold thinking and actions. At the same time, the two countries should also look for new and feasible cooperation initiatives to deepen mutual trust and strengthen practical cooperation in mutually beneficial areas.
*Guest writer, Nguyen The Phuong, is a PhD Candidate in Maritime Security at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia. He is also a Lecturer at the Faculty of International Relations, Ho Chi Minh City University of Economics and Finance (UEF).
ISEAS Perspective 2022/98, 6 October 2022
INTRODUCTION
Although diplomats from both Vietnam and the United States have given special prominence to the two countries’ growing comprehensive partnership, many challenges remain.[1] In particular, despite gradual concrete improvement in recent years, defense and security cooperation has not met expectations. Vietnamese policymakers’ indecisiveness and their exaggerated fear of potential retaliations from China have been cited by analysts as reasons why they hesitate to actively push for significant breakthroughs in bilateral defense and security ties.[2]
The future of Vietnam-U.S. defense and security cooperation relies in part on meaningful policies that can meet both sides’ objectives in the South China Sea and beyond. If the United States undertakes projects that can have a real and profound impact on the South China Sea situation that is favourable for Hanoi, Vietnam would respond positively. The author’s personal dialogues with both Vietnamese and U.S. scholars and officials reveal the need for practical collaborative projects that can boost bilateral defense ties, increase Vietnam’s confidence in Washington’s regional commitments and effectively tame China’s assertive behaviour in regional waters. One of the possible avenues for the two sides to conduct such projects is through the increased engagement of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in Southeast Asia’s maritime domain. This article discusses how Vietnam can and should play a proactive role in the shaping of such an initiative.
A MEANINGFUL PROJECT: USCG IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
In March 2019, the USCG cutter Bertholf joined a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Curtis Wilbur, to transit the Taiwan Strait for the first time. Two months later, the same vessel conducted a maritime exercise with the Philippine Coast Guard near Scarborough Shoal. Another USCG cutter, the Stratton, has been deployed alongside the U.S. 7th Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan. In 2021, the USCG cutter Munro, part of the U.S. 7th Fleet, conducted engagements with Japanese and Filipino navies and maritime enforcement agencies.[3] According to Vice Admiral Michael McAllister, as a military service of the United States, the USCG can integrate seamlessly into defense operations alongside the Navy and other services.[4]
U.S. coast guard cooperation with Southeast Asian countries has been ongoing for some time.[5] For example, Washington has provided technical assistance, financial support, training and capacity-building to regional maritime law enforcement agencies, including Vietnam’s, through selective maritime security institutions such as the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative (formerly known as the Gulf of Thailand Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative) or the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.[6] However, these initiatives were not designed for the U.S. to initiate strategic reorientation toward the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. It seems that Washington considers these coast guard cooperation activities less important than other maritime security priorities,[7] although the U.S. Coast Guard 2018-2022 Strategic Plan did call for steps to “strategically orient time and resources toward international activities that maximize return on investment to national and Coast Guard priorities; and foster international capacity-building efforts in regions that are […] critical to U.S. interests”.[8]
Despite the abovementioned activities and the importance of Southeast Asia for U.S. maritime strategy, the USCG did not have “even a single operational vessel west of Guam”.[9] This changed in May 2022 when President Biden hosted the U.S. – ASEAN Special Summit, where Washington announced that a USCG vessel would be assigned to the region to operate as a “training platform”, provide multinational crewing opportunities and participate in cooperative maritime engagements.[10] A regional-based technical training team will also be established to provide capacity building in the areas of institutional development, readiness, sustainment of equipment and workforce professionalism.[11] Where their assets will be based remains unclear, but it is highly likely that Guam will be the operational centre for the USCG’s activities in Southeast Asia.
The permanent presence of an official USCG detachment in the South China Sea could be the first step for a deeper engagement of the USCG in Southeast Asia.[12] Based on previous experiences between USCG and regional maritime law enforcement agencies, such a service can help establish a multi-national task force of paramilitary and civilian agencies for upholding international law and combating illegal activities at sea, while fending off Chinese assertiveness by mirroring Beijing’s tactics. However, the deployment should be assigned to one of the regional countries, not at a base outside the South China Sea. Such a comprehensive engagement by the USCG will likely be considered by Vietnamese policymakers as a meaningful project that, as explained in the next section, not only effectively enhances the bilateral relationship, but also encourages Hanoi to proactively contribute to the evolving regional security architecture.
Since the United States conducted its first Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) mission in the South China Sea in 2013, Vietnamese policymakers have carefully observed U.S. military activities in the region. Several of them, mostly within the military, have not been impressed. They perceive the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy at best as lacking substance in dealing with China’s unconventional tactics at sea, and at worst as lame-duck thinking that can do nothing to constrain China’s rise.[13] Several U.S. scholars have also raised questions about the effectiveness of FONOPs, considering them insufficient in preventing2022 Beijing from using the “grey zone” tactic in the South China Sea.[14]
Any “breakthrough” initiatives that involve Vietnam in the maritime security domain will need to meet two requirements. First, the policy of “4-nos and 1-depend” highlighted by Vietnam in its 2019 Defense White Paper needs to be upheld.[15] In other words, such initiatives should not generate the impression that Hanoi is banding with Washington against Beijing. Fortunately, the “1-depend” principle provides some flexibility for Vietnam to hedge against China.[16] It opens the door for deeper defense cooperation and creates a sense that existing limitations, or restrictions, in security and defense cooperation between the two countries are subject to changes.
Second, Vietnam’s concerns behind its hesitance to conduct meaningful security cooperation with the United States need to be addressed. An interlocutor within the U.S. Coast Guard once told the author that “every country in Southeast Asia wants the U.S. to lead, but they don’t want to be led by the U.S., and Vietnam is a particularly good example of that.” This could be an overstatement, but it does, to some extent, reflect the strategic thinking of many regional countries. The reluctance of most Southeast Asian states to get closer to the United States mainly results from China’s increasing political, economic and military influence in the region. Indeed, Hanoi deliberately restricts military cooperation with Washington because “it was afraid of sending a wrong signal to Beijing”.[17] This fear, exacerbated by strategic distrust, becomes a huge obstacle to meaningful cooperation between Vietnam and the United States.
Against this backdrop, increasing USCG’s engagement with Vietnam’s diverse maritime forces in the South China Sea could be the right step toward expanding maritime cooperation between the two countries. Unlike the Navy, the coast guard, as a softer tool for maritime enforcement, can help reduce the “sensitiveness” that inherently informs Vietnam’s concern regarding maritime security cooperation with America. And, as argued below, it may also be a relevant tool to counter China’s “grey zone” tactic in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
VIETNAM LIKELY TO SUPPORT USCG ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH CHINA SEA
Both Vietnam and the United States need to appreciate that China will pursue “war by other means”. Indeed, many Vietnamese strategists seem to believe that Beijing does not want to fire the first shot in any war, conventional or nuclear. Instead, such “grey zone” tactics have been a cornerstone in China’s maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific since 2009, and have enabled Chinese maritime forces to incrementally change the status quo without firing a single shot.[18] The United States, as the leading superpower, imagines victory in a high-intensity war in the Western Pacific, and has devoted resources to ensure that scenario. However, China does not need to go to war to assert its control over regional waters. Therefore, the United States must invest in relevant capabilities to counter Chinese “grey zone” coercion.
Vietnam has been mirroring China’s approach in the South China Sea, albeit on a smaller scale. Vietnam’s coast guard fleet and fisheries resources surveillance force are among the largest in Southeast Asia. They have been at the forefront of nearly every recent confrontation with Chinese maritime forces at sea.[19] However, one of the main disadvantages of the Vietnam Coast Guard is its limited number of vessels and their relatively small size. The continuous presence of USCG cutters in the South China Sea may help ease the pressure on smaller regional coast guards, including Vietnam’s, especially in international waters around the Paracels and the Spratlys. The frequency and intensity of confrontation may increase, but the nature of “white-hull” forces allows them to avoid the dire diplomatic and military risks that their “grey hull” counterpart (i.e., naval forces) may otherwise have to face.
The permanent presence of a powerful law enforcement force like the USCG in the South China Sea may also soften the suspicious attitude towards U.S. intentions and commitments to the region among regional countries. Because of the constabulary and less militaristic nature of white hulls, it may also be easier for Vietnam to accept some form of maritime security network in which coast guards play a central role. Such an arrangement may focus on dealing with less sensitive issues such as protecting the environment and maritime resources, combating piracy, armed robbery and illegal fishing.
Such a network of like-minded maritime law enforcement partners could play an essential role in strengthening and expanding the maritime domain awareness capabilities of Vietnam’s maritime forces. Since 2016, the United States has provided nearly US$100 million in capacity-building assistance to help strengthen Vietnam’s maritime domain awareness and its presence in its waters in the South China Sea. This involves the provision of professional training as well as equipment such as coastal radars or unmanned aerial systems.[20] Maritime domain awareness is not only about sharing technology, know-how or intelligence but also about networking and actual joint activities to improve regional security. Vietnam has generally been hesitant to join regional joint-patrol schemes. However, this may change if ASEAN maritime member countries and the United States, along with its traditional allies such as Japan or Australia, come up with a well-planned and well-executed mini-lateral initiative with coast guard forces acting as lead players. The first operations of such an initiative could take place in the southern part of the South China Sea, where Vietnam and other Southeast Asian maritime countries have been actively participating in other initiatives involving the United States such as the annual Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise, or many other workshops and exercises hosted by the Indonesian Coast Guard in partnership with the USCG.
One could even expect a more open attitude from Vietnamese officials towards the concept of “places not bases”, where white-hull cutters instead of naval warships will be welcomed. Currently, Singapore is considered the best option for this concept within the boundary of the South China Sea as it already hosts a significant U.S. Navy presence, as well as rotationally deployed ships. Vietnam can offer an alternative option for supplies in case the USCG wishes to deploy a permanent detachment to the region. Several ports in southern Vietnam, especially Phu Quoc Island or Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province, may welcome USCG cutters if they dock for supplies or replenishment before sailing off to conduct patrol missions in the South China Sea or moving to other places. Visits to these locations would be less politically sensitive as these are located in areas where non-traditional maritime security issues, such as illegal and unregulated fishing activities, piracy, or environmental degradation, are common. Moreover, the USCG and other regional coast guards can also use them as logistical hubs, especially in joint-patrol missions, which helps to further legitimize their involvement in the initiative.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Memories and experiences from the socio-economic crisis in the 1980s created two enduring security concerns that came to shape Vietnam’s security mindset. Economic collapse gave rise to reformist “new thinkers” who believed that market-oriented reforms and international integration were needed to transform the country’s frail economy. It also created a sense of insecurity among the conservative “old thinkers” because the legitimacy of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which is in part based on socio-economic performance, was severely undermined. However, the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s imbued among the conservatives a high level of skepticism towards liberal ideas embraced by the “new thinkers”.
The success of any meaningful maritime security initiative between Vietnam and the United States therefore relies heavily on the attitude the dogmatic “old-thinkers” might hold towards it. Washington has always been considered by Hanoi as a valuable “comprehensive partner”, especially in terms of economic and maritime cooperation. But one of the factors that has caused Vietnam to be hesitant in upgrading bilateral ties to the “strategic partnership” level is the conviction among certain old thinkers that the United States remains a potential threat to the Party’s regime security. American officials have been frustrated with the overcautious attitude of their Vietnamese counterparts, as this has hampered security cooperation between the two countries.
However, mutual trust has been improving in recent years, helping to ease the old thinkers’ suspicion towards the U.S. intentions in strengthening defense and security ties with Vietnam.[21] Depending on the level of trust, Washington should treat the issue of coast guard cooperation patiently or push it through a multilateral initiative that includes several ASEAN stakeholders such as Indonesia or the Philippines in order to make Vietnamese officials more comfortable with such collaboration projects.
On the part of Vietnam, strengthening the security partnership with the United States requires bold thinking and action. Hanoi should not passively wait for cooperative opportunities with Washington to emerge. There have been growing voices from regional scholars urging Vietnam to take up a leadership role in areas where it has strength, including maritime security.[22] Washington has recently clarified its positions on maritime disputes in the South China Sea and decried China’s maritime claims there as “unlawful”, paving the way for more concrete policies against Beijing.[23] Vietnam, as a main claimant state with a large stake in the South China Sea, should be bold and quick in defining its role in the regional maritime domain and looking for new initiatives to address the evolving maritime challenges. Its paramilitary and civilian maritime forces can lead the way by joining an active network of regional coast guard forces that includes the USCG to promote its national interests and uphold the rules-based international maritime order.
ENDNOTES
[1] Bich T. Tran (2020), Will We See a US-Vietnam Strategic Partnership?, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/will-we-see-a-us-vietnam-strategic-partnership/.
[2] The Phuong Nguyen (2019), Vietnam’s Need to Become a Proactive Middle Power, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-need-to-become-a-proactive-middle-power/.
[3] USNI News, US Coast Guard Continues to Expand Presence in the Western Pacific, https://news.usni.org/2021/09/03/u-s-coast-guard-continues-to-expand-pressence-in-the-western-pacific.
[4] Ibid.
[5] See Amy E. Searight (2020), U.S. Coast Guard cooperation with Southeast Asia: Maritime Challenges and Strategic Opportunities”, Statement before the US Congress, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110649/witnesses/HHRG-116-PW07-Wstate-SearightA-20200310.pdf.
[6] US White House (2015), FACT SHEET: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/fact-sheet-us-building-maritime-capacity-southeast-asia.
[7] Herzinger, 2019.
[8] U.S. Department of Defense (2018), Coast Guard Strategic Plan 2018-2022, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Nov/16/2002063979/-1/-1/0/USCG_STRATEGIC%20PLAN__LORES%20PAGE_20181115_VFINAL.PDF.
[9] Blake Herzinger (2019), Reorienting the Coast Guard: A Case for Patrol Forces Indo-Pacific, War on The Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/reorienting-the-coast-guard-a-case-for-patrol-forces-indo-pacific/.
[10] US White House (2022), FACT SHEET: U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington, DC, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/12/fact-sheet-u-s-asean-special-summit-in-washington-dc/.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Herzinger, 2019.
[13] Author’s interview with Vietnamese military officers, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City, December 2021.
[14] For instance, see Zack Cooper & Gregory B. Poling (2019), America’s Freedom of Navigation Operations are Lost at Sea, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/08/americas-freedom-of-navigation-operations-are-lost-at-sea/.
[15] This policy refers to Vietnam’s principles of no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases on its soil, and no using of force or threatening to use force in international relations. At the same time, Vietnam also stressed that “depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will consider developing necessary, appropriate defense and military relations with other countries”. See Vietnam Ministry of National Defence (2019), 2019 Vietnam National Defence, http://www.mod.gov.vn/wps/wcm/connect/08963129-c9cf-4c86-9b5c-81a9e2b14455/2019VietnamNationalDefence.pdf.
[16] The Phuong Nguyen (2019), Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White Paper: Preparing for a Fragile Future, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-2019-defense-white-paper-preparing-for-a-fragile-future/.
[17] Do Thanh Hai (2021), Vietnam and China: ideological bedfellows, strange dreamers, Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies, Vol 10, Issue 2, p. 174.
[18] According to the Australian Department of Defense, grey-zone activities are “coercive statecraft actions short of war. The grey-zone is a mainly non-military domain of human activity in which states use national resources to deliberately coerce other states. States achieve grey-zone goals using multiple, apparently unrelated innocent/low attributable, mutually-supporting and synchronized statecraft techniques below the threshold of war. Grey-zone campaigns seek to exploit adversaries’ weaknesses and suppress adversaries’ response options, all the while achieving tangible national strategic aims”. See more at “Grey Zone”, The Perry Group, Australian Defense College, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/perry-group-papers/grey-zone.
[19] The Phuong Nguyen (2020), Vietnam’s Maritime Militia is not a Black Hole in the South China Sea, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-maritime-militia-is-not-a-black-hole-in-the-south-china-sea/.
[20] U.S. Department of State (2021), U.S. Security Cooperation with Vietnam, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-vietnam/.
[21] On the trust-building process between Vietnam and the United States over the past three decades, see Ted Osius (2021), Nothing is Impossible: America’s Reconciliation with Vietnam, Rutgers University Press.
[22] Ralf Emmers & Huong Le Thu (2021), “Vietnam and the search for security leadership in ASEAN”, Asian Security, Vol 17, Issue 1, pp. 64-78. See also, Joshua Bernard B. Espena & Don McLain Gill (2020), Indonesia and Vietnam: The Quest for ASEAN Leadership, Geopolitical Monitor, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/indonesia-and-vietnam-the-quest-for-asean-leadership/.
[23] Zack Cooper and Bonnies S. Glaser (2020), What Options are on the Table in the South China Sea, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/what-options-are-on-the-table-in-the-south-china-sea/.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha. Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“Thailand’s Economic Dilemmas in Post-Pandemic Asia” by Richard Yarrow
2022/97 “Thailand Has No Shortage of Aspirants to Succeed Prime Minister Prayut” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- On 24 August 2022, the Constitutional Court suspended Thai Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha from the premiership after it accepted for deliberation opposition parties’ questions on whether General Prayut had reached the 8-year constitutional limit of his premiership.
- The unexpected suspension constituted a serious setback to General Prayut, eroding his political stature as an infallible strongman.
- Opposition leaders welcomed it as a belated blow to shatter the myth of General Prayut’s indispensability to Thai national security.
- The chief drafter of the current Thai Constitution and General Prayut’s team of defence lawyers share the same interpretation that General Prayut has about two more years of premiership eligibility.
- The Constitutional Court’s ruling, to be announced on 30 September 2022, may fall short of settling the question of when exactly General Prayut’s premiership will reach the 8-year limit.
- If indeed General Prayut’s premiership eligibility has only two more years to go, fewer political parties would want to nominate him to return to power in the next general election since he would not be able to serve the full four-year term.
- Political parties have already intensified their manoeuvrings to put forth their aspirants for the next premiership in anticipation of an early general election one or two months before the four-year term of the current House of Representatives ends on 23 March 2023.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Previously, he was a researcher on ASEAN political and security cooperation at the Institute’s ASEAN Studies Centre.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/97, 27 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
The writing was on the wall for Thai Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha’s political future when on 24 August, the Constitutional Court suspended him from the premiership, as it accepted for deliberation a question from opposition parties asking whether General Prayut had reached the eight-year constitutional limit of his premiership.
On the surface, the suspension appeared to be a prudent precaution to guard against legal complications should the Constitutional Court rule that General Prayut had reached the eight-year limit on 23 August 2022, based on him having assumed the premiership for the first time on 24 August 2014, about three months after leading a bloodless coup to seize power.
The suspension has delighted opposition politicians who consider it the end of General Prayut’s illusion of political infallibility. And even though it remains uncertain what the exact ruling of the Constitutional Court will be, this much seems clear: the myth of General Prayut’s indispensability to Thai national security has been shattered.
UNSATISFACTORY MINIMALIST OUTCOME
What is also notable is that the 5-to-4 vote in the Constitutional Court to suspend General Prayut indicates some serious disagreement among the nine judges, and this will deter them from being proactive.
One puzzling shortcoming in the opposition parties’ case is its omission to ask the Constitutional Court to clearly state when General Prayut’s premiership came under constitutional rule, as provided for in Section 158 of the 2017 Constitution.[1] They simply questioned whether General Prayut had reached the eight-year limit at the end of 23 August 2022.
This being the case, the Constitutional Court may simply rule “Yes” or “No”.
If the ruling is “Yes,” it means the Constitutional Court considers General Prayut’s premiership to have started on 24 August 2014. Immediately after the coup on 22 May 2014, he became the head of the military junta, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Subsequently, he was appointed the prime minister by King Bhumibol. Should this be the ruling, then General Prayut premiership will be deemed to have ended on 23 August 2022, and the selection of his successor will now have to be carried out in parliament.[2]
However, if the Constitutional Court rules “No,” without determining when to start counting the time of General Prayut’s premiership, then the issue will remain unresolved.
There are two schools of thought: General Prayut’s premiership came under the eight-year rule when the Constitutional entered into force on 6 April 2017. This is the understanding of the chief drafter of the Constitution, Meechai Ruchuphan, who, upon request, has submitted his interpretation to the Constitutional Court.[3] The team of lawyers defending General Prayut concurs with Meechai’s interpretation.[4] Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, leader of the Palang Pracharat Party (PPP), the largest party in the ruling coalition, appears to believe too that General Prayut has two more years of premiership eligibility.
Alternatively, some supporters of General Prayut would contend that the eight-year rule began to apply in General Prayut’s case only on 9 June 2019, when he was formally appointed the prime minister under the relevant procedures and provisions of the 2017 Constitution, by King Maha Vajiralongkorn.
PRAYUT’S DIMINISHED STATURE
Immediately following the suspension of General Prayut, his “Big Brother” General Prawit stepped in as the acting prime minister. Surprisingly, the health of the 77-year-old former army chief seemed to have suddenly improved. He can now walk unassisted during inspection trips to the provinces. Prawit has also pledged to serve the people with his heart despite his advanced age and physical frailty, has also become friendlier towards the media, and has shown himself to be more willing to answer questions in impromptu interviews. Undoubtedly, his lieutenants in the PPP see their boss as the most promising candidate for the premiership in the next general election.
On his part, General Prawit contends that he wants the PPP to re-nominate General Prayut for the premiership as it did successfully in the 2019 general election. He has however not ruled out the possibility of his nomination by the PPP as its second choice for the next premiership. The Constitution allows each party to nominate up to three candidates, but each candidate can only be nominated by one party.
If indeed General Prayut’s premiership eligibility lasts until only 5 April 2025, or just about the midway point of the four-year term of the next elected House of Representatives, it will be unwise for the PPP to re-nominate only him as its sole candidate for the next premiership. The PPP would need to show its supporters from the outset who will succeed General Prayut after he has reached the eight-year limit.
Since his suspension from the premiership, General Prayut has sometimes gone to work at the Defence Ministry, because he is concurrently the prime minister and the minister of defence. He has chosen not to attend cabinet meetings in person, and has simply monitored them via video conferencing. But he has found time to undertake a few inspection trips in the provinces. On one such trip, he put on media record his concern about the well-being of flood victims in the eastern coastal province of Rayong – in his capacity as the minister of defence.[5] Perhaps he does not want the Thai media to write him off too quickly.
General Prayut is apparently looking forward to hosting the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in Bangkok, which U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, among others, are expected to attend. The event will most likely be General Prayut’s last hoorah as a politician. This is presupposed on the Constitutional Court’s ruling on 30 September 2022 allowing him to continue in the premiership.
After the APEC summit, he is widely expected to dissolve the House and call for an early general election.
WHEN TO DISSOLVE THE HOUSE?
The four-year term of the current House of Representatives will end on 23 March 2023. Dissolving the House and holding an early general election will give those of General Prayut’s ministers who are politicians the significant advantage of incumbency during the election campaign.
However, for practical reasons, the House should not be dissolved until it has, in collaboration with the Senate, passed necessary new laws to put into effect recent constitutional amendments concerning election of MPs and revision of rules regulating political parties. The parliamentarians had earlier agreed to constitutional amendments which include increasing the number of directly elected MPs from 350 to 400 and reducing the number of party-list MPs from 150 to 100.
They also agreed to use two ballots, one for choosing a candidate for a House seat (in single-seat constituency), and another ballot that goes to a party for a share of the 100 party-list House seats.[6]
In addition, they voted to abolish the rule concerning holding party caucuses in every province for the selection of provincial candidates to stand in a general election and for the scrutiny of candidates on the party’s list. Many political parties lack necessary sources to implement this rule. None of them have a branch office in each of the 76 provinces outside of Bangkok.
At issue now is the crucial question of how to calculate the allocation of the 100 party-list House seats. The latest proposed formula is to combine all second-ballot votes received by all parties in a general election, and to divide the grand total with 100 to derive the allocation rate of votes per one party-list House seat. Assuming that the grand total is 40 million, then the allocation rate is 400,000 votes per one party-list House seat.
A group of small parties and micro-parties (each with only one MP) has requested the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of such a new formula. MPs from these micro-parties won their party-list House seats with only 35,000–80,000 votes. Few of these micro-parties will be able to get more than 100,000 votes in the next general election, let alone 400,000 votes to qualify for one party-list House seat under the proposed new rule.
Leaders of small parties and micro-parties also want the Constitutional Court to uphold the sanctity of the constitutional notion – as mentioned in Sections 93 and 94 – concerning how many MPs each party “deserves” to have in accordance with the party’s total of votes as a percentage of the grand total.[7] They want to retain this rule in order to prevent large parties from taking most of the party-list House seats. The Constitutional Court’s ruling on these election issues will have significant political implications.
NO SHORTAGE OF PREMIERSHIP ASPIRANTS
The suspension of General Prayut from the premiership has intensified political manoeuvrings in search of his successor. In addition to the PPP’s renewed efforts to promote General Prawit as the “most suitable” successor to General Prayut, several other political parties have put forth their candidates whom they all claim can be a much more capable and democratic head of government than General Prayut.
Old faces in new parties include former Public Health Minister Khunying Sudarat Keyuraphan of Thai Sarng Thai Party, former Deputy Prime Minister Dr Somkid Jatusripitak of Futurise Thailand Party, and Pirapan Salirathavibhaga of Ruamthai Sarngchart Party.
Khunying Sudarat was Phuea Thai Party’s No. 1 nominee for the premiership in the previous general election. However, she left the party in November 2020 after she and her team were eclipsed in the party’s power struggle. Nevertheless, her popularity remains high, especially in the Northeast,[8] and this can erode the chances of Phuea Thai Party in winning the lion’s share of the 133 House seats at stake in the 20 “e-san” provinces in the next general election.
Dr Somkid was the first “economic czar” of the Prayut Administration until his resignation in July 2020 along with Finance Minister Uttama Saowanayon and Energy Minister Sonthirat Sonthijirawong. Uttama and Sonthirat are now party leader and secretary-general of Futurise Thailand Party respectively. On his return to national politics, Dr Somkid has declared that his mission is to bring about necessary changes to the country.[9] Dr Somkid’s arrival makes the “economic team” of Futurise Thailand Party one of the strongest.[10]
Pirapan is an advisor to the prime minister. He is known to have close personal ties to ex-army chief General Apirat Kongsompong, who is now a deputy director of the Bureau of the Royal Household. Pirapan’s Ruamthai Sarngchart is widely seen as a “spare party” set up for General Prayut to take over if and when he wants to have a party of his own, instead of relying chiefly on the PPP. Pirapan has dismissed recurring media speculations that he has been positioned to succeed General Prayut should the Constitutional Court rule that General Prayut had reached the eight-year limit of premiership.[11]
In the next general election, one key challenge looming ahead of these three new parties is whether or not they can win enough MPs to be eligible to enter their premiership candidates in the selection race in parliament. In order to be eligible, a party must have at least 5% of the House seats, or 25 MPs, and its candidate needs the endorsement of at least 10% of the House seats, or 50 MPs.
Most prominent among the old faces in old parties vying for the next premiership is the party leader of Bhumjaithai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Health Anutin Charnvirakul. His party had at first won only 51 House seats; but its number of MPs has increased to 64, thanks to defectors from other parties, making it the second largest in the ruling coalition after the PPP. In the next general election, Bhumjaithai Party is expected to do well, partly because of its successful push to decriminalise marijuana.
Also always in the media limelight is the party leader of Move Forward, Pita Limjaroenrat, who on 9 September declared his readiness to become the next prime minister. His slogan : Be a modern prime minister. Thais must be equal. Move forward to make Thailand progress.[12]
Another familiar old face also in the quest for the next premiership is former Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij. He recently left Kla Party to join Chartpattana Party and is expected to its party leader.[13] The small government party has only four MPs and has kept a low profile. Its recruitment of Korn appears to be a renewed attempt to rejuvenate the party in preparation for an uphill battle in the next general election.
ENIGMATIC NEW FACE
Undoubtedly, one new face who has attracted a great deal of media attention is Ms Paethongtarn Shinawatra. This 36-year-old daughter of former Prime Minister Thaksin was appointed Phuea Thai Party’s advisor on participation and innovation last October. Subsequently, she has assumed a high-profile role as the “Head of the Phuea Thai Family”. On paper, her primary mission is to rally support for a “landslide victory” of the party in the next general election, but it is widely assumed that she is more interested in mobilising support to bring her father home scot-free after over 13 years in exile overseas.
If the 73-year-old Thaksin returns to Thailand under normal circumstances, he would face a combined jail term of 10 years from three convictions in corruption cases. Two other corruption cases are still pending investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Commission.[14] The Phuea Thai-led government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, a younger sister of Thaksin, tried but failed in 2013 to ram through parliament a controversial general amnesty bill designed to free Thaksin from all corruption charges. The controversial attempt led to prolonged and chaotic street protests in Bangkok, which eventually prompted General Prayut – who was at that time the army chief – to seize power on 22 May 2014.
When Paethongtarn joined the party’s road show in Chiang Mai on 10 September, her mother and other members of Shinawatra family showed up in full force to support her.[15] This was the first time in nearly two decades that her mother, Khunying Potjaman, appeared in a political event after the downfall of Prime Minister Thaksin in the coup on 19 September 2006. Khunying Potjaman and Thaksin registered their divorce at the Thai Consulate in Hong Kong on 14 November 2008, after 32 years of marriage.
The Phuea Thai Party leadership has neither confirmed nor denied that Paethongtarn will be one of the party’s nominees for the next premiership.
CONCLUSION
Bringing back Thaksin has practically become one important – if not the most important – goal of the Phuea Thai Party. Whether or not it will help the party score a “landslide victory” in the next general election remains debatable.
Other premiership aspirants in new parties are positioning themselves as alternative leaders who will move Thailand beyond the damaging power struggle between Thaksin through the Phuea Thai Party and the Thai military through General Prayut, General Prawit and the PPP. This line of thinking has found strong traction among young voters, who were either not yet born or too young to remember how Thaksin exploited his political successes in the early 2000s.
General Prayut has apparently run out of time and is still failing to end the power struggle with Thaksin.
Whatever the case, one should not expect the Constitutional Court to shine any new light on the political future of General Prayut when the decision of its nine judges is announced on 30 September.
ENDNOTES
[1] Section 158 of the 2017 Constitution prescribes that “The Prime Minister shall not hold office for more than eight years in total, whether or not holding consecutive term. …”.
[2] To be considered first are existing nominees of political parties registered prior to the March 2019 general election. They include: Bhumjaithai’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Health Anutin Charnvirakul, Phuea Thai’s Chaikasem Nitisiri, chief strategist. (Note: The party’s two other nominees were Khunying Sudarat Keyuraphan and Chadchart Sitthipunt, but both have left the party, and the latter was in May elected Bangkok Governor). If none of the existing nominees gets a majority of votes from MPs and senators, then parliament can consider outsiders, such as PPP party leader and Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, who is now the acting-prime minister during the suspension of General Prayut.
[3] “คำชี้แจง ‘มีชัย ฤชุพันธุ์’ วาระนายกฯ 8 ปี เริ่มนับ 6 เม.ย. 60” [ Clarification of ‘Meechai Ruchuphan’ : the prime minister’s term starts counting on 6 April 2017], Isra News, 6 September 2022, www.isranews.org/article/isranews-article/111824-nred-46.html, accessed 16 September 2022.
[4] “เปิดเอกสารลับ คำแถลงสู้คดี นายกฯ 8 ปี จากทีมกฎหมายประยุทธ์” [Disclosing the secret defence document of Prayut’s legal team on the eight-year term limit], Prachachat, 7 September 2022, www.prachachat.net/politics/news-1041041, accessed 16 September 2022. The legal team contends that there is one crucial “discontinuity”: General Prayut who was first appointed prime minister on 24 August 2014 under the Provisional Constitution of 2014, which formally lapsed on 6 April 2017 when the current Constitution entered into force. Moreover, the rule on the eight-year limit to the premiership is a new law which cannot curtail anyone’s rights retroactively. General Prayut’s legal team also cites the conclusion of the seven former drafters of the Constitution, led by Meechai Ruchuphan, who were secretly appointed on 17 January 2022 to look into this issue. The Meechai-led group concludes that the 8-year rule started applying to General Prayut’s premiership when the Constitution entered into force.
[5] “ ‘บิ๊กตู่’ ตรวจท่วมระยองวันนี้ เยี่ยมให้กำลังใจ มอบสิ่งของให้ผู้ประสบภัย” [ ‘Big Tu’ visits flooded areas in Rayong today; consoling flood victims and handing out relief supplies], Matichon, 16 September 2022, www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_356372, accessed 17 September 2022. ‘Big Tu’ is the nickname of General Prayut.
[6] In the 2019 general election, voters cast only one ballot to choose a candidate for a House seat. The total of votes going to all candidates of a party was then used in calculating how many party-list House seats the party would get.
[7] Under this rule, the Phuea Thai Party did not get any share of the party-list House seats in the 2019 general election, after winning 136 directly-elected House seats. All of Phuea Thai’s candidates received a total of about 7.881 million votes, which accounted for 22.16% of the grand total of all votes going to all parties in the race. Twenty-two per cent of 500 House seats is 110. The Phuea Thai Party had thus won more House seats than it “deserved” to have, therefore it did not get any additional seats from the allocation of the party-list House seats.
[8] “ เพื่อไทยยุ่งแล้ว! คนอีสานชู ‘สุดารัตน์’ ขี่ ‘แพทองธาร’ ” [Trouble for Phuea Thai! E-san people adore ‘Sudarat’ more than ‘Paethongtarn’], Thai Post, 10 September 2022, www.thaipost.net/politics-news/218618, accessed 17 September 2022. The newspaper reports the outcome of a recent survey by E-saan Poll of Khon Kaen University’s E-saan Centre for Business and Economic Research. Khunying Sudarat came first with 23.4% support, followed by Phuea Thai’s Paethongtarn Shinawatra at 21.1%. In third place was Move Forward party leader Pita Limjaroenrat, 20.2%. General Prayut came fourth, with only 12.5%. In terms of the popularity of political parties, Phuea Thai came first with 35.9%, followed by Move Forward at 19.8%, and Thai Sarng Thai at 14.7%. See other outcomes of the E-saan Poll at www.facebook.com/EsaanPoll, accessed 17 September 2022.
[9] “ ‘สมคิด’ ผู้กลับมาเพื่อเปลี่ยนแปลงประเทศ” [‘Somkid’ : the one who returns to change the country], Kom Chad Luek, 8 September 2022, www.komchadluek.net/news/politics/529044. The party plans to nominate Dr Somkid for the next premiership.
[10] “วัดฝีมือ ‘ทีมเศรษฐกิจ’ 8 พรรคการเมือง” [ Assessing the “economic teams” of 8 political parties], Manager Online, 15 September 2022, www.youtube.com/watch?=1EMUmNcZzDU, accessed 19 September 2022.
[11] “ ‘พีระพันธุ์’ ปฏิเสธข่าวถูกดันนายกฯ คนใหม่ เชื่อเป็นไปได้ยาก” [‘Pirapan’ denies news about him being supported to be the new prime minister, believing that it is difficult], Thai Post, 16 September 2022, www.thaipost.net/politics-news/223226, accessed 17 September 2022.
[12] “ ‘พิธา’ ประกาศพร้อมเป็นนายกฯ” [ ‘Pita’ declares his readiness to be prime minister], The Standard, 9 September 2022, www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfLOjd4eXZA, accessed 17 September 2022.
[13] “ ‘กรณ์’ เท ‘พรรคกล้า’ ไปเป็นใหญ่ที่ ‘พรรคชาติพัฒนา’ ” [‘Korn’ deserts ‘Kla Party’ to assume a leadership role at ‘Chartpattana Party’], Thai Post, 2 September 2022, www.thaipost.net/politics-news/213261, accessed 17 September 2022. Korn was a former deputy leader of Democrat Party. He left the party to set up Kla Party in February 2020. This failed to win anything in the Bangkok elections last May.
[14] “ 8 คดีทุจริต โทษคุก12 ชนักติดหลัง ‘ทักษิณ’ ก่อนประกาศกลับไทย” [ 8 corruption cases with combined jail terms of 12 years stuck on his back before ‘Thaksin’ announced his return to Thailand], Bangkok Business News , 5 January 2022, www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/980942, accessed 17 September 2022. The first conviction concerning abuse of power in his wife’s attempt to bid for a plot of government land resulted in two years of imprisonment. But the jail term has already lapsed after 10 years. Therefore, the total of jail terms awaiting Thaksin has dropped from 12 years to 10.
[15] “คุณหญิงพจมาน นำตระกูลชินวัตร ร่วมงานครอบครัวเพื่อไทย เชียงใหม่ ให้กำลังลูกสาว ” [ Khunying Potjaman leads Shinawatra family to attend the Phuea Thai Family event in Chiang Mai to show support of her daughter], Thai Rath,10 September 2022, www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2496565, accessed 17 September 2022. The official objective of the event was to introduce the party’s candidates in northern provinces. But Khunying Potjaman’s presence stole the show and attracted most of the media attention. Also presented were her son Panthongtae, her eldest daughter Pinthongtha and husband Natthapong Kunakorn, her son-in-law Pidok Suksawas (Paethongtarn’s husband), Mrs Yaowapa Wongsawas (Thaksin’s younger sister) and husband former Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawas, and Banpot Damapong, an elder brother of Khunying Potjaman.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha. Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“The Political Economy of Education in Myanmar: Recorrecting the Past, Redirecting the Present and Reengaging the Future” by Aung Tun
2022/96 “Islamisation in Malaysia Beyond UMNO and PAS” by Norshahril Saat and Afra Alatas
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- In the 1980s and 1990s, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) engaged in a fierce battle to portray themselves as the foremost champion of Islam in the country. This also resulted in the party leaders labelling each other deviant (kafir-mengkafir).
- The competition to out-Islamize one another seems to have waned, and both parties are now in an alliance called Muafakat Nasional (MN). While they were both part of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition in the 1970s and united by the aim of national reconciliation, their partnership this time is based on Malay-Muslim unity.
- This article explains why the study of Islamisation in Malaysia should move beyond UMNO and PAS. The focus should instead be on how revivalist ideology has both penetrated the state apparatus and been reinforced by developments in society.
- It explains that revivalists are not interested in building a theocracy in Malaysia but are instead preoccupied with how Islam should be practiced in totality in institutions, universities, and bureaucracy. While UMNO and PAS have converged on this basis, Islamisation is now creeping into popular culture.
- The forces of Islamisation—defined here as a ‘greening’ process—are so strong that no Malaysian government can push back against it. This will have an impact on the country’s multi-religious and multi-ethnic society in the long run.
* Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Program at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Afra Alatas is Research Officer at the Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/96, 26 September 2022
POST-ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND THE PAS-UMNO ALIGNMENT
Today, UMNO-PAS relations are no longer defined by cries of kafir-mengkafir. This is largely due to UMNO’s increasingly conservative and revivalist outlook. The seeds of this revivalist outlook were sown in the early 1980s when Mahathir Mohamad was prime minister for the first time. During this period, revivalism was characterised by the desire to Islamise various aspects of life, including educational institutions, government agencies, and financial institutions.[1] The Islamisation agenda was further entrenched during Abdullah Badawi’s administration, when there was a conservative backlash from Islamist groups in response to his vision of Islam Hadhari (Civilisational Islam). Conservative voices gained further foothold when Najib Razak demonstrated willingness to work with PAS when he was prime minister (2009-2018). This was most evident in 2016 when he voiced his support for Abdul Hadi Awang’s move to introduce the Syariah Bill Act 355, which would facilitate the implementation of harsher punishments under the Syariah Courts Act 1965.[2] The UMNO-PAS alignment finally reached its peak in 2019 when both parties agreed to sign a National Consensus charter to formalise their political cooperation. This paved the way for the official founding of Muafakat Nasional (MN), the formal political alliance between the two parties.
IMPLICATIONS OF A GREENING MALAYSIA
However, cracks have appeared in the UMNO-PAS pact under MN. The two parties are currently part of the ruling Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition which also includes Bersatu (Malaysian United Indigenous United Party), another UMNO splinter party. Yet, in the recent state elections in Malacca (2021) and Johor (2022), UMNO and PAS campaigned under separate banners: UMNO contested under its traditional BN banner while PAS joined Bersatu under PN. Going into the next general election, due by September 2023, it is unlikely that UMNO and PAS will reconcile, thus making the future of MN untenable unless major compromises are made.
Nevertheless, while current tensions between UMNO and PAS centre more on political differences, they converge in their approaches to religion, which is characterised by the intertwining of Malay nationalism and Islamism. Arguably, this is a result of growing Islamic revivalism in the last 40 years.[3] To be sure, the revivalist ideologues who were active in the 1970s and 1980s in university campuses, mosques, and dakwah organisations now hold key positions in society: several of the prominent ones are in politics, the civil service, think-tanks, and institutes of higher learning.
As mentioned above, one of the clearest indications that the political leadership represents revivalist thinking was apparent when in 2016, UMNO leaders supported the amendment of Act 355 to raise the authority of the shariah courts. The initiative came from PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang who wanted to table a private members bill in parliament. Prime Minister Najib Razak pledged to support the bill. To be sure, it is unlikely that Najib represented revivalist thinking, and his support for the amendment was mainly political pragmatism. Yet, the same cannot be said about his party members who were proponents of Islamist activism in the 1980s. This includes Najib’s deputy prime minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, who was an active student leader and close to Anwar Ibrahim.
If the amendment was passed, the maximum sentence that could be handed out by the shariah courts would be increased from a RM5000 fine, six lashes of the cane and three years jail to a RM100,000 fine, 100 lashes of the cane, and 30 years imprisonment. A desire for such laws is illustrative of a certain orientation of Islam. It would be inaccurate to argue—as several scholars have done—that UMNO is going through a process of Salafisation.[4] Salafism refers to a puritan approach to Islam which is against innovations such as the celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, visitations to graves of pious persons, and communal feasting. Rather, Malaysia is faced with creeping Islamisation in accordance with Muslim Brotherhood ideology and strategy, aimed at strengthening shariah courts vis-à-vis civil courts, enhancing Islamic identity in the civil service and institutions, and popularising Islamic idioms in politics. These revivalists are not really interested in establishing a theocracy a la Iran for this would be impossible in a country like Malaysia that is not only multi-racial and multi-ethnic but, more importantly, is based on operationalising conservative Islam within the parameters of constitutionalism.
Revivalists attempt instead to promote Islamic perspectives in all aspects of social and political life. In 2001, then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad claimed that Malaysia was already an Islamic state. However, the criteria he adopted in making such a declaration did not include the implementation of hudud laws, and instead he placed more emphasis on the Islamisation of institutions, the bureaucracy and policies.[5] Today, PAS seems to accept this version of an Islamic state. This is in contrast to its stance in the 1990s which was more aligned to the creation of a theocracy and included the desire to replace the Federal Constitution with the Quran, to adopt the system of shura,[6] and to implement hudud laws.
Apart from laws, the growth of the religious bureaucracy is a prime indicator of the greening of Malaysia. In Malaysia, religion falls under the purview of the Islamic religious councils in each state. Members of the religious councils, including the mufti, are appointed by the respective state rulers. Yet, the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM), which functions as the federal government’s Islamic machinery, is a supra organisation with multiple times more funding and resources than the state bureaucracies, and its activities overlap with some of the latter’s functions. In fact, the Johor ruler has a number of times highlighted the need to reduce the size of JAKIM and its annual budget of over RM1 billion. Aside from its funding, the bigger issue would be to observe the background of its personnel. They are mostly graduates from the Middle East and from Malaysia’s own Islamic universities which were established during the revivalist era, as well as academics with revivalist ideas.
Revivalist discourse has also shaped the educational sphere in Malaysia. The International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) was built on the goal of the Islamisation of knowledge, or at least on the promotion of Islamic perspectives on science, economics, and the humanities, among others. The university offers subjects such as Islamic finance and banking apart from traditional Islamic sciences such as jurisprudence, theology, hadith (narrations of the Prophet Muhammad), and Quranic studies. After IIUM was formed, several universities and Islamic departments in national universities either grew or were formed. The majority of these also uphold the Islamisation philosophy, or its calibrated version, referred to as the integration of knowledge. Underlying these ambitions is the need to shun or question Western perspectives that are deemed “secular” or “devoid of religion”. This ignores lessons from early Islamic history which showed that Muslims had learnt from the best practices of others including Western, Chinese, Indian, and indigenous societies, without undermining their belief in God. Despite this, the revivalists have conveniently segregated Islam from the rest. Other new universities include Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM), Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), and colleges such as Kolej Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Selangor (KUIS) which do not challenge the Islamisation of knowledge paradigm.
Additionally, revivalism has grown from strength to strength in the realm of popular culture. Since the 1960s, Malaysia has hosted the international Quranic recitation competition, where participants compete to see who can read the Quran most melodically and accurately based on linguistic rules. Since then, revivalists have found new ways to combine Islam with popular culture. In the 1980s, for example, the number of women wearing headscarves grew exponentially, and the headscarf has now become a fashion industry and a standard marker of Malay identity. There was also the promotion of Islamic pop songs through nasyid in the 1990s, which continue to be popular today. Lately, the concept of hijrah—the journey Prophet Muhammad made from Mekkah to Medina in 622 to escape from the Quraish—has been extended to the spiritual journey of Muslims who become more religious and pious. Often, the decision to use a headscarf is a standard marker of the hijrah. Islamisation has also entered the entertainment scene where artists who become more outwardly religious are celebrated and praised for their successful hijrah, and for women, their decision to wear the headscarf.
Considering all these developments, Malaysian leaders today find it hard to push back against revivalism. For example, when he was the prime minister for the second time in 2018, Mahathir had to give in to conservative pressure. One such occasion was when he came out in support of controversial Indian preacher Zakir Naik being allowed to remain in Malaysia despite requests from the Indian government to have him extradited. Zakir is an Islamist preacher who has made many insensitive comments about non-Muslims.
CONCLUSION: IS ‘KELUARGA MALAYSIA’ ENDORSING OR IMPEDING REVIVALISM?
Gone are the days when UMNO and PAS leaders publicly argue with one another regarding their commitment to Islam. UMNO had wanted to promote Malay identity with Islam as one of its pillars while PAS had preferred to prioritise Islam over Malay identity. Through such public engagements, observers knew where their leaders stood on various religious issues. However, this is not the case today; alliances are now forged and disagreements voiced mainly over political considerations.
Lately, Islamists and Malay nationalists have converged, although their convergence pivots towards the former. This is the outcome of Islamic revivalism since the 1980s. Proponents of Islamisation now occupy important positions in society, alongside the second and third generations of those who uphold the ideology. Additionally, Islamist ideas have now been integrated into policies, especially those concerning Islam and religious matters.
Under the current Ismail Sabri Yaakob government, there has thus far been minimal effort to counteract these Islamist trends. The leader’s priority is to reunite the country, as his political future depends on it. His slogan Keluarga Malaysia (Malaysian Family) is certainly a departure from Badawi’s Islam Hadhari. It also moves away from Najib’s Islam Wasatiyyah (Moderate Islam), which was emphasized after he suffered a decline in popular support in the 2013 election, and after interest in his vision for Satu Malaysia (One Malaysia) waned. However, while it may seem that Ismail Sabri’s vision for the nation is less Islam-centric, a more detailed analysis of his campaign reveals that Islam still takes centre stage, and only time will tell if he will be pressured or is inclined to adopt a more explicit Islamic approach. Nevertheless, Keluarga Malaysia is a platform for the prime minister to push back against conservatism in the form of Islamism and right-wing nationalism. Judging from Mahathir’s failure to curb revivalist trends after returning as prime minister the second time in 2018, future Malaysian prime ministers will face an uphill task if they wish to reverse the greening of Malaysia.
ENDNOTES
[1] Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn Bhd, 1987)
[2] Norshahril Saat, “ACT 355 will divide Malaysians even more,” /media/commentaries/act-355-will-divide-malaysians-even-more-a-commentary-by-norshahril-saat/
[3] Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Islamic Discourses in the Malay-Indonesian World: Critical Perspectives. (Selangor, SIRD, 2014)
[4] Mohamed Nawab Osman, “Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 36(2), 206-231.
[5] IKIM, Malaysia Sebagai Sebuah Negara Islam (Kuala Lumpur, IKIM, 2005)
[6] Shura is a term mentioned in the Quran which means to discuss. Yet, revivalists argue the concept to refer to an alternative system to democracy.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha. Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2022/95 “Dissecting Thailand’s 2022 Military and Police Reshuffles: Palace Proactivity?” by Paul Chambers
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Thailand’s annual military and police reshuffles, due to take effect on 1 October 2022, have been, as usual, greatly influenced by political considerations — including ties with the palace, pre-cadet class membership and factionalism.
- Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan have appointed their favourites to senior posts in the Army and Police.
- The Crown in turn has appointed its own favourites to command the Air Force and Navy, again ensuring that its trusted Army commander remains in place and prepared to appoint favourites to head the Police and Armed Forces in 2023.
- While control over the 2021 reshuffles was shared between the Army’s Burapha Phayak faction and the Crown, in 2022, palace proactivity has enhanced royal influence over the military and police reshuffles.
* Guest writer, Paul Chambers, is Lecturer and Special Advisor for International Affairs, Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. In March-May 2021, he was Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/95, 23 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
This year’s military and police reshuffles in Thailand, due to take effect on 1 October, saw the enhancement of monarchical power over appointments. Decisions regarding reshuffles represent crucial demonstrations of power — on the part of the king, of leading military, and police personalities, or of both working together. The military has seen 765 promotions, involving 18 female officers, while the police force saw 255 promotions, involving 10 female officers. Among military branches, there have been appointments involving 458 generals and 307 colonels or officers at colonel-equivalent rank.[1] Among the police, there have been 169 promotions involving generals and 86 involving colonels.[2] This is thus another year of top-heavy promotions to flag rank for both the Thai military and the country’s police.
CLASS AND FACTIONAL TIES IN THE RESHUFFLES
In Thailand, military promotions are inevitably based on political and personal ties. Shared educational experiences in pre-cadet academy classes have become the most fundamental linkage for soldiers and police due to the fact that almost all future officers attend the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School before enrolling in the specialised Navy, Air Force, Police, or Chulachomklao (Army) academies. Shared experiences in a particular military unit are another basis for factionalism. Factions connected to royalty tend also to have more power. The oldest of these is the Wongthewan or “Divine Progeny” faction, associated with the King’s Guard 1st Infantry Regiment. Wongthewan had enjoyed dominance over other Army factions from 1870 until 1978, and King Vajiralongkorn is himself a member of Wongthewan. The second most powerful Army faction is Burapha Phayak, the “Eastern Tigers”, representing the Second Infantry (and Cavalry) Division. This division is comprised of three regiments, but it is the 21st Infantry Regiment, known as the Thahan Suea Rachini or Queen’s Tiger Guards, that is closest to the palace. Queen Mother Sirikit remains its honorary commandant. After Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra began to enlist allies from among members of Wongthewan in 2003, arch-royalists used the more reliable Burapha Phayak faction to spearhead the 2006 coup, cobble together a 2008-2011 anti-Thaksin civilian government, and oust Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014.[3] Retired-generals-turned-cabinet-ministers Acting Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, currently suspended Prime Minister and concurrent Defense Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and Interior Minister Anupong Paochinda — “the three P’s”[4] — all hail from Burapha Phayak. Though the faction prevailed in intra-service politics in 2007-2016, other Army factions continue to exist: not only Wongthewan, but also the Cavalry, the Special Forces (Muak Daeng or Red Berets), and the 9th Infantry Division (Suea Dam or Black Panthers).
Personalities also play a role in Army factionalism. This is due to the tremendous sway that some individuals possess. First and foremost, Thailand’s current king has sought to take an active role in military reshuffles, unlike his father and predecessor who opted for a more indirect role. Initiatives in this area on the part of the palace have translated into the king’s direct selection of Wongthewan faction members to serve as Army commanders, as in the cases of General Apirat Kongsompong (2018-2022) and General Narongphan Jitkaewthae (2020-2022). In 2018, King Vajiralongkorn established the Kho Daeng or Red Rim clique, whose members attend special short-term military training under royal sponsorship. Only Red Rim officers can now rise to top Army, Air Force, or Supreme Command postings.[5] Meanwhile, though “the three Ps” have influenced military reshuffles over the last decade, growing tensions between Prayut and Prawit[6] have, in recent times, contributed to disagreements between them over decisions relating to reshuffles. In the Police, the “Wongsuwan connection” is influential because Prawit’s brother, retired commander Police General Patcharawat, holds sway over senior police appointments. Prawit’s henchman Captain Thamanat Prompao, who has promoted Prawit’s interests against those of Prayut in Parliament, has pre-cadet class connections with newly-appointed military and police officers. Finally, individuals with some “big” family names have, by virtue of the charisma attached to their kinship ties, succeeded in securing palace support for senior appointments in the military and the police force.
WHAT’S NEW IN 2022?
The tables below group the 2022 leadership changes into six groups: 1) All security services, 2) The Police, 3) The Armed Forces Headquarters, 4) The Army; 5) The 1st Army Region, and 6) Additional crucial Army postings. Each table demonstrates that the year’s appointments have tended to go to either palace favourites or followed the preferences of the Burapha Phayak. Those preferences in turn reflect the influence of Prawit and/or Prayut. Officers from Pre-Cadet Class 22, to which Wongthewan member and Army commander General Narongphan Jitkaewthae belongs, have figured prominently in these appointments. Other classes whose members have received important posts in 2022 are Pre-Cadet Classes 23-26; selected members of these classes will lead Thailand’s military and police in future.
The Security Services as a Whole
The data in Table 1 indicate that the palace and Burapha Phayak—the latter as dominated by Prawit—are engaged in a tug-of-war for control over postings at this highest level of authority. The Navy and Air Force commanders are king’s men first and foremost. Incoming Navy chief Admiral Cherngchai Chomcherngpat and Air Force commander Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn Wannarot join their classmate Army chief General Narongphan in acting as the bulwark of monarchical interests. Admiral Cherngchai’s royalist ties are owed to his being part of a Navy faction connected to former Navy Chief Admiral Luechai Ruddit, brother of Privy Council member General Kampnat Ruddit. For his part, Armed Forces chief General Chalermpol Srisawat must walk a tightrope, as he is close both to the palace and to Burapha Phayak, the military faction to which he belongs. Like Narongphan, Chalermpol is also a member of the king’s Red Rim faction. Meanwhile, Prawit has ensured the appointment of one of his loyalists, Burapha Phayak member General Sanitchanok Sangkachan as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense.[7] This appointment serves to increase Prawit’s influence at the ministry — technically helmed by Prayut himself, in his capacity as defense minister.
Table 1: Key figures in the Security Services, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense | General Sanitchanok Sangkachan* | Prawit Wongsuwan/ Burapha Phayak | 24 | 2023 |
| Commander, Armed Forces | General. Chalermpol Srisawat | Burapha Phayak/Thahan Suea Rachini/Cavalry/palace/ Red Rim | 21 | 2023 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Army | General. Narongphan Jitkaewthae | palace | 22 | 2023 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Navy | Admiral Cherngchai Chomcherngpatat* | palace (Narongphan) | 22 | 2023 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Air Force | Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn Wannarot* | palace (Narongphan)/Red Rim | 22 | 2023 |
| Commander, Royal Thai Police | Police General Damrongsak Kittiprapas* | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan | 22/Police Academy Class 38 | 2023 |
The Police
The annual Police reshuffle sheds light on an arena of competition between the palace and the police clique of Prawit’s brother Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, which includes former Police Generals Somyot Pumpanmuang and Chakthip Chaijinda. This faction was successful in seeking the appointment of Police General Damrongsak Kittiprapas as the new Police commander.[8] At the same time, the Patcharawat-connected Damrongsak hails from the same pre-cadet class as Wongthewan Army chief Narongphan; Prawit may have had to bargain with the palace to ensure that Damrongsak received this posting.
Damrong’s accession to the post of Police commander could help Prawit in the upcoming general election because the police sometimes act as vote canvassers. Two other Wongsuwan minions who were promoted are Police Generals Kittirat Phunphet and Surachate Hakpan, each of whom has cultivated publicity and may one day rise to the post of Police commander. Kittirat is also a pre-cadet academy Class 25 classmate and friend of powerful Prawit minion and influential member of parliament, Captain Thammanat Prompao.
Three other leading police officials figuring in this year’s reshuffle enjoy the favour of the palace. One is Police General Suchart Teerasawat, an officer due to retire in 2023. In contrast, the other two have bright futures. General Torsak Sukvimol, the younger brother of Lord Chamberlain of the Royal Household Air Chief Marshal Satitpong Sukvimol,[9] was this year promoted to deputy Police chief and is likely to rise to the force’s top post upon Damrongsak’s retirement in 2023 and to serve until his own retirement in 2024. Police General Jirabhop Bhuridej—the younger brother of General Jakrapob Bhuridej, who is a commander of the Royal Security Command[10]—is likely to become Police chief in the future.
Table 2: The six senior-most Police officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class/Police Academy Class | Retirement Date |
| Police Commander | Police General Damrongsak Kittiprapas* | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan/ Narongphan | 22/38 | 2023 |
| Deputy Commander 1 | Police General Chinnapat Sarasin* | Sarasin/Apirat[11] | (did not attend pre-cadet academy)/40 | 2023 |
| Deputy Commander 2 | Police General Kittirat Phunphet* | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan | 25/41 | 2026 |
| Deputy Commander 3 | Police General Torsak Sukvimol* | palace/ Sukvimol | (did not attend pre-cadet academy)/51 | 2024 |
| Deputy Commander 4 | Police General Surachate Hakpan* | Prawit and Patcharawat Wongsuwan | 31/47 | 2031 |
| Deputy Commander 5 | Police General Suchart Teerasawat | palace | (did not attend pre-cadet academy)/36 | 2023 |
| Commander, Central Investigation Bureau | Police General Jirabhop Bhuridej | palace/ Bhuridej | 34/50 | 2037 |
The Armed Forces Headquarters
Measured by firepower, Thailand’s Armed Forces Headquarters—formerly known as the Supreme Command—represents a weak entity relative to other security services, particularly the Army. Nevertheless, its leaders are symbolic in the projection of military unity, and the palace is extremely influential in determining headquarters postings. Table 3 presents a number of interesting data. First, the headquarters’ new chief of staff, General Thitichai Thienthong, is a distant relative of the ageing political baron Sanoh Thienthong, a close friend of Prawit’s.[12] Furthermore, General Songwit Noonpakdi—the son of a former Army commander, a long-time Wongthewan faction member, and at the same time an officer who over the last three years was constantly demoted—has risen to become the deputy chief of the Armed Forces, in probable preparation to succeed Chalermpol as commander, or perhaps even to become Army Commander, in 2023.[13] Songwit’s inexplicable resurrection is likely owed to the intervention of the king.
Table 3: The six senior-most Armed Forces Headquarters Officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Armed Forces Commander | General Chalermpol Srisawat | Burapha Phayak/Thahan Suea Rachini/ Cavalry/Red Rim | 21 | 2023 |
| Deputy Commander (Army) | General Songwit Noonpakdi* | Palace/Wongthewan/ Red Rim | 24 | 2025 |
| Deputy Commander (Army) | General. Sirawut Wongkhante* | palace | 22 | 2023 |
| Deputy Commander (Navy) | Admiral Sutinan Samanrak* | palace | 22 | 2023 |
| Deputy Commander (Air Force) | Air Chief Marshal Kongsak Chantarasopa* | palace/Red Rim | 22 | 2023 |
| Chief of Staff | General Tidichai Tienthong* | Prawit Wongsuwan/Sanoh Thienthong | 24 | 2023 |
The Army
The reshuffle in the Army, Thailand’s strongest security service, produced few surprises in 2022. Wongthewan Army commander Narongphan’s continued tenure overshadows the jump by two members of the pro-Prawit Burapha Phayak faction, Generals Jaroenchai Hintao and Suksan Nongbualuang, to become deputy and assistant Army commander, respectively. While this year’s remaining Army appointments have little relative significance, the palace may have a conundrum in 2023, namely the lack of a Wongthewan officer to whom to pass the Army commander’s torch following the retirement of Narongphan. The likelihood is that Burapha Phayak member Jaroenchai will succeed Narongphan; (see Table 4).[14]
Table 4: The five senior-most Army officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Commander | General Narongphan Jitkaewthae | Palace/Wongthewan/Red Rim | 22 | 2023 |
| Deputy Commander | General Jaroenchai Hintao* | Prawit/ Burapha Phayak/Red Rim | 23 | 2024 |
| Assistant Commander 1 | General Suksan Nongbualuang* | Prawit/ Burapha Phayak/Red Rim | 23 | 2025 |
| Assistant Commander 2 | General Kriangkrai Srirak* | Wongthewan | 22 | 2023 |
| Chief of Staff | General Ukrist Buntanon* | Special Operations | 24 | 2025 |
The 1st Army Region
Soldiers stationed in the Army region covering Bangkok and the Central Plains are strategically positioned to thwart coups; its command and a range of others has for that reason been an extremely important post. In 2021, officers with a Burapha Phayak background held most leadership postings in the 1st Army Region; but in 2022, as Table 5 indicates, the new regional commander is General Pana Klaewplotthuk, a trusted Wongthewan officer who apparently has a proclivity for US military hardware.[15] He is a candidate for eventual appointment as Army commander. The remaining deputy or cohort commanders in the region are all “Red Rim” soldiers; three have Wongthewan backgrounds, while two are members of the Burapha Phayak faction of the Army.
Table 5: The six senior-most 1st Army Region officers, 2022-2023. (Asterisks indicate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| 1st Army Region Commander | General Panaplotthuk* | palace/Wongthewan/Red Rim | 26 | 2027 |
| Cohort Commander | General Chinupong Raudsiri* | Prawit/Burapha Phayak/Red Rim | 26 | 2027 |
| Deputy Cohort Commander | General Tawatchai Thangpitakgul* | Apirat/Wongthewan/Red Rim | 27 | 2028 |
| Deputy 1st Army Region Commander | General. Amrit Bunsuya* | Burapha Phayak/Prayut/Red Rim | 27 | 2029 |
| Deputy 1st Army Region Commander | General Kraipop Chaipan* | Apirat/Wongthewan/Red Rim | 24 | 2025 |
| Deputy 1st Army Region Commander | General Worayot Luangsuwan* | Wongthewan/Red Rim | 28 | 2029 |
Miscellaneous Matters
Seven additional new promotions also deserve mention. In the 3rd Army Region, covering Northern Thailand), incoming commander General Suriya Uemsuro hails from Army commander Narongphan’s pre-cadet Class 22—as does National Security Advisor General Supot Malaniyom. Meanwhile, in the Southern 4th Army Region, where a long-running Malay-Muslim insurrection persists, General Santi Sakuntanak has rather surprisingly been appointed 4th Army commander. Santi is a member of pre-cadet Class 25, like Captain Thammanat Prompao. However, it is rumoured that his appointment has come at the behest of the palace.[16] Other postings have proved less surprising: the 1st and 11th Divisions, traditionally closest to the palace, are to be commanded by palace favourites, while the 2nd Infantry Division, home of the Burapha Phayak, will have a new chief who hails from that faction.
Table 6: Additional important Army positions, 2022-2023. (Asterisks designate new appointments.)
| Position | Name | Faction | Pre-cadet Class | Retirement Date |
| Secretary-General, National Security Council | General Supot Malaniyom | Cavalry | 22 | 2023 |
| Commander, Second Army Region | General Sawarat Saengpol | Surasakmontri Task Force[17] | 23 | 2024 |
| Commander, Third Army Region | General Suriya Uemsuro* | Narongphan (Wongthewan) | 22 | 2023 |
| Commander, Fourth Army Region | General Santi Sakuntanak | Wongthewan/ palace | 25 | 2026 |
| Commander, Special Forces Warfare Center | General Issara Damrongsak* | Special Forces | 27 | 2028 |
| Commander, 1st Infantry Division | Colonel Natadej Jantharangsu* | palace | 28 | 2029 |
| Commander, 2nd Infantry Division (“Eastern Tigers”) | General Sarawut Chaiyasit* | Burapha Phayak | 28 | 2030 |
| Commander, 9th Infantry Division | Colonel Wutiya Janthamat* | 9th Infantry Division (“Black Panthers”) | 28 | 2030 |
| Commander, 11th Infantry Division | Colonel Ekanan Maobutr* | palace | 30 | 2032 |
CONCLUSION
With a general election due no later than May 2023, guaranteeing palace-led political stability in Thailand’s military and police is essential to the interests of the state and of the elites. These security services must not only effectively enforce election results but also quell potential protests and ensure effective counterinsurgency in the Deep South. The 2022 military and police reshuffles reflect an attempt on the part of the monarch to enhance palace proactivity in a year that has seen differences between Prawit and Prayut grow. The Constitutional Court temporarily forced Prayut to step down as prime minister in August, and Prawit temporarily succeeded him until a court decision regarding Prayut’s eligibility to extend his tenure as prime minister can be made.[18] The unpopular Prayut’s political career looks to be increasingly on the rocks; and the frail Prawit is 77 years old. Meanwhile, the palace appears to be backing new potential Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul of the military-allied Bhumjaithai Party.
Paralleling these developments in the political arena, the king seems to have intervened in military and police reshuffles, ensuring that arch-royalists whom he trusts assume the top leadership positions. His initiative appears particularly clear in 1) the continued service of Wongthewan Army commander General Narongphan; 2) the promotion of arch-royalist offiders Admiral Cherngchai and Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn to serve as Navy and Air Force commanders; 3) the promotion of Wongthewan General Pana to command the 1st Army Region; 4) preparation for the likely promotion of palace-connected Police General Torsak Sukvimol to command the police in 2023; and 5) the likely appointment of Wongthewan General Songwit Noonpakdi as commander of the Armed Forces. The only fly in the ointment is that the Burapha Phayak faction’s General Jaroenchai could well succeed General Narongphan as Army commander. At the same time, the already overarching dominance of the palace in the security realm may mean that that move would matter relatively little. If the next election pushes “the three Ps” out of the government, then their direct influence over reshuffles will come to an end, leaving the king to extend his sway over such appointments even further. If, however, one or all of those three officers should continue to exert influence over reshuffles, then the jousting match between the Burapha Phayak faction and the palace—so evident in military appointments—is likely to continue.
One aspect of Thailand’s military and police reshuffles remains certain. Since 2008,[19] these reshuffles have remained under the control of the palace and senior security officials; elected civilians have no legal right to influence them. This is despite the fact that civilian control over reshuffles is necessary to enhance democracy in Thailand.
ENDNOTES
[1] “ประกาศสำนักนายกรัฐมนตรี เรื่อง ให้นายทหารรับราชการ” [ Prime Minister’s Office announcement regarding military reshuffle], Royal Gazette, volume 139, section 2213, 10 September 2022 (http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2565/E/213/T_0001.PDF).
[2] “ประกาศสำนักนายกรัฐมนตรี เรื่อง แต่งตั้งข้าราชการตำรวจ”[Prime Minister’s Office announcement of Police reshuffle], Royal Gazette, volume 139, section 209, 7 September 2022 (http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2565/E/209/T_0027.PDF).
[3] See Supalak Ganjanakhundee, A Soldier King: Monarchy and Military in the Thailand of Rama X. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2022).
[4] Anupong’s nickname is “Big Pok”; hence his resultant status as a “P”. See Komchadluek, “พี่น้อง 3ป”. “ประวิตร” เปิดบ้านปั้น อนุพงษ์ – ประยุทธ์ – คมชัดลึก.” [Brothers 3P “Prawit” opens wide the house of Anupong-Prayut], 20 October 2021 (https://www.komchadluek.net/scoop/481858).
[5] Paul Chambers, “‘Red Rim Soldiers’: The Changing Leadership of Thailand’s Military in 2020”, New Mandala, 21 September 2020 (https://www.newmandala.org/the-changing-leadership-of-thailands-military-in-2020/).
[6] Komchadleuk, “เสี่ยงยึด ‘ประยุทธ์-ประวิตร’ ผ่าซีก พปชร. หยุดยื้อเวลา” [Take the Risk of Seizing “Prayut-Prawit”, slicing the Democratic Party, Stopping Time”], 26 February 2022 (https://www.komchadluek.net/scoop/504341).
[7] Matichon, “โปรดเกล้าฯ นายพล 765 นาย ‘บิ๊กหนุ่ม’ ผงาดปลัดกห. ‘บิ๊กจอร์จ-บิ๊กตุ๊ด’ ผบ.ทร.-ผบ.ทอ.” [765 Military Appointments including “Big Num,” Permanent Secretary of Defense; “Big George-Big Thood”, Commanders of the Navy, Air Force], 10 September 2022 ( https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_35560470.
[8] Krungthep Thurakit, “ผ่าขุมกำลัง ’ประวิตร’ พยัคฆ์บูรพา ป้อแป้แต่สุดปึ้ก” [Excision of the power of “Prawit” and Phayak Burapha, but extremely flabby], 28 August 2022 (https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/blogs/news/news_update/1023445); Krungthep Thurakit, “เคาะแล้ว พล.ต.อ.ดำรงศักดิ์ กิตติประภัสร์ ผบ.ตร. คนที่ 13” [Knocked, Pol. Gen. Damrongsak Kittiprapas, the 13th Commander-in-Chief of the Police], 29 August 2022 (https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/1023600).
[9] BBC Thai, “ต่อศักดิ์ สุขวิมล: ผู้บัญชาการ ตร. สอบสวนกลางคนใหม่ กับคติ ‘ทำงานในตำแหน่งที่เราได้รับให้ดีที่สุด’” [Torsak Sukwimol: The new commander of the Central Investigative Police with the motto “Do the best job in the position we have been given”], 25 September 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-54239870).
[10] BBC Thai, “‘ตั๋วช้าง’: เส้นทางสู่ ผบ.ตร. ของ จิรภพ ภูริเดช และ สำราญ นวลมา ในอีก 10 ปี” [“Elephant Tickets”: the path to the police chiefs of Jirabhop Bhuridejand Samran Nuanma in 10 years”], 3 October 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/58770346).
[11] Chinnapat is the son of the late politician and Police chief General Pao Sarasin and is thus a member of one of Thailand’s most storied politico-bureaucratic families. He is also close to former Army commander and current Royal Household Bureau vice chamberlain, General Apirat Kongsompong.
[12] The Standard, “เส้นทางชีวิต ‘พล.อ. ประวิตร วงษ์สุวรรณ’ จากนายทหารสู่ถนนการเมือง ก่อนขยับเป็น ‘รักษาการนายก’” [The life path of “Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan” from military officer to political road before moving to “Acting Prime Minister”], 24 August 24 2022 (https://thestandard.co/prawit-wongsuwan-way/).
[13] Matichon, “โปรดเกล้าฯ นายพล 765 นาย ‘บิ๊กหนุ่ม’ ผงาดปลัดกห. ‘บิ๊กจอร์จ-บิ๊กตุ๊ด’ ผบ.ทร.-ผบ.ทอ.”.
[14] Royal intervention could alternatively see deputy Armed Forces commander Gen. Songwit Noonpakdi succeed Narongphan—despite Songwit not having obtained his military education in Thailand, a traditional obstacle to any command appointment. A direct promotion from the Armed Forces headquarters to Army commander is not unprecedented: palace-favoured General Surayud Chulanond, who currently chairs the Privy Council, followed the same path in 1998.
[15] Krungthep Turakit, “นับถอยหลัง สิ้นอำนาจ ’3 ป.’ “กองทัพ” เปลี่ยนขั้ว รับการเมืองใหม่” [Countdown. End of power of “3 Ps” “Army” changes orientation, gets new politics], 12 September 2022 (https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/1026151).
[16] Isranews, “‘บิ๊กเกรียง’ ผงาดผู้ช่วย ผบ.ทบ. – ‘พล.ต.ศานติ’ ขึ้นแม่ทัพ 4” [“Big Krieng” emerges as assistant commander-in-chief of Royal Thai Army – ‘Major General Santi’ as commander of 4th Army”], 10 September 2022 ( https://www.isranews.org/article/south-news/scoop/111938-santicommander.html); interview with retired senior army officer, 10 September 2022.
[17] The Surasakmontri Task Force, created in 1978 and upgraded in 1995, is a special Army unit charged with handling special operations such as anti-smuggling activities, in the northern part of Thailand’s Northeastern region.
[18] For a discussion on the controversy over how long Prayut is eligible to remain prime minister under the terms of the 2017 Constitution, see Wassana Nanuam, Mongkol Bangprapa and Aekarach Sattaburuth, “PM Tenure Ruling September 30,” Bangkok Post, 15 September 2022 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2391730/pm-tenure-ruling-sept-30).
[19] See section 25, พระราชบัญญัติ จัดระเบียบราชการกระทรวงกลาโหม [Act on the Organization of the Ministry of Defense], Royal Gazette volume 125, part 26, q February 2008 (https://www.rtaf.mi.th/th/Documents/Law/%E0%B8%9E%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%9A%20%E0%B8%88%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%94%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B0%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%B5%E0%B8%A2%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%8A%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B0%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%B2%E0%B9%82%E0%B8%AB%E0%B8%A1_2551.pdf).
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2022/94 “Xin Yimin in Malaysia: Trends and Implications” by Ngeow Chow Bing
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The current size of the xin yimin (new Chinese migrants) in Malaysia is estimated to be 82,000. These xin yimin are also generally mobile, circulatory, and transitory in nature.
- Students, holders of MM2H scheme, expatriates/workers and spouses constitute the major categories of the xin yimin in Malaysia. In recent years, the number of illegal xin yimin in Malaysia has declined.
- Although the COVID-19 pandemic has slowed down the movement of xin yimin into Malaysia, it is expected that this trend is temporary and that the number of xin yimin will continue to increase in the long term.
- Generally, most xin yimin only interact with the ethnic Chinese community in Malaysia due to familiarity with the Chinese language and culture. Latent anxiety about the xin yimin has emerged among Malaysians but it has as yet not become an explosive issue in Malaysian politics.
Guest writer, Ngeow Chow Bing, is Director at the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/94, 23 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
The term xin yimin (new China migrants) refers to the Chinese migrants of the latest wave—those who ventured out of China since the enactment of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening-up” policies in the late 1970s. The recent waves of xin yimin could be characterized as being of mobile, circulatory, and transitory nature, and is fundamentally different from the early Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. Today, out of the eleven Southeast Asian countries, Singapore is one of the few places where the xin yimin can easily obtain legal naturalisation. However, while the xin yimin often stay in this region for a sustained period, they rarely remain for permanent settlement.
Malaysia has a sizable xin yimin population, yet not much research has been published regarding this community, with the exception of a unique aspect of the xin yimin phenomenon in Malaysia—the presence of the ethnic Hui xin yimin. The Hui, who are mostly Chinese Muslims, find Malaysia ideal for a combination of reasons—it is a society in which the practice of their religion, Islam, is widely encouraged and it has sufficient Chinese cultural space for them to live comfortably. The Hui were in fact the xin yimin pioneers in Malaysia.
This paper provides an updated and comprehensive overview of the xin yimin in Malaysia in light of their growing numbers in the country and their potential impact on society.[1] It will discuss their numbers, organisations, and some preliminary implications for Malaysia.
TRENDS AND NUMBERS
It is difficult to estimate the size of the xin yimin community in Malaysia as there is no single definition of the term. However, broadly speaking, xin yimin comprise of three categories: 1) PRC citizens who have successfully become naturalised citizens of Malaysia; 2) PRC citizens who are staying in Malaysia legally for a sustained period of time, such as students, expatriates, workers, and so forth; and 3) PRC citizens who are staying in Malaysia illegally, mostly by overstaying their visas.
Given Malaysia’s strict naturalisation process, the first category is negligible.[2] Putting the second and third categories together, a rough estimation of the number of xin yimin in Malaysia is 82,000 (see Table 1).
Table 1: Estimating the Number of Xin Yimin in Malaysia
Students in Tertiary Institutions
According to the Ministry of Higher Education of Malaysia, as of 2021, the number of PRC students in Malaysia was 28,593.[3] This was a sharp increase from 10,775 in 2015, seeing Malaysia effectively displacing Indonesia and Bangladesh to become the largest source country of international students in Malaysia’s higher education institutions (see Table 2). Moreover, compared to the 1990s and 2000s, when PRC students were generally concentrated in private universities and colleges within the Klang Valley region (the area surrounding the metropolitan Kuala Lumpur), students from PRC are today abundantly found in both public and private institutions across different states in Malaysia, including Sabah and Sarawak. Due to their relatively higher ranking and prestigious status, these public universities are especially popular among PRC students.
This is due to several factors. The relatively affordable price and decent quality of Malaysia’s higher education, the short distance between Malaysia and China, and the widespread use of the English language are intrinsic appeals to the PRC students. Moreover, the recent deterioration of China’s relations with the Western world has had an impact as well, and more and more PRC students are starting to look for alternatives to Western universities. Conversely, the Malaysian government and universities have also been keen to tap into the huge PRC student market, having put many years of effort into marketing themselves.[4]
Table 2: PRC Students in Malaysia’s Tertiary Institutions
Malaysia My 2nd Home (MM2H) Scheme Holders
Malaysia My 2nd Home (MM2H) is a scheme to attract foreign citizens (primarily wealthy retirees) to bring financial capital (in the form of a bank fixed deposits), investment, and consumption to Malaysia. MM2H holders are given a ten-year renewable visa, which almost makes them permanent residents of the country. MM2H holders, however, are not allowed to be employed in any form by either the public or private sectors in Malaysia, but are allowed to buy properties and open up businesses to generate income and employment.
When MM2H was first implemented in the early 2000s, the target population was Japanese retirees. However, the rapid rise of the Chinese economy and its affluent middle class have led to PRC citizens becoming the largest group of MM2H holders. According to the MM2H agency, as of 2019, the total number of accumulated MM2H holders was 48,471. Among them, 30.5 percent were PRC citizens (14,541).[5] Japan was a distant second (11.3 percent).
In 2021, the Malaysian government revised the MM2H criteria with a higher threshold. The revised scheme affects both existing and potential applicants, and the number of MM2H applicants is expected to decline.[6] However, due to the ongoing COVID-related travel restrictions, it is difficult to ascertain the impact of this new scheme on the current and future applicants from the PRC.[7]
Expatriates/Workers
Malaysia issues several categories of visas for foreigners to be employed legally within the country, ranging from professional visit pass (mostly for skilled professionals/ expatriates) to employment and temporary employment pass (generally for low-skilled workers). In the early 2000s, there were tentative talks about opening the general labour market of Malaysia to PRC workers, but up until now, except for a few selected sectors, Malaysia has not opened its general labour market to China’s workers. Therefore, almost all legally employed PRC citizens are likely to be holders of the professional visit pass. However, an unknown portion of them certainly use this pass to work as labourers, especially in the construction sector.
The number of PRC expatriates/workers has increased over the decades, but it noticeably peaked around 2017-2018. In 2017, the Malaysia’s government disclosed that out of 1.7 million foreign workers in Malaysia, PRC workers accounted for 15,399.[8] In 2019, that figure had fallen to 13,305 (out of 1.99 million foreign workers).[9]
On the other hand, the figures for PRC expatriates/workers provided in the Annual Foreign Investment Country Guide: Malaysia, compiled by the Ministry of Commerce of China, were somewhat higher (Table 3), although the declining trend since 2017-2018 can be similarly observed.[10] Reasons for the decline could be partly political (Malaysia’s political transition in 2018 that created some initial uncertainties), economic (China’s slowing economy) and the pandemic (especially in 2020 and after).
Table 3: PRC Expatriates/Workers in Malaysia According to China’s Ministry of Commerce)
It is safe to assume that the data from both China and Malaysia only include workers with legal status. There are however occasional reports of PRC workers being illegally employed (and exploited) in Malaysia, especially in construction projects contracted to private enterprises from China.[11] The exact number of illegal workers however, is difficult-to-calculate (see later discussion). Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that the number of illegal PRC workers exceeds the legal one, and based on the declining press reports on this issue, the trend suggests that the number of illegal PRC workers in Malaysia has lessened, although they are by no means completely absent.
Spouses, Students in Private International Schools and Their Guardians, Permanent Residents
PRC spouses of Malaysian citizens (mostly wives) staying in Malaysia are estimated to number around 6,000.[12] They possess a “long-term social visit pass” for their stay, which is renewable every five years. Additionally, they are allowed to work, but subject to certain conditions.
Private international schools have sprung up in Malaysia in the past few years and have attracted many affluent families within Malaysia and internationally. These international schools can issue their own student visas to international students. As of 2021, there were 924 PRC students attending these schools using student visas, ranking second to South Korea, which has 1,717 students).[13] Given that most PRC students are below the legal age of eighteen, they would likely have at least one guardian (parent or grandparent, widely known as peidu mama or peidu nainai) staying with them. As such, the total number of these students and guardians is estimated to be 2,000.
As of June 2022, 2,346 PRC citizens have obtained Permanent Resident (PR) status in Malaysia. China is the seventh largest source country for PRs in Malaysia.[14]
Illegal Xin Yimin
Overstaying their visas is one of the main ways for PRC citizens to reside in Malaysia illegally. In 2004, a deputy consul at the Embassy of China in Malaysia suggested that possibly a whopping 185,000 PRC citizens had overstayed their visa periods in Malaysia. However, it was later clarified that the number could be between 20,000 and 40,000. Most of these came from rural areas in China and were deceived by fraudulent companies and agents. They were promised legal working permits and manual labour work in Malaysia but suffered serious exploitation once they arrived.[15]
Other than manual work, a few of these illegal PRC citizens were also entrepreneurial enough to open small businesses on their own, often as food stall operators, hawkers and small traders. Female prostitution is also another line of illicit/illegal work. Not all prostitutes were illegal; some had proper visas such as student pass or social visit pass. However, many of them were victims of criminal gangs who had deceived and manipulated them into prostitution.
In 2019, the director general of the immigration department of Malaysia disclosed that between 2016 and 2018, 18,341 PRC citizens who entered Malaysia via tourist visas did not have exit records.[16] This could be taken as a rough estimation of the number of PRC citizens staying illegally in Malaysia.[17] Despite the lack of consistent data, the long-term trend is almost certainly a declining one. As China becomes richer, the outward drive for its poorer citizens to do manual labour legally or illegally outside the country also declined. Furthermore, the Chinese government has always warned its citizens against taking up illegal jobs in Malaysia, and both Malaysia and China have collaborated to resolve the issue.[18]
ORGANISATIONS AND NETWORKS
In terms of formal organisations, xin yimin organisations are mostly concentrated in two sectors: the business sector and the student body (Table 4).
Table 4: Organisations Related to Xin Yimin in Malaysia
The most important and authoritative xin yimin business organisation in Malaysia is the China Enterprises Chamber of Commerce in Malaysia (CECCM), founded in 2002. Its secretariat is housed at the Bank of China in Malaysia and its current chairperson is the president of Malaysia’s Bank of China. The chairperson of CECCM, by convention, always comes from the banking industry. It has over 250 members (corporate members only, individuals as associate members), and a majority of the membership consists of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). CECCM maintains close ties with the Embassy of China, particularly the Trade and Economic department. It has two autonomous branches: Northern Malaysia (Penang) and Sarawak. It serves as a platform for the PRC’s SOEs to discuss business collaborations and also as a channel of interaction with relevant government departments of Malaysia. Other than business activities, it also organises charity and corporate social responsibility events on behalf of its members.[20]
One of the non-“mainstream” xin yimin business organisations in Malaysia is the China Enterprises Association of Malaysia (CEAM). Founded in 2015, it caters to China’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Malaysia, and currently has a membership of 160 SMEs. The founding of CEAM was somewhat a contentious affair, especially with the presence of CECCM. On top of that, it was not officially endorsed by the Embassy of China in its early years. However, in recent years, CEAM has been accepted as the secondary xin yimin business organisation by the Chinese Embassy.[21]
A new phenomenon in Malaysia is the rise of various PRC provincial and regional business associations, consisting of PRC business entities or persons from the same province or region (such as Hebei, Shandong, etc). As of today, there are eight of them. These organisations provide new linkages between Malaysia and different provinces of China, beyond Guangdong and Fujian.
For PRC students, the major organisation is the China Students Association Malaysia (CSAM). There have been disputes over its founding year (2002 or 2008) but it was formally registered in 2013 in Malaysia, serving as the national organisation connecting all PRC student associations in over 20 Malaysian higher education institutions (public and private, mostly in the Klang Valley). CSAM also serves as a network for taking care of PRC students, liaises with the Embassy of China (supporting Embassy activities such as festivals of leaders’ visits), and organises social, educational, and youth exchange activities between Malaysia and China.[22] Another student-related organisation, although not directly, is the Malaysia Association of China Students Alumni (MACSA). Founded in 2012, it has about 1,000 members. These are PRC citizens who studied in Malaysia’s universities and have stayed on to work in Malaysia after graduation.
The president of MACSA (Huang Bin) also founded a non-governmental organisation (NGO) known as the Malaysia China Welfare Advisory Society to help distressed PRC citizens in Malaysia.[23] It has a cooperative relationship with the Consular Protection Department of the Embassy of China and operates a hotline and a WeChat account. The Malaysia China Welfare Advisory Society has been praised by the Chinese government as being exemplary in providing assistance to xin yimin.[24]
IMPLICATIONS
Overall, despite the pandemic temporary changing migration patterns, the number of xin yimin in Malaysia is expected to increase. Most xin yimin find Malaysia a comfortable place to live in due to its sizable ethnic Chinese community. As a xin yimin said, “there are so many Chinese that you can integrate into the society easily.”[25] In fact, xin yimin-styled “Chinatowns” have emerged in Kuala Lumpur such as Nanjing Street at Sunway Velocity Mall. However, the comfort that the xin yimin feel about the sizable Malaysian Chinese community also suggests that most of the xin yimin have an asymmetrical pattern of interaction with the broader Malaysian society. Apart from the Hui, most xin yimin have relatively limited interaction with the non-Chinese communities in Malaysia. In this sense, whatever impact that the xin yimin may create in the future would be first absorbed by the Malaysian Chinese community–the community that is effectively a buffer between the xin yimin and other circles of Malaysian society. So far, the ethnic Chinese do not perceive the xin yimin as a threat, nor does their presence significantly shape the way they practise their culture.[26]
Some Malaysians are worried that the xin yimin are economic competitors to the local population and that they do not bring economic benefits. A Malaysian academic once commented that Malaysians may “not be comfortable with a glut of foreigners coming to Malaysia and potentially doing business or eating into the market. If this happens, it may strain the relations between Malaysians–regardless of race–and Chinese nationals.”[27] However, the economic impact of the xin yimin in Malaysiahas never actually been properly studied. While they could certainly bring competition to the locals and may not provide economic spillover effects, they could generate consumption, employment, capital inflows, and new business opportunities for Malaysians.
Finally, Malaysian politics is hypersensitive to ethnic issues and there is latent anxiety, especially among the Malays, that the xin yimin will upset the delicate ethnic balance in the country. The asymmetrical pattern of interaction between the xin yimin and the Malaysian society suggests that outside of the ethnic Chinese circle, much is unknown about this community. Populist fear of large-scale Chinese “colonisation” that may undermine the local Malay majority and upset the delicate balance is an easily exploitable myth. Furthermore, anti-xin yimin fake news has also emerged after 2018.[28] Some insensitive xin yimin have also been oblivious to sensitive historical and ethnic issues in Malaysia, and may behave in ways that fuel suspicion and hostility.[29]
CONCLUSION
Over the last 20 years, the xin yimin have become more proper (with fewer illegal xin yimin), organised, and resourceful. Once the pandemic-related restrictions are lifted in China, the upward trend of the xin yimin in Malaysia is likely to resume. In one sense, this is the real manifestation of the “people-to-people exchanges” between Malaysia and China and it should not be feared. Rather, the xin yimin’s potential to contribute to the well-being of Malaysian society and bilateral ties should be harnessed and welcomed. Nonetheless, more efforts to understand and study their potential social, cultural, economic, and even political implications are needed.
ENDNOTES
[1] The only work that provides a general picture of the xin yimin in Malaysia is Yao Zhulin, Shengcun yu fazhan: Zhongguo xinyimin zai Malaixiya (Survival and Development: The New Chinese Migrants in Malaysia), (Master Thesis, Xiamen University, 2007).
[2] According to Malaysia’s National Registration Department, from 2018 to 2019, only 37 persons from China were granted citizenship. It is safe to assume that the numbers for other years are fairly similar. See “Home Ministry denies allegations that 100,000 Chinese nationals were granted citizenship under Pakatan govt,” The Malaya Mail, 30 May, 2019. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/05/30/home-ministry-denies-allegations-that-100000-chinese-nationals-were-granted/1757870
[3] See https://www.mohe.gov.my/muat-turun/statistik.
[4] Interview with a PRC student leader from China Students Association Malaysia, 18 April 2022.
[5] See https://www.mm2h.com/mm2h-statistics/. Successful applicants can bring in family dependents too, so the potential number could be higher.
[6] Nur Hanani Azman, “Tougher new requirements may see fewer MM2H applicants,” The Malaysian Reserve, 24 August 2021. https://themalaysianreserve.com/2021/08/24/tougher-new-requirements-may-see-fewer-mm2h-applicants/
[7] Many MM2H applicants from the PRC were aiming to buy properties built by PRC companies, in Malaysia. The collapse of PRC-linked property projects in Malaysia, such as the Forest City in southern Johor, also could impact the number of PRC applicants of MM2H.
[8] Aina Nasa, “More than 1.7 million foreign workers in Malaysia; majority from Indonesia,” New Straits Times,27 July 2017. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/07/261418/more-17-million-foreign-workers-malaysia-majority-indonesia
[9] Ida Lim, “Are fears over China’s citizens in Malaysia justified? What the numbers tell us,” The Malay Mail, 22 January 2020. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/01/22/are-fears-over-chinas-citizens-in-malaysia-justified-what-the-numbers-tell/1830360
[10] Annual Foreign Investment Country Guide: Malaysia is available at: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/gbdqzn/upload/malaixiya.pdf. The latest edition is 2021, which covered the figure in 2020.
[11] “108 Chinese Workers Cheated to Malaysia,” China.org, 20 May 2004; http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/May/95995.htm; Kow Gah Chie and Adrian Wong, “Broken dreams – the plight of Forest City’s migrant workers,” Malaysiakini, 8 May 2017. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/381555
[12] This is a rough estimation. Twenty years ago, the Malaysian government disclosed that there were about 2,700 PRC spouses living in Malaysia. A conservative estimation roughly doubling the size in twenty years is acceptable. See. Yao Zhulin, Shengcun yu fazhan, p. 20.
[13] Parliamentary written replies, 8 August 2022, Question # 103.
[14] Parliamentary written replies, 8 August 2022, Question # 102.
[15] “185,000 Chinese Overstayed Their Visas in Two Years,” Sina News, 15 April 2004. https://news.sina.cn/sa/2004-04-15/detail-ikkntiak9809828.d.html; Yao Zhulin, Shengcun yu fazhan, p. 20.
[16] He was actually correcting the erroneous figure (76.258) that was reported in an Auditor General report in 2019. See “High number of overstaying Chinese, Indian tourists worries ministry,” The Malay Mail, 3 December 2019. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/12/03/high-number-of-overstaying-chinese-indian-tourists-worries-ministry/1815783
[17] In August 2022, the Minister of Home Affairs of Malaysia refuted the number of 1.2 million PRC citizens who had entered the country but had no exit record in from 2018 to 2021, which was reported earlier in the media, claiming that this was a false number. See “Home Ministry will clarify on claims that 1.2 million Chinese nationals still in the country, says minister,” The Malay Mail, 26 August 2022. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/08/26/home-ministry-will-clarify-on-claims-that-12-million-chinese-nationals-still-in-country-says-minister/24973
[18] “Malaysia, China are collaborating on immigration breach,” Malaysiakini, 19 September 2019.https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/492467
[19] Overseas Chinese Muslim Association is briefly discussed in this article. See Ngeow Chow Bing and Ma Hailing, “More Islamic, No Less Chinese: Explorations into the Overseas Chinese Muslim Identities in Malaysia” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39: 12 (2016), pp. 2108-2128.
[20] Interview with a member of CECCM, 26 April 2022.
[21] Interview with a Xin Yimin who is familiar with the matter, 11 May 2022.
[22] Interview with a PRC student leader from China Students Association Malaysia, 18 April 2022.
[23] “Malaysia China Welfare Advisory Society to help the fellow nationals: Language and communication difficulties causing problems in seeking help,” Sinchew Daily, 3 October 2019. https://www.sinchew.com.my/20191003/%E9%A9%AC%E4%B8%AD%E6%8F%B4%E5%8D%8F%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%BA%E5%90%8C%E8%83%9E%E8%A7%A3%E5%9B%B0%C2%B7%E8%AF%AD%E8%A8%80%E6%B2%9F%E9%80%9A%E9%9A%9C%E7%A2%8D%E5%9C%A8%E9%A9%AC%E6%B1%82%E5%8A%A9%E6%97%A0/
[24] Discussion with a Xin Yimin who is familar with the matter, 6 May 2022.
[25] Tashny Sukumaran and Coco Liu, “Why are Chinese moving to Malaysia by the thousands?” South China Morning Post, 25 March 2017. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2080869/why-are-chinese-moving-malaysia-thousands
[26] For example, the increasingly ubiquitous xin yimin Chinese restaurants in Malaysia have by no means diluted or threatened the distinctly Malaysian Chinese restaurants. See Du Jingxuan “Mainland Chinese restraurants coming in big in Malaysia; Will they change the food culture of local Chinese?” The News Lens, 19 August 2021.https://www.thenewslens.com/feature/aseanpodcast/155205
[27] Sukumaran and Liu, “Why are Chinese moving to Malaysia by the thousands?”
[28] Ida Lim, “In Malaysia, are China’s citizens becoming the new bogeyman?” The Malay Mail,22 January 2020. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/01/22/in-malaysia-are-chinas-citizens-becoming-the-new-bogeyman/1830299
[29] In early 2021, a xin yimin-linked Chinese restaurant that was decorated with Maoist and communist themes was raided and investigated by the police. See Imran Hilmy, “Cops raid restaurant decorated with Communism-inspired wallpaper,” The Star, 3 January 2021. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/01/03/cops-raid-restaurant-decorated-with-communism-inspired-wallpaper
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