2022/93 “Climate Emergency and Food-Energy Conflicts in Southeast Asia” by Prapimphan Chiengkul
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Climate change influences food, water and energy security in multiple ways. The current agri-food system significantly contributes to climate change, and the adverse effects of climate change will likely lead to higher food prices in the future. Additionally, transitions to renewable energy increase competition for land and water usage, which potentially undermine agri-food production.
- High food prices and increased resource competition to meet food-energy needs have often led to social tensions and socio-environmental conflicts in Southeast Asia.
- Increased biofuel production in the future could potentially exacerbate environmental degradation, drive up food prices, intensify existing land conflicts and encourage new waves of large-scale land acquisitions.
- It is important that Southeast Asia balances the goals of food-energy security, ecological sustainability and social justice. Sovacool’s (2021) ‘4Es’ processes – enclosure, exclusion, encroachment and entrenchment – should be used to guide policy decisions.
- Moreover, policymakers should support land-use rights for poverty reduction and food security purposes, seek peaceful resolutions to land conflicts, promote sustainable farming of energy crops, and increase support for research on second- and third- generation biofuels.
* Prapimphan Chiengkul is Visiting Research Fellow with the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, Assistant Professor at Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University in Thailand, and Honorary Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in the UK.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/93, 20 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
Scientific evidence suggests that climate change has adverse effects on food and water security, and are likely to drive up food prices in the future (IPCC 2022a, 10-14). To tackle climate change, transitions to renewable energy are necessary. However, this increases competition for land and water usage, which potentially undermines agri-food production (FAO 2021, 29). Renewable energy projects have also led to social conflicts in many countries across the globe (Sovacool 2021).
After providing an overview of the interconnections between climate change and food-water-energy security, this article discusses instances where high food prices and increased resource competition to meet food-energy needs have led to social tensions and socio-environmental conflicts in Southeast Asia. The focus of the article is on the contentious issue of biofuels, and suggests that future food-energy demands could potentially exacerbate environmental degradation, drive up food prices, intensify existing land conflicts and encourage new waves of large-scale land acquisitions in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it is important that Southeast Asia strikes a balance between food and energy production, ecological sustainability and social justice. The final section discusses some policy recommendations.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOOD-WATER-ENERGY CONNECTIONS
There are multiple ways in which climate change is interconnected with food, water and energy security. On the one hand, the agricultural sector, and also the production, distribution and consumption of food generally, significantly contribute to climate change. One estimate suggests that the current agri-food system is responsible for around 21-37 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions (Mbow et al. 2019, 439). Notably, the current agri-food system is very energy-intensive (Weis 2010, 321; Sage 2013, 75), roughly accounting for 30 percent of the world’s energy consumption (IRENA and FAO 2021, 9). Since industrial agriculture relies significantly on fossil fuels, rising energy costs will also lead to higher food prices (for further discussion, see: Chiengkul 2017, 13) On the other hand, climate change has adverse effects on global food and water security (IPCC 2022a, 10-14; Quiggin et al. 2021, 6-9; Mbow et al. 2019, 446-447; FAO et al. 2021). Depending on actions to tackle climate change in the near future, the number of people facing hunger in 2050 is predicted to be between 8 and 80 million (IPCC 2022c, 5). If global warming reaches 2 degrees Celsius, between 800 million and 3 billion people might suffer from chronic water scarcity due to droughts (IPCC 2022c, 5). Moreover, those whose livelihoods predominantly rely on nature, such as small-scale farmers and fishermen, are highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Other people who are especially at risk are those in areas that have poor governance structures, widespread poverty and violent conflicts (IPCC 2022a, 12).
To eradicate global hunger by 2030, 50 per cent more food, animal feed and biofuels ought to be produced by 2050 compared to levels in 2012 (FAO 2021, xi). However, this poses a serious challenge because current agricultural production has already put unsustainable pressures on land and water resources. Globally, the agricultural sector withdraws significant amounts of freshwater, which often exacerbates water stress in many countries (FAO 2021, 16). In addition, global transitions to renewable energy, such as solar, wind, hydropower and biofuels, will increase competition for land and water usage, which potentially undermine agri-food production (FAO 2021, 29; IRENA and FAO 2021, 32; Weis 2010, 325) and fuel social conflicts (Sovacool 2021). Due to higher economic returns, more farmlands are likely to be converted for renewable energy production. Solar and wind parks in India, for example, have been linked to land dispossessions that economically harm many locals, including indigenous farmers (Chandran 2021). Examples from Southeast Asia are discussed in the next section.
FOOD CRISIS, RESOURCE COMPETITION AND SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Climate change will increase the scale and frequency of extreme weathers and natural disasters, and it is highly likely that this will cause a reduction in food supply and lead to higher prices in South and Southeast Asia (IPCC 2022b).Drastic increases in food prices may give rise to social instability. During the 2007-2008 global food crisis, protests against high food prices occurred in many countries across the globe, including in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia (United Nations 2012, 62). The hikes in food prices disproportionately affected low-income consumers, and Southeast Asian countries had to implement many measures to circumvent large-scale food riots in 2008, such as export restrictions, food subsidies and limits on rice purchases in supermarkets (Fuller 2008; The Observer 2008). The Philippines also used police and military forces to distribute subsidised rice to poor populations (Fuller 2008). Slightly more than a decade later, the world is facing another global food crisis. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have warned that, in 2022, food crises in many countries are likely to be much more severe than the 2007-2008 global food crisis (FAO-WFP 2022). Rising food and energy prices have been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, as well as adverse effects of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and other conflicts around the globe (FAO-WFP 2022). Since large proportions of the populations in Southeast Asian countries, particularly in the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam, spend significant amounts of their incomes on food, there are concerns that inflated food prices may prompt social unrest (Ong 2022). In the Philippines, for example, almost 40 per cent of household spending was on food in 2021 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2022). Since lower-income households in Asia spend larger shares of their incomes on food compared to average households, they are likely to be more intensely affected by the current food price inflation (Elbehri et al. 2022, 19).
As discussed previously, tackling climate change requires rapid expansion of renewable energy capacities across the globe, but renewable energy and food production compete for land and water resources. There are many examples from Southeast Asia that demonstrate how such competition for resources have led to socio-environmental conflicts. Biomass plants in Thailand, for example, have increased competition for water usage and caused health concerns in local communities (see, for example: Chandran 2021). However, it is not necessarily the case that large-scale acquisitions for energy production will always cause social conflicts. In Vietnam, for example, there had been large-scale land acquisitions for hydropower projects, and solar and wind parks had also raised concerns about food-energy trade-offs (Urban et al. 2018, 576-578). Nevertheless, some measures were put in place to mitigate negative socio-environmental consequences of the projects, including financial compensations for those who were adversely affected (Urban et al. 2018, 577). As discussed below, expansions of energy-crop plantations in Southeast Asia also have negative socio-environmental consequences that ought to be addressed.
Biofuels, land acquisitions and conflicts
Following the 2007-2008 global food crisis, there was an increase in large-scale transnational acquisitions of land across the globe (see, for example: United Nations 2010; Borras et al. 2011) for the production of multiple-purpose crops that can be used for food, feed and fuel (Borras et al. 2016, 94). Energy crops that are commonly used for biofuel production – sugarcane, oil palm, soy and maize (Borras et al. 2016, 94) – are also important crops that are grown in Southeast Asia. Farmlands in Southeast Asia have continually been converted for monocrop plantations long before the 2007-2008 food crisis, but higher profitability of energy crops further stimulated agricultural investments and expansions of energy-crop plantations. Since the early 2000s, many countries such as the US, Brazil, the EU, China, India, have substantially increased their biofuels production (Weis 2009, 152), and this global trend has repercussions in Southeast Asia. For example, due to large-scale conversions of its rapeseed oil output for biodiesel production, the European Union doubled its imports of palm oil from Southeast Asia between 2000 and 2006, significantly driving up palm oil prices (Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 5). Indonesia and Malaysia – the two biggest world producers of palm oil – converted large-scale forest lands into oil palm plantations in this period (Weis 2009, 152; Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 7-9). Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand – now major producers of biofuels in Southeast Asia – also formed national plans to promote biofuels in early-to-mid 2000s (Kumar, Shrestha, and Abdul Salam 2013, 834; Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 5). Renewable energy development plans in these countries also significantly rely on biofuels (Ying, Chien, and Fan 2020, 17-19).
At present, only “first-generation” biofuels are produced at large scales. These include ethanol (often derived from maize and sugarcane) and biodiesel (often derived from soybeans, rapeseed and oil palm) (Weis 2009, 151-152; Correa et al. 2019, 251; Kumar, Shrestha, and Abdul Salam 2013, 833-834). Biodiesel production in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand predominantly relies on oil palm, which is used as both food and fuel (Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 2). Since first-generation biofuels are based on food crops, large-scale production of these biofuels could potentially raise the price of these crops and undermine food security. For example, when palm oil prices increased drastically between 2006 and 2008 due to increased global demand, this benefited palm oil producers in Southeast Asia whilst poor households in the region suffered from increased food prices (Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 5). Increased production of energy crops also translates to increased demands for agricultural inputs, such as land and fertilisers, which puts upward pressure on the costs of agri-food production. In Thailand, for example, many Thai and non-Thai transnational companies increased their agricultural investments after the 2007-2008 food crisis and also tried to secure farmlands for the production of cash crops and energy crops. This significantly drove up the prices and rental costs of farmlands, which adversely affected the economic situations of small- and medium-scale farmers in many parts of the country (Chiengkul 2017, 40-42).
The production of energy crops is rather land-intensive, and it has also been linked to many environmental problems. These issues raise questions regarding the sustainability of first-generation biofuels. Expansion of oil palm plantations in Southeast Asia, for example, have often led to deforestation and the reduction of biodiversity (Correa et al. 2019, 251; Kumar, Shrestha, and Abdul Salam 2013, 833; Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 7-9). In Indonesia and Malaysia, large expansions of oil palm plantations in the 2000s involved conversions of peatlands, which are known to be important carbon sinks (Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 4). Additionally, the use of pesticides, herbicides and fertilisers in the monocropping of energy crops harms the environment, and there are also concerns over water depletion, soil degradation and erosion (Correa et al. 2019, 251; Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 4-5). Notably, other types of renewable energy technology, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, currently has more land-use efficiency than biofuels derived from oil palm (Vidinopoulos, Whale, and Fuentes Hutfilter 2020, 8, 10). Moreover, if one takes into account feedstock production, as well as processing, transportation, fermentation and distillation stages of biofuels, then fossil energy used in production of biofuels tends to be higher than the amount of energy that can be obtained from biofuel outputs (Weis 2009, 152).
Expansion of farmlands for energy-crop production has often led to social conflicts. In 2012, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the right to food and the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples warned that there were notable cases of large-scale land acquisitions in Southeast Asia that lacked transparency, undermined biodiversity, and also closed off people’s access to land that they previously relied on for food (OHCHR 2012). In Merauke, South Papua, Indonesia, for example, it has been noted that the conversion of around 1-2 million hectares of forest and farm lands into large-scale plantations could undermine food security for around 50,000 people (OHCHR 2012). In the South of Thailand, many conflicts erupted over the leasing of state-owned and reserved forest lands for large-scale oil palm plantations. There were many instances where violence, including assassinations, were used against land-reform activists (Chiengkul 2017, 144, 161). Similar cases have also been documented across Southeast Asia. For example, a large transnational sugar company has been sued for forcibly evicting around 700 Cambodian farmers from their land between 2008 and 2009 (Agrawal 2020). In the Philippines, conflicts over land rights broke out between a giant palm oil company and the Higaonon tribe in Misamis Oriental in 2011 (Silverio 2011). There were also some protests led by villagers in Sarawak, Malaysia, against a palm oil company the same year (Silverio 2011; see also: Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 9). In Indonesia, over 600 communities had conflicts with palm oil companies between 2006 and 2010 (Silverio 2011; see also: Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 5, 7-8), and there were also allegations of police harassment and forced evictions (Manibo 2015).
It is likely that Southeast Asia will continue to promote large-scale renewable energy, including biofuels, for the sake of energy security, for economic benefits and as part of countries’ climate change mitigation strategies. As discussed above, this could potentially exacerbate environmental degradation, intensify existing land conflicts and encourage new waves of large-scale land acquisitions. Policy recommendations to tackle these issues are discussed in the next section.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Aside from short-term policies to tackle the current food price crisis, such as measures to strengthen intra-regional food trade and provisions of food subsidies, Southeast Asian governments should have long-term plans to promote ecological sustainability and socially just transitions in the agricultural and energy sectors. Socio-environmental problems associated with oil palm plantations in Southeast Asia have also negatively affected the export prospects of Southeast Asian countries (see, for example: Azhar, Nobilly, et al. 2021), so there are economic reasons why countries should commit to addressing these issues. Policy recommendations specifically related to the promotion of biofuels in Southeast Asia are discussed below.
- (De Schutter 2011, 271), and there should be peaceful resolutions to conflicting claims over land ownerships. It is important to consider that, in many cases, using land to enhance food security for the local populations is likely to have more poverty-reducing impact compared to using land to grow energy crops for biofuel production (De Schutter 2011, 249, 256). Land-use rights for landless farmers should also be supported, especially for the purpose of poverty reduction and for ensuring local food security (see, for example: Chiengkul 2017, 145-147).
- (see discussions in, for example: Fortin and Richardson 2013). Instead of monocropping, sustainable farming techniques should be used in the production of energy crops. These techniques include, for example, the use of organic fertilisers, intercropping of energy crops with other food or perennial crops, and integrating the production of energy crops with livestock raising. (Azhar, Nobilly, et al. 2021; Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 10). Integrated energy-livestock production increases land-use efficiency and enhances both food and fuel production. It could also provide an alternative source of income for farmers and farm workers, as well as increase food variety in the region. Moreover, targeted grazing by livestock can be used for weed control instead of herbicides that has adverse effects on farm workers’ health and the environment (Azhar, Nobilly, et al. 2021; Azhar, Tohiran, et al. 2021).
- (Correa et al. 2019, 256, 259-260; Weis 2009, 151-152). Third-generation biofuels based on microalgae is even more promising because they require less freshwater, pesticides and cultivation areas to grow. Microalgal production systems can also potentially capture carbon dioxide, as well as help with waste water remediation (Correa et al. 2019, 252-253). Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have implemented small-scale pilot projects to study second- and third-generation biofuels, but much higher levels of support are needed (Kumar, Shrestha, and Abdul Salam 2013, 834; Ying, Chien, and Fan 2020, 18; Mukherjee and Sovacool 2014, 7-8).
When planning and implementing renewable energy projects, governments, the private sector and other non-governmental organisations in Southeast Asia should aim to circumvent or alleviate socio-environmental conflicts. They should take into consideration the interconnected ‘4Es’ processes – enclosure (what resources are being captured), exclusion (who are being excluded from the decision-making process), encroachment (what environmental damage will occur), and entrenchment (whether the projects will exacerbate inequalities) (adapted from: Sovacool 2018, 2021).
Fuelled by climate change, food-energy demands are likely to continue to increase in the future. To tackle this challenge, it is imperative that Southeast Asia balances food and energy production in ways that also promote ecological sustainability and social justice.
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“Health Security in Indonesia and the Normalization of the Military’s Non-Defence Role” by Jun Honna
2022/92 “Business Throws its Support Behind Indonesia’s Opposition-Free Liberal Democracy” by Max Lane
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Some writers have described political life in Indonesia as regressing into illiberal democracy due to the absence of an opposition that can offer itself as a viable alternative to the current government. However, it may be more useful to characterise contemporary Indonesian politics as going through a phase of liberal democracy where the government is comprised of most of the major parties in parliament, with not much divergence in their policy preferences. A typical opposition is absent not due to suppression but because it has yet to evolve.
- In this opposition-free liberal democracy, the government commands an overwhelming parliamentary majority with the capacity to pass constitutional amendments, which could include a provision to allow President Widodo to stand for another term as President. Whether this materialises would depend on the political parties’ calculations on how this might impact on their own prospects and the possible reactions from civil society.
- As electioneering activities start to warm up for the 2024 elections, potential candidates are seeking to enhance their credentials and quietly assessing their own electability. In this context, the traditional political party elites have to contend with a new breed of entrepreneur politicians whose profiles are boosted by their achievements in the ongoing transformation of the Indonesian economy.
- Presumably to alleviate political tensions and promote investor confidence, an important business federation, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, has publicly called for election contenders to promise that the losing candidates will be brought into the government after the elections. Clearly the business community favours the sort of consensual politics ushered in by Jokowi’s inclusion of Prabowo and his allies in the government after the previous elections.
* Max Lane is Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is the author of “An Introduction to the Politics of the Indonesian Union Movement” (ISEAS 2019) and the editor of “Continuity and Change after Indonesia’s Reforms: Contributions to an Ongoing Assessment” (ISEAS 2019). His newest book is “Indonesia Out of Exile: How Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet Killed a Dictatorship”, (Penguin Random House, forthcoming).
ISEAS Perspective 2022/92, 19 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
Academic analysts of Indonesian politics have been arguing whether Indonesia’s political system is an “illiberal democracy” or a democracy sliding backwards, a regressing democracy.[1] However, there are other ways to understand what is happening. Indonesia’s political format since 1998 has been that of liberal democracy but perhaps better described as ‘liberal democracy minus’. It is important to understand the “minus” aspects in order for us to locate current tensions and contradictions.
The classic liberal democratic format has multi-party free elections, freedom of speech and organisation, and a free press. All liberal democracies so far have existed under capitalist economic systems, which means that while formal democratic rights are legally available to all, there is no level playing field in terms of resources available to different political actors. Acceptance of capitalism defines what is considered legitimate questions for contestation in mainstream politics.
This situation also applies in Indonesia, but with some minuses. First, in classic liberal democracy, anti-capitalist ideologies are not banned but are marginalised due to the long-term ideological hegemony of pro-capitalist outlooks. In Indonesia, because of its specific history, such ideologies, in particular, what is classified as Marxism-Leninism, are formally banned. Free speech is also limited formally in that advocating a change of the formal state ideology, Pancasila, is prohibited,[2] as is advocating for separatism of any part of Indonesia.
In some senses, they are in practice (though not in principle) not yet significant minuses, except in the case of the ban on advocating separatism in western Papua. The formal ban on spreading Marxism-Leninism has been, so far, irrelevant, as there are no substantial organised forces trying to do this. Many books on these subjects, for and against, are published, but none are a part of any significant effort to spread these ideas widely. Two organisations have now been banned for advocating the establishment of an Islamic State to replace Pancasila; however, nobody has been arrested for this and people who believe in this continue to advocate it. In the case of separatism, people are arrested and gaoled in western Papua for calling for self-determination or independence in West Papua, and even in Jakarta.[3] This is the most significant and oppressive “minus” of these minuses.
It is, however, not these formal repressive limitations which make political life in Indonesia’s liberal democracy different. The fundamental location of democratic limitations is not to be found in legislative or formal provisions or government policy, but rather in society itself and in its history. Indonesia is a liberal democracy without an opposition presenting itself as an alternative government with differing policies. Such opposition is not banned or suppressed by the state – it simply does not exist. Mainstream political life is not characterised by competition between radicals, progressives, liberals, moderates, centrists, right-of-centre, conservatives and reactionaries as in most large capitalist democracies.
Civil society acts as a social opposition that might oppose specific policies but does not offer itself as an alternative government. In a situation where there is no pattern of “government and opposition”, the social opposition does not have the leverage of threatening to switch support from one side to the other. This situation also frames the current preparations for the 2024 elections. How do the current parliamentary political parties situate themselves vis-à-vis each other when they all share the same political and development outlook?[4]
TO COALESCE OR NOT TO COALESCE
The current cabinet under President Joko Widodo comprises Ministers from seven of the nine parties in parliament and one from a party that did not win any seats. This coalition has given the government an overwhelming majority in parliament, although it has hardly been necessary since the remaining two parties have mainly voted with the ruling coalition on all substantial questions. The Democrat Party, founded for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is primarily not in the coalition because of irreparable bad relations between the two former Presidents, Yudhoyono and Megawati Sukarnoputri, chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), Indonesia’s biggest party and holding more than 20% of the seats in parliament.[5]
The smooth functioning of this coalition under President Widodo immediately poses the question: why not continue it? If all the seven parliamentary parties in the Widodo government agree to amend the Constitution and then nominate Widodo again, they easily have the numbers to do so.[6] This would also mean that there would be only one presidential candidate, as even the combined numbers from the Democrat Party and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) are not enough to nominate a candidate.
There are two complicating calculations to this scenario. First, to what extent some parties will calculate that fielding a Presidential candidate from their party may help their campaigns for seats in the parliament which may be seen as more important than the actual prospect of their candidate becoming President. To date, almost all parties have stated they will nominate a candidate from their own ranks. Second, all the parties, and the political elite in general, will calculate the costs of deepening the sense of weakening democracy and lack of accountability if they unite to ensure only one candidate. The parties may calculate that a Presidential election with two or three candidates may be a better tactic for them. These calculations are still ongoing, however, and we may not see a conclusion for some time yet.
In the meantime, those individuals with potential party backing, from all backgrounds, will test the waters over the next several months using poll responses to publicity runs and initiatives to assess their ‘elektabilitas’.[7] This will have a strong influence on decisions about which presidential candidate to back—Joko Widodo or one of the personalities currently being tested out.
Developments in the Indonesian political economy have, however, introduced a new dimension in the calculation of the ‘elektabilitas’ of candidates.
NEW-STYLE BUSINESSMAN POLITICIANS
President Joko Widodo’s economic policies have prioritised supporting and pushing forward private sector economic activity. This has included a so-called “Revolution 4.0”[8] involving, in particular, the increased development of the Applications Sector. Online ordering of services and goods has expanded greatly.[9] This, no doubt, combined with the boost to the economy in 2022 as the value of exports climbed to give Indonesia a trade surplus,[10] has both worked positively for the Widodo government’s image and elevated the profile of figures associated with the modernisation of the economy. This has been the case in particular for three ministers with business backgrounds, namely: Sandiaga Uno, Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy; Nadiem Makarim, Minister of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology; and Erick Thohir, Minister of State-Owned Enterprises.
Although Uno had been the Vice-Presidential Candidate with Prabowo Subianto in 2019, nominated by Gerindra Party, he was not a long-term Gerindra member – not a cadre. Neither Makarim nor Thohir have party histories, although Thohir has connections to the religious organisation Nahdatul Ulama. In recent months, their names have also entered the lists of potential presidential and vice-presidential candidates in media and various polls, although scoring very low. Top of the list in this discussion is, by far, Sandiaga Uno.
As early as in January 2020, President Widodo named Sandiaga Uno as a possible 2024 Presidential candidate.[11] This may have been politeness appropriate for the period of settling his rapprochement with General Prabowo, with whom Uno had partnered as VP candidate in 2019, but it, in turn, gave Uno an extra push. More recently, the high-profile Young Entrepreneurs Association (HIPMI) has supported Uno as a Vice-Presidential candidate, usually alongside PDIP’s Ganjar Pranowo. If we see a revival of discussion sometime over the next several months about Widodo standing again, we can also expect Uno’s name to be mentioned again.[12]
Uno, and sometimes, Thohir, score only around 5% in most polls testing ‘elektabilitas’.[13] Yet this emergence of non-party business figures as potential presidential or vice-presidential candidates, or even as political figures with their own standing, is perceived as a threat by party elites. Government coalitions are negotiated among the parties by the Party Chairpersons.[14] The entry into the game of non-party figures with their own basis of support, including from these new style entrepreneurs, complicates this process.
Between February and July 2022,[15] there was a wave of reactions from many political parties strongly stating that both the President and Vice-President must be “cadres” of a political party. Party figures appeared on television[16] on a daily basis arguing that parties must be rewarded for the work they have put into developing cadres and leaders. The campaign by almost all the party leaders grew intensive before fading away. The broad coalition is evolving into an all-faction coalition. Apart from bringing in these three businessmen, Widodo has also brought into the cabinet a retired top police general. Of course, there were already two New Order generals in the government, Luhut Panjaitan and Moeldoko. The police general was General Tito Karnavian, who retired from National Police Commander during the first Widodo Presidency. However, it is the HIPMI that gives them enough bargaining power to irritate some party leaders.[17]
This development may signal the likelihood of campaigns being launched to achieve a combination of a party politician and one of the business-political figures teaming up as President and Vice-President. It would represent a significant shift from Vice-Presidential candidates being chosen to accommodate political Islam. Whether this happens will also depend on the results of the testing out of initiatives.
The various calculations described above fundamentally constitute what mainstream political life within Indonesia’s democratic system is. The promotion of individual personalities and taking stands on what kind of background – party machine, political personality or businessman – makes most political noise. The debate over policies is provoked without the mainstream, and comes from civil society; but this is usually settled through a unanimous stance from all the parties, business, ex-police and ex-military personnel within the ruling coalition. In almost all cases, this unanimity has been a rejection of the pleas made by civil society. This was the case with the weakened Corruption Eradication Commission Law as well as the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law). The one exception to date was when the Law Against Sexual Violence, a law championed by civil society, was passed by the DPR, although some clauses were watered down. It is being tested again with the proceeding through parliament of a new Criminal Code Law, which is being criticised outside parliament for its range of human and personal rights restrictions.
NEGATING OPPOSITION: ELECTIONS TO DECIDE WHO INVITES THE REST INTO GOVERNMENT
It is worth noting that one important business organisation has come out publicly in support of the general political format initiated by President Widodo. The all-party, no opposition format has now been openly supported by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN). Of course, the first step in doing this was President Widodo’s embrace of his twice Presidential rival, Prabowo Subianto. KADIN has proposed that this precedent continues, with the winner embracing the loser as a standard approach to Presidential elections. A July 11 Republika[18] newspaper reported the KADIN Chairman, Arsjad Rasjid, stating that Kadin: “hoped that, after the election, the losing presidential pair would be invited into government by the president-elect. Together, gotong royong manages and builds the country. As President Jokowi did, inviting Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, to enter the cabinet.”
However, Rasjid has argued that this commitment should be made beforeelections, not afterwards. This way, he argues, everybody will be more motivated. The people and the candidates can be reassured, and their capital does not just disappear. If they lose, there is still certainty and hope that they will join the next government.
Rasjid took a neutral stance on whether President Widodo should stand again or for any particular candidates. In fact, he seemed to be arguing that the more candidates there are, the better, but that they must all declare beforehand that they would invite into the government all losing candidates. It seems clear that the Kadin leadership is also validating the idea that there be more figures from the business sector stepping forward.
This approach means that the government parties – i.e. everybody – can act unhampered by any mechanism of political accountability, giving the country the appearance of having a diminishing democratic life.
FROM SOCIAL TO POLITICAL OPPOSITION: IS IT HAPPENING?
Both the business sector and the existing parties now all seem to have settled for the current format of a politically liberal attitude to polemics among themselves, but within a framework that accepts the broadest possible governing coalition,[19] and with no political opposition offering itself as an alternative. Opposition to government policy emerges from outside the parliamentary parties, from civil society organisations. The question thus arises as to whether there is a process underway for that social opposition to evolve into political opposition. Given the homogeneity of outlook on the current mode of politics among the existing parties, such an evolution would require the formation and successful electoral registration of new parties committed to a different set of policy priorities than those of the existing parties.
While there are nine parties in the DPR, all of whom will be able to participate in the 2024 elections, there are a total of 76 parties currently registered with the Ministry of Human Rights and Law.[20] The General Elections Commission is now receiving applications to participate in the 2024 elections. These applications will be vetted to ensure that the parties meet the stringent requirements to be verified for election participation.[21] As of August 2022, there are already five new parties that have submitted applications, and more are expected.[22] Of these new parties, it is possible to identify two as having connections with organised civil society and opposition to current government policies. These are the Workers’ Party (PB),[23] the initiative of leaders of some of the larger trade unions that have criticised the Job Creation Law, and Prima Party,[24] which describes itself as anti-oligarchy and which originates from a faction of the People’s Democratic Party (PRD) that was the vanguard opposition party to the New Order in the 1990s. However, both these parties have yet to pass verification to participate in the elections. Neither has yet won support from many of the civil society social opposition groups, who are suspicious of these parties’ history of linkages to the existing party elites.
There are, at this moment, still no solid signs of the social opposition evolving further to produce a political opponent with an alternative set of policy priorities. The KADIN’s perspective of all parties in government sharing a single goal of economic growth along the lines currently being pursued remains unchallenged.
ENDNOTES
[1] Vedi Hadiz, “Behind Indonesia’s Illiberal Turn”, in https://www.newmandala.org/indonesia-illiberal/ , 20 October, 2017; Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections Amidst Rising Illiberalism,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 5, no. 3 (2019): 295–317; https://ipsh.brin.go.id/2022/04/29/prevent-indonesias-democratic-regression-rate-ahead-of-electoral-year/
[3] https://fulcrum.sg/jakarta-and-papua-where-there-are-no-risk-free-choices/
[4] The one noticeable ideological difference is the PKS’s adherence to moral puritanism on issues of sexual mores, however this did not stop the PKS being able to work smoothly within the governing coalition formed under President Yudhoyono.
[5] A key exception to this is the relationship between the PDIP and the Demokrat Party. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had been a Minister in the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri had had allegedly given a commitment not to stand against Megawati after she finished her term. However, he then formed the Demokrat Party which nominated him for the Presidency. He stood against here and won. Cooperation between the PDIP and Demokrat has not been possible since then. Again here, we see the differences do not relate to policy but personal rivalries
[6] https://fulcrum.sg/a-third-term-for-jokowi-weighing-the-risks-of-constitutional-change/
[7] Max Lane, Indonesia’s 2014 Legislative Elections: The Dilemmas of “Elektabilitas” Politics at /wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2014_25.pdf
[8] Ministry of Industry, Making Indonesia’s Fourth Industrial Revolution at file:///C:/Users/ASUS/Downloads/BPPI.pdf
[9] https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/why-e-commerce-key-indonesias-small-businesses
[10] https://en.antaranews.com/news/242789/indonesian-economy-to-grow-507-percent-in-2022-second-quarter
[12] For more on the early start to party maneuverings for 2024, see /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-73-political-parties-manoeuvring-after-the-jokowi-prabowo-rapprochement-by-max-lane/
[13] https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2996273/survei-index-prabowo-unggul-dalam-bursa-capres-2024
[14] In June, 2022, a photograph of the https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/499457/tujuh-ketua-umum-parpol-koalisi-pemerintahan-sambangi-istana
[15] Just a few examples include: https://www.merdeka.com/politik/pemilu-2024-idealnya-capres-cawapres-dari-kader-parpol.html; https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5930261/elite-pd-harusnya-capres-cawapres-wajib-kader-parpol-kalau-sekarang: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210127083059-32-598855/ruu-pemilu-calon-presiden-kepala-daerah-wajib-kader-parpol; https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/melani-hermalia-putri/politikus-golkar-sebut-capres-harus-kader-parpol; https://www.viva.co.id/berita/politik/1492941-pks-sebut-di-dpr-mulai-muncul-wacana-tolak-capres-bukan-kader-partai: https://www.beritasatu.com/news/888113/ketua-harian-gerindra-capres-dan-cawapres-tidah-harus-kader-partai;
[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkRgDrMgI20
[17] There is another aspect to this polemic: it can also be seen as being aimed at Anies Baswedan. Baswedan, now Governor of Jakarta, scores high in presidential polls, usually number 2 or 3, alongside Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto. Baswedan himself is not a cadre of a specific party, although he was nominated by the PKS and Gerindra when he stood for Governor. However, his history is that he first approached the Demokrat Party, and then became a campaign spokesperson for Joko Widodo after Widodo was nominated by the PDIP, before he accepted the PKS nomination.
[19] A key exception to this is the relationship between the PDIP and the Demokrat Party. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had been a Minister in the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and had allegedly given a commitment not to stand against Megawati after she finished her term. However, he then formed the Demokrat Party which nominated him for the Presidency. He won. Cooperation between the PDIP and Demokrat has not been possible since then. Again here, we see the differences do not relate to policy but to personal rivalries.
[21] This test requires parties to have offices in all provinces and in 75 per cent of the total regencies and cities in the province concerned. They would also need to have offices in 50 per cent of the number of sub-districts in the district and cities concerned, as well as 1,000 members in each district and city. Another requirement is that there is a party member for every 1,000 members of the total population of each district and city. Furthermore, 30 per cent of all local leaderships must be women.
[23] For further analysis on the Workers’ Party see https://fulcrum.sg/indonesias-new-workers-party-ambiguity-in-labour-politics/
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“Promoting Cross-Border Connectivity in Asia: The Role of the Asian Development Bank” by Jayant Menon
2022/91 “From Liberalism to Sufism: Ulil Abshar Abdalla Gains Renewed Relevance Online Through Ngaji Ihya” by Wahyudi Akmaliah and Norshahril Saat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Ulil Abshar Abdalla, founder of the Islamic Liberal Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal or JIL), is a highly controversial Islamic scholar and activist in Indonesia. His publications and activism have constantly challenged and angered the orthodox Islamic ulama (religious elites). His liberal viewpoints, notably his support for religious minorities in Indonesia often triggered criticisms from the conservatives.
- However, since 2016, Ulil has undertaken efforts to change his controversial image on social media. Mainly through his Facebook page known as Ngaji Ihya (NI), the Islamic scholar has been teaching Ihya Ulumuddin (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), a well-known classical text on Muslim spirituality and Sufism written by scholar Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al Ghazali ath-Thusi asy-Syafi’i (also known as Muhammad Al-Gazhali), to his online followers.
- As a result of Ulil’s preaching activities and growing influence on Facebook, he has become acceptable within Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) circles for spreading mainstream Islamic knowledge. For this reason, Ulil is widely believed to be a “repentant” Muslim—one who has denounced liberal Islam and embraced traditionalism instead.
- In view of Ngaji Ihya’s (NI) growing popularity, mainstream Muslim organizations such as NU maintain that the Ulil Abshar can play a crucial role in challenging puritan and conservative Salafi orientations which have recently infiltrated the digital sphere in Indonesia.
- However, this article seeks to demonstrate that Ulil has not been distancing himself from liberal Islam. In fact, his recent shift in religious orientation is merely part of a spiritual transformation. Furthermore, this article examines the role of Ulil’s wife, Ienas Tsoraya, in popularising Ngaji Ihya. Unbeknownst to many, she has been instrumental in reaching out to the platform’s female audience and raising its followership.
*Wahyudi Akmaliah is PhD Candidate at the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS). Norshahril Saat (PhD) is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/91, 14 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
In March 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19 in Indonesia, thousands of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) kyais (religious teachers) began to migrate their religious classes (ngaji) to the digital sphere. This move was considered necessary for preserving NU’s outreach and presence following the introduction of COVID-19 preventive measures limiting all forms of mass religious gatherings, such as face-to-face interactions in mosques and Islamic boarding schools. However, NU was not the first to shift its religious classes online. Even before the pandemic, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, the so-called “liberal” kyai, had been utilising social media to reach out to his followers; in 2016, he pioneered a religious class called Ngaji Ihya on Facebook. Remarkably, unlike most online religious classes which are well patronized only during the month of Ramadhan, Ulil’s Ngaji Ihya’sfollowing has remained consistent even beyond the fasting month.
The teaching material used by Ulil during his religious classes is key in explaining Ngaji Ihya’sgrowing popularity within Indonesian society. While one would have expected Ulil, a liberal Islamic scholar, to refer to progressive books in his lectures, he chooses instead to teach Ihya Ulumuddin, a classical text associated with Sufism authored by Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al Ghazali ath-Thusi asy-Syafi’i (also known as Imam Al-Gazhali, b.1058-b.1111). Such a move has surprised many within the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) community as they believe that only a senior ulama with the appropriate credentials, skills and morality is qualified to teach this text. Significantly, due to Ulil’s selection of Ihya Ulumuddin, many Indonesians are beginning to suspect that he is abandoning liberal Islam and is embracing doctrines similar to the ones held by NU.
This article examines how Ulil Abshar, a controversial preacher associated with the Islamic Liberal Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal or JIL), has become socially accepted among traditionalist NU members and the Indonesian public. JIL is a critical movement against orthodox and conservative Islam, yet Ulil’s choice to teach Ihya Ulumuddin in his religious classes, has largely pacified NU’s attitudes toward him. Additionally, given Ulil’s popularity on social media, NU has sought to leverage Ulil’s potential in reaching out to urban Muslims, who are becoming increasingly conservative due to rising Salafi online influence. This article also examines the popularity of Ulil’s Ngaji Ihya classes among women in Indonesia. Notably, what is often missed out when one analyses Ulil’s apparent reinvention of himself is the sizable proportion of women in his online classes; they make up a huge percentage of his followership. Ulil’s wife, Ienas Tsoraya, plays a crucial role in popularising Ngaji Ihya among women. Lastly, this article assesses how Ulil’s Ngaji Ihya challenges criticisms levelled against him that NU’s or traditional Islam’s representation on digital platforms pales in comparison with the Salafis.[1]
ULIL ABSHAR AND LIBERAL ISLAM
Since the establishment of the Islamic Liberal Network (JIL), founding member Ulil Abshar has been frequently denounced as a “liberal” by his orthodox opponents, including members of NU. Through the activities of JIL, Ulil proposes a contextual and critical interpretation of Islamic texts (ie. the Quran, Hadith, and legal canons), and emphasises rational thinking. On 18 November 2002, Ulil published a controversial article titled, Menyegarkan Kembali Pemikiran Islam (Refreshing how we think about Islamic tradition). This criticizes the textualist orientation of Islam which interprets religion in a rigid and closed manner without consideration for the Islamic principles of universal justice, tolerance, and respect for local cultural context.[2] Conservative Islamic groups were angered by this article, and on 20 December 2002, an Islamist non-governmental organisation (NGO) known as the Forum Ulama Umat Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Forum for Religious Leader and Islamic Society (FUII), issued a statement legitimising the killing of Ulil.[3] On top of this, Ulil also received death threats in the form of unsolicited packages containing explosives.[4]
Two decades later, Ulil seems to have moved on from his controversial past, and his Ngaji Ihya sessions on Facebook demonstrate a significant shift in terms of his religious orientation. Through his live Facebook sessions, it is evident that Ulil is no longer the firebrand and critical Islamic thinker that he was in the early 2000s, prompting questions as to whether he has abandoned his liberal viewpoints. In addition, many Indonesian Muslims are questioning the motivations behind Ulil’s sudden change of dakwah strategy and his selection of Al-Ghazali’s Ihya Ulummudin as the central text for his online classes. It is known that the classical text centres more on Sufism than liberal Islam and that it is a text that the orthodox scholar associates with. Interestingly, the incorporation of Ihya Ulummudin in his Ngaji Ihya sessions (whether intentionally or otherwise)has made him acceptable to mainstream NU members.
However, Ulil has explained that his religious transformation is simply a result of nostalgia aroused during the days he was stuck in traffic congestions from his house to his office. Ulil recalls that he started reminiscing over what he studied as a former santri in the pesantrens in order to fill up his spiritual emptiness during those moments. It was these moments that catalysed a change in his religious orientation.
ULIL’S CRITICAL ROOTS
Ulil established his critical thinking skills and knowledge while studying in Madrasah Mathali’ul Falah, Kajen, Pati, Central Java. In the 1980s, the school was run by KH M. Ahmad Sahal Mahfudz, a former supreme leader (Rais Am) of Nahdatul Ulama (1999-2010). At the same time, Sahal was also a progressive Islamic thinker who contended that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) must be practiced in tandem with Muslims’ everyday life. By proposing the fiqh social (social jurisprudence), he combined past traditions with material references from current Islamic jurists to solve problems presently faced by the Muslim community. This method of thinking has forced many NU leaders in the pesantren to reinterpret their tradition in accordance with existing conditions.[5]
As a young and passionate reader, Ulil also exposed himself to ideas from Indonesian intellectual authors such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Goenawan Muhammad, Dawam Rahardjo, Ignas Kleden, and Nurcholish Majid. However, his critical views came at a cost—he was marginalised while studying at LIPIA (Islamic and Arabic College) in 1993. While LIPIA adopted ideas from prominent Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and Abu A’la Al-Maududi,[6] Ulil went to the other end of the spectrum by joining JIL. Due to his connection with JIL, Ulil was further disassociated by his peers from other Islamic organizations, within the pesantren circles and NU networks.
Studying in the United States for a Master’s degree in Comparative Religion at Boston University (2007) also enriched his classical Islamic knowledge. His interest grew in Fahkrhuddin Al-Razi’s thought, one of the famous thirteenth century Persian Islamic interpreters/thinkers of the Asy’ariyah theological tradition. Even though it was not a mandatory subject, he enjoyed attending and reading the thinker’s writings; specifically, to understand Al-Razi’s synthesising of diverse materials from the Greek philosophy and the rationalist Mu’tazilah sect. For Ulil, Al-Razi’s knowledge and his method could be adapted to the modern Muslim context. Studying classical Islamic thinkers then became Ulil’s Ph.D. topic.[7]
This intellectual engagement encouraged him to write his Ph.D,[8] although for reasons still unknown, he did not complete it. In 2010, he offered himself to be the Chairman of NU during a conference (Muktamar) in Makassar, Central Sulawesi, but failed to get that position.[9] After failing to be part of NU’s elite circle, he continued to find other political opportunities and eventually joined the Demokrat party (2010-2015). Sadly, this political journey was short-lived.
Amidst these back-to-back challenges, Ngaji Ihya offeredanother step of his intellectual discovery that rooted him in the Islamic tradition as a santri. Well-known to many Indonesian Muslims, Al-Ghazali’s classical Islamic books are mandatory in most pesantren affiliated with the NU tradition.[10]
CONFLUENCE OF NU’S AND ULIL’S INTERESTS THROUGH NGAJI IHYA
NU’s growing acceptance of Ulil today is partly due to its attempts to reach out to the young, social media-savvy Muslims in Indonesia.[11] There is a confluence of interests between Ulil and the more progressive segments in NU. By and large, the online Islamic space in Indonesia today is currently witnessing a rise in conservatism. Salafi-oriented preachers, among others, present themselves as the face of pure Islam, and target those living in the urban areas.[12] Their presence is now crowding out established Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah and NU.[13] Before this development, Indonesian Muslims were known for their moderate attitudes, particularly their ability to balance local traditions with religious norms and to co-exist with other religions. They earned the name, “smiling face of Islam” for having lived peacefully with other ethnic and cultural groups, and celebrated diversity and plurality. Undoubtedly, many factors have contributed to rising intolerance in Indonesia, but the rise of the Salafi movement in digital space is arguably the most significant cause.[14] It is also inaccurate to simply blame Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states for the growth of the puritan ideology in Indonesia, since in the digital world, Salafism also spread out from Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region.
The idea to study and teach Ihya Ulumuddin came from Ulil himself. In 2016, he made this suggestion to revive his life as a santri while fasting during the month of Ramadhan. He shared that he had sought his wife, Ienas Tsuroya’s views on teaching Ihya Ulumuddin. The original plan was to simply read the classical text for self-study purposes but Ienas contended that studying it that way would be monotonous. Instead, she proposed making the learning journey accessible to more people, through live streaming on social media. As the couple was not technologically savvy at that time, they ended up recording their live streaming sessions via Ulil’s Facebook account regularly. His critics were quick to pounce on Ulil’s new move. Those who were clearly displeased with Ulil’s affiliation with JIL suggested that he had disassociated himself from his liberal ideology,[15] most notably through his decision to read Ihya Ulumuddin.
To provide some context, Ihya Ulumuddin mainly touches on spirituality and Sufism. In the pesantrens, this text is taught by senior kyais. Not everyone is qualified to teach the text; the person must have long teaching experience, be pious, and hold moral standing in the community. He must also be respected by the students, and be a person with humility. When Ulil decided to teach the text, netizens were quick to sensationalise his “repentance” from being a liberal (associated with Western thinking) to being a Sufi. Many also observed Ulil’s more mellowed way of speaking, which was very unlike his rhetorical and provocative nature of the past.
However, Ulil disagrees that teaching Ihya Ulumuddin is a sign of him distancing himself from his liberal-thinking past. For him, repentance means a sense of guilt for committing sins or crimes such as theft and corruption.[16] Accordingly, a repentant Muslim must not only regret but struggle to correct past mistakes by changing their present attitude. By contrast, Ulil argues that his new teaching style is a step towards strengthening his acquisition of knowledge, and towards admitting that in Islamic jurisprudence, perspectives do evolve from time to time and with change of place. He confesses that he is taking a leaf from classical and modern Islamic ulama who experienced this form of scholarly evolution. Ulil names Abu Al-Hasan Al-Asyari (well-known as Imam Asy’ari, b.873-d.936) as an example. Imam Al-Asyari once followed the Mu’tazilah school of thought, which emphasises rational thinking, but changed his mind in order to follow the Sunni school of jurisprudence, which balances uncritical acceptance of ideas of savants of the past and rationalism.[17] Fast-forward to the twentieth century, the same can be said about a religious scholar in Indonesia. Harun Nasution (b.1919-d.1998) studied the Mu’tazila school during his early years as an Islamic intellectual. His university students were familiar with Harun’s Mu’tazilah-based works but nevertheless, towards the end of his academic career, he primarily focused on Sufism.
Ulil acknowledges that this new online journey requires him to alter his presentation style in order to engage a wider audience. He no longer sees value in public confrontation, and admits that in the 2000s, his views on Islamic renewal could be misconstrued as arrogant and provocative, which aided conservative Islamic groups such as FPI (Islamic Front Defender), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), and MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) in gaining followership. He confesses that he was once filled with youthful enthusiasm, but is now grown older, more humbled and matured.[18]
ULIL’S DIGITAL QUEST AND THE FEMALE AUDIENCE
Ngaji Ihya has now been running for six years, since 2016, and has established a stable 300 viewers who tune in to its live sessions, while its Facebook recordings often reach out to more than 7000 viewers. Compared to the Salafi-based channels, the numbers are indubitably small. Nevertheless, if measured by NU standards, Ngaji Ihya is an original effort that other Indonesian Islamic thinkers are copying. On the one hand, it has created a new platform for traditional learning, one that applies digital methods, and Ulil can be seen as a pioneer in this regard. While the class centres on text (kitab), and in essence follows the NU tradition, it does not strictly follow the pesantren structure that emphasises the relationship between the kyai and the santri. On the other hand, Facebook has played a crucial role in reinventing Ulil’s image. Significantly, migrating to a digital platform has opened doors for a bigger audience to scrutinise Ulil’s thinking, and he has taken this opportunity to tone down the way he expresses his ideas. The digital platform has bridged the differences which he once had to his traditionalist counterparts in NU.
Whether intentional or not, his wife, Ienas Tsoraya also plays a significant role in Ulil’s growing acceptance in mainstream Indonesian Islam. Ienas mainly manages Ulil’s live streaming and recording through his Facebook account, identifying herself as Mba Admin (assistance staff) instead of calling herself Nyai (associated with someone who is a Kyai’s wife, and who holds the second authority in a pesantren). Ienas also comes from a family lineage of scholars. She is the daughter of Musthofa Bisri, a man who has strengthened NU’s credibility for years. In Ngaji Ihya, both Ulil and Ienas have made the difficult text easy to comprehend and learn.
Ienas’s presence as “mbak admin” (lady administrator) is key to Ngaji Ihya’s success. Interestingly, other liberal Muslim intellectuals who desire an online presence have their wives’ backing them too. To illustrate, Titik Razak assisted Abdul Moqsith Ghazali’s Kitab Kuning classes, and Maria Fauzi handled Munir Ikhwan’s. The wives facilitate social interaction between the male religious preachers and female audiences.[19]
This mbak admin phenomenon has reshaped the image of Muslim women in traditionalist circles, where they were once perceived as old-fashioned and backward. Furthermore, their presence in these online projects presents their equal standing with their husbands, and this husband-and-wife collaboration is what the Salafi rival does not have. Feedback from female participations shared that mbak admin’s role was what attracted them to attend Ngaji Ihya.[20]
CONCLUSION
Ulil’s and his wife’s online initiative has unintentionally contributed to Ulil’s overall improved image. Ngaji Ihya has become a medium for clarifying (tabbayun) Ulil’s present and past viewpoints including those articulated when he was active in JIL. So popular is Ngaji Ihya that itis now extended to a hybrid (both online and offline) format called Kopi Darat. During the question-and-answer session that follows Ulil’s sermons, the audience will often ask why the couple started Ngaji Ihya, given that it contradicts JIL’s ideology. Ienas plays a key role in this clarification exercise by handling and responding to the audience’s comments on Ulil’s Facebook account and private messages.
In addition, Ngaji Ihya strengthens Ulil’s traditionalist credentials by reminding the audience of his santri roots. He demonstrates his strong bonds with the NU tradition by underscoring the significance of the ties between pesantren, kyai and the classical ngaji method.[21]The programme’s followers are also able to reconnect to the santri world that emphasises the centrality of texts (as opposed to rationalism).[22] In addition, many sought to obtain blessing (berkah) from the spiritual master through this activity.[23] The power of the online platform is that it can connect groups from different Indonesian provinces.[24]
Furthermore, Ngaji Ihya attracted not only Indonesian Muslims but non-Muslims as well. Muslim Ngaji Ihya followers are highly impressed by Ulil’s ability to blend progressive ideas and Islamic tradition. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, are attracted to his classes for giving them the opportunity to learn how santris read classic Islamic books. Ulil’s appreciation of diversity, tolerance and pluralism also play an important role in attracting non-Muslims to his sessions. Through Ngaji Ihya, both these communities would like to be recognized as santri under the pesantren virtually led by both Ulil and Ienas. Previously, santris only refer to Muslims studying through the pesantren system. Through Ngaji Ihya, Ulil’s students also include non-Muslims. Given the growing popularity of Ngaji Ihya, it could revolutionise kyai-santri relations in Indonesia in the near future.[25]
ENDNOTES
[1] Wahyudi Akmaliah, “The Demise of Moderate Islam: New Media, Contestation, and Reclaiming Religious Authorities,” Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 10 (5/2020): 1–24; Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Pluralism, Liberalism, and Islamism: Religious Outlook of Muhammadiyah,” Studia Islamika (1/2018): 433–470; Alexander R. Arifianto, “Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post- Reformasi Indonesia,” TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 1 (5/ 2020): 37–50; Jeremy Menchik, “Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia,” Asian Studies Review 43 (7/2019): 415–433.
[2] Ulil Abshar Abdallah, “Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam”, Kompas, 18 November 2002.
[3] “Fatwa Mati Ulil Termasuk Ancaman Pembunuhan”, Tempo.co, 7 December 2003. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/35921/fatwa-mati-ulil-termasuk-ancaman-pembunuhan (accessed 7 September 2021).
[4] “Ulil Abshar Dikirimi Paket Bom Lewat KBR68H”, detik.com, 15 March 2011.https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1592163/ulil-abshar-dikirimi-paket-bom-lewat-kbr-68-h (accessed 7 September 2021).
[5] Some of his works in Bahasa Indonesia include Nuansa Fiqih Sosial (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994); Pesantren Mencari Makna (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 1999), Wajah Baru Fiqh Pesantren (Jakarta: Citra Pustaka, 2004, dan Dialog dengan KH MA Sahal Mahfudh: Telaah Fikih Sosial (Semarang: Yayasan Karyawan Suara Merdeka, 1997)
[6] Ahmad Suaedy, “Menuju Al-Ghazali Komprehensif Bersama Ulil Abshar Abdalla: Part1”, Jelajah Pustaka, 6 April 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvN4xOgvbsE&t=1148s (accessed 8 September 2021).
[7] “Wawancara Ulil Abshar Abdallah: Kenapa Harus Jauh-jauh Belajar Islam di Amerika Serikat”, Hauzah.wordpress.com, 17 September 2007. https://hauzah.wordpress.com/2007/09/17/wawancara-ulil-abshar-abdalla-%E2%80%9C%E2%80%A6kenapa-harus-jauh-jauh-belajar-islam-di-amerika-serikat-as%E2%80%A6%E2%80%9D/ (accessed 8 August 2022)
[8] “Ulil Abshar Abdallah: Pengawasan Ceramah Perlu”, Tempo.co, 31 August 2009. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/195255/ulil-abshar-abdalla-pengawasan-ceramah-perlu/full&view=ok (accessed 8 September 2021).
[9] Amin Mudzakkir, “Mengaji Al-Ghazali atau Refleksi Ulil Abshar Abdalla Sendiri?”, Alif.id, 2 June 2020. https://alif.id/read/amin-mudzakkir/mengaji-al-ghazali-atau-refleksi-ulil-abshar-abdalla-sendiri-b229947p/ (accessed 8 September 2021).
[10] “Ulil Abshar Abdalla: Sang Pendekar live Streaming Ngaji Ihya”, mojok.co, 14 May 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AhIz7C71ioQ (accessed 8 September 2021).
[11] In response to this growing Salafi encroachment in digital space, NU, being the largest Muslim organisation in the country, introduced NUTIZEN (a catchy term for netizens). It is an NU-run mobile application downloadable via Playstore, created by Savic Ali, the Director of NU Online (launched on 4 February 2016). The app seeks to bring ngaji or traditional learning circles into digital space. In 2016, Savic estimated that there were around the 20 kyai (Islamic clerics) organising online classes through Ngaji Online. By 2017, the number had increased five times with 100 live streaming sessions.[11] Ulil was one of the earliest to utilise social media platforms for his classes, though he was not really considered part of NU circles, despite his pesantren and traditionalist training. His recent popularity did not escape NU’s attention.
[12] Chris Chaplin, “Salafism and the State: Islamic Activism and National Identity in Contemporary Indonesia” (Copenhagen: Nias Press).
[13] Wahyudi Akmaliah, “The Demise of Moderate Islam: The Demise of Moderate Islam: new media, contestation, and reclaiming religious authorities”, Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, 10 (1/2020), pp.1-24.
[14] Birgit Bräuchler, “Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace”, The Australian Journal of Anthropology 15(3/2004): 267–85; Noorhaidi Hasan, “New Media, Post Islamist Piety, and Cyber Islam: Islamic Knowledge Production in Indonesian Muslim Society” in Nabil Chan-Kuan Lin (ed), Commerce, Knowledge, and Faith: Islamisation of Modern Indonesian and Han-Speaking Muslim Ummahs (Tainan: Center for Multicultural Studies. College of Liberal Arts, National Cheng Kung University; Muhammad Asep Iqbal, “Internet, Identy, and Islamic Movements: The Case of Salafism in Indonesia” Islamika Indonesiana (2014/1): 81–105; Muhammad Asep Iqbal, “Cyber-Activism and the Islamic Salafi Movement in Indonesia”, Murdoch University, Australia; Merlyna Lim, “Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet”, (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005).
[15] Bonardo Maulana Wahono, “Ulil Abshar Abdallah dan Berkah Pendidikan Pesantren”, lokadata.id, 25 April 2019. https://lokadata.id/artikel/ulil-abshar-abdalla-dan-berkah-pendidikan-pesantren (accessed 8 September 2021).
[16] Ulil Abshar Abdalla, “Tentang Salah Kaprah Penggunaan Istilah Taubat”, facebook.com, 10 February 2018. https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10160112202475533&id=762930532&_rdr (accessed 8 September 2021)
[17] The ulama in Imam Asy’ari’s circle stated that this shift of orientation did not constitute repentance but transformation.
[18] Amin Mudzakkir, the senior researcher at BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency) and one of the leading Islamic intellectuals in the NU tradition, explains how Ulil’s educational and spiritual journey strengthened his choice of Al-Ghazali’s work when he decided to teach on digital platforms. For Mudzakkir, Ngaji Ihya, is Ulil’s self-mirroring. Ulil experienced the dynamic intellectual and activism journey just like Al-Ghazali, who experienced knowledge transformation from rationalist Islam to Sufism. Historically, Al-Ghazali was made to choose between working with the rulers of Abassite caliphs—asthe state’s advisor—or to leave this role to become an independent Islamic scholar disassociating himself from the material world and from power, to move towards spirituality. Ulil’s comparison with Al-Ghazali was that during his intellectual formative years, he invested his time to becoming a professional. Amin Mudzakkir, “Mengaji Al-Ghazali atau Refleksi Ulil Abshar Abdalla Sendiri?”, Alif.id, 2 June 2020. https://alif.id/read/amin-mudzakkir/mengaji-al-ghazali-atau-refleksi-ulil-abshar-abdalla-sendiri-b229947p/ (accessed 8 September 2021).
[19] Amin Mudzakkir, “Apa Arti Mbak Admin Dibalik Pengajian Online?”, Alif.co, 28 April 2020, https://alif.id/read/amin-mudzakkir/apa-arti-mbak-admin-di-balik-pengajian-online-b228435p/ (accessed 10 August 2022).
[20] Amin Mudzakkir, “Apa Arti Mbak Admin Dibalik Pengajian Online?”, Alif.co, 28 April 2020, https://alif.id/read/amin-mudzakkir/apa-arti-mbak-admin-di-balik-pengajian-online-b228435p/ (accessed 10 August 2022).
[21] Feedback from the programme’s participants prove this point.For a former santri Imam Malik, Ngaji Ihya complements his professional entrepreneur career and helps him make difficult decisions, including whether to continue being in business or to pursue a PhD. Imam Malik, “Ngaji Ihya dan Peta Jalan Setelah 40 Tahun), Facebook.com, 29 May 2020. https://www.facebook.com/imam.malik.mm/posts/10156985625830059 (accessed on 10 September 2021)
[22] Evi Ghozaly, “Mengaji Ihya Ulumuddin Pada Gus Ulil Itu Seperti Candu”, Kompasiana.com, 7 June 2020. https://www.kompasiana.com/evighozaly/5edcf152097f3616e86ce4e2/mengaji-ihya-ulumiddin-pada-gus-ulil-itu-seperti-candu (accessed on 10 September 2021); Nadia Safira Cahyani, “Respon Ngaji Ihya”, facebook.com, 23 May 2020. https://www.facebook.com/nadia.s.cahyani/posts/4345477732132910 (accessed on 10 September 2021). Uswah, “Gus Ulil Sang Vioner Pesantren”, Neswa.id, 20 June 2020. https://neswa.id/artikel/gus-ulil-sang-pionir-pesantren-virtual/ (accessed on 10 September 2021).
[23] Andre Moller, “Respon Ngaji Ihya” facebook.com, 29 May 2020. https://www.facebook.com/andremoller/posts/10164169602630571 (accessed on 10 September 2021); Aji Wijanarko, “Respon Ngaji Ihya”, facebook.com, 29 may 2020. https://www.facebook.com/aji.winaryoko/posts/10219712016583784 (accessed on 10 September 2021);
[24] Ienas Tsoraya, “Catatan Mba Admin Keliling Nusantara Bersama al-Ghazali”, (Bandung: Afkaruna, 2021).
[25]Ahmad Suaedy, “Menuju Al-Ghazali Komprehensif Bersama Ulil Abshar Abdalla: Part2”, Jelajah Pustaka, 6 April 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2RseiPI1mA&t=31s (accessed 10 September 2021).
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2022/90 ““Tell China’s Story Well”: Chinese Embassies’ Media Outreach in Southeast Asian Media” by Wang Zheng
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, China has attached great importance to Chinese discourse power in its foreign policy agenda. In Southeast Asia, China views engagements with local media as a crucial conduit for disseminating its official narratives.
- This article examines how Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia utilise local media to tell “China’s story” in the region through three channels: 1) media events organised by Chinese embassies; 2) signed articles by Chinese leaders and diplomats in local newspapers; and 3) interviews and media briefings by Chinese ambassadors with local media.
- The overarching tone of “China’s story” to Southeast Asian audiences is positive, and the three core themes of “China’s story” involve denunciation of Western narratives, harmonisation of China-ASEAN ties, and promotion of China’s achievements.
- Notwithstanding Chinese efforts to project its discourse power in Southeast Asia, a question mark hangs over whether “China’s story” has gained credibility among Southeast Asians. There is no straightforward answer to this, given the diversity of views within the region, not only across regional states but also different sectors of society.
- China’s focus on strengthening mutually beneficial relations with Southeast Asian states, in lockstep with its discourse power push, potentially enhances its standing in the region, because the attractiveness of “China’s story” depends less on what China says but on what China does.
*Wang Zheng was previously Wang Gungwu Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/90, 12 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
Since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, China has attached great importance to the notion of discourse power in its foreign policy agenda. Xi’s speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in 2013 underscored the urgent need to “tell Chinaʼs story well, disseminate Chinaʼs voice well, and strengthen China’s discourse power internationally.”[1] Coined as huayuquan (话语权) in Chinese, the term connotes simultaneously the “right” of China to project its own narratives, ideas and concepts on the international stage and the “power” to influence the way people should think about the world.[2] China’s goal of projecting its discourse power is to create “a positive global image to achieve global institutional power of agenda-setting” and to shape favourable international opinion for the exercise of China’s national interests.[3]
From China’s perspective, although the balance of power in the current international system has undergone substantial changes with its rise to become the world’s second-largest economy, Western countries still dominate international discourse. Consequently, Western narratives about China are viewed by Beijing as biased and ideology-driven, posing major barriers to China’s peaceful development.[4] China therefore aspires to “accelerate the construction of Chinese discourse and Chinese narrative system … to present the Chinese story and the ideological and spiritual power behind it more fully and distinctly.”[5] China’s discourse power projection is a systematic project orchestrated by the entire party-state apparatus involving multiple subdivisions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[6] Chief among the implementing bodies in enhancing China’s international communication capabilities are state media, universities, Confucius Institutes, think tanks, and tech firms, among others.
One important conduit for China to project its discourse power is through media, including establishing local branches of Chinese state media overseas, enhancing China’s presence on social media platforms, and strengthening partnerships between Chinese state media and their foreign counterparts via content-sharing agreements and exchange programmes.[7] In Southeast Asia, China views engagements with local media as a crucial conduit to disseminate its official narratives. In his speech at the 2021 ASEAN Media Partners Forum, Shen Haixiong, President of the China Media Group (CMG), conveyed that media cooperation between the CMG and ASEAN “has effectively promoted mutual understanding and trust” and that China is hoping to see more local media in ASEAN states join China in “telling China stories, ASEAN stories and stories about China-ASEAN exchange and cooperation in an objective and faithful way.”[8]
“TELL CHINA’S STORY” THROUGH LOCAL MEDIA
This section examines how Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia (including China’s Mission to ASEAN) utilised local media to tell “China’s story” through their media engagement activities between January 2019 and April 2022.[9] These activities were undertaken in three forms: 1) media events organised by Chinese embassies; 2) signed articles by Chinese diplomats and top Chinese leaders in local newspapers; and 3) interviews and media briefings by Chinese ambassadors with local media.
First, Chinese embassies organised various media events, including media forums, high-level conferences, training programmes, and trips to China, to directly engage with local media and journalists (see Table 1).[10] For instance, during the ASEAN Media Delegation’s trip to China in 2019, participants were invited to attend an exhibition themed “Great History, Splendid Achievements” and visit China Central Television (CCTV). As the host to the delegation, Chinese officials reiterated China’s commitment to building a ‘community of shared future’ with ASEAN countries and repudiated Western media’s negative coverage of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism.[11]
Table 1: Selected Media Events Organised by Chinese Embassies in Southeast Asia (Jan 2019-Apr 2022)
Second, Chinese diplomats and top Chinese leaders published signed articles in local newspapers. Table 3 lists the top ten local newspapers from Brunei, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines that have published signed articles authored by Chinese diplomats and top Chinese leaders between January 2019 and April 2022. Indonesia tops the list given that both the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia and China’s Mission to ASEAN are based in Jakarta. It should be noted that newspapers listed here operate in multiple languages, including English, Chinese, and local languages such as Tetun and Bahasa Indonesia, reflecting China’s efforts to appeal to audiences with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds.
Table 2: Top Ten Local Newspapers Publishing Signed Articles by Chinese Leaders and Diplomats (Jan 2019-Apr 2022)[12]
Third, Chinese ambassadors had interviews with local media and addressed their questions in media briefings convened by Chinese embassies. Table 3 shows selected local media that interviewed Chinese ambassadors or attended media briefings convened by Chinese embassies in each Southeast Asian state between January 2019 and April 2022. Overall, Chinese embassies’ interactions with local media vary across countries, with Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines topping the list. Furthermore, China has been engaging with various local media platforms, including print, broadcast, and digital media. Similarly, these media outlets operate in different languages.
Table 3: Selected Local Media Interacting with Chinese Embassies in Southeast Asia
COMMON THEMES IN “CHINA’S STORY” TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN AUDIENCES
This section identifies the common themes from three sources of Chinese official messaging featured on Chinese embassies’ websites between January 2019 and April 2022,[13] namely: 1) local newspaper articles written by top Chinese leaders and Chinese diplomats; 2）Chinese diplomats’ interviews with local media; and 3) Chinese diplomats’ remarks at media briefings convened by Chinese embassies or at their meetings with local government officials. The author analysed 209 pieces of texts in two ways. First, word frequency in the texts is calculated to discern the overarching tone of China’s official narratives to Southeast Asian audiences. Second, three common themes running through the texts are distilled: namely, denunciation of Western narratives, harmonisation of China-ASEAN ties, and promotion of China’s achievements.
WORD FREQUENCY
Table 4 shows the top 50 frequent words and their weighted percentages in the texts, and the word cloud chart presented in Figure 1 visualises the top 100 common words in the texts.[14] Words such as “cooperation,” “mutual,” “joint,” “support,” and “friends” represent China’s characterisation of its relationship with Southeast Asian states. Terms related to China’s economic and foreign policy agenda, including poverty reduction, the BRI, and ‘community of shared future’, also feature frequently on the word list. It is evident that the overarching tone of these texts is positive, which is consistent with China’s polite attitudes towards Southeast Asian states on Twitter, contrary to its combative ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy in the West.[15]
Table 4: Top 50 Frequent Words
Figure 1: Cloud Chart of the Top 100 Key Words
COMMON THEMES
By coding the selected texts and organising the codes accordingly, three common themes of “China’s story” to Southeast Asian audiences are identified, namely: denunciation of Western narratives, harmonisation of China-ASEAN ties, and promotion of China’s achievements. Inherent in the narratives is a dichotomous framing of China’s attitudes towards Western and Southeast Asian countries, reflecting Beijing’s strategy of tailoring its communication methods when projecting its discourse power overseas. While denouncing Western narratives about its domestic politics and foreign policies, China portrays Southeast Asian countries as good neighbours, close friends, strategic partners, and family members. China also promotes its achievements in order to enhance its image as a benign power in Southeast Asia.
Denunciation of Western Narratives
One of the core themes in “China’s story” is Beijing’s denunciation of Western narratives about its domestic politics and foreign policies. China regards these narratives as driven by a “Cold War mentality,”[16] which motivates Western countries to demonise its achievements, sabotage the solidarity among Asian countries, and ultimately contain its peaceful development. To refute such narratives, China contends that it firmly champions multilateralism, free trade, and the rule-based international order as enshrined in the United Nations (UN) charter. In Southeast Asia, China’s position is manifest in its rebuttal of multiple Western narratives regarding the origin-tracing of Covid-19, the BRI, and the South China Sea disputes.
The origin-tracing of Covid-19 abounds in China’s denunciation of Western narratives. China views criticisms regarding the lack of transparency in its initial handling of the pandemic and the “lab-leak” theory as US attempts to politicise the issue of Covid-19 origins and undermine global cooperation in fighting the pandemic.[17] China claims it has adopted a scientific approach to determine Covid-19 origins by collaborating with the World Health Organisation (WHO) on a joint study conducted in March 2021, according to which the “lab-leak” theory is “extremely unlikely” to be valid.[18] Cambodia and Indonesia reportedly supported China in opposing the politicisation of the origin-tracing of Covid-19, according to the interviews with Chinese ambassadors to Cambodia and Indonesia in local media.[19]
Responding to the criticism of the BRI being a “debt trap,” China counters with the claim that it pursues a market-oriented approach to “foster a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory and foreseeable financing environment” and to alleviate the debt burdens of recipient countries.[20] China also asserts that BRI projects can promote economic growth and create job opportunities for recipient countries in Southeast Asia.[21] Furthermore, China conveys that there is no hidden geopolitical agenda behind the BRI – the BRI itself aligns well with regional states’ national strategies such as Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” vision,[22] the Philippine’s “Build, Build, Build” programme,[23] and Malaysia’s push for the development of the digital economy.[24]
On the South China Sea disputes, China insists that the so-called “accusation” of China’s militarisation of the South China Sea is a vivid example of how Western countries “interfere in China’s internal affairs and drive a wedge between China and regional countries”.[25] China has repeatedly articulated its commitment to resolving the South China Sea disputes through consultations with claimants in the region[26] and has evaluated that consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) have been “proceeding smoothly and effectively.”[27]
Harmonisation of China-ASEAN Ties
In stark contrast to its negative portrayal of Western countries, China has sought to harmonise its ties with ASEAN countries by highlighting the positives while downplaying the tensions in its relationship with regional states. China defines its relations with ASEAN countries as not only close friends, good neighbours, and strategic partners[28] but also family members that “have a shared future, enjoy blessings and endure misfortune together…and honour kinship and fidelity”.[29] References to the notion of “family” are very prominent, and aim to make Southeast Asian states “empathize and identify with China and against its others”.[30]
China regards cooperation as the foundation of the China-ASEAN relationship. As shown in Table 4, the word “cooperation” appears most frequently in the texts. President Xi even extols the China-ASEAN relationship as “the most successful and vibrant model for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific” and “an exemplary effort in building a community with a shared future for mankind.”[31] From China’s perspective, win-win cooperation lies at the core of China-ASEAN relations and overshadows any downsides or challenges. For instance, China views the South China Sea disputes as “neither the keynote nor the sum total”[32] of China-ASEAN relations: “Even lovers and friends may have differences, but differences should not prevent them from loving and supporting each other.”[33] Euphonic as the statement is, China’s real motive, it has been otherwise asserted, is to “condition ASEAN states into “good behaviour” by “offering rewards for those ASEAN members that follow Beijing’s scripts and imposing punitive measures on those that do not.”[34]
Promotion of China’s Achievements
The promotion of China’s achievements is another crucial part of “China’s story” to Southeast Asian audiences. China attributes its effective pandemic control to the “Chinese Solution,” which comprises the CCP’s strong leadership, a scientific and people-centred approach, and international cooperation.[35] Such an approach is believed to have won China worldwide praises.[36] In return for ASEAN countries’ support during the Covid-19 pandemic, China actively distributed medical supplies such as vaccines, masks and test kits to assist regional states in fighting the pandemic.
Despite the pandemic, China has managed to maintain the momentum of economic growth – another achievement frequently mentioned in the texts. In 2020, China was reported to be the only major economy that achieved significant economic growth during the pandemic.[37] In 2021, China announced that it realised the goal of building a “moderately prosperous society in all respects” – a major milestone of the CCP’s long march towards the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.[38] In doing so, China claimed that it “has made enormous contributions to world peace and development in its own right.”[39]
A key indicator of China’s economic growth is the elimination of extreme poverty. Touted as another “Chinese Miracle”, China’s poverty reduction campaign is claimed to have lifted over 98.99 million rural population out of extreme poverty in the past decade, marking the “complete victory in its overall national campaign against poverty”.[40] China holds that its success in poverty reduction benefits the world – the total number of over 850 million people lifted out of poverty in the past four decades accounts for more than 70 percent of the global population that has exited poverty.[41] Especially in its messaging towards Mekong countries and Timor-Leste,[42] China has underscored the applicability of its approach to eliminating extreme poverty – one that focuses on sustaining industrial growth and empowering the local economy.[43]
To capture how China’s narratives about its achievements have shifted over time, this study analyses changes in the number of references to three words – “contribution,” “achievement,” and “success” – in 209 texts from 2019 to 2021 (see Table 5).[44] As shown in Figure 2, the number of references dropped from 3.56 to 3.29 words per text during the pandemic outbreak in early 2020. At this stage, China’s tone was more defensive as it had to deal with its reputational fall-outs globally following the first ever Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan. After that, China effectively controlled the pandemic in the second half of 2020, and started to actively distribute medical supplies to other countries, which gained momentum after the WHO approved the Sinovac vaccine for emergency use in June 2021.[45] As a result, the number of references to Chinese “contribution”, “achievement” and “success” rose to 4.79 per text in 2021.
Table 5: Number of References Per Year and Per Text
Figure 2: Number of References between 2019 and 2021
CONCLUSION
Have China’s intensifying efforts to project its discourse power in Southeast Asia helped improve its “national positive image” among Southeast Asians? There is no straightforward answer to this, given the diversity of views within the region.
At the regional level, views regarding China’s influence in Southeast Asia appear to be more critical than what China may have expected. According to the 2022 State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) annual survey, foreign policy elites remain wary of Beijing’s growing influence in the region, although they recognise China as the most influential economic and political power in Southeast Asia.[46] Only 7% of respondents think that China is a benign and benevolent power, while 58.1% are not confident that China would “do the right thing” in global affairs. Contentious issues downplayed in “China’s story,” including China’s assertive stance on the South China Sea, its use of economic tools for political purposes, and its growing influence over Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia, are among respondents’ top concerns over China’s engagement with the region.
At the country level, perceptions of China’s presence in the region are not monolithic and exhibit more nuance. In mainland Southeast Asia, the share of respondents receptive to China’s influence in the region is higher in Cambodia and Laos than in Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Among maritime Southeast Asian states, foreign policy elites in Brunei, Indonesia and Indonesia are becoming more amenable to Chinese influence than those in Singapore and the Philippines.[47] However, the 2022 Pew Research survey with a broader sampling across different sectors of society indicates that while the majority of respondents from all developed countries have unfavourable views of China, only Singapore and Malaysia buck the trend with more than 60% of their respondents viewing China favourably.
There are signs that China’s focus in strengthening mutually beneficial relations with Southeast Asian states, in lockstep with its discourse power push, would potentially enhance its standing in the region. The 2022 SSEA survey indicates that confidence in China has picked up in 2022 compared to previous years, especially in Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Indonesia, arguably thanks to its continued “charm offensives” across the region in recent years, such as vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure financing and trade integration. The 2021 Malaysia-China Relations Survey Report conducted by the UCSI Poll Research Centre also reveals that China-Malaysia vaccine cooperation has improved respondents’ perceptions of China and their attitudes towards Chinese investment in Malaysia.[48] In the final analysis, the attractiveness of “China’s story” – or the lack thereof – depends less on what China says but on what China does.
ENDNOTES
[1] “Xi Jinping’s 19 August speech revealed? (Translation)”, China Copyright and Media, 12 December 2013, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/xi-jinpings-19-august-speech-revealed-translation/.
[2] For more details about the meaning of the term, see Toni Friedman, “Lexicon: ‘Discourse Power’ or the ‘Right to Speak’ (话语权, Huàyǔ Quán)”, DigiChina, 17 March 2022, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/lexicon-discourse-power-or-the-right-to-speak-huayu-quan/.
[3] “Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition”, Atlantic Council, December 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/China-Discouse-Power-FINAL.pdf.
[4] Zuo Fengrong ed., Great Changes of the World and China’s International Discourse Power (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2020).
[5] Adam Ni, “Xi on external propaganda and discursive power”, China Neican, 4 June 2021, https://www.neican.org/xi-jinping-on-external-propaganda/.
[6] Atlantic Council 2020; and Paul Charon and Jean-Baptise Jeangene Vilmer, “Chinese Influence Operations: A Machiabellian Movement”, The Institute for Strategic Research, October 2021, https://www.irsem.fr/report.html.
[7] Charon and Vilmer 2021; and Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media”, International Federation of Journalists, June 2020, https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_ChinaReport_2020.pdf; and Maria Repnikova, Chinese Soft Power (Cambridge University Press, 2022)
[8] “China Media Group and ASEAN media set up partnership to boost regional development”, CGTN, 15 July 2021, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-07-14/CMG-and-ASEAN-media-set-up-partnership-to-boost-regional-development-11TErueblh6/index.html.
[9] This study traces Chinese embassies’ activities back to January 2019 given the availability of updates
posted on their websites.
[10] The events here do not include press conferences or media briefings convened by Chinese embassies on a regular basis.
[11]“感受70载辉煌发展成就 唱响中国-东盟美好未来—东盟媒体代表团访华纪实”, 中国驻东盟使团，2019年10月25日，http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/stxw/201910/t20191025_8849155.htm.
[12] The numbers presented in Table 2 and 3 are based on the count of updates posted on Chinese embassies’ websites.
[13] This study selected English sources since the software NVivo – which is used to code the texts and identify common themes – can only process data in English.
[14] The analysis here only examines English sources posted on the websites of Chinese embassies in Southeast Asia between January 2019 and April 2022. The count of each word also includes its stemmed terms. For instance, when counting the frequency of the word “development”, the software also takes into count its stemmed forms such as “develop,” “developed,” “developer,” and “develops.” In doing so, the analysis calculates word frequency more accurately. Furthermore, certain words that do not carry significant meanings, such as country names, are put on the stop words list and are not calculated here.
[15] Darren Cheong, “Polite Wolves: China’s Soft Twitter Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, Fulcrum, 21 February 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/polite-wolves-chinas-soft-twitter-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia/.
[16] Deng Xijun, “An Undemocratic ‘Summit for Democracy’”, Mission of People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 9 December 2021, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202112/t20211209_10464838.htm and Deng Xijun, “Uncovering Truth About AUKUS”, Mission of People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 30 September 2021, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202109/t20210930_9578428.htm.
[17] “Written Interview of Ambassador WANG Wentian on Fighting COVID-19 Pandemic”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 16 August 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dssghd_1/202108/t20210818_8938489.htm and “A signed article ‘Covid-19 origin tracing: Respect science, reject politicisation’ by Mr. Zhang Xumin, Chargé d’Affaires, ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Singapore published in Straits Times”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Singapore, 20 August 20 2021, http://sg.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgsd/202108/t20210820_8913765.htm
[18] “Signed Article by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Suara Timor Lorosae”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 18 June 2021, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202106/t20210618_8909268.htm.
[19] “Written Interview of Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia H.E. Wang Wentian on the Outcomes of State Councilor Wang Yi’s Visit to Cambodia by Cambodia News Agency”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 20 September 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dssghd_1/202109/t20210920_9579992.htm and “Ambassador Xiao Qian published a signed article titled United States origin tracing of coronavirus is a dead end in Jakarta Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 10 September 2021, http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202109/t20210910_9633640.htm.
[20] “Keynote Speech by Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian at Seminar ‘Connecting Indonesia and China through Belt and Road Initiative’”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 27 March 2019, http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201903/t20190327_2049062.htm and “Full text: Why Belt and Road and Global Maritime Fulcrum Cooperation Benefits both China and Indonesia?”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 2 September 2019 http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201909/t20190902_2049102.htm.
[21] “Timor Post published a signed article by Ambassador Xiao Jianguo on the Belt and Road Forum” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 26 April 2019 http://tl.chineseembassy.org/eng/xwdt/201904/t20190426_1140850.htm.
[22] “Full text of Chinese ambassador Xiao Qian’s article on Belt and Road Initiative published by the Jakarta Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 9 April 2019 http://id.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/201904/t20190409_2049070.htm.
[23] “Ambassador Huang Xilian: All Chinese projects will continue as planned”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 1 September 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/sgdt/t1811014.htm.
[24] “Interview of H.E. Ambassador Ouyang Yujing with BERNAMA (Transcript)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 16 March 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202103/t20210316_9935451.htm.
[25] “Ambassador Huang Xilian: All Chinese projects will continue as planned”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 1 September 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/sgdt/t1811014.htm.
[26] “The South China Sea issue should not be a tool for implementing the strategy of containing China by non-regional countries”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 14 July 2020, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202007/t20200714_10149168.htm.
[27] “China-Philippines Relations Shine Brighter in the Tempering of Time”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 9 June 2019, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202106/t20210609_8936066.htm.
[28] “Remarks by Ambassador Deng Xijun at the Launching Ceremony of the ASEAN-China Survey 2021 Report”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 21 October 2021, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202110/t20211028_10348960.htm; “Multilateralism: still the key to a prosperous East Asia”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 21 February 2022, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/202202/t20220221_10643913.htm; and Ambassador Ouyang Yujing “Stand together for 30 years, Start New journey with a shared future–Commemorating the 30 Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 21 December 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202112/t20211231_10478004.htm.
[29] Ambassador Ouyang Yujing, “Stand together for 30 years, Start New journey with a shared future—Commemorating the 30 Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 21 December 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202112/t2021123110478004.htm.
[30] Linus Hagström, Astrid H M Nordin. “China’s ‘Politics of Harmony’ and the Quest for Soft Power in International Politics”, International Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2020), p.517.
[31] Ambassador Ouyang Yujing, “Stand together for 30 years, Start New journey with a shared future—Commemorating the 30 Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 21 December 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202112/t20211231_10478004.htm.
[32] “China-Philippines Relations Shine Brighter in the Tempering of Time”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 9 June 2021, http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202106/t20210609_8936066.htm.
[33] “Full text: Written interview with Manlila Times by H.E.Amb. Huang Xilian”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, 20 July 2020. http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/202007/t20200720_1182956.htm.
[34] Hoang Thi Ha. “Understanding China’s Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny and ASEAN’s Ambivalent Response.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (August 2019), pp.223-254.
[35] “Written Interview of Ambassador WANG Wentian on Fighting COVID-19 Pandemic”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 18 August 2021, http://kh.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dssghd_1/202108/t20210818_8938489.htm and “Interview of H.E. Ambassador Ouyang Yujing with BERNAMA (Transcript)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 16 March 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202103/t20210316_9935451.htm.
[36] “Bolster Cooperation, Overcome Difficulties, And Usher in a Brighter Shared Future”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 30 September 2021, http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202109/t20210930_9580639.htm.
[37] “Seize the Opportunity and Achieve Win-Win Cooperation”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, 2 April 2021, http://bn.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxws/202104/t20210402_8930160.htm.
[38] “Signed Article by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Suara Timor Lorosae”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 29 October 2021, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202110/t20211029_10403650.htm.
[39] “China’s Moderate Prosperity and Its Benefits to the World”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, 4 November 2021, http://bn.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxws/202111/t20211104_10442233.htm.
[40] “Interview of H.E. Ambassador Ouyang Yujing with BERNAMA (Transcript)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 16 March 2021, http://my.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202103/t20210316_9935451.htm.
[41] “Signed Article by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Timor Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 18 March 2021, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202103/t20210318_9995669.htm.
[42] “Do Not Say You Start Too Early; and You Have Close Friends Wherever You GoState Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to Myanmar”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 21 January 2020, http://mm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202001/t20200121_1389314.htm and “Signed article on issues of Xinjiang and Hong Kong by H.E. Dr. Xiao Jianguo, Chinese ambassador to Timor-Leste, published on Timor Post”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 4 September 2019, http://tl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/201909/t20190904_1140957.htm.
[43] “Toward Zero Poverty and Sustainable Development with Innovation”, Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN, 5 September 2019, http://asean.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/stxw/201909/t20190905_8235826.htm.
[44] Given the insufficient number of sources posted in 2022 thus far, the analysis here focuses on the number of references of these words from 2019 to 2021. Similarly, the count of each word includes its stemmed forms. The figures presented on the y-axis are references of the three words per text in each year. Since the number of sources examined this study varies across each year, the number of references of the three words are divided by the number of sources each year, in order to enhance the reliability of the analysis results.
[45] “WHO validates Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine for emergency use and issues interim policy recommendations”, World Health Organization, 1 June 2021, https://www.who.int/news/item/01-06-2021-who-validates-sinovac-covid-19-vaccine-for-emergency-use-and-issues-interim-policy-recommendations
[46] Sharon Seah, et al., “The State of Southeast Asia 2022 Survey Report”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 16 February 2022, /articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2022-survey-report/.
[47] See Sharon Seah, et al., 2022.
[48] S Birruntha, “Vaccine cooperation improves Malaysians’ perception of China”, The Malaysian Reserve, 2 December 2021, https://themalaysianreserve.com/2021/12/02/vaccine-cooperation-improves-malaysians-perception-of-china/.
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2022/89 “Sustainability Collaborations between Businesses: Proposing a Roadmap for Cooperation between ASEAN Competition Authorities” by May Loh and Poh Lip Hang
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Abiding by competition laws could pose a challenge to business collaborations designed to meet environmental sustainability targets. Surveys of companies show that a majority choose not to pursue sustainability-related collaboration with other companies due to competition law compliance risk.
- Collaboration between competition authorities is crucial for the achievement of sustainability outcomes across territories. However, the cost-benefit analysis of relaxing competition laws to allow for sustainability collaborations between businesses is challenging due to the difficulties in quantifying environmental benefits. It is also unclear how a consideration of environmental sustainability targets features in competition authorities’ assessment frameworks.
- As such, a roadmap is herein proposed which fosters collaboration between ASEAN competition authorities, and facilitates cross-border sustainability collaborations and sustainability collaborations that bring about extra-territorial environmental benefits.
- Recommendations include issuing guidance for businesses involved in sustainability collaboration. Such guidance should explain how the competition authority will assess environmental benefit claims under the relevant provisions in their competition legislation.
- A supportive policy environment in ASEAN, especially for sustainability collaborations which are at the intersection of ten sets of national competition laws and other national environmental laws, will advance businesses’ efforts to pursue and implement sustainability collaborations in the region.
*May Loh is Senior Advisor at Conservation International (Asia-Pacific) and the Albright Stonebridge Group where her advisory work covers the intersection of issues of public policy, philanthropy, corporate governance and sustainability. Poh Lip Hang is a competition economist with Baker McKenzie.Wong & Leow, and an Adjunct Faculty at the Singapore Management University School of Economics where he teaches Economics of Competition Law to postgraduate students. The views set out in this article are the authors’ own and do not represent the views of the authors’ respective organisations.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/89, 9 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
There is increasing debate globally on the intersection between competition law and sustainability in recent years. Countries want to promote free and fair marketplaces, but dealing with environmental challenges may require businesses to collaborate in a way that is contrary to most precepts of competition law. In Southeast Asia, the sustainability imperative is clear as the region is one of the most vulnerable to climate change and sustainable development has become a strategic priority outlined in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025. At the same time, ASEAN Member States have also committed to fostering a culture of fair business competition for enhanced regional economic performance in the long-term. To date, all ASEAN member states have enacted national competition laws, and initiatives are ongoing to strengthen enforcement. Herein lies a key question – while ASEAN continues to encourage open competition, will its laws and policies inhibit business collaborations designed to meet environmental challenges such as climate change?
Private sector-led initiatives are key to addressing urgent sustainability challenges, most of which are too large and interconnected to solve without collaboration between businesses across industries and supply chains. A report by IMAGINE and the University of Michigan highlights that persistent global problems require systems change through collective, collaborative action. It further notes that “collaborations present an opportunity for companies to expand their knowledge base, expertise, market reach and social impact”.[1] Pre-competitive collaboration is proposed by the report as a form of system change, which differs from other forms of private sector collaboration as it takes place before differentiation in the market occurs. For example, the Global Salmon Initiative (GSI) is a pre-competitive platform launched by aquaculture companies representing 70% of global production to advance sustainability practices in the sector. The GSI enabled information-sharing and drove the uptake of Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) certified salmon, resulting in about 40% of the industry being certified today.[2]
Pre-competitive sustainability collaborations can therefore bring about positive, lasting impact when it is well-implemented across the value chain. Unfortunately, competition law enforcement can stymie sustainability collaboration between competing businesses. A 2020 survey of sustainability leaders in the UK, USA, France, Germany and the Netherlands found that over 90% of companies want to work together to address sustainability goals. However, almost 60% of these companies chose not to pursue sustainability-related collaboration with other companies due to competition law compliance risk.[3] Relatedly, more than half (57%) of the 800 business leaders in the Asia Pacific region surveyed in 2021 cite regulatory enforcement and investigations as a top “ESG” risk.[4] A key factor especially for multi-national organisations is the fragmented nature of ESG regulation across Asia Pacific where regional collaboration is not as well-established as for example, in the European Union.
COOPERATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IS KEY
The OECD opined on the importance of international cooperation between competition authorities on sustainability collaboration between businesses. This is because even if a sustainability collaboration is not subject to competition law prohibition in one jurisdiction they might still be so in other jurisdictions. This can sometimes lead to perverse outcomes. For example, the OECD noted that Indonesia’s competition authority (KPPU) “faced pressure to prohibit a private standard for palm oil that reduced deforestation [and so the standard] was subsequently abandoned”.[5] This was the Indonesia Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP), an agreement between major palm oil companies aimed at fighting deforestation and forest fires. These companies agreed to not develop peatlands of any depth as peatland fires are a major source of the haze problem in Southeast Asia. The KPPU found that the IPOP has “the potential to become a cartel that will lead to monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition amounting to an infringement of Indonesia’s competition law.”[6]
Certainly competition law should first and foremost be enacted and enforced to safeguard market competition and consumers in the jurisdiction. Southeast Asian countries’ competition legislation are therefore aimed at safeguarding national interests and promoting free and fair markets. Competition authorities will be hard-pressed to explain why public resources are expended to intervene in market competition outcomes in other jurisdictions. A summary of the policy objectives of the 10 Southeast Asian member states’ competition laws by Burgess (2020)[7] is set out in the table.
| SE Asian Country | Economic Efficiency | Economic Growth and Development | Consumer Welfare | Fairness | Promotion and Protection of Competition |
| Brunei Darussalam | X | X | X | N/A | X |
| Cambodia | X | N/A | X | X | X |
| Indonesia | X | N/A | X People’s welfare | X | X |
| Lao PDR | N/A | X | X Protect interests of State and businesses, as well as consumers | X | X |
| Malaysia | N/A | X | X | X | X |
| Myanmar | N/A | X | X Public interests also considered | X | X |
| Philippines | X | X | X | X | X |
| Singapore | X | N/A | N/A | N/A | X |
| Thailand | X | N/A | X | N/A | X |
| Vietnam | X | X | X Consumer interests and social welfare | X | X |
However, it is short-sighted, like in the case of a prisoners’ dilemma, if we consider the foregone extra-territorial environmental benefits that sustainability collaborations can bring about. For the sake of discussion, we use the IPOP as a hypothetical example. The benefit arising from IPOP’s contribution to the reduction in environmental cost of transboundary haze pollution e.g. to neighbouring Singapore and Malaysia, should be weighed against costs of allowing IPOP to engage in monopolistic practices and/or unfair business practices in Indonesia. This cost-benefit analysis is nonetheless challenging due to difficulties in quantifying environmental benefits and externalities, especially those that are extra-territorial and long-term in nature.
Relatedly, it is unclear how the consideration of environmental issues feature in competition authorities’ assessment frameworks. The OECD Competition Committee suggests that the interpretation of competition law to environmental issues can have two different outcomes:[8]
(a) The extent that competition law provisions are to be interpreted so that environmental costs arising from prohibited agreements, conduct and mergers are prevented/prohibited.
(b) The extent that competition law provisions can possibly be interpreted so that sustainability collaboration that brings about environmental benefits are allowed.
It may also be the case that the consideration of environmental issues fall outside the scope of the competition legislation. In order to steer Southeast Asia away from the sub-optimal prisoners’ dilemma outcome, the current trajectory that ASEAN competition authorities with regard to sustainability issues has to change.
A ROADMAP FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
We propose a roadmap for ASEAN competition authorities to ensure that sustainability collaborations, in particular those that lead to extra-territorial environmental benefits, are not stymied.
Recommendation 1 (National Level): Recognise the importance of environmental issues in the competition authority’s strategic plan. The strategic plan will facilitate communication and accountability, and enhance business stakeholders’ understanding of the competition authority’s purpose and functions in relation to environmental issues. For example, the Malaysia Competition Commission noted in its Strategic Plan 2021 to 2025 that “Investment in green technology can be cost-prohibitive and businesses may want to cooperate with their competitors to achieve the ESG agenda. The MyCC may need to study how Act 712 works to encourage the ESG agenda amongst businesses in Malaysia.” [9] This will set the “tone” of the competition authority, and promote consultative discussions between the competition authority and businesses looking to implement sustainability collaborations.
Recommendation 2 (Individual Level): Issue guidance for businesses involved in sustainability collaboration. The International Competition Network Special Project 2021 carried out by the Hungarian Competition Authority on “Sustainable Development and Competition Law” noted that 85% of the non-governmental advisors surveyed chose “more/better guidance documents” when asked to suggest ways that competition authorities can enhance transparency in their decision making.[10] Such guidance should explain how the competition authority will assess environmental benefit claims under the relevant provisions in their competition legislation e.g. cartel, abuse of dominance, mergers or unfair trade practices. Additionally, guidance on specific standards and/or quantification methodologies that are acceptable to the competition authority when assessing environmental costs and benefits should also be provided. This will alleviate compliance risk concerns that businesses have when pursuing sustainability collaboration. An example is the “Draft Guidelines on Sustainability Agreements” first published by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) in 2020, which was followed by a revision in 2021 after public consultation. The guidelines explain different types of sustainability agreements that are allowed and how environmental benefits should be substantiated. The ACM also jointly commissioned a technical report with the Greek competition authority elaborating on methods used to substantiate benefits of sustainability agreements.[11]
Where the consideration of environmental issues falls outside the scope of competition legislation and the providing of exemptions is not feasible, competition authorities should consider solutions to address the lacuna e.g. proposing legislative amendments or holding discussions with relevant regulatory authorities in their respective jurisdictions.
Recommendation 3 (Individual Level): Cooperate with relevant regulatory authorities that have oversight of sustainability policy. Apart from designing and administering environment-related regulations on businesses, regulatory authorities may also engage in public-private partnerships to address environmental issues. Where regulations or private-public partnerships have unintended adverse impact on market competition, competition authorities play an important role in the advocacy of pro-competition policy-making, and in assisting regulatory authorities with re-shaping policy options to mitigate the adverse impact. One example would be enabling a regulatory sandbox regime for pre-competitive collaboration. This in turn could strengthen competitive collaboration at the bilateral or regional level. For example, the Hellenic Competition Commission introduced the “Sustainability Sandbox” in June 2022 where businesses can request for ex ante evaluation of their pre-competitive collaboration. It is aimed at enhancing legal certainty and reducing regulatory risks for businesses engaging in green investments.
Recommendation 4 (Bilateral or Regional Level): Initiate discussions on how ASEAN competition authorities can cooperate to assess cross-border sustainability collaborations, and sustainability collaborations that bring about extra-territorial environmental benefits. As highlighted by the OECD, even if sustainability collaborations are not subject to competition law prohibition in one jurisdiction they might still be in other jurisdictions. Such cooperation is also consistent with the general thrust to promote greater harmonisation of competition policy, law and enforcement in the region, following the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community. The ASEAN Expert Group on Competition (AEGC) is an excellent regional platform to facilitate or join discussions on specific cross-border sustainability collaborations as they arise. Such initiatives can fall under the ASEAN Competition Action Plan 2021-2025’s Strategic Goal 3; namely, for steps toward ensuring that regional cooperation arrangements on Competition Policy and Law are in place.
Recommendation 5 (Regional Level): Conduct a study to scope ASEAN-wide competition law and sustainability-related policy objectives. The study should ideally commence with a survey of the sustainability-related key result areas and the corresponding strategic measures of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025.[12] It is clear that private-sector involvement, and sustainability collaborations are crucial to achieving most of the strategic measures in the key result areas. The study can be part of the work under “Strategic Goal 3” of the ASEAN Competition Action Plan 2021-2025. Likewise, the AEGC would be the appropriate platform to engage with other relevant ASEAN-wide platforms e.g. the ASEAN Senior Officials on Environment to scope ASEAN-wide competition law and enforcement, and sustainability-related policy objectives. Once these policy objectives are agreed upon, guidance on how (i) cross-border sustainability collaboration, and (ii) sustainability collaborations that bring about extra-territorial environmental benefits, are assessed, should be issued.
CONCLUSION
There is a strong imperative for ASEAN competition authorities to cooperate and examine how sustainability collaborations can be addressed without undermining fairness and market efficiency. With increasing focus on region-wide initiatives such as the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance[13] and scaling-up carbon markets to unlock the potential of nature-based solutions, the cost of inaction is far too great to ignore.
A supportive policy environment in ASEAN, especially for sustainability collaborations which are at the intersection of ten sets of national competition laws and other national environmental laws, will advance businesses’ efforts to pursue and implement sustainability collaborations in the region. To borrow from a popular Chinese proverb: “The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, the second best time is now.”
ENDNOTES
[1] Naomi Barker, Douglas Ely, Nicholas Galvin, Anya Shapiro, and Adrienne Watts (2021) Enacting Systems Change: Precompetitive Collaboration to Address Persistent Global Problems (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan).
[2] WWF (2019). The Business Case for Pre-Competitive Collaboration (Global Salmon Initiative). Access: https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/1283/files/original/GSI_Business_Case_07-19_v8.pdf?1576875829
[3] Linklaters (2020), Competition law needs to cooperate: companies want clarity to enable climate change initiatives to be pursued.
[4] Baker McKenzie (2021), From Strategy to Action – Advancing ESG in Asia Pacific.
[5] Julian Nowag (2020). Sustainability & Competition Law and Policy – Background Note. 134th Meeting of the OECD Competition Committee 1-3 December 2020
[6] KPPU Tanggapi Keberadaan Indonesia Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP) (2016). Access: https://www.kppu.go.id/id/blog/2016/04/kppu-tanggapi-keberadaan-indonesia-palm-oil-pledge-ipop/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
[7] Burgess (2020), Commonalities and Differences across Competition Legislation in ASEAN and Areas Feasible for Regional Convergence
[8] Sustainability & Competition Law and Policy – Background Note. Access: https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2020)3&docLanguage=En
[9] Malaysia Competition Commission Strategic Plan 2021 – 2025. Access: https://www.mycc.gov.my/sites/default/files/pdf/newsroom/MyCC_Strategic%20Plan%202021-2025%20%28Public%20Ver.%29_English%20%2814%20Dec%202021%29.pdf
[10] ICN Special Project 2021 (NGA.II.B.% Ways of enhancing transparency). Access: https://icn2021budapest.hu/site/assets/docs/spec_project/sustainability_survey%20REPORT%20(2ndEd%202021%2009%2030)%20final%20PUBLIC.pdf
[11] Guidelines on sustainability agreements are ready for further European coordination. Access: https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/guidelines-sustainability-agreements-are-ready-further-european-coordination
[12]ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025. See key results areas under Section C: Sustainable. Access: https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/8.-March-2016-ASCC-Blueprint-2025.pdf
[13] Introduced in 2021, the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance provides a common language to communicate and co-ordinate on labelling for economic activities and financial instruments, and thus can be used as a reference or starting point for competition authorities to understand the types of activities that are credibly considered ‘green’ across ASEAN.
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Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2022 Survey Report
The Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2022 Survey Report, the third iteration of ISEAS’ annual regional climate survey, was conducted both online and in-person between 8 June and 12 July 2022, covering topics ranging from climate change impacts and food security to climate governance and international cooperation. Besides English, the survey was offered in six different Southeast Asian languages (Bahasa Indonesia, Burmese, Lao, Khmer, Thai and Vietnamese). It drew a total of 1386 responses from citizens of all ten ASEAN countries.
2022/88 “Chinese ‘Debt Traps’ in Southeast Asia: What the Data Say” by Darren Cheong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Utilising novel data on China’s overseas development finance, this article examines whether a Chinese “debt trap” strategy exists in Southeast Asia.
- China’s development loans in the region are mainly debt-financed, rather than aid-financed, which carry substantially higher interest rates than those of benchmark institutions such as the World Bank, and generate higher returns for Chinese lenders.
- Taking into account these unfavourable terms and the contextual origins of China’s development finance, the evidence, on the balance, does not lend credence to the existence of a purposive Chinese “debt trap” strategy in the region.
- China seems to have taken on the role of a banker whose development finance is largely driven by commercial interests, although its risk management against defaults may entail strategic implications.
- This complex reality neither fits Western conceptions of China’s “debt trap” strategy nor Beijing’s self-image as a benevolent development partner.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/88, 8 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
The story of China’s development finance around the world tends to be mired in arguments concerning “debt trap”. Under the “debt trap” narrative, it is said that China has set out with a grand strategy to saddle developing countries with debt by financing the building of big-scale infrastructure projects of dubious economic viability. As these developing-country borrowers struggle to repay their debts and eventually default on their loans, China will be left to seize ownership of their critical infrastructure assets. The poster child of this narrative is the Hambantota port, a project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which fell to Chinese control in a 99-year lease following Sri Lanka’s inability to service debt associated with the project.[1]
On the flipside, Beijing and the host countries reject this characterisation, arguing that Chinese financing is fulfilling a niche for developing countries who have found it difficult to finance sorely needed infrastructure and development projects on their own or with the help of other financial institutions. The ease of borrowing and “no strings attached” approach have made China an attractive lender – leading analysts to describe it as a “financier of first resort”.[2] Encapsulating the essence of this counter-narrative, Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, at the 27th Future of Asia Conference in 2022, asked “If we don’t have investment from China, what source of electricity can we have?”.
Given that Southeast Asia has been among the key recipients of Chinese development finance, questions surrounding whether a Chinese debt trap exists in the region loom large. For the most part, scholars analysing China’s development finance programme in Southeast Asia have refrained from commenting directly about the specifics of Chinese-funded projects and instead utilised arguments from the standpoint of individual Southeast Asian countries to provide clarity on the “debt trap” question. Their perspectives shed light on how Southeast Asian countries have wielded a considerable amount of agency and have been able to extract concessions in negotiating financing terms with Beijing; and the “debt trap” argument alone does not match with the fact that numerous Chinese development projects have taken root in the region.[3] Others have pointed out that the bureaucracy behind China’s overseas development finance programme is highly decentralised with different agencies and state-owned enterprises taking ownership of a disjointed agenda.[4] Thus, they conclude it is unlikely that “debt trap” constitutes any form of grand strategy on the part of China.
Building on these analyses, this article utilises the AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance (GCDF) dataset[5] to examine the structure of China’s development finance in Southeast Asia, making comparisons with the World Bank. The analysis paints a mixed picture. While the terms of China’s aid and loans to Southeast Asian countries are less favourable compared to those of the World Bank, the weight of the evidence does not lend credence to the existence of a Chinese “debt trap” strategy in the region. Taking into account the contextual origins of China’s overseas development finance programme, the less favourable terms of China’s loans to the region stem predominantly from commercial rather than geopolitical interests. Yet, Chinese financial institutions’ risk management against defaults on their loans may entail strategic implications. This complex reality neither fits common Western conceptions of China’s “debt trap” strategy nor China’s self-image as a benevolent development partner.
CHINA’S OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND THE GCDF DATASET
China has typically been extremely secretive about details on its overseas development financing and the GCDF dataset represents a pioneering effort in uncovering this shroud of secrecy. Without such data, it is difficult to make concrete assertions about the validity of the “debt trap” argument. This explains why even though the BRI was launched almost a decade ago, there still seems to be continuous debate about a Chinese “debt trap”. In an attempt to uncover the shroud of secrecy over China’s massive development finance portfolio, the researchers behind the GCDF dataset developed a “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF)”[6] methodology which systematically synthesises large volumes of open-source data that aim to provide as much detail on China’s overseas development projects as possible. These data come from four main sources: (1) unredacted documentation from various Chinese institutions, (2) information from the aid/debt information management systems from government departments in recipient countries, (3) field research from scholars and NGOs, and (4) English, Mandarin and local-language media reports. Rigorous cross-referencing, verification and data quality control ensure that the data are accurate and standardised across the board. This article utilises various details in the GCDF dataset to shed light on the structure and terms of Chinese development finance in Southeast Asia. Using these insights, this article evaluates arguments about China’s “debt trap” in the region.
THE STRUCTURE OF CHINA’S OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
The unwieldy nature of China’s overseas development finance has made it difficult to provide a framework for understanding its structure. Past studies have tried to provide a more systematic way of breaking down the structure of China’s overseas development finance by drawing comparisons with international development finance lending standards.[7] According to OECD definitions, development finance flows are typically categorised as “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) or “Other Official Flows” (OOF). ODA flows are meant to be concessional in nature and the OECD uses several strict criteria[8] to establish whether development finance flows meet standards of concessionality. For example, ODA loans tend to have much lower interest rates than the market rate. Development finance flows that do not meet the ODA criteria are deemed to be OOF; most OOF flows tend to be priced at or near market rates. This distinction allows analysts to disaggregate between what can be considered “aid” (ODA) or “debt” (OOF). For a more intuitive interpretation, the rest of the article will refer to ODA as “aid” and OOF as “debt”.
As China does not classify its projects along these definitions, the GCDF dataset classifies China’s development finance flows using the “ODA-like” and “OOF-like” categories that strictly follow the OECD’s definitions. These categories allow us to determine the share of aid and debt in China’s development finance portfolio in Southeast Asia. Figure 1 provides a simple visualisation of the ratio of debt-to-aid in China’s development finance flows to Southeast Asia for projects approved between 2000 and 2017 – the period captured by the GCDF dataset.
Within this time period, the overall ratio of aid-to-debt is 1:5, meaning that for every dollar of aid that flowed to Southeast Asia, 5 dollars of debt accompanied it. From these figures, it is evident that China tends to provide loans more than aid in its development programme in Southeast Asia. However, it should also be noted that the 1:5 aid-to-debt ratio in Southeast Asia is lower than the same ratio for China’s global development finance portfolio, which stands at 1:9.[9] While it may be tempting to use these headline figures to support the “debt trap” narrative, further examination of the terms of China development flows is needed. The next section explores in detail three key indicators – interest rates, grace periods and maturity periods – to see how China’s development lending compares to those if international lenders such as the World Bank. For reasons laid out below, the World Bank’s lending programmes serve as an excellent benchmark for assessing the favourability of China’s lending terms.
THE LENDING TERMS OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Researchers have previously identified the World Bank’s dual-track development funding windows, which disburses both aid-financed (ODA) and debt-financed (OOF) loans, to be a benchmark to which China’s development loans can be compared.[10] Aid-financed loans are given out under the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA). Eligibility for IDA loans depends on the country’s relative poverty, which is defined as gross national income below a threshold that is updated yearly. This figure stands at US$1,255 per capita for the 2023 fiscal year. The bulk of the IDA’s funds comes from middle to higher-income donor countries, which meet every three years to replenish the IDA’s resources.[11] This source of funding allows the IDA to price its aid-financed loans on highly concessional terms. On the other hand, the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) provides debt-financed loans to middle-income countries that do not qualify for IDA funding. The IBRD raises its funds through the global financial market, resulting in the terms being more in line with market rates.
The World Bank’s bifurcated structure which separates aid-financed loans and debt-financed loans closely resembles China’s development finance programme, which similarly disburses loans on both aid and debt terms to developing countries. Hence, a like-to-like comparison between the terms of the World Bank’s IDA and IBRD loans can be made with China’s aid-financed and debt-financed loans.
To facilitate this comparison, the first step to take has been to separately calculate the average lending terms of China’s aid-financed and debt-financed loans to Southeast Asia, which are measured along three indicators – interest rates, grace periods,[12] and maturity periods.[13] The average lending terms of the World Bank’s IDA and IBRD loans are derived from a previous study.[14] As this study utilises weighted averages that take into account the value of loans, the calculations for China’s loans in this article will similarly use averages that are weighted by loan value. As data for lending terms in the GCDF dataset are subject to availability, not all projects listed in the dataset are represented in this calculation. Data from 47 aid-financed projects (ODA) and 169 debt-financed (projects) in Southeast Asia are utilised in the calculation of China’s lending terms. Figure 2 provides a summary of the comparison between the lending terms of the World Bank’s IDA and IBRD loans and China’s aid-financed and debt-financed loans.
The World Bank’s lending terms are consistent with the idea that IDA-eligible low-income countries should receive more concessional loans while middle-income countries, who are better able to pay loans, receive harder terms. Progression from IDA to IBRD loans marks a transition to higher interest rates as well as shorter grace and maturity periods. This can be seen in the 1.3% and 2.8% weighted average interest rates for IDA and IBRD loans, respectively. China’s loans to Southeast Asia are somewhat consistent with this logic, where aid-financed loans have marginally lower average interest rates of 3.2% while debt-financed loans are higher at 3.6%.
Based on the average grace and maturity period of China’s loans, there does not seem to be a consistent logic to which these terms are set. Counterintuitively, the weighted average grace periods for China’s aid-financed loans to Southeast Asia have been shorter than their debt-financed ones, at 4.8 years compared to 6 years. As for maturity periods, there is not much differentiation between China’s aid-financed and debt-financed loans, which have average maturity periods of 17.6 years and 17.8 years respectively.
Based on the interest rate figures, we can see that both China’s aid-financed and debt-financed loans are more expensive than the World Bank’s. On average, aid-financed loans from China have interest rates that are 1.5% higher, while debt-financed loans have interest rates that are 0.8% higher. However, for some Southeast Asian countries, this disparity seems to be larger. Table 1 provides the country-level weighted average terms for China’s debt-financed loans. To facilitate comparison with the World Bank’s rates, IBRD terms have also been included in the table.
Debt-financed loans given to Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam seem to have average interest rates that are substantially higher (above 4.0%). On the other hand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia and Laos seem to secure lower interest rates for debt-financed loans (3.1% to 3.3% on average). While there are suggestions that certain Southeast Asian countries have been able to secure better deals with China through tough negotiations,[15] it remains that these rates are across the board higher than the IBRD’s 2.8% benchmark.
A similar picture can be gleaned from the terms for China’s aid-financed loans, which are provided in Table 2. For comparison, the IDA terms are included in the table. The interest rates on China’s aid-financed loans in these Southeast Asian countries are also higher than what the World Bank offers. That being said, as there is much less data available for China’s aid-financed loans, more caution should be exercised when interpreting these country-level figures.
CONTEXTUALISING THE TERMS OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT LOANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The figures presented in the earlier sections might lend credence to the idea that China is saddling Southeast Asian countries with debt on unfavourable terms, possibly prompting a “debt trap” narrative in the region. However, this is an oversimplification of the issue as these figures need to be interpreted within the historical context of China’s overseas development finance. There are several reasons indicating that China’s development loans to Southeast Asia, expensive as they may be, are unlikely to be part of a “debt trap” strategy.
As analysts point out, when China began its overseas development finance programme through its “Going Out” strategy in the late 1990s, its primary concern was its massive foreign currency reserves.[16] The Chinese government was concerned that channelling these reserves into its domestic economy may increase the macro-economic instability in the form of inflation or currency revaluation. Hence, it quickly accelerated the pace of its overseas investments and lending. Locked mostly in U.S. Treasury bonds, China’s foreign currency reserves generated an estimated 3% in annual returns.[17] At the same time, there was an increasing consensus within China that its foreign reserves could be better invested in higher-yielding assets.[18]
One of the vehicles for China’s overseas investment was through its development finance portfolio which predominantly comprises debt rather than aid and is typically priced above the reference 3% rate in Southeast Asia. As an additional point of reference, the domestic rate of return of infrastructure in China stood at 3.1% in 2012.[19]
These higher interest loans carry a heavier risk of default that Chinese lenders manage through the utilisation of repayment safeguards. In a report by the creators of the GCDF dataset, they found that collateralisation is the risk mitigation strategy of choice for Chinese lenders. In the context of a typical Chinese development loan, this means that borrowers have pledged some form of asset, future revenue or commodity export which can be seized in the event of a default. What Chinese lenders see as essentially a risk management strategy is chiefly where fears of a Chinese “debt trap” strategy lie. This is especially so if the development loans are concentrated primarily in sectors of strategic importance.
In Southeast Asia, the GCDF dataset recorded 54 instances of collateralised development loans totalling US$23.9 billion (constant 2017). Table 3 provides a country-level breakdown of these loans. Approximately 95% of these collateralised loans went into sectors of strategic importance – energy, mining, transport and communications. However, it should be noted that this sample of 54 projects is based on what the GCDF authors could collect based on publicly available information. For the vast majority of projects, details on collateralisation are not available. That being said, even if we expect that many more Chinese development loans in the region are likely to be collateralised, it is still a stretch to claim that a “debt trap” strategy is in play.
Dr Bradley Parks, Director of the AidData research lab, which created the GCDF dataset, said in an interview that China heavily prefers to collateralise on cash or liquid assets as well as commodity exports.[20] We see this in multiple examples in the sample of 54 collateralised projects. The most notable case is a collateralised debt-financed loan for the China-Laos Railway Project,[21] valued at US$3.63 billion (constant 2017). The Laotian government did not pledge any assets or provide a sovereign guarantee for the loan but provided instead collateral in the form of revenue from a bauxite mine and three potash mines. In another example, a US$724 million (constant 2017) debt-financed loan for the Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline Project[22] was collateralised using future revenues from the project.
In the instances where illiquid physical infrastructure has been pledged as collateral, it is worth remembering that these development loans are meant to generate a financial return for China’s lenders. If seizure of assets is the purported goal of “debt trap”, it would mean that the loans of Chinese lenders ultimately became non-performing. It makes little sense, if any, for any financial institution to hope that their loans fail. Previous research has also indicated China’s strong preference for restructuring debt before the possibility of defaults.[23] China’s approach to debt restructuring has been dominated by debt maturity extensions with outright debt cancellations being limited to the very few zero-interest loans.[24] It is thus likely that the seizure of pledged collateral would only be a final resort for Chinese financial institutions dealing with non-performing loans.
CONCLUSION
China’s development finance portfolio in Southeast Asia heavily relies on debt-financing with interest rates that are high compared to the World Bank. There are also questions surrounding the debt sustainability of Southeast Asian countries that have taken such loans from China, as well as doubts about the due diligence processes in which Chinese lenders finance “high-risk” projects that overwhelmingly require collateralisation as a risk management strategy. However, the evidence, on the balance, does not lend credence to a purposive Chinese “debt trap” where China sacrifices its genuine commercial interests in the hope of securing assets of strategic importance, and purposefully saddles the host countries with unsustainable debts.
The data explored in this article present a more nuanced picture in which China assumes a role akin to that of a banker who has devised sure ways to guarantee repayment on its loans, which allows it to take on big-scale, high-risk projects. The seizure of strategic assets to repay Chinese loans is more an outgrowth of this process than a premeditated geopolitical goal. China’s development finance is largely driven by commercial interests although its risk management against defaults may entail strategic implications. These strategic implications, which are amplified by the state-led nature of China’s overseas development finance, have underpinned the anxiety behind the “debt-trap” narrative. However, the complex reality neither fits Western conceptions of China’s “debt trap” strategy nor Beijing’s self-image as a benevolent development partner.
ENDNOTES
[1] Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port”, New York Times, 25 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html
[2] “Leaders of Least Developed Cambodia, Laos Play Down Concerns of a China Debt Trap”, Radio Free Asia, 27 May 2022, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/cambodia-debt-05272022110503.html.
[3] See for example Lampton, David M., Selina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik. Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia. University of California Press, 2020; Lim, Guanie, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra. “Why Is It So Hard to Push Chinese Railway Projects in Southeast Asia? The Role of Domestic Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia”, World Development 138 (2021): 105272.
[4] Jones, Lee and Shahar Hameiri, “Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy”, Chatham House, Asia Pacific Programme Research Paper (2020): 1-43.
[5] Custer, Samantha, Axel Dreher, Thai-Binh Elston, Andrea Fuchs, Siddharta Ghose, Joyce Lin, Ammar Malik, Bradley Parks, Russell Brookes, Kyra Solomon, Austin Strange, Michael Tierney, Katherine Walsh, Lincoln Zaleski, and Zhang Sheng, Tracking Chinese Development Finance: An Application of AidData’s TUFF 2.0 Methodology (Williamsburg: AidData at William & Mary, 2021)
[6] Custer et al, Tracking Chinese Development Finance.
[7] Morris, Scott, Brad Parks, and Alysha Gardner, Chinese and World Bank Lending terms: A Systematic Comparison across 157 Countries and 15 Years (Washington, DC: Centre for Global Development, 2020).
[8] The three criteria for ODA classification are: (1) the primary purpose of the project must be the promotion of economic development and welfare in the recipient country, (2) official commitment supporting the project must be concessional in nature (i.e., grant, technical assistance, scholarship, debt forgiveness, or loan with a grant element of at least 25%), (3) the project must take place in a country that qualifies for ODA, based on its income level.
[9] Malik, Ammar, Bradley Parks, Russell Brookes, Joyce Lin, Katherine Walsh, Kyra Solomon, K., Zhang Sheng, Thai-Binh Elston, and Seth Goodman. Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects. (Williamsburg: AidData at William & Mary, 2021).
[10] Morris et al, Chinese and World Bank Lending Terms.
[11] China also contributes to the IDA but not as much as other countries. In the latest replenishment round in 2022, China’s share of IDA contributions was 3.8% while the US and Japan each contributed about 10%. See “IDA Partners Contributions to the Twentieth Replenishment”, World Bank, 4 August 2020, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/de673efb6d163ebe533e902221b5d415-0410012022/ida-partners-contributions-to-the-twentieth-replenishmen.
[12] Grace periods are a time period granted on a loan during which the borrower does not have to make payments towards the loan.
[13] The maturity period is the length of time the lender will receive repayments on loans.
[14] Morris et al. Chinese and World Bank Lending Terms, 16.
[15] Lampton et al. Rivers of Iron, Chapter 5.
[16] People’s Bank of China, “China: The Evolution of Foreign Exchange Controls and the Consequences of Capital Flows”,in Financial Globalisation and Emerging Market Capital Flows, 143-151. (Bank for International Settlements, 2008).
[17] Kong, Bo, and Kevin P. Gallagher (2016), “The Globalization of Chinese Energy Companies”, Boston University: Global Economic Governance Initiative, 06/2021, 24.
[18] Hongying Wang, “A Deeper Look at China’s “Going Out” Policy”, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 8 March 2016,https://www.cigionline.org/publications/deeper-look-chinas-going-out-policy/.
[19] Leutert, Wendy. “Challenges Ahead in China’s Reform of State-Owned Enterprises.” Asia Policy 21 (2016): 84.
[20] Rob Garver, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Is about Profit, Not Development, Study Finds”, VOA News, 1 October 2021,https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-is-about-profit-not-development-study-finds/6252992.html.
[21] “China Exim Bank Provides $3.54 Billion of Debt Financing for China-Laos Railway Project”, AidData, https://china.aiddata.org/projects/85304/.
[22] “China Development Bank Provides EUR452.75 Million Loan for Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline Construction Project”, AidData, https://china.aiddata.org/projects/34468/.
[23] Horn, Sebastian, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, “China’s Overseas Lending and the Looming Developing Country Debt Crisis”, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 4 May 2020, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/chinas-overseas-lending-and-looming-developing-country-debt-crisis.
[24] Ibid.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha. Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2022/87 “Can ASEAN and India Share a Common Outlook and Approach in the Indo-Pacific?” by Joanne Lin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Over the past three years, ASEAN and India, as strategic partners, have been finding ways to align their outlook and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. As such, identifying common approaches and strategic alignment between the two can help elevate the relations to a higher level.
- ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) aims to defend its centrality through inclusive partnerships to promote greater strategic trust in the region. However, operationalising the AOIP will be challenging due to a lack of collective outlook.
- India aims to strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific through the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) by focusing on three key aspects, namely purposeful partnerships (with like-minded countries), power promotion, and broad pluralistic policy.
- ASEAN and India may find convergence in four aspects, namely, upholding common values; seeking balance in the Indo-Pacific and maintaining neutrality; broad and pluralistic approaches to engagement; and issues-based cooperation which may result in strategic alignment.
- However, India’s interest to project its own leadership in the Indo-Pacific may pose a challenge to ASEAN centrality. ASEAN’s inability to exert its leadership role in the Indo-Pacific due to the limitations in ASEAN-led mechanisms and a lack of collective outlook will result in India relying on other mechanisms such as the QUAD to project a greater influence in the Indo-Pacific.
* Joanne Lin is Lead Researcher in Political-Security affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/87, 2 September 2022
INTRODUCTION
The Indo-Pacific region, signifying the confluence of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, is becoming increasingly important to ASEAN and India. Although there is no common definition of the strategic nature of the region, the construct was made with the strategic interests[1] of major powers in mind, including the US, Japan, Australia, and India—members of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD)—and others like the European Union, United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea.
In the case of ASEAN and India, the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region is underscored in their respective guiding documents, namely the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN’s collective outlook to guide ASEAN’s engagement in Asia-Pacific and Indian Oceans region), adopted in June 2019 and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (India’s non-treaty-based initiative for cooperation with partners in the Indian and Pacific Oceans region), launched in November 2019.
Over the past three years, ASEAN and India as strategic partners, have been finding ways to align their outlook and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific; and this eventually culminated in the Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region[2] being adopted at the 18th ASEAN-India Summit in November 2021.
The joint statement which seeks to deepen ASEAN-India strategic partnership by exploring clear convergences and potential cooperation between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), reaffirmed shared values and common fundamental principles. It also highlighted a long list of potential activities that are aligned to the four areas of cooperation outlined in the AOIP, namely maritime and economic cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development, and other areas of mutual interest. Apart from India, Japan has a similar joint statement with ASEAN[3] on the AOIP adopted in 2020.
While most documents and literature on ASEAN-India relations seek to identify areas of cooperation for strengthening the strategic partnership, this paper explores ASEAN’s and India’s strategic alignment in the Indo-Pacific through their respective approaches, and examine if a common outlook can be established to take ASEAN and India relations to the next level.
ASEAN’S APPROACH TO THE INDO-PACIFIC
ASEAN’s motivation in the Indo-Pacific has always been lacklustre and is driven primarily by its need to ensure that the region is not dominated or driven by any great power. The adoption of the AOIP in 2019 was in response to the growing narratives on the Indo-Pacific that are increasingly being shaped by major powers with vested interests in the region.[4] ASEAN, under the leadership of Indonesia, decided to come up with its own collective outlook to carve out its role in the Indo-Pacific in order to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture.[5] Apart from Indonesia and Vietnam[6] which chose to embrace the Indo-Pacific, others in the bloc were less keen on a strong ASEAN approach towards the Indo-Pacific.
As such, the AOIP was deliberately kept broad, rudimentary and ambiguous to cater to the ambivalence or different levels of interest (or lack of interest) within the regional bloc on a construct that is, in fact, malleable.[7] Several ASEAN member states were apprehensive about the new Indo-Pacific construct for fear of being seen to be embracing the free and open Indo-Pacific strategies of countries such as Japan and the US which were interpreted as countering the rise of China.
Apart from underlining key principles,[8] forging inclusive partnerships is one of the main thrusts of ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. This approach enables ASEAN to defend its centrality in the regional architecture and, at the same time, ensure the sustainability of initiatives in the Indo-Pacific through the support of external partners. ASEAN, on its own, has limited resources to maintain multilateral processes and platforms or to fund sizable initiatives and activities.
Notwithstanding the lack of strategic and substantive elements within the AOIP, or any salient or concrete ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific initiatives, ASEAN has managed to gain considerable success in garnering support for its maiden document on the Indo-Pacific. Many of ASEAN’s dialogue partners, including India, have seemingly welcomed its adoption and underscored ASEAN’s central role in the Indo-Pacific in various statements with ASEAN. Attempts have also been made by partners to find areas of synergy between the various Indo-Pacific strategies and the AOIP.
However, operationalising the AOIP will be challenging due to the lack of a collective outlook. ASEAN’s role in the region (let alone a leading one) will be limited due firstly to ASEAN’s inability to undertake substantive positions on key issues owing to the diverse interest and alliances among its members; secondly, the need to preserve its neutrality and unity amidst major power rivalry will limit ASEAN’s options; and thirdly, the absence of hard power in its security mechanisms cannot serve as a deterrence against potential aggressors.
INDIA’S APPROACH TO THE INDO-PACIFIC
In a similar vein, given the increasing salience of the Indo-Pacific discourse, Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region[9] in a speech delivered at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018. In that speech, India envisioned the Indo-Pacific as a free, open and inclusive region based on international law.
Modi had specifically underlined that “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members, nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate, and by no means do we (India) consider it as directed against any country”.[10] The importance of ‘ASEAN centrality’ and the need for greater cooperation in the region was highlighted.
Subsequently, Modi launched the IPOI at the East Asia Summit in November 2019, shortly after the AOIP was adopted. The IPOI draws on existing regional cooperation focusing on seven key pillars,[11] namely, maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; trade connectivity and maritime transport.
A separate “Indo-Pacific” Division was set up within the Ministry of External Affairs to help consolidate India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific across the Government of India and to provide substantive policy elements and programmes to its vision. ASEAN-India relations have since been subsumed under the new division.[12]
While the IPOI appears to be an announcement and framework rather than an actual policy document, it aims to provide a specific institutionalised structure[13] and strategic direction to the Indo-Pacific architecture. It is to establish India as a ‘rule-maker’ rather than a ‘rule-taker’,[14] and to bolster New Delhi’s strategic posturing.[15] This is in line with India’s ambition to be a stronger regional security power as evidenced in its Act East Policy. Scholars have also noted the important role that the Indian Ocean plays in supporting India in its economic rise, and as a maritime power in the region.[16]
The need for India to extend its influence in the Indo-Pacific also stems from India’s sensitivity to China’s expanding influence through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and China’s growing partnership with Pakistan.[17] Safeguarding maritime security and strengthening relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, especially with ASEAN, has become an important priority for Modi.
However, India has not taken a defined position on the contested power politics in the Indo-Pacific[18] and has maintained cordial relations with most countries in the region. It has also kept its objectives and definition of the Indo-Pacific very broad to suit its interest to maintain a degree of “fuzziness”.[19]
It is observed that India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific focuses on three key aspects, namely, purposeful partnerships (with like-minded countries), power promotion, and broad pluralistic policy.[20] In addition, strategic autonomy, non-alignment (or multi-alignment), and inclusiveness are core to India’s foreign policy and have been translated into its Indo-Pacific approaches.
India’s aim, therefore, is to foster a culture of institutional participation[21] in the Indo-Pacific region, especially the Indian Ocean region, that will strengthen India’s power and influence. Cooperation with international organisations and regional groupings (such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium), minilateral partnerships (i.e. QUAD), trilateral (i.e. India-Australia-Japan Supply Chain Resilience Initiative), bilateral engagements (including with ASEAN countries), as well as issue-based partnerships[22] (i.e. the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, BIMSTEC), form the cornerstone of India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.
A COMMON OUTLOOK AND APPROACH
While ASEAN and India have attempted to explore synergies and identify areas of cooperation that are complementary to the AOIP and IPOI, what is equally important to understand is the extent to which ASEAN and India may align their approaches in the Indo-Pacific.
There are converging approaches including upholding fundamental principles and values, as well as the pursuit of multilateralism and neutrality that will allow ASEAN and India to further advance their strategic partnerships. At the same time, certain divergences between ASEAN and India may also pose challenges to their relations in the long run.
Seeking Balance in the Indo-Pacific and the Need for Neutrality
India is keen to balance—although not specifically contain—China’s influence[23] in the Indo-Pacific.[24] Thus, India’s membership in the QUAD will help to satisfy India’s security needs. However, India is also viewed as the weakest link in the QUAD due to its need to maintain strategic autonomy and therefore may not align with Australia, Japan, and the US to the same extent in their outlooks toward China or even Russia. India’s history and policy of non-alignment (and being a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, NAM) reflects its desire to “be friendly to all countries…and not being entangled in any alliance”, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru.[25]
This aspect bodes well with ASEAN’s aim to preserve neutrality. The importance of neutrality in ASEAN has been reflected in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN) signed in 1971[26] in which the five ASEAN foreign ministers (then) agreed to work towards the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, free from outside interference in its internal affairs. The need for neutrality was also considered in ASEAN’s AOIP which did not mention any specific countries or align itself to the Indo-Pacific strategies of major powers.
This principle has therefore allowed ASEAN to bring together major powers and regional players—regardless of ideologies or values—for inclusive dialogues and strategic cooperation through its multilateral mechanisms including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) which India is a member of. Similarly, this principle has allowed India to extend its diplomatic influence into the wider Indo-Pacific and engage freely with multiple partners through established rules, processes and institutions.
Broad Pluralistic and Multi-Pronged Engagement
Another similarity between ASEAN and India as observed in the AOIP and IPOI is the vagueness and broad nature of both approaches. This is perhaps designed to allow both parties to have a stake in the Indo-Pacific without the need to parse the nature of the Indo-Pacific.[27] The avoidance of having a definitive position on the contested power politics in the Indo-Pacific has allowed ASEAN and India to maintain cordial relations with most countries and stakeholders in the region.[28]
India’s plurilateral approach in the Indo-Pacific as reflected in the IPOI not only focuses on its engagement with ASEAN and its multilateral mechanisms but also through various forms of cooperation (minilateral, trilateral and bilateral, as illustrated in the earlier section).
Apart from cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, India is also part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—a growing China-led organisation—and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This reflects the reality of India’s “need for a strong multi-polar world order for dealing with the challenges of our times”, according to Modi.[29] India’s preference for multi-pronged engagement has therefore prompted observations that India’s non-alignment policy is increasingly shifting to multi-alignment.[30] Some scholars have also referred India’s enlargement of partnerships and strategic space to “conjectural alliances”[31]—alignments without political or military alliance structure—which can result in little commitment.
This in a way is similar to ASEAN’s outward-looking approach to external relations in which multiple partnerships are formed bilaterally (with over 95 Non-ASEAN Ambassadors accredited) and through sub-regional, regional and international organisations. The number of formal partnerships including dialogue partners, sectoral dialogue partners, and development partners as well as with various organisations have grown over the years, although commitment remains low. In fact, scholars have observed that ASEAN’s strategy for external relations is to embrace as many outsiders as possible to balance any threat arising from one single power.[32]
Projection of Leadership in the Indo-Pacific (Power Promotion vs ASEAN Centrality)
As much as India has always placed emphasis on the importance of ASEAN centrality and leadership in the regional architecture (as underscored in most documents), India has also been active in projecting its own power across the military and commercial domains in the Indo-Pacific. Some scholars have argued that the Indo-Pacific as envisioned by the IPOI, “celebrates the rise of India, re-emergence of Japan and the return of the US to the region”.[33]
Furthermore, India’s partnerships through regional sub-groupings or minilaterals like the QUAD help to promote greater (and largely unexplored) roles of middle powers such as India, Australia, Japan, France, and the UK, and hold the potential to bridge between the smaller littoral states of the region with the bigger powers like the US.[34]
By embracing the QUAD, India is able to rise above its middle-power status[35] and project a greater influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly post-pandemic through various vaccines and economic initiatives. Scholars have noted that New Delhi visualises a regional and global order which facilitates a greater role for India in its diffusion and distribution of power.[36] As such, its promotion of a “Quad Plus”[37] will enable India to build a more concentrated power structure in the Indo-Pacific that could help it gradually break away from its dependency on the Chinese economy.[38]
It seems then that the value of the QUAD to India far surpasses that of ASEAN. India’s aspiration to project its leadership through the QUAD or QUAD-Plus will run contrary to its support for ASEAN as the driving force in the regional architecture.
Although ASEAN has not issued any official statements on the QUAD, the bloc is cautious about QUAD replacing ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture. In addition, ASEAN does not wish to be entangled in a possible power transition taking place[39] in the Indo-Pacific region and does not wish for the Southeast Asia region to be securitised. In this aspect, ASEAN and India do not have the same level of ambition when it comes to the securitisation or building of a power structure in the Indo-Pacific region, especially if such a move is to counter the rise of China in the region.
However, the convergence of strategic interests between a multilateral organisation and a minilateral group cannot be ruled out if the QUAD and ASEAN find common ground in shared normative and practical engagements.[40]
CONCLUSION
The examination of ASEAN’s and India’s approaches to the Indo-Pacific shows many similarities which could lead to significant strategic alignment. India’s pragmatism, neutrality and open approaches to engagement in the region will allow both sides to advance their strategic partnership, especially in areas of common interests or issues to forge a win-win partnership.
However, there remain differences when it comes to leadership in the Indo-Pacific. The limitations in ASEAN-led mechanisms coupled with the declining unity of ASEAN have resulted in ASEAN centrality appearing obsolete in the face of emerging challenges. Fundamentally, ASEAN will not be able to exert its leadership role in the Indo-Pacific due to the lack of a collective outlook among ASEAN countries toward this construct. As such, it will be tough for India to rely on ASEAN alone to satisfy its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.
As ASEAN and India work towards a comprehensive strategic partnership after 30 years of relations, ASEAN and India may need to find new options to sustain its strategic alignment, including closer cooperation between ASEAN and the QUAD.
ENDNOTES
[1] Brendon J. Cannon and Kei Hakata, Indo-Pacific Strategies: Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age”, Routledge, London and New York, 2021, Pp. 5
[2] ASEAN, “ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region”, 28 October 2021, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/71.-ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific-for-Peace-Stability-and-Prosperity-in-the-Region-Final.pdf
[3] ASEAN, “Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, 13 November 2020, https://asean.org/joint-statement-of-the-23rd-asean-japan-summit-on-cooperation-on-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-2/
[4] This was recognised even in the founding days of ASEAN when Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik noted that “Southeast Asia is one region in which the presence of interests of most major powers converge, politically as well as physically”.
[5] ASEAN, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, 22 June 2019, ASEAN Secretariat, https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf
[6] Hoang Thi Ha, “ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potential”, Perspective, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 20 April 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_49.pdf
[7] Ibid.
[8] Such as openness, transparency, inclusivity, rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty and international law, non-intervention, mutual respect and benefit among others.
[9] Ministry of External Affairs India, Indo-Pacific Division Briefs, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf
[10] Narendra Modi, Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018
[11] Ibid.
[12] Rahul Mishra, “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to the Indo-Pacific Region”, AIC Commentary, No. 20, August 2021, ASEAN India Centre, https://aei.um.edu.my/img/files/AIC%20commentary%20No%2020%20August%202021%20final.pdf
[13] Panda, J. P. The Strategic Imperatives of Modi’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative, Asia-Pacific Bulletin No. 503, East West Centre, 8 April 2020.
[14] Rahul Mishra, “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative: Providing Institutional Framework to the Indo-Pacific Region”, AIC Commentary, No. 20, August 2021, ASEAN India Centre, https://aei.um.edu.my/img/files/AIC%20commentary%20No%2020%20August%202021%20final.pdf
[15] Jagannath P. Panda, “The QUAD Plus and India’s pointed alignment strategy”, in QUAD Plus and Indo-Pacific, The Changing Profile of International Relations, edited by Jagannath P. Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell, Routledge, 2022. Pp. 45-77.
[16] Frederic Grare and Jean-Loup Samaan, The Indian Ocean as a New Political and Security Region, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. 43.
[17] Panda, J. P. The Strategic Imperatives of Modi’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative, Asia-Pacific Bulletin No. 503, East West Centre, 8 April 2020.
[18] Jagannath Panda, “The Strategic Imperatives of Modi’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiatives”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, Number 503, 7 April 2020, East West Centre, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb503.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=37466
[19] Ibid.
[20] Jagannath Panda, “The Strategic Imperatives of Modi’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiatives”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, Number 503, 7 April 2020, East West Centre, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb503.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=37466
[21] Samikshya Das, “Understanding India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean’s Initiative, CESCUBE, 10 June 2022, www.cescube.com/vp-understanding-india-s-indo-pacific-ocean-s-initiative
[22] Premesha Saha, “India’s Role in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific”, Observer Research Foundation, 26 January 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-role-in-the-emerging-dynamics-of-the-indo-pacific/
[23] The need to balance China also result from clashes between India and China forces along the disputed Himalayan border.
[24] Iqbal Singh Sevea, “ASEAN and India in an Evolving Indo-Pacific”, ISAS Briefs, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), 22 June 2022, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/asean-and-india-in-an-evolving-indo-pacific/
[25] India Constituent Assembly Debates, 17 May 1949, Part 1, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1990531/
[26] ASEAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, 27 November 1971, https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ZOPFAN.pdf
[27] Vivek Mishra, Scholars’ Point- IORA Set of Events in New Delhi: Embracing the Indo-Pacific, Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies, 15 December 2019, http://www.kiips.in/research/iora-set-of-events-in-new-delhi-embracing-the-indo-pacific/
[28] Premesha Saha and Abhishek Mishra, “The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative: Towards a Coherent Indo-Pacific Policy for India”, ORF Occasional Paper No. 292, December 2020, Observer Research Foundation.
[29] Narendra Modi, Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018
[30] Raghavan, P.S. “The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 12, no. 4 (2017): 326–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45342011.
[31] Brendon J. Cannon and Kei Hakata, “Indo-Pacific Strategies: Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age”, Routledge, London and New York, 2021, Pp. 62
[32] M. Mayilvaganan “ASEAN and India: navigating shifting geopolitics” in ASEAN and India-ASEAN Relations, Navigating Shifting Geopolitics, edited by M. Mayilvaganan, Routledge, 2022, pp. 2.
[33] Mishra, Rahul, “Where ‘Act East’ meets Indo-Pacific: Mapping India’s Southeast Asia engagement”, Presentation made at the Conference, Asia’s Post Pandemic Order and Integration Outlook of ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific at Crossroads organised by the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia with the ASEAN Studies Centre (Chulalongkorn University), and the ASEAN India Centre(AIC), RIS, New Delhi, 8 July 2021.
[34] Frederic Grare and Jean-Loup Samaan, The Indian Ocean as a New Political and Security Region, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. 8.
[35] Harsh V. Pant, “India and the Quad: Chinese belligerence and Indian resilience”, Observer Research Foundation, 20 March 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-quad/
[36] Jagannath P. Panda, “The QUAD Plus and India’s pointed alignment strategy”, in QUAD Plus and Indo-Pacific, The Changing Profile of International Relations, edited by Jagannath P. Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell, Routledge, 2022. Pp. 45-77.
[37] QUAD-Plus includes countries such as Israel, South Korea, Brazil, New Zealand and Vietnam which are seen as like-minded partners.
[38] Jagannath P. Panda, “The QUAD Plus and India’s pointed alignment strategy”, in QUAD Plus and Indo-Pacific, The Changing Profile of International Relations, edited by Jagannath P. Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell, Routledge, 2022. Pp. 45-77.
[39] Hernaikh Singh, “ASEAN-India Relations: Potential for Further Growth”, ISAS Insight, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), 1 July 2022, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/asean-india-relations-potential-for-further-growth/
[40] Evan A. Laksmana, “Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Special Issue 2020: 106-117, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/12/2002599864/-1/-1/0/6-LAKSMANA.PDF/TOC.pdf
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha. Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |