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Articles & Commentaries

“Examining the Drivers of Changes in Mean Earning and Earning Inequality in Indonesia” by Maria Monica Wihardja and Abror Tegar Pradana

 

2022/77 “The Media Landscape in Indonesia: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same” by Sofie Syarief

 

A newspaper kiosk in Jakarta showing the front pages of various newspapers on 16 March 2019. Picture: Bay ISMOYO/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The structure of Indonesia’s media landscape has remained largely unchanged over the last decade, and continues to be dominated by a handful of conglomerates.
  • As this study shows, many of these conglomerates have clear political leanings and affiliations, and have often used their media platforms to advance the agendas of their political allies.
  • Many owners of these large media groups have also utilized their businesses to diversify their investments and broaden their economic interests.
  • The emergence of digital media has not resulted in more diversity in terms of ownership control and editorial content. The capital-intensive nature of the industry means that large media groups have the ability to become larger by resorting to multiplatform media. In addition, many new digital media outlets need to be backed by conglomerates in order to become sustainable and significant.
  • While the media landscape is still largely dominated by the established media groups, a couple of new players have used digital media as gateways to enter the industry. These new players are also business conglomerates seeking to diversify their portfolios.

* Sofia Syarief is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and a Senior Journalist in Indonesia.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/77, 3 August 2022

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INTRODUCTION

There are ample examples around the world of media owners using their platforms to cultivate access to politicians and government officials. The situation is no different in Indonesia. In fact, media owners are not only actively involved in the political sphere, some even have direct affiliations with political parties.

The same few media groups that have controlled Indonesia’s information and media sector over the last decade continue to dominate the information landscape. In essence, 12 media companies control 90 per cent of what people watch, listen and read in Indonesia (Nugroho et al, 2012). These groups—mainly seven of them—also control a majority of large online media platforms.

INDONESIAN MEDIA, MEANS OF POLITICS

Forgot to tell #Leveson that it’s unreasonable to expect individuals to spend £millions on newspapers and not have access to politicians.

(Evgeny Lebedev, UK, owner of The Independent, current member of House of Lords,

tweet 23 April 2012)

Within Indonesia’s media landscape, several conglomerate owners are considered key players (Tapsell, 2017). These are Chairul Tanjung (CT Corp), Hary Tanoesoedibjo (Global Mediacom), Eddy Sariaatmadja (Emtek), Bakrie Group (Visi Media Asia), Surya Paloh (Media Group), the Riady family (Berita Satu Media Holding), and Jakob Oetama-PK Ojong (Kompas Gramedia)[1] (see Table 1). Several of these names are directly linked to political parties and, to some extent, the Jokowi administration. At the same time, some other players are actively using their media platforms to influence broader issues and policies to serve their interests.

Surya Paloh, the owner of Media Group (MetroTV, Media Indonesia daily, Medcom.id), is the founder and chairman of NasDem Party (Partai Nasdem, National Democrat Party), which currently holds three ministerial posts within the cabinet and 59 out of 575 seats in the House of Representatives. Paloh, who established NasDem after he lost his bid for Golkar Party’s (Partai Golongan Karya, Functional Group Party) chairmanship in 2009, is known as one of President Joko Widodo’s closest allies.[2] This support has been clearly demonstrated in publications under the Media Group, especially Metro TV which was nicknamed “TV Jokowi” throughout the election cycle of 2014 and 2019 for the way it aggressively promoted news on then-presidential candidate Joko Widodo.[3]

Although arguably not as politically influential as Paloh, two other conglomerate owners, Chairul Tanjung and Hary Tanoesoedibjo, are also supporting Joko Widodo. Interestingly, both Tanjung and Tanoesoedibjo have managed to place their respective daughters in governmental positions: Putri Tanjung is one among seven presidential “millennial” special staff,[4] while Angela Tanoesoedibjo is the Deputy of Tourism and Creative Economy Minister.[5] Chairul Tanjung, who had served as coordinating economic minister under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is in control of several media outlets, including two large television stations (TransTV and Trans7) as well as Indonesia’s largest online news portal (Detik.com). He has generally refrained from interfering in the editorial content of his media outlets and largely treats his media outlets as profitable business entities. (Fernandes, 2018).

Table 1. Major Indonesia News Media Groups

Source: Author, data compiled from Haryanto, 2011; Nugroho et al, 2012; Tapsell, 2017; Souisa, 2020; and official websites.

Unlike Tanjung, Tanoesoedibjo adopts a more activist and interventionist approach. He is founder/chair of Perindo Party (Partai Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesia’s Unity Party) and owner of MNC Group, which is Indonesia’s largest television network with the largest audience share,[6] consisting of 4 television stations (RCTI, MNC TV, GTV, and iNews). He has been known to abuse his ownership of public-frequency television stations to frequently air Perindo’s advertisements to the point of violating campaign regulations.[7] He also recruits journalists working for his media to become party functionaries[8] and forces his employees to attend Perindo party’s political campaigns[9]. Such behaviour has resulted in him receiving sanctions for pushing his party’s agenda.[10] Even prior to Perindo’s establishment in 2015, Tanoesoedibjo had used his media platforms to support parties he was aligned with – such as NasDem Party in 2011 where he served as a functionary, and Hanura Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, The People’s Conscience Party) in 2014.

Aburizal Bakrie, former Golkar Party chairman, has also been using his media outlets (TVOne, ANTV, VIVANews and several other news outlets) to advance his political interests. While Metro TV was dubbed “TV Jokowi”, TVOne was regarded as “TV Prabowo” in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. It has been reported that Bakrie’s youngest son, Ardie Bakrie had sent a strongly-worded email to all members of VIVANews editorial board, accusing some of them of disloyalty to the company simply because the news outlet had an advertisement of Widodo’s campaign[11] in its website header (Dhyatmika, 2014). Not long thereafter, the chief editor on VivaNews and the chief editor of ANTV resigned. On election day, TVOne, along with all MNC Group television stations which at the time supported Subianto, deliberately aired a bogus quick count suggesting that Prabowo was leading in the election.[12]

James Riady, owner of Lippo Group (Berita Satu, The Jakarta Globe and several investment news outlets), is allied with Widodo (Tapsell, 2017). Erick Thohir, the current State-Owned Enterprises Minister, who owns Mahaka Group (Republika, Jak TV, and several radio stations) is also allied with Widodo and is said to harbour ambitions of running for president in 2024. While the media companies associated with Riady and Thohir have been more subtle in their affiliations to the regime, the political leanings of their owners are evident.

ABOVE ALL ELSE: INTEREST

Paloh and Bakrie have been notorious for using their television stations to score political points. After the 2006 Lapindo mudflow disaster in the Porong subdistrict of Sidoarjo, East Java, both Paloh’s Metro TV and Bakrie’s TVOne portrayed very different narratives. In 2008, three years into the prolonged mudflow, Metro TV persisted in using the phrase Lumpur Lapindo (Lapindo mudflow)[13] in an attempt to accentuate the responsibilities[14] of Lapindo Brantas Inc., an oil and gas company that belongs under the Bakrie Group, while TVOne insisted on labelling the disaster as Lumpur Porong (Porong mudflow) to emphasize the location of the disaster in order to downplay the role played by the Bakrie Group (Nugroho & Syarief, 2012). The term Lumpur Lapindo used by Metro TV was more widely accepted, with Indonesians generally thinking that the Bakrie Group should be held responsible for the disaster. But that was not the only reason. During that time, both Paloh and Bakrie had been locked in a heated contest for the 2009 chairmanship of Golkar, Indonesia’s second largest party, and both their television stations were used to attack the opposing camp. (Setiawan, 2010). Bakrie eventually won.[15] 

Although these moguls might not agree on everything—and even use their media to politically attack each other, their shared interests do serve to override differences. One example was the response to the Broadcasting Law 2002, which was enacted to ensure decentralization mainly by: 1) setting up digital (as opposed to analogue) broadcasting to enable more broadcasters reaching households, and 2) requiring national broadcasters to establish networked broadcasting with local television stations in an attempt to democratize and diversify the media (Nugroho et al., 2012). In an act of unity, media conglomerates, using their political power and connections, managed to influence the government to establish policies that sustain their dominance (Armando, 2014): mainly by shifting broadcasting permit issuance from Indonesia’s independent broadcasting commission’s (KPI/Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia) to the government in order got it to be more accessible to media moguls. Networked-broadcasting had only begun its slow implementation in 2012 and digital broadcast only started in April 2022.

It is also a common practice among news media in Indonesia not to criticize each other in the name of maintaining good working relationships, and avoiding future retaliation should their own company face adversities.[16] Attacks between media companies tend to occur in the context of political contests between their respective owners but almost never in order to cast criticism on editorial or managerial decisions affecting journalism in general. For instance, during and after the release of the bogus quick count results of the 2014 presidential election showing Prabowo Subianto’s false lead, the Bakrie Group and MNC Group’s television stations faced very little backlash from other prominent media companies. There was no attempt from other media companies to specifically hold them accountable for airing misleading information, hurting journalist integrity, and jeopardizing the democratic process. The details around the issue were simply reported as straight news.[17] 

DIGITAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE: SAME OLD, SAME OLD

It has been thought that the advancement of digital technology would help level the playing field and result in a less concentrated media landscape. In Indonesia, digital technology has, on the surface, facilitated the flourishing of alternative media. However, the reality is that forces remain at play to keep real control over the digital media landscape in the hands of a few.

The latest data from Indonesia’s Press Council show that up till 2018, there were approximately 43,300 online media portals in the country. But a large portion[18] of them were reportedly fake media entities that had been created to exploit the availability of funding from the local government’s advertising budget (Prasetyo, 2018).

It is apparent that digitalization has enabled media moguls to further expand their reach, perpetuating their continued dominance of the media scene and consolidating the oligarchic structure of Indonesia’s media ecosystem. (Ambardi et al, 2014). This is the result of digital conglomeracy, where existing media moguls expand their businesses to converge with or acquire digital media entities in order to expand their media empires and to cover both the communication and network infrastructure as well as the content (Tapsell, 2017). Currently, among the 30 most accessed digital media in Indonesia, 19 are directly affiliated with media conglomerates[19] and thus practically control the majority of digital news.

Table 2. Major Indonesia Digital Media Groups

Source: Dable.io; official websites.

With each media group controlling many news outlets across many platforms, the practice of republishing the same news content on multiple platforms has become ubiquitous. This has come at the expense of quality content. For many of these conglomerates, their media businesses are first and foremost a means of generating profits (Haryanto, 2011) rather than developing journalism as an industry. Hence, creating content to maximize the number of “clicks” and drive advertising revenues has become the primary motivation—above quality content. It is therefore common to see similar news and headlines repeated across many digital media platforms, decreasing the overall diversity and quality of news content. More profoundly, in this digital media landscape, any conglomerate with a particular agenda, especially a political one, will simply have more channels through which to propagate their content (Couldry et al, 2018). This has been the common practice of media moguls/politicians such as Harry Tanoesoedibjo and Surya Paloh.

The digital landscape enables new players to invest in digital media business through funding established by venture capital firms. It has become the gateway for other conglomerates who traditionally do not operate in the media industry to enter the arena. Among several venture capital firms in Indonesia funding digital news media, two are found to be investing considerably: East Ventures and GDP Venture. East Ventures[20] is backed by Indonesian conglomerate Sinar Mas Group.[21] It currently funds various digital media companies in several countries in Asia. Two of their most notable investments are IDN Times (co-investing with GDP Venture) and Katadata, a business/finance media and data/research firm. Although Katadata’s readership is behind many other business/finance online media, their integration of news and data quite often catches attention since data journalism has started to flourish in Indonesia.

GDP Venture is owned by Djarum Group, a diversified conglomerate with tobacco cigarette manufacturing as their primary business.[22] The firm funds 12 news outlets of varied genre and two user-generated content platforms. Several notable companies receiving funding—either fully or partially—are Narasi, Kumparan, and IDN Times. Narasi is a multi-format news outlet established by one of Indonesia’s most popular and influential journalists with huge followings, Najwa Shihab. Their news products, especially text and video-based journalism from Narasi Newsroom and talkshow Mata Najwa, have proven influential in shaping public opinion and discourse. Meanwhile, both Kumparan and IDN Times[23] are among native digital news outlets with the highest growth in readership. With this portfolio, along other smaller publications, GDP Venture has managed to form their own digital media group.[24] The entrance of a subsidiary of Djarum Group into the digital media industry might in the future be interesting as this conglomerate has allegedly been maintaining an as yet undisclosed relationship with Indonesian Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Indonesia, PSI),[25] [26] a newcomer supported by members of the young urban middle class.

CONCLUSION

As this paper has shown, there are strong forces at play to keep the structure of Indonesia’s media landscape oligarchic. While the internet has in theory enabled digital news media outlets to flourish, the grim realities of the capitalistic nature of the media sector mean that deep pockets are still required for media outlets to thrive and be sustainable. Conglomerates’ stronghold on the media sector practically diminishes real competition within the industry. Granted that influential journalists and credible journalism continue to flourish, especially in the digital sphere, but in reality, they still have to operate within the structure of media conglomerates which, as has been proven from time to time, are largely driven by the owners’ political, economic or other particular interests.

BIBLIOGRPAHY

Ambardi, K., Parahita, G., Lindawati, L., Sukarno, A., Aprilia, N., & Dragomir, M. (2014). Mapping digital media: Indonesia. London: Open Society Foundation.

Armando, A. (2014). The greedy giants: Centralized television in post-authoritarian Indonesia. International Communication Gazette, 76(4-5), 390-406.

Armando, A. (2019). Kontestasi dan Negosiasi Kepentingan dalam Implementasi Sistem Siaran Jaringan Televisi di Indonesia. Jurnal Komunikasi, 14(1), 41-60.

Couldry, N., Rodriguez, C., Bolin, G., Cohen, J., Goggin, G., Kraidy, M. M., … & Thomas, P. (2018). Inequality and Communicative Struggles in Digital Times: A Global Report on Communication for Social Progress.

Dhyatmika, W. (2014). Who owns the news? In Indonesia, corporate media ownership mixes with politics to create challenges for independent journalists. Nieman Reports, 68(4), 14-20.

Fernandes, Arya. (2018). Chairul Tanjung dan Politik Jokowi. Kumparan, 11 Juni. Available at: https://kumparan.com/arya-fernandes/chairul-tanjung-dan-politik-jokowi

Haryanto, I. (2011). Media ownership and its implications for journalists and journalism in Indonesia. Politics and the media in twenty-first century Indonesia: Decade of democracy, 104-18.

Nugroho, Y., Putri, D. A., & Laksmi, S. (2012). Mapping the landscape of the media industry in contemporary Indonesia. Available at: https://cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEDIA-2-Media-Industry-2012.pdf

Nugroho, Y., & Syarief, S. S. (2012). Beyond click-activism?: New media and political processes in contemporary Indonesia. Jakarta: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Prasetyo, Yosep Adi. (2018). Abal-Abalisme sebagai Musuh Kemerdekaan Pers. Jurnal Dewan Pers, 18, November 2018. Accessed from: https://dewanpers.or.id/assets/ebook/jurnal/1901200528_jurnal_DP_edisi_18_Desember_ 2018f.pdf

Rianto, P. (2012). Digitalisasi televisi di Indonesia: Ekonomi politik, peta persoalan, dan rekomendasi kebijakan. PR2Media.

Setiawan, Y. B. (2016). Tekanan konglomerat media terhadap otonomi individual para praktisi: Kasus keberpihakan pada kandidat pelalui pemberitaan TV One, ANTV dan Metro TV, selama masa pencalonan Ketua Umum Partai Golkar 2009-2014. Jurnal The Messenger, 2(1), 49-60.

Souisa, H. Y. (2017). Regulating convergence: Challenges for contemporary media in Indonesia. Asian Journal of Media and Communication (AJMC), 1(1), 35-50.

Souisa, H. Y. (2020). Broadcasting Paradox? A Study of Content Diversity and Ownership in Contemporary Indonesian Television (Doctoral Dissertation). The University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

Tapsell, R. (2017). Media power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, citizens and the digital revolution. Rowman & Littlefield.

ENDNOTES


[1] Tapsell (2017) mentioned eight media conglomerates. However, one of Indonesia’s media key figure, Dahlan Iskan, lost his shares in Jawa Pos Group in 2018. Jawa Pos Group is currently owned by several entities, including PT Grafiti Pers, PT Jaya Raya, Yayasan Jaya Raya (Jaya Raya Foundation), and Yayasan Karyawan Tempo (Tempo Employees Foundation)—all are part-owners of Tempo Media Group (Tempo magazine, Koran Tempo, Tempo.co).

[2] https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/473273/jokowi-surya-paloh-mesra-pengamat-bisa-jadi-berkah-elektoral-buat-nasdem

[3] https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2014/07/140702_lapsus_media_bias

[4] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/11/21/jokowi-picks-young-people-to-presidential-expert-staff-for-their-fresh-innovative-ideas.html

[5] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/25/breaking-jokowi-announces-12-new-deputy-ministers-to-assist-cabinet.html

[6] https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/04/19/grup-mnc-kuasai-pangsa-penonton-televisi-indonesia

[7] https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/08/03/2018/sering-tayangkan-mars-perindo-tapi-mnc-tak-penuhi-panggilan-bawaslu/

[8] https://tirto.id/perindo-partai-politik-rasa-mnc-cNvZ

[9] https://pemilu.tempo.co/read/568160/karyawan-mnc-ini-terpaksa-hadiri-kampanye-hanura/full&view=ok

[10] http://www.kpi.go.id/index.php/id/edaran-dan-sanksi/31996-teguran-iklan-kampanye-partai-hanura-mnc-tv

[11] https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/ardie-bakrie-akui-marah-soal-iklan-jokowi-di-viva

[12] https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2019/02/27/di-ilc-karni-ilyas-klarifikasi-salah-hitung-quick-count-prabowo-menang-di-pilpres-2014-bukan-tvone

[13] The writer, whom worked for Metro TV and based in East Java during that time, was personally instructed to specifically use the phrase Lumpur Lapindo in all news pieces and live/taped reports on the disaster.   

[14] https://news.okezone.com/read/2010/02/12/18/302972/ilmuwan-lumpur-lapindo-disebabkan-keteledoran-manusia

[15] https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/10/08/03403172/~Nasional

[16] A very common, though rather poorly documented, example of this is when media companies undergo mass layoffs. It is a common “code of conduct” among larger media companies not to produce news regarding the issue unless it can be published as a simple straight news, e.g. when workers finally decide to file a public complaint. It is also very common for media owners and top managements to ask each other to drop this kind of news citing “kitchen business”, referencing to Indonesians’ way of signaling others not to meddle with internal household affairs.    

[17] See: https://money.kompas.com/read/2014/07/11/143425126/Jadi.Bahan.Canda.TV.One.Mengaku.Terus.Lakukan.Perbaikan and https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/07/12/13581501/IRC.Akui.Dapat.Dana.untuk.Quick.Count.dari.3.Televisi.MNC.Group.

[18] Of that number, only 2.400 have passed the verification process and are listed as professional media by the council as of 2018.

[19] http://dable.io/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ID-Media-Landscape-2022.jpeg

[20] Based in Singapore but managed by Indonesians investing in Southeast Asia and Japan.

[21] https://jakartaglobe.id/business/sinar-masbacked-venture-capital-ev-growth-closes-250m-funding-round/

[22] Djarum Group owns PT Djarum—4th largest tobacco manufacturer (https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/problem/toll-global/asia/indonesia), BCA—3rd largest bank (https://keuangan.kontan.co.id/news/ini-posisi-lima-besar-perbankan-dengan-nilai-aset-terbesar-di-indonesia),  and both owners of Djarum Group, brothers Budi and Michael Hartono, are Indonesia’s richest (https://www.forbes.com/lists/indonesia-billionaires/#2814bfa72ff7).

[23] IDN Times is itself part of IDN Media group, mainly funded by brothers Winston and William Utomo. GDP Venture currently partially funds IDN Times and several other outlets from IDN Media. Other than GDP Venture, IDN Times also received co-investment from another venture capital firm, East Venture.

[24] http://dable.io/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ID-Media-Landscape-2022.jpeg

[25] Since its establishment, the party has been known to be a strong supporter of President Widodo, and has been gathering votes for him from young voters who are not adequately represented by other parties.

[26] A PSI politician filed a lawsuit against a senior journalist for criticizing President Jokowi’s minister’s policy regarding his cooperation, and against an e-marketplace owned by Djarum Group. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/05/30/aji-condemns-lawsuit-against-senior-journalist-for-criticizing-ministers-policy-online.html

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2022/76 “Piracy and the Pandemic: Maritime Crime in Southeast Asia, 2020-22” by Ian Storey

 

At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 there were concerns that maritime crime in Southeast Asia would surge due to an expected global economic slump. In this picture, vessels are seen anchored along the southern straits of Singapore on 21 September 2021. Photo: ROSLAN RAHMAN/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 there were concerns that maritime crime in Southeast Asia would surge due to an expected global economic slump.
  • Although incidents of piracy and sea robbery (PSR) in the region did increase in 2020 the numbers were much lower than during previous spikes. In 2021 the frequency of attacks declined to pre-pandemic levels.
  • The worst PSR black spot in Southeast Asia was the Singapore Strait where the number of attacks has increased significantly since late 2019.
  • The implementation of counter-PSR measures by regional states, both individually and collectively, ensured that the problem was largely contained during the pandemic.
  • The 2021 trend lines have continued into 2022: the Singapore Strait continues to be a PSR black spot, while the number of attacks has declined in almost every other part of the region.
  • In the second half of 2022, PSR incidents may experience a moderate increase due to economic problems caused by the Russia-Ukraine War.

* Ian Storey is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/76, 2 August 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Piracy and sea robbery (PSR) is a perennial problem in Southeast Asia.[1] The geography of the region is characterised by large maritime spaces, sprawling archipelagos, and porous and contested sea boundaries. Regional navies, coast guards and other civilian maritime law enforcement agencies have limited resources to conduct patrols and monitor illegal activities in their countries’ territorial seas, large exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and expansive archipelagic waters. Inter-state cooperation to address the problem is sometimes constrained by sensitivities over sovereignty. Southeast Asia’s sea lanes, maritime choke points and harbours are among the busiest in the world, providing seaborne criminals with a target-rich environment. Corruption within the armed forces, civilian law enforcement agencies and port authorities exacerbates the problem. Poor socio-economic conditions in coastal communities often lead locals to turn to crime to make ends meet, especially during economic downturns.

Over the past two decades, however, Southeast Asian governments have enacted measures to improve security and crack down on crime in their ports, territorial waters and EEZs. And despite sensitivities over sovereignty and disputed maritime zones, regional states have established effective minilateral and multilateral initiatives to increase practical cooperation at sea and share information. As a result, PSR incidents in Southeast Asia have dropped dramatically, though the problem flares up periodically.

Historically, PSR incidents in Southeast Asia climbed during economic recessions, including during the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis. Consequently, at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, there were concerns that maritime crime in Southeast Asia would experience another surge. As countries closed their borders to contain the spread of the virus, ships were forced to ride at anchor outside ports and anchorages across the region, providing tempting targets for sea robbers. The contraction of commercial activities raised the prospect of economic hardship in coastal communities. And as governments were forced to divert financial resources to tackle the spread of the virus, the budgets for navies and coast guards were threatened with cuts.

Although PSR incidents experienced an uptick in 2020, they did not reach the same levels as previous spikes, and in 2021 fell to pre-pandemic levels. This article examines the PSR statistics over the past two years and attempts to explain why Southeast Asia did not see a tsunami of maritime crime during the pandemic. It concludes by offering an assessment of the situation in 2022.

PIRACY AND SEA ROBBERY DURING THE PANDEMIC

Several organisations collect and publicly disseminate statistics on PSR incidents in Southeast Asia. The two most well-known are the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB-PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia’s Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) in Singapore. The IMB-PRC is a non-governmental organisation set up in 1992 and funded by private companies in the maritime sector.[2]  ReCAAP is an intergovernmental agreement signed by 14 countries in 2004 but which now has 21 contracting parties, including the United States and several European countries.[3] ReCAAP established the ISC in 2006 to facilitate information exchange and operational cooperation among the contracting parties. A third source of PSR statistics is the Information Fusion Centre (IFC). The IFC was established in 2009 as a multinational maritime security information sharing centre and is hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy at Changi Naval Base.[4] A fourth source of data is the Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center (MICA) operated by the French Navy in Brest, France.[5]

The data provided by the four organisations do not, however, provide a complete picture of the PSR situation in the region. Ships masters are sometimes reluctant to report PSR incidents because it leads to journey delays and raises their company’s insurance rates. This results in the issue of under-reporting. Due to political sensitivities, the IMB-PRC and ReCAAP-ISC assign different geographical descriptors to the location of PSR incidents, i.e. the latter uses more neutral geographic descriptors such as “Straits of Malacca and Singapore” or “South China Sea” instead of pointing to specific countries, especially Indonesia which has always been sensitive about the problem. Geographic definitions of Southeast Asia vary. For example, the IMB-PRC places Vietnam in East Asia rather than Southeast Asia, while MICA includes Papua New Guinea as a regional state. Nevertheless, the data from all four organisations provide an invaluable source of information for maritime security analysts.

For the period 2019 to 2021, the statistics from the four centres differ -sometimes markedly-but demonstrate the same overall trends: that during 2020, the first year of the pandemic, PSR incidents rose by 15-20 per cent in Southeast Asia but in 2021 declined to approximately the same level as in 2019 (see Table 1).

Table 1

Reports of PSR Incidents in Southeast Asia, 2019-2021

Reporting Agency201920202021
IMB-PRC556657
ReCAAP-ISC748377
IFC9210892
MICA859686

Sources: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (London: International Maritime Bureau, various issues 2019-2021); Annual Report (Singapore: ReCAAP-ISC, various issues 2019-2021); Annual Report (Singapore: Information Fusion Centre, 2021); Maritime Security Annual report 2021 (Brest: MICA Center, 2022).

Although there was an uptick in incidents in 2020, the number of PSR incidents was lower than during previous spikes. As shown in Figure 1, maritime crime increased significantly between 2009 and 2011 due to the Global Financial Crisis, and from 2014 to 2015 when oil prices fell and criminal gangs hijacked small product tankers to siphon off fuel to sell on the black market. Moreover, the majority of attacks in Southeast Asia during the pandemic were opportunistic, involved low levels of violence, and largely petty theft from ships carried out during the hours of darkness.

Figure 1

PSR Incidents in Southeast Asia as Reported to the IMB-PRC and ReCAAP-ISC, 2005-2020

Source: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (London: International Maritime Bureau, various issues 2005-2020); Annual Report (Singapore: ReCAAP-ISC, various issues 2007-2020).

Both globally and regionally, the number of PSR incidents dropped in the second year of the pandemic. The IMB-PRC recorded 132 global incidents in 2021, down from 194 in 2020 and the lowest recorded number since 1994.[6] ReCAAP-ISC reported 82 attacks across Asia in 2021, down from 97 in 2020, a drop of 15 per cent and the second lowest number of incidents since it started collecting data in 2007.[7]

The Singapore Strait as a PSR Black Spot

The most serious PSR black spot in Southeast Asia during the pandemic was the Singapore Strait. Approximately 100 km in length, over 100,000 vessels transit through the strait every year carrying billions of dollars in commodities and goods. The three littoral states, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, are responsible for security in their respective territorial waters which make up the strait. Even before the pandemic, the number of attacks in the Singapore Strait had been rising. The IMB-PRC received 12 reports in 2019 (up from three in 2018), rising to 23 in 2020 and 35 in 2021. In 2021, incidents in the Singapore Strait accounted for 61.4 per cent of all reports that year and the highest number since 1992.[8] The ReCAAP-ISC recorded 49 incidents in the Singapore Strait in 2021 (accounting for 60 per cent of all attacks in Asia) up from 34 in 2020. According to the ReCAAP-ISC, between 2019 and 2021, the majority of incidents occurred in the eastern sector of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), in Indonesian waters in the Riau Islands, including Bintan and Batam. The attacks (most of which were non-violent low-level robberies) were conducted against larger ships – bulk carriers, oil tankers and general cargo ships – by gangs of between three to five men, mostly armed with knives.[9]

Several reasons may account for the surge in attacks in the Singapore Strait over the past several years. The economic problems caused by the pandemic are probably one reason, though not in 2019 of course. The IFC has suggested that the large number of incidents in the fourth quarter of 2021 (23 out of the 49 that year) may be attributable to unfavourable weather conditions (which prevented fishermen from going out to sea) and the approach of year-end festivities, causing locals to turn to petty crime to supplement their incomes.[10] Growing tensions between Indonesia and China in the South China Sea may provide another explanation. China’s expansive claims in the South China are represented by the so-called nine-dash line which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna Islands. In contravention of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China claims “historic rights” in Indonesia’s EEZ, including fishing rights in the vicinity of the Natunas. In a push to enforce its claims, Beijing surged the number of China-flagged fishing boats into the area in late 2019 and early 2020.[11] The Indonesian government responded by rejecting China’s unlawful claims and increasing its military presence around the Natunas by redeploying warships from other parts of the archipelago including the Singapore Strait.[12] The IMB-PRC has noted that PSR incidents ceased off the Natunas in 2021.[13]

Why Wasn’t There an Upsurge in PSR Attacks During the Pandemic?

As the data from the four agencies indicate, PSR incidents in the region increased by 15-20 per cent in 2020, before falling back to pre-pandemic levels in 2021. Unlike during previous economic shocks, there was not a dramatic upsurge in attacks, except in the Singapore Strait. Why was that?

The IFC has put forward two theories to explain this: first, the imposition of movement restrictions by Southeast Asian governments and local authorities to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus; second, increased enforcement efforts by regional states.[14] The first reason probably did not have a major impact. The area which saw the biggest increase in incidents, Riau Province in Indonesia, was subject to movement restrictions that were both short-term (a few weeks at a time), not vigorously enforced and widely evaded.[15] They are unlikely to have affected the activities of sea robbers in the province.

The second reason is much more plausible: that the counter-PSR measures put in place by regional governments over the years effectively contained the problem. Three areas which were previously known as PSR black spots are worthy of examination: the Strait of Malacca; the Sulu-Celebes Seas; and regional ports and anchorages.

The Strait of Malacca is Southeast Asia’s busiest waterway and became the subject of international concern in the late 1990s and early 2000s due to the increasing number of PSR attacks.[16] In 2004, the three littoral states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, established the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) to improve security in the strait (Thailand joined in 2008). The MSP consists of coordinated naval patrols, combined air patrols and information sharing networks. The MSP, together with a number of national initiatives launched at the same time, led to a sharp reduction in PSR incidents in the Malacca Strait. The IMB-PRC did not report a single attack in the busy waterway between 2016 and 2018. During the pandemic, both the IMB-PRC and ReCAAP-ISC reported only one minor incident in the strait, in 2021. The daily naval and air patrols by the MSP members appear to have exerted a strong deterrent effect on maritime criminals.

The Sulu and Celebes Seas – two large bodies of water connecting Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia – became an area of concern in the mid-2010s following a series of violent kidnapping-for-ransom incidents perpetrated by the criminal-terrorist organisation the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).[17] In response to the attacks, in May 2016 the three governments agreed to establish coordinated naval and aerial patrols in the affected areas modelled on the MSP, though it was not until June 2017 that the Trilateral Maritime Patrols (TMP) were launched. However, more effective than the TMP were the counter-terrorism operations conducted by the Philippine security services against the ASG, beginning in July 2016, which significantly degraded the group’s ability to carry out attacks at sea. As a result, the number of incidents in the Sulu and Celebes Seas fell from 18 in 2016 to two in 2019. In 2020, one kidnapping-for-ransom occurred in the area but not a single incident was reported in 2021. Throughout the pandemic, the Philippine armed forces continued to conduct counter-terrorism operations against the ASG with a high degree of success.[18] Nevertheless, the ReCAAP-ISC continues to warn that the threat of abductions remains high and ships should exercise extreme vigilance.[19]

The vast majority of PSR incidents in Southeast Asia are acts of sea robbery, i.e. actual or attempted attacks that take place within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit of coastal states. To combat this problem, regional coast guards and other law enforcement agencies have strengthened security in their ports and anchorages. This has resulted in a significant decrease in acts of sea robbery in some of Southeast Asia’s major ports. Indonesia has been particularly successful. Under its 2014 Safe Anchorage programme, the Indonesian Marine Police increased patrols in 10 ports. The programme has contributed to a major decline in incidents in Indonesian waters (outside of the Singapore Strait): according to the IMB-PRC, from 43 attacks in 2017 to 25 in 2019, 26 in 2020 and nine in 2021. Data from the ReCAAP-ISC show a similar trend: from 33 incidents in 2017 to 22 in 2020 and 13 in 2021. The number of incidents in Malaysian and Vietnamese ports also fell between 2020 and 2021. In Manila there was an uptick in attacks during the pandemic due to the large number of ships anchored in the port awaiting crew changes. There were nine incidents of sea robbery in Manila in 2021. However, the Philippine Coast Guard has stepped up patrols in the harbour and arrested a number of the perpetrators.[20]

OUTLOOK FOR 2022

The 2021 trend lines continued into the first half of 2022. The Singapore Strait continues to be a PSR black spot. The IMB-PRC reported 16 incidents between January and June compared to 11 during the same period in 2020, and 16 in 2021 (62 per cent of attacks in Southeast Asia).[21] The number of incidents in Indonesia was up slightly from the same period last year –seven compared to five – but still far fewer than five years ago. The frequency of incidents in the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam continued to fall. Overall, the IMB-PRC recorded 26 attacks in Southeast Asia between January and June 2022, down from 35 and 28 during the first halves of 2020 and 2021 respectively.

The ReCAAP-ISC data track similar trends, recording 36 incidents in Southeast Asia in the first six months of 2022, compared to 35 attacks during the same period in 2021 and 47 in 2020.[22] ReCAAP-ISC received reports of 27 incidents in the Singapore Strait (all in Indonesian waters) compared to 20 in the first six months of last year. The number of incidents in Indonesia remained the same as January to June 2021 (six) while incidents continued to decrease in Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines.

Neither the IMB-PRC or ReCAAP-ISC received reports of actual or attempted attacks in the Strait of Malacca or Sulu-Celebes Seas between January and June 2022.

In the second half of 2022, PSR incidents in Southeast Asia could experience a moderate rise due to the economic impact of the Russia-Ukraine War which has led to rising food prices and increased economic hardship across the region. While national initiatives and inter-state cooperation have proved effective at managing the PSR problem, those measures need to be strengthened. In particular, Indonesia should allocate more resources for apprehending criminal gangs operating in its waters in the Singapore Strait. Enhanced cooperation among the littoral states, including enlarging the geographical scope of the MSP to include the Singapore Strait, may also help eradicate this PSR black spot.

ENDNOTES


[1] Under international law, an act of piracy is defined as an illegal act of violence or detention involving two or more ships on the high seas i.e., outside a coastal state’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Acts of maritime depredation which occur within a state’s territorial or archipelagic waters are known as sea robbery or armed robbery against ships and are subject to the national jurisdiction of the state.

[2] See https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre

[3] See https://www.recaap.org/

[4] See https://www.ifc.org.sg/

[5] See https://www.mica-center.org/en/home/

[6] Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 1 January 31 ̶ December 2021 (London: International Maritime Bureau, 2022).

[7] Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report January to December 2021 (Singapore: ReCAAP-ISC, 2022), https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/annual/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202021.pdf

[8] Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 1 January 31 ̶ December 2021 (London: International Maritime Bureau, 2022).

[9] Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report January to December 2021 (Singapore: ReCAAP-ISC, 2022), https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/annual/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202021.pdf

[10] Annual Report 2021 (Singapore: Information Fusion Centre, 2022), https://www.ifc.org.sg/

[11] Hannah Beech and Muktita Suhartono, “China Chases Indonesia’s Fishing Fleets, Staking Claim to Sea’s Riches”, New York Times, 31 March 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/world/asia/Indonesia-south-china-sea-fishing.html

[12] “Jakarta: ‘No reason to negotiate’ with Beijing on South China Sea”, Benar News, 18 June 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/response-letter-06182020173036.html; “Indonesian Navy Conducts Major Exercise amid South China Sea Tensions”, Benar News, 22 July 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/naval-exercise07222020170545.html

[13] Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 1 January 31 ̶ December 2021 (London: International Maritime Bureau, 2022).

[14] Annual Report 2021 (Singapore: Information Fusion Centre, 2022), https://www.ifc.org.sg/

[15] Francis E. Hutchinson and Siwage Dharma Negara,“The Riau Islands and its Battle with COVID: Down but not Out”, ISEAS Perspective, No. 25 (8 March 2021), /wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_25.pdf

[16] See Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Policy Paper, May 2006); John Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005); Ian Storey, “Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress”, Asia Policy, no. 6 (July 2008): 95-127.

[17]  Ian Storey, “Trilateral Security Cooperation in the Sulu-Celebes Seas: A Work in Progress”, ISEAS Perspective, No. 48 (27 Aug 2018), /images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_48@50.pdf

[18] Michael Hart, “Abu Sayyaf Under Rising Pressure in Asia’s Backwater”, Asia Sentinel, 28 June 2022, https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/abu-sayyaf-rising-pressure-asia-backwater

[19]  Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report January to December 2021, pp. 35-36.

[20] Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report January to December 2021, pp. 32-33.

[21] Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the Period 1 January to 30 June 2022 (London: International Maritime Bureau, 2022).

[22] Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report January to June 2022 (Singapore: ReCAAP-ISC, 2022), https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/half-year/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Half%20Yearly%20Report%202022.pdf

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2022/75 “Did China Eke out a Vaccine Diplomacy Victory in Southeast Asia?” by Khairulanwar Zaini

 

A health worker checks the containers of Covid-19 vaccine produced by China’s Sinovac, as they arrived in Surabaya on 13 January 2021, with the sprawling archipelago of nearly 270 million kicks off a mass innoculation drive in a bid to control soaring case rates. Photo: Juni Kriswanto/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • This Perspective examines the 2021 Covid-19 vaccine portfolios of five Southeast Asian (SEA5) countries—Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines—in terms of the different vaccine brands, their production provenance, and whether the vaccines were procured or donated.
  • The most heavily reliant on China-made vaccines were Cambodia (88.5% of its portfolio) and Indonesia (68%), and the two countries secured their supplies mainly through procurements rather than donations.
  • Laos was entirely dependent on vaccine donations and 55% of its portfolio were China-made.
  • Western-made vaccines formed the bulk of the Philippines’ vaccine inventory (68%).
  • There was a 60:40 split between China-made and India-made vaccine supplies to Myanmar, which had to make do without any Western-made vaccine after the February coup.
  • China’s strategy of “flooding the zone” early with its vaccines has somewhat succeeded as Southeast Asian respondents in an elite opinion poll credited Beijing for providing the most vaccine support to the region, despite the predominantly commercial nature of China’s vaccine supplies.
  • For the SEA5, their primary consideration in vaccine acquisition in 2021 was availability. However, with the ramping up of production capacity of Western-made vaccines and the preference for mRNA vaccines for booster shots, a pivot to Western-made vaccines is expected to be a trend in Southeast Asia in 2022.

* Khairulanwar Zaini is Research Officer at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme (RSPS) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/75, 1 August 2022

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INTRODUCTION

This Perspective surveys the inflows of Covid-19 vaccines in 2021 to five Southeast Asian (SEA5) countries—Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines. The SEA5 are neither meant to be illustrative nor representative of Southeast Asia as a whole; rather, they were chosen for the relative availability, accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data about their vaccine inflows.

What will follow is an examination of the SEA5’s respective vaccine portfolios in terms of the different vaccine brands and the production provenance of these vaccines (i.e., the country in which the vaccine was developed and/or manufactured).[1] Except for Myanmar, most of the SEA5 primarily sourced for vaccines from China and the West, though some relied on India-made and Russia-made vaccines to supplement their inventory. This article also looks into the manner in which the five countries secured their vaccines, whether through donations or purchases.[2] These details contextualise how China’s considerable vaccine deliveries to the region in early 2021 helped Beijing to edge out the United States in the vaccine diplomacy race, even though (i) most of China’s vaccine supplies were commercially procured by the recipient countries, and (ii) the United States was the largest single donor of vaccines to the SEA5.

THE VACCINE PORTFOLIOS OF THE SEA5

Cambodia

Of the five countries, Cambodia was the most reliant on China-produced vaccines. Out of the 38.2 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines the country received in 2021, 28.4 million and 5.4 million were Sinovac and Sinopharm respectively. The two Chinese vaccines accounted for 88.5% of Cambodia’s total vaccine supplies for the year (Figure 1).

After Sinovac and Sinopharm, AstraZeneca had the third-largest vaccine presence in Cambodia (2 million doses, or 5.3%). It constituted roughly half of Cambodia’s inventory of Western vaccines. The amount of mRNA vaccines in Cambodia was limited, with 783,000 doses of Pfizer (2.1%) and 188,160 doses of Moderna (1.1%).

To acquire its vaccine supplies, Cambodia relied more on procurement than on donations. Around 64.1% of Cambodia’s vaccine supplies were procured on a commercial basis (Figure 2), with the bulk coming from its order of 23.5 million doses of Sinovac and one million doses of Sinopharm. Out of Cambodia’s 33.8 million doses of China-made vaccines in 2021, only 8.9 million–or over a quarter–were donated.

However, China’s bilateral donations to Cambodia still outstripped the contributions of other Western countries. China’s gift of 8.9 million doses represented 23.3% of Cambodia’s total supplies, in comparison to the West’s donation of 3.5 million doses (9.3%). Meanwhile, the COVAX Facility provided Cambodia with around 1.3 million free doses, which collectively accounts for 3.3% of the country’s vaccine supplies.

Figure 1. Cambodia’s vaccine portfolio in 2021

Figure 2. Cambodia’s vaccine portfolio by origin and mode of acquisition


Indonesia

China-made vaccines dominated Indonesia’s vaccine supplies in 2021. The country received 210.5 million doses of Sinovac and 5.7 million doses of Sinopharm, which together accounted for 67.9% of Jakarta’s vaccine portfolio. The bulk of the remainder were Western-produced vaccines, including 46.2 million AstraZeneca shots (14.5%), 25 million shots of Pfizer (7.9%) and 21 million shots of Moderna (6.6%) (Figure 3).

Roughly three-quarters of Indonesia’s vaccine stocks in 2021 were procured. Most of Jakarta’s procurement budget was spent on 196.5 million doses of Sinovac (Figure 4).

In terms of dose donations, Western countries were major benefactors and collectively provided Indonesia with 58.2 million free shots, which amounted to 19% of its total vaccine supplies in 2021. The United States, for instance, singularly accounted for 8% of Jakarta’s inventory with a donation of 9.5 million Moderna shots and 16 million Pfizer shots. In contrast, China donated 2 million doses of Sinovac and 200,000 doses of Sinopharm — fewer than Japan’s vaccine aid package of 2.4 million AstraZeneca doses.

Figure 3. Indonesia’s vaccine portfolio in 2021

Figure 4. Indonesia’s vaccine portfolio by origin and mode of acquisition

Laos

Slightly over half of Laos’ 2021 supplies were China-made vaccines, with Sinopharm (5.8 million doses) and Sinovac (0.7 million doses) respectively forming 49.3% and 6% of the country’s inventory of 11.7 million shots. After Sinopharm, AstraZeneca (3.2 million doses, or 27.2%) and J&J vaccines (1.7 million doses, or 15.5%) were the other two major vaccines in Laos (Figure 5).

The country was the only one among the SEA5 to use both India- and Russia-produced vaccines to supplement its stocks. (The other four countries generally sought either India- or Russia-made vaccines, but not both.) Laos had limited access to mRNA vaccines, having received only a tiny supply of 100,620 Pfizer doses from the COVAX Facility.

Laos was entirely reliant on donations for its vaccine supplies. China was the largest donor with 6.5 million shots, while the rest of Laos’ inventory was donated by Western countries (3.3 million doses), Japan (938,820 doses), the COVAX Facility (887,820 doses), and Russia (60,000 doses). The United States was the second largest overall donor, with around one million J&J shots, followed by Japan with 938,000 doses of AstraZeneca (Figure 6).

Figure 5. Laos’ vaccine portfolio in 2021

Figure 6. Laos’ vaccine portfolio by origin and mode of acquisition

Myanmar

As a result of its diplomatic isolation after the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar could only secure China- and India-made vaccines. Out of the total reported supply of 48,436,000 shots in Myanmar’s portfolio, China-made vaccines had a slight edge over India-made vaccines by a ratio of roughly 3:2 (Figure 7).

73.3% of Myanmar’s supplies were procured (Figure 8). The country bought 18 million and 2 million doses of Sinopharm and Sinovac respectively from China (41.3%), and 100,000 and 15.4 million doses of Covaxin and Covishield respectively from India (32%).

In terms of dose donations, China outpaced India by a factor of 2.5. Beijing offered Myanmar 2.2 million and 7 million doses of Sinopharm and Sinovac respectively at no cost (amounting to 19.7% of Myanmar’s total vaccine supplies), while New Delhi provided 1.2 million and 2.5 million free Covaxin and Covishield shots respectively.[3] In sum, around a third of China’s vaccine supplies to Myanmar was donated, while less than a quarter of India’s was donated.

Due to the post-coup political turbulence, no deliveries from the COVAX Facility were made in 2021 (even though Myanmar qualifies for free COVAX shots). Western countries and aid organisations were reticent about engaging the junta regime, not least to avoid lending the latter legitimacy, especially since Myanmar’s parallel National Unity Government (NUG) was trying to conduct its own pilot vaccination programmes in the Mon, Karen, Karenni and Shan border zones in cooperation with the “Ethnic Health Organizations” operating in those areas.[4] Worries also remained over whether any supplied shots would indeed reach those in need. An August 2021 investigative report revealed a thriving black market for non-Chinese vaccines in Myanmar. Doses were priced at “a mark-up of up to 25 times”, with a vial of Covishield normally costing US$49 being sold for US$1,215.[5]

Figure 7. Myanmar’s vaccine portfolio in 2021

Figure 8. Myanmar’s vaccine portfolio by origin and mode of acquisition

The Philippines

The Philippines had the most diverse and evenly-balanced portfolio among the SEA5. It was also the only SEA5 country to rely on Western-made vaccines for the majority of its vaccination needs, with Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Moderna and J&J vaccines collectively making up 67.7% of its 2021 Covid-19 vaccine portfolio (Figure 9). China-made vaccines accounted for 27.4%, while Russia-made vaccines rounded up the remaining 4.9%. With 10 million Sputnik V and 195,000 Sputnik Light shots, the Philippines was the largest purveyor of Russian vaccines among the SEA5 and the wider Southeast Asian region. The fortunes of Russia-made vaccines in the Philippines did not appear to have improved since, with Manila reportedly mulling in early May 2022 whether to donate five million expiring Sputnik V doses to Myanmar.[6]

64.6% of the Philippines’ vaccine supplies in 2021 were procured (Figure 10). Manila’s three largest commercial orders were for Sinovac (52 million doses, making up 25% of its overall 2021 inventory), Pfizer (37.9 million doses, or 18.1%), and Moderna (20 million doses, or 9.6%).

The Philippines’ strategic value to the United States was evident in the significant streams of dose donations to the country from the West. The United States and its allies in Europe and Oceania gifted over 56 million free shots for the Philippines (27%). The United States alone provided 10.5% of the Philippines’ entire inventory with its donation of 22.2 million shots (including a bumper package of 16 million Pfizer shots). In comparison, China mustered a relatively paltry donation of 5.1 million doses (2.4%), which was fewer than the COVAX Facility’s offering of 8.6 million doses (4.1%).

Figure 9. The Philippines’ vaccine portfolio in 2021

Figure 10. The Philippines’ vaccine portfolio by origin and mode of acquisition[7]

THE VACCINE SOURCING TRENDS OF THE SEA5

The strong presence of China-made vaccines in the portfolios of the SEA5 primarily reflect China’s ability and willingness to supply its vaccine (whether as commercial transactions or donations) in the first few months of 2021. The sheer volume of these early vaccine deliveries to Cambodia (Figure 11), Indonesia (Figure 12) and Laos (Figure 19) ensured that either Sinovac or Sinopharm was the predominant vaccine in these three countries.

There was a gradual uptick in the delivery of Western-made vaccines from June 2021 onwards as production capacity was ramped up and developed countries began releasing their excess supplies. It reached a point that the volume of Western-made vaccine deliveries to Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos eclipsed the size of China-made vaccine supplies in December 2021.[8] Even in Myanmar, the volume of India-made vaccines significantly outstripped the number of Chinese doses in December 2021 (Figure 14).  

The trend in the Philippines is slightly distinctive from the rest of the SEA5. From February to September 2021, the supplies of Western-made vaccines into the Philippines roughly kept pace with those of China-made vaccines. However, in the fourth quarter, the Western-made vaccine shipments overtook China-made vaccine supplies by a significant margin (Figure 15).

For the first three months of 2022, the available vaccine delivery statistics from three countries—Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines—indicate broadly similar trajectories from the previous year.[9] Continuing the trend of its reliance on China-made vaccines, Cambodia received 5 million doses of Sinovac, which was more than five times the size of the AstraZeneca dispatch in Q1 2022.

Meanwhile, Laos—whose dependence on China-made vaccines is not as acute compared to Cambodia’s—was able to secure doses from a variety of sources in Q1 2022, reflecting its relatively-balanced vaccine portfolio in 2021. Along with a delivery of 1.5 million Sinopharm shots, Vientiane received 2.6 million Pfizer, 594,000 Covishield and 321,760 AstraZeneca doses. The predominance of Western-made vaccines in the Philippines also persisted. Eschewing China-made vaccines entirely, Manila obtained 28.5 million Pfizer doses in the first three months of 2022, while supplementing that inventory with a medley of 2.2 million shots of AstraZeneca, Moderna and J&J.

Figure 11. Monthly dose deliveries to Cambodia in 2021

Figure 12. Monthly dose deliveries to Indonesia in 2021

Figure 13. Monthly dose deliveries to Laos in 2021

Figure 14. Monthly dose deliveries to Myanmar in 2021

Figure 15. Monthly dose deliveries to the Philippines in 2021

VACCINE DIPLOMACY: VICTORY TO BEIJING?

When vaccine supplies were relatively scarce in the first half of 2021, developed countries were criticised for prioritising doses for their own use. Meanwhile, with its successful Covid-19 containment at home, China committed itself to sending overseas “regular shipments of vaccines in sufficient quantities”, especially to Southeast Asia.[10] This has prompted an observer to describe the pandemic as a “window of opportunity” for China to “boost its soft power”, identifying Cambodia and Laos as particularly “the most receptive to China’s assistance”.[11]

However, a closer scrutiny of the delivery statistics suggests for a more nuanced reading of China’s assistance: while China was indeed the largest supplier of vaccines by far to the SEA5, it was not the biggest donor. Of the 330,441,840 doses that China delivered to the SEA5 countries in 2021, a whopping 90.3% were provided on a commercial basis. Commercial orders for Sinovac alone accounted for 274 million doses, at rates between US$10 to US$17 for each dose.[12] These vaccine sales to the SEA5 represent a hefty chunk of revenue for the Chinese vaccine manufacturer.

In terms of donations, China donated a total of 31.9 million doses to the SEA5. This is fewer than the 49.8 million shots donated by the United States, which holds the actual mantle of being the largest singular vaccine donor to the SEA5 in 2021 (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Volume of donated shots to the SEA5 from major donors in 2021

Note: This graph only includes donors that provided an aggregate of at least 5 million doses to the SEA5 countries in 2021.

Where the European Union is concerned, if we aggregate the vaccine donations by France (14,923,740 doses), Germany (17,686,100 doses), Netherlands (13,507,400 doses) and Italy (5,218,420 doses) to the SEA5, its total contributions of around 51.3 million free shots would exceed both that of the United States and of China. 

Yet, findings from the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2022 survey revealed that China was identified as the country that had provided the most vaccine support to the region (Table 1), suggesting that China’s strategy of “flooding the zone” early with their vaccines has somewhat succeeded.[13] 57.8% of respondents chose China, while only 23.2% picked the United States in second place. It appeared that the predominantly commercial nature of China’s vaccine supplies to the region did not prevent respondents from crediting Beijing with substantial praise for its vaccine assistance.

Meanwhile, the European Union came in sixth at 2.6% – behind Australia in third (4.7%), Japan in fourth (4.1%) and India in fifth (3.6%) – despite the fact that Germany’s gift of 17.7 million doses alone was larger than the donations of the other three countries combined (16.6 million doses).[14] To be fair, India’s strong performance in this survey question can be attributed to its vaccine support to Myanmar, which only received vaccines from India and China, and none from the European Union. More than a fifth of Myanmar respondents chose New Delhi—an outlier among the other Southeast Asian countries.[15]

Table 1. Answers to “Which ASEAN Dialogue Partner has provided the most COVID-19 vaccine support to the region?” by respondents’ nationality

CONCLUSION

The foregoing data and analysis suggest that the primary consideration in vaccine acquisition for the SEA5 in 2021 was availability. Although all the countries avoided relying on a single source or brand of vaccine, China-made vaccines dominated supplies in four out of the five countries in 2021 due to the sizeable volume of deliveries in the earlier part of the year. However, the SEA5 started pivoting to Western-made vaccines (and in the case of Myanmar, India-made vaccines) once their availability improved in the second half of 2021, especially in the fourth quarter.

In May 2022, Nikkei reported that the exports of Chinese Covid-19 vaccines had plummeted by 97% from September 2021 due to concerns about their weaker efficacy, especially against newer variants.[16] Thus, a sustained pivot to Western-made vaccines (particularly mRNA ones) is expected to be a trend in Southeast Asia in 2022, especially given the urgency of developing sufficient immunity in the population against new Covid-19 variants.

ENDNOTES


[1] The figures in this Perspective were drawn from the UNICEF Covid-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard and other publicly available data sources. Figures for the Philippines were corrected by cross-referencing with Rappler’s vaccine tracker (https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/data-documents/tracker-covid-19-vaccines-distribution-philippines/), while figures for Myanmar were cross-checked with data from India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (https://www.mea.gov.in/vaccine-supply.htm).

[2] Two methodological points of clarification: first, the production provenance of a vaccine should not be equated with its origin. The presence of a China-made vaccine in a country’s portfolio is not necessarily due to a procurement from or donation by China; instead, there is a possibility that some of those doses were donated by the COVAX Facility. (All the SEA5 countries are eligible for free COVAX shots.) Second, this paper does not distinguish between dose donations from countries that were bequeathed bilaterally or routed through the COVAX delivery mechanism, since donor countries still retained the prerogative of determining (“earmarking”) where these dose donations were headed to. This paper does however treat the COVAX Facility as its own donor entity, since the Facility’s dose offerings were purchased with its own funds.  For more details about bilateral and earmarked dose donations, and how COVAX works more generally, see Khairulanwar Zaini, “Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies, Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 4/2022 (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), pp. 15-18, 3 30-35.

[3] This sum includes a bulk donation of one million Covishield doses to the Myanmar Red Cross Society in late December 2021, given during the visit of India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla to the country—the first undertaken by a senior Indian official since the February 2021 coup. See Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India gives 1 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to Myanmar”, The Hindu, 22 December 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-gives-1-million-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-myanmar/article38015840.ece.

[4] “Statement on COVID-19 Vaccination Progress (20-11-2021)”, National Health Committee, 21 November 2021, https://nhcmyanmar.org/statement-on-covid-19-vaccination-progress-20-11-2021/. See also Htet Myat Aung, “Myanmar’s pandemic politics goes international”, East Asia Forum, 3 March 2022, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/03/myanmars-pandemic-politics-goes-international/.

[5] “Brokers sell Covishield vaccine on Myanmar’s black market for millions of kyat”, Myanmar Now, 21 August 2021, https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/brokers-sell-covishield-vaccine-on-myanmars-black-market-for-millions-of-kyat.

[6] “Philippines planning to give Myanmar 5 million Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccines”, Channel NewsAsia, 2 May 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/philippines-plan-give-myanmar-sputnik-v-covid-19-vaccines-2660676.

[7] Brunei’s donation of 2,000 doses and Russia’s donation of 5,000 doses are not reflected in the graph.

[8] This could also be partly attributable to the smaller delivery packages of China-made vaccines across-the-board in December 2021.

[9] The available figures for Indonesia and Myanmar were not reliable for any meaningful analysis. According to UNICEF Covid-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard, 64.6 million out of the estimated 91 million doses delivered to Indonesia in Q1 2022 were of “unknown” brand and origin. Similarly, for Myanmar, 9.4 million out of 13.1 million doses were marked as “unknown”.

[10] Khairulanwar Zaini, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy in Southeast Asia – A Mixed Record”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 2021/86, p. 4, /wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_86.pdf.

[11] Chheang Vannarith, “Fighting COVID-19: China’s Soft Power Opportunities in Mainland Southeast Asia”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 2021/67, p. 7, /wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_66.pdf

[12] These figures were sourced from the UNICEF Covid-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard. According to the database, the price per dose of Sinovac was US$10 for Cambodia, between US$13.60 and US$17 for Indonesia, and US$14.49 for the Philippines.

[13] Sharon Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), p. 13. The survey gathered elite opinion, and respondents were drawn from (i) academic and research institutions, (ii) finance and commerce, (iii) civil society, media and non-governmental organizations, (iv) government, and (v) regional or international organizations. Also, note that the particular wording of the questionnaire asked respondents for their assessments of the external powers’ vaccine assistance to the collective region, rather than to their own individual countries.

[14] The survey results should also spell worries for the United Kingdom’s soft power in the region. Despite providing much more dose donations to the region than Australia, more respondents across the region identified Australia (4.7%) as providing stronger vaccine support than the United Kingdom (1.5%). Moreover, respondents in all Southeast Asian countries (with the exception of Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar) consistently ranked Australia above the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also lagged behind Japan despite having offered around the same amount of vaccine donations.

[15] The timing of the survey could perhaps be offered as another plausible reason for the European Union’s underperformance with respect to this particular question. The survey was conducted between 11 November and 31 December 2021, while the surge in European vaccine donations generally occurred in late December. As such, this uptick in donations might not have been reflected in the answers of respondents who took the survey early.  

[16] Shin Watanabe and Kentaro Takeda, “China’s vaccine diplomacy spoiled by omicron variant”, Nikkei Asia, 8 May 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/COVID-vaccines/China-s-vaccine-diplomacy-spoiled-by-omicron-variant.

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“The Halal Project in Indonesia: Shariatization, Minority Rights and Commodification” by Syafiq Hasyim

 

2022/74 “What do the Official Chinese Media’s Mixed Messages on the Myanmar Coup Mean?” by Su Mon Thazin Aung and Nan Lwin

 

In this picture, protesters in Yangon hold banners as they participate in a demonstration on 5 December 2021 against the military coup which occurred on 1 February 2020. Photo: STR/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The Myanmar public and Myanmar watchers have been carefully looking out for China’s responses to the 1 February 2021 coup in the former country.
  • In the weeks and months that followed the coup, China’s mixed messages resulted in differing understandings of Beijing’s position vis-à-vis the new State Administrative Council junta.
  • This fuelled the interpretation that China was balancing between the junta and pro-democratic forces.
  • However, critical discourse analysis of relevant media reveals a different story. China’s English-language state-run and Communist Party outlets appear to have been supportive of the coup-makers from the beginning and to have been putting post-coup events in Myanmar in the context of rivalry between the United States and China.
  • Using positive words in describing the coup and the State Administration Council, these official media signalled to the international community that the restoration of military dictatorship in Myanmar was a domestic affair in which the intervention of outsiders was not necessary.
  • At the same time, the official Chinese media adopted a much harder tone where Chinese economic interests in Myanmar were concerned.

* Su Mon Thazin Aung is Associate Fellow in the Myanmar Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Director of Capacity-Building at the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar, an independent non-partisan and non-governmental think tank. Guest writer, Nan Lwin, is Program Head, China Studies Program, Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/74, 26 July 2022

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INTRODUCTION

The stance that China — as a major power and the neighbour that shares Myanmar’s longest land border — has taken toward the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar and the resultant State Administration Council (SAC) junta is crucial to prospects for Myanmar’s return to a democratic path. The Myanmar public has held a range of expectations concerning China’s reaction to the military takeover. Some observers hold that China will always support the military, serving as its foreign patron. However, others argue that the stakes are now higher for China than in the past and that it has had much to lose from the coup and the ensuing political turmoil in Myanmar.

The latter argument is grounded in two basic premises. First, in the past decade, China invested heavily in a series of projects related to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.[1] Second, to ensure the security of its investments in Myanmar, China cultivated warm ties with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League For Democracy (NLD) party before and during the party’s 2016-2022 tenure in government.[2] That same period saw a slight retreat in China’s relations with the Myanmar military, as the latter attempted to diversify the sources on which it relied for its modernization programme.

Acceptance of these premises suggests that the February 2021 coup represented a serious setback for China, as it made uncertain the prospects for China’s multi-billion dollar projects in various parts of the country.[3] Therefore, it seemed natural that China would carefully hedge its bets in the face of the crisis that followed the coup. The prevailing view following the coup was that, although China might not side clearly and decisive with the pro-democracy forces resisting the SAC, neither would it offer the same level of backing to Myanmar’s notorious military as in the pre-2011 era that preceded the country’s short-lived democratic decade. Toward the end of 2021, however, analysts observed that China’s approach to the Myanmar crisis shifted from one of cautious and balanced diplomacy to one marked by the resumption of elite-level contacts with the military. Gradually indicating its recognition of the SAC as Myanmar’s de facto government, China relaunched working relationships with Myanmar ministries after months of the latter’s efforts to re-engage with their Chinese counterparts.[4] Talks between China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the SAC’s foreign minister during the latter’s working visit to China in April 2022 seemed to confirm Beijing’s support for the junta.[5]

This article argues that China’s willingness to side with the Myanmar military and the SAC regime has in fact been apparent from the period immediately following the February 2021 coup, despite its apparently mixed messages. Through its state media, China has all along transmitted messages largely in favour of the military takeover of its smaller neighbour. Those media have elaborated a consistent message that highlights three core points. First, the Myanmar military’s course of action has been constitutional and fell within the bounds of Myanmar’s internal affairs. Second, China therefore adheres to a non-interference principle and encourages the international community to do likewise. And, third, China will nevertheless show no mercy to anti-Chinese elements who seek to undermine its economic interests in Myanmar in protesting against the junta or against Chinese investment projects.

This article first draws on critical discourse analysis to examine examples of the mixed messages on the Myanmar coup and its aftermath which China transmitted to the world. It then uses the same approach to investigate what the Chinese state media’s messages have meant for the Myanmar public.

The article analyses 133 articles in the English-language released by a Chinese state-run news agency and appearing in a Communist Party-backed newspaper in order to scrutinize their representations of Myanmar’s 2021 coup. It discusses the careful tone that Chinese state media have adopted, and explores China’s signals and attempts to influence international opinion. Finally, the article deciphers China’s reactions to developments relating to its economic interests in Myanmar.

CHINA’S MIXED MESSAGES

To the general public, China’s initial reactions to the 2021 Myanmar coup did not seem as bold as in the past. At first, China neither condoned nor supported the military coup or the SAC junta that it installed. With anti-Chinese sentiment – grounded in the belief that Beijing was close to the military – at a high in Myanmar, China abstained from voting for the 18 June 2021 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Situation in Myanmar calling for an end to the flow of arms into Myanmar and for the Myanmar armed forces to respect the results of the 2020 election.[6] Moreover, China and the United States agreed in late September 2021 to allow Myanmar’s NLD-appointed ambassador to the United Nations to continue representing the country before the world body, effectively barring Myanmar’s coup-makers from addressing the General Assembly’s meeting that month. China’s expression of support for ASEAN’s five-point consensus on dealing with the Myanmar military also reflected its backseat position in responding to the crisis. This included upholding the Association’s October 2021 decision to invite only a non-political Myanmar representative to ASEAN summits. At the ASEAN-China summit in November 2021, the Myanmar seat was left empty, in a reflection of China joining international efforts to deny SAC representation of the country at high-level political meetings.[7] At the bilateral level, China also suspended border trade with Myanmar for months and tightened regulations governing that trade. Though this move was partly motivated by concerns over cross-border Covid-19 transmission, it nevertheless had a devastating impact on Myanmar farmers and exporters who were already facing huge losses from existing Covid-19 restrictions.

However, this record of mixed public messaging was part of China’s strategy on the international stage to avoid being seen as one of the main supporters of the coup. One should not presume that China’s support for the Myanmar military has been reflective of uncertainty or doubt. Rather, China’s intention to work with the Myanmar military already became apparent shortly after the coup. On 27 March 2021, barely two months after the coup, the Chinese ambassador attended celebrations on Myanmar Armed Forces Day, despite strong public outcry. And, even though an SAC representative was not invited to join the virtual ASEAN-China summit on 22 November 2021, the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar briefed the junta’s foreign minister on its discussions and outcome almost immediately afterwards.[8] Five months after the coup, the ambassador also met junta supremo Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw.[9]

Similarly, despite the consequences of its Zero Covid policy for bilateral border trade with Myanmar, China provided its neighbour with more than 50 million vaccine doses in the post-coup period[10] — a quantity sufficient to fully vaccinate half of Myanmar’s population.

In fact, this pattern of activity corresponded to a consistent and clear official Chinese narrative on the 2021 coup in Myanmar. The following section turns to discourse analysis of China’s English-language state-run news service and Communist Party’s language newspapers to explain how China built that narrative.

NARRATIVE CREATION

China’s state media are known for influencing, persuading and distracting audiences.[11] This article addresses China’s efforts to shape the narrative regarding the 2021 coup in Myanmar through its English language official media.

The analysis focuses on 133 news articles from the Chinese state-run and Communist Party mouthpiece English-language media — the Xinhua news agency and The Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party-backed newspaper — published between 1 February 2021 and 30 April 2022. It examines China’s position on three key issues: the nature of the 2021 coup and of the SAC, international responses to and intervention against the coup and the coup regime, and the Myanmar public’s views of China’s economic interests in Myanmar.

Table 1: Articles selected from Chinese state media for discourse analysis

SourceTotal StoriesPercent of Total
Global Times11485.7%
Xinhua1914.3%

These two media outlets aggressively published articles concerning Myanmar issues, starting from the period immediately following the coup. Among the 133 articles analysed, more than 90 appeared between 1 February and 30 April 2021, when anti-China sentiments in Myanmar were reaching its peak. These mostly advanced the narrative that the US and pro-Western groups spearheaded anti-China sentiments in Myanmar. From June 2021 onwards, the number of articles touching on Myanmar decreased, and their focus slowly shifted from coverage of the coup and anti-China sentiments to socio-economic issues in China-Myanmar relations. News items discussed the Covid-19 situation in Myanmar, bilateral economic relations, and the situation at the border between China and Myanmar.

Notably, English-language official Chinese media seldom gave space to news stories on forces resisting SAC rule after 2021, such as the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the National Unity Government (NUG), or People’s Defense Forces (PDF). When the NUG’s acting president announced a defensive war against the SAC regime in September 2021,[12] The Global Times ran an article stating that the open support of the US and the West for the NUG and PDFs might lead Myanmar into a civil war, thus framing events in the country with reference to the US-China geopolitical rivalry.[13]

The analysis also finds that China has shown unwavering support for the Myanmar coup-makers of 2021 since the early days following their seizure of power. It has carefully packaged its media message to advance the view that the coup was nothing more than a constitutional act by the Myanmar military in the country’s domestic affairs. The discourse analysis of China’s articulation of its overall position on the coup and the international responses to it discovers the prevalence of an ostensibly constructive tone, featuring the use of positive words. But in news items concerning China’s economic interests, however, these official media demonstrate instead a switch to negative tones.

The following figures compile findings from the discourse analysis, revealing the Chinese media’s employment of contrasting words in their coverage of the three issues noted above. They indicate the frequency in articles of commonly used words relating to China’s position on the coup, to international responses to the coup, and to China’s economic interests in Myanmar.

FRAMING THE 2021 MYANMAR COUP

Discourse analysis of the 133 news articles shows that Chinese media exercised caution in portraying events relating to the coup through the use of euphemistic language. They consistently framed the Myanmar military’s seizure of power as a constitutional act, though without mentioning the fact that the country’s 2008 Constitution was drafted under a military regime and thus granted disproportionate power to the military. Since 1 February 2021, The Global Times and Xinhua have downplayed military control of the country, avoiding labelling the military takeover as a coup d’etat. These Chinese state-run media referred to a tragic event that crushed hard-won democratic reforms and overthrew the elected civilian government merely as “a major cabinet reshuffle”.[14]

Articles in The Global Times consistently avoided any word or text implying that the Myanmar military seized state power, and instead stated that “state power has been handed over to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces”.[15] Unlike articles from international media agencies, those in The Global Times omitted critical information on topics such as the reason that power was allegedly handed over to the military and the role of vice president in the seizure of power. Among readers with little knowledge of political developments in Myanmar, this (mis)representation may induce the understanding that the civilian government for some reason transferred power to the military willingly. Articles in The Global Times have described the coup as a “political event”,[16] a “political change”,[17] a “power transition”,[18] a “political reshuffle”[19], and a “domestic incident”.[20] The use of those terms unsurprisingly ignited the anger of many Myanmar people, who were already outraged by the military takeover. In addition, the official Chinese media portrayed the coup as part of a deep-seated conflict between the NLD and the military and discredited the reforms of the last decade by saying, “political reforms failed to provide any impetus to solve deep-seated problems, nor did they provide a safety valve to avoid repeated political wrangling”.[21]

Official Chinese media have also avoided conveying messages that would tarnish their country’s relations with the Myanmar military. In describing the coup of 1 February 2021, English-language Chinese media repeatedly employed the phrase “state of emergency”, avoiding words that would have described the situation clearly, such as “coup d’état”, “overthrow”, or “power seizure”. In the period following the coup, when pronounced anti-China sentiments emerged across Myanmar, The Global Times emphasized the narrative that China was a “friendly neighbor” and had “good relations” with both the civilian government and the military.[22] Furthermore, Chinese media justified the military coup as “an adjustment to the country’s dysfunctional power structure”.[23]

Moreover, Chinese Communist Party media framed the coup in a way that placed events within the bounds of the 2008 Constitution. Articles often directly quoted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his spokesperson saying that the political crisis in Myanmar should be resolved under “the constitutional and legal framework”, in order to achieve social and political stability in the country. Through its narrative of power adjustment under Myanmar’s constitution, the Chinese Communist Party’s English-language media suggested to the world China’s willingness to resolve the Myanmar crisis within Myanmar’s existing constitutional and legal framework. This solution appeared to be at least indirectly aligned with the preferences of the Myanmar generals who have repeatedly justified their coup as constitutional.

PROMOTING NON-INTERVENTION

Despite its mixed messages on the Myanmar crisis, messages that gave the appearance of a balanced Chinese approach, Beijing’s state-run English-language media have been consistent in stressing that the crisis is Myanmar’s internal affair, and other countries, including China, should not interfere in Myanmar’s domestic issues. To do otherwise, according to these state media, would be to exacerbate tensions in the country.

The description of Myanmar’s crisis as “internal affairs” serves China’s objective of warding off, or at least delegitimizing, Western political influence on its close neighbour, where several China-backed strategic projects are planned under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the same time, Chinese media have described the US response to the coup as “external interference” and “external forces”, implying that Washington was using Myanmar’s situation to revive its global leadership. This emphasis on “internal affairs” contradicts the demands and expectations of Myanmar’s pro-democracy supporters, who wish to see effective international intervention to overthrow their country’s post-coup military regime. The English-language Chinese media’s choices of narrative provoked negative responses from Myanmar people on social media, including posts asking whether China would view blowing up the twin China-Myanmar pipelines that traverse their country as an internal affair, too.[24]

The repetition of the term “non-interference” reinforces the position that other countries, including China, should maintain a policy toward Myanmar marked by that approach. It also implies the idea that ASEAN is on the same page as China, through allusion to ASEAN’s historic non-interference principle.

Chinese media have also highlighted Beijing’s opposition to any Western actions against the Myanmar military, including targeted sanctions. They call attention to the notionally negative consequences of such efforts such as “exacerbating tensions” and adding “fuel to fire”. In contrast, these media employ positive adjectives to describe the “constructive role” that China continues to play when addressing Myanmar’s political situation.

PROTECTING CHINESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Although Chinese media systematically downplayed the seriousness of the Myanmar crisis by using positive words, they deployed negative language, indicating credible threats against anti-Chinese protestors in Myanmar, in their coverage regarding Chinese interests. After attacks on 14 March 2021 striking Chinese factories in Hlaingthayar Township, an industrial zone on the outskirts of Yangon, Chinese state media repeatedly urged the SAC to take serious action against the perpetrators.[25]While pro-democracy supporters were facing a deadly crackdown by SAC security forces, the Chinese media discourse was egging the junta on, urging it to take severe action against the people. The repetition in those media of the phrases “effective measures”, “concrete measures,” and “punish the perpetrators”[26] may have emboldened the SAC to announce martial law in several townships with pronounced anti-junta activity.[27]

The discourse in The Global Times indicated China’s awareness of the significant rise in anti-China sentiments in post-coup Myanmar. However, it also claimed that actors in Western countries such as think-tanks, NGOs and the media were responsible for the growing anti-China sentiments in Myanmar. Indicting these actors as “Anti-China forces”, Chinese media alleged that the West’s moves were aimed at capturing the opportunity to turn Myanmar into a more pro-Western country and to smear China’s reputation. These allegations ignored the reality that anti-China sentiments among Myanmar people had risen dramatically on its own, in response to China’s failure to denounce the coup.

Official Chinese media also tried to establish that Western anti-China forces were smearing China-backed BRI projects in Myanmar. Notwithstanding these smears, articles in The Global Times offered assurances that there would be no change in China’s determination to push forward with BRI projects, as Myanmar had already made tremendous efforts to push for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor under the BRI.[28]

CONCLUSION

Sino-Myanmar relations are not monolithic. It is apparent that China, which always aims to preserve functional stability to safeguard its strategic and economic interests, has carefully crafted its relations with a range of counterparts in Myanmar — the military, the elected NLD government, ethnic armed groups and the public. Having cultivated a good relationship with the now ousted pro-democratic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD government that she led, and invested heavily in infrastructure projects in various parts of Myanmar in the past five years, China has faced the risk of huge economic losses in the wake of the 2021 coup. It now seems to be seeking to limit or even head off those losses by siding with the military through quiet diplomacy.

Despite sending mixed messages in the international arena, China has clearly conveyed its position on the coup and post-coup regime in Myanmar, regarding international intervention, and its economic interests in the country through its mouthpiece news outlets since early February 2021. It appears to have been supportive of the coup makers from the start. The analysis presented here illustrates the significant divergence in China’s state-owned English-language media between characterizations of the coup and the SAC on one hand, and of people involved in anti-military and anti-Chinese protests on the other. The coup has been framed as nothing more than the playing out of constitutional processes, legitimately carried out by the military.

In contrast, they have depicted the rising anti-China sentiments that led to the destruction of some Chinese investments in Myanmar within the context of China-US rivalry while omitting coverage of China’s reaction to anti-China protests such as its request to the SAC to arrest protestors, and using official media to support the junta. In general, these framing exercises and associated developments reaffirm China’s role as a foreign patron for the Myanmar military. It plays this role despite its well-developed relationship with the elected civilian government of the half decade preceding the coup. These Chinese narratives on the Myanmar crisis also support China’s claims that the West continues to fuel anti-Chinese sentiments in the region.

ENDNOTES


[1] Han Enze, “Why China has everything to lose from Myanmar Coup”, Think China, 24 February 2021 (https://www.thinkchina.sg/why-china-has-everything-lose-myanmar-coup, downloaded 20 May 2022).

[2] Lucas Myers, “China Is Hedging in Myanmar Between the NLD, Junta”,Foreign Policy, 10 September 2021 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/10/china-myanmar-coup-national-league-for-democracy, downloaded 19 May 2022).

[3] Brian Y.S. Wong, “For China, Democracy in Myanmar Is Better Than Dictatorship”, Foreign Policy, 26 February 2021 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/26/china-myanmar-coup-democracy/, downloaded 10 June 2022).

[4] John Liu and Thompson Chau, “Myanmar: Months After Coup, China Warms Up to Military Regime”, Foreign Policy, 17 November 2021 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/china-myanmar-military-regime-recognition-investment/, downloaded 20 May 2022).

[5] During his meeting with the SAC foreign minister, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “No matter how the situation changes, China will always support Myanmar in safeguarding sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and exploring a development path in line with its national conditions, and support the people of Myanmar in pursuing a happy and peaceful life. China is ready to work with Myanmar to implement the outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s historic visit to Myanmar, forge the four pillars of political mutual trust, mutually beneficial cooperation, people-to-people bonds and mutual learning in culture and people-to-people exchanges, and deepen exchanges and cooperation in various fields in a coordinated manner, so as to achieve the goal of building a China-Myanmar community with a shared future”; “Wang Yi Talks about the Situation in Myanmar”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Croatia”, 8 June 2021 (https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cehr/eng/gnxw/t1882086.htm?fbclid=IwAR3-rttK4x-qh3EQ8uXtZtEFjXPgCtTd442AuKeTK5sVScaJDALI1dQYjAw, downloaded 10 May 2022).

[6] Michelle Nichols, “United Nations calls for halt of weapons to Myanmar”, Reuters,19 June 2021 (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-chief-urges-general-assembly-act-myanmar-2021-06-18/, downloaded 20 May 2022).

[7] Liz Lee, “UPDATE 1-Myanmar a no-show at China-ASEAN summit as junta defies neighbours”, Reuters, 22 November 2022 (https://www.reuters.com/article/china-asean-malaysia-idUSL1N2SD0AY, downloaded 10 June 2022).

[8] “中国驻缅甸大使向缅方通报中国—东盟建立对话关系30周年纪念峰会情况” [ Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar briefed Myanmar on thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of China-ASEAN dialogue relations], People’s Daily, 22 November 2021 (http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1122/c1002-32289100.html?fbclid=IwAR2PK05pE1f8jshKuZkPAiLQuEGFfDFVEo-HXs3rFWCLgo6Kq8AKL6ZBZ-c, downloaded 11 April 2022).

[9] “The Leader of Myanmar Senior General Min Aung Hlaing Met with Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,6 June 2021 (https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cemm/eng/sgxw/t1881649.htm, downloaded 10 June 2022).

[10] “တရုတ်နိုင်ငံအစိုးရမှ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့လှူဒါန်းသည့် ကိုဗစ်-၁၉ Vaccine နှင့်ဆေးကုသရေးပစ္စည်းများ လွှဲပြောင်းပေးအပ်သည့်အခမ်းအနားကျင်းပ” [China transferred COVID-19 vaccines and related medical supplies to Myanmar], Facebook page of Chinese Embassy in Myanmar, 29 May 2022 (https://www.facebook.com/paukphawfriendship/posts/pfbid02o67RBwSdDp4sP5QaHCu7MXgrEKcuBiatNFHQnCeRrvghWzLrRizZReEM2v1LFL3Sl, downloaded 3 June 2022).

[11] Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “Inside China’s audacious global propaganda campaign”, The Guardian, 21 Octobeer 2021 (https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping, downloaded 20 May 2022); and Sarah Cook “Beijing’s Global Megaphone, Special Report 2020”, Freedom House, January 2020 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone, downloaded 7 July 2022); and Vanessa Molter and Renee Diresta, “Pandemics & propaganda: How Chinese state media creates and propagates CCP coronavirus narrative”, Harvard Kennedy School: Misinformation Review. 8 June 2020 (https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/pandemics-propaganda-how-chinese-state-media-creates-and-propagates-ccp-coronavirus-narratives/, downloaded 14 May 2022).

[12] “Myanmar shadow government calls for uprising against military”, Al Jazeera, 7 September 2021 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/7/myanmar-shadow-government-launches-peoples-defensive-war, downloaded 10 May 2022).

[13] “US, West should refrain from encouraging civil war in Myanmar: Global Times editorial”, Global Times, 7 September 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1233613.shtml?fbclid=IwAR3_Y1jTAiaQLe0BhYawKVylRkgEdX_AFas174c2klx2Xi5x2A6RZAXR3mA, downloaded 4 April 2022).

[14] “Major cabinet reshuffle announced in Myanmar,” Global Times,1 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1214655.shtml, downloaded 12 May 2022).

[15] “Chinese energy firms assess changes as Myanmar upheaval has a mixed impact”, Global Times, 2 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1214749.shtml, downloaded 12 May 2022).

[16] “US threat to reimpose sanctions on Myanmar may drive up prices of rare earth, insiders say”, Global Times, 2 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1214734.shtml, downloaded 15 May 2022).

[17] “Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar H.E. Mr. Chen Hai gives interview to Myanmar Media on the current situation in Myanmar”, Global Times, 16 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1215672.shtml, downloaded 17 May 2022).

[18] Wang Qi, Li Xuanmin and Li Sikun, “China hopes for a stable, peaceful Myanmar through domestic negotiations, not external interference”, Global Times, 1 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1214556.shtml, downloaded 17 May 2022).

[19] Hu Yuwei and Zhang Yutong, “BHRN and more West-funded Myanmar groups surface behind violent attacks on Chinese factories”, Global Times, 17 March 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218646.shtml, downloaded 21 May 2022).

[20] Chen Hong, “Malign ASPI report underestimates strong China-Myanmar ties”, Global Times, 26 February 2021 ( https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1216668.shtml, downloaded 21 May 2022).

[21] “Democracy in Myanmar faces uncertain future”, Global Times, 1 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1214629.shtml, downloaded 24 April 2022).

[22] “West utterly manipulates Myanmar situation as a tool in anti-China campaign”, Global Times, 17 March 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218717.shtml, downloaded 24 April 2022).

[23] Wang Qi, Li Xuanmin and Li Sikun, “China hopes for a stable, peaceful Myanmar through domestic negotiations, not external interference”, op. cit.

[24] “Myanmar Protesters Say an Attack on China’s Pipelines Would Be ‘Internal Affair’”,The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-protesters-say-attack-chinas-pipelines-internal-affair.html, downloaded 24 April 2022).

[25] GT staff reporters, “Exclusive: 32 Chinese factories in Yangon have been attacked with two employees injured: Embassy”, Global Times, 15 March 2021(https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218404.shtml, downloaded 21 May 2022).

[26] “Perpetrators who violently attacked Chinese factories in Myanmar must be severely punished”, Global Times, 15 March 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218350.shtml, downloaded 21 May 2022).

[27] Within two days after the attacks, the SAC issued a series of orders in those townships; see “Myanmar military extends martial law after bloodiest day since coup”, BBC, 15 March 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56398001, downloaded 19 May 2022).

[28] Xu Liping, “West’s tactic of using Myanmar to rumormonger China will only end up in vain”, Global Times, 18 February 2021 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1215893.shtml, downloaded 20 April 2022).

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok   Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong   Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha.   Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng   Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng   Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/73 “On the United States, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and US Freedom of Navigation Operations” by Robert Beckman

 

This photograph taken on 16 October 2019 shows US Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets multirole fighters on board USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier as it sails in the South China Sea. Photo: Catherine LAI/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The US has not become a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) despite the overwhelming support for US accession by all American government agencies, major interest groups, business sector, marine scientists and environmental organisations, and is not likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
  • Right-wing conservative Senators have persistently prevented UNCLOS from being sent to the Senate for a full vote, their main argument being that accession to UNCLOS would surrender part of America’s sovereignty to international organisations.
  • Since the US is not a party to UNCLOS, American nationals cannot serve on UNCLOS institutions, the US cannot bid for deep sea mining sites from the International Seabed Authority, and does not have access to the UNCLOS dispute settlement system.
  • While not being a party to UNCLOS, the US State Department undertakes studies examining the maritime claims and practices of other States, including China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, and whether such claims are consistent with UNCLOS.
  • US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) are focused on excessive maritime claims that restrict the rights and freedoms of US naval vessels, but they do not challenge China’s excessive maritime claims to the natural resources in the South China Sea – a more critical concern of Southeast Asian countries.
  • Accession to UNCLOS would serve American security and economic interests, enhance US reputation as a promoter of the rules-based maritime order, and enable Washington to challenge excessive maritime claims through UNCLOS’ compulsory binding dispute settlement system.

* Robert Beckman is an Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Law and Head of the Ocean Law and Policy Programme of the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore (NUS). The author would like to thank Ms. Teo Jian Ling, a Student Research Assistant, for her research assistance.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/73, 18 July 2022

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THE US AND UNCLOS NEGOTIATIONS, 1973-1982

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (the Conference) began in 1973 and ended with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 12 December 1982. The US administration of Republican President Richard Nixon was a principal initiator of the Third Conference. The US maintained a bipartisan approach and actively participated in the Conference negotiations throughout the presidencies of Richard Nixon (Republican, 1969-74), Gerald Ford (Republican, 1974-1977) and Jimmy Carter (Democratic, 1977-81). However, the situation changed with the election of Republican President Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan replaced the US negotiating team and called for a review of the provisions in Part IX on Deep Sea Mining.[1]

The US and Part IX on Deep Sea Mining

The Reagan administration called for fundamental changes to Part IX on deep sea mining because it believed that the provisions were not consistent with its view on the appropriate role of private enterprise in deep sea mining. However, the Conference was not willing to accede to what many countries regarded as America’s “last-minute” demands for major changes to one part of the draft convention given that from the outset it was agreed upon that the entire convention would be negotiated as a “package deal”. The Conference decided to proceed to formally adopt the text of UNCLOS on 10 December 1982.

UNCLOS was opened for signature on the same day the text was adopted. President Reagan announced that the US would not sign UNCLOS because of its provisions on deep sea mining. However, in 1983, President Reagan issued a Policy Statement declaring that the US would accept and act in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS relating to traditional uses of the oceans, but not to its provisions in Part IX on the deep seabed. Reagan stated that the US would exercise and assert its navigational and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner consistent with the balance of interests reflected in UNCLOS. He also announced the US’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) within 200 nautical miles of its coast in consistence with UNCLOS.[2] 

1994 Implementation Agreement on Deep Sea Mining

UNCLOS provided that it would enter into force 12 months after the deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession with the UN Secretary-General. A potential problem arose because almost all of the countries that ratified or acceded to UNCLOS from 1982 to 1990 were developing countries. Most leading Western industrialised countries supported the US objections on Part XI on the deep seabed and refused to become parties to UNCLOS. This raised the prospect that the goal of establishing a universally accepted legal regime for all uses of the oceans might not be realised.

Consequently, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar established an informal group of experts in the early 1990s to review the provisions in Part XI to determine if they could address the concerns of the US and other Western industrialised countries. Everyone saw the need for a universally accepted set of rules for the oceans. The administration of President George H.W. Bush (1989-93) participated in the discussions, which were continued under the administration of President Bill Clinton (1993-2001).

The result of the negotiations was the 1994 Implementation Agreement on Part XI which in effect amended the provisions in Part XI of UNCLOS on deep sea mining to address the concerns that had been articulated by the Reagan administration. Other Western industrialised countries then began to ratify UNCLOS. It entered into force on 17 November 1994 and is now universally accepted with 168 Parties including the European Union. The only major power that is not a party to UNCLOS is the United States.

As America has not acceded to UNCLOS, its nationals cannot serve on the institutions established under UNCLOS, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Seabed Authority and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In addition, the US cannot bid for deep sea mining sites from the International Seabed Authority. Furthermore, as a non-party to UNCLOS, the US does not have access to the dispute settlement system in UNCLOS.[3]

WHY THE US FAILED TO BECOME A PARTY TO UNCLOS

Given that the US concerns on deep sea mining were addressed by the 1994 Implementation Agreement, many observers are baffled as to why America has not become a party to UNCLOS, despite the US position that UNCLOS “for the most” part reflects customary international law.[4]

According to the US Constitution, Article II, Section 2, the President has the power to enter into treaties “with the advice and consent of the US Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present agree”. Simply stated, this provision of the US Constitution and the rules of the US Senate have enabled a small group of right-wing Senators to block US accession to UNCLOS.

In November 1994, following the 1994 Implementation Agreement amending Part XI of the deep seabed to address the concerns of the Reagan administration, President Bill Clinton sent UNCLOS to the US Senate for approval. However, conservative Senator Jesse Helms, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, refused to even hold a hearing on the Convention.[5]

Support for the Convention and Subsequent Attempts to Obtain Senate Approval

The position of the US on UNCLOS is even more baffling when one considers the fact that there is overwhelming support for US accession to UNCLOS by all government agencies and all major interest groups in America. This includes the Department of Defense and the State Department, as well as almost all industries with commercial interests in the oceans, including the shipping industry, deep sea mining industry, fishing industry, oil and gas industry and the submarine cable industry. Marine scientists and leading environmental organisations in the US also favour it becoming a party.

Two further attempts to obtain the consent of the US Senate were made during the administration of Republican President George W. Bush. In 2004, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the issue and unanimously recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to accession. However, procedural moves made by conservative Senators prevented the matter from being sent to the Senate for a full vote.[6] In 2007, President Bush again urged the Senate to give its consent to the US becoming a party to UNCLOS.[7] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings and voted 17-4 in support of the US becoming a party. However, opponents of UNCLOS prevented a full vote of the Senate from taking place.

The major argument put forward by opponents to UNCLOS has been that if the US becomes a party, it would be surrendering part of its sovereignty to international organisations. Their arguments are set out by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that has led the drive to prevent the US from becoming a party.[8] Leading US experts on the law of the sea have countered the Heritage Foundation’s arguments and articulated in detail the reasons why it is in the US’ national interests to become a party, but to no avail.[9] For summaries of the arguments and statements of leading experts on both sides of the debate, see UNCLOS debate, a website devoted to the issue.[10]

The latest attempt to obtain approval of the US Senate was in 2012, under the administration of Democratic President Barack Obama. A series of hearings were held on UNCLOS to obtain the perspectives of the US business community and the US military, with a particular focus on UNCLOS and US national security interests. All sectors supported UNCLOS. However, once again, UNCLOS was not referred to the full Senate for a vote.[11]

The increased polarisation of politics in the US makes it increasingly unlikely that it will become a party to UNCLOS in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that President Joe Biden was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for many years and fully understands the importance of UNCLOS to the US, he is enough of a realist to know that the chances of obtaining approval by a two-thirds vote in the US Senate are practically nil.

THE PRACTICES OF THE US ON LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES

Although it is not a party to UNCLOS, the US State Department carefully studies the extent to which the practice of countries that are parties to UNCLOS is consistent with their obligations under UNCLOS.

Limits in the Seas

Since 1970, the US State Department has undertaken studies and published reports examining the maritime claims and boundaries of other countries, including an assessment of whether in the opinion of the US, those claims and boundaries are consistent with international law. Prior to the adoption of UNCLOS, most of the studies were on maritime boundaries and the use of straight baselines. Since the rules on straight baselines are the same in UNCLOS as in the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the early studies on straight baselines remain relevant. After UNCLOS entered into force, the US studies expanded to include maritime claims based on archipelagic baselines.

The US State Department has undertaken studies under the Limits in the Seas series on whether China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea are consistent with UNCLOS. In December 2014, while the Philippines’ case against China was in progress, the US issued Limits in the Seas No. 143 on China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea.[12] After the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea case in 2016, China’s statements seemed to suggest that it was basing its maritime claims from straight baselines around the four “island groups” over which it claims sovereignty in the South China Sea. In response, in January 2022,  the US issued Limits in Seas No. 150 on China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea.[13]

The US can justify its studies on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea because there is a strong argument that China’s claims restrict passage rights and high seas freedoms in a manner that is not consistent with UNCLOS. However, some would argue that the US studies are a form of “lawfare” that is part of the rising competition between the existing superpower and the rising superpower. 

On a more general level, critics might also ask whether a country that is not a party to UNCLOS should appoint itself as a judge to determine whether the practice of countries that are parties is consistent with UNCLOS. The US justification for its actions lies with its Freedom of Navigation Program.

US Freedom of Navigation Program and US Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims

The US Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program was instituted in 1979 by the Carter administration to highlight the navigation provisions in the draft convention to provide further recognition of the US national interest in protecting maritime rights and freedoms of the seas. The programme’s underlying policy was to ensure that the US Navy’s normal activities did not operate in a manner that might be construed as an acquiescence to a claim that was not consistent with international law and was thus not recognised by the US.[14]

On 9 March 1992, the US issued Limits in the Seas No. 112 entitled United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims.[15] This study focused on the US Freedom of Navigation Program. The US position on excessive maritime claims was later published in a book authored by two State Department officials, Captain J. Ashley Roach and Robert Smith under the title Excessive Maritime Claims. The first edition was published in 1994. The fourth is by J. Ashley Roach and was published in 2021.[16]

Under the FON programme, the US first undertakes diplomatic action with respect to what it believes are excessive maritime claims.[17] This could involve bilateral consultations or formal diplomatic protests. If diplomatic efforts are not successful, the US may conduct operational challenges to assert the rights and freedoms which it believes it has under international law as set out in UNCLOS. These operations are known as Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs).

One problem with FONOPs is that the US government often fails to clearly articulate to the international and local media what it is doing and why it is doing it. Consequently, it sometimes appears to observers that the US is merely asserting its naval strength in a manner that increases tensions and poses a risk of military conflict.

The US policy with respect to freedom of navigation and overflight was codified in 2018 under the Trump administration as follows: 

(a) Declaration of Policy: It is the policy of the United States to fly, sail, and operate throughout the oceans, seas, and airspace of the world wherever international law allows.

(b) Implementation of Policy: In furtherance of the policy set forth above, the Secretary of Defense should:

(i) plan and execute a robust series of routine and regular air and naval presence missions throughout the world and throughout the year, including for critical transportation corridors and key routes for global commerce;

(ii) execute routine and regular air and maritime freedom of navigation operations throughout the year, in accordance with international law, including, but not limited to, maneuvers beyond innocent passage, and;

(iii) to the maximum extent practicable, execute these missions with regional partner countries and allies of the United States.[18]

Since 2018, the US has more actively pursued a robust programme of FONOPs to challenge what the US believes are excessive maritime claims by China from the disputed islands it occupies in the South China Sea. This includes China’s use of straight baselines around the Paracel Islands, its claim of a territorial sea from low-tide elevations and submerged features, and its requirement that ships exercising the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea seek authorisation for such passage. The US position is that if it does not conduct operational challenges to China’s excessive maritime claims, it will be seen to have acquiesced to the legality of those claims. The intensification of these FONOPs has increased tensions between the US and China and has been a cause for concern among some regional countries – that an incident may trigger a response that could get out of control.

FONOPS are focused on excessive maritime claims that unlawfully restrict the rights and freedoms of US naval vessels. These operations, however, do not challenge China’s excessive maritime claims to the natural resources in the South China Sea – a far more important concern of many countries. The ASEAN member states bordering the South China Sea assert that under UNCLOS they have sovereign rights and jurisdiction to explore and exploit the natural resources, both fisheries and hydrocarbons, in the 200 nautical mile EEZ measured from the baselines along their mainland coast or from their archipelagic baselines. They assert that China’s claim to “historic rights” within the nine-dash line, and China’s claim to an EEZ from the four “island groups” in the South China Sea, are inconsistent with UNCLOS and prejudice their sovereign rights and jurisdiction to explore and exploit the natural resources in their exclusive economic zone.

The US is also seeking to execute the freedom of navigation operations with its regional partner countries and allies. However, because FONOPS are limited to challenging excessive maritime claims that restrict the rights and freedoms of navies, and do not challenge unlawful claims to natural resources, ASEAN member states are reluctant to participate in or even publicly support US FONOPs in the South China Sea. Some may even regard the “robust” series of FONOPs as actions that could exacerbate tensions in the region and increase the risk of conflict between the US and China. As such, these operations are not likely to enhance America’s prestige.

Hopefully, the day will come when the US Senate realises that it is the country’s national interests to accede to UNCLOS. This would enhance the reputation of the US as a promoter of the rules-based legal order for the oceans and give it an additional tool to challenge what it believes are excessive maritime claims: the compulsory binding dispute settlement system in UNCLOS.

ENDNOTES


[1] “Law of the Sea Convention”, United States Department of State, https://www.state.gov/law-of-the-sea-convention/.

[2] “Statement on United States Oceans Policy”, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-united-states-oceans-policy.

[3] Marjorie A Browne, “The Law of the Sea Convention and US Policy”, Congressional Research Service Brief for Congress (10 February 2005), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IB95010.pdf.

[4] “Remarks at a UN General Assembly Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention”, United States Mission to the United Nations, 29 April 2022, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-general-assembly-commemoration-of-the-40th-anniversary-of-the-opening-for-signature-of-the-1982-law-of-the-sea-convention/.

[5] John A Duff, “The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification”, Ocean & Coastal LJ 11 (2005), https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1297&context=oclj.

[6] Marjorie A Browne, “The UN Law of the Sea Convention and the United States: Developments Since October 2003”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (14 June 2007), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA471150.pdf.

[7] Robert Beckman, “Bush’s Decision to Accede to UNCLOS Why It Is Important for Asia”, RSIS Commentaries 22, No. 42 (22 May 2007), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/925-bushs-decision-to-accede-to/?doing_wp_cron=1653734955.2094221115112304687500#.Yp2WshpBxyx.

[8] See Steven Groves, “U.S. Accession to U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Develop Oil and Gas Resources”, The Heritage Foundation, 14 May 2012, https://www.heritage.org/report/us-accession-un-convention-the-law-the-sea-unnecessary-develop-oil-and-gas-resources; Steven Groves, “The Law of the Sea: Costs of U.S. Accession to UNCLOS”, The Heritage Foundation, 14 June 2012, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/the-law-the-sea-costs-us-accession-unclos.

[9] See John E. Noyes, “UNCLOS and the Continental Shelf: A Response to Steven Groves”, Opinio Juris, 21 June 2012, http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/21/unclos-and-the-continental-shelf-a-response-to-steven-groves/; John Norton Moore and William L Schachte Jr, “The Senate Should Give Immediate Advice and Consent to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Why the Critics Are Wrong”, Journal of International Affairs 59, No. 1 (2005), http://www.jstor.org/stable/24358230; David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, “The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty | ASIL”, The American Society of International Law 11, No. 16 (11 June 2007), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/16/united-states-and-1982-law-sea-treaty.

[10] UNCLOSdebate.org is a website devote to the debate on whether the U.S. should ratify UNCLOS through a structured wiki-like tool. It contains more than 1300 quotes and 200 citations to arguments on the issues. Statements and articles by authors are set out under “Resources – Authors”. For arguments for US accession, see the statements of James Kraska; John B. Bellinger; Richard Lugar; John Norton Moore; and Bernard H. Oxman. For arguments against U.S. accession see the statements of Frank Gaffney and Steven Groves.

[11] “United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations”, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/treaties/103-39.

[12] Kevin Baumert and Brian Melchior, “Limits in the Seas: China Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, The US Department: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, No. 143 (2014), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/LIS-143.pdf.

[13] Kevin Baumert, Amy Stern, and Amanda Williams, “Limits in the Seas: People’s Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”, The US Department: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, No. 150 (2022), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/LIS150-SCS.pdf.

[14] Bernard H Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979)”, American Journal of International Law 74, No. 1 (1980), https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1408&context=fac_articles.

[15] Robert W. Smith and J. Ashley Roach, “Limits in the Seas: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims”, The US Department: Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, No. 112 (1992), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/LIS-112.pdf

[16] J. Ashley Roach, Excessive Maritime Claims: Fourth Edition, Publications on Ocean Development (Brill, 2021), https://brill.com/view/title/59191?language=en.

[17] Ibid. Chapter 1 explains the background of FONOPS and details the U.S. position on several maritime claims by issue.

[18] Ibid.

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha.  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng  
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/72 “Digital Transformation under Indonesia’s G20 Presidency: What can it Deliver?” by Lili Yan Ing, Titik Anas and Maria Monica Wihardja

 

The call made by the G20 under Indonesia’s presidency for urgent global action to make digital transformation more equitable is timely. Picture: https://www.freepik.com/free-photo/researcher-using-transparent-digital-tablet-screen-futuristic-technology_15434073.htm Photo created by Digital Man at www.freepik.com.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The call made by the G20 under Indonesia’s presidency for urgent global action to make digital transformation more equitable is timely. Digital transformation has raised economic inequality in at least three ways: through displacement effects, premature deindustrialisation and skill-biased technological change.
  • The G20 has three routes through which it can help address the digital divide and its associated risks: Policy coordination through the G20’s consensus-building role; action in financing; and action in knowledge building.
  •  There are at least five items to consider for consensus-building:
    • – Reduce digital literacy divides within and between countries.
    • – Improve privacy and security laws based on a set of agreed overarching principles.
    • – Improve competition/antitrust policies by adapting national policies pertinent to the digital era.
    • – Strengthen key digital and analogue enablers for scaling up digital transformation.
    • – Provide assistance to developing countries to access and adopt technologies.         
  • In financing, the G20 could accelerate financial inclusion and help fund the digital infrastructure of developing and less-developed countries. In knowledge building, the G20’s auxiliaries such as the T20, B20 and Y20 could play the leading role.

* Lili Yan Ing (guest writer), is Lead Advisor, Southeast Asia Region, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA); Titik Anas (guest writer), is Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance, Government of Indonesia; Lecturer at Universitas Padjajaran; and Maria Monica Wihardja, is Economist and Visiting Fellow, Regional Economic Studies and Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.[1]

ISEAS Perspective 2022/72, 15 July 2022

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INTRODUCTION

The post-pandemic global growth trajectory shows an uneven recovery, with most sectors remaining below pre-pandemic levels in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). Only a limited number of sectors such as commodities, health, food and beverages, and the ICT-related sector have experienced significant GDP growth since the pandemic erupted. Low- and medium-income countries, as well as more vulnerable population segments (e.g., less-educated groups), workers (e.g., women and youth), and firms (e.g., smaller firms) have been disproportionately affected. Moreover, intensifying geopolitical tensions have placed additional pressure on the world economy.

Indonesia, through its G20 presidency, has put digital transformation – next to global health and the energy transition – as one of the key G20 priorities for 2022, with the theme ‘Recover Together, Recover Stronger’. By placing digital transformation on the agenda, Indonesia aims to create a more inclusive global economic recovery, especially through digitising and digitalising micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), expanding financial inclusion, accelerating digital literacy and skills, and reforming global data governance.

The digital economy has become more central as a new driver of economic growth in the post-pandemic world. However, emerging evidence shows that COVID-19 may be widening the digital divide. One agenda item under the G20 digital transformation action plan aimed at mitigating this is to digitise and digitalise MSMEs. A survey of more than 120,000 firms across more than 60 countries, including four ASEAN nations (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam), found that smaller firms were hit much harder than larger firms during the pandemic and were less likely to receive policy support (World Bank, 2021a). Moreover, at least in East Asia, smaller firms were also less likely to adopt more advanced technologies (World Bank, 2021b).

To enable more disadvantaged smaller firms and unbanked populations to conduct digital transactions, the agenda items under the G20 digital transformation action plan also include accelerating digital financial inclusion. Small and medium-sized firms are mostly excluded from formal borrowing, despite increasing numbers having an account at a financial service provider (Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, n.d.). The G20 Financial Inclusion Indicators in 2017 also show that while 90.5% of adults (age 15+) in high-income countries made or received digital payments in the past year, only 25.6% of adults in low-income countries did. Globally, while 66.2% of adults with secondary education or higher made or received digital payments in the past year, only 35% of adults with primary education or lower did.

Moreover, since gaps in digital literacy and digital skills are still pervasive across and within countries (Burns, 2022), accelerating digital literacy and skills will also be included in the agenda.

The next section discusses the digital transformation paradox, explaining why certain regulations are needed at both the national and global levels to avert a digital divide, and related risks and threats. Following that, concrete and necessary commitments for digital transformation that can be delivered under Indonesia’s G20 presidency are discussed.

THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION PARADOX

The main reason to undertake a digital transformation is perhaps productivity gains. However, many observers, including Wolf (2018) and Acemoglu (2021a), argue that digital transformation may actually bring negative consequences for overall productivity growth and distribution – at least in the short run. Wolf contends that digital technology is transformational, but the aggregate effects, even after controlling for possible mismeasurement (Byrne and Sichel, 2017), are modest at best compared to the effects brought about by innovations in electricity, energy, transportation and health in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Acemoglu shows that as automation advanced, wage gaps between those in the top and bottom of the income distribution widened. 

Digital transformation also comes with risks. The dark side of digital technologies, including widening economic inequality, exploitation of individual privacy, an infodemic[2] and political polarisation (Acemoglu, 2021a), is amplified when the analogues, such as education, basic infrastructure and institutions, are not well developed, or are weak or corrupted. 

THE DIGITAL DIVIDE

In 2016, the top 1% of the world’s population owned half of the global wealth. But for the past two years, the income of 99% of the global population has shrunk while the income of the top ten richest people has doubled (Hardoon et al, 2016; Ahmed et al, 2022). Eight of the top ten richest people are technology titans, some of them owning US technology giants that have become influential in shaping policies, political views and individual behaviour.

Digital transformation increases economic inequality in at least three ways, beginning with displacement effects. Capital and technology take over tasks previously performed by labour, while automation reduces the share of labour contribution in value added. Displacement affects both employment – type of employment and number of employed – and wages, particularly for middle-skilled workers carrying out manual and routine tasks in manufacturing: They are more likely to be replaced by robots and AI-powered automation.[3] Displacement effects could be accelerated by the adoption of labour-replacing technologies (instead of labour-augmenting technologies), tax systems that favour capital vis-à-vis labour, strong labour unions, and high unit labour costs that incentivise firms to automate processes.

Second, digital transformation creates premature deindustrialisation in developing countries (Rodrik, 2022), which may in turn raise inequality, especially as employment growth in modern large-scale manufacturing firms (a source of middle-class jobs; see World Bank, 2021c) becomes anaemic. Premature deindustrialisation may occur in developing countries, where the comparative advantage is in labour-intensive industries, and some of these countries lack an educated and skilled workforce that can move up to higher-skill, more capital-intensive industries. Developing countries may also experience reshoring of manufacturing to developed countries, where high labour costs can be replaced with automation.

Third, digital transformation creates skill-biased technological change. Technologies, most of which are imported from advanced countries by developing countries, tend to be skill- and capital-intensive. Therefore, digital transformation benefits better-educated and higher-skilled workers more than less-educated and lower-skilled workers. Empirical evidence from Indonesia shows that while internet penetration benefits all types of workers except the least educated, the incremental benefits from internet penetration are greater for better-educated workers, thereby widening skill premiums and wage inequality that existed before the arrival of the internet (World Bank, 2021d).

The diverse effects of inequality-inducing technological change on countries and demographic groups arguably depend on a country’s digital and analogue infrastructure, antitrust laws and enforcement capacity, as well as the digital literacy and skills of various demographic groups, among other domestic factors. Although the extent to which each factor plays a role in widening inequality in the presence of digital technologies is still unclear, anecdotal studies show the importance of complementary policies.

A case in point is China, which has been able to develop digital finance and e-commerce at scale across its society. It has put in place public policies to form the backbone of its unprecedented digital transformation: These are policies that ensure a healthy and well-educated population, on last-mile transportation infrastructure, countrywide access to a fibre-optic or 4G network and a single set of tax codes, business norms and other regulations (Wong and Wihardja, 2022).

The pandemic has also spotlighted and exacerbated the digital divide. For example, in Indonesia, 84% of high-skilled jobs can be done from home, but 85% of low-skilled jobs require physical presence in the workplace (World Bank, 2021d).

Last, the global digital divide is a challenge. Digitalised systems and digitally deliverable goods and services are still less prevalent in the least-developed countries than in other parts of the world. While over half the population in high-income countries shopped online in 2019, only 2% of the population in low-income countries did likewise (UNCTAD, 2022). Countries, firms and individuals vary greatly in their digital trade readiness, depending on education, skills and infrastructure.

DIGITAL PRIVACY, CYBERSECURITY, RISKS AND THREATS

On top of inequality issues, we face other significant challenges in digital transformation, including in digital trade: privacy, cybersecurity, and competition.

First, private individual information and data are made available to service providers, enabling the pervasive exchange of data that has fuelled concerns about data use and misuse. A case in point is the Cambridge Analytica scandal affecting the Brexit referendum and the 2016 US presidential election. With the use of AI-empowered algorithms, large profit-making social media platforms can target individuals with personalised messages and advertising, and control the news and (mis)information received or filtered out from the public discourse.

Second, the rapid expansion of digitalisation and the use of data by businesses and consumers for information, communication, digital trade and innovation comes with increased threats—against data, systems and people. Without cybersecurity for software (education, knowledge and awareness) and hardware (technologies, processes and practices) to protect users from cyberattacks, the threat of such attacks increases.

Third, competition is a challenge. Technological advancement enables firms to produce and operate in massive economies of scale because of the almost zero marginal costs, combined with large fixed costs, leading to market concentration.

A concentrated market has widespread implications. It reduces competition and can create barriers hindering potential competitors, including MSMEs and start-ups, from entering markets. This means large tech players can use vertical and horizontal integration as their strategy to dominate and capture more revenues (or markup) at the expense of consumers. There is also an implication for employer–employee relations. A monopsony or duopsony market of large firms undermines workers’ bargaining power and may drive wages below competitive levels.

The absence of cross-border digital tax might also create a non-level playing field between brick-and-mortar and digital businesses and a bias in favour of multinational technology giants. Similarly, a non-harmonised antitrust law and its enforcement could create market concentration in one country (e.g., of the US big tech companies) which might have global spillovers.

The digital economy is perhaps the most globalised of all economic sectors and global-level complementary policies are needed as much as national-level complementary policies to create a more equitable global transformation. The issues of privacy, cybersecurity and competition are in some ways a result of the lack of international rules and norms.

However, creating international rules and norms in these areas is extremely complex, especially given the strategic competition between the United States and China, including a proxy technological war on digital trade, standards and procurement policy, which is creating a splinternet (Malcomson, 2016). It is also reducing the prospects of cross-border digital payments and the internet of things, among others. 

With digital technologies becoming central and indispensable in supporting future economic growth across the world, and the risks and threats affecting the global population and (geo)political discourse (Acemoglu, 2021a), the G20 remains a relevant platform on which to discuss the high-level global challenges related to digital transformation.

DELIVERING AN INCLUSIVE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

The G20’s origins go back to 1998 and the Asian financial crisis. The main goal of the G20 then was to strengthen the global financial system and better coordinate macroeconomic issues among finance ministers and central bank governors. The G20’s elevation in 2008 to a leaders summit successfully mobilised the world’s response to the global financial crisis. The initiation and elevation of the G20 changed the whole structure of global governance. It is the first global forum of international economic cooperation to include both developed and developing countries, and represented about 95 percent of global GDP in 2020.

The G20 has achieved much, including the recent ground breaking Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, an initiative with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to reform international taxation rules and ensure that global corporations, including tech giants, pay a fair share of tax wherever they operate. Although the G20 risks becoming like a Christmas tree and the organisation certainly needs to be more focused, the widespread social, economic and political impacts of digital transformation justify the addition of digital transformation to the G20 agenda. The implementation of a digital transformation agenda, like other more topical issues discussed under the Sherpa track instead of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Track, will take place under the existing G20 Digital Economy Task Force and Working Group, in which relevant technical ministries are involved.  

The G20 could help address national and global causes of the digital divide and digital risks and threats via three channels: policy coordination through its consensus-building role, action in financing and action in knowledge building.

In terms of policy coordination, there are at least five areas where consensus could be reached. First, the G20 could help improve the preparedness of countries and individuals; essentially, digital transformation is about people. This includes improving digital literacy and skills. Indonesia’s initiative to develop the G20 Toolkit for Measuring Digital Skills and Digital Literacy – developed by Digital Pathways Oxford University and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies to help G20 members measure their digital literacy and skills – is a good start. However, more ambitious national and global complementary initiatives and policies are needed to close the digital literacy and skills gaps.

Moreover, to ensure that technologies benefit society as a whole, the G20 could create a definition of people-centred ‘appropriate technologies’[4] (e.g., expressing the extent to which technologies complement workers and increase productivity rather than replace workers, and maximise social welfare; see also IEA, n.d.), similar to the way in which criteria are created for climate/environmentally friendly technologies.[5] The G20 could also identify incentives to encourage private technology firms to adopt technologies that could bring more good jobs that could provide a middle-class way of life (Rodrik and Sabel, 2019) and hence, political stability (Acemoglu, 2021a). Moreover, a relative tax on capital vis-à-vis labour may also need revisiting by the G20 to stimulate the development of labour-augmenting technologies, instead of labour-replacing technologies. A Roadmap Toward a Common Framework for Measuring the Digital Economy, delivered under the Saudi Arabian G20 Presidency in 2020 (OECD, 2020), providing an agreed definition of the digital economy and an agreed set of indicators for measuring the jobs, skills and growth within it, is a critical step to start measuring the impacts of digital technologies across countries in the world in a concerted and standardised way. 

Second, the G20 could improve the quality of privacy and security laws. It could agree on a set of principles on privacy and security laws, derived perhaps from existing laws, for example, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act (Personal Data Protection Commission, n.d.; Personal Data Protection Digest, 2022) and the International Telecommunication Union’s cybersecurity strategy design and implementation (ITU, 2021). The G20 could then help members and non-members to adopt the principles – with adjustments for local context – through technical assistance and capacity building. Since most large technology firms are multinational corporations with global consumers, privacy and security laws in one country have global privacy and security implications.

Third, the G20 could improve competition/antitrust policies. The Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2021) reported on challenges faced by competition authorities when dealing with digital technologies, and elaborated on best practices. The EU Digital Market Act, a proposal currently under consideration by the European Commission to ensure a higher degree of competition in European digital markets, could be considered a model in this regard. The International Competition Network could prepare a set of standards to be agreed on by the G20 member countries and secure political commitments from G20 leaders to implement these standards.

Fourth, the G20 could strengthen key digital and analogue enablers. It could adopt guidelines on what might constitute prerequisites for scaling up digital transformation. It could achieve this by reflecting on the experiences of countries that have successfully implemented digital transformation. For example, Indonesia, as the host country, could share how it has attracted billions of dollars of digital investments in recent years and now hosts the largest number of unicorns and decacorns in Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s large and young consumer base is one possible explanation, but there must be an enabling environment that supports this impressive growth which could fit other developing countries.

Fifth, the G20 could provide assistance to developing countries to access and adopt technologies – especially those that have been identified as appropriate technologies (IEA, n.d.) – and digital goods and services to support digital transformation. It is important for the G20 to implement the existing commitments made in digital transformation and digital trade, including the Industrial Revolution Action Plan, the Roadmap for Digitalisation and recently the G20 initiative to enhance the adoption of AI by MSMEs and start-ups. What we need now is to operationalise and implement these frameworks and commitments through the G20 Digital Economy Task Force and Working Group.

In financing, the G20 could accelerate financial inclusion and help fund the digital infrastructure of developing and less-developed countries which are most lagging from a digital transformation perspective, similar to its work in climate change and in global health financing. In knowledge building, the G20’s auxiliaries such as the T20 (Think 20), B20 (Business 20) and Y20 (Youth 20) could lead, for example, by supporting the onboarding of MSMEs to digital platforms and reducing barriers to growth.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia’s G20 presidency has committed to taking action in the three priority areas of digital transformation, global health infrastructure and energy transition. In digital transformation, the G20 could deliver commitments to contribute to inclusive digital transformation by promoting digital preparedness for all, harmonising global digital governance including a regulatory framework on innovation, privacy, security and competition, and improving the quantity and quality of key digital and analogue enablers.

Moreover, policy coordination at the G20 could reduce the ‘cyber-Balkanisation’ that is occurring due to geopolitical tensions and divergent national interests, making consensus-based agreements on global data governance (including privacy and competition policies) difficult to achieve. Otherwise, developing and less-developed countries that are forced to choose camps will be more likely to be the ones bearing the brunt of the splinternet. Further harmonisation of digital economy governance is needed.

With the war in Ukraine continuing, it may be challenging for the G20 to achieve any substantial consensus-based commitment. The war has caused increased tension among G20 countries and the geopolitical agenda may hijack this year’s meeting. Realistically, the G20 may have to be satisfied with lowest common denominator agreements, though Indonesia is aspiring for more. While the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting on 20 April 2022 was mostly successful, despite the brief walkout by some member delegations, the hope remains that the G20 can stay relevant amid the current global economic challenges.

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, Daron. 2021a. ‘AI’s future doesn’t have to be dystopian.’ Boston Review. May 21. AI’s Future Doesn’t Have to Be Dystopian – Boston Review

Acemoglu, Daron. 2021b. ‘Automation and the inappropriateness of technology.’ Presentation at the International Economic Association’s Workshop on Digital Technologies, Limits and Opportunities for Economic Development. October 12. Daron-Acemoglu.pdf (iea-world.org)

Ahmed, N., A. Marriott, N. Dabi, M. Lowthers, M. Lawson, and L. Mugehera. 2022. ‘Inequality kills: The unparalleled action needed to combat unprecedented inequality in the wake of COVID-19’, OXFAM Briefing Paper, Oxfam.

Burns, Tracey. 2022. ‘United we stand, digitally divided we fall.’ The Forum Network. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/united-we-stand-digitally-divided-we-fall-gold-standard-digital-literacy-ensures-access-to-technology-regardless-of-age-gender-and-background

Byrne, David and Dan Sichel. 2017. ‘The productivity slowdown is even more puzzling than you think’. CEPR. https://voxeu.org/article/productivity-slowdown-even-more-puzzling-you-think

Daojiong, Zha and Ting Dong. 2022. ‘China in international digital economy governance.’ China Economic Journal, April 19, 187–201. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17538963.2022.2067690

G20 Research Group. 2021. Annex 1 in ‘Declaration of G20 digital ministers: Leveraging digitalisation for a resilient, strong, sustainable and inclusive recovery.’ 5 August.

Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion. N.d. ‘G20 financial inclusion indicators’. G20 Financial Inclusion Indicators | Home | The World Bank

Hardoon, D., S. Ayele and R. Fuentes-Nieva. 2016. ‘An economy for the 1%’, OXFAM Briefing Paper, Oxfam.

IEA (International Economic Association). N.d. ‘Technology, jobs, and development working group’. https://www.iea-world.org/technology-jobs-and-development-working-group/

Insider Intelligence. 2021. ‘China becomes first country in which ecommerce surpasses 50% of retail sales.’ 17 February. https://www.emarketer.com/newsroom/index.php/china-becomes-first-country-in-which-ecommerce-surpasses-50-of-retail-sales/

ITU (International Telecommunication Union). 2021. ‘Global policy dialog and briefing: Cybersecurity strategy design and implementation’. 6 April.

Malcomson, Scott. 2016. Splinternet. How Geopolitics and Commerce Are Fragmenting the World Wide Web. OR Books publication.

Morton, Fiona M. Scott. 2018. ‘Markups, profit, and competition enforcement.’ Presentation at a World Bank seminar.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2022. OECD Handbook on Competition Policy in the Digital Age. https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition-policy-in-the-digital-age/

OECD. 2020. A Roadmap Toward a Common Framework for Measuring the Digital Economy. Report for the G20 Digital Economy Task Force. Saudi Arabia, 2020.

Personal Data Protection Commission. N.d. ‘PDPA overview’.

Personal Data Protection Digest. 2022. [2021] Personal Data Protection Digest. https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Commissions-Decisions/2021-Personal-Data-Protection-Digest.pdf

Rodrik, Dani. 2016. ‘Premature deindustrialization’. Journal of Economic Growth 21, 1–33.

Rodrik, Dani and Charles F. Sabel. 2019. ‘Building a good jobs economy’. Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP20-001. https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2608

Rodrik, Dani. 2022. ‘Reviving Appropriate Technologies’. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/appropriate-technology-global-innovation-and-labor-by-dani-rodrik-2022-02

Stanford HAI (Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence). N.d. ‘What problems can AI solve? What problems does it create?’

Statista. 2022a. ‘E-commerce as percentage of total retail sales worldwide from 2015 to 2025’. 27 May.

Statista. 2022b. ‘Retail e-commerce sales worldwide from 2014 to 2025’. 4 February.

Timberg, Craig, Elizabeth Dwoskin and Reed Albergotti. 2021. ‘Inside Facebook, Jan. 6 violence fueled anger, regret over missed warning signs.’ The Washington Post. October 22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/jan-6-capitol-riot-facebook/

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2022. ‘Digital trade: Opportunities and actions for developing countries.’ Policy Brief No. 92. January.

UNCTAD Secretariat. 2021. Competition Law, Policy and Regulation in the Digital Era 2021.

Wolf, Martin. 2018. ‘The long wait for a productivity resurgence.’ Financial Times. June 13. https://www.ft.com/content/8bea636a-6d78-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa

Wong, Brian A. and Maria M. Wihardja. 2022. ‘What can Indonesia learn from China’s digital economic transformation?’ World Bank blog. https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/what-can-indonesia-learn-from-china-digital-economic-transformation

World Bank. N.d. ‘Databank: Global financial inclusion’. Database. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/global-financial-inclusion

World Bank. 2021a. ‘Taking an unprecedented year for businesses, everywhere’. World Bank Group publication, Washington, D.C. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/02/17/tracking-an-unprecedented-year-for-businesses-everywhere

World Bank. 2021b. East Asia and Pacific Economic Update: Long Covid. October. World Bank Group Publication, Washington, D.C. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/36295/9781464817991.pdf

World Bank. 2021c. Pathways to Middle-Class Jobs in Indonesia. World Bank Group publication, Washington, D.C. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/pathways-to-middle-class-jobs-in-indonesia

World Bank. 2021d. Beyond Unicorns: Harnessing Digital Technologies for Inclusion in Indonesia. World Bank Group publication, Washington, D.C. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/beyond-unicorns-harnessing-digital-technologies-for-inclusion-in-indonesia

ENDNOTES


[1] The views expressed here are personal. The authors would like to thank Yongmei Zhou (Peking University), Lesly Goh (World Bank), Cassey Lee (ISEAS), and Tham Siew Yean (ISEAS) for their constructive comments.

[2] The term was first used by David Rothkopf in 2003 in connection with SARS (see: https://www1.udel.edu/globalagenda/2004/student/readings/infodemic.html).

[3] The hollowing out of middle-skilled jobs does not only happen in the United States but in many other parts of the world (Acemoglu, 2021b).

[4] The term came from a book by British economist E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered (1973).

[5] See, for example, Stanford HAI, n.d.

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“Justifying Digital Repression via “Fighting Fake News”: A Study of Four Southeast Asian Autocracies” by Janjira Sombatpoonsiri and Dien Nguyen An Luong

 

2022/71 “The Arakan Dream in Post-Coup Myanmar” by Aung Tun

 

This photo taken on 23 January 2022 shows Rohingya vendors selling fish in the market at Thal Chaung camp in Rakhine state. Photo: STR/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Following intense warfare between the Arakan Army and Myanmar’s military in recent years, Rakhine State has arguably become the region of the country to make the most promising progress towards greater autonomy.
  • The Arakan Army’s “Arakan Dream” has been partially implemented through the establishment of a new local administration, including a judicial sector, across the state.
  • However, the pathway towards its desired future still faces fluid national politics, not least from the possible resumption of conflict in the wake of the 2021 military coup.
  • The Arakan Dream is not related just to national politics but also to the strategic interests of both China and India, ties with neighbouring Bangladesh, and to the Rohingya crisis.
  • The situation in Rakhine State has implications that could shape Myanmar’s national politics, the allocation of resources and revenues, migration, and the elections that may be held in 2023.

*Aung Tun is Visiting Fellow, Myanmar Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He has over thirteen years of professional experience working on various policy, governance, community, and economic development projects in Myanmar.

Perspective 2022/71, 14 July 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Following the 2021 coup, regions across Myanmar have faced major military offensives mounted by the regime. Resistance forces operating throughout the country in various forms have emerged and grown, both to try to counter such offensives and to pursue a federal democratic future for the country. The nation is confronting a very uncertain future.

However, Rakhine State (formerly Arakan) appears to be a different story. It has secured a negative peace[1] with the Myanmar military since late 2020 and pursued its political goal of greater autonomy, or the “Arakan Dream”, with some success. The Arakan Army (AA) is also participating in the governance of the state. It has established the Arakan People’s Authority (APA) with great public support. These achievements, in such a short period, have inspired many other parts of the nation.

However, the AA’s political dream still faces challenges if conflict is to be avoided. The populace has suffered greatly from Covid-19, warfare, and intercommunal violence. The Rohingya crisis will also loom over any governing mechanisms in the state and test prospects for its inclusive politics. Furthermore, though Rakhine State is among the poorest regions in Myanmar, it is the recipient of multi-billion-dollar international investments, such as projects under the auspices of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The results of these investments will depend on the political options that the AA is now pursuing.  

FROM ARMED STRUGGLE TO INFORMAL PEACE

The informal peace deal between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw obtained in Rakhine State[2] has given hope for a better future to communities in the state and people elsewhere in Myanmar. But the resumption of warfare would affect those communities adversely. The risk of such a resumption needs to be managed carefully now.

The state has enjoyed relative political stability in recent years, a stability that became more evident after the cessation of warfare between the Arakan Army (AA) and theTatmadaw, or Myanmar armed forces, via an informal peace agreement dating to 2020.[3] This agreement left the AA in control of various aspects of life in many parts of the state. The AA, though a newly established armed force relative to other ethnic armed organizations, including the Karen National Union or the Kachin Independence Army, has achieved far more through armed resistance than observers have expected in such a short time.

Promoted by members of a younger generation of Rakhines, [4] with a fresh sense of the state’s possible future, the AA’s “Arakan Dream” or “Way of Rakhita” is all about moving forward with self-government and protecting security, political, and even cultural interests in its own way.[5] There has been good progress at the expense of lives and economic and social challenges, including the suspension of school classes during warfare and the Covid-19 pandemic (2018-2020).[6] Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the state have also been unable to return home.

Renewed warfare in Rakhine State is still possible; several clashes have been reported between the AA and the Tatmadaw in some areas of Arakan, including the Maungdaw Township.[7] There have also been instances of military buildups on the part of both the AA and the Tatmadaw. Instead of the resumption of extensive conflict, what the people of Arakan need is to rebuild their lives with the provision of state services: the rule of law, a functioning judiciary, and policing, education and health services. The AA understands those needs and realizes that much more needs to be done. The first task for the AA is to govern. To provide the necessary services, the AA’s own local administration, the Arakan People’s Authority (APA), has to be consolidated.

ARAKAN’S LOCAL ADMINISTRATION — A WAY FORWARD

Progress toward the realization of the Arakan Dream is very much evidenced in the area of local administration, in the work of the Arakan People’s Authority on the ground. Upon gaining substantive territorial control, the AA has made the establishment of its own administrative system a priority. This is a critical determinant of its ability to achieve the Arakan Dream in the years ahead. The APA, has thus far enjoyed some success: improved public trust in the judiciary sector — in contrast to the State Administration Council (SAC) junta’s judiciary, which has been teetering towards collapse. Policing work is also underway. And the AA has pursued the creation of an administrative structure that includes Rohingya communities in governing roles.[8] But much work remains. For instance, legal reform in line with the Arakan Dream needs to be implemented. That reform could accelerate judicial reform, in the form of dispute resolution, and lead to the realization of the rule of law. This would also improve trust in state and public administration and allow the maintenance of stability in this diverse and troubled region; in Arakan, the different political views of the various communities must be handled with extra care.

The next test for the APA is to expand its reach into southern Rakhine State, believed to be a National League for Democracy (NLD) stronghold[9] — especially areas such as Gwa and Thandwe Townships which border Ayeyarwaddy Region, which is an NLD stronghold. Those southern Rakhine areas have suffered less from armed conflict than other parts of the state, and they also appear to have better commercial links, as in the commodity trade, to the Ayeyarwaddy Region. While the political views of people in these communities remain unclear, it has been reported that the SAC has arrested a number of Rakhine people with links to the anti-junta People’s Defence Forces (PDFs)[10] in such areas.[11] The AA must then adopt a strategic approach to the development of local administration mechanisms and to the politics of the Arakan Dream in southern Rakhine State.

RAKHINE POLITICS AMIDST NATIONAL CRISIS

Though the Arakan Dream is literally unfolding, Myanmar’s national political crisis has constrained its further development. In this context, the AA has embraced the tactic of allying politically with neither the SAC and nor with pro-NLD elements and their allies. The Arakan political landscape is in a state of transformation, but the 2021 coup has led to the lack of a clear-cut answer to the question of what the next step for the Arakan Dream is to be. Those seeking to further the dream need both to confront the current post-coup crisis and to look beyond it.

It appears that the AA still distrusts both the Tatmadaw and the NLD. The military buildup in the state is evidence of its mistrust of the former. In the case of the latter,[12] the problem goes back to the earlier days of ‘bitter’ politics. That began with the 2015 elections in which the Arakan National Party (ANP) won 22 out of 29 seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Myanmar’s bicameral national parliament, and also secured 23 out of 35 elected seats[13] in Rakhine State legislature. On the day of the appointment of the state’s chief minister, an NLD nominee, Rakhine parliamentarians walked out in protest[14] because they believed that, with its majority, the ANP should be allowed to select their state’s chief minister.[15] Another issue is the history of warfare in Rakhine State. In March 2020, the NLD government declared the AA a terrorist group[16] and then praised theTatmadaw for conducting airstrikes[17] in the state. A local activist recalls the Tatmadaw’s offensive as being tantamount to an invasion by foreign troops exploiting all their military power – ground forces, naval assets, and control of the air.[18]

In addition, in areas of northern Rakhine State in which Rakhine parties have strongholds, voting in the 2020 elections was largely cancelled for security reasons. According to Rakhine State’s sub-national election commission, over 1.2 million out of 1.64 million voters in the state were disenfranchised as a result.[19] The Rohingya crisis represented yet another source of friction between Rakhines and the NLD government. Rakhine stakeholders were upset over the NLD’s lack of consultation on the appointment of members of the Rakhine Advisory Commission formed to address that crisis.[20]

These developments informed AA’s response to the 2021 coup. They help explain the AA opting not to ally itself politically with NLD figures and their allies, on the one hand, or with the coup regime, on the other. The chances that it will ally itself with either side in the near future is slim.[21] It has for instance made clear that it does not want to see Civil Disobedience Movement activities and street protests in Rakhine State.[22] Unlike other areas of Myanmar, schools in the state have operated normally during the period of nationwide anti-junta resistance. At the same time, it is reported that the AA is conducting training for or extending support to local PDFs.[23] The organization has also decided not to attend the peace talks in May 2022, to which the SAC regime invited it and other ethnic armed organizations.[24] Even so, its diplomatic channels with the coup regime remain open. AA representatives attended the Union Day ceremonies in early February,[25] for instance, even when many other ethnic armed organizations boycotted them.

THE ARAKAN DREAM IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

The relevance of China’s and India’s strategic interests must not be underestimated in any effort to understand Arakan’s circumstances. The risks arising from those interests must be carefully mitigated in an effort to pursue the Arakan Dream. Bangladesh is also a potential game-changer for this dream.

China is a multi-billion investor in Rakhine State — especially in the Kyaukphyu Deep Seaport project, the related special economic zone and the gas pipeline crossing through Arakan and the Myanmar heartland all the way up to China’s Yunnan province.[26] Those projects, part of China’s BRI, obviously serve China’s strategic interests, and are carried out with the approval of Myanmar’s central government; Beijing wants access to the Indian Ocean through the BRI infrastructure projects. During the period of intense warfare between the AA and the Tatmadaw in 2016-2020, when the NLD government was in power in Naypyitaw, neither side appeared to have attacked Chinese projects in the state — a contrast to events in other parts of the country during conflict between the Tatmadaw and resistance forces since last year’s coup.

As people in the communities around the Chinese project areas in Rakhine State became IDPs, social media users in Myanmar mocked both the AA and the Tatmadaw[27] for their shared fright of harming Chinese interests, above all in the 2018-2019 period. They argued that an attack on those projects would at least raise a warning signal to China to change its course of action in Myanmar

But from the point of view of the government in Naypyitaw, this caution had a clear logic. In the wake of the Rohingya crisis, China protected the NLD government and theTatmadaw by using its veto power on the United Nations Security Council.[28] And safeguarding Chinese projects remains critical for the post-coup SAC regime. In an emergency discussion on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the junta reportedly discussed concerns about the possibility of ‘China’s incursion’,[29] especially if the SAC were not able to safeguard the projects. Civil society groups in Rakhine State have since the coup criticized several investment projects,[30] arguing that the project must be suspended so as not to benefit the regime. And, in practice, many of the project areas are to some degree under the evolving APA administration’s control. Their treatment is thus an issue in the state’s evolving political situation.

Diplomacy with India also matters for the future of Arakan. Most visible is India’s flagship Kaladan Project, linking Myanmar to India’s landlocked northeast. The project in the remote border areas of Mizoram State in India and around Rakhine and Chin States in Myanmar is aimed at boosting India’s strategic connectivity in its northeast both domestically and with neighbouring countries in order “to balance China’s growing influence”.[31] The project has already missed two deadlines and it is now set to be completed by 2023.[32] A reason for the missed deadlines is obviously instability in the project area, including the warfare in Rakhine State. The AA abducted five Indian workers from a project site in November 2019, and one of them died of a heart attack in custody.[33] Indian media has used the words “a Myanmar-based insurgent group with links to China”[34] in characterizing the AA, demonstrating India’s generic view of the group. These factors only underline the degree to which, in the diplomatic realm, the Arakan Dream would face a challenging international context, given Rakhine State’s position between the two great Asian powers, both well connected to the Tatmadaw.

A third international or diplomatic dimension of developments in Rakhine State concerns building relations with Bangladesh. This is significant work. The AA once characterized its relationship with Dhaka as “being so-so”.[35] Bangladesh will, however, join China in playing a critical role in the realization of the Arakan Dream. This is because geography matters: Bangladesh is the closest neighbour to Rakhine State, and it will serve many dimensions of the state’s broader development, including border trading. It is also now host to Rohingya communities, members of the second largest population group[36] in Arakan, many of whom are due to be repatriated to the state. Successful repatriation will serve the international credibility of the AA, if the latter plays a role in ensuring that Rakhine residents, especially those with strong ethno-nationalistic sentiments,[37] accept peaceful coexistence. The AA has its work cut out. Currently, repatriation efforts are under the control of the central government in Naypyitaw, but realization of the Arakan Dream will mean that they will fall under the AA’s authority.

RAKHINE POLITICAL UNITY AND THE ARAKAN DREAM

Tackling such national and international issues in pursuing the Arakan Dream, Rakhine stakeholders need to be more united than ever before. Fulfilment of the Arakan Dream demands a shared or collective dream all across Rakhine State. It has been rare, however, to see Rakhine political parties or politicians behave in unity. Differing views among them have often resulted in the emergence of new political parties, making the dream of united action even more of a dream. For instance, a strong Rakhine nationalist party, the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), boycotted Myanmar’s 2010 election, and the resulting political fracture led to the emergence of the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP).[38] In 2014, the two parties managed to merge into the Arakan National Party (ANP) in preparation for the 2015 elections. Facing alleged party infighting[39] and with its chairman Dr Aye Maung facing treason charges, the ANP then split. Aye Maung went on to found a new party, the Arakan Front Party (AFP), in January 2019. Political unity appears sorely needed in pursuit of the evolving Arakan Dream if it is to inspire people in Rakhine State and beyond.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RAKHINE STATE FOR MYANMAR


Like all aspects of developments in Rakhine State, the quest for political unity there is not merely a matter of local significance. What is happening in the state has implications for Myanmar as a whole. The first implication is political: the AA’s Arakan Dream has inspired not only the population of Rakhine State at large but also people in other ethnic states and beyond. For instance, actors in Kayah (or Karenni) State are taking a similar approach to that of the AA in Rakhine State,[40] even if there are important differences in the circumstances of the two states. Even ethnic Bamar heartland areas like Sagaing and Magwe Regions may follow suit in their ‘liberated areas’.

A second implication is military: the AA’s military success demonstrates the role of public support as a critical determinant in military measures regardless of the firepower at hand. At the end of the day, having public support makes a difference.

A third implication more generally concerns resources, or revenues for Naypyitaw. If Rakhine State, where most of Myanmar’s offshore gas and oil reserves are located, is able to move towards greater autonomy, a good portion of the revenue from the exploitation of its resources will go to the state itself. This will significantly reduce the flow of revenue to Naypyitaw and place a strain on the national government’s finances.[41]

A fourth implication of developments in Rakhine State is related to migration. Despite the serious instability throughout Myanmar following the 2021 military coup, Rakhine State appears to be stable. In fact, it could be the one among the country’s states and regions with the most potential to enjoy an economic boom, given the multi-billion investments such as the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port, the special economic zone and the Sittwe Deepwater Port[42] project. Tourism and supply chains related to those projects would follow; the emergence of some of them is already evident.[43] Foreigners – Chinese and others – will migrate to the state to work, while business communities from Yangon and other areas will seek investment opportunities in there, especially if the current political stability lasts. This trend could transform both the state’s political and social landscape[44] and Rakhine State’s significance among Myanmar’s constituent parts.

Finally, there is the matter of possible elections in 2023. Whether elections can be held next year remains doubtful for many reasons, one of which is obviously security concerns. But Rakhine State’s relatively stability, under the informal peace settlement between the AA and the Tatmadaw, means that the SAC regime could take advantage of that stability to seek credibility by holding an election. How political stakeholders in the state would respond to the organization of such polls remains unclear. The election could, for example, ‘divide rather than unite’, and exacerbate the cracks within Rakhine politics and thus complicate the Arakan Dream.

CONCLUSION

The Arakan Dream is unfolding before us. However, those who would realize it need to work out many important issues — local, national and international. Myanmar’s fluid national politics now constrain the dream. Still facing looming conflict, Rakhine State’s ability to maintain an informal peace remains limited. The Arakan Army, as the professed prime mover for changing the situation of Rakhine people, needs to take extra care in managing the international rivals China and India. Significant work in building a relationship with Bangladesh is also required.

At the same time, the economic outlook for Rakhine State appears to be better than that anywhere else in Myanmar, at least in the short term. While the people of Rakhine deserve a better life, an “Arakan” political future may nevertheless remain elusive.

ENDNOTES


[1] Here negative peace refers to the informal ceasefire and lack of fighting while the formal process remains uncertain, meaning suspension of the warfare but no peace deal yet.

[2] “Rakhine State” and “Arakan” are used interchangeably in this article. The state was formerly known as Arakan, a term that many Rakhine politicians still use with the intention of recalling Arakan’s history of political independence. In total, Myanmar has seven states and seven regions administratively; states usually refer to as ethnic majority while regions as to Burmese majority.

[3] Office of the Commander in Chief of Defence Services, “Statement of Ceasefire and Eternal Peace”, 12 November 2020 (https://cincds.gov.mm/node/9793?d=1).

[4] AA’s leader Twan Mrat Naing is 43, and his comrades are also believed to be in their mid-forties.

[5] For details on the Way of Rakhita, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zQGZ8VE1PY.

[6] Schools in conflict-affected areas like central and northern Rakhine State were forced to close down during the fighting.

[7] Nan Oo Nway, “Junta Searches for AA-linked Administrators, in latest Sign of Rakhine Tensions”, Myanmar Now, 10 May 2022 (Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-searches-for-aa-linked-administrators-in-latest-sign-of-rakhine-tensions)

[8] Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, “Arakan Army Seeks to Build ‘Inclusive’ Administration in Rakhine state”, The Diplomat, 31 August 2021 (https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/arakan-army-rebels-seek-inclusive-administration-in-rakhine-state/).

[9] The graph here explains in detail Rakhine State vote in the 2015 election: http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/50-Sector_Map_Gov_IFES_St-Rg_Constituency_Bd_Parties_in_Rakhine-State_MIMU1327v04_3Dec15_A3_0.pdf.

[10] It is very rare to see any PDF-linked activities in Arakan, except in the southern part of the state.

[11] Kyaw Lynn, “The Nature of Parallel Governance and Its Impacts on Arakan Politics”, Transnational Institute, 24 Feb 2022 (https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-nature-of-parallel-governance-and-its-impact-on-arakan-politics).

[12] The NLD-government appeared to have very limited access to information on military matters, which were of course under Tatmadaw control. Examples were the latter force’s atrocities against Rohingya in 2017 and its attacks on the AA. The NLD’s leadership thus operated with a somewhat flawed understanding of the situation on the ground in Rakhine State. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself was unable to visit the state until several weeks after the Rohingya exodus unfolded in 2017; see https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/world/asia/myanmar-suu-kyi-rohingya.html.

[13] According to Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, an additional 12 seats are reserved for unelected military members of the state legislature.

[14] Moe Myint, “ANP Stages Walkout Over NLD Chief Minister for Arakan State”, The Irrawaddy, 28 March 2016 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/anp-stages-walkout-nld-chief-minister-arakan-state.html).

[15] The appointment of chief ministers of states and regions is the prerogative of the central government, under Article 261 of the 2008 Constitution, which states that the Union President has the right to appoint individuals to those posts regardless of the electoral outcome at the state or regional level.

[16] Myat Thura et al, “Myanmar Govt Declares Arakan Army a Terrorist Group”, Myanmar Times, 23 March 2020 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-govt-declares-arakan-army-terrorist-group.html).

[17] Nyein Nyein, “In Western Myanmar, State Counselor’s Praise for Tatmadaw Causes Unease”, The Irrawaddy, 23 April 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/western-myanmar-state-counselors-praise-tatmadaw-causes-unease.html).

[18] Author’s interviews with an Arakan activist, 5 May 2022.

[19] Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Myanmar Military Ready to Work with Arakan Army on Rakhine Voting”, The Irrawaddy, 16 November 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmar-military-ready-work-arakan-army-rakhine-voting.html). In the immediate aftermath of the 2020 elections, the AA proposed to hold elections in the constituencies in question by the end of 2021, and the Tatmadaw agreed to this proposal; the coup three months later rendered this plan irrelevant, of course.

[20] Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Anger Over International Experts Appointed to Rakhine Commission”, Myanmar Times, 29 August 2016 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/22187-anger-over-international-experts-appointed-to-rakhine-commission.html).

[21] While meetings between the AA and the NUG have been taking place at the time of writing, their results are not tangible. A breakthrough will require more effort from both sides than is likely, as will substantive negotiations.

[22] The Irrawaddy, “AA Chief Doesn’t Want Myanmar’s Strikes and Protests in Rakhine State”, 12 April 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/aa-chief-not-want-myanmars-strikes-protests-rakhine-state.html).

[23] BBC Burmese, “ရက္ခိုင်တပ်တော် အေအေဆီမှာ စစ်သင်တန်းတပ်ရောက်ပြီ ကျောင်းသားလက်ရုံးတပ်တော် SAF ကိုဖွဲ့စည်း” [Upon military training under AA, Student Armed Force (SAF) established], 12 April 2022 (https://m.facebook.com/watch/?v=736105574479862&_rdr).

[24] At the time of writing, the AA had decided not to attend the junta’s peace talks to be held soon.

[25] See more details at “Why the Arakan Army Attended Myanmar Junta Union Day Event”, The Irrawaddy, 15 February 2022 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/why-the-arakan-army-attended-myanmar-juntas-union-day-event.html).

[26] The initial agreement on investment in the port project was estimated to be for US$7 billion, but during the term of NLD government term the investment was reduced to US$1.3 billion, mainly due to fear of a debt trap. For details, see Thompson Chau, “China-led Port Project Inches Ahead in Myanmar”, Asia Times, 15 July 2019 (https://asiatimes.com/2019/07/china-led-port-project-inches-ahead-in-myanmar/).

[27] This is based on the author’s observation at the time and on the fact that no visible attacks on “Chinese interests” were reported in any media at that time.

[28] Reuters, “China, Russia Block U.N Council Concern about Myanmar Violence”, 18 March 2017 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un-idUSKBN16O2J6).

[29] Amanda Batterslay, “Myanmar Junta Concern Over Possible China Incursion”, Upstream Media, 11 March 2022 (https://www.upstreamonline.com/politics/myanmar-junta-concern-over-possible-china-incursion/2-1-1180616).

[30] See for example Arakan Oil Watch, “Fanning the Flames: expansion of foreign oil and gas investments despite Burma’s military coup”, November 2021.

[31] Abhisek Bhalla, “India Must Enhance Connectivity in North-East to counter China’s Influence: Army Chief Gen Naravane”, India Today, 12 February 2021 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-must-enhance-connectivity-in-north-east-to-counter-china-s-influence-army-chief-gen-naravane-1768760-2021-02-12).

[32] India Today, “Kolkata to Mizoram: Kaladan Project Likely to be Completed by 2023”, 23 March 2021 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/video/kolkata-to-mizoram-kaladan-project-likely-to-be-completed-by-2023-1782655-2021-03-23).

[33]Abhisek Bhalla, “Indian Worker part of Kalandan Project dies in custody of Myanmar Insurgent group”, India Today, 5 November 2019 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-worker-part-of-kaladan-project-dies-in-custody-of-myanmar-insurgent-group-1615819-2019-11-05).

[34] Abhisek Bhalla, “China-backed Arakan Army, military coup in Myanmar not a hurdle for Strategic Kaladan Project”, India Today, 23 March 2021 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-backed-arakan-army-military-coup-in-myanmar-not-a-hurdle-for-strategic-kaladan-project-1782777-2021-03-23).

[35] See details of the AA chief’s January 2022 comments on the relationship with Bangladesh at https://www.dhakatribune.com/south-asia/2022/01/19/arakan-army-keen-for-stronger-ties-with-bangladesh.

[36] It is believed to amount to more than one million people, representing a third of the total population in Rakhine State: see https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2016/04/myanmars-democratic-deficit-demography-rohingya-dilemma/.

[37] There has been deep mistrust between the two communities. The 2012 intercommunal violence will shadow the ‘unified’ efforts attempted on both sides. For details on the violence, see https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18395788.

[38] Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Rakhine Parties Discuss Possible Merger”, Myanmar Times, 20 September 2012 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/1647-rakhine-parties-discuss-possible-merger.html).

[39] Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Elections or War? The Dilemma Facing Rakhine State”, ISEAS Perspective, 14 October 2020 (/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_116.pdf).

[40] Khun Bedu, “Earning Credentials: A Karenni Perspective on the future of Burma/Myanmar”, Transnational Institute, 17 August 201 (https://www.tni.org/en/article/earning-credentials-a-karenni-perspective-on-the-future-of-burmamyanmar).

[41] According to local monitoring group, Arakan Oil Watch (AOW), Naypyitaw earns more US$ 3 billion dollars annually from the export of natural gas to Thailand and China from four offshore projects: Yadana, Yetagun, Shwe and Zawika. For details, see https://www.oilwatcharakan.org/fuelling-conflict-investment-exacerbating-turmoil-in-western-burma/.

[42] India continues to implement this as part of its strategic interests; see https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/sittwe-deep-water-port-built-by-india-in-myanmar-to-be-operational-soon-to-benefit-landlocked-mizoram.

[43] Author’s interview with an Arakan resident studying Rakhine politics, 28 April 2022.

[44] For more details on the impact of the 2021 coup on migration, see the author’s recent “Migration in Post-Coup Myanmar: A Critical Determinant in Shaping the Country’s Future?” (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-37-migration-in-post-coup-myanmar-a-critical-determinant-in-shaping-the-countrys-future-by-aung-tun/).

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