“Malaysia’s Responses to Issues Pertaining to Palestine” by Mohd Faizal Musa
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Malaysia’s support for Palestinian independence has always been based on religion. Historically, Malaysia has had warm relations with Palestinian leaders including the Palestine Liberation Organization—during Hussein Onn’s and Mahathir Mohamad’s administrations—and Hamas since Najib Razak’s administration.
• However, Malaysia’s support is not just based on their affinity to Palestinians as fellow Muslims but is also a matter of domestic politics. Support for Palestine has been used as a political tool for various quarters to prove that they are more Islamic than the other.
• Malaysia is now led by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a former student leader who rose to prominence in the 1970s for his activism on issues regarding the Muslim ummah, including Palestinian independence. Over the years, Anwar has demonstrated consistency in his support for Palestinians, and this has especially been the case since the outbreak of Israeli aggression against Gaza which began on 7 October 2023.
• As a result, Malaysia has gained global prominence for its aggressive stand against Israel. Thus, this paper discusses the Malaysian government’s responses to issues pertaining to Palestine over the years. In doing so, it illustrates that while Islam has been a crucial rallying point in supporting the rights and independence of the Palestinians, it is also arguable that Malaysia’s foreign policy outlook is also influenced by domestic politics and the need for the government of the day to maintain its support from the Muslim voter base.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/13, April 2024
2024/32 “Assessing Prabowo-Gibran’s Victory: An Exit-Poll Aftermath Analysis of the 2024 Presidential Election” by Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Kennedy Muslim
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Prabowo-Gibran’s landslide victory in the 2024 presidential election can be explained by two major factors: Jokowi’s high approval rating, and support from young voters (Gen Z and millennials).
- Ganjar Pranowo’s failure to develop a political brand and a narrative outside the influence of Jokowi, together with his chosen strategy of attacking Jokowi, led to election defeat. This left him with little appeal outside his own PDIP base.
- In turn, Anies Baswedan’s strategy of offering change appealed to anti-Jokowi voters. But given Jokowi’s high approval rating, this did not boost support for him to any significant extent.
- The social assistance (Bansos) programme indirectly boosted support for Prabowo-Gibran by way of maintaining Jokowi’s high approval due to the fact that the recipients of Bansos were generally spread across the camps of all the three candidates.
* Burhanuddin Muhtadi is Visiting Fellow of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor of Politics at the State Islamic University, Jakarta; and Kennedy Muslim is Senior Researcher at Indikator Politik Indonesia.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/32, 6 May 2024
INTRODUCTION
After a long and widely criticized vote recapitulation process, the General Election Commission (KPU) finally announced the results of the 2024 presidential and legislative elections on March 20, 2024. Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka were declared the winner with a landslide margin of 58.6%, beating rivals Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar at 24.9% and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD at 16.5%.[1]
The KPU’s final vote tally surpassed the predictions of several leading Indonesian pollsters which had estimated Prabowo-Gibran’s victory in the range of 52-54%. How could someone with a track record of human rights violations, who had repeatedly lost elections, suddenly manage to defeat two strong rivals by such a large victory margin? Using exit poll data, this article investigates the factors that contributed to the overwhelming triumph of Prabowo-Gibran.
Survey trends ahead of the election had indicated a landslide victory for Prabowo.[2] Once Prabowo had picked Gibran as his vice-presidential candidate, his electability had continued to rise. Jokowi’s high approval rating throughout the election cycle favoured the candidates who promised to continue Jokowi’s programmes. Picking Gibran as running mate was a clear political cue from Prabowo to voters that he was the only candidate running in “Jokowi’s lane,” which he previously had had to share with Ganjar. From then on, support for Prabowo was accompanied by a sharp decline in Ganjar’s poll numbers. This trend continued until election day, February 14, 2024. Ganjar voters had migrated to Prabowo.
At the same time, Anies’ electability trend tended to stagnate. Even though he overtook Ganjar in mid-December 2023, Anies failed to increase support in Prabowo’s traditional electoral base, except in Aceh and West Sumatra. He also failed to attract Jokowi voters in Central Java, East Java and in the non-Muslim bases.
Prabowo also benefited from the presence of so-called ‘shy voters’. Almost all ‘shy voters’ who did not reveal their choice at the time of the survey gave their votes to Prabowo. One reason could be as predicted in the spiral of silence theory,[3] which asserts that when individuals notice that their opinion is shared by their like-minded community, for example, in social media like Twitter, they will in time become more confident and outward with their opinion. However, if the individual notices that his opinion is unpopular in the group, he will be more reserved (shy to reveal their opinion). People who backed Prabowo, especially middle-class people who knew Prabowo’s background and who were active on social media, especially Twitter, tended to hide their preferences before the election.
EXIT POLL ANALYSIS OF THE CANDIDATES
An exit poll conducted by Indikator Politik, a leading pollster, covering 2,975 respondents after they cast their votes across the country[4] helps us understand the demographic base of supporters of the three presidential candidates. In terms of gender, there is no significant difference between male and female voters who supported the three candidates. In terms of age, the younger voter group displayed greater support for Prabowo. On the other hand, the older voter group showed higher support for Ganjar. In contrast to previous trends where the participation of young voters tended to be lower than the national average, the findings of the Indikator exit poll showed that Generation Z and millennial voters’ participation rates were very high. This explains Prabowo’s convincing majority in the 2024 presidential election.
The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) recorded the proportion of Indonesian Zillennial (Gen-Z and millennial) voters at 53% whereas the exit poll recorded the turnout rate of the Zillennial voters at 58.7%.
Graph 1: Candidate support based on demographic variable (%)
In contrast to the widely held assumption that Gen Z voters tend to be progressive, recent studies show a tendency for them to be more conservative than expected in their political preference.[5] In this regard, Indonesian young voters seem to follow the global trend. Indonesia’s young generation, raised in an environment where democratic elections and the safeguarding of civil liberties are considered ‘normal’, may be taking for granted their democratic rights and are exhibiting reduced sensitivity towards the potential risks associated with anti-democratic and illiberal state policies.[6] Moreover, Prabowo’s smart campaign strategy, recasting him as a cute, cuddly—gemoy in Indonesian—grandpa and his signature gemoy dance, also connected well with the young.
Based on ethnic background, support for Prabowo was dominant in almost all ethnic groups, except for Minang voters, who tended to vote for Anies. Interestingly, Prabowo received huge support from both Muslims and non-Muslims. Meanwhile, Ganjar relied too much on non-Muslim voters, and was weak among Muslim voters. In contrast, Anies depended too much on Muslim voters and was very weak among non-Muslims.
Interestingly, the magnitude of support among NU members for Prabowo was much higher than among members of Muhammadiyah or other mass organizations. Prabowo’s prominence within NU circles is interesting because neither Prabowo nor Gibran has NU background. This was different from the cases of Muhaimin Iskandar and Mahfud MD who are closely associated with NU. Studies show that the mobilization of support by NU leaders, or Pengurus Besar Nadhlatul Ulama (PBNU)[7] and popular NU-affiliated figures such as the Governor of East Java Khofifah Indar Parawangsa, boosted NU support for Prabowo. Again, the Jokowi factor was at play here. Jokowi’s popularity and traditional support base at NU’s grassroots level and his patronage relationship with current NU Chairman, Gus Yahya, strongly influenced NU members to support Prabowo.
Regarding social class categories, Prabowo dominated all lower-, middle-, or upper-class segments based on education level or monthly income level. The assumption that Prabowo was only supported by lower educated groups, while Anies was supported by educated circles, proved to be incorrect. Overall, Prabowo supporters from educated circles were much more than those favouring Anies. This finding confirms that many from the educated middle class were not worried about Prabowo’s human rights record or the ethical controversies surrounding Gibran’s nomination process in the Constitutional Court. They were not especially concerned about dynastic politics either. The issue of political dynasty and democratic regression were voiced by intellectuals and civil society activists. Yet, these only resonated in a limited circle, even among the educated.
THE JOKOWI EFFECT AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
The 2024 Presidential campaign narrative was overshadowed by the electoral referendum on Jokowi’s approval rating. The dominant campaign theme revolved around two messages, namely, continuity of and change in Jokowi’s programmes. In mid-2022, almost two years before election day, Ganjar was the frontrunner in the presidential race, ahead of Prabowo and Anies. He was widely seen as Jokowi’s natural successor, given the President’s endorsement in public at the time. Along the way, voters eventually split between those satisfied with Jokowi’s rule and wanted continuity of his programmes, represented by Ganjar and Prabowo, and those dissatisfied with Jokowi’s rule, who gravitated toward a new oppositional camp symbolized by Anies. The opposition camp always faced a daunting challenge in enlarging their electoral base. This was due to the high popularity of Jokowi, who had approval ratings consistently above 75%.
Once Jokowi shifted his endorsement to Prabowo after his eldest son was chosen to be the latter’s running mate, Jokowi supporters shifted dramatically to support Prabowo. This situation suddenly left Ganjar and PDIP in a dilemma. They started attacking Jokowi for political betrayal and for intervening in the electoral process and sidelining democratic and ethical principles. Yet, their strategy was counterproductive. Ganjar’s poll number started to collapse as voters observed a growing rift between Jokowi and PDI-P. They then started to follow the electoral cue from Jokowi to support Prabowo; who had now suddenly become the sole candidate promising continuity of Jokowi’s programmes.
Graph 2: President Jokowi’s Approval Trend
Graph 3: Three-way Candidate Poll Trend
The strong reaction from Ganjar and PDIP against Jokowi also highlighted their failure to develop a political persona and narrative unique and apart from Jokowi. Without Jokowi’s brand, Ganjar’s poll numbers crumbled as he was left without a clear campaign message or identity. In contrast, Jokowi and Prabowo had their own political identity and electoral support base. The latter had developed over the past two elections to transcend each their own political party, PDIP and Gerindra respectively. Ganjar failed to develop an independent political persona which could appeal to voters outside his own party base. Even Anies had managed to develop a clear political persona as a smart and religious figure, not to mention his reputation as the icon of opposition to Jokowi’s regime.
With more than 200 million voters spread across the archipelago, reaching those voters directly presented a daunting challenge for any candidate in any election. Each presidential candidate therefore had to have a public identity that stood out without the need for him to visit all constituencies physically. Prabowo positioned himself as Jokowi’s successor at a time when eight out of ten voters approved of Jokowi. Prabowo and Gibran were less active compared to Anies and Ganjar when campaigning. Instead, they spent more time as Minister of Defense and Mayor of Solo than campaign. This lack of footwork was more than compensated for by a solid coalition strategy and an effective social media campaign. Using TikTok, Prabowo’s campaign team managed to reach and win over many young voters. One of the turning points in Prabowo’s social media campaign came after one of the presidential debates, which showed Anies and Ganjar jointly attacking Prabowo’s track record. Prabowo’s poor performance during the debate was then effectively reframed by his social media campaign team to create a perception of nasty bullying by his opponents. This then garnered widespread sympathy among voters who watched the debate clip on social media.[8] An outpouring of support could be seen in the millions of new followers which Prabowo gained on his personal social media accounts, such as Instagram and Tiktok. This shows that political campaigns are not always about appealing to rational voters; affective means are often very effective.
During the campaign period, Anies’ and Ganjar’s camps criticized Jokowi for initiating massive government social assistance or bansos programmes such as direct cash assistance (BLT) to influence the electorates.[9] To verify this, we asked respondents and their families if they had ever received government assistance (basic food assistance, cash social assistance (BST), direct business assistance (BLU), family hope programmes (PKH), and so on). Graph 3 shows that 45.6% of respondents reported that they had received social assistance, while 51.7% said ‘no’. For those who said ‘yes’, we asked if they continued getting help on a regular basis. On this question, 53.7% said ‘yes’, while 43.9% said ‘no’. Nonetheless, the exit poll results showed that the effect of social assistance was not directly visible since the recipients were spread quite evenly among the three candidate’s supporters (Graph 4).
Graph 4: Whether respondents have ever received bansos? (%)
Graph 5: The electoral effect of bansos (%)
This was also true for the ten kilogrammes of rice assistance programme.[10] 66% of respondents said that they were aware of the programme. Of those who knew, 45% admitted to receiving it. However, there was no significant difference between those who received and those who did not receive the assistance in terms of their choice of candidate (Graph 5). Kompas exit poll results also revealed similar findings, in which social assistance programmes did not significantly increase Prabowo’s electability.[11] Meanwhile, Prabowo’s electability was higher among those who did receive direct cash assistance (BLT)[12] compared to those who did not receive it (Graphs 6a and 6b). Overall, the majority of voters who did not receive BLT assistance still voted for Prabowo.
Graph 6a: The electoral impact of 10-KG rice assistance (%)
Graph 6b: The electoral impact of Direct Cash Assistance (BLT)
This does not mean that social assistance had no electoral impact at all. Graph 7 shows that the social assistance programs had direct effect in maintaining and even increasing Jokowi’s popularity as well as his approval rating. We found a significant positive correlation between bansos, 10kg rice assistance and 3-month lump sum cash transfer (or BLT) and Jokowi’s approval rating. Similar significant positive correlations were also found between Jokowi’s approval rating and people’s support for Prabowo. Apparently, the effect of bansos for Prabowo’s electability poll happened indirectly, by way of Jokowi’s high approval rating. But it did happen.
Graph 7: President approval based on the recipients of bansos, 10KG rice, and BLT
CONCLUSION
From the beginning of the election cycle, the 2024 presidential election zeitgeist and narrative were set by Jokowi, who was seen as the most influential political actor on the Indonesian electoral scene. His constantly high approval rating, above 75%, throughout the election cycle benefited Prabowo-Gibran as the candidate-pair who claimed a continuity of Jokowi’s programmes and legacy. Another major factor contributing to Prabowo’s landslide victory over his two opponents also rested on his own effective electoral strategy in recasting his old strongman image in the last two elections into a more friendly image of a “cuddly grandpa”; this attracted many Gen-Z and millennial voters through social media platforms like TikTok. The exit-poll analysis clearly shows an overwhelming support from young voters, which made up more than half the electorate, towards Prabowo-Gibran. The 2024 election also saw a high young voters turnout, unlike in previous elections. This young voters turnout and their support for Prabowo-Gibran was evident in the exit-poll.
Despite some incidents of electoral irregularities, various exit-poll analyses show that Prabowo’s commanding lead and one-round victory were simply too convincing for any electoral fraud allegation. Controversies surrounding the mobilization of the state apparatus and the utilization of bansos to overturn the landslide election result are difficult to prove due to weak evidence. The most dominant factor in explaining Prabowo’s victory lies in Jokowi’s high approval rating. In this sense, we could argue that the 2024 presidential election was a “referendum” on whether Jokowi’s legacy should be continued or not.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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“Why Young Malay Voters in Malaysia Are “Turning Green”” By Syaza Shukri
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• There is an increasing trend among young Malay voters in Malaysia to support the Perikatan Nasional coalition, with a particular emphasis on the Islamist party PAS.
• Despite recognition of the weak economy as a significant national concern, young Malay voters continue to place a higher emphasis on Muslim leaders who assert their commitment to safeguarding the rights of Islam in Malaysia.
• Consistent with theories on political socialization, the influence of family members significantly affects young Malay voters in Malaysia, particularly due to their limited political awareness of alternative channels like formal schooling.
• Young Malay voters acknowledge the significant impact of social media and TikTok, particularly in how these shape the voting patterns of their peers. They nevertheless maintain a perception of their own impartiality in this regard.
• Interestingly, the influence of Islamic institutions, with their own educational philosophy, on the political behaviour of Malay youth is minimal, as their political ideas are already shaped by their early experiences.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/12, April 2024
2024/31 “Islamist Figures and Their Limited Role in Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election” by A’an Suryana
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- This article discusses the role of Indonesian Islamists in the 2024 Presidential Election. Their role merits discussion because they have been impactful during various episodes of Indonesia’s political history.
- This article argues that unlike previous elections, the Islamists did not play a significant role in the run-up to the 2024 Presidential Election.
- Their dwindling social and political influence can be attributed to state repression under President Joko Widodo’s regime and the shifting of political alliances among nationalists and religious elites.
- However, under the upcoming Prabowo Subianto government, which begins its term in October 2024, the Islamists are expected to have greater room to manoeuvre.
- Under Prabowo’s regime, they are expected to be under less social and political pressure, judging from Prabowo’s history of working together with Islamists.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/31, 29 April 2024
*A’an Suryana is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and is a lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia.
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the role of Indonesian Islamists in the 2024 Presidential Election. Although Islamists are generally peripheral players in Indonesian politics, they have had significant influence on Indonesia’s social and political conditions, due to their religious legitimacy and their skills in mobilising the masses.
A case in point was their role in the anti-Ahok protests in the run-up to the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017. Despite being small in numbers, the Islamists rallied as the 212 Aksi Bela Islam Movement (Defending Islam Movement) and managed to mobilise Muslims from various backgrounds to stage a series of protests against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), former governor of Jakarta whom they accused of committing blasphemy against Islam. The protests, one of which was the biggest in Indonesian history, successfully prevented Ahok, who held a double minority status, a Christian and a Chinese Indonesian, from winning the election. At the same time, the protests also brought Habib Rizieq, the leader of the Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI) and a long-time fringe player in Indonesian politics, to the apex of his social and political status. The Islamists also played a significant role in instigating anti-Ahmadiyah and anti-Shia protests nationwide; these were rampant during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014).
“Islamists” in this article loosely refers to Islamic activists who operate outside the formal political structure. In other words, they do not occupy positions as leaders of political parties, councillors, legislators or state actors. Instead, they promote their ideas and interests through street protests and religious events. A substantial number of Islamists are leaders and members of FPI, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Salafi movement.[1] According to scholar Greg Fealy, they aspire “to make Islamic law and values a central part of public life and the structure of the state.”[2] Unlike moderate Muslims, Islamists tend to support the establishment of Sharia law and reject the appointment of non-Muslim leaders in strategic leadership positions such as governorship or presidency (and vice-presidency). However, Islamists do not support acts of terror and, therefore, are distinct from extremist Muslims.
It is important to note that Indonesian Muslims are diverse in orientation. For the purpose of this research, the definition of Islamist used in this article excludes moderate Muslims of the modernist and traditionalist type (people who follow religious beliefs and practices of Muhammadiyah and Nadhlatul Ulama, respectively) as well as religious figures and organisations that support terrorism such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah or other supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS).
Recent academic literature discusses Islamists resorting to populism or riding on blasphemy issues to gain religious legitimacy. Some scholars have argued that populism among Islamists arose due to deepening religious conservatism,[3] while others contend that this is instead due to experiences of social injustice.[4] Islamists have also used blasphemy to attain their objectives.[5]
This article seeks to expand the existing scholarship on the role of Islamists in Indonesian politics. This article will also discuss the future of Islamists in the post-Joko Widodo era as his term ends in October 2024. It argues that the Islamists’ loss in significance in the 2024 Presidential Election was mainly due to their social and political influence being weakened by state repression under Joko Widodo, and to shifts in political alliances among nationalists and religious elites.
REPRESSION OF ISLAMISTS UNDER JOKO WIDODO
The protests against Ahok in 2017 sharply increased Islamists’ political influence. The effective framing of the blasphemy case saw the National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council’s Fatwa (GNPF-MUI) successfully mobilising thousands of Muslims to participate in the series of protests.
While the protests targeted Ahok, the ultimate aim of the Islamists was to undermine Joko Widodo’s popularity and power going into the 2019 Presidential Election.[6] Following the successful anti-Ahok protests, the Islamists formed the Persaudaraan Alumni 212 (the 212 Brotherhood Alumni) to sustain the momentum of the Aksi Bela Islam movement and uphold public support for them.
However, the political influence of the Islamists weakened when Joko Widodo began consolidating his power by controlling security apparatuses, building stronger ties with civil society, and expanding a coalition of parties to control seats in the parliament. Joko Widodo granted strategic security positions to at least two individuals with whom he had established relationships during his tenure as mayor of Solo between 2005 and 2012. Hadi Tjahjanto, the man Joko Widodo installed as the chief of the Indonesian military on 8 December 2017, was a military airport commander in Solo between 2010 and 2011, while Listyo Sigit Prabowo, chief of the Solo police between 2010 and 2012, was appointed as national chief of police on 27 January 2021.
Joko Widodo also obtained support from civil society by building partnerships with Nadhlatul Ulama, for example, by appointing Ma’ruf Amin, a senior NU cleric, as his vice-presidential candidate. Nadhlatul Ulama is Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation whose moderate ideology stands in contrast to that of the Islamists. Good ties with NU is strategic as a vote-getter and the move proved hugely successful in the 2019 Presidential Election. Partnership with NU provided the government with an effective counterbalance to the power of the Islamists.
Joko Widodo also successfully expanded a coalition of political parties to have a firmer grip on the House of Representatives. At the beginning of his administration in 2014, he controlled 207 seats out of the total 560 seats in the parliament.[7] In 2022, he added more parties to the pro-government coalition, increasing the number of seats under his control to 471 seats – equivalent to 81.9 percent of the total seats.[8] He consolidated his power through a carrot-and-stick approach. On one hand, he offered governmental positions, including ministerial positions, to parties in exchange for their support.[9] On the other hand, he ensured that none of these positions were offered to opposition parties, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).
As Joko Widodo’s power base grew, the Islamists faced contrasting fates including legal prosecution. Their frontman, Habib Rizieq Shihab, was jailed for spreading fake news while another prominent figure during the 212 protest, Mohammad Al Khaththath, was arrested on treason charges. In addition, seven FPI executives were arrested on various charges including terrorism. Islamist organisations also became a target of state repression. HTI was banned in 2018, followed by FPI two years later. The criminalisation and the banning of these organisations weakened the Islamists, and explains their limited influence during the 2024 presidential campaign.
SHIFTING POLITICAL ALLIANCES
Another factor that has weakened the Islamists is the shift in political alliances. In the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, Islamists had rendered their support to Prabowo Subianto. However, Jokowi successfully convinced pro-Prabowo Islamist supporters to switch allegiance to his camp. In 2014, only one Islamic party supported Jokowi, but the number increased to three in the 2019 election: the Nation Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). Some politicians who had been known to support Islamist causes also left Prabowo in favour of Jokowi, including Ali Mochtar Ngabalin, Kapitra Ampera, Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Zainul Majdi.[10] Their departure not only weakened the Islamists, it also made them vulnerable.
A political bombshell was dropped when Prabowo accepted Jokowi’s offer to join his administration and cast aside his Islamist allies while seeking political support from moderate Muslim figures and organisations such as Nadhlatul Ulama.[11] Islamists felt that Prabowo abandoned them, and called him “a traitor.”[12]
Going into the 2024 Presidential Election, support for Islamic parties was fragmented. The Prabowo-Gibran pair obtained support from PBB and the National Mandate Party (PAN), whereas the Anies-Muhaimin and Ganjar-Mahfud pairs received support from PKS and PPP respectively. As a result of the three-way race and the fragmented support from Islamic parties, identity politics became a non-viable weapon. This resulted in little demand among candidates to engage with the Islamists to mobilise the masses.
Initially, none of the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs sought support from the 212 Brotherhood Alumni. Anies-Muhaimin ultimately did, and on 21 November 2023, they signed an integrity pact with 212 on 14 December 2023.
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ISLAMIST POLITICAL BASE
The following paragraphs examine the loss in stature of some prominent Islamist personalities in the face of state repression and shifting political alliances.
Mohammad Al Khaththath,also known as Gatot Saptono, the Secretary General of Forum Umat Islam (FUI),played a prominent role as GNPF MUI’s secretary general during the protests against Ahok. However, after his arrest on 31 March 2017 on treason charges, he remained inactive. He was released in July 2017 at the request of his wife and an influential ulema. Mohammad Al Khaththath only appeared once in public on 10 October 2023 when he normatively called for the public and government to promote a peaceful election.[13]
Islamists who played a more active role, albeit with limited influence, in the 2024 Presidential Election were Habib Rizieq Shihab, Novel Bamukmin, Bachtiar Nasir and Yusuf Muhammad Martak. All, except Bachtiar Nasir, remain active in the 212 Brotherhood Alumni movement.
The controversial firebrand cleric, Habib Rizieq Shihab, was rather muted throughout the election.This founder ofFPI in 1998, who then expanded it into a national-scale organisation, was known for leading his men in street protests for a variety of causes. Rizieq, who is now the chairman of the 212 Brotherhood Alumni’s governing board, is known for his combative and divisive sermons publicised at various religious and community events nationwide. His social and political career has experienced several ups and downs. He was imprisoned for provoking violence in 2008 and for defamation in 2003, but he enjoyed the peak of his Islamic activism career after successfully inspiring and mobilising people for the anti-Ahok protests between 2016 and 2017. His role made him one of the nation’s prominent political players as well as influential ulema. In 2018, a survey found that he was among the five most influential ulema in Indonesia.[14] His political career suffered a setback in 2020 after he was found guilty of spreading fake news and lying about the results of his Covid-19 test. He was released on parole in July 2022 which is to end in June 2024. During the 2024 Presidential Election campaign, he often appeared at religious events both offline and online. He appeared most frequently on the Islamic Brotherhood Television, the official media of the Front Persaudaraan Islam (Islamic Brotherhood Front), the organisation that replaced FPI. Perhaps bound by parole regulations, Habib Rizieq appeared less critical of Joko Widodo’s regime and mostly addressed general topics relating to the presidential election. He eventually expressed his support for Anies-Muhaimin. Unlike in past elections, Habib Rizieq did not organise or participate in any movement to support his preferred candidates.
Novel Bamukmin is the 212 Brotherhood Alumni’s deputy secretary general. He was active at FPI’s Jakarta chapter, but was fired from his position and had his membership revoked in December 2017, for internal insubordination. He joined the 212 Brotherhood Alumni in 2018 where he has since served as one of the executives in the Islamist organisation. He remained outspoken and often created social controversies through comments in the mainstream media. In 2023, he opposed the organising of Coldplay concert in Jakarta, accusing the music group of promoting Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Trans-Sexual (LGBT) interests.[15] He also often participated in street protests that promote the interests of FPI, and later, PA 212. Recently, he made public comments regarding the 212 Brotherhood Alumni’s political position in the 2024 Presidential Election. The organisation eventually supported the candidacy of Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar. However, as explained above, the organisation’s power had weakened to such an extent that the candidate pair took their support reluctantly.
Bachtiar Nasir, a Salafist, is a seasoned activist. He is an educator, ulema and the secretary general of the Council of Indonesian Intellectuals and Young Ulema (MIUMI). He became widely known after assuming the position of chairman and guarantor of GNPF MUI in 2016. He was mainly responsible for formulating the protest agenda, ensuring the protests received sufficient funding and making sure that the protests ran smoothly without major incidents. After stepping down in 2018, Bachtiar faced several charges including treason and money laundering. However, his cases have remained stagnant; the police has neither continued their investigation nor officially closed the matter. In the run-up to the 2024 Presidential Election, he attended some huge events such as Gontor Islamic boarding school alumni’s declaration of support for Anies and Muhaimin, and the biggest outdoor campaign for Anies-Muhaimin in Jakarta International Stadium in North Jakarta on 10 February 2024.[16] However, he did not partake in organising these events, in stark contrast to the central role he played in organising the anti-Ahok protests.
Unlike other Islamists, Yusuf Muhammad Martak, the chairman of the 212 Brotherhood Alumni’s advisory council, is quite new to Islamic activism. He comes from a family of businessmen who have an interest in politics. His uncle, Faradj Martak, donated his house to Soekarno, Indonesia’s independence fighter and the country’s first president.[17] He spent much of his career as a businessman. His social and political career began when he served as MUI’s treasurer in 2015. He later joined the 212 movement and remains active in it. Representing the movement, he demanded that the Indonesia Election Commission cancel Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin’s victory in the 2019 Presidential Election for electoral fraud. In the recent presidential election, he was one of the executives in the campaign team for Anies-Muhaimin.
The above cases show that a majority of the Islamists, except for Yusuf Martak, are ulema who are also capable of mobilising the masses. The Islamists had been able to collaborate militant or conservative causes, as demonstrated in the anti-Ahok and anti-Ahmadiyah protests. Such collaborations had boosted their political power. However, they played a limited role during the 2024 Presidential Election following state repression by the Joko Widodo regime and the shifting political alliances among political actors.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this article has explained that Islamists failed to play a significant role in the 2024 Presidential Election due to repression under President Joko Widodo and the shifting of political alliances. This was further proven by the limited role some Islamist key figures played, such as Rizieq Shihab, Novel Bamukmin, Yusuf Martak and Bachtiar Nasir.
However, under President Prabowo Subianto, the Islamists are anticipated to have more room to manoeuvre. It is expected that they will no longer face stiff social and political pressure from the state given Prabowo’s history of working together with Islamists. It is unlikely that Prabowo will resort to social and political repression. Prabowo is a secular nationalist, and hence, uninterested in Islamic activism. He is nevertheless pragmatic, and working together with the Islamists to further his agenda remains on the table. Despite setbacks under President Joko Widodo, the Islamists will continue to have influence in Indonesian social and political spheres.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“Myanmar’s Resistance and the Future of Border Trade: Challenges and Opportunities” by Jared Bissinger
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Since the start of Operation 1027, Myanmar’s resistance groups have gained control over large parts of key overland trade routes and a number of important border crossings, fundamentally changing the realities in the control of border trade.
• Despite these losses, the State Administration Council (SAC) retains control-of-trade-related institutions that are vital for accessing an international trading system characterized by state-to-state interactions—giving them significant influence over trade even if they do not control trade routes and border crossings.
• International precedents from territories such as Palestine, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that non-state actors face significant challenges engaging in trade, and are vulnerable to frequent changes in trading arrangements. Perhaps the most important factor shaping trade in these territories is the state of their relationship with either the state of which they are nominally a part, or a neighbouring state.
• Thailand allows small-scale trade and limited movement of people through “checkpoints for border trade”, which exist outside the formal system and are unilaterally established by Thailand. These checkpoints represent an alternative opportunity to reshape border trade.
• If Myanmar’s resistance hopes to transform trade from a revenue source to a meaningful strength, their prospects are best if they collaborate and develop a status-neutral plan (e.g., not requiring diplomatic recognition nor denying recognition to the SAC) for trading arrangements with neighbours, and enhance dialogue with them about this plan.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/11, April 2024
2024/30 “The Power of a Vote in Malaysia: Malapportionment Under UNDI18, AVR, and MA63” by Kai Ostwald
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While often overlooked, electoral boundaries can strongly shape political competition and policy priorities. In Malaysia, the long-dominant United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) manipulated boundaries in ways that amplified the power of votes in its stronghold areas. This created significant discrepancies in the number of voters across electoral districts—known as malapportionment—and is strongly associated with distortions to governance and disillusionment with the political process.
- The 2019 UNDI18 constitutional amendment lowered the voting age to 18 and introduced automatic voter registration. This increased the size of the electorate by a remarkable 40% between the 2018 and 2022 general elections. More recently, Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government has pledged to increase the parliamentary seat share of East Malaysia’s Sabah and Sarawak from the current 25% to 35%, despite the states already being significantly over-represented. Both these developments worsen the malapportionment in the country, potentially causing further political distortions.
- Against the backdrop of already high levels of malapportionment, the impact of UNDI18 on malapportionment is more modest than most narratives suggest, though it is responsible for creating a number of problematic mega-districts. By contrast, implementing the proposed seat increase for Sabah and Sarawak would substantially worsen state and district level malapportionment. While this may be justified, given East Malaysia’s unique position in the federation—as well as a newfound political agency—there is little obvious justification for the ongoing discrepancies within Peninsular Malaysia, particularly the under-representation of Selangor.
- A dominant narrative in Malaysia, voiced by numerous political elites in recent months, holds that reducing malapportionment is disadvantageous for ethnic Malays. This however reflects assumptions that are no longer valid following demographic developments and changes to Malaysia’s party system since 2013. To the contrary, in terms of electorate size, there are substantial similarities in the seats won by the Malay-majority Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS) and their arch-rival Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party, while on average the largest seats were won by the Malay-majority Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Amanah.
- In short, there is no empirical basis for the ethnic-focused narrative. Recognizing this would facilitate constructive discussions around addressing malapportionment, particularly in light of the significant political reordering that a seat increase for East Malaysia would produce.
* Kai Ostwald is Associate Senior Fellow with the Malaysian Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is also Director of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia, and Associate Professor in UBC’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/30, 25 April 2024
INTRODUCTION
The size and shape of electoral districts can profoundly impact political outcomes. Malaysia is a case in point: the strategic manipulation of district boundaries over decades played a key role in sustaining the electoral dominance of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and its Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition partners prior to their 2018 defeat. This was achieved primarily through malapportionment—the unequal distribution of voters across electoral districts—which amplified the influence of voters in the BN’s stronghold areas, allowing the coalition to consistently secure parliamentary majorities well above their level of popular support.[1]
While Malaysian politics have evolved dramatically since 2018, manipulated electoral districts continue to shape political representation and competition. Three key questions stand out. First, the UNDI18 constitutional amendment (in 2019) significantly increased the size of the electorate and appears to have exacerbated malapportionment, although to what extent and effect is yet unclear. Second, the BN’s defeat in 2018 decoupled East Malaysia’s party system from the Peninsula’s and catalyzed demands for greater East Malaysian influence in federal politics, including via an increase in parliamentary seats from the current 25% to 35% — which the manifesto of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition pledged to do. If implemented, this move would further increase malapportionment, but it is likewise unclear to what extent. Finally, given the broader fragmentation of the party system, it is uncertain whether previous patterns of who benefits and who is disadvantaged from malapportionment still hold.
This Perspective addresses those questions and reaches several conclusions. Malapportionment, which entails myriad costly distortions to politics and governance, remains high and would increase significantly through the introduction of new East Malaysian seats. While the unique position of East Malaysia may justify that, the extensive malapportionment in Peninsular Malaysia is less defensible. Importantly, constituency-level demographic changes and new coalition compositions mean dominant narratives around who benefits from malapportionment are now outdated and flawed. Updating the underlying assumptions provides an opportunity to address the most problematic boundary distortions.
THE POWER OF A VOTE
Malapportionment arises when there are disparities in the number of voters across electoral districts. The figure below illustrates the effect through two hypothetical districts: District A has one voter, while District B has eight voters. Since each district has one seat in parliament, District A’s voter has significantly more power to shape parliamentary outcomes than does a voter in District B. In short, malapportionment amplifies the influence of voters in districts with relatively few voters, while diluting the influence of voters in districts with relatively many voters. As a result, the preferences of District A’s voter are overrepresented, which contradicts the normatively important “one person, one vote” principle. By creating incentives for political leaders to focus resources and policy decisions on over-represented voters, this dynamic creates extensive political distortions and fosters clientelistic behaviours.[2] On the side of voters, perpetual under-representation is associated with political disengagement.
Malapportionment illustrated
During its decades in power, UMNO systematically reshaped Malaysia’s electoral process in ways that provided it and its coalition partners fundamental advantages (Lim 2002, Ostwald 2017). This included reducing the size of electoral districts in areas where the coalition enjoyed strong support, allowing it to inflate its parliamentary seat share relative to its vote share. The effect of this cannot be overstated: in the 2013 general election, for example, malapportionment allowed the BN to secure a 20% parliamentary seat advantage despite losing the popular vote by 4%. By 2018, decades of manipulating electoral boundaries left Malaysia with unusually high levels of malapportionment by global standards (Ong, Kasuya, and Mori 2017).[3]
The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government that took power in 2018 pledged extensive reforms, including of the electoral process (Ting and Horowitz 2023). Among its successes was the UNDI18 constitutional amendment that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 and introduced Automatic Voter Registration (Weiss 2022). The measures were implemented prior to the 2022 general election, increasing the number of eligible voters by over 40%. A disproportionate number of these new voters were registered to districts that already had a relatively high number of voters, exacerbating the disparity in district sizes. The figure below illustrates this by arranging Malaysia’s 222 electoral districts from smallest to largest (in terms of registered voters) for both the 2018 (dark grey) and 2022 (light grey) elections. Several things are striking. First, the range in district-level electorate size has grown even larger: the largest district (303k) in 2022 had over ten times as many voters as the smallest (28k). Second, the disparities are significant even beyond the extremes: the 75th percentile district (117k) in 2022 is almost twice as large as the 25th percentile (62k). Finally, the largest increases in electorate size appear to be in districts that were already disproportionately large.
UMNO’s defeat in 2018 fundamentally altered the political dynamic between the peninsula and the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Specifically, major East Malaysian parties that once belonged to the BN left the coalition post-election and leveraged their seats to play a stronger role in federal-level politics. Since 2018, this has included more prominent cabinet positions, including the current Deputy Prime Minister from the Sarawak-based PBB. Notably, the manifestos from the three major coalitions contesting the 2022 election all outlined intentions to empower East Malaysia through such things as greater revenue sharing from petroleum exploitation and political empowerment (Lee 2022).
The PH manifesto—from current Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition—went furthest in offering Sabah and Sarawak a 35% parliamentary seat share, a significant increase from the current 25%. This reflects demands from East Malaysian political leaders, who see the increase as integral to fulfilling the original terms of federation under the 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63), as well as critical to ensuring that the peninsula’s domination of politics is kept in check. It is unclear whether, how, and when this rebalance might occur, but there are signs of growing momentum in its favour.[4]
Given the political difficulty of removing seats from peninsular states, the path of least resistance is likely through adding new seats in East Malaysia. Procedurally, this can be done through a two-thirds majority parliamentary vote, which is theoretically attainable given the supermajority that Anwar’s unity government currently holds.
Assuming the number of peninsular seats remains unchanged, East Malaysia would require 33 additional seats to reach the 35% seat target. At present, the seat split between Sabah and Sarawak is 45% and 55% respectively; the electorate split is similar at 46.5% and 53.5% respectively. Assuming the new seats are divided at that proportion, Sabah and Sarawak would receive 15 and 18 new seats respectively. That would bring Sabah’s total to 40 and Sarawak’s to 49 seats. Given that existing seats in Sabah and Sarawak already tend to be smaller than their peninsular counterparts in terms of electorate size, the proposed seat additions would further elevate malapportionment.
There is real and growing urgency to this question, given the complex sequencing challenge that arises due to the redelineation exercise currently in motion for Sarawak and on the horizon for Sabah (in 2025).[5] The key question is how many seats the Electoral Commission is basing the exercise on. If it is the current number, then a resource intensive redelineation exercise would have to be re-conducted following any Parliamentary approval of new seats. If it is an expanded number (for example, the promised increase to 35% of the total), then the exercise assumes Parliamentary approval that has not yet been attained. This has further implications for redelineation of state-level seats, which are likewise highly malapportioned.[6]
THE SIZE AND SCALE OF MALAPPORTIONMENT
Both the UNDI18 increase in electorate size and the proposed MA63-related seat increase impact malapportionment in ways that affect political competition and representation. We now turn attention to systematically measuring the magnitude of those changes, which provides insights into their effects.
The starting point is inter-state malapportionment, in other words, the unequal distribution of seats across Malaysia’s thirteen states and three federal territories. The figure below illustrates this, comparing inter-state malapportionment in the 2018 election (light grey), 2022 election (medium grey), and under the potential MA63 plan that increases East Malaysia’s seat share to 35% (dark grey). The figure shows how many seats above or below a state has relative to its share of the total electorate. For example, in the 2018 election, Terengganu had approximately 5% of Malaysia’s electorate but only 3.6% of seats, making its voters underrepresented in parliament: based on its electorate size, it had 3 seats too few, as indicated by the -3 value. In short, the figure captures how over- or underrepresented states are, relative to the size of their electorate.
Three states stand out. Sabah and Sarawak are already significantly overrepresented in parliament relative to their electorate size: Sabah had approximately 7 seats above what the size of its electorate called for in 2022, while Sarawak had 11 more. Should the MA63 proposal be implemented, that would increase to a surplus of 20 and 26 seats, respectively. To put that into concrete terms, the mean number of voters per district would fall from 67,575 (in 2022) to 42,235 for Sabah, and from 62,680 (in 2022) to 39,655 for Sarawak, relative to 106,040 for peninsular seats. That may be justifiable given their unique position in the federation and the many features that continue to make them distinct. There is little clear justification, however, for Selangor being so vastly underrepresented: it had 14 and 17 seats too few in 2018 and 2022 based on its number of voters; this would climb to a deficit of 22 seats should the MA63 proposal be implemented.[7] That amounts to a mean number of 167,175 voters per district in 2022. In short, the weight of one East Malaysian voter would be approximately four times that of a voter in Selangor.
There is substantial malapportionment of federal seats within the states as well. The figure below captures the number of voters in each district (left columns are from 2018, right columns are from 2022) for each state and federal territory. As is clear, the UNDI18 reforms and natural population growth increased the size of nearly all districts, but the effect—visible both as a general upward shift and the greater dispersion of seats—is more pronounced in some states than others. The growth of problematic mega districts is also evident. In 2018, only two districts—both in Selangor—had more than 150,000 voters. By 2022, twenty-five districts were above that threshold, now including Kedah, Perak, Negri Sembilan, Malacca, Johor, and a majority of Selangor’s districts.[8]
An international comparison helps contextualize the scale of malapportionment in Malaysia. The primary measure for malapportionment is the percentage of seats that need to be shifted from over-represented districts (with relatively small numbers of voters) to under-represented districts (with relatively large numbers of voters) in order to achieve an equal apportionment of voters across districts (Samuels and Snyder 2001). In short, higher values denote greater malapportionment. The figure below compares malapportionment in several high-income democracies—which Malaysia seeks to join—and regional counterparts to Malaysia in 2018, 2022, and under the MA63 35% proposal.[9]
As anticipated, the UNDI18 reforms did increase malapportionment between 2018 and 2022, but against the backdrop of already very pronounced levels, this increase is modest in scale. Implementing the MA63 proposal without addressing existing malapportionment would have a far more substantial effect. Regardless, the primary conclusion is that under all three conditions, malapportionment in Malaysia is considerably higher than in counterparts, with the exception of Myanmar (which based its electoral districts primarily on colonial-era administrative boundaries). This is significant, given the evidence from around the world that malapportionment has pernicious effects on a range of important matters including governance, economic development, conflict, and voter motivations.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Malapportionment in Malaysia is fundamentally a political issue. The founding 1957 Constitution called for constituencies to contain a nearly equal number of voters, with some deviation—limited to no more than 15%—to account for differences in population density, means of communication, and community composition. That limit was relaxed in 1962 and repealed entirely in 1973, paving the way for the current significant disparities. Indeed, each redelineation before 2016 saw the addition of new seats, typically allocated disproportionately to areas under the BN’s control (Chacko 2019).
This pattern of redelineation contributed to the BN’s dominance and supported a (generally unspoken) view that malapportionment provides additional assurance of Malay-Muslim political dominance. Consequently, reforms that mitigate malapportionment are sometimes cast as ploys to empower ethnic Chinese, particularly the DAP. For example, in mid-2019, UMNO’s president Zahid Hamidi suggested the DAP’s interests in redelineation were driven by a desire to gain more seats, which would be unfavourable to Malays.[10] More recently, former Selangor UMNO chief Noh Omar warned while campaigning for the PN that redelineation would be favourable to the DAP, would reduce the number of Malay-majority seats, and might even lead to a DAP prime minister.[11]
The narrative that the DAP would be the sole beneficiary of more equal apportionment is not reflected in more systematic analyses. That is because today’s malapportionment reflects not current party strengths and alignments, but rather party strengths and alignments at the time of previous redelineations, which were conducted under BN domination. The main implication is that parties that were historically associated with the BN tended to win smaller seats in 2022, while parties historically opposed to the BN tended to win larger seats. Given the comprehensive fragmentation of Malaysia’s party system relative to the era of BN dominance, that no longer cleanly aligns with current coalition structures.
The figure below shows the electorate size of districts won by major parties (or coalitions in East Malaysia) in 2022. The middle line of each box indicates the median district, while the upper and lower bounds of the box indicate the 25th and 75th quartiles, and the dots indicate outliers. For example, the median district won by UMNO had approximately 68k voters (54k and 79k respectively for the 25th and 75th percentiles), while its largest seat has 133k voters.
The distribution is striking. On the peninsula, small seats were won primarily by UMNO and Bersatu, despite them being bitter rivals in 2022 campaigning. This reflects Bersatu’s status as essentially an UMNO-clone party, at least initially comprised primarily of former UMNO elites with existing ties in over-represented areas. By contrast, PAS’s median district had 106k voters (83k and 116k at 25th/75th percentiles), significantly larger than their bumiputera rivals and reflective of their historical position as an opposition party. In fact, excluding a small number of outlier mega districts, PAS and DAP districts are quite similar in terms of size, especially in comparison to the smaller UMNO, Bersatu, or East Malaysian districts. On the high end of the distribution are PKR and Amanah districts, both of which are not only historically oppositional to the BN, but also primarily Malay-oriented. This underscores a related key point: (typically large) urban districts are now often more diverse—and more Malay—than in earlier decades, further undermining the narrative that malapportionment is primarily an ethnic issue. In fact, when controlling for party and geographic factors, an OLS regression analysis finds no evidence for an independent effect of ethnic composition on district size.[12]
Two overarching conclusions emerge from this brief study. Malapportionment in Malaysia, which was already high from a comparative perspective, increased modestly through the 2019 UNDI18 constitutional amendment and would grow significantly greater if a proposed seat increase for East Malaysia is implemented. Given the many pernicious distortions associated with malapportionment, this is a concern for issues ranging from governance to development and political polarization. Even if the unique relationship between West and East Malaysia justifies the aforementioned increase, there is no clear justification for the considerable inter- and intra-state malapportionment on the peninsula. That leads to the second conclusion: given the fragmentation of Malaysia’s party system, the simple race-based narratives around malapportionment and redistricting are no longer empirically substantiated. On the contrary, a Malay-Muslim party such as PAS has potentially as much to gain from reducing malapportionment as does its Chinese-majority rival DAP. Given that the obstacles to reducing malapportionment are ultimately political rather than technical, updating assumptions about the potential effects of reform could generate the cross-party support to see it through.
REFERENCES
Bhavnani, Rikhil. 2021. “The effects of malapportionment on economic development”. PLoS ONE, 16(12): e0259150.
Chacko, Danesh Prakash. 2019. “Winning Elections by Rigging Borders? Barisan Nasional’s Brazen, and Failed, Attempt”. In Hutchinson and Lee (eds), The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge? Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
Chai, James. 2022. “Bigger Constituencies, Lesser Political Clout”. ISEAS Fulcrum, no. 175.
Daxecker, Ursula. 2020. “Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India”. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1): 156-170.
Lee Hwok Aun. 2022. “Malaysia’s GE-15 Manifestos: Wading Through a Flood of Offerings”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 113.
Lee Hwok Aun. 2023. “Will UMNO’s Mutant Electoral Map Bite Pakatan Harapan?” ISEAS Fulcrum, no. 177.
Lim Hong Hai. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Malaysia: ‘Managing’ Elections in a Plural Society”. In Croissant, Bruns and John (eds), Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Ong Kian Ming, Yuko Kasuya, and Kora Mori. 2017. “Malapportionment and Democracy: A Curvilinear Relationship”. Electoral Studies, 49: 118-127.
Ostwald, Kai. 2017. “Malaysia’s Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule”. ISEAS Trends, no. 19.
Ostwald, Kai. 2023. “The Politics of Malapportionment and Electoral Reform in a Dominant-Party Regime”. In Ting and Horowitz (eds) Electoral Reform and Democracy in Malaysia, Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
Ostwald, Kai, and Constant Courtin. 2020. “Malapportionment in Myanmar’s Elections: A Slumbering Menace”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 42(2): 145-173.
Samuels, David, and Richard Snyder. 2001. “The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective”. British Journal of Political Science, 31(4): 651-671.
Tindak Malaysia. 2023. “Persempadanan untuk Sarawak”, available at: https://www.tindakmalaysia.org/persempadanan/sarawak_redelineation
Ting, Helen, and Donald Horowitz (eds). 2023. Electoral Reform and Democracy in Malaysia, NIAS Press.
Washida, Hidekuni. 2019. Distributive Politics in Malaysia: Maintaining Authoritarian Party Dominance. Routledge.
Weiss, Meredith. 2022. “Can Youth Save Malaysia’s Democracy?” RSIS Working Paper, no. 337.
Wong Chin Huat. 2018. “Constituency Delimitation and Electoral Authoritarianism in Malaysia”. The Round Table, 107(1): 67-80.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735. Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/29 “Indonesian Mainstream Media in the Digital Age: Corporate Convergence, Low-quality News and Staff Exploitation” by Sofie Syarief
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- News as a business, especially in its most traditional press and broadcast models, is suffering from shrinking readership and viewership, and thus becoming less profitable. The digital revolution has ushered significant changes into Indonesia’s mainstream media landscape.
- In response to the rise of digital media, mainstream outlets have implemented various strategies to remain relevant and competitive. Corporate mergers in the already highly oligopolistic media industry have created a less hospitable environment for smaller players. The bigger players are better able to create multi-media platforms to reach their audiences.
- Faced with diminishing advertising revenues, the media conglomerates have been forced to cut costs in the creation of news content, such as in their consolidation of production facilities and pooling of resources, to be shared across their respective array of multiple platforms for distribution. One significant consequence of such consolidation efforts has been the cutting of jobs for journalists.
- These changes have raised questions about a likely decline in the quality of journalism and news content. There seems to be a trend towards acquisition of news from common sources, with less scope for independent investigation or in-depth analysis and commentary. Responsible and good quality journalism is a matter of public interest, but it would be an uphill journey to muster the political will or funding to deliver the desired policy interventions.
* Sofie Syarief is a former Visiting Fellow at the Media, Technology and Society at ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore and a PhD student at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/29, 18 April 2024
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia’s mainstream media landscape has always been oligopolistic and capital-intensive. The diversity of content needed to cater to its diverse citizenry has never been satisfactory due to the fact that the industry is controlled by a few powerful conglomerates (Nugroho, Putri and Laksmi, 2012). Contrary to earlier expectations that the growth of the internet would threaten the power of media moguls (Couldry and Curran, 2003), Indonesia’s digitalisation in the early 2000s enabled a select number of conglomerates to further consolidate the industry into a small number of multi-platform companies (Tapsell, 2017). The country’s media industry is currently controlled by eight politically-connected individuals – viz., Perindo Party chairman Hary Tanoesoedibjo’s MNC Group, Nasdem Party chairman Surya Paloh’s Media Group, Golkar Party politician Aburizal Bakrie’s Visi Media Asia, Minister of State Owned Enterprises Erick Thohir’s Mahaka Media, ex-minister Chairul Tanjung’s Trans Corp, Jakob Oetama and PK Ojong’s KG Media, EMTEK founder Edy Sariaatmadja’s SCMA Group, and Lippo Group heir James Riady’s B Universe (previously Berita Satu) (Syarief, 2022). But even these powerful conglomerates have had to adapt to more powerful trends disrupting the industry. This paper discusses how Indonesia’s media conglomerates have had to make significant adjustments to their business models in order to meet disruptive challenges from the digitalisation of media consumption and the rise of Big Tech social media platforms.
Traditional media is no longer the primary source of regular daily news for digitally adept Indonesians.[1] According to the Reuters Institute 2022 Digital News Report,[2] roughly 88 per cent of surveyed respondents regard online media—including social media—as their news source. In addition, social media platforms are the news source of choice for 68 per cent of the population. At the same time, the percentage of respondents who indicated television and print media as their preferred news sources were 57 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. Juxtapose these numbers with the estimation that 70 per cent of Indonesia’s online population is under the age of 35, most of whom are using social media platforms daily (Sinpeng and Tapsell, 2020), and we see an ageing population of traditional media consumers.
The rise of the digital has disrupted the traditional revenue model of the mainstream media industry. In 2021,[3] television—the most popular medium in the country—held the top spot as the preferred platform for advertising. Meanwhile, other forms of traditional media, such as print media and radio, only accounted for 5.5 per cent and 0.4 per cent of all advertisement spending, respectively. Moreover, the challenges for print media have been even more significant; as subscriptions and paywalls became increasingly important for these media outlets to generate revenue, they had largely not been successful in making the transition to online due to their inability to garner enough subscriptions—only 19 per cent of Indonesians are willing to pay for online news.[4]
This overall decline in consumer and advertising in traditional media happened mainly due to digitalisation. The grip of Google and Meta in the digital world was apparent by 2017 when both companies accounted for 84 per cent of global digital media investments.[5] This number was naturally followed by both receiving large shares of digital advertising, driving down the significance of the advertising middlemen, including the media. It also shifted the economic value of news from production to distribution almost entirely. While convergence enabled elements of the Indonesian mainstream media, such as news producers, to also become news distributors in the early wave of digitalisation, a massive reallocation of revenue from news/content creators to platform owners started to occur. Digitalisation saw search engines and social media becoming the go-to places to find news (Whittaker, 2020). Increasingly, mainstream media outlets in Indonesia have felt compelled to align themselves with the playbook of these giant digital platforms.
The challenges of digitalisation for Indonesia’s media conglomerates led to a significant shift within journalism, and financial rewards moved from the producer to the distributor. Given shrinking advertising dollars and the growing preference among the younger generation to consume their news via social media sites, Indonesia’s media conglomerates were compelled to transition from the production of longer, in-depth journalism to shorter-form content that could be more easily digested online.
MEDIA CONVERGENCE
In addition, digitalisation paved the way for platform convergence. In responding to the fragmentation of advertising revenue from solely traditional media to traditional and online media, large media corporations have shifted their businesses into multi-platform companies by buying up smaller online outlets or creating new ones (Tapsell, 2017). This enabled them to disseminate their news publications via multiple content platforms, each usually containing similar information. In most cases, these common outlets are merged into one large newsroom for editorial, content or business purposes.
One of the most significant examples is MNC Media, Indonesia’s largest television network, which is a part of a multinational conglomerate known as the MNC Group. It is owned by tycoon and chairman of the Perindo Party Hary Tanoesoedibjo. MNC Media has been integrating its newsrooms since 2016, essentially merging the news-gathering divisions of their four television channels (RCTI, MNCTV, GTV, and iNews) into one large division. The news gathered by this division is then supplied to all MNC television channels, including their digital platforms (e.g. Okezone.com, Sindonews.com, and iNews.id). On one hand, this approach can be seen as efficient. But on the other hand, this practice essentially removes a significant number of media-related jobs. This creates a single low-cost news-gathering pipeline that produces news which then can be aired—and, by extension, sold to advertisers in various media outlets, be it national, local, or digital.
By creating an umbrella company for these various channels, deciding what news to cover and what needs to be aired or published becomes easier and more efficient as only one director of news is needed for all of these media channels. Other than having an integrated newsroom for all video-format channels, MNC created a one-for-all newsroom for their online text-based outlets, called MPI (MNC Portal Indonesia). In contrast, the Kompas Gramedia Group, owned by late journalists Jacob Oetama and PK Ojong, has been approaching the idea of convergence differently and is creating a system of content sharing among all media outlets under their corporation without actually merging the newsrooms.
Regardless of the means to achieve convergence, at the end of the day, when large corporations with large numbers of outlets streamline their news gathering and production processes, there is always the possibility that this comes at the expense of a diversity of content and perspectives. Newsroom integration decreases the diversity of perspectives that the different outlets used to have. One prevalent example of this is the practice of deploying one journalist to cover a particular event and then asking said journalist to send brief articles to the company’s online media sub-team, longer articles to their print media sub-team, as well as requiring them to do live reports for their radio or television broadcast media, sometimes without adequate training or preparation.[6]
In Indonesia, media convergence has also paved the way for mainstream media corporations to penetrate other businesses outside the media industry, such as acquiring communications and network infrastructure. Many among the eight key players in the Indonesian media landscape (Syarief, 2022) now possess their own television companies, online streaming services, internet service providers, telecommunications companies, other communication infrastructures, or all of the above.[7]
Such convergence of the media industry and the imperative to cut costs has led to massive lay-offs and the closing down of outlets. Within the past three years, several media companies have resorted to either of the two approaches. Koran Sindo (the only print newspaper of Hary Tanoesoedibjo’s MNC Group) ceased their operations on 15 April 2023, while Republika (owned by the current Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, Erick Thohir), Suara Pembaruan (owned by Lippo’s Berita Satu), Koran Tempo (part of the TEMPO Media Group), and Indopos (part of the Jawa Pos Group) closed down their print division to go fully digital.[8] Meanwhile, mass lay-offs have been carried out by various outlets such as Net TV (owned by the Indika Energy Group, a conglomerate focusing on mining), Berita Satu TV (part of the Lippo Group), and Kumparan (supported by venture capital investments from Djarum’s GDP and Go-Jek’s Argor). AJI, the Alliance of Independent Journalists, estimated that there were nearly 1,000 journalists, mainly from mainstream media, who were laid off in 2023 alone.[9] While the COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impact on the overall health of the media industry,[10] it has also been used as a cover for lay-offs due to business restructuring.[11]
Another common way of cutting costs within the media industry is to get rid of expensive news, especially if it is deemed as not bringing in enough of an additional audience. Indonesian news consumers are now seeing less and less investigative journalism and local news. Specifically for television channels, documentary programmes have generally been slashed. For example, Kompas TV and Trans 7 are currently the only two outlets with specific documentary programmes, and even so, the quantity of such documentaries has been reduced significantly over the past decade. Within the larger television industry, the common practice is to replace expensive programmes with non-news features, social media trends, as well as commentary programmes (especially talk shows designed to be heated debates) that are largely cheaper to produce and that attract more emotional responses from the audience. This approach is useful in boosting viewership and social media engagement, including clicks from clips that get uploaded on other platforms after the shows conclude on television.
THE DUMBING DOWN OF CONTENT: THE USE OF CLICKBAITS
One notable shift in Indonesia’s journalism landscape has been the prioritising of news that is more likely to generate clicks and engagement, even if it deviates from traditionally important news topics. This includes the rampant production of clickbait and sensationalist news articles—from which the traffic is then used as part of the sales pitch by these media companies to advertisers. A dataset of clickbait in the Indonesian language (William and Sari, 2020)[12] actually shows how this is used among 12 online media websites—eight of which are mainstream media outlets, the focus of this paper. As shown in figure 1, all outlets are not immune to the use of clickbait, but some utilise it more than others.
Source: Adapted from William and Sari (2020)
While clickbait is used to simply attract more traffic for most media, it is worth noting that for Kompas Gramedia, the largest media conglomerate in Indonesia and owner of Kompas.com and Tribunnews.com, clickbait may also be used to offset the cost of their ‘good’ journalism such as lengthy investigative pieces[13] and expedition features[14] in Kompas, or Kompas TV’s documentary programmes. While Kompas Gramedia is generally seen as one of the most trustworthy media groups in Indonesia,[15] one of their subsidiaries, Tribunnews.com—consistently in the top three of most visited media websites in Indonesia,[16] has been heavily criticised for their tendency to publish low-quality clickbait articles. According to the media studies and monitoring institute Remotivi, it would seem that Tribunnews.com has been tasked by their parent company (Kompas Gramedia) with “stealing” as many clicks as possible while the rest of the members of the group are instructed to practice responsible journalism.[17] What Tribunnews.com is essentially doing is producing sensationalist news with bombastic titles and headlines, from celebrity gossip to coverage of government policies. The consequences of this can be unexpected. Remotivi observed that during a series of terror attacks in Indonesia in the first half of 2018, Tribunnews.com’s publications ended up glorifying terror to muster clicks.
As views and clicks have become the new currency for online news media, TikTok has also become a platform of choice for the dissemination of news content. As of 2022, 90 per cent of Indonesia’s top news media publishers have routinely been uploading news content on TikTok, placing the country’s media on the top list of TikTok adoption followed by Australia (89 per cent), Spain (86 per cent), France (86 per cent), the UK (81 per cent), and the US (77 per cent).[18]
However, this trend has mainly put an emphasis on virality rather than quality. The general belief is that young people are more interested in entertaining news, or news stories that are packaged in more entertaining ways.[19] This comes from the industry’s own analysis of their broad social media reach/view reports, essentially showing that entertaining news and news packaged in a more accessible and entertaining manner are generally seen by more people without any further information on the consumers of the content. By combining the need of online media outlets to muster clicks and the tendency of reformatting news for social media, we now have the propensity of trivialising important stories.[20]
OTHER TUSSLES WITH BIG TECH
The latitude for Indonesian media conglomerates to produce independent content is further crimped by the powerful influence of Big Tech companies. The most notable policy from Alphabet’s Google to make sure they always have a say in the content that flows over news platforms is the creation of the Google News Initiative (GNI).[21] Funding from GNI is often worded as “no strings attached”.[22] However, what these programmes generally do is assist news media in developing digital skills, offering them various resources such as training, tools, as well as funding and sponsorship, allowing Google to act as a media patron (Fanta and Dachwitz, 2020). While these partnerships have helped many local media outlets develop digital business models and increase their revenue or even combat disinformation, the initiative essentially pushes news media outlets to produce content tailored for specific platforms, such as YouTube, using technical and content practices aimed at aligning headlines with Google’s search ranking algorithms. This makes it difficult to “sell” news that does not conform to these specifics.
Furthermore, as Google’s power over the media industry strengthens, digital media outlets in Indonesia are now facing harsh realities in trying to defy their playbook. In an attempt to protect digital news outlets from losing advertising revenue to online aggregators, the Indonesian government, as well as Indonesia’s Press Council and media associations, had been drafting a regulation, initially called the Publishers’ Rights, aimed at providing a level playing field between domestic news industries and digital platforms. In this draft, tech giants are deemed to be benefitting from using and displaying news content without providing proper compensation to publishers.[23] This move has been rejected by Google on the grounds that the regulation is unworkable because it will give power to non-governmental agencies to determine what content is allowed to appear online and which publisher is allowed to earn revenue from advertising, without seriously addressing the initial complaints from the news outlets.[24] Meta shared the same sentiment, threatening to block news content from Indonesia on all their platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram.[25] The draft was finally passed on 20 February 2024 as a presidential decree titled “Responsibility of Digital Platform Companies to Support Quality Journalism”. It necessitates the establishment of an independent committee to ensure the fulfilment of digital platform companies’ obligations to “give (their) best effort” in facilitating and commercialising news by press companies, providing fair treatment to press companies, and designing news distribution algorithms that support quality journalism. However, as much as it forces the cooperation and profit sharing between digital platforms and press companies, the decree does not spell out how and in what proportion these cooperation and profit-sharing arrangements will occur.[26] Moreover, a mere one day after the decree was signed, Meta said that it had no obligation to pay for news content posted by Indonesian publishers voluntarily.[27] While more details may emerge in the next six months during the formation of derivative regulations, it is quite apparent that everyone involved in the drafting of the decree are opting to be very cautious, so as not to offend these companies.
CONCLUSION
What needs to be addressed, then, is the urgency of finding new economic models that will allow mainstream media to thrive without compromising their journalistic quality. As it stands currently, large media companies might no longer serve the best interests of both the public and the media industry. Moreover, the Indonesian media’s dependency on advertising needs to be revisited, while other schemes such as public funding warrants serious consideration. Although public funding for journalism organised by the state might be a long shot—as Indonesia’s power structure might skew the outcome of it (Tapsell, 2020), limited public funding such as subscriptions or memberships needs to be promoted and woven into the media industry in order to ensure the media’s commitment to the public interest and, at the same time, create an avenue for media diversification by allowing small, independent media companies—with no chance of competing in the capitalistic media landscape—to flourish.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Couldry, N. and Curran, J. (eds) (2003) Contesting media power: alternative media in a networked world. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield (Critical media studies).
Dwyer, T. (2010) Media convergence. Maidenhead: McGraw Hill/Open University Press.
Fanta, A. and Dachwitz, I. (2020) ‘Google, the media patron: How the digital giant ensnares journalism’. Otto Brenner Foundation. Available at: https://www.otto-brenner-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_data/stiftung/02_Wissenschaftsportal/03_Publikationen/AH103_Google_EN.pdf.
Nugroho, Y., Putri, D.A. and Laksmi, S. (2012) Mapping the landscape of the media industry in contemporary Indonesia. Jakarta: CIPG and Hivos. Available at: https://cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEDIA-2-Media-Industry-2012.pdf.
Singer, J.B. (2004) ‘Strange bedfellows? The diffusion of convergence in four news organizations’, Journalism Studies, 5(1), pp. 3–18. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670032000174701.
Sinpeng, A. and Tapsell, R. (2020) ‘Sinpeng, Aim, and Ross Tapsell. “From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social Media Trends in Southeast Asia.”’, in A. Sinpeng and R. Tapsell (eds) From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social Media in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 1–18.
Souisa, H.Y. (2017) ‘Regulating Convergence: Challenges for Contemporary Media in Indonesia’, Asian Journal of Media and Communication, 1(1), pp. 35–50. Available at: https://doi.org/10.20885/asjmc.vol1.iss1.art3.
Syarief, S. (2022) ‘The Media Landscape in Indonesia: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same’. ISEAS, Perspective No. 2022/77. Available at: /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-77-the-media-landscape-in-indonesia-the-more-things-change-the-more-they-stay-the-same-by-sofie-syarief/.
Tapsell, R. (2017) Media power in Indonesia: oligarchs, citizens and the digital revolution. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd (Media, culture and communication in Asia-Pacific societies).
Tapsell, R. (2020) ‘The media and democratic decline’, in T. Power and E. Warburton (eds) Democracy in Indonesia: from stagnation to regression? Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute (Indonesia update series), pp. 210–227.
Whittaker, J.P. (2020) Tech Giants, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of Journalism. S.l.: Routledge.
William, A. and Sari, Y. (2020) ‘CLICK-ID: A novel dataset for Indonesian clickbait headlines’, Data in Brief, 32, p. 106231. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2020.106231.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735. Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/28 “Thailand’s Ageing Society and Young Thais’ Changing Views and Expectations” by Panarat Anamwathana
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Thailand is facing a historically low birthrate which could negatively impact the country’s economy in the near future.
- According to recent surveys, the main causes of low fertility are people’s aversion to the high costs of care and pessimistic outlook on Thailand’s economic and political future.
- Traditional cultural values also encourage adults and children to take care of their parents, making the working population even less likely to start families to add to their current care responsibilities. At the same time, young people are expecting that the responsibility of care will be shifting from private citizens to state-funded social welfare.
- The government’s proposed solution is to increase access to fertility services. These measures are unlikely to fully reverse the trend of falling birthrates, as they do not address the root causes of the problem, namely the burden of care, and economic and political uncertainty.
* Panarat Anamwathana is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/28, 15 April 2024
INTRODUCTION
One of the most imminent problems facing Thailand today is its rapidly ageing population. Depending on measurements, Thailand is either the oldest or second oldest country in Southeast Asia, with Singapore being the other contender.[1] Thailand’s birthrate has been steadily dropping for decades, hitting a record low at 1.16 children per woman in 2023.[2] According to the World Bank, Thailand is currently experiencing its highest age dependency ratio since 2000 at 44%.[3] That same year, the Thai labour force shrank for the first time, showing a higher number of retirees (aged 60-64) than new entrants (aged 20-24).[4] Indeed, demographer Prof. Dr. Kuea Wongboonsin estimates that if the current trend persists, Thailand’s population will be halved within the next 60 years. In 2083, the projected number of children will have fallen from 10 million to 1 million, the working population will decrease from 46 million to 14 million, and the number of elderly rise from 8 million to 18 million.[5]
This would have profound negative effects on Thailand’s economic outlook, from labour shortages, rising healthcare and pension costs, and falling productivity and aggregate demand. Thai scholars and economists have identified demographics as one of the factors affecting the country’s slow growth.[6] Similarly, the World Bank has forecasted that Thailand’s economy will only grow 3% over the next two decades, the lowest in ASEAN, due to low levels of private investment and the ageing population.[7]
The new government under Prime Minister Sretta Thavisin has described this demographic change as a “crisis,” and is proposing various health-related policies to increase fertility rates. This paper argues that these measures are insufficient to alleviate the crisis, and do not adequately address the main causes of the problem. According to surveys from 2023, major concerns behind people opting to be childless are the pessimistic outlook for Thailand’s economic and political future, coupled with the high costs of care driven by cultural expectations of filial obligations. At the same time, younger generations of Thais seem to worry less than their predecessors about who would take care of them in old age, reflecting a shifting perception of familial obligations and expectations of state support. A more effective means to increase fertility rates would be for the Thai state to meet young people’s higher expectations of government assistance, expand social welfare, as well as work to improve their perception of Thailand’s economic and political prospects.
WHY IS FERTILITY DECLINING?
People of child-rearing age in Thailand currently are the older Gen-Z (aged 18-27) and Gen-Y or millennials (aged 28-43).
Their decision to refrain from having children is primarily driven by political and economic concerns and is closely related to their pessimistic outlook on Thailand’s future.
These sentiments are clearly presented in opinion polls from late 2023. In a September survey conducted by the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), only 44% of childless adults in Thailand indicated that they want children someday. Among the 334 respondents who do not want children, the primary reasons cited by 38.32% were the reluctance to incur child-rearing expenses, and concerns about the social and political environment’s negative impact on their children. The second most common reason (37.72%) is that they do not want the burden of childcare, while 33.23% indicate a preference for maintaining their current lifestyle and personal freedom. Other respondents cite concerns about their own parenting abilities (17.66%), prioritisation of careers (13.77%), and health issues (5.39%) as contributing factors.[8] Other scholarly studies offer similar findings: the additional costs of having a child are the main reasons young people do not want children, coupled with poor economic outlook, demanding jobs, unemployment, and the spread of COVID-19.[9]
Childcare expenses stand out as one of the most important deterrents, which is unsurprising given the extremely high cost of raising a child in Thailand. In 2022, a Bank of Thailand study showed that the cost of raising a child from birth to finishing an undergraduate degree in Thailand was roughly 1.6 million baht per person, roughly 6.3 times higher than GDP per capita.[10] Furthermore, the “child penalty” on wages is significant, especially for women. While the gender wage gap in Thailand has been decreasing over the past few decades, workers with children experience salary setbacks. A 2019 study from the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce found that, on average, men and women with children respectively earn 17% and 22% less than their childless counterparts. The main reason for this is the time constraints associated with raising young children.[11] It is thus understandable that many young people choose not to have children, as doing so would not only increase their expenses but also negatively affect their earnings.
The other main deterrent to having a child is people’s pessimism towards Thailand’s future. This sentiment is reflected in a separate poll from December 2023 from NIDA, which surveyed Thai people on their expectations of quality of life and political landscape. Regarding political stability, 45.65% of respondents anticipate that the situation would “still be chaotic,” 28.40% predict “things to be more chaotic,” and only 14.34% responded that it would be “less chaotic.” Thai people’s outlooks on the country’s economic future are mixed, with 35.65% anticipating improvement in 2024 and 31.22% responding that the economy will “remain bad.” Similarly, while 31.98% of respondents believe that their quality of life will improve in 2024, 31.76% feel that it will “remain bad.”[12] If young people perceive bleak economic and political prospects for themselves and the nation, they will likely refrain from having children. While these data offer meaningful insights into why Thai fertility is declining, they do not paint a complete picture. There is an additional cultural factor to this demographic change.
“WHO WILL TAKE CARE OF YOU IN YOUR OLD AGE?”: A CULTURAL SHIFT
When young people say that they will remain childless, they are often asked, “Who will take care of you in your old age if you do not have children?” However, Thai youths do not seem to be concerned about this question, which signifies a shift in young people’s perception of their duties and relationship to their families, as well as their changing expectations of the state.
This question is asked with the assumption that children would take care of their parents when they grow old. It is rooted in the Asian concept of filial piety. The traditional Thai value of katanyu katavedi has no direct translation in English but it conveys a deeper meaning of gratitude towards parents for their sacrifice and hard work, and implies an obligation to reciprocate. It is thus a reasonable expectation of the older generation that their children be katanyu katavedi and care for them financially, physically, and emotionally in their old age.
It has been remarked that Thailand “got old before it got rich”; the country’s GDP per capita is far lower than that of other ageing societies in Asia like Japan and South Korea.[13] Without readily available social security that requires a high GDP and the expectation of katanyu katavedi, parts of Thailand’s rapidly ageing society might not have thought about how to take care of themselves in their old age. The elderly’s plan after retirement was simply to rely on their children or the young people in their families. It is estimated that in Thailand, one working person is responsible for the care of 6 elderly people.[14] This has put further financial strain on the working population and offers further insights into the findings of NIDA’s surveys. Adding expenses for children on top of these financial obligations has been almost unthinkable, making many people less likely to have children.
Furthermore, many young Thai people have started to move away from this traditional expectation. Some young people have begun questioning katanyu katavedi. For instance, they argue that as it was their parents’ decision to have children, they should not be obligated to repay them, causing much alarm and confusion among the older population, who in turn label such questioning as “ungrateful.”[15] Furthermore, due to economic demands and competitive labour markets, many parents have had to leave their children in the care of grandparents in the countryside or babysitters in urban areas, further weakening katanyu katavedi. However, this does not mean that young people intend to abandon caring for their parents. Rather, much of the working population do not have the same anticipation to be cared for in their old age, lifting the obligation of katanyu katavedi from the children they may or may not have. This can be interpreted as the import of the Western conceptualisation of family and parental relationships, in which parents tend to encourage children to be independent, sometimes as soon as they are of legal age. Young Thais have begun to plan for their childless retirement, with options for retirement and pension plans, care homes, and elderly communities becoming more available.[16] This independent retirement plan aligns with young people’s mixed outlook for Thailand’s economic and political future. They do not need to incur the financial costs of children or worry about the negative impact of society on their children, while making arrangements to take care of themselves in their old age.
Yet, the issue of katanyu katavedi bears more social weight than just a generational shift away about familial relationships, but also informs us of what young people expect of their societies and governments. Some have argued that katanyu katavedi was a means for the state or society to push the responsibility of social care to private citizens. In an ideal world, katanyu katavedi would not be obligated as there would be an adequate system of social care and safety net for the old, sick, and vulnerable. Indeed, while no government policy can be a substitute for loving familial relationships, it can alleviate some of the burden on the working population and perhaps encourage them to have children if they environment was emotionally less obligatory and financially less stressful.[17]
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING BIRTHRATES
The best approach to Thailand’s ageing demographic is for the Srettha government to alleviate care expenses, and enhance public confidence in the nation’s economic and political future. The Thai state is however promoting measures that do not engage with the root causes of the problem and which are likely to be insufficient.
The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has announced that increasing Thailand’s fertility rate as one of its top 12 priorities and one of the “national agendas.” Dr. Cholnan Srikaew of Pheu Thai Party, the Minister of Public Health, has stated that the government aims to increase the birthrate to 2.1.[18]
To assist in this national agenda, the government’s 13th National Economic and Social Development Plan[19] (2023-2027) includes three slightly vague measures to assist in this national agenda: First, to create an “enabling environment” to have children by offering financial assistance to raise and care for children. Second, to change the attitude and values of people to recognise that “all births are important,” as well as to support diverse forms of family. Third, to give comprehensive support to those who decide to have children, such as fertility services and offering assistance to promote the growth and development of children.[20]
The Thai state appears to be making progress in the latter two measures. The MOPH launched a “Give Birth, Great World” campaign and announced that it is setting up fertility clinics at public hospitals to promote having children, and offer consultancy services and infertility treatment.[21] There are currently 800 fertility clinics in Thailand, but most are concentrated in urban areas. The MOPH aims to expand this number and establish at least one state-funded fertility clinic in every province.[22] It has announced that it will provide cheaper and easier access to reproductive technology for single people who want to be parents, or couples who have trouble conceiving, such as intrauterine insemination (IUI) and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). The government is also working on legislation to make these services available to members of the LGBTQIA+ community.[23] Thailand is on track to pass a marriage equality bill within the year, expanding the definition of “family” and making it easier for people of diverse sexualities to have children.[24]
While these efforts are commendable, especially to make fertility services more accessible to a wider range of people, they are unlikely to reverse the trend of falling fertility rates. It is true that these services might be beneficial to certain subsets of the population, such as older individuals or those who are struggling to conceive, but the main concerns for people who decide against having children are not health related, and thus these measures do not address the causes of the fertility crisis. The government should instead focus on the first strategy of its development plan to create an “enabling environment” by alleviating some of the burden of care and improving the country’s economic and political stability.
This argument has been echoed by academics. For instance, Assoc. Prof. Napaphorn Atiwanichayapong argue that “social factors in all aspects” that have accumulated for many years are now the causes for declining fertility, including political instability and a highly competitive capitalist environment that has produced a poor economic outlook. To make young people more optimistic about society and their futures, the government will need to make “comprehensive” changes to Thailand and many of its systems.[25]
Expanding social welfare programmes and state-mandated benefits for both child and elderly care would directly address many of the deterrents to having children. In March 2024, the Thai parliament accepted a proposal to expand maternity leave to 180 days and paternity leave to 90 days. In the same session, however, it rejected a labour protection bill that would limit working hours to 40 per week, increase minimum wage to match inflation, allow for 15 days of leave per year for familial care, and mandate that workplaces accommodate breastfeeding mothers.[26] Increasing the minimum wage could have been the first step towards alleviating the financial strain on the working population, as well as improve their outlook for their own well-being. Similarly, the 15-day leave especially could have helped the Thai labour force care for their aging parents and family members. After the vote, many Thai netizens expressed their frustration with the Thai state for campaigning for people to have more children but remain unwilling to expand social welfare or assist working mothers. Some even say sarcastically that “extinction” seemed like a good option if the state failed to provide necessary benefits, while others imply that not having children is an appropriate punishment for a state that cannot protect or help its people.[27] Thai parliament’s actions are seemingly out of step with young people’s changing perception that the state should expand social welfare to support vulnerable members of society, rather than relying on personal obligations such as katanyu katavedi.
Another possible avenue would be to enhance public’s confidence in Thailand’s economic and political future. As it is, the Sretta government has inherited a stagnant economy due to the COVID-19 crisis, low exports, diminished private investment, and tourism spending below initial projections.[28] The government is still struggling to overcome legal and political hurdles to deliver its flagship stimulus policy of giving certain Thai citizens 10,000 baht (roughly 280USD) in digital wallets.[29] At the same time, political tension in Thailand escalated after the coalition government was formed under Sretta.[30] More charges are being brought against activists and academics.[31] Move Forward Party, the main opposition party that won the most votes in the 2023 general election, faces dissolution by the constitutional court.[32] Expanding medical access is largely insufficient to increase birth rates in the face of such low levels of confidence in the economy and political instability.
CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, Thailand will face an economic crisis if the trend of falling birthrates is left unchecked. However, the Sretta government does not seem to fully grasp the root causes of this problem. Their proposed policies of making fertility care more accessible, while commendable and could make a difference to the lives of poor or LGBTQIA+ people, are largely going to be ineffective in increasing fertility to meet its current goals. The majority of people are not deciding to be childless because they have no access to fertility treatment, but because they cannot afford the additional expenses of childcare and because they feel pessimistic about their future.
Understanding the cultural context and changes in expectations towards familial relationships and the state’s obligations towards its citizens is a good first step. Poll data and academic studies all concur that expanding social welfare to assist in the costs of caring for both infants and the elderly would alleviate some of the burden borne by Thailand’s working population. The state should also work to convince young people that it can improve the Thai economy and political stability, and create a good environment for future children. Without these measures, Thailand can expect the falling fertility rate to only worsen.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735. Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/27 “Something Old, Something New: The Philippines’ Transparency Initiative in the South China Sea” by Edcel John A. Ibarra & Aries A. Arugay
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since February 2023, the Marcos Jr. administration has embarked on a transparency initiative for exposing China’s grey zone tactics within Philippine maritime zones in the South China Sea.
- Officially dubbed as a policy of “measured transparency”, the Philippine government has received a modicum of support from like-minded states as well as severe reactions from China.
- Exposing China’s unlawful activities in the South China Sea goes as far as the Aquino III administration after the Scarborough Shoal standoff in April 2012.
- At present, public opinion agrees with this approach, further contributing to the political legitimacy of the Marcos Jr. administration. At the international level, Marcos Jr. has attracted the attention, support, and solidarity of major regional powers.
- This measured transparency approach carries with it risks and challenges but it is not sufficient to protect and promote Philippines interests in the SCS. Apart from sustaining this approach, the Marcos Jr. administration must develop and articulate a clear maritime strategy adhered to by the security sector and the civilian bureaucracy.
* Edcel John A. Ibarra is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman. Aries A. Arugay is Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Philippine Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/27, 12 April 2024
INTRODUCTION
After a China Coast Guard vessel aimed its laser weapon at a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship on a resupply mission to Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal in February 2023,[1] the Philippines embarked on a markedly different approach to counter Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS). The government under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. began exposing China’s coercive grey-zone tactics: attempts short of war to deny the Philippines access to its own waters, such as by bullying or blocking ships in transit or by “swarming”—staking out reefs with large numbers of military and paramilitary vessels.
The transparency initiative is not limited to Second Thomas Shoal. Since it began, the Philippines seemed to have become more proactive in defending its maritime rights in the SCS as affirmed by the arbitral tribunal’s ruling in 2016. This is a refreshing contrast to the country’s seeming inactivity under former president Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022), whose foreign and security policies appeared chaotic, ad hoc, and transactional rather than structured, deliberate, and strategic.[2] Yet although the Marcos government’s new approach is welcome, evidence so far suggests it to be a policy that lacks the qualities of a properly constituted strategy.
This article discusses the main tenets of the new approach of the Marcos administration in the SCS. We argue that some of the principles and motivations behind the transparency initiative are continuations of the approach under former president Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016). So far, this approach has yielded some strategic benefits at home and abroad. These include garnering international solidarity and support from major regional powers as well as cultivating strong domestic public approval for the government’s efforts to defend the country’s national interest. However, this article argues that merely exposing China’s grey-zone tactics is insufficient, given the risks associated with such an approach. There have been many pendulum swings in the country’s foreign policy in the recent past and sustaining this approach is the main challenge, particularly amidst potential domestic distractions as well as external developments beyond the control of the Philippines.
WHAT’S IN A NAME?
The Philippines’ transparency initiative exposes China’s coercive and unlawful actions against an SCS littoral state, effectively debunking Beijing’s narrative portraying itself as a benevolent and responsible great power, and the SCS as a peaceful and calm waterway where territorial and maritime disputes can be managed among directly concerned parties. Philippine officials have assigned various names to the new approach. Assistant Director-General Jonathan Malaya, the communications chief of the National Security Council, referred to it as “measured transparency”,[3] whereas a spokesperson of the PCG described it as “assertive transparency”.[4] Analysts also called it “radical transparency” and “strategic transparency”.[5] Everyone agrees on the need for transparency, but the degree to which the government wants to be transparent is an open question. “Measured” and “strategic” suggest selectiveness on information to be disclosed, while “assertive” and “radical” hint at a determination to expose just about everything.[6] Unfortunately, bickering over the name and confusion over meanings may indicate bureaucratic in-fighting and the tentative nature of the policy, rather than demonstrate a united resolve and adherence to a whole-of-government approach.
In a webinar hosted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in February 2024, Malaya identified National Security Adviser Eduardo Año as the architect of “measured transparency”. Malaya also claimed that “measured transparency” was inspired by the military’s information operations during the siege of Marawi in Mindanao in 2017, during which Año was chief of staff of the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP). In the battle to reclaim the city from Islamic militants, the AFP successfully deployed counter-messaging, promoted civil-military cooperation (such as by bringing the media along in humanitarian operations), and projected an image of transparency in their community engagements (such as by regularly holding press conferences).[7] Malaya argued that this experience of “measured transparency” in Marawi brought valuable lessons for the Philippines in the SCS context.
In fact, the strategy of “naming and shaming” was a hallmark of former president Benigno Aquino III’s foreign policy, culminating in the historic filing of an arbitration case against China in 2013—probably the Philippines’ most dramatic effort to expose China’s behaviour in the SCS before an international arbitral tribunal and the global community. History shows that the challenge the Philippines is now facing at Second Thomas Shoal is not new, and Manila’s resort to transparency is also not new. Among those that the Philippines exposed and formally complained about during the arbitration was China’s attempt to block a resupply mission to Second Thomas almost a decade ago, in March 2014. The Philippines withdrew its ship at the time and held a press conference afterward to publicise the incident. The Philippines attempted another resupply a few weeks later, this time bringing journalists on board to witness China’s harassment.[8] The second attempt succeeded, and no public record exists of another incident at Second Thomas under Aquino. Still, in the months and years that followed, China was able to dredge and transform nearby Mischief Reef into a de facto military base, allowing Chinese ships to conduct sustained patrols around Second Thomas and harass incoming Philippine boats more frequently and for longer periods.[9]
PAY-OFFS & TRADE-OFFS OF THE SCS TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
Evaluating the effectiveness of the transparency initiative may not offer a straightforward answer because it depends on the objectives set for maritime transparency. If the objective is to facilitate the Philippines’ resupply missions to its SCS outposts, then the approach appears successful. The PCG reported that China had deployed smaller and fewer ships in Philippine waters,[10] and the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea said that it had accomplished nearly all of its humanitarian missions to Philippine-occupied reefs.[11] With regard to Second Thomas Shoal, however, the approach appears less successful. Ship tracking data collected by the Center for Strategic and International Studies from 2021 to 2023 shows that Chinese ships have increased their presence around the shoal, and they have increasingly engaged in physical encounters with Philippine vessels. The US-based think tank also noted that since the Philippines pursued the transparency initiative in February 2023, major incidents substantially increased over Second Thomas.[12] Worryingly, incidents this March included not only damages to Philippine vessels but also injuries to crew.[13]
If the objective is to rally international sympathy and domestic support amid Chinese maritime coercion, then the approach also appears successful. One advantage of the new approach is the strong diplomatic support extended by major powers such as the US, Japan, and Australia. Even countries that used to be muted in Chinese intrusions in the Philippines’ part of the SCS have voiced their fear and calls for sobriety.[14] The list includes Vietnam, South Korea, India, and several European Union states, which were previously ambivalent about supporting the Philippines after the arbitral tribunal’s ruling but are now explicitly siding with Manila.[15] Still, there is the question of audience: whose support must be courted? The Philippines may be preaching to the choir. Although several major powers and Western countries have shown support for the Philippines, other ASEAN states, including fellow SCS claimants, except Vietnam, have been more careful. ASEAN issued a statement of concern with the SCS situation in December 2023,[16] but the veneer of an ASEAN consensus was soon dismantled when Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim echoed Beijing’s narrative of China’s peaceful rise earlier this year, seemingly unmoved by the evidence produced by the Philippines’ transparency initiative.[17]
The overall increase in international support for the Philippines is also reflected in domestic public opinion. Surveys have shown that Filipinos strongly approve of the Marcos administration’s approach in the SCS disputes, which includes the transparency initiative.[18] As domestic public opinion solidifies, even the country’s political elites, notably senators, have had no choice but to rally behind the government’s policy.[19] Some of these now-vocal senators included former allies of Duterte, who had previously either defended the ex-president’s soft stance on China or stayed silent amid news of Chinese maritime coercion.[20]
But if the objective is to dissuade China from pushing ahead with its coercive grey-zone tactics, then the approach has not succeeded. China persists in conducting blockades and swarming in the SCS. Although China has so far refrained from inflicting economic punishments,[21] the Philippine Foreign Affairs Department is not discounting the possibility in the future.[22] Additionally, in recent weeks, Chinese hackers have repeatedly attempted to breach Philippine government websites and email servers, including the PCG’s.[23] Disinformation has also increased, targeting academics, journalists, and the general public through social media.[24] Pro-Beijing narratives are also being echoed in the public discourse by Filipino influencers and groups seen as proxies for China.[25]
If the objective is to ease maritime tensions between the Philippines and China, then the approach has clearly had the opposite effect. Rhetoric from both sides has heated up, and China has also made veiled threats of force.[26] These are raising worries about escalating prospects of armed conflict in the region.
China, of course, bears much of the responsibility for the situation. Not only is China the prime mover of coercive grey-zone tactics, it is also an outlaw. The arbitral tribunal already ruled in 2016 that China has no right to prevent Filipinos from accessing waters 200 nautical miles west of the Philippine archipelago in the SCS. The panel also ruled that China has no right to claim, much less commandeer, mid-ocean reefs that submerge at high tide, like Second Thomas Shoal. At best, China, like the rest of the world, enjoys freedom of navigation in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone—but not freedom to swarm.
China also categorises any action in the SCS that falls short of acquiescing to its demands as provocation. Other than inaction or appeasement, the Philippines finds itself with little meaningful leeway to defend its maritime rights without “provoking” China. In any case, none of the Philippines’ actions so far have matched China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal, construction of militarised artificial islands, use of coercive grey-zone tactics, and undermining of the rule of international law. The Philippines has too few and too small ships to effectively challenge the much larger fleets and vessels of the People’s Liberation Army–Navy and even the China Coast Guard. The Philippines also has too tiny and too underdeveloped installations in the SCS to support advanced military operations. The installation on Second Thomas, the decommissioned World War II warship BRP Sierra Madre, is the poorest in condition among the Philippines’ SCS outposts. The ship is so besieged by leaks and rust and so exposed to the elements that no soldier would survive there for long without regular resupplies.[27] China objects that Philippine resupply missions include construction materials, but these are necessary to provide decent living conditions for Philippine soldiers.[28] The materials being sent are also too rudimentary compared to the coastal defence and ground-based missile systems that China has built on its illegally occupied reefs in the SCS. China’s anger towards the Philippines is simply too disproportional to its own maritime activities.
DOMESTIC FOUNDATION OF MARCOS JR.’S SCS POLICY
Although the transparency initiative is not new, the current policy differs in two important respects from previous ones. First, the Marcos administration seems more assertive than the Aquino government. The increased confidence is a function of the legal clarity that the arbitration win now affords the Philippines. The Aquino government, while tough on rhetoric, was much softer on the ground because they were trying to avoid incidents that may jeopardise the Philippines’ case. This confidence is further bolstered by the US’ explicit endorsement of the arbitral tribunal ruling and Washington’s unambiguous security reassurances that their mutual defense treaty applies to “armed attacks on either nation’s armed forces or public vessels anywhere in the South China Sea”.[29]
Second, Marcos himself so far appears more tamed in his rhetoric than his officials are. He refrained from mentioning the disputes, much less calling out China, in all his previous state of the nation addresses. Although happy to paint himself as a defender of the Philippines’ maritime entitlements, Marcos often balances his public statements with declarations of openness to continued dialogue with China. This messaging affords Manila room to remain cooperative with Beijing. Indeed, unlike under Aquino, no dialogue mechanisms are being cancelled, and the other aspects of Philippines-China relations remain largely business as usual. Marcos probably wants to keep it that way. Fortunately, it seems that China is balking at being the first to cut off bilateral ties with the Philippines despite reacting that way before towards the Aquino government.
The transparency initiative conveniently aligns with Marcos’s regime legitimacy considerations. Surveys since the Duterte administration have consistently shown that Filipinos support a more assertive approach to the SCS disputes. The transparency initiative satisfies this yearning and is a popular policy for Marcos to champion. Indeed, public opinion polls in 2023 show that Marcos’s approval rating for handling the SCS disputes increased to 58 percent.[30] Marcos also seems to base his legitimacy on economic performance and, counterintuitively, adherence to democratic rules—even if only at face value, for performativity’s sake. He is aware of the baggage associated with Chinese developmental assistance and has pulled the Philippines out of some China-funded infrastructure projects.[31] He is also aware of his association with authoritarian politics, not only through his father but also through his electoral alliance with Duterte and his daughter Sara. By explicitly aligning with the West, Marcos is simultaneously able to court higher quality sources of developmental funds and boost his democratic credentials, allowing him to claim membership in the free world.
Moreover, toning down reliance on China and painting himself as a democratic leader also allow Marcos to implicitly criticise Duterte and, in the process, distance himself from his autocratic predecessor. Rifts with the Dutertes are an unavoidable consequence of Marcos’s legitimation strategies.
CONCLUSION & PROSPECTS
Going forward, sustaining the transparency initiative depends on external factors such as how committed the US will be in supporting the Philippines and how long China’s patience will remain. It will also depend on the Philippine government’s ability to weather domestic political disturbances that rifts in the Marcos-Duterte alliance could unleash. Yet the first step is for the Marcos administration to clarify the objectives it wants to achieve with transparency. Of course, the new approach can be used as leverage to request for more concrete support from major powers, but towards what end should the Philippines garner support for? Isolating China diplomatically, rallying regional states and major powers, enhancing Philippine maritime domain awareness, modernising the AFP and the PCG, establishing new security partnerships, or all? The government will need to think strategically about this.
Some red lines must be drawn, however. We believe that transparency should not be a bargaining chip that the Philippines can dial down in exchange for concessions from China. Manila must remain steadfast in exposing Beijing’s coercive grey-zone tactics. Relying solely on quiet diplomacy could be dangerous. Left behind closed doors, Philippine leaders may promise deals that are unconstitutional, or China may make up accounts of Philippine promises. Indeed, China keeps referring to various supposed deals on Second Thomas Shoal, and previous Philippine leaders are avoiding public scrutiny of whether these promises were indeed made. Quiet diplomacy must be conducted alongside transparency operations to keep China in check that its reassurances in meetings matches its behaviour at sea. The Philippines must make it clear that the transparency initiative is reactive to breaches of international law, peace, and stability in the SCS. As long as China behaves in line with these norms, there would be nothing to expose.
Although the maritime transparency initiative is a necessary step forward, it alone does not transform the Philippines into a rational strategic actor in world affairs under Marcos Jr. Ultimately, the government must have strategic hindsight to recognise what worked in the past and what did not, and apply those lessons accordingly. It must also have strategic foresight to forge ahead towards a more comprehensive strategy on the SCS.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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“Beyond Slacktivism: The Dynamic Relationship between Online and Offline Activism among Southeast Asian Youths” by Iim Halimatusa’diyah
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• As digital platforms continue to evolve, youths increasingly employ social media, online forums, and digital campaigns to advocate for social and political change. While this phenomenon is often considered disparagingly as slacktivism, recent studies find that individuals engaging in digital activism often also participate in other conventional forms of activism.
• Despite a surge in youth activism across Southeast Asian countries, comparative analysis in this region remains scarce. Using data from the World Values Survey of several studies, and case studies on Indonesia, this article examines the extent to which online political activism serves as a catalyst for mobilization, awareness and community building among young people in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.
• Additionally, it examines the interplay between online and offline political activism and its impact on traditional forms of activism.
• The study argues for a reciprocal relationship between online and offline political activism, particularly noting the potential for digital efforts to influence real-world action, especially on cohesive issues such as corruption.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/10, April 2024