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Articles & Commentaries

2022/43 “More Political Implications Than Meet the Eye in Upcoming Election for Bangkok Governor” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

 

Thailand’s former transport minister Chadchart Sittipunt (centre) speaks with residents, as he campaigns as an independent candidate in the upcoming Bangkok gubernatorial election, in Pathum Wan district in Bangkok on 5 April 2022. Picture: Lillian SUWANRUMPHA/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Bangkok’s voters will go to the polls to elect a new governor on 22 May 2022.
  • A record number of 31 candidates have entered the race for the post, though one has since been disqualified.
  • The clear front-runner is Dr Chadchart Sittipunt, a former transport minister, and the Phuea Thai Party’s No. 2 nominee for the premiership in the 2019 general election.
  • Chadchart left Phuea Thai in November 2019 to pursue the Bangkok governorship as an “independent” candidate. His meticulous preparation has earned him the front-runner spot in most opinion polls.
  •  Chadchart’s past ties to the chief opposition party continue to haunt him, especially since Phuea Thai has decided not to field its own candidate in the Bangkok governor’s race in order to avoid undermining Chadchart.
  • Three other candidates have reasonable prospects of pulling an upset victory.
  • The election’s outcome will be determined by three factors: the uncertain popularity of Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, the electoral behaviour of an estimated 700,000 young voters, and Chadchart’s ability to clarify to the electorate that he is a genuine “independent” capable of working with all political parties.

*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/43, 26 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

A new record number of 31 candidates have entered the race for the post of governor of Bangkok, with one subsequently disqualified.[1] Few of these aspirants, however, have the potential to best the favoured front-runner, Dr Chadchart Sittipunt.  Who among those few might be able to pull a surprise upset victory on 22 May? And how?

Dr Chadchart is running as an independent. He has no team in the simultaneous race for the 50 seats on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council (BMC), but has a large team of over 10,000 volunteers to help in the campaign, and the endorsement of former Bangkok Governor Dr Bhichit Rattakul.[2]

The 55-year-old former transport minister in the 2011-2014 Yingluck Shinawatra administration received a doctorate in civil engineering from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He was the No. 2 nominee of the Phuea Thai Party (PT) for the premiership in the 2019 general election.

Chadchart left the chief opposition party in November 2019 to prepare for the Bangkok gubernatorial election. One remarkable outcome of his two-year-long preparation is his raft of 200 proposed policy initiatives in nine areas intended to make Bangkok a liveable city for every resident.[3]

However, critics still question whether Chadchart has actually severed all his ties with PT. They point out that the party has not fielded a candidate in the Bangkok governor’s election, allegedly for fear of undermining Chadchart. In the meantime, it is running a full slate of 50 candidates in the BMC election.

Chadchart says that he is a genuine “independent” who will be able to work with all parties if he is elected. By his own assessment, his only “weakness” is his lack of a political base in major Bangkok communities, many of which are strongholds of well-established parties.[4]

Chadchart has consistently led in the NIDA Poll’s surveys of voter preferences over the past two years. In the NIDA Poll published on 10 April, he maintained a commanding lead with 38.84 per cent support from respondents in the survey conducted between 5-7 April. Importantly, however, the number of “undecided” respondents remained high, at 26.69 per cent.

Coming in a distant second place with 10.06 per cent support was former Bangkok Governor Pol Gen Asawin Kwangmuang, whom the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta placed in the job in 2016 and who only recently resigned in order to run in the May election.[5]

In third and fourth places were the Democrat Party’s candidate Dr Suchatchavee Sawansawas, with 6.83 per cent, and the Move Forward Party’s candidate Dr Wiroj Lakkhana-adisorn, with 6.02 per cent.[6]

A survey undertaken by Thammasat University’s Research and Consultancy Institute and published on 3 April showed that Chadchart’s popularity has declined to 25.7 per cent, from 33.8 per cent in early February.[7]

Even then, Chadchart appeared to remain the most popular front-runner at the start of the election campaign in early April. What can go wrong in his quest for the Bangkok governorship?

NEW CRUCIAL FACTORS

The new record number of 31 candidates reflects the strong interest of Bangkok voters in the city’s long-delayed gubernatorial election, the first since 3 March 2013. Those polls saw incumbent Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra of the Democrat Party re-elected with 1.256 million votes.

On 25 August 2016, Sukhumbhand was dismissed by NCPO leader and Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha on suspicion of corruption. General Prayut then appointed Asawin to succeed him.

Some 4.273 million voters will be eligible to cast ballots in the upcoming election. After a wait of nine years for the election, voter turnout is expected to be higher than the 63.38 per cent in the 2013 election. Be that as it may, the winner of the upcoming election needs only some one million votes to reach victory, chiefly because of the large number of candidates in the race.

One huge voting bloc is the estimated 700,000 voters aged between 18 and 27 who will cast ballots for Bangkok governor for the first time. Whoever manages to win the hearts and minds of these young voters will have a significant edge.

Only three political parties have fielded candidates in both the gubernatorial and the BMC elections: the Democrats, Move Forward and Thai Sang Thai (Thais Build Thailand). Four other parties have candidates only in the BMC election: PT, Phalang Pracharat, Kla, and Ruamthai United. The latter is, however, fielding only 12 and 5 candidates, respectively. And one party, Phalang Sangkom Mai, ran the ultimately disqualified Kraidej Bunnag as its candidate in the Bangkok Governor race, but no candidates in the BMC election.[8]

Laws regulating local government elections prohibit holders of public office—ministers, members of parliament, senators, senior government officials and military officers—from taking part in election campaigns. These laws tend to work to the disadvantage of major political parties.

For example, Pita Limjaroenrat, leader of the Move Forward Party, cannot campaign for the party’s candidate Wiroj, because Pita is an MP. Ironically, people who have been banned from participating in national politics, such as Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit of the Progressive Movement,[9] can nevertheless campaign for candidates in local-government elections. Thanathorn has in fact been campaigning for Wiroj as well as for his movement’s candidate in the Pattaya City manager election, Kittisak Nilwattanatochai.

Former Governor Asawin’s candidacy constitutes yet another crucial factor in the race, as it makes the contest more competitive and the outcome more unpredictable. All three other incumbent Bangkok governors who have stood for re-election in the past won.[10]

THREE RIVALS FOR NO. 2 SPOT

As their campaigning intensifies, Asawin, Wiroj and the Democrat Party’s candidate Suchatchavee appear to have reasonable prospects to emerge as the runner-up behind front-runner Chadchart.

Asawin has the advantage of incumbency, having spent nearly six years heading the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. The full team of 50 candidates that his “Rak Krungthep” or “Preserve Bangkok” group is fielding in the BMC election will also help him draw votes.

Prime Minister General Prayut and Interior Minister General Anupong Paochinda seem to favour Asawin, although they are prohibited by law from showing overt support for his candidacy. Every Bangkok governor needs the support of the prime minister and the interior minister, especially in maintaining public security and seeking extra funds to deal with emergencies, like in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Asawin’s campaign emphasises his management experience in leading the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and his wish to stay on to “finish the job” for the Thai capital.[11] He tried but failed to obtain the endorsement of the Phalang Pracharat Party (PPP), the largest party in the ruling coalition. In addition to this setback, there are the factors of his advanced age of 71 and his police background, each of which will turn away many young voters.

With Thanathorn’s active support, 44-year-old Wiroj can attract considerable attention from young voters, who tend to dislike both General Prayut and General Anupong. His gain is likely to come at the expense of Chadchart. Thanathorn’s backing means that Wiroj can count on the support of a large number of Bangkok voters who voted for the former’s Future Forward Party in the 2019 general election. Those polls saw the party capture more than 800,000 votes and win eight of Bangkok’s 30 seats in the House of Representatives. Wiroj was a Future Forward party-list MP who moved on to join the Move Forward Party after the Future Forward was dissolved in February 2020.[12]

As an opposition MP, Wiroj proved tenacious in criticising General Prayut and General Anupong, two of the strongmen behind the 2014 coup. His confrontational style raises serious doubt over whether he will be able to implement new initiatives if he is elected the Bangkok governor. Tackling the city’s chronic traffic problem, for example, requires the cooperation of the traffic police, who are under the supervision of the prime minister, General Prayut.

Wiroj’s campaign promise of creating a new Bangkok in which all Bangkokians are equal sounds idealistic and abstract. What, after all, can a Bangkok governor, with her or his limited authority, do to tackle the inequality that has become such a defining national concern for Thailand?

The 49-year-old Suchatchavee is meanwhile, positioning himself as an MIT-educated structural engineer who knows how to utilise modern technologies to tackle the chronic problems of Bangkok. The former rector of the justifiably prestigious King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology-Ladkrabang has the strong backing of Thailand’s oldest party and member of the prime minister’s governing coalition, the Democrats. Its candidates had won five of the past 10 Bangkok gubernatorial elections.[13] Suchatchavee also enjoys the assistance of a team of 50 candidates in the BMC election.

Public sentiments in Bangkok towards the premiership of General Prayut will have a direct impact on the Bangkok election. If Bangkok voters are happy with the prime minister, they will vote for either Asawin or Suchatchavee. But if they are upset, they will turn to either Chadchart or Wiroj.

SPOILERS ON THE SIDELINES

Three other candidates are trying to do all that they can to make their presence in the race for governor of Bangkok felt. These are Thai Sang Thai Party’s candidate Squadron Leader Sita Divari and the independent candidates former Bangkok Senator Rosana Tositrakul, and Sakolthee Pattayakul. None of these three candidates received over 3.0 per cent of support in the NIDA Poll of 10 April.[14]

Like his party leader Sudarat Keyaraphan, 57-year-old Sita formerly belonged to the PT. He was also a prominent F-16 fighter pilot in the Royal Thai Air Force. His candidacy will directly undermine Chadchart because both will count on votes from backers of the PT. Thai Sang Thai’s team of 50 candidates in the BMC election will also clash head on with the team from the PT.

Sudarat’s photograph and name feature prominently on Sita’s campaign posters. She was PT’s No. 1 nominee for the premiership in the 2019 general election, and her political stronghold was and still is in Bangkok’s eastern and northern suburbs. She left the PT in November 2020 to launch a new party of her own.

Sudarat can take an active part in the campaign for Bangkok governor because she is not an MP. Her ulterior motive in fielding Sita and the team of 50 candidates in the BMC election is clearly to advertise her new Thai Sang Thai Party in preparation for the next general election, when the number of House of Representatives seats in Bangkok will increase from 30 to 34.[15]

Another lady who is trying to energise Bangkok voters is 68-year-old former senator Rosana. She was elected a senator for Bangkok in 2008 with nearly 750,000 votes. In the current race, she has received the tacit support of former two-time Bangkok Governor Maj Gen Chamlong Srimuang. She has also picked up the endorsement of the influential State Enterprises Workers’ Relations Confederation, thanks to her work in opposition to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises.[16]

Rosana is capitalising in her campaign on her achievements in consumer protection, environmental protection and energy conservation. But she has neither a party machine nor a team of BMC candidates to support her. Her best bet is to convince those voters who are still “undecided”, estimated at around 20 per cent of the Bangkok electorate, to consider her.[17]

One of the youngest candidates contesting the Bangkok governor election is 44-year-old Sakolthee Pattayakul. He previously served as one of the four deputies to Governor Asawin, in charge of public order, health and the environment. He also won a seat as an MP for Bangkok under the banner of the Democrat Party in the 2011 general election.

Sakolthee joined the anti-Yingluck protests of November 2013-May 2014 that, under the leadership of Suthep Thuagsuban of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, precipitated the military coup of the latter month. Suthep has now endorsed Sakolthee in the Bangkok governor election, saying that Sakolthee knows what needs to be done, and has the experience as well as the connections in the Prayut government, to get things done for Bangkok.

Sakolthee is directly competing with Asawin and Suchatchavee for the support of pro-government voters.

WHAT COULD GO WRONG?

Front-runner Chadchart certainly cannot rest on his laurels and hope to cruise to a comfortable victory without doing more heavy lifting in the last few weeks before the 22 May voting day. At least three crucial factors will determine how the election will unfold.

First and foremost, the internal political stability of the ruling coalition is improving. The prime minister and some ministers will soon face a grilling in the House in a no-confidence debate after the parliament opens on 22 May for the 2022-2023 session, and General Prayut’s self-confidence and popularity will rise as there is no longer any serious threat to unseat him in the no-confidence vote. This will ease tensions among Bangkok voters and lead them to consider more favourably voting for pro-government candidates, particularly Asawin, Suchatchavee and Sakolthee.

Another unpredictable factor is the collective voting behaviour of the 700,000 young voters. Most probably, a large portion of this voting bloc will support Wiroj, regardless of what will happen in the General Prayut administration.

Last but not least is the lingering doubt about whether Dr Chadchart is a secret ally of the PT, spearheading in the vanguard to capture the Bangkok governorship as part of the party’s ambitious plan to score a “landslide victory” in the next general election. Bangkok voters who oppose the PT will not vote for Chadchart.

CONCLUSION

The upcoming elections in Bangkok will have significant implications on national politics, and vice versa.

Chadchart has maintained a commanding lead in opinion surveys, chiefly because he has been much better prepared than all other candidates over the past two years.

Three other candidates have improving prospects of scoring an upset victory. The fluctuating political fortune of the prime minister, the sentiments of the 700,000 young voters, and, finally, how well Chadchart can clear up the lingering doubt about his alleged secret alliance with PT, will determine the final outcome of the Bangkok governor election on 22 May.

ENDNOTES


[1] The Election Commission has accepted applications from 31 candidates. Their names, brief biographical data, and election numbers are as follows.

No. 1: Dr Wiroj Lakkhana-adisorn, 44, of the Move Forward Party; an ex-MP, and a former senior executive of a publishing company. He holds a doctorate in economics from the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in Bangkok.

No. 2: Lt Col Thitha Rangsitpol Manitkul, 55, an independent candidate; a female former army officer and a former member of the Democrat Party.

No. 3: Sakolthee Pattayakul, 44, an independent candidate, a former Bangkok MP of the Democrat Party; he served as one of the four deputies to Bangkok Governor Pol Gen Asawin Khwanmuang.

No. 4: Dr Suchatchavee Suwansawas, 49, the Democrat Party candidate, and the former rector of the King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology-Ladkrabang (KMITL). He holds a doctorate in geotechnical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

No. 5: Virachai Laoruerngwattana, 45, an independent candidate, a graduate of KMITL, and a computer programmer.

No. 6: Pol Gen Asawin Kwanmuang, 71, an independent candidate, a former Bangkok governor, and a former head of the Bangkok Metropolitan Police.

No. 7: Ms Rosana Tositrakul, 69, an independent candidate, a former senator for Bangkok and a civil society activist.

No. 8: Dr Chadchart Sittipunt, 55, an independent candidate, a former minister of transport, and the No. 2 nominee for the premiership of the Phuea Thai Party in the 2019 general election. He turned down offers to become that chief opposition party’s leader, and left it in November 2019 to pursue the Bangkok governorship.

No. 9: Dr Watcharee Wannasri, an independent candidate, and a businesswoman.

No. 10: Dr Supachai Tantikom, an independent candidate, and a structural engineer who served as advisor to three Bangkok governors in the past.

No. 11: Squadron Leader Sita Divari, 57, a candidate of the new Thai Sang Thai Party, and a former the Royal Thai Air Force F-16 jet fighter pilot.

No. 12: Dr Prayoon Krongyos, 62, an independent candidate, and a former senior official of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration.

No. 13: Pisarn Kittiyaowamal, an independent candidate.

No. 14: Thanet Wongsa, an independent candidate, a businessman, and a social media influencer.

No. 15: Ms Sasikarn Wattanachan, an independent candidate, and a television presenter and businesswoman.

No. 16: Air Vice Marshal Tootpreecha Lerdsantadwatee, an independent candidate, and a retired senior Air Force officer.

No. 17: Utain Chartpinyo, an independent candidate, and a former leader of the Khon Thai Party (Thai People Party).

No. 18: Ms Soommana Appaired, an independent candidate who previously served in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration.

No. 19: Kraidej Bunnag, the candidate of the new Phalang Sangkhom Mai Party (New Social Force Party). The Election Commission has found that Kraidej is not qualified to run, and his candidacy has been cancelled.

No. 20: Ms Amornpan Ounsuwan, an independent candidate, and an investment analyst.

No. 21: Nipatpon Suwanchana, an independent candidate, and a former advisor to the Department of Rights and Liberties Protection, Ministry of Justice.

No. 22: Waranchai Chokchana, 70, an independent candidate, and a well-known political activist who aspires to set Thailand’s record of running in eight consecutive Bangkok Governor elections since 1990.

No. 23: Chalermpol Uttarat, an independent candidate; he was a parliamentary candidate of the Thai Liberal Party in Bangkok in the 2019 general election.

No. 24: Kosit Suvinijjit, an independent candidate, and a former advisor to the Ministry of Justice.

No. 25: Prapat Banjongsiricharoen, an independent candidate and businessman.

No. 26: Pol Lt Gen Monthon Ngernwattana, an independent candidate, and a vice chairman of the Thai Police Association.

No. 27: Dr Poompat Asawapupin, an independent candidate and businessman.

No. 28: Saravudh Benjakul, an independent candidate; he recently resigned as the chief of the Courts of Justice Office, Ministry of Justice, under controversial circumstances.

No. 29: Kritchai Payomyaem, an independent candidate, public speaking trainer, and social media influencer.

No. 30: Pongsa Choo-nam, 58, an independent candidate and forest conservation activist.

No. 31: Vidhaya Jangkobpattana, 75, an independent candidate and retired government official: the oldest candidate in this race.

The qualifications of these candidates are subject to verification by the Election Commission. The final number of candidates may drop below 31 if more candidates are disqualified.

[2] Dr Bhichit Rattakul won the Bangkok governor election in 1996 as an independent. He was the Democrat Party’s unsuccessful candidate for the post in 1992, but he lost. His father was the late Bhichai Rattakul, a former leader of Thailand’s oldest party, a former deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, and a former House speaker.

[3] “‘ชัชชาติ’ เผย 200 นโยบายหาเสียง ‘ผู้ว่า กทม’ ชัดเจน ชี้เป็นอาวุธต่อสู้ปัญหา” [“Chadchart” discloses 200 clear-cut policies for his campaign in the Bangkok governor race, saying these are weapons for fighting problems], Bangkokbiznews, 6 April 2022 (www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/997787, accessed 8 April 2022). Details of these 200 policies are posted on Dr Chadchart’s website: www.chadchart.com.

[4] “อุ๊ต๊ะ! ‘ชัชชาติ’ เปิดจุดอ่อนตัวเองในศึกเลือกตั้งผู้ว่าฯกทม.” [U-tah! “Chadchart” reveals his weakness in the Bangkok Governor election], Thai Post, 5 April 2022 (www.thaipost.net/hi-light/118181, accessed 7 April 2022).

[5] See NIDA Poll published on 10 April 2022 (https://bit.ly/3kadskz, accessed 10 April 2022).

[6] Ibid.

[7] “โพลธรรมศาสตร์ ‘ชัชชาติ’ ยังเต็ง 1 ตามด้วย ดร.เอ้ – วิโรจน์ ส่วนอัศวิน อันดับ 4” [Thammasat Poll shows “Chadchart” remains the No. 1 front-runner, followed by Dr Ae and Wiroj; Asawin is in fourth place], Bangkokbiznews, 3 April 2022 (www.bangkokbiznews.com/politics/997240, accessed 8 April 2022). “Dr Ae” is the nickname of the Democrat Party’s candidate Suchatchavee. The Thammasat-affiliated pollster has conducted three surveys in which the popularity of Chadchart appeared to slip from 33.8 per cent in early February to 29.3 per cent in mid-March, and to 25.7 per cent on 3 April. The number of the “undecided” dropped from 21.7 per cent in mid-March down to 17.5 per cent on 3 April.

[8] Altogether 382 candidates are vying for the 50 seats on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council. Each of the 50 Bangkok’s districts has one BMC seat.

[9] In November 2019, Thanathorn was stripped of his parliamentary seat and banned from national politics by the Constitutional Court, which found him guilty of failing to dispose of all his shares in a magazine publishing company before applying to participate in the 2019 general election as a party-list candidate of the Future Forward Party. He now leads a new political action group called the Progressive Movement, which has fielded candidates in provincial and municipal and now in the Pattaya City local elections. However, how effective Thanathorn can be in assisting in the campaign for Wiroj in Bangkok remains to be seen. He, his mother and his elder sister are facing possible criminal prosecution for allegedly possessing forest land in Ratchaburi Province. On 29 March, the Land Department nullified their 59 no so 3 ko land ownership documents covering about 2,111 rai (834 acres) in the central province 100 kilometres west of Bangkok, because the documents were issued unlawfully, and no individual can own the forest land. No so 3 ko (น. ส. 3 ก) are land ownership documents of lower legal security than regular land title deeds; they were originally issued to landless rural people.

[10] They were Sukhumbhand Paribatra in 2013, Apirak Kosayothin (also a Democrat like Sukhumbhand) in 2008, and Maj Gen Chamlong Srimuang (of the Phalang Dhamma Party) in 1990.

[11] “‘อัศวิน’ เปิดใจลาออก ลงสู้ศึกเลือกตั้ง ผู้ว่า กทม.” [“Asawin” opens heart in his resignation to join the Bangkok governor election], Post Today, 24 March 2022 (www.posttoday.com/politic/news/678973, accessed 10 April 2022).

[12] The Future Forward Party was dissolved in February 2020 by the Constitutional Court for illegally borrowing about 191.2 million baht from Thanathorn. The borrowing was deemed unlawful because it constituted an opening for Thanathorn to dominate the party with his wealth.

[13] They include Sukhumbhand Paribatra in 2013 and 2009, Apirak Kosayothin in 2008 and 2005, and Thammanoon Tien-ngern in the first election for Bangkok governor election in 1975. Apirak was sacked one year into his second term because of corruption allegations; hence there was an election for Bangkok governor election in 2009.

[14] NIDA Poll, op cit.

[15] In the 2019 general election, of Bangkok’s 30 seats in the House of Representatives 13 were won by the PPP, 9 by PT, and 8 by Thanathorn’s Future Forward Party, the predecessor of the present-day Move Forward Party. The Democrat Party failed to win any of the 30 House seats in the capital three years ago. The upcoming elections in Bangkok on 22 May constitute a significant new opportunity for the latter party to re-establish itself there, as the next general election approaches.

[16]  “สรส. โดนใจนโยบาย หนุน รสนาชิงผู้ว่า กทม.” [SEWRC likes her policy, supports “Rosana” in the Bangkok governor race], Manager Online, 8 April 2022 (www.mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000033955, accessed 8 April 2022). The SEWRC is the State Enterprises Workers’ Relations Confederation, which serves as the umbrella organisation of labour unions in Thailand’s 56 state-owned enterprises.

[17] In the eleventh NIDA Poll survey in early March 2022, about 13.04 per cent of the respondents said they were still “undecided”. In Thammasat poll of 3 April, the number of the “undecided” stood at 17.5 per cent.


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2022/42 “Cambodian Perception of the New Chinese” by Vannarith Chheang*

 

Members of a lion dance troupe perform in Phnom Penh ahead of the Lunar New Year. Picture: TANG CHHIN Sothy, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

  • The New Chinese of Cambodia—Chinese migrants who arrived in the country after the 1990s—reinforce the existing politico-economic order characterized by the dominant economic role of the ethnic Chinese. 
  • A preliminary online survey of 100 respondents was conducted in February 2022 to understand public perception of the New Chinese in Cambodia. The findings show that Cambodians generally perceive the New Chinese positively (52 out of 100 responses). The survey is a pilot study and does not claim to be conclusive, and further surveys should be conducted in the future.
  • The New Chinese are perceived to have significant political and economic influence over the politico-economic establishment. Remarkably, 64 per cent of respondents perceive the New Chinese as having strong economic influence and 17 per cent rate it as very high. In terms of political influence, 38 per cent rate it as high and 15 per cent rate it as very high. 
  • The social tension between Cambodians and the New Chinese is rated high (45 per cent) and very high (14 per cent). This is mainly due to a lack of mutual understanding and respect, language barrier and miscommunication, and the bad behaviour of some New Chinese.

*The author is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and President of the Asian Vision Institute (AVI), an independent think tank based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/42, 25 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION 

China is Cambodia’s top economic partner and donor. Cambodia’s economic overdependence on China, and the power asymmetry between the two countries, have enabled China to exert vital political leverage over the Kingdom.[1] The influx of New Chinese migrants to the Kingdom has further enhanced China’s socio-economic and political presence in Cambodia. In addition to migrant socio-economic networks, it is the close political and economic relations between the two countries which have contributed to the inflow of New Chinese migrants.

The New Chinese, referring to Chinese migrants who arrived and settled in Cambodia after the 1990s (after peace in Cambodia was restored), is an emerging socio-economic force in Cambodia. The main occupations of the New Chinese include petty traders, service entrepreneurs, skilled garment workers, and white-collar workers in the construction, engineering, financial services, law, media, journalism, and education sectors.[2]

There are some news reports about Cambodian reactions to the New Chinese, but no academic study has ever been undertaken on Cambodian perception of the New Chinese. This paper attempts to shed light on the matter by conducting an online survey among residents of Phnom Penh, the capital city of Cambodia. These respondents were from a variety of sectors; but with only 100 responses received, the survey should be treated as a pilot study. 

BACKGROUND 

Historically, extensive Chinese settlement in Cambodia began in the fifteenth century, which brought a marked change to the nature of the local economy. After 1400, the Cambodian economy depended more on trade, mainly contributed by the Chinese migrants who gradually formed an entrepreneurial class and an ethnic minority community. The marketplace became the meeting point for different ethnicities, as economic relations predominated over other aspects of life. The Chinese were in control of almost all internal trade and a substantial portion of the manufacturing sector, including rice-milling and transportation, which were so vital to the Cambodian economy.[3]

In the 1990s, Chinese business migrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the ASEAN countries played a major role in Cambodia’s economy. Since 2010, migrants from mainland China have come to dominate the Chinese community. Whereas the earlier migrants in the 1900’s were from Fujian, these new migrants are mostly from Zhejiang, Sichuan, Hunan and Guangxi, followed by Guangdong, the Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang), Hubei, Henan, Chongqing, Shanghai, Yunnan, Beijing and Fujian. . There is no official record on the number of New Chinese migrants from mainland China, but it is estimated to be around 150,000.[4]

The New Chinese normally have no regional, dialect or occupational identity. Still, their common origins in either mainland China, Taiwan or Hong Kong, and their knowledge of Mandarin or Cantonese are quite distinct from that of the earlier Chinese.[5]

These migrants are endowed with commercial acumen and entrepreneurial spirit that enable them to adapt to the host society. Most Chinese immigrants initially went to Cambodia on job assignments before deciding to stay and seek new opportunities there. The jobs that brought them were usually related to state-owned enterprises, sub-contractors, textile factories, and Chinese-language schools.[6]

Generally, the new Chinese migrants are more mobile, and possess higher education, specialized skills, and capital than the earlier Chinese. However, tensions between the new migrants and the locals increased due to ethnicity being politicized especially after China implemented a policy called ‘return to original roots.’[7]

Moreover, daily social interactions created a multifaceted Chineseness among various Chinese sub-ethnic groups (Sino-Khmer, Mainland Chinese, and Taiwanese). These groups adapt to different social statuses to ‘fit in, adapt, adjust, assimilate, reject, or resist’ within the diversified social organizations and networks, and socio-political structure. Shihlun Allen Chen argues that Chineseness is a socio-political process.[8] The formalization and legalization of the Chinese networks with the support of political and economic institutions contribute to expanding business opportunities and personal connections. Being part of these networks helps develop social capital and political protection.[9]

The New Chinese are protected by different networks. Personal relationship formed with government officials, patron–client relations, rent-seeking and crony capitalism are common strategies for their survival and social mobility.[10] As a result, they have underpinned Cambodia’s established politico-economic order signified by the economic dominance of ethnic Chinese, the patronage system, and the disparity between the elites and the general population.[11]

The New Chinese in Cambodia embody slightly different cultural characteristics. They are less integrated into Khmer society than the Old Chinese, whose cultural identity integrated well with Khmer culture thanks to inter-ethnic marriages and the fusion of cultural traditions and norms. The New Chinese prefer to live within their community, without many interactions with Cambodians. Noticeably, the influx of New Chinese in the 2010s—mainly driven by growing investment and tourism—has caused a certain degree of anti-Chinese sentiment among Cambodians due to increased crime rates and the bad behaviour of some Chinese.[12]

Some local Cambodians are not happy with the New Chinese because the economic benefits are not widely shared.[13] Some local analysts have raised concerns over the loss of Cambodian identity[14] and socio-economic issues such as rising inflation, land conflicts, and limited benefits to local people.[15]

SURVEY FINDINGS 

A random online survey was conducted in February 2022 among residents working and residing in Phnom Penh. The snowballing approach was used to approach potential respondents. As a result, 100 responses were received. The survey comprised of 14 questions, which took approximately 5 minutes to complete. This is a preliminary research project with the aim to set some hypotheses for future research with larger sample and more sophisticated research methodology.

Profile of Respondents 

The profile of the respondents is as follows: 59 per cent are male, and 41 per cent female. In terms of age distribution, 42.9 per cent are between 20 and 30 years old, 32.7 per cent are between 30 and 40, and 24.5 per cent are above 40. Regarding the level of education, 52 per cent have an undergraduate degree, 41 per cent have a post-graduate degree, and 7 per cent completed high school. In terms of affiliation, 47 per cent are from the private sector, 29 per cent are from the public sector, 18 per cent from civil society, and the remaining 6 per cent are self-employed. 

In terms of occupations of the New Chinese, 48 per cent of the respondents run their own business, 29 per cent are employed in the private sector, and 20 per cent are self-employed. The survey findings reinforce the general perception that the New Chinese play a dominant economic role in Cambodia.

General Perceptions of the New Chinese 

The New Chinese are widely positively perceived by the respondents. Remarkably, 39 per cent have a positive view of the New Chinese and 13 per cent have a very positive view. A neutral view of the New Chinese accounts for 38%, and 10 per cent hold an unfavourable view. Such an overwhelming positive perception is perhaps also influenced by the support of China helping Cambodia fight against the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s increasing economic and political influence over Phnom Penh.[16]

More than 90 per cent of the Cambodian respondents perceive that China is the most crucial support in providing vaccines to the region, and about 68 per cent trust Chinese vaccines (Sinopharm, Sinovac). China is widely perceived as the most influential economic power in the region (84 per cent) and most influential political and strategic power in the region (75.3 per cent).[17]

Figure 1: Perception of the New Chinese

Economic and Political Influence 

As much as 64 per cent perceive the new Chinese to have strong economic influence and 17 per cent rate it very high. The New Chinese are considered entrepreneurial and highly involved in economic activities such as trading and investment. The flow of Chinese investment capital and tourists into Cambodia creates vast business opportunities for the New Chinese.

Figure 2: Economic influence of the New Chinese

In terms of political influence, the New Chinese are seen to have significant influence, with 38 per cent rating it high and 15 per cent very high, while 43 per cent rate it to be moderate. The political influence stems from the complex patronage networks between political leaders and business elites.

Figure 3: Political influence of the New Chinese

Economic Contributions 

The economic contributions of the New Chinese are rated high (53 per cent), very high (14 per cent), moderate (25 per cent), low (6 per cent), and very low (2 per cent). Clearly, the New Chinese are a fundamental economic actor in Cambodia, with some of them functioning as a bridge to connect Cambodia and China by attracting Chinese investors, tourists and donors, establishing companies that create job opportunities and incomes for the local people, and sharing entrepreneurship knowledge and skills. 

Figure 4: Economic contributions of the New Chinese

Some local Cambodian entrepreneurs and job seekers feel that they cannot compete with the New Chinese. Other issues relate to inflation (perceived to be partially caused by the New Chinese) and economic crime include money laundering, trafficking, and online gambling. 

Social Integration 

Although the New Chinese have gained significant influence in Cambodia’s economic and political activities, social integration remains a key issue and challenge. The survey findings illustrate that the level of social integration of the New Chinese is relatively low compared with other perception indicators: 28 per cent rate it to be low, 36 per cent rate it moderate, 25 per cent rate it high, 7 per cent rate it very high, and 4 per cent rate it to be very low.

Figure 5: Level of social integration of the New Chinese

Social tension between Cambodians and the New Chinese is high (45 per cent) and very high (14 per cent) mainly due to the lack of mutual understanding and respect, language barrier and miscommunication, and the bad behaviour of some New Chinese. Noticeably, the New Chinese, especially those who have arrived in Cambodia after 2010, tend to live within their own circles or community, and have little interactions with the locals. Moreover, the use of the Chinese language on the signboards of businesses owned and/or managed by New Chinese, and in some cases, the erroneous usage of Khmer words on signboards stir up public resentment. 

Figure 6: Social tension between the New Chinese and local Cambodians

The public has negative views about Chinese involvement in the casino economy. For instance, Chinese gangsters and mafia in Sihanoukville are involved in online scams and human and drug trafficking. These crimes lead to the deterioration of public security and rising negative sentiments towards the New Chinese.[18] 

To improve social integration, the respondents suggested that the New Chinese respect local laws and norms (46 per cent), learn the Khmer language (24 per cent), respect local culture and traditions (19 per cent), and live together with Cambodians (10 per cent). Promoting social and cultural exchanges between Cambodians and New Chinese, especially those who arrived in Cambodia after 2010, is critical to reducing social tensions and enhancing social integration.

It is further suggested that the local authorities should enhance the rule of law, good governance (transparency and accountability), raise public awareness among the New Chinese on Cambodian culture and traditions, promote mutual respect and tolerance, and control cross-border crimes. In addition, the companies run by the New Chinese should adhere to social and environmental safeguard measures. 

CONCLUSION 

The New Chinese who have worked, done business, and settled down in Cambodia since 1990s have significantly contributed to the socio-economic development of Cambodia as well as underpinned the established politico-economic order characterized by the economic dominance of ethnic Chinese and the disparity between the elites and the grassroots.

The findings of this preliminary research illustrate that the public perception of the New Chinese in Cambodia is generally positive, although there are some social tensions and anti-Chinese sentiments. The New Chinese are the dominant economic actor mainly involved in trading, services, and manufacturing, and are a critical force shaping Cambodia’s politico-economic order. 

The main issue for the New Chinese is social integration as they are already strongly immersed into the Cambodian economy. Language barriers and misunderstanding, lack of mutual respect, and lack of knowledge of local culture and norms are the key issues that need to be addressed. Social tension is expected to rise unless policy interventions are introduced. 

ENDNOTES


[1] Chheang, Vannarith (2019) The political economy of Chinese investment in Cambodia. Trends in Southeast Asia No.16. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 

[2] Pal, Nyiri (2014) New Chinese migration and capital in Cambodia. Trends in Southeast Asia No. 3. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 

[3] Willmott, William (1967) The Chinese in Cambodia. Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 

[4] Chin, James (2017) “Ethnicise networks and local embeddedness: The new Chinese migrant community in Cambodia” in Min Zhou (ed., pp. 187-206) Contemporary Chinese diasporas. Palgrave Macmillan.

[5] Chin, James (2017) “Ethnicise networks and local embeddedness: The new Chinese migrant community in Cambodia” in Min Zhou (ed., pp. 187-206) Contemporary Chinese diasporas. Palgrave Macmillan.

[6] Shihlun Allen Chen (2018) Social spacing, organizational development and network utility of Chinese business organisations in Cambodia. International Journal of Anthropology, 8:11, 12-24.

[7] Leo, Suryadinata (2021) A rising China affects ethnic identities in Southeast Asia. ISEAS Perspective No. 74, Issue 2021. /wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_74.pdf

[8] Shihlun Allen Chen (2015) Socialising Chineseness: Cambodia’s ethnic Chinese communities as a method. A dissertation submitted to the University of Hawaii at Manao. https://www.academia.edu/13313902/SOCIALIZING_CHINESENESS_CAMBODIA_S_ETHNIC_CHINESE_COMMUNITIES_AS_A_METHOD

[9] Shihlun Allen Chen (2018) Social spacing, organizational development and network utility of Chinese business organisations in Cambodia. International Journal of Anthropology, 8:11, 12-24.

[10] Chin, James (2017) “Ethnicise networks and local embeddedness: The new Chinese migrant community in Cambodia” in Min Zhou (ed., pp. 187-206) Contemporary Chinese diasporas. Palgrave Macmillan.

[11] Verver, Michiel (2019) ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Chinese business in Cambodia’s capital. Trends in Southeast Asia No. 17. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

[12] Wright, Goerge (2018) “Anti-Chinese sentiment on the rise in Cambodia”. The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/anti-chinese-sentiment-on-the-rise-in-cambodia/ 

[13] “How Chinese money is changing Cambodia”, Deutsche Welle (DW), 22 August 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/how-chinese-money-is-changing-cambodia/a-50130240 

[14] Sim Vireak (2019) Sihanoukville: A Cambodian city losing its ‘Cambodian-ness’, The Diplomat, April 20, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/sihanoukville-a-cambodian-city-losing-its-cambodian-ness/

[15] Jing Luo and Kheang Un (2020) Cambodia: Hard landing for China’s soft power? ISEAS Perspective No. 11, Issue 2020, /wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_111.pdf 

[16] Cambodia’s Hun Sen: “If I don’t rely on China, who will I rely on?”, Nikkei Asia, May 20, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia/The-Future-of-Asia-2021/Cambodia-s-Hun-Sen-If-I-don-t-rely-on-China-who-will-I-rely-on

[17] State of Southeast Asia Report 2022, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, /articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2022-survey-report/

[18] Han, Enze (2021) Non-state Chinese actors and their impact on relations between China and mainland Southeast Asia. Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue 1, 2021. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

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2022/41 “Social Media Discourse in Malaysia on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Rationales for Pro-Russia Sentiments” by Benjamin Y.H. Loh and Munira Mustaffa

 

A woman in front of her destroyed house in the village of Moshchun, northwest of Kyiv, on 20 April 2022. Picture: Genya SAVILOV, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • In late February 2022, Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which sent shockwaves around the world. As the world responded with sanctions against Russia, Moscow increased its public relations campaign to justify its invasion and recast the narrative in the media and on the internet.
  • The Malaysian government’s initial responses were mixed, with the Prime Minister refraining from naming Russia as the aggressor but ultimately voting to support the UN resolution to condemn the invasion.
  • Malaysian social media were abuzz with discussions on the conflict, with different groups articulating both condemnation and support for Russia.
  • The research in this paper, using digital ethnography, examines pro-Russian sentiments and unpacks them for possible explanations for why such views prevail amongst Malaysians.
  • Four key themes emerged from our analysis. These were: perceived Islamist solidarity, pervasive animosity towards Western hegemony, preference for neutrality and pacifism, and the delegitimization of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy.

* Benjamin Y.H. Loh, is Senior Lecturer (School of Media and Communication) at Taylor’s University, Malaysia, and an associate with the Asia Centre in Bangkok; Munira Mustaffa is the founder and Executive Director of Chasseur Group. She is also a non-resident fellow at Washington, DC’s New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, and a fellow at Verve Research. Both guest writers would like to thank Amirul Adli Rosli for his support in gathering data for this paper.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/41, 22 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Another battle was raging online even as Russian rockets dropped on Ukrainian cities. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which sent shockwaves throughout the world, generated a polarising debate online. As the United States, Canada, and the European Union enforced harsh sanctions on Russia for its invasion, Moscow intensified its public relations efforts to exert control over the narrative expressed in the media and on the internet, blocking Facebook in tit-for-tat fashion, as Google imposed restrictions on Russia’s state-controlled media outlets in Ukraine and elsewhere.[1]

Two days after the invasion, Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri issued a statement saying Malaysia was “seriously concerned over the escalation of conflict in Ukraine” and urging for de-escalation without explicitly mentioning Russia as the aggressor.[2] Although Malaysia eventually voted in favour of the UN resolution condemning Russia,[3] several questions were raised over Malaysia’s purported condoning of Russia’s conduct and over its ostensible claims of “neutrality”.

To many pro-Russia sympathisers across the political spectrum in Malaysia, Russia is perceived as the potent alternative “superpower” that can compete with Western neo-colonialism and influence on equal grounds, even as Moscow is engaged in direct acts of imperialism. They subscribe to the belief that global politics can only be interpreted through the binary framework of corrupt and evil western imperialists versus honourable and wrongfully accused benevolent Eastern superpowers (as framed by western media and experts).

Malaysia’s administration is no stranger to sending confusing signals and contradictory messages. Former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad openly defended Russia, despite the fact that Bellingcat’s open-source intelligence reports and the Dutch Safety Board’s extensive investigations established that Russia was involved in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014 by providing the Buk surface-to-air missile launcher to Moscow-backed separatists.[4] Known for being scathingly anti-West, Mahathir Mohamad, who is well-known for being sceptical of Western media, argued that Russia had been “scapegoated” for the plane’s downing over eastern Ukraine.[5]

Given the escalating geopolitical tensions across the world, it is critical to study how cyberspace can be a highly contested environment for powerful state actors. Information warfare has become an integral part of adversarial state and non-state actors’ non-kinetic strategic approaches to influence foreign policy, undermine diplomatic relations, erode public confidence, and distort the truth. This paper will present key narratives that appear to resonate amongst pro-Russian Malaysians and will unpack the potential rationales behind them.

MALAYSIA’S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: IMPLICATIONS

Malaysia is not short on information access; according to one study, around 89.6 percent of Malaysians are likely to be online by 2025.[6] But in Malaysia’s pursuit to become a highly developed nation in terms of information technology, policymakers and local stakeholders have neglected to consider public resiliency (through media literacy) towards maligning campaigns being part of their strategic communications framework. As a consequence, Malaysia, like the rest of the world, was unprepared for this era’s reiteration of one of the oldest forms of warfare – the weaponisation of information – which was further exacerbated by a raging worldwide pandemic.

It is crucial to understand that deception, misinformation, and mal-information are not a new problem; they have existed for millennia. Nonetheless, the arrival of social media and the proliferation of multiple platforms have aggravated the matter, since social media provide a permissive environment for the weaponisation and cross-pollination of contaminated information. Among the most pernicious consequences of this phenomenon is the public’s deteriorating faith in mainstream news media and their government, causing people to seek alternative sources, even if these are unverified or derived from untrustworthy sources.

Being a world-shaking event, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict resulted in the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation and malinformation as people attempted to explain the conflict and understand it. On social media platforms that are highly frequented by Malaysians (such as Facebook, Twitter and Tik-Tok) and online forums, the most prevalent argument was that “Ukraine had provoked Russia first”.

Given that the vast majority of studies on propaganda and narratives is focused on the Western audience, little is known about the Global South audience and their response to the West’s confrontation with Russia. Because of this, Western observers are perplexed that many in the Global South are bolstering support for Russia’s right to attack Ukraine and reiterating the assertion that Ukraine and NATO “provoked” Russia by being increasingly a danger to Russian national security. This article focuses on Malaysia as a case study for examining the narratives that the country’s social media users subscribe to where that conflict is concerned.

In this article, disinformation is defined as, “the deliberate and coordinated spread of falsehoods”, while misinformation is defined as, “the unintentional spread of falsehoods”.[7] Malinformation is described as “Information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person, organization or country”.[8]

METHODOLOGY

This study includes collecting materials across social media platforms between early February and late March 2022, with a particular emphasis on accounts, pages and posts that proclaim pro-Russia attitudes. The data were gathered via digital ethnography, and then analysed through the use of critical discourse analysis using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

Data was gathered from 1142 tweets on Twitter, and dozens of posts and threads from Facebook and the Lowyat.net forums which drew significant responses, to perform this research. A Twitter search for relevant phrases and hashtags was conducted, and data were manually collected from Twitter’s platform. The study focused specifically on Malaysian users and the content they shared between February and late March, and covered both Bahasa Melayu and English-language sources.

The posts selected were those which had at least 40 responses, which resulted in the smallest post studied being one that had 42 responses, and the largest being one that had 8,088 comments. We coded comments that showed clear support for Russia in the conflict, after which we coded and categorised them into several overarching themes that represented the different rationales used in support of the invasion. We hope to shed light on the key themes that resonate with Malaysians and to understand why they have taken root amongst them.

Figure 1: Based on the selected data, the graph illustrates a surge in public interest following the February invasion.

THE POLITICAL DIGITAL DIVIDE: AN OVERVIEW

Many Malaysians actively participate in online discussions, and a considerable number of them show great interest in significant political events, both local and global. Russia’s justification of its invasion of Ukraine generated an internet firestorm, and many Malaysian social media users framed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a positive development necessary for “de-nazification” as well as a response to “NATO provocations”. According to our findings, support for Russia’s invasion is not concentrated in a single political camp, but rather is dispersed throughout the political spectrum, from reactionary right-leaning groups to militant left-leaning ones.[9] Although the political right and left in Malaysia are diametrically opposed to each other, in this instance, many of them share common viewpoints, such as a shared contempt for the West (particularly the United States), and they hold favourable views of Russia as the preferred alternative “superpower”, with President Vladimir Putin embraced as the “strongman” capable of withstanding Western leaders. Their support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine is mostly motivated by two factors: first, a common bond of enmity with Putin against a Western world that they characterised as “anti-imperialist”; and second, Malaysian conservatives see Putin as more tolerant of Muslims, owing to Russia’s developing ties with the Islamic world.[10]

Notably, this same segment of Malaysians who support Russia are unlikely to feel the same way about China, for a number of reasons. To begin, despite the fact that significant economic deals have been negotiated between China and Malaysia’s political stakeholders, many Malaysians are wary of Chinese investments being used for graft, jeopardising Malaysia’s sovereignty and resulting in the country deferring to China’s sphere of influence and becoming financially dependent on them.[11] Second, Malaysians in general are suspicious of Chinese media outlets just as much as they are of Western news organisations, despite’s China’s increased efforts to improve its image and control its narrative in the region.[12] This is because many of Malaysia’s conservatives harbour strong anti-China sentiments, owing in part to China’s adventurism in the South China Sea and its persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang, even despite a Malaysian minister’s controversial blind acceptance of China’s description of concentration camps as “re-education camps”.[13] Thirdly, China’s influence operations are mostly focused on cultivating support among the region’s Chinese diaspora.[14] Finally, Malaysia’s experience with the Communist insurgency from 1968 to 1989, aided by British propaganda, produced an antipathy to anything approximating Communism, and many Malaysians regard China as a Communist state, while Malay grassroots dread being overrun by Chinese people.[15] In essence, China’s superpower position is emphasised more at the policy level – specifically in economics and security – than among the public at large. 

KEY NARRATIVES

Using critical discourse analysis, this study subjected the samples to an in-depth analysis to determine the narrative themes that appeared most often. These turned out to be: Antisemitism, anti-Western hegemony, power dynamics, strongman leadership, and pragmatic neutrality/pacifism.

Perceived Islamist solidarity against an Israel-supporting nation

A dominant narrative in the conservative spaces of Facebook and TikTok was one that appealed strongly to Islamists, tipping them to favour Russia against Ukraine in the conflict. Numerous arguments offered by the social media users are reminiscent of Islamist discourses prevalent in Indonesia, and is steeped in a strong “Us versus Them” mentality. These arguments portray Russia and Putin as allies of Islam and Muslims, and regularly highlight Ukraine’s condemnations of Palestinian aggression,[16] Russia’s “humanitarian assistance” in Syria, and Putin’s “moderate” approach to Islam in comparison to that of Western nations. There are certain parallels between Malaysian Islamist rhetoric and Indonesian Islamist arguments, which have been extensively discussed by other researchers and the media.[17]

Pervasive Anti-Western posture (or “Whataboutism”)

The pervasive attitude, which is interestingly shared across the political spectrum online (even among those who profess support for Ukraine), is that of anti-Western hegemony. The period leading up to the invasion, during which NATO trainers withdrew swiftly from Ukraine as an invasion seemed likely, further cemented the notion that Western powers were the instigators of this crisis and, when the going got tough, simply abandoned their “friend.” They believe this exemplified the West’s duplicity in antagonising non-Western nations, and then fleeing when the stakes grew too high. In this context, Russia’s invasion is seen as a response to the “threat” to Russia instigated by NATO and its attempts to recruit Ukraine. Events such as the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the more recent US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan that led to the Taliban’s return, have solidified the view that the West tends to interfere with other nations with little or no consequences. Because of this, they would diminish the significance of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine through the use of “whataboutism” by bringing up America and NATO’s previous involvements in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

This anti-Western bias manifests itself in extreme distrust of any mainstream media outlets linked to the West. Many of the social media commentators across all platforms have been eager to label reports from Western sources as “propaganda,” “fake news,” and other derogatory phrases. At the same time, they do not hesitate to use Russian-affiliated media outlets (particularly RT) to bolster their assertions. As social media platforms began to prohibit Russian-affiliated media outlets for propagating disinformation, these Malaysian commentators began to use that as proof to support their belief of duplicity on the part of Western corporations.

Dedication to abject neutrality and pacifism

Many felt the need to support Russia, or at the very least, support the invasion as a way to maintain pragmatic neutrality, and condemned the act of directly dressing Russia down, which they saw as a breach of Malaysia’s “neutral position”. The rationale was that since Malaysia was not a party to the war, it should abstain from any verbal involvement in it.

These viewpoints overlooked the invasion’s broader consequences, which could promote the harmful idea that military strength is a sufficient justification for invading one’s sovereign neighbours. Proponents of this viewpoint believe that Russia as a “superpower” can win this “special operation”, and they are convinced that it may shift its focus and target “Third World” countries that ally themselves with the West against them.

This narrative seems to imply that resisting an overwhelming greater force is a fundamentally foolish endeavour and a losing ideology. Proponents of this viewpoint appear to believe that it is much more preferable that a nation relinquishes its autonomy to survive as opposed to organising resistance which may eventually be crushed. This idea is likely to be borne from Malaysia’s political landscape which is frequently dominated either by strongman-style politics or political blue-bloods which entitled them to immediate fear and respect. There is a notion of self-serving pacifism which these so-called neutrals prioritise as a tactic to avoid any confrontations.

Delegitimization of President Zelenskyy

A contempt for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy resonated almost universally among those supporting Russia. Almost every allusion to Zelenskyy online would be framed as “pelawak” (comedian) or “badut” (clown). Before entering politics, Zelenskyy was both a comedian and an actor. This is despite Zelenskyy’s formal credentials as a trained lawyer.

Zelenskyy was also described as a “pawn of the West” engaged in a personal conflict with Russia against the will of the Ukrainian people. Some commenters viewed him with scorn because of his Jewish ancestry, while others believed him to be a reckless leader who was using common Ukrainian people as his “shield”. Throughout the invasion’s early stages, many questioned Zelenskyy’s determination, assuming he would abandon the country in order to save himself. When Zelenskyy made no indication of doing anything of the sort, rather than recognising his tenacity, commitment to his people and devotion to the war cause, they began to claim that he was really hiding in Poland or another country due to the secrecy surrounding his movements and activities.

Numerous commenters hastened to dissociate Zelenskyy from the Ukrainian people, with many making allegations that Ukrainians were coerced into war by Zelenskyy’s hubris in “provoking” Russia. There were various arguments raised about whether he was a Western agent (i.e., for NATO or Israel) or a clueless populist. 

CONCLUSION

This paper’s main findings give insights into online behaviour regarding this conflict, and highlight several significant pro-Russia arguments circulating within Malaysia’s social media and information space.

A substantial portion of the problem stems from poorly executed regulations governing information access, fact-checking, and expertise by government stakeholders. Malaysia’s own conflicted portrayal of the country’s stance has also contributed to further distorting the narrative and weakening faith in mainstream news outlets.

Government stakeholders’ policies for navigating this digital environment still need a significant amount of work in order to improve public resilience. This is because structural deficiencies in the country, such as educational institutions and strict government regulation of the media, can limit people’s ability to develop the critical thinking and media skills necessary for navigating the digital reality. Social media firms should also step up efforts to prevent malicious messaging from being disseminated via their platforms (e.g. Twitter’s “state affiliated media” warning readers of potential bias and propaganda in the tweet). A majority of the narratives studied being written in Bahasa Melayu underlines the challenges faced by social media companies in mitigating the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories owing to certain languages being a continuous policy blind spot for them.

ENDNOTES


[1] YouTube blocks Russian state-funded media channels globally. (2022, March 11). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/mar/11/youtube-blocks-russian-state-funded-media

[2] Statement by Prime Minister of Malaysia: The Situation in Ukraine. (2022). Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia. Retrieved April 1, 2022, from https://www.pmo.gov.my/2022/02/statement-by-prime-minister-of-malaysia-the-situation-in-ukraine/

[3] General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine. (2022, March 2). UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

[4] The Bellingcat Team, “MH17 – The Open Source Investigation, Three Years Later,” Bellingcat, July 17, 2017, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/07/17/mh17-open-source-investigation-three-years-later/.

[5] “Malaysian PM Says Russia Being Made a Scapegoat for Downing of Flight MH17,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, June 20, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-mh17-malaysia-idUSKCN1TL0OW.

[6] Malaysia: Internet penetration rate. (2021). Statista. Retrieved April 2, 2022, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/975058/internet-penetration-rate-in-malaysia/

[7] Ireton, C., & Posetti, J. (Eds.). (2018). Journalism, fake news & disinformation: Handbook for journalism education and training. UNESCO. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265552

[8] ibid

[9] In Malaysia, right-leaning groups (conservatives) often hold feudal ideals and are concerned with maintaining current social institutions, while reactionary rights tend to reject or oppose progressive social advances. In their quest for equality, left-leaning activists are generally hostile to the existing political and economic status quo. See also Nungsari Radhi, “Inequality – The Missing Left and in The Malaysian Context,” The Edge Markets, March 27, 2018, https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/mysay-inequality-%E2%80%94-missing-left-and-malaysian-context.

[10] Damien Sharkov, “Putin Declares Russia an ‘Ally’ to Islamic World,” Newsweek (Newsweek, June 16, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/putin-declares-russia-ally-islamic-world-464160.

[11] Jason Lim, “Malaysia – and No Southeast Asian Nation – Should Be Bullied by China,” Lowy Institute (The Interpreter, June 8, 2021), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/malaysia-no-southeast-asian-nation-should-be-bullied-china. See also Peter Hays, “The Impact of Chinese Investments in Malaysia’s Economy and Strategy,” Global Risk Insights, September 26, 2017, https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/09/impact-chinese-investments-malaysia/.

[12] “Malaysia under China’s Growing Media Influence, Says Freedom House Report,” Malaysiakini, December 18, 2020, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/507301.

[13] Noah Lee and Ray Sherman, “Malaysian Minister Criticized for Comments about Visit to Uyghur Camp,” Benar News, October 11, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/China-Uyghurs-07022019123612.html.

[14] Timothy Heath, “Beijing’s Influence Operations Target Chinese Diaspora,” War on the Rocks, February 28, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/.

[15] Amy Chew, “Beijing the Bogeyman: How Fake News Fuels Fears in Southeast Asia,” South China Morning Post, December 18, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3029668/beijing-bogeyman-how-fake-news-fuels-fears-malaysia-and.

[16] Akram, F., & Shurafa, W. (2022, March 17). In Gaza, Palestinians with Ukraine ties watching with empathy as Russian attack continues. PBS NewsHour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/in-gaza-palestinians-with-ukraine-ties-watching-with-empathy-as-russian-attack-continues

[17] See Chew, A. (2022, March 17). Russia and Ukraine jostle for support of world’s largest Islamic group. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3170667/russia-and-ukraine-jostle-support-worlds-largest-islamic-group; Strangio, S. (2022, March 9). Why Are Indonesian Netizens Expressing Support for Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/why-are-indonesian-netizens-expressing-support-for-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/; Why are Indonesians on social media so supportive of Russia? (2022, March 19). Al-Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/19/why-are-indonesians-on-social-media-so-supportive-of-russia

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
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Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/40 “Cambodia’s Post-Pandemic Recovery and Future Growth: Key Challenges” by David Freedman and Jayant Menon

 

The Buddhist Institute building, situated next to modern commercial buildings, in Phnom Penh on 29 June 2020. Photo: Tang Chhin Sothy, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Almost two years after the pandemic, Cambodia is moving ahead with re-opening. An impressive vaccination campaign and pragmatic economic policies have helped position the country for economic recovery.
  • However, risks remain and three key challenges must be addressed to support recovery and long-term growth.
  • The first challenge relates to maintaining health security and the need to strengthen the healthcare system. Had there been more healthcare capacity, a more targeted approach in managing the outbreak would have been feasible, reducing the toll on the economy and livelihoods.
  • Second is supporting new sources of growth. With the construction and real estate boom ending, future growth must come from diversification within agriculture and manufacturing, with a move towards higher value-added activities. A revival in tourism will aid recovery but will need to cater to higher-spending tourists.
  • The last challenge relates to managing financial sector risks. The forbearance measures related to the pandemic and growth slowdown have increased the indebtedness of banks and households. While a gradual winding back may avert a financial meltdown, increased regulation and supervision are required for long term financial sustainability.

* David Freedman was the Head of Economics, Strategy and Programming at the Asian Development Bank’s Cambodia Resident Mission during 2020-2021.Jayant Menon is Senior Fellow in the Regional Economic Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. They thank Cassey Lee, Siwage Negara and Tham Siew Yean for useful comments without implicating them in any way.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/40, 20 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Cambodia was one of the first countries in Asia to record a case of COVID-19 and was also heavily impacted by the pandemic. Two years later, it is moving ahead with re-opening. An impressive vaccination campaign and pragmatic economic policies have helped position the country for economic recovery. However, risks remain. This brief summarizes developments in 2020-2021 and highlights three key issues in support of recovery and long-term growth.

Strict border controls helped Cambodia avoid widespread transmission of COVID-19 during 2020, but this changed in February 2021 with a major outbreak in Phnom Penh. The disease quickly spread to all provinces of the country, triggering school closures, lockdowns, and other measures to slow transmission of the virus. For most of 2021, Cambodia was in a race between the vaccine and the virus. Vaccination began in January 2021 with donations of Sinopharm vaccines from China, and accelerated through the year as the government leveraged bilateral ties to secure additional vaccine supplies. Clear public communication, a rapid expansion of vaccination to include younger children, and a pragmatic area-based approach to vaccine rollout all contributed to an exceptionally quick vaccine rollout.

Cambodia recorded its first case of the Omicron variant in December 2021. This new variant spread rapidly, with the 7-day moving average reaching 550 cases in late February 2022 before a change in testing protocols brought reported case numbers down. Despite this threat, economic activity has continued to recover. Mobility, which is a good short-term proxy for economic activity, had largely returned to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2021 and has not been severely impacted by the spread of Omicron. Flight connectivity and international visitor arrivals also started to improve, albeit from a low base.

These developments have positioned the economy for recovery in 2022, with the IMF forecasting growth of 5.1 per cent for the year, following a contraction of 3.1 per cent in 2020 and estimated growth of 2.1 per cent in 2021 (IMF, 2021a). This return to growth is encouraging, but the recovery remains fragile. In 2022 and beyond, policy makers will need to address three key challenges to safeguard the recovery: (i) maintaining health security; (ii) supporting new sources of growth; and (iii) managing financial sector risks.

Challenge No. 1 – Improving health surveillance and healthcare capacity

Although the COVID-19 pandemic is not yet over, it is clear that poor countries in particular need to be better prepared for future health and related crises, which are likely to become more frequent.

Cambodia recorded its sharpest daily decline of COVID-19 cases when they fell from 978 on 30 September to 232 on 1 October 2021 (Figure 1). The overnight reduction of 76 per cent was due to a change in the approach taken on testing. By eliminating random testing of asymptomatic individuals, the reported numbers now only reflected cases presented for testing following the onset of symptoms.

With the sharp drop in testing, case numbers remained predictably low for some time, leading to the easing of lockdowns and the opening of borders in November 2021. So, is this approach to ending the pandemic illusionary or visionary? The answer depends on whether it is time to redefine the pandemic by changing how it is measured. In other words, do circumstances warrant a shift in focus from infection rates to hospitalisation rates? This in turn depends on vaccination rates on the one hand, and the capacity and quality of the healthcare system on the other.

Figure 1

As noted, Cambodia’s record on vaccinations has been remarkable. The vaccination rate in February 2022 at above 80 per cent of its population is one of the world’s highest with the WHO reporting that 99.0% of all adults have received two vaccine doses (WHO, 2022a). The government has also been proactive in expanding vaccine coverage to children and offering booster doses from different manufacturers to increase immune response. As a result, over 80 per cent of the population were fully vaccinated by March 2022, and population-level immunity continues to improve.

Although adequate supplies of vaccines from China and other partners were important in the vaccination outcome, Cambodia deserves credit for managing the logistics efficiently, enabling a rapid rollout under challenging circumstances. Work to strengthen vaccine supply chains has continued and the government has expanded its cold-chain infrastructure to enable nationwide rollout of mRNA vaccines for booster doses and vaccination of young children.

Despite these ongoing investments, Cambodia’s health system capacity remains among the lowest in Asia. For instance, there are currently only 0.7 hospital beds per 1,000 people, compared to 2.6 in Vietnam and an average 4.7 amongst the OECD countries. This suggests that a future surge in cases of a new COVID-19 variant requiring hospitalisation could quickly overwhelm the healthcare system. So, how does the decision to drastically reduce testing affect this risk?

Reduced testing makes the case positivity rate – the share of tests returning a positive result – less useful. Apart from being an indicator of the adequacy of testing itself, it can also be used to monitor the outbreak and introduce pre-emptive measures. The rate fell from 12.8% on 28 May 2022 to 7.0% on 19 June, presumably due to the lockdown.[1] However, subsequent reductions, including the sharp decline in October 2021 and March 2022 were driven by changes in testing policies

Figure 2

Re-opening while reducing domestic health surveillance like testing could backfire if emerging signs of an outbreak that could overwhelm the healthcare system are missed as a result (see Menon, 2021a). This converts risk, where the probability of occurrence can be estimated, into uncertainty, where it cannot. The early warning system should therefore be retained and strengthened. The recent increase in cases in Cambodia due to transmission of the Omicron variant, is testimony to the need for continued, effective surveillance. The recent return of healthcare system stresses as a result of Omicron in Hong Kong and South Korea highlights this concern.

With limited healthcare capacity, Cambodia will have to rely on the efficacy of its extensive vaccination programme, consisting mainly of Sinovac, with booster doses of AstraZeneca and Pfizer. The biggest threat to this approach is the emergence of a new variant that significantly erodes the efficacy of current vaccines in preventing severe disease. This is one of the three scenarios that the WHO (2022b) recently outlined on how the pandemic could evolve in 2022. They warn that in a worst-case scenario, a more virulent and highly transmissible variant that overcomes protection from prior vaccination or infection could result in sudden increases in severe disease and death, especially if early warning systems have been downgraded or disabled. Since the evidence suggests that border closures cannot keep new variants out, mitigation measures through improved surveillance and healthcare systems are the only safeguard (see Menon, 2021b).

The key lesson from the pandemic is the need to increase both the quality and availability of health services. Cambodia had been falling behind on many of its Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) before the pandemic (see Sachs et al, 2021), leaving it vulnerable and exacerbating the negative social impacts of the pandemic. The universal health coverage indicator of SDG 3 on Health and Wellbeing measures the average coverage of essential services for prevention and treatment of infectious and non-communicable diseases for the general and the most disadvantaged population. The score of 60 out of 100 in 2017 (see Sachs et. al., 2021) means that Cambodia was not on-track to achieve its 2030 goals. The pandemic is a further setback in meeting the 2030 goals but the greater awareness of the importance of health system strengthening and the experience mobilizing additional resources for healthcare and social protection during the pandemic may help create momentum for Cambodia to catch up.

Challenge No. 2 – Sustaining future growth

While the economy is projected to return to positive growth in 2021 and pick up further in 2022, long-term growth will depend on public policy choices. To achieve the high rates of growth seen before the pandemic, Cambodia will need to implement a well-targeted programme of investments and reforms.

During 2010-2019, Cambodia’s economy grew by more than 7 per cent per annum on average, making it one of the fastest growing countries in the world. This growth was initially fueled by large inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), strong growth in garment manufacturing and tourism, and rural-urban migration of workers from agriculture into manufacturing and services. However, over time the sources of growth shifted to become increasingly reliant on construction and real estate, which was unsustainable. Property development boomed as investors sought to capitalize on rising urbanization, strong demand from foreign buyers, and the development of Sihanoukville as a hub for gambling and coastal tourism.

The construction and real estate sectors accounted for 19.0 per cent of all growth in 2010-2019 and accounted for 22.5 per cent of total GDP in 2019 (Figure 3). Having accounted for only 4.8 per cent of FDI inflows in 2011, FDI into construction increased steadily to reach 18.8 per cent in 2019. While prices for residential and commercial property remained below regional comparators, the investment boom led to a growing problem of over-supply that has been exacerbated by reduced demand due to COVID-19.

The construction and real-estate sectors cooled significantly in 2020-2021. The close linkages between construction, real-estate, and the financial sector mean that further corrections in the property market could spill over to the rest of the economy. Even if the property and real-estate sector can achieve a soft landing, it is unlikely to be a major source of growth in the medium term. Cambodia will therefore need to rely on productivity improvement and upgrading of agriculture, manufacturing, and other services as the main drivers of growth going forward. Achieving this will require continued investments in infrastructure and human resources as well as reforms to reduce transaction costs and facilitate private investment.

Significant investments are already underway to improve competitiveness. The Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville expressway, which will halve travel time between the two cities, is due to be completed in 2022, while construction of new airports to serve Phnom Penh and Siem Reap is progressing well. The government has also implemented reforms to reduce the cost of doing business. An online business registration service was launched in 2020, followed by an online licensing platform and a new investment law in 2021. The new investment law includes enhanced incentives to stimulate skills development and investment in high-tech industries, but it will not become fully effective until implementing regulations have been approved.

Figure 3.

FDI inflows to construction, real estate, and accommodation ($ million), and as a share of total FDI (%)

Source: Authors’ estimates using data from Royal Government of Cambodia.

In addition to economy-wide interventions, the government should also consider sector-specific initiatives to boost growth. Cross-country comparisons suggest that much of the potential benefit of moving workers from agriculture into other sectors have already been realized. While the inter-sectoral transfer is usually associated with a one-off increase in the level of productivity, future growth will require adoption of improved technologies and an intra-sectoral reallocation of factors towards production of higher-value differentiated products or higher value-added activities.

Exports of agricultural products have been growing steadily and the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) and a forthcoming agreement with South Korea offer additional opportunities to expand agricultural exports. To realize this potential, Cambodia will need to strengthen the infrastructure and institutions for trade in agricultural products. This includes development of laboratory and food safety capacity as well as specific sanitary and phyto-sanitary protocols for food exports (See Roeun and Hiev, 2022). There is also scope for well-targeted public policy to support innovation in agricultural production and food processing. This includes greater use of digital technologies, as well as introduction and dissemination of more advanced production technologies.

In the manufacturing sector, strong growth in exports of garments, travel goods and footwear (GTF) and approval of new GTF FDI projects in 2021 and Q1 2022 suggest that Cambodia retains a competitive advantage in this sector. However, this is likely to be gradually eroded by rising labour costs and the eventual loss of trade preferences following LDC graduation. While the GTF sector accounted for 57.6 per cent of merchandise exports during Q1-Q3 2021, non-GTF manufacturing exports have been growing rapidly (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Non-garment manufacturing exports, $ million

Source: Authors’ estimates using data from Royal Government of Cambodia.

To sustain this growth, Cambodia should implement measures to strengthen the efficiency and competitiveness of its special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial parks (see Warr and Menon, 2016). Potential measures include adoption of voluntary frameworks to enhance SEZ’s environmental sustainability, improved regulation and facilitation of firms operating in SEZs, and promotion of industry clusters to encourage agglomeration effects. Developing industry-relevant skills will also be crucial, and so the government should collaborate with business associations and manufacturers to develop industry skills transformation maps that can be implemented through public-private partnerships.

Tourism recovery and the shift to higher-value tourism can also contribute to growth but Cambodia will need to improve its competitiveness to achieve this. The government is currently implementing a phased tourism sector recovery plan spanning 2020-2025. Visitor arrivals have increased following the re-opening of borders but remain below 10% of pre-COVID levels.[2] The pandemic is expected to lead to long-lasting changes in tourism demand including increased emphasis on social and environmental sustainability (ADB, 2022). Cross-country comparisons suggest that Cambodia lags on key dimensions of tourism competitiveness needed to capitalize on the shifts in demand. For example, Cambodia ranked 98th in the world Economic Forum’s 2019 Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report and was the lowest ranked country in Southeast Asia, with notable gaps and weaknesses on environmental sustainability, human resources, and tourism service infrastructure.

Challenge No. 3 – Rebalancing the financial sector

An open and facilitating approach to regulation has supported rapid financial sector growth. By 2020, Cambodia had 59 licensed banks and 79 licensed microfinance institutions. It is notable that some of the largest institutions have either full or majority local ownership (Figure 5). Private sector lending has also increased, very rapidly growing at an average rate of 26 per cent per annum during 2010-2019. This growth saw the ratio of private sector credit to GDP almost quadruple from 28.1 per cent in 2010 to 97.8 per cent in 2019 (Figure 6). Despite efforts to promote local currency usage, Cambodia’s financial system has remained highly dollarized and has significant reliance on overseas funding.[3]

Figure 5.

Total assets of selected Cambodian financial institutions in 2019 (KHR million)

Source: National Bank of Cambodia. Banking Supervision Report. 2020.

While rates of non-performing loans remained low, there was a moderate decline in the profitability of financial institutions during 2015-2018 (Figure 7). Such declines in profitability can be a leading indicator of increased risk of financial sector distress (Thegeya and Navajes, 2013). In the banking sector, the rapid growth in lending coincided with an even faster growth in lending for construction and real-estate activities linked to the property boom.

Meanwhile in the micro-finance sector, growth in total lending was accompanied by increased loan sizes and growing concern about over-indebtedness of individuals and households (Cambodian Microfinance Association, 2021).

Figure 6.

Ratio of private sector credit to GDP (%) 2019

Source: Authors estimates using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
 

Figure 7.

Average return on assets and equity of licensed banks in Cambodia (%)

Source: National Bank of Cambodia. Banking Supervision Report, various years

Recognizing the scale of the economic impacts arising from COVID-19, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) moved quickly to introduce a package of regulatory forbearance measures. This included a deferral of the planned increase in the bank’s capital conservation buffer and a loan restructuring programme. The restructuring programme was initially targeted at sectors directly impacted by COVID-19 but was quickly expanded to cover all private lending. Under the programme, banks and MFIs could suspend loan interest and principal repayments and adjust the schedule of repayments without reclassifying a loan as non-performing. This enabled banks and MFIs to accommodate borrowers’ needs for flexibility without large-scale provisioning that would have constrained new lending.

Uptake of the loan restructuring programme has been significant. By end 2021, $5.2 billion in loans had been restructured, equivalent to 12.9 per cent of total private sector lending, and 19.9 per cent of GDP. At the same time, new lending continued to grow. As a result, the total stock of private sector lending increased by 52.9 per cent during 2020-2022, with loans to businesses rising 47.6 per cent while personal loans rose by 73.6 per cent. The restructuring programme was extended several times and is now due to end in June 2022. While reported NPLs have remained low to date, the proportion of loans that are non-performing is likely to increase as the restructuring programme is phased out. No data on the distribution of restructured loans by bank or sector have been published but NBC carried out on-site supervision and stress tests in Q4 2021 to get a better understanding of possible risks. It has also instructed banks to postpone dividend payments in order to retain capital and has encouraged some banks to increase their capital base.

A related concern is that some banks, including large locally owned banks have quite high exposure to the construction and real estate sectors. The growth of the property sector has also been associated with increased shadow banking by real-estate developers. A new Non-Bank Financial Services Authority has been established to strengthen regulation and supervision but will need time to become fully operational. Cambodia’s authorities have also been encouraged to accelerate work on the establishment of a deposit protection scheme, implement measures to prevent money laundering, and clarify the framework for bank resolution (IMF, 2021b).

The recent pace of credit growth cannot be sustained indefinitely, however, and has led to growing concerns about over-indebtedness. The rise in imported inflation through supply chain disruption and increase in energy prices raises concerns over domestic inflationary pressures. However, a sudden tightening in the availability of credit would have a significant impact on economic growth.

Cambodia’s authorities will therefore need to carefully monitor the health of banks and MFIs as the forbearance measures are phased out and be ready to intervene as needed to maintain financial sector stability. Systemically important banks with concentrated exposure to construction and real-estate should be closely monitored. A staged increase in minimum capital requirements could also be used to promote consolidation in the banking and microfinance sectors but would need to be managed carefully.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Cambodia has been heavily impacted by both the direct effects on health from the COVID-19 virus and from measures designed to curtail its spread. Almost two years after the pandemic, Cambodia is moving ahead with re-opening. An impressive vaccination campaign and pragmatic economic policies have helped position the country for economic recovery. However, risks remain, and three key challenges must be addressed to support post-pandemic recovery and long-term growth.

The first relates to maintaining health security and the need to strengthen the healthcare system. The capacity of the healthcare system remains one of the lowest in Asia. Had there been more healthcare capacity to work with, the government could have employed a more targeted approach in managing the outbreak and reduced the toll on the economy and livelihoods.

The second challenge is to identify and support new sources of growth. While the construction and real estate sectors accounted for about a fifth of growth in the decade leading up to the pandemic, this is unsustainable and will not continue. Future growth will need to come from diversification within agriculture and manufacturing, with a move towards higher value-added activities supported by greater investment. Foreign investment is likely to play a key role in enabling this transformation and improving domestic infrastructure, and upgrading local skills will help ensure that Cambodia is well positioned to attract high quality investment. A revival in tourism will also aid recovery but will also need more investment for upgrading to cater to higher-spending tourists.

The third and last challenge relates to managing financial sector risks. The forbearance measures related to the pandemic, cooling of the property sector and slowdown in growth have increased the indebtedness of households and firms. The winding back of the support measures needs to be carefully managed to avoid a financial meltdown, while increased regulation and supervision is required for long-term financial sustainability.

REFERENCES

ADB. 2022. COVID-19 and the Future of Tourism in Asia and the Pacific. Manila https://www.adb.org/publications/covid-19-future-tourism-asia-pacific

Cambodian Microfinance Association. 2021. CMA Lending Guidelines Interim Report, May 2021. Phnom Penh. https://cma-network.org/c/uploads/2022/02/2.-Final-CMA-LG-Interim-Report-May-2021.pdf

IMF. 2021a. Staff Report of the 2021 Article IV Consultation. Washington DC

IMF. 2021b. 2021 Article IV Consultation, Press Release and Staff Report. Washington DC: https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1KHMEA2021002.ashx

Menon, Jayant. 2021a. Is Cambodia’s Endemic Covid-19 Approach Sensible? Fulcrum, 9 November. https://fulcrum.sg/is-cambodias-endemic-covid-19-approach-sensible/

Menon, Jayant, 2021b. “New Covid-19 Strains: Domestic Surveillance, Not Selective Travel Bans, Will Go A Longer Way” Fulcrum, 10 February. https://fulcrum.sg/new-covid-19-strains-domestic-surveillance-not-selective-travel-bans-will-go-a-longer-way/.

Roeun, Narith and Hokkheang Hiev. 2022. Agricultural Exports from Cambodia to China: A Value Chains Analysis of Cassava and Sugarcane. In Menon, Jayant and Vathana Roth (eds.), Agricultural Trade between China and the Greater Mekong Subregion Countries: A Value Chain Analysis, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Sachs, Jeffrey, Guido T.-Schmidt, Christian Kroll, Guillame Lafortune and Grayson Fuller. 2021. Sustainable Development Report 2021 – The Decade of Action for the Sustainable Development Goals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/profiles/cambodia.

Thegeya, Aaron and Matias Costa Navajas. 2013. “Financial Soundness Indicators and Banking Crises,” IMF Working Papers 2013/263, International Monetary Fund.

Warr, Peter and Jayant Menon. 2016. Cambodia’s Special Economic Zones. Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 33(3), 2016, pp. 273-90.

World Economic Forum. 2019. The Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, 2019. Geneva https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TTCR_2019.pdf

World Health Organization. 2022a. COVID-19 Joint WHO-MOH Situation Report 82. Phnom Penh https://www.who.int/cambodia/internal-publications-detail/covid-19-joint-who-moh-situation-report-82

World Health Organization. 2022b. Strategic Preparedness, Readiness and Response Plan to End the Global COVID-19 Emergency in 2022, WHO/WHE/SPP/2022.1, Geneva. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/strategic-preparedness-readiness-and-response-plan-to-end-the-global-covid-19-emergency-in-2022

ENDNOTES


[1] The WHO has suggested that rates under 10 per cent indicate adequate testing (see Menon, 2021a)

[2] Authors’ estimates using data from the Royal Government of Cambodia.

[3] Foreign currency deposits accounted for over 80 per cent of broad money (M2) during 2014-2022 while in 2019, deposit taking corporations had $6.5 billion in external liabilities (equivalent to 24.1 per cent of GDP).

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha.  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng  
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/39 ““Ukraine Today, Taiwan Tomorrow”: Should Southeast Asia Worry?” by Drew Thompson

 

Taiwanese air forces soldiers check an armed US-made F-16V fighter at an air force base in Chiayi, southern Taiwan on 5 January 2022. Photo: Sam Yeh, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder of the possibility that the fate of Taiwan may be eventually decided by military force.
  • Japan and Australia have recently taken steps, especially through strengthened security ties with the US, to contribute to efforts to deter Beijing from using force, indicating their changed assessment of the expansive regional risks posed by a cross-Strait conflict.
  • For Southeast Asian states, the clear preference is to avoid becoming embroiled in a cross-Strait conflict, though it may come at the expense of their own principles and security.
  • Southeast Asian states would face unavoidable political, economic and security risks should cross-Strait tensions reach the point of armed conflict.
  • Eventually, Southeast Asian states may come to recognise that it cannot treat the threat of a cross-Strait war as a distant problem that they must stay out of at all costs. If so, they should consider using their agency to bolster efforts to deter China from resorting to force.

* Drew Thompson is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/39, 19 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

The unresolved dispute between China and Taiwan is the most significant potential flashpoint in Asia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February is a stark reminder that state-sponsored use of military force is not a relic of the past, and the international community lacks the cohesion to deter a regional hegemon committed to using its military to achieve political objectives. Taiwan’s social media resonated with the phrase, “Ukraine Today, Taiwan Tomorrow”, highlighting the public’s increased insecurity and sense of inevitability that China will feel compelled to use force against Taiwan. An open conflict over Taiwan would likely involve the United States and Japan, and would likely also spill over into Southeast Asia. While the majority of US-China bilateral differences and tensions are unlikely to escalate to the point of military confrontation, Taiwan is the principal exception. The senior-most officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) consistently tell their American counterparts that Washington’s support for Taiwan is the most sensitive issue in the US-China relationship.

China insists that the cross-Strait dispute is an internal matter that third countries should not interfere in. Southeast Asian states generally respect this position, limiting their engagement with Taiwan to economic matters while avoiding political and security entanglements. Should cross-Strait tensions increase to the point of conflict, the consequences for Southeast Asia would be dire, raising the question how Southeast Asian countries would be impacted and whether individual states, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), would actively respond to prevent tensions from rising to the point of military conflict.

THE BIGGEST TINDERBOX

The risk that a military conflict breaks out over Taiwan is not an abstract or remote possibility. Beijing sees Taiwan as an intrinsic part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), characterised by its “One China principle”. Achieving unification is a fundamental goal of the CCP, a political commitment it has made over generations of leaders since Mao Zedong, linking unification to the CCP’s very legitimacy and justification for its continued rule. Senior CCP leaders frequently state that the use of military force to achieve unification if peaceful measures fail is reasonable and rational due to the importance of the objective. The legal justification to use military force is enshrined in Article 8 of China’s anti-secession law passed in 2005.[1] China’s Ambassador to the United States, Qin Gang, reminded his American audience in a recent interview that, “China will not commit to giving up non-peaceful means for reunification… the Taiwan issue is the biggest tinderbox between China and the United States.”[2] The ambassador made clear, however, that the threat to use military force against Taiwan is specifically intended to deter Taiwan from pursuing a path towards independence, not provoke a war with America which neither side wants.

PRC pressure against Taiwan has ratcheted up under President Xi Jinping, including rhetoric justifying the use of force to resolve the cross-Strait dispute. Xi’s own 2013 statement that the Taiwan issue “should not be passed down generation after generation” created a sense of urgency as well.[3] Unification is an inherent element of Xi’s “China Dream” of national rejuvenation, making Taiwan a measure of his success and political legacy, and raising the stakes for resolution on his terms, peaceful or otherwise. The threat to deploy the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to attack Taiwan to force unification is made credible not only by the PLA’s increasing capabilities achieved by its two-decade long modernisation and expansion, but by regular demonstrations of force, including PLA air force missions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, naval transits of China’s aircraft carriers off Taiwan’s East and West coasts (which Taiwan officials describe as “encirclement missions”), and recurring military exercises simulating amphibious exercises and attacks on Taiwan.

Taiwan’s government, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, has taken a cautious and pragmatic approach to managing cross-Strait relations, seeking to balance competing interests and desires of Taiwan’s public and Beijing’s political objectives. She has also sought to placate the United States by not succumbing to populism and not openly supporting independence, which would antagonise Beijing and alienate Washington. Taiwan public opinion polls consistently make clear that there is little to no support among the population to unify with the PRC, with the majority of Taiwanese supporting the current status quo, despite a latent desire for independence, which becomes the dominant preference if the threat of military force is removed from consideration.[4] This indicates the success of Beijing’s military pressure campaign and threat to use force as an effective deterrent against Taiwan moving towards independence. Beijing’s uncompromising position on unification by any means, and the failure of economic and political inducements to stimulate Taiwanese popular support for unification, create an uneasy status quo that is increasingly shaped by the growth of China’s military capabilities and the role of third countries underwriting Taiwan’s security.

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA BECOMING THIRD PARTIES

The long-standing US policy objective is to provide Taiwan with the necessary support- diplomatic and military-to enable Taipei to negotiate a peaceful resolution with Beijing, or as the White House’s recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy states, “to ensure an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people”.[5] US economic and military support for Taiwan since the 1950s has effectively underwritten Taiwan’s sovereignty and maintained the current stasis in pursuit of that goal. As China’s military power grows, deterring Beijing from using force against Taiwan becomes more challenging, and requires increased commitments commensurate with China’s increasing threats and capabilities.

The United States is not the only third country concerned about the risk that cross-Strait relations could deteriorate should deterrence fail and Beijing opt for a military solution to the Taiwan issue. Japan and Australia have notably changed their assessments of the risk and consequences of a cross-Strait conflict. Australia’s decision to acquire long-range weapons including tomahawk missiles and nuclear-powered submarines as part of the 2021 Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) agreement indicates its determination to project power as far as Northeast Asia as part of an effort to deter China from using force. Japan has stepped up its acquisition of long-range weapons including a hypersonic weapons programme, and signed an agreement with Australia to deepen military cooperation and enable Australia to operate more seamlessly with Japan in Northeast Asia. Japan’s rationale for these moves was made clear by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who stated, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance.”[6] The fact that Japan and Australia as third parties have taken such significant rhetorical and tangible steps to deter Beijing from using force against Taiwan indicates their changed assessment of the probability and impact of a cross-Strait conflict. Southeast Asian states on the other hand have not made a similar transition, indicating a different perception of the risks and potential benefits of contributing to deterrence efforts to prevent a cross-Strait conflict.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asian states have thus far opted to avoid becoming embroiled in cross-Strait issues, preferring instead to limit engagement to economic relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis, while sidestepping political choices that would antagonise Beijing. Singapore is a notable exception, having a military-to-military relationship with Taiwan that is a vestige of Singapore’s use of Taiwan’s military facilities prior to the establishment of Singapore-PRC diplomatic ties in 1992. However, Singapore does not provide any security guarantees to Taiwan, nor does it have a law similar to the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act. Singapore is the most articulate of the Southeast Asian states regarding concerns about US-China tensions, including the Taiwan issue at its core. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated succinctly at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, “no country wants to choose sides between the US and China”, underscoring the risks that Singapore sees in rising US-China competition.[7] Not choosing sides is popular concept, but it does not take into account Singapore’s own values and agency. In some circumstances, Singapore will make policies based on their own interest, regardless of how it aligns with either PRC or US preferences.

Singapore’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an example where Singapore chose to impose sanctions and denounce the invasion, despite China supporting Russia. Explaining his country’s rationale for opposition at the United Nations, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, underscored Singapore’s commitment to the “fundamental norms of international law and the UN Charter that prohibit the use of force and acts of aggression against another sovereign State”, which is considered “an existential issue” for the country.[8] However, while Singapore’s values reflect its interest in protecting sovereignty and the rights of small states from predation by larger ones, opposing China would be a very difficult decision in the event of China’s invasion of Taiwan.

Unlike China, Russia is geographically distant, and inconsequential economically to Singapore and other Southeast Asian states. Imposing sanctions against China would be costly for Singapore, both politically and economically. China is the largest trading partner to every country in the region. Wide-ranging sanctions of the type imposed on Russia would be devastating to Southeast Asian economies should they be imposed on China. Singaporean public opinion is quite favourable towards China, fuelled by local Chinese-language media which echoes PRC narratives even when it is at odds with government policy such as Singapore’s position on the invasion of Ukraine. Should Singapore’s government strongly oppose a PRC invasion of Taiwan, public opinion would likely run against it. Furthermore, Taiwan lacks diplomatic relations with any Southeast Asian state or status in the UN, making its sovereignty ambiguous. This lack of recognition gives Singapore and Southeast Asian states a justification for not choosing sides in a cross-Strait conflict, should they seek to avoid the considerable political and economic costs of directly opposing and sanctioning China.

While avoidance may be the preferred policy option for most Southeast Asian states should cross-Strait tensions rise, there may come a point when China’s pressure on Taiwan, particularly military pressure, elevates risks to Southeast Asian interests, prompting some countries to contribute to efforts in their own way to discourage China from using force. Southeast Asian states are unlikely to follow Japan and Australia’s lead by hard balancing with the United States and its allies, but regional diplomatic responses are not inconceivable. Singapore hosting the Ma Ying-jeou-Xi Jinping summit in 2015 is an example of the role individual Southeast Asian states can play in leveraging their influence and bilateral channels with Beijing to express their opposition to the use of force and encourage diplomatic solutions. Although ASEAN is not designed to confront external security threats or deter aggression beyond its member states, in the event of a crisis, its member states could be expected to express the lowest-common denominator position which would likely call on all parties to act with restraint, without naming the sides.

Should China lose hope in the prospect of peaceful unification and decide to use military force to compel Taiwan to unify, there will undoubtedly be negative political, economic and security consequences for Southeast Asia.

Security Implications

For ASEAN as an organisation, a cross-Strait military conflict undermines the most fundamental premise of ASEAN itself – the peaceful resolution of disputes without resort to violence, enshrined in Article 13 of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). While ASEAN and its member states will be understandably reluctant to choose sides in a conflict, maintaining its credibility would necessitate at the very least the renunciation of the use of force. While it is likely that ASEAN would call on all sides to exercise self-restraint and avoid violence without singling out China, Beijing’s reliance on military coercion and the threat to use force against Taiwan should heighten strategic anxieties among ASEAN member states, particularly those with their own territorial disputes with China. It would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes. Granted, it may be politically convenient to “other” Taiwan and claim Taipei’s dispute with Beijing is an internal matter and therefore different from the South China Sea (SCS) disputes. However, should the PLA attack Taiwan, the future prospect of peaceful settlement of disputes with China would be greatly diminished, leaving Southeast Asian claimant states in a significantly disadvantageous position in the SCS.

The security impacts to Southeast Asia of a military conflict on its periphery cannot be understated. The Philippines’ security situation would be most directly affected should a conflict break out. The Bashi channel is a strategically important choke point for navy vessels, especially the PLA Navy’s submarines based in southern China, making it certain that belligerents would seek to dominate the space in and around the channel. The Philippines’ territorial air and sea space would undoubtedly be directly affected by a conflict, but it is conceivable that security consequences would extend further. US and Chinese naval and aviation forces are unlikely to restrict hostilities to a defined box around Taiwan. Both the US Navy and PLA Navy would have incentives to use SCS choke points to target naval vessels transiting from the Middle East to enter the primary theatre around Taiwan. US and PLA air forces would be operating throughout the region as well. The Taiwan theatre would undoubtedly encompass Southeast Asia.

How a cross-Strait conflict ends would impact Southeast Asia as well. A successful conflict to unify Taiwan would undermine US credibility, potentially leading to a reduced US military presence in the region, or US inability to deter China from using force to settle other territorial disputes. Countries that enable a sustained US military presence in the region would be confronted by an empowered, hegemonic Beijing willing to more actively pressure smaller states to reject the US military or curtail its activities in the region. Military success in Taiwan could lead to China establishing a sphere of influence over Southeast Asia, greatly diminishing the autonomy and sovereignty of Southeast Asian states. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to deter an emboldened China, having successfully used military force to take over Taiwan, from repeating the feat, regardless whether China’s adversary is a US ally or not. Furthermore, China’s suzerainty over the SCS and its sea lanes would impact the security and economies of all Southeast Asian states, as well as Northeast Asian states dependent on SCS sea lanes. It is worth noting that the SCS is not the only route between the Indian Ocean and Northeast Asia, but it is the shortest, and therefore the cheapest and most efficient. Longer transit routes increase shipping costs – a key input that would contribute to rising costs of virtually all commodities and finished goods in the region.

Should China mobilise the PLA to unify Taiwan and fail, it is difficult to find a silver lining in that cloud either. Political turmoil in Beijing is a potential outcome. A frustrated CCP and PLA unable to achieve their primary political objective through the use of force might seek validation and redemption through a military campaign against a less-capable adversary in a territorial dispute with Beijing, potentially in the SCS.

Economic and Humanitarian Concerns

Taiwan’s economy is large, ranked 23rd in the world by GDP, behind only Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Its industries are integrated into regional supply chains, and Taiwan is a major source of foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia. A conflict would not only disrupt supply chains and economic activity on Taiwan itself, but Taiwan-invested companies in China would likely curtail their activities, including payments to mainland workers, further disrupting Southeast Asian and global supply chains relying on integrated manufacturing bases in both China and Taiwan. More importantly, economic activity throughout China would be disrupted by a massive military mobilisation effort. Commercial aviation and maritime trade would be impacted, with planes and ships re-routed away from the conflict zone and wartime risk insurance increased, while hoarding and uncertainty would also drive up costs, driving inflation. Economic impacts would be broad – not just the cost of disrupted technology supply chains centred on Taiwan and its highly prized integrated circuit industry, but the regional costs of food, energy, commodities and consumer goods as well. Possible US and allied sanctions against China would magnify the economic damage caused by military mobilisation and the conflict itself.

Another concern is over labour mobility between Taiwan and Southeast Asia, which is both a political and economic issue. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Labour, there were over 718,000 workers from Southeast Asia resident in Taiwan before the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily from Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[9] As Taiwan’s economy grows, its working-age population shrinks, and the government reforms its immigration policy, that number is expected to increase. Taiwan is therefore an important source of remittances to Southeast Asia. In the event of a cross-Strait conflict, large numbers of citizens from Southeast Asian states resident in Taiwan would face substantial threats to their personal security and safety.

CONCLUSION

With clear political, economic and security consequences arising from a cross-Strait conflict, Southeast Asian interests undoubtedly lie in maintaining the current peaceful status quo, but the question is how much political capital would Southeast Asian states be willing to spend to maintain it. The peaceful resolution of disputes should be a bottom line for Southeast Asian states, just as it is a principle for ASEAN. Regional interests extend beyond maintaining credible pathways to peaceful resolution of SCS disputes, too. ASEAN’s own conception of a cooperative and inclusive Indo-Pacific, as well as its centrality, is challenged by the use of force to settle disputes on its periphery.

Southeast Asia is a cross-road, benefitting from its strategically important location across vital sea lanes, as well as the intrinsic advantages of each country’s industrious population and complementary economies. Globalisation and connectivity that have made Southeast Asia so central to Asia’s prosperity also make it vulnerable to conflict-induced global disruptions. ASEAN and Southeast Asian states had little incentive to directly intervene and contribute to efforts to dissuade Vladimir Putin, particularly when the United States and Europe were so actively engaged prior to Russia’s invasion. Ukraine is more distant than Taiwan, affording Southeast Asian states the luxury of standing on the sidelines. However, a military conflict in Europe will undoubtedly have an impact in Southeast Asia, whether it is economic disruption and inflationary pressures, or the humanitarian consequences of violent incidents such as the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014 over eastern Ukraine. Taiwan, however, is contiguous to Southeast Asia, so the consequences will undoubtedly be greater.

In 1956 at the outset of the Cold War, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that neutralism is an “immoral and short-sighted conception”, as he sought to rally allies behind America in its competition with the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, pragmatically walked back that assertion, recognising India and other countries’ commitment to non-alignment while noting that the United States itself had once remained neutral and avoided entanglement in European conflicts. For Southeast Asian states, the clear preference is to avoid becoming embroiled in a cross-Strait conflict, but eventually, the question is not how they can stay neutral or not choose sides in a conflict involving the three largest economies on the planet. The issue is whether they can continue to assess that a war on their doorstep is a distant problem that they must stay out of at all costs, or whether they will use their agency to contribute to efforts to deter China from using force, impressing upon Beijing that peaceful settlement of disputes with all parties, including Taiwan, is a core Southeast Asian interest that they are ready to defend.

ENDNOTES

[1] Anti-Secession Law, National People’s Congress, 15 March 2005, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm.

[2] “Ambassador Qin Gang Takes an Interview with NPR Morning Edition”, PRC Embassy to the United States, 28 January 2022, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/dshd/202201/t20220129_10636444.htm.

[3] Bonnie Glaser, “Xi Jinping’s Speech Fails to Deliver what the People of Taiwan Want”, Asia Dialogue, 21 January 2019, https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/01/21/xi-jinpings-speech-fails-to-deliver-what-the-people-of-taiwan-want.

[4] Lin Chia-nan, “Poll says 72.5% of Taiwanese willing to fight against forced unification by China”, Taipei Times, 30 December 2021, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2021/12/30/2003770419. See also: “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland”, Election Study Center National Chengchi University, https://bit.ly/3L08LW8.

[5] The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, The White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

[6] Isabel Reynolds, “Invasion of Taiwan by China would be ‘economic suicide’, former PM Abe warns”, Japan Times, 1 December 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/12/01/national/abe-china-taiwan.

[7] Transcript of Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Shangri-La Dialogue on 29 May 2015, https://mfa.gov.sg/Overseas-Mission/Geneva/Mission-Updates/2015/05/press_20150529.

[8] “Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Ministerial Statement on the Situation in Ukraine and its Implications”, 28 February 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/02/20220228-Ministerial-Statement.

[9] “Cabinet urged to review migrant worker policy amid labor crisis”, Central News Agency, 21 January 2022, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202201210013.


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2022/38 “What’s Next for ASEAN-UK Dialogue Relations?” by Joanne Lin

 

ASEAN and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their relationship through a “Joint Ministerial Declaration on Future Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)” on 15 September 2021. Photo: ASEAN.ORG

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The United Kingdom (UK) was accorded the status of Dialogue Partnership by ASEAN on 2 August 2021. With the UK as ASEAN’s 11th Dialogue Partner, both the partners face the important task of establishing modalities of engagement and charting areas of cooperation across the three Community pillars.
  • Beyond practical cooperation, the UK may have a greater ambition to explore strategic engagement with ASEAN.
  • ‘Global Britain’ is the new identity that the UK post-Brexit seeks to assume on the global stage, and especially in Southeast Asia. The UK aims to raise its status in as many of the region’s multilateral platforms as possible, and is “upping its game” through its increasing political dialogues, military presence, and socio-economic initiatives with ASEAN.
  • While noting the UK’s security interest in the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN needs to continue serving as an anchor in the regional architecture through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and to promote synergy through ASEAN-led mechanisms.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/38, 14 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom (UK) was accorded the status of Dialogue Partnership by ASEAN on 2 August 2021. Despite ASEAN having a moratorium in place on Dialogue Partnership since 1996, the decision was made given the UK’s relationship with ASEAN on its own merits as well as its past cooperation and engagement with ASEAN as a member of the European Union (EU).[1]

With the UK as the 11th Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, both the partners face the important task of establishing modalities of engagement and charting areas of cooperation across the three Community pillars. Beyond practical cooperation, the UK may wish to explore strategic engagement with ASEAN through ASEAN-led mechanisms, starting with an Observership status at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus. ASEAN will have to find ways to allow meaningful participation from the UK in these sought-after platforms without further exacerbating major power rivalry—especially between the US and China/Russia—within these platforms. At the same time, ASEAN has to find ways to engage the UK meaningfully in its tilt to the Indo-Pacific while cementing its central role in the region.

This paper will examine the various dimensions of the new ASEAN-UK Dialogue Partnership and explore ways in which both sides may cooperate substantively in areas of mutual interest and more strategically in the Indo-Pacific.

SUBSTANTIATING THE DIALOGUE PARTNERSHIP

In substantiating the new dialogue partnership, ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to establish dialogue and cooperation mechanisms, namely the ASEAN-UK Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), the ASEAN-UK Senior Officials’ Meeting, and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) Plus One Session with the UK, in accordance with the Guidelines for ASEAN’s External Relations. These mechanisms will meet once a year and will allow ASEAN and the UK to review current cooperation, explore future areas of cooperation in strengthening the partnership, and exchange views on regional and international issues.

It is important for ASEAN and the UK to carefully chart out practical cooperation over the next five years, by building on the foundations of the UK’s strong bilateral relations with ASEAN member states and in line with its priorities.

The Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) and the Ambassador of the UK to ASEAN have been tasked to draft a five-year ASEAN-UK Plan of Action (POA). The POA is expected to be adopted at the first Post Ministerial Conference Plus One session with the UK in August 2022.

ASEAN and the UK may consider some potential areas of cooperation in line with the UK’s priorities in the region and potential funding sources available including a £300 million Official Development Assistance to support economic and social development in Southeast Asia.[2] Available funding[3] includes the South East Asia Prosperity Fund,[4] the UK’s Newton Fund,[5] the Fleming Fund,[6] the International Partnership Programme, as well as specific programmes for ASEAN such as the ASEAN Economic Reform Programme (£19.7 million) and the ASEAN Low Carbon Energy Programme (£15 million).

Potential Political-Security Cooperation

The UK enjoys good diplomatic relations with all ASEAN member states. Having played a pivotal role in the establishment of many international organisations and being a member of the Group of 7 and Group of 20, the UK is well-positioned to work alongside ASEAN in promoting key values and principles such as a rules-based international order and multilateralism.[7]

As the highest defence spender in Europe coupled with longstanding bilateral defence relationships with most ASEAN Member States (including a support unit in Singapore and a military Garrison in Brunei), the UK is also well-suited to support capacity building and knowledge sharing in defence cooperation across the region.

The UK’s extensive experience in combating transnational crime and cybersecurity—being the 3rd most powerful cyber nation in the world[8] with an investment of over £1.9 billion through the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre—will allow ASEAN to tap into its expertise in areas such as cybercrime, money laundering, and trafficking in persons through regular consultation with the ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC).

Potential Economic Cooperation

The UK was the second-largest economy in the EU before Brexit. It is also an important economic partner of ASEAN; total trade between ASEAN and the UK amounted to £36.2 billion[9] in 2021 (to the end of Q3). Foreign Direct Investment to ASEAN stood at US$7.9 billion in 2019.[10]

With trade being at the heart of Global Britain, the UK is working towards replicating some of the over 40 FTAs that it was previously part of under the EU, and a future FTA between ASEAN and the UK cannot be ruled out—especially since the UK is currently negotiating FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam.[11] The UK has also launched negotiations to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—in which Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam are members—and may consider acceding to ASEAN Plus FTA which has an accession clause, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the future. However, the likelihood of an ASEAN-UK FTA[12] will depend on whether the level of ambition of the UK aligns with what ASEAN can accommodate.

Apart from further boosting trade and investment ties, the Joint Ministerial Declaration on Future Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the UK, adopted at the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) – UK Consultation on 15 September 2021, has also identified several areas of cooperation such as (i) promoting economic recovery and supply chains resilience; (ii) promoting a multilateral trading system to strengthen commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO); (iii) developing regulatory standards and systems; (iv) strengthening digital innovation, data governance and e-commerce under the ASEAN-UK Digital Innovation Partnership launched in September 2022; (v) financial technologies (FinTech) and green financing; and (vi) science, technology and innovation, among several others.

Potential Socio-Cultural Cooperation

As a global leader in diplomacy and development, the UK has established strong socio-economic and people-to-people ties with ASEAN member states through close historical links and various initiatives. This is particularly so in education with over 40,000 ASEAN students studying in the UK and over three million British visitors to the region annually. The State of Southeast Asia 2022 Survey[13] has also shown that the UK remains the region’s second top choice in tertiary education after the US.

The availability of various funding sources set aside by the UK Government will enable ASEAN and the UK to enhance cooperation on a few key fronts including: (i) education and scholarships such as the Chevening Scholarship Programme; (ii) skills development including Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and English language training; (iii) health including joint research on COVID-19 and vaccines production; (iv) climate change; (v) humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness including support to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre); and (vi) strengthening people-to-people exchanges through tourism, sporting and exchanges in the cultural and creative sectors.

EXPLORING STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

A Dialogue Partnership status with ASEAN will certainly be a stepping stone for the UK to seek membership in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

With its global standing, the UK will most likely fulfil the membership criteria in all ASEAN-led mechanisms. The UK is a sovereign state (unlike the EU), a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, and a High Contracting Party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) since 2012. In addition, it has Embassies or High Commissions in all ten ASEAN member states and is able to contribute positively to regional peace, stability and prosperity.

However, the UK is aware that its membership in ASEAN-led mechanisms including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will not be automatic and requires separate requests to be made to the respective mechanisms. For over a decade, none of the ASEAN-led mechanisms has accepted new membership,[14] observing a de-facto moratorium to ensure the effectiveness of the mechanism.

Furthermore, the admittance of new members into these mechanisms, particularly the EAS may require consulting with non-ASEAN EAS members following ASEAN’s decision. The UK as a strong political ally of the US and a member of the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) could face some level of resistance from both China and Russia.

The challenge for the UK is further compounded by two longstanding Dialogue Partners—Canada and the EU—who have been requesting to join the EAS and the ADMM-Plus for several years, with no success.

However, despite these challenges, the UK has applied for an Observer Status[15] [16] for the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups (EWG) for Peacekeeping Operations and Military Medicine in 2018. The deliberation is ongoing with a decision expected to be reached in 2022.

While noting the UK’s strategic ambition in the region, a common understanding between ASEAN and UK is the importance of substantiating the new dialogue relations before seeking additional membership. However, being aware of the UK’s aspirations will help ASEAN prepare for future scenarios. ASEAN member states that have strong strategic and political linkages with the UK may also advance the lifting of moratoriums on these ASEAN-led mechanisms.

THE UK IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

In February 2021, the UK Government published a policy paper on “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy”[17] in a tilt to the Indo-Pacific.[18] The review noted the Indo-Pacific region as being at the “centre of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints” such as the South and the East China Sea, nuclear proliferation, climate change and transnational crimes.

As such, the UK has vested interests and is increasing its defence and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond the UK’s strong historical and naval ties with regional countries (including through the Five Power Defence Arrangement),[19] the UK has also taken a stronger stand on the South China Sea[20] with several Royal Navy warships conducting freedom of navigation operations[21] in recent years.

The UK’s Carrier Strike Group,[22] [23] led by HMS Queen Elizabeth has completed a series of engagements with several ASEAN member states, with more planned for the future. The UK has also deployed two Patrol Vessels (HMS Sprey and Tamar)[24] for a five-year Indo-Pacific Mission which can assist regional states (together with local navies) in addressing non-traditional security issues including drug smuggling and IUU fishing. A Littoral Response Group is also expected to operate in the Indo-Pacific from 2023.[25]

The UK has highlighted that its future prosperity and security are increasingly dependent on developments in the Indo-Pacific, and expressed commitment to building partnerships across the Indo-Pacific region including with ASEAN – as mentioned eight times in its policy paper.[26] The UK through various platforms (including at the ASEAN and G7 Foreign and Development Ministers meeting in December 2021) has reaffirmed its support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which envisages ASEAN centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Apart from seeking closer relations with ASEAN, the UK has announced in September 2021 a new enhanced trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines, and other security cooperation. While the initiative will help strengthen the UK’s defence credentials in the Indo-Pacific, mixed views have been recorded in the region. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2022 Survey Report,[27] 36.4% of respondents felt that the AUKUS arrangement will help balance China’s growing military power, 22.5% opined that it will escalate the regional arms race, while 18% are of the view that it will weaken ASEAN centrality.

The assessment of AUKUS may be premature, but UK’s resolve to work with allies and partners to build capacity and preserve maritime security in the region is clear. The UK’s credibility as a partner of ASEAN can be enhanced by involving ASEAN in some of its strategic engagements and activities in the region. A good starting point could be through the four key areas of cooperation in the AOIP, including maritime, economic, connectivity and sustainable development.

CONCLUSION – WAY FORWARD

‘Global Britain’ is a new identity that the UK post-Brexit seeks to assume on the global stage, especially in Southeast Asia – a region growing in economic and geopolitical significance. The UK aims to gain status in as many of the region’s multilateral platforms and at the highest level as possible. It is “upping its game” in the region by increasing political dialogues, military presence, and socio-economic initiatives with ASEAN.

ASEAN may tap into the strength and expertise of the UK in its integration and community building across all three Community pillars. The new Plan of Action between ASEAN and the UK, building on areas of mutual interest will further strengthen the Dialogue Partnership, once adopted in 2022. Strategically, noting the UK’s security interest in the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN needs to continue serving as an anchor in the regional architecture through the AOIP.

ASEAN may also need to find a roadmap to concretise the AOIP and substantiate key areas of cooperation that will allow like-minded partners such as the UK to meaningfully engage with ASEAN vis-à-vis their Indo-Pacific strategies. This will help cement ASEAN’s central role in the Indo-Pacific region and promote synergy through ASEAN led-mechanisms.

ENDNOTES


[1] ASEAN, Joint Communique of the 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 2 August 2022, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Joint-Communique-of-the-54th-ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Meeting-FINAL.pdf

[2] UK Mission to ASEAN, https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/uk-mission-to-asean

[3] UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK-ASEAN factsheet (updated 11 February 2022), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-asean-factsheet/uk-asean-factsheet

[4] South East Asia Prosperity Fund, https://blogs.fcdo.gov.uk/southeastasiaprosperityfund/

[5] The Newton Fund builds outstanding research and innovation partnerships with countries in Asia, Africa and America. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/newton-fund-building-science-and-innovation-capacity-in-developing-countries/newton-fund-building-science-and-innovation-capacity-in-developing-countries

[6] The Fleming Fund is UK’s aid programme supporting up to 24 countries across Asia and Africa to tackle antimicrobial resistance. https://www.flemingfund.org/

[7] The ASEAN-G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 12 December 2021 was an example of the UK’s role in bringing together like-minded partners to reaffirm key values.

[8] UK Cabinet Office, Policy Paper on Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 2 July 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

[9] UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK-ASEAN Factsheet, updated on 11 February 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-asean-factsheet/uk-asean-factsheet

[10] ASEAN, ASEAN Investment Report 2020-2021, September 2021, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/AIR-2020-2021.pdf

[11] The Diplomat, Global Britain: Why the United Kingdom Needs ASEAN, 5 July 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/global-britain-why-the-united-kingdom-needs-asean/

[12] UK’s level of ambition in its potential FTA with ASEAN needs to be taken into consideration, particularly if it is ambitious and comprehensive. In addition to typical FTA clauses, the UK may be interested to include non-traditional value-based trade provisions such as human rights, labour rights, environment, fair and ethical trade, and sustainable development-related issues. ASEAN may prefer to keep these issues separate from FTA negotiations.

[13] Seah, S. et al., The State of Southeast Asia 2022 Survey Report, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022, /wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-State-of-SEA-2022_FA_Digital_FINAL.pdf

[14] EAS accepted the last two members, Russia and the U.S., in 2011. ADMM-Plus since its inauguration in October 2010 has not accepted any new members. Sri Lanka was the last member to join the ARF in 2007. A moratorium on accepting new states was adopted at the same time and sustained at the 15th ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2008.

[15] Since June 2021, the decision on new ADMM-Plus members or observers will be made solely by ADMM i.e. ASEAN member states, and not the plus-partners. Prior to this decision, the application of the UK, EU, Canada, and France has met some resistance from China and Russia.

[16] Ian Storey and Hoang Thi Ha, ‘Global Britain’ and Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospect, ISEAS Perspective Issue 2021 No. 130, 1 October 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_130.pdf

[17] UK Cabinet Office, Policy Paper on Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 2 July 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

[18] Lynn Kuok, From Withdrawal to Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’: Southeast Asia welcomes enhanced British security presence, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 11 August 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/08/southeast-asia-british-security-presence-indo-pacific-tilt

[19] Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK.

[20] Ian Storey and Hoang Thi Ha, ‘Global Britain’ and Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospect, ISEAS Perspective Issue 2021 No. 130, 1 October 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_130.pdf

[21] East Asia Forum, Is ASEAN too ‘Far East’ or just right for Global Britain?, 4 June 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/04/is-asean-too-far-east-or-just-right-for-global-britain/

[22] Ian Storey and Hoang Thi Ha, ‘Global Britain’ and Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospect, ISEAS Perspective Issue 2021 No. 130, 1 October 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_130.pdf

[23] The carrier group included Type 45 destroyers and Type 23 anti-submarine frigates, support vessels, a submarine, plus a Dutch frigate and U.S. destroyer. Aircraft included a mix of RAF/Royal Navy and US Marine Corps F-35 Lightning combat aircraft, Wildcat and Merlin helicopters.

[24] Relatively small and lightly armed, the Offshore Patrol Vessels will be less controversial than larger warships and are better suited for working with the navies of ASEAN member states which mostly operate similar-sized vessels. Their small size will enable them to visit a larger number of regional ports. In an era of great power competition, this arrangement avoids the political sensitivities associated with permanently hosting foreign warships.

[25] East Asia Forum, The United Kingdom’s ‘tilt’ toward the Indo-Pacific, 18 June 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/18/the-united-kingdoms-tilt-toward-the-indo-pacific/

[26] UK Cabinet Office, Policy Paper on Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 2 July 2021.

[27] Seah, S. et al., The State of Southeast Asia 2022 Survey Report, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022, /wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-State-of-SEA-2022_FA_Digital_FINAL.pdf

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2022/37 “Migration in Post-coup Myanmar: A Critical Determinant in Shaping the Country’s Future?” by Aung Tun

 

People who have fled due to fighting between the military and the Karen National Union (KNU) line up to receive food at a temporary lodging for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Karen state, along the Thai-Myanmar border, on 25 December 2021. STR/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Since the February 2021 coup, migration—both internal and external—has taken on new importance in Myanmar, to the degree that this may be called a “Myanmar migration moment”.
  • The reason for increases in migration is clear: security concerns.
  • Migrants driven out of the country in the aftermath of the coup have reinforced the existing populations of migrants abroad and in some liberated areas in their determination to topple the junta.
  • Migration also plays a critical role in the power politics of electoral processes in Myanmar. This current migration trend, which could be more significant than earlier patterns of migration, will shape the political landscape in Myanmar now and in the future. It could also create conflict amidst heightened ethnic identity issues.
  • Many young and energetic Rakhine migrants have returned to their homeland of Rakhine State as revolutionary soldiers. They are now pursuing the collective Arakan nationalist dream instead of their personal dreams of a better life outside the state.

* Aung Tun is Visiting Fellow, Myanmar Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He has over thirteen years of professional experience in working in various policy, governance. community and economic development projects on Myanmar.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/37, 13 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Since Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup, internal and external migration has become a pronounced form of social mobilization. A key reason is very clear: security concerns. Many Myanmar people have been forced to go into hiding, while others have fled to avoid atrocities committed by the State Administration Council (SAC) regime. In addition, many people have chosen to migrate in order to prepare to fight back against the regime in various ways. Some have also emigrated in order to survive economically since many businesses have been closed down in Myanmar, which has suffered the compounded impacts of the coup and Covid-19. In all, hundreds of thousands of Myanmar migrants have been on the move in quite a short period. This condition could be called a “Myanmar migration moment”.

In fact, migration will continue until political and economic stability returns to the country. This will be hard, and will require a political settlement that brings peace to Myanmar.[1] The implication is that Myanmar’s migration moment could prove lasting and that it could have serious impacts on Myanmar’s political, social and economic landscape now, in the near future, and in the long term. This migration could utterly reshape Myanmar.

TRADITIONAL MIGRATION VS. MIGRATION RESULTING FROM THE COUP

Migration is not in any way new to Myanmar. A well-known Myanmar proverb on migration refers to the benefits of moving where there is clear water and (fresh) green grass. The proverb refers to the condition in which people need to migrate to new areas simply in order to make a better life. Myanmar society has a culture of mobility. A 2019 survey taken across Ayeyarwaddy and Mandalay Regions and Rakhine and Shan States found that approximately a quarter of all households surveyed had at least one migrant member.[2] However, these findings relate to conventional migrants, who migrate internally or externally to ensure a better life. The major drivers behind conventional migration are economic. Natural disaster is also a key driver for migration. Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in May 2008, created, for instance, many migrants from the Delta region to Yangon and other areas.[3]

Myanmar has been in political turmoil for a long time.[4] The nation’s economic and social policies have not been sound enough to overcome the hardships that people face, above all compared to the policies adopted in neighbouring countries. Those Myanmar people who live close to the country’s borders with its neighbours can easily make migration journeys to enjoy better economic and social conditions. Those who make such a journey are people residing in ethnic areas close to Thailand, China and even Laos. People in the Bamar heartlands like the Ayeyarwaddy Region also migrate through those ethnic areas en route to neighbouring countries.[5] Potential Myanmar migrants move to these same destinations since they already have affiliations with family or friends there.

Following the 2021 coup, this conventional migration pattern has shifted. Warfare has intensified across many areas, including the heartland areas of Myanmar. New migration drivers have dramatically emerged, among them forced migration or displacement. Three key categories of people involved in such migration are a) those who were directly involved in the anti-coup movement, b) those who were not directly involved but supported it, as through participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and other forms of popular resistance, and c) those whom the SAC regime considers politically suspicious. The resulting pattern of displacement contrasts with what happened in previous decades. Political motivation is a crucial driver in this regard. Destinations for migrants are also new. The present choice of destination is for a place that offers safety; it has nothing to do with the considerations that previously drove internal and external migrations, or with ties to family or friends. The usual destinations now are the liberated areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations. Groups active in the liberated areas have apparently attempted to render them ‘really’ liberated in practice. For instance, the Karen National Union announced in February 2022 that all civil servants under the military junta working in some KNU-controlled areas like Hpapun Township, Kayin State, must leave.[6] This challenge drew a migration line, which signaled a welcome to those who were not safe (or felt they were not safe) in regime-controlled areas. This was a critical moment for Myanmar’s internal migration.

MIGRATION IN THE SPRING REVOLUTION

Following the coup, the Spring Revolution became a watershed in Myanmar’s modern history. Unlike other Myanmar revolutions such as the 1988 Uprising and the 2007 Saffron Revolution, this revolution has a concrete advantage—in the form of migration. In comparison with the present, during the decades of those earlier uprisings against military rule fewer Myanmar people were migrants living abroad. The country had isolated itself, and leaving was difficult. The country’s isolation itself was a political tool ensuring that very few people had the chance to witness the progress and prosperity of other countries. Seeing those countries might be a wake-up call to political mobilization inside Myanmar. Over the decade of democratic transition from 2011-2021, Myanmar people were able to migrate more easily and with fewer costs. This condition has resulted in a sizeable Myanmar migrant population abroad, almost everywhere in the world. There are, for example, an estimated 3 million Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, which hosts Myanmar people as the greatest percentage of international migrants of any single country.[7]

These migrants understand that Myanmar has been mismanaged, and that this mismanagement has forced it to be a poorer nation than it needs to be. They can easily compare it with the countries in which they now reside. Understanding this, they are impelled to do something for Myanmar. The best way for them to contribute to Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is to support it in forms that include financial support. In a reflection of such support, the first budget of the National Unity Government (NUG) includes US$700 million in spending, from sources ranging from an international crowdfunding campaign to a covert lottery that is expected to bring in about US$8.4 million per month from domestic and international buyers.[8] In addition, the NUG sold more than US$6 million worth of bonds in less than 12 hours in late November 2021.[9] The victory of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution will depend on the financing that it receives. In this regard, Myanmar migrants all over the world play a vital role, given that those inside the country are facing difficulties such as frozen bank accounts and arbitrary arrests for supporting the NUG and its resistance forces.[10] This same factor also means that the revolution will keep going, thanks to the sizeable number of Myanmar migrants inside and outside the country.

As an example of migration in response to revolution, the Rakhine is exceptional. In the few years before the coup, many Rakhines migrated. Since the coup, they have supported the campaign against the military regime both with monetary donations[11] and through direct participation in warfare against the regime’s troops. For instance, many young Rakhine migrants like those in China have joined the Arakan Army (AA), fighting against the regime’s forces under the inspiration of AA’s “Arakan Dream”[12] or “Way of Rakhita”.[13] Rakhine migrants return home as Rakhine soldiers, not migrants. Many observers are surprised to see how fast the AA resistance has grown; apparently the AA has come largely to control many parts of Rakhine state.[14] Rakhine migrants play a critical role in this regard. Migrants who left in search of work in foreign countries, as well as within Myanmar, have returned to pursue the AA’s dream. This dream is far more important to them than any personal dreams that they may have pursued before.

MIGRATION IN POWER POLITICS

Myanmar migration is not necessarily just migration in search of improved welfare. It is also highly associated with power politics in some cases. The election period was such a case. Migration in this respect includes not only labour migrants but also members of the armed forces. For instance, in the 2020 election, U Soe Thein, a former minister in the president’s office, competed as a candidate of the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the very small Kayah State constituency of Bawlakhe. Just over 8,000 voters reside there. Several reports indicated that strong military support undeniably contributed to the USDP’s continued electoral success in Bawlakhe, as “the three Tatmadaw battalions and Border Guard Forces account for about 980 of the more than 8,000 voters”, according to one report.[15] Members of the armed forces can move around—that is, migrate—during the electoral process for security purposes, and at the same time shape election results in small constituencies in particular. Migrant workers have shaped election results, too. For instance, in Kachin State, the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) blamed the votes of mainly Bamar migrant workers for its poor results despite having secured huge support from Kachin voters in areas like Hpakant and Tani Townships. Gold and jade mining projects attract many migrants to those townships,[16] and they can be initiated anytime and anywhere during the pre-election period as a way to shape the election results.

Apparently, the SAC will add 42 more districts[17] to the country’s current 74; a total of 116 districts will be in place if the plan is actually implemented.[18] While a major reason behind this move is to provide for ‘effective administrative functions’, as claimed by the SAC, it is also understood that the move is related to the next election—promised for 2023, when the SAC also aims to implement a proportional representation (PR) system.[19] PR has pros and cons, as do other electoral systems. Many believe that the goal of its implementation is to secure military power in politics through the 25 per cent seats that the military is constitutionally granted and the seats that pro-military parties will win thanks to PR.[20] In fact, if PR is in place, migration may play an even more decisive role in Myanmar’s elections. The reason is that there will be many smaller districts (or constituencies), and thus fewer eligible local voters than before, as a result of which migrant workers or members of the armed forces would gain more electoral power vis-à-vis those local voters.[21]

The role of migration in Myanmar’s power politics concerns not just the movement of people but also that of a statue: the country’s national hero Bogyoke (General) Aung San. Politicians have erected this statue in, or rather migrated it to, several public spaces under the pretext of affirming his federalism principle, popularly known as the Panglong Agreement.[22] This migration sparked protests across many ethnic areas in particular. The ethnic communities argue that the statues are symbols not of heroism but rather of policies that diminish the rights of the ethnic minorities in the country.[23] Whether the installation of or debate over this statue actually affects elections results remains unknown. Given the political circumstances of migration, however, migration trends following the coup will certainly have a political impact that should not be overlooked. Concerned stakeholders need to pay more attention to migration in their political decision making.

THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN CONFLICTS

Important data on migration trends since the coup are not yet available. These data would record the number of people who have migrated internally and externally since February of last year. But the number is certainly growing, given how many are suffering airstrikes and other attacks by the military. One aid agency has predicted that there would be more than 14 million people—or more than 27 per cent of Myanmar’s total population—in dire humanitarian need in 2022, compared to around 1 million during the pre-coup period. Similarly, the number of people forced into displacement will have doubled, to more than 400,000 people, since the coup.[24] The affected population of over 14 million represents 38 per cent of the total eligible voters—who totalled more than 37 million people—in the Myanmar elections of 2020.[25] How long the ongoing civil war will last remains unknown, and the same is true for the significant movement of people within the country and to external destinations.

These trends have several political implications. The most serious one concerns ethnic identity. A good example was observed in the processing of the 2014 Myanmar census data.[26] The release of data on the sensitive matter of religion occurred in July 2016, after a two-year delay.[27] The data on ethnicity have, however, not been published yet. A reason for the delay in releasing, or the failure to release, those apparently even more sensitive data is that they ‘could shatter transition stability’.[28]

In the case of data on ethnicity, direct political entitlements are involved. Those data could inflame political tensions in the context of the longstanding demands of the country’s various ethnic minority groups for greater autonomy and participation in political decision making. Constitutionally, these ideas are still controversial. For instance, Provision 161/c of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution created a governing system under which ethnic groups—Bamar and non-Bamar alike—that meet a designated population threshold of 0.1 per cent of the nation’s population[29] in a state or region will have the chance to elect their own representatives at the level of state and regional legislatures. In each state or region, the individual elected then becomes a National Race Affairs Minister (NRAM) for that state or region. There are 29 NRAMs in total across many areas.[30] This system itself could create a political problem. For instance, the constitutional provision involved could also be understood as leading to the ‘deepening of (political) competition’[31] among ethnic groups. In this regard, one commenter notes, “I wish they had never included article 161/c. It was put there as a trap that has been set for [non-Bamar] ethnic people to make us fight with each other and distract us from focusing on real issues.”[32]

In addition, migration could trigger conflict when it comes to resource sharing. In some cases, such situations have already arrived. For instance, communities have raised concerns over labour-intensive industries such as jade and gold mining in Kachin State and in the Naga Self-Administered Zone of Sagaing Region.[33]

MIGRATION IN THE CURRENT EFFORT TO BUILD A FEDERAL DEMOCRACY

The coup leadership has claimed that the ‘establishment of a union based on democracy and federalism’[34] is the key to a success for the nation. The democratic forces have also pronounced that the country’s achievement of long-lasting peace and democracy is all about building a federal democratic state. To this end,[35] the Federal Democracy Charter[36] offers core guidance from the current democratic forces. In fact, migration will be of considerable significance in the construction of a federal democratic state. Both external and internal migration will largely shape many important elements of the political setting: voting power, the voting process, ethnicity, ethnic representation, citizenship, the status of minorities, local governance, and so forth.

In fact, migration, including migration prompted by the coup, could have positive impacts on the process of building a federal democracy in which many diverse ethnic groups, including the country’s majority Bamar population, reside in ‘other’ parts of the country, including ‘ethnic’ areas. Members of the Bamar majority themselves have now suffered the atrocities committed by the regime especially in heartland areas such as Sagaing and Magway Regions. Such people now understand how ethnic rights have been violated. They feel sympathy for the ethnic minorities. However, this is just an individual or a community level impact, not one occurring at the institutional level. The nation requires a political pact on how to turn those ‘shared feelings’ into a political compromise ensuring a better coexistence. This action is not only related to constitutional designs but also to changes in the mindset and behaviour of ethnic groups, whether majority or minority. There is now an opportunity for such change. Without it, the same old stories of the majority fighting the minorities will ensue.

CONCLUSION

The importance of ongoing migration in Myanmar must not be underestimated. The current migration landscape has a profound impact on the country now and for the future, and in a wide range of areas including constitutional design, ethnicity, political representation, citizenship, voting power, resource sharing, power sharing and beyond.

Myanmar’s present migration trend will shape many important socioeconomic elements of the country’s future. Migration will also be a decisive factor in shaping the future political landscape—whether it works to reinforce Myanmar’s federal democratic future or triggers further conflict among many diverse ethnicities. For this reason, migration needs to be considered politically, and not just in conventional ways. Ongoing migration is also a driver of attempts to topple the junta, as it relates to factors like financial support for those attempts. The junta is not able to block support for pro-democracy forces coming from migrants outside the country. Given the significant numbers of migrants abroad and in many liberated areas, Myanmar’s migrants—internal and external—now have the leverage to shape the nation’s future.

ENDNOTES


[1] There is very little likelihood of the political stakeholders agreeing to move forward in a peaceful manner that could bring about some return to stability in the country. Currently, the ongoing warfare between the coup regime and anti-coup forces—People’s Defense Forces, the National Unity Government, and some ethnic armed organizations—appears to see them determined to ‘annihilate’ each other. This unfolding crisis also creates many economic migrants since the domestic economy has suffered considerably as a result.

[2] Priya Deshingkar et al, “Capitalising Human Mobility for Poverty Alleviation and Inclusive Development in Myanmar (CHIME)”, International Organization for Migration, 2019.

[3] World Bank, “A Country on the Move – Domestic Migration in Two Regions of Myanmar,” 2016 (https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/a-country-on-the-move—domestic-migration-in-two-regions-of-myanmar).

[4] Since the country’s independence in 1948, Myanmar has faced repeated political crises—notably the 1962 military coup, the 1988 Uprising and, most recently, the coup of 2021—all in the context of a civil war that has lasted more than seven decades.

[5] Author’s interviews with migrants from Ayayerwaddy Region and from the heartlands of Upper Myanmar, 11-20 March 2022.

[6] Mon News Agency, “KNU Brigade (5) Announced All Staff Serving the Military to Leave Hpapun Township”, 2 February 2022 (https://monnews.org/2022/02/02/knu-brigade-5-announced-all-staff-serving-the-military-to-leave-hpapun-township/).

[7] Rosai Wongsuban, “In Limbo: Migrant Workers Struggle with Myanmar Coup and Covid-19”, New Mandala, 9 June 2012 (https://www.newmandala.org/in-limbo-migrant-workers-struggle-with-the-myanmar-coup-and-covid-19/).

[8] Gwen Robinson, “Myanmar parallel government to challenge regime with $700 million budget”, Nikkei Asia, 2 September 2022 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-parallel-government-to-challenge-regime-with-700m-budget).

[9] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Civilian Govt’s Bonds Sale Raises Over 6 Million in under 12 Hours”, 23 November 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-civilian-govts-bond-sale-raises-over-6-million-in-under-12-hours.html).

[10] The public inside Myanmar is having a hard time making donations to the popular resistance since it is believed that the junta controls the banks through its surveillance of who makes transfers to whom; many customers have found their accounts frozen following their donations to the Civil Disobedience Movement, for example.

[11] Frontier, “Nine Held in Myanmar in Arkan Army fundraising probe,” 26 July 2019, (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/nine-held-in-myanmar-in-arakan-army-fundraising-probe/).

[12] For details on the Arakan Dream or the Way of Rakhita, see Kyaw Linn, “‘Way of Rakhita’: dream or nightmare?”, Asia Times, 28 February 2019 (https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/way-of-rakhita-dream-or-nightmare/).

[13] Radio Free Asia (RFA), “A Rare Look at Arakan Army Headquarters”, 16 February 2019 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAW3_M8wLEM).

[14] Radio Free Asia (RFA), “Arakan Army, not military junta, run the show in Myanmar’s Rakhine state”, 19 January 2022 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arakan-army-01192022193040.html).

[15]Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Forever Green: Kayah’s Bawlakhe Township Beats Back the Red Wave”, Frontier, 19 November 2020 (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/category/elections/bawlakhe/).

[16] Nyan Lin Tun, “KSPP Blames Migrant Workers’ Votes for its Election Defeats”, Eleven Media, 16 November 2020 (https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/kspp-blames-migrant-workers-votes-for-its-election-defeat).

[17] Districts are important components of the administrative system in Myanmar, comprising 4.5 townships on average per district. In Myanmar, there are currently 330 townships in 74 districts in total.

[18] The Irrawaddy, “အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး ယန္တရားတိုးချဲ့ရန် စစ်ကောင်စီက ခရိုင်များ ပြင်ဆင်ဖွဲ့စည်းမည်” [SAC is Organizing More Districts for Effective Administration], 21 January 2022 (https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2022/01/21/249153.html).

[19] The Irrawaddy, “Junta Leader Endorses Proportional Representation Election System”, 1 February 2022 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-leader-endorses-proportional-representation-election-system.html).

[20] Nikkei Asia, “Myanmar’s Military Plots to Change Electoral System, Tighten Grip”, 8 November 2021 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-s-military-plots-to-change-electoral-system-tighten-grip).

[21] As of writing, whether Proportional Representation (PR), First Past the Post (FPTP) or Hybrid remains unclear; regardless of this, migrant issues will likely shape the elections in many ways.

[22] On the 1947 Panglong Agreement and its contents, see https://myanmar-law-library.org/law-library/laws-and-regulations/constitutions/the-panglong-agreement-1947.html.

[23] Victoria Milko, “Ethnic Minorities Protest Against Aung San Statues”, Aljazeera News, 19 March 2019 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/29/ethnic-minorities-across-myanmar-protest-against-aung-san-statues).

[24] Refugees International, “One Year since the Coup, Refugees International Calls for Global Action on Myanmar”, 31 January 2022 (https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/1/31/one-year-since-coup-refugees-international-calls-for-global-action-on-myanmar).

[25] Moe Moe, “Over 37M Eligible Voters in Myanmar; Lists for 2020 Poll Not Complete Yet, UEC says”, The Irrawaddy, 28 November 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/over-37m-eligible-voters-in-myanmar-lists-for-2020-poll-not-yet-complete-uec-says.html).

[26] Transnational Institute, “Ethnicity Without Meaning, Data Without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar”, 24 February 2014 (https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/ethnicity-without-meaning-data-without-context).

[27] Some Buddhist nationalists claimed that the Muslim population was growing faster and could pose threats to other religions. See Ye Mon and Pyae Thet Phyo, “After Long Delay, Religious Census Data Proves Less Sensitive Than Anticipated”, Myanmar Times, 22 July 2016 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/21542-after-long-delay-religious-census-data-proves-less-sensitive-than-anticipated.html).

[28] Pyae Thet Phyo, “Census Data Could ‘Shatter’ Transition Stability, Says Official”, Myanmar Times, 24 February 2016 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/19137-census-data-could-shatter-transition-stability-says-official.html).

[29] Article 161/c of the 2008 Constitution states, “Representatives of the State Hluttaw, each is elected from each national race determined by the authorities concerned as having a population which constitutes 0.1 percent and above of the population of the Union, of the remaining national races other than those who have already obtained a respective State or a Self-Administered Area in that State”.

[30] Currently, there are 29 NRAMs in various states and regions: Bamar (5), Kayin (5), Chin (3), Shan (3), Rakhine (2), Lisu (2), Pa’O (2), Kachin (1), Rawang (1), Lahu (1), Kayh (1), Mon (1), Inthar (1), Akha (1). For details, Sarah Clarke et al, “Re Examining Ethnic Identity in Myanmar”, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 31 May 2019 (https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethnic-Identity-in-Myanmar.pdf).

[31] Ibid., p. 40.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Global New Light of Myanmar, “The Speech Made by SAC Chairman on the Occasion of Six Months since SAC Has Taken State Responsibilities”, 2 August 2021 (https://www.gnlm.com.mm/the-speech-made-by-state-administration-council-chairman-senior-general-min-aung-hlaing-on-the-occasion-of-six-months-on-1-august-2021-since-the-state-administration-council-has-taken-the-state/).

[35] The Federal Democracy Charter is the most recent effort at alternative constitution-making in Myanmar; it offers the outlines of a kind of political compromise in the making of a federal democratic future, under the leadership of the National Unity Consultative Council—a body whose membership includes the NUG, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and some representatives of ethnic armed organizations.

[36] See more details on the NUG’s Federal Democracy Charter at https://crphmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Federal-Democracy-Charter-English.pdf.

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha.  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng  
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/36 “Cambodia-Vietnam Relations: Key Issues and the Way Forward” by Kimkong Heng

 

Cambodia’s Prime minister Hun Sen (L) shakes hands with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc (R) prior to a meeting at the Government Office in Hanoi on 4 October 2019. Picture: Nhac NGUYEN / AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • In recent decades, Cambodia and Vietnam have enjoyed strong and deepening bilateral ties, but their relations are not without contention.
  • The unfinished demarcation of their land border has caused persistent disputes between the two countries. This has not only shaped Cambodia’s domestic politics but also contributed to the lingering suspicion among certain Cambodians about Vietnam’s expansionist intentions.
  • Ethnic Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia remain a long-standing problem that has been exploited to fuel nationalist and anti-Vietnamese sentiments in Cambodia.
  • Popular views on Vietnam’s role in Cambodia, particularly regarding its liberation of Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge regime, have been highly divisive, creating tensions in Cambodian society.
  • Cambodia needs to work both independently and collaboratively with Vietnam to find ways to resolve these important issues to ensure healthy and sustainable Cambodia-Vietnam ties.

*Guest writer, Kimkong Heng, is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Cambodia Development Center and an Australia Awards scholar pursuing a PhD at the University of Queensland, Australia. The author would like to thank Mr. Sovinda Po for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/36, 12 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Bilateral relations between Cambodia and Vietnam can be considered a love-hate relationship. As immediate neighbours with a long history of engagement, collaboration and hostility, the two countries have been both friends and enemies. Following the fall of the Khmer Empire in the 15th century, weakened Cambodia was constantly threatened by its two more powerful neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. To counter the threat from Thailand, Cambodia would establish an alliance with Vietnam and vice versa. Cambodia’s formal relationship with Vietnam began in the early 1600s when Cambodian King Chey Chetha II married a daughter of Vietnamese Lord Nguyen Hy Tong.[1] Through the alliance, Vietnamese migrants were permitted to settle in Khmer territory. The complex relationship between the two countries and between Cambodia and Thailand have also led to Cambodia’s diminishing independence over the past centuries.

The Kingdom of Cambodia, which gained independence from France in 1953, officially established diplomatic ties with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 24 June 1967. The relationship was, however, beset with many challenges, both domestic and geopolitical. Despite the ups and downs in their relationship, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, Cambodia and Vietnam have managed to maintain amicable relations over the past four decades. Notably, both countries have often used such terms as “good neighbourliness, traditional friendship, comprehensive cooperation, and long-lasting stability” to describe their contemporary ties.[2]

During a state visit by Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc to Cambodia in late December 2021, Cambodia and Vietnam signed seven agreements covering key areas of bilateral cooperation such as security, defence, education, trade, border, and justice.[3] To mark the 55th anniversary of their diplomatic relations (1967-2022), both countries have agreed to “promote high level contacts and delegation exchanges at all levels, [and] encourage people-to-people exchanges, especially between bordering provinces.”[4] They also emphasized the importance of educating the youth of both countries about their “time-honored friendship, solidarity and mutual trust.”[5]

Notwithstanding their strong and deepening ties,[6] some unresolved issues remain. This article discusses three of these, namely the unfinished border demarcation process, ethnic Vietnamese immigrants, and conflicting views on Vietnam’s role in Cambodia. The article will then outline the way forward to ensure stable bilateral relations.

KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Unfinished Border Demarcation

One of the key issues between the two countries is the ongoing border dispute caused by the unfinished demarcation of their land border. Thus far, only 84 per cent of the border (1,270 km in length) has been officially demarcated.[7] The undemarcated border areas remain a bone of contention. For example, in April 2020, a total of 31 military tents or shelters set up by Vietnamese authorities, were discovered in an undemarcated area along the border, prompting the Cambodian embassy in Hanoi to demand that the Vietnamese side take them down.[8] Vietnam explained that the shelters were built for its forces to guard the area against illegal immigrants that could potentially spread COVID-19.[9] After some diplomatic exchanges, Vietnam agreed to remove the tents once the pandemic was over.

The border issue with Vietnam remains a hot and sensitive topic in Cambodia. In July 2020, Cambodian Confederation of Unions leader Rong Chhun was arrested after he alleged that there were irregularities in the demarcation process and that some Cambodian villagers had lost their land as a result. He was sentenced to two years in prison for incitement to cause serious disorder to social security.[10] Around 20 young activists were also arrested for protesting for his release. Sam Rainsy, a former leader of the now-dissolved opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), has been at the forefront of the border issue, constantly accusing the Cambodian government, especially Prime Minister Hun Sen, of ceding Cambodian land to Vietnam and allowing Vietnamese immigrants to live illegally in Cambodia. He has long exploited the Cambodia-Vietnam border issue and anti-Vietnamese sentiments to achieve political gains. Now living in exile in France, he has been sentenced many times in absentia on defamation and incitement charges, some of which were related to the sensitive border issue.

At present, many Cambodians share a belief that Vietnam harbours expansionist intentions and wants to encroach on Cambodia’s land whenever possible, despite the fact that anti-Vietnamese sentiments in Cambodia appear to have declined in recent years.[11] Believing that Cambodia had lost Kampuchea Krom (Lower Cambodia) and the island of Koh Tral (Phu Quoc in Vietnamese) to Vietnam in the past, these people are concerned that more land may be lost to their eastern neighbour. Such a belief remains prevalent in certain segments of the Cambodian population, preventing advancement towards sustainable and truly amicable ties between the two countries, particularly at the people-to-people level. It also continues to affect the legitimacy of the Cambodian government, which has been repeatedly accused of operating under Vietnam’s influence.[12]

Ethnic Vietnamese Immigrants

Another issue that affects Cambodia-Vietnam relations concerns unregistered or illegal Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Cambodia, ethnic Vietnamese made up 0.3 per cent (about 45,500 people) of the Cambodian population of 15.1 million in 2014. Meanwhile, a 2019-2020 national survey shows that there were 27,477 ethnic Vietnamese (or 0.2 per cent of the Cambodian population) in Cambodia.[13] However, estimates on the number of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia do differ. For example, one source claims the number to be between 400,000 and 700,000, around 90 per cent of whom have no birth certificates or identity cards.[14] Another reported that in 2019, Cambodia had a total of 80,000 immigrants, 72,000 (about 90 per cent) of whom were Vietnamese.[15] These conflicting figures suggest the complexity of the Vietnamese immigrant issue in Cambodia.

Due to the Cambodian government’s seemingly laissez-faire approach toward Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia, the issue remains a sensitive topic that continues to influence Cambodian politics and cause division among Cambodian people. It has long been a sticking point between the two neighbours,[16] which can be exploited to fuel nationalist fervour and anti-Vietnamese sentiments among Cambodians, particularly during election campaigns.

In 2019, Cambodian authorities relocated 4,563 families (54 per cent or 2,480 families were of Vietnamese origin) living in floating houses on the Tonle Sap River in Kampong Chhnang Province to live in a designated 40-hectare land area. This move drew much criticism that Cambodia was giving away land to the Vietnamese,[17] reinforcing the suspicion that the Cambodian government is a “Vietnamese puppet.” There has been a long-held conspiracy theory that the current Cambodian government might not be able to operate independently of Vietnamese influence because it was installed by Vietnam in the 1980s.[18] This logic appears to lack concrete supporting evidence, particularly given Cambodia’s closer alignment with China than with Vietnam and its responses to the South China Sea disputes, which show that Cambodia operates independently of Vietnam’s influence and strategic interests.[19] However, the Cambodian government’s current approach (i.e. lack of strong measures in dealing with unregistered Vietnamese immigrants) fails to dispel doubts and criticism about its close ties with Vietnam.

Conflicting Views on Vietnam’s Role in Cambodia

Cambodia went through one of the darkest periods in its modern history in the 1970s when the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) killed almost two million Cambodians, or around 20 per cent of the Cambodian population at the time. Thanks to the help of Vietnamese forces, the brutal Khmer Rouge regime was ousted on 7 January 1979. However, after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnamese troops continued to stay on in Cambodia for ten more years, until 1989.

The date 7 January marks the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime, and has been celebrated as “Liberation Day” or “Victory Day” by the Cambodian government led by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The celebration pays homage to Vietnam’s critical role in liberating Cambodia from the genocidal regime. However, the same date has also been viewed entirely differently by opposition parties and government detractors. To them, 7 January should be remembered as the day that Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia for ten years. These conflicting interpretations have created “division rather than unity, hostility rather than harmony, and tensions rather than cooperation among Cambodians.”[20]

Perhaps cognizant of the controversies surrounding the meanings of 7 January, the CPP has changed how the historic date is celebrated. In the past two years, fewer activities were held and less energy put into the celebration. The COVID-19 pandemic has been cited as the reason for the change. However, some analysts argued that the key reasons were more of a political and strategic nature.[21]

It should be noted that the importance of 7 January in the CPP’s political discourse is also declining as Hun Sen, who came to power during the 1980s with the support of Vietnam, has announced his intention to step down after the 2023 elections. The CPP has endorsed Lieutenant General Hun Manet, Hun Sen’s oldest son, as a prime minister candidate. To prepare Hun Manet for his political campaigns, the CPP needs to adopt a political strategy and a rhetoric that fit his background and achievements, and these have nothing to do with his father’s legacy involving 7 January. Thus, the CPP is aiming to move away from the controversial and divisive 7 January narrative that it has used for decades.

The new strategy can also be seen as part of Cambodia’s bid to distance itself from Vietnam. As mentioned above, 7 January serves as a reminder of both Vietnam’s help to liberate Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge regime and its decade-long occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s. Thus, the CPP may want to move beyond this controversial date to prepare for future elections while limiting Vietnam’s influence and the conspiracy theory surrounding it. All of these take place against the backdrop of the CPP receiving strong backing from China while facing no credible challengers in the coming elections.

THE WAY FORWARD

To overcome the above challenges, the two countries should consider measures to expedite the border demarcation process. At the same time, the Cambodian government should also find ways to properly address the issue of Vietnamese immigrants and reconcile conflicting views among the Cambodian public about historical issues related to Vietnam.

Expedite the Border Demarcation Process

While working on technical and legal documents,[22] it is essential that both sides expedite the border demarcation process and complete the planting of border markers as soon as possible. This can help mitigate doubts and concerns among Cambodian people about Vietnam’s expansionist intentions. Due to historical reasons, many Cambodians still believe that Vietnam always tries to encroach on Cambodian land whenever feasible. Anti-Vietnamese sentiments remain high, particularly whenever news about border issues with Vietnam arises. Moreover, due to the unfinished border demarcation process and other issues such as Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia, Vietnam has been “the convenient target for the opposition parties to attack the ruling party so as to consolidate their political positions among voters.”[23] As long as these issues remain, opposition parties in Cambodia will continue to play “the Vietnam card” to achieve political gains, reinforcing anti-Vietnamese sentiments and affecting bilateral ties, especially people-to-people exchanges.

Address the Vietnamese Immigrant Issue

The issue concerning Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia is complex because many of them have been living in the Kingdom for decades. Their children were born in Cambodia and live their lives as Cambodians. However, they are still considered Vietnamese as their parents are Vietnamese immigrants, some of whom have not obtained legal rights to remain in Cambodia.

It is essential that the Cambodian government find innovative and inclusive ways to solve this long-standing problem. The government needs to establish specific requirements or criteria to grant citizenship or permanent residence to Vietnamese people who have lived in Cambodia for many years. Vietnamese immigrants who cannot fulfil the requirements have to face deportation. This is a controversial approach, yet it needs to be done to pave the way for a sustainable relationship between the two neighbours.

The success of this process requires political will from both governments, particularly the Cambodian side. The goal is to ensure that Vietnamese people who have resided in Cambodia for many years, albeit without legal rights, can lead their lives on equal terms as Cambodians, provided that they meet a set of criteria designed for this purpose. A clear and transparent immigration policy on Vietnamese immigrants needs to be established. The development of such a policy also needs to consider inputs from stakeholders from both countries, including “government officials, historians, researchers, academics, teachers, students, youth representatives and other concerned individuals or groups in the public, private and non-governmental sectors.”[24]

Reconcile the Conflicting Views on Vietnam

Although Vietnam helped liberate Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge regime, it occupied Cambodia for a decade, which have led many Western scholars to consider the intervention an “invasion.”[25] This historical fact should not be denied, distorted, or politicised and be allowed to breed a culture of division, animosity and prejudice between Cambodians and Vietnamese.

In the same vein, the competing interpretations of 7 January—“Liberation Day” versus “Invasion Day”—have created two dominant political narratives in Cambodia, which are harmful to not only Cambodian politics and society but also to Cambodia-Vietnam ties. It is vital to reconcile the conflicting views regarding the meanings of 7 January and the legacy of Vietnam’s removal of the Khmer Rouge. Leaders and politicians of both countries should “leave the debate on the meanings of this historic event to historians who are capable of grounding their argument in sources and critiques rather than specific political agendas.”[26]

It is also crucial for leaders and supporters of both the ruling and opposition parties, particularly the now-dissolved CNRP, to accept 7 January as “both the historic day that Vietnam liberated Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge and the day that Vietnam placed Cambodia under a decade-long occupation.”[27] Promoting one narrative over the other is not helpful because it perpetuates social and political division in Cambodia and encourages anti-Vietnamese sentiments among the Cambodian people.

CONCLUSION

Given the current context of Cambodian politics, which is shaped by both internal and external factors, such as national interests, nationalist sentiments, electoral politics, and the intensifying US-China strategic rivalry, it can be challenging for Cambodia to maintain good relations with Vietnam due to their long history of animosity and distrust. Although the challenges to bilateral ties identified in this article seem to be under control as both governments are generally on friendly terms, there is no guarantee that this will remain the case in the future. Both countries, especially Cambodia, should therefore find ways to address these challenges.

With Hun Manet being endorsed by his father as the prime minister candidate from the CPP, the prospects of the Cambodia-Vietnam relationship remain uncertain. If Hun Manet is to become prime minister and follows in his father’s footsteps to consolidate power and maintain stability in Cambodia’s ties with its neighbours, Cambodia and Vietnam are likely to remain on good terms. However, in the improbable event that he introduces political reforms and embraces liberal democracy, Cambodia-Vietnam relations will take a new direction, with issues in bilateral ties risking being politicised for electoral gains.

As China’s influence in Cambodia and the broader region grows, the Kingdom is in a delicate situation. It needs to carefully manage relations with Vietnam to avoid antagonizing China, its largest aid provider, foreign investor, and trading partner.[28] However, Cambodia also needs to maintain good and stable relations with Vietnam due to the latter’s proximity and economic, political as well as security significance to the country.

ENDNOTES


[1] Thearith Leng, “Small State Diplomacy: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam,” The Pacific Review 30, no. 3 (2017): 328-347.

[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Joint Statement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the Occasion of the State Visit of H.E. Nguyen Xuan Phuc, President of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to the Kingdom of Cambodia from 21 to 22 December 2021,” 22 December 2021, https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2021-12-22-Press-Release-Joint-Statement-between-the-Kingdom-of-Cambodia-and-the-Socialist-Republic-of-Viet-Nam-on-the-occasi-13-33-27

[3] Suos Yara, “A New Chapter in Cambodia-Vietnam Bilateral Ties,” Phnom Penh Post, 22 December 2021, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/opinion/new-chapter-cambodia-vietnam-bilateral-ties.

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Joint Statement.”

[5] Ibid.

[6] See Suyheang Kry and Terith Chy, “Cambodia’s Relations with Vietnam: Prospects and Challenges,” in Cambodia’s Foreign Relations in Regional and Global Contexts, edited by Sok Udom Deth, Suon Sun and Serkan Bulut (Phnom Penh: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018): 63-82.

[7] Phnom Penh Post, “Border Demarcation Effort Sped Up,” 24 October 2021, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/border-demarcation-effort-sped.

[8] Joshua Lipes, “Vietnamese Military Shelters Remain in Disputed Border Area Despite Cambodian Diplomatic Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 22 May 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/shelters-05222020154046.html.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Kim Sarom, “Chhun Sentenced to Two Years,” Phnom Penh Post, 18 August 2021, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/chhun-sentenced-two-years

[11] Alastair McCready, “Is Anti-Vietnamese Sentiment on the Decline in Cambodia?,” Southeast Asia Globe, 7 January 2021, https://southeastasiaglobe.com/cambodia-vietnam-relations/.

[12] Kry and Chy, “Cambodia’s Relations with Vietnam.”

[13] National Institute of Statistics, “Report of Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2019/20,” 2020, https://www.nis.gov.kh/index.php/en/14-cses/86-cambodia-socia-ecomonic-survey-2019-20.

[14] Minority Rights Group International, “Cambodia – Ethnic Vietnamese,” 7 November 2017, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/ethnic-vietnamese/.

[15] Khorn Savi, “Kingdom Rejects VN Request,” Phnom Penh Post, 20 August 2019, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/kingdom-rejects-vn-request.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Phoung Vantha, “Cambodia Says Relocated Vietnamese Families Cannot Own Land,” Cambodianess, 12 December 2019, https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodia-says-relocated-vietnamese-families-cannot-own-land.

[18] John D. Ciorciari & Jessica Chen Weiss, “Nationalist Protests, Government Responses, and the Risk of Escalation in Interstate Disputes,” Security Studies 25, no. 3 (2016): 546-583.

[19] Veasna Var, “Cambodia’s South China Sea Policy: From ASEAN Aligned to Echoing Chinese Clientism,” in Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea: Cross-National Perspectives, edited by Gordon Houlden, Scott N. Romaniuk and Nong Hong (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021): 193-214.

[20] Heng Kimkong, “January 7 in Cambodia: One Date, Two Narratives,” The Diplomat, 16 January 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/january-7-in-cambodia-one-date-two-narratives/.

[21] Ben Sokhean, “CPP Slams Slander over Victory Day Celebration,” Khmer Times, 10 January 2022, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501003718/cpp-slams-slander-over-victory-day-celebration/

[22] Suos Yamy, “Demarcation ‘Complicated,’” Phnom Penh Post, 24 June 2020, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/demarcation-complicated

[23] Nguyen Vu Tung, “Vietnam-Cambodia Relations: An Analysis from a Vietnamese Perspective”, in Cambodia’s Foreign Relations in Regional and Global Contexts, edited by Sok Udom Deth, Suon Sun and Serkan Bulut (Phnom Penh: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018): 83-100.

[24] Him Raksmey and Heng Kimkong, “Taking Cambodia-Vietnam Relations to New Heights,” Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 13 July 2020, https://cicp.org.kh/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CICP_Op_Ed_Series_Him_Raksmey_and_Heng_Kimkong_Taking_Cambodia_Vietnam_Relations_to_New_Heights.pdf

[25] Theara Thun, “‘Invasion’ or ‘Liberation’?: Contested Commemoration in Cambodia and Within ASEAN”, TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia (2021): 1-17, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.17.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Heng, “January 7 in Cambodia.”

[28] Po and Primiano, “An ‘ironclad friend.’”

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /supportISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.   © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha.  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng  
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2022/35 “Can OTOP Support Northeastern Thailand’s Post-Pandemic Recovery?” by Alexandra Dalferro

 

An extensive array of local products, including traditional handicrafts, cotton and silk garments, pottery, fashion accessories, household items, and food, are included in OTOP – One Tambon (Sub-District), One Product). (Screengrab, RyanKeith TV, OTOP Exhibit Thailand, Zeer Mall, One Tambon One Product, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mo2gwZwxyk).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The OTOP programme sponsored by Thailand’s Community Development Department (CDD) has become synonymous with “community economy” in Thailand’s rural areas.
  • OTOP stands for “One Tambon, One Product;” producers grouped by tambon or sub-district receive support from the CDD to develop a product particular to their locality.
  • OTOP was initiated by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to enhance rural livelihoods and has remained popular among producers and consumers since its inception.
  • OTOP profits are one source of income among many that together compose a “multi-sited livelihood”, helping Thai people to cope with ongoing economic precarity.
  • Even before, and especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, many producers have struggled to make money from their OTOP goods.
  • Case study interviews indicate that the CDD has responded to challenges posed by COVID-19 by making adaptations to the OTOP programme rather than radically changing its structure and premise.
  • OTOP can be viewed as a programme that facilitates adaptation to conditions of precarity rather than as a means to overcome economic instability.

*Alexandra Dalferro is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Her research focuses on the politics, practices, and history of silk production in Thailand, particularly among Khmer communities in Surin Province.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/35, 8 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Thai people all over the country, every person is ingenious and persistent

With intense kindness, just like marvellous holy water

(Men sing) We love our lineage

(Women sing) We love one another like relatives

(Men sing) We love the kingdom

(Women sing) We love sources of livelihood

(Together) The lord of the land, the local places of Thailand, we love forever

Building a foundation and having work to do

Implementing activities, we are rich because… we help ourselves.[1]

Thailand’s Community Development Department (CDD) released this song, “The Community Development March”, on its YouTube channel on 9 February 2022. The accompanying music video opens with shots of groups of CDD officers striding through the forest, and standing with arms resolutely crossed in front of jagged cliffs, azure seas and vegetable gardens. The officers then join people in planting rice, fishing, bowing towards images of Rama X and his father, weaving silk and making other handicrafts. In some clips, people all wear masks, indicating that the video was created during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the masks are the only evidence of the ongoing challenges that the pandemic has posed for Thailand, especially for communities dependent on revenue from tourism and the sale of products like those depicted in the video.

With its buoyant tempo and lyrics, the CDD march is perhaps intended to boost morale among beleaguered Thai citizens and to reinforce some of the central tenets of Thai national identity, such as devotion to the monarchy. The song also encapsulates the department’s official vision, “A stable economy and self-reliant communities”, around which its mission and four-point strategy are constructed. If and when the CDD succeeds in realizing this vision, its work would be finished – and thus its continued existence hinges on never-ending development projects and never-fully-realized stability and self-reliance.

This paper explores the inherent paradoxes in the work of the CDD, and, relatedly, its role in promoting the production and consumption of local products. Such products are ubiquitous in villages across Thailand and are viewed as an important part of local economies, with hopes pinned on their potential to facilitate post-pandemic economic recovery. While their production often endows creators with enhanced social capital, material benefits do not always follow, especially in the 20 provinces that comprise Isan, Thailand’s Northeastern region. This paper argues that, despite the sincerity and good intentions of many CDD workers across Thailand, the department lacks fundamental understanding of the diverse economic, sociocultural and political circumstances of people located geographically beyond Thailand’s urban centres.[2] While these populations are often perceived as experiencing a “lack” of material resources, knowledge, and the capacity for self-reliance, it is in fact policymakers who have a dearth of awareness about the nature of regional precarity and the ways their programming increases livelihood instability for rural inhabitants.[3] The OTOP programme is one example of a project that seeks to improve economic conditions for Thai people in rural areas but in fact may only achieve the opposite. As state offices like the CDD design post-pandemic economic recovery plans to support these communities, they should also consider minimizing the outsized presence of OTOP.

THE CDD AND OTOP

The Community Development Department is part of Thailand’s Ministry of Interior (MOI). It traces its approach to community development back to 1940, when the MOI initiated a plan to improve living conditions in rural areas and to empower rural people to help them become “good citizens”.[4] Today, the CDD has offices in every province in Thailand, and 878 offices at the district level.[5] It is thus a crucial node of connection between state representatives and Thai people in rural areas, as CDD officers appointed to provincial- and district-level positions interact regularly with village leaders and village inhabitants to seek to enhance livelihoods, expand local economies, and promote self-reliance according to the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy.[6] [7]

The CDD’s abstract objectives are concretized in a variety of training and programmes, of which one of the latter is perhaps most recognized among Thai people: OTOP, or “One Tambon, One Product”. A tambon is a sub-district, and, under the OTOP programme, producers grouped by sub-district receive support from the CDD to develop a product particular to their locality.[8] OTOP products are divided into five broad categories that range from food to textiles. Before products can be labelled with the OTOP brand and sold, they must undergo evaluation for quality, consistency and uniqueness. Criteria vary depending on the type of product, but overall considerations include the product’s materialization of a “local story” that reflects the place where it was created, epitomizing one of the programme’s unstated objectives of making sanctioned forms of “Thainess” commodifiable and consumable.[9] At the end of this evaluation process, the CDD assigns stars to products, following a 100-point system; any product with three to five stars is saleable, while products receiving one or two stars are enrolled in CDD programmes for improvement. OTOP promotional materials are designed in ways that implore Thai people to chop chuai chat, or “shop to help the nation”, a request that exposes the incompatibility of this consumption-driven initiative with the CDD’s philosophical underpinnings rooted in ideals of moderation and mindful resource use.

OTOP was initiated in 2001, and many OTOP producers and consumers still associate it with its creator, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin’s widespread popularity, particularly among inhabitants of Thailand’s North and Northeast, is due in part to projects such as OTOP which sought to reduce rural poverty and to enfranchise groups historically excluded from spaces and positions of power.[10]

OTOP POLICIES AND ECONOMICS

OTOP products are mostly sold and consumed outside of their locations of production, mainly at large festivals held three times a year at the Mueang Thong Thani convention centre in Bangkok. Annual provincial-level fairs are common in provinces with many producer groups, and OTOP products can also be purchased at established markets and shops in provincial capitals and villages. Being invited by the CDD to sell at the Mueang Thong fairs in Bangkok is the goal and dream of many producers, as it both signifies that their products are well-regarded by local CDD officers and presents opportunities for them to earn increased revenue. For an OTOP producer group to participate in the Mueang Thong fairs, its product must earn at least a four-star rating. But not all such groups may participate in the fairs, and the selection of OTOP producer groups for the fairs can be competitive and contentious. No standardized protocol is in place across provinces,[11] and producer groups often remark on how the same groups are invited again and again, a non-transparent practice belying the CDD’s goal of equitable income expansion for all.

Districts do receive a number of slots calculated on the basis of the number of producers active in a given district, divided by product category. CDD officers in a district with many OTOP textile-producing groups would thus be permitted to invite a larger number of textile-producing groups to sell their products at Mueang Thong. This method also causes provinces with the most OTOP producer groups to be more represented at national fairs. The most recent data gathered by the CDD, covering 2016-2019, indicate that 87,468 producer groups[12] are active across Thailand. The provinces with the most registered groups are Buriram with 3,143 groups, followed by Surin with 2,831 groups, and then Khon Kaen with 2,682 groups. 186,356 distinct products have been registered from groups across Thailand. The highest number of products from a single province come from Chiang Mai with 6,501 products, followed by Buriram with 5,700 products, and then Ubon Ratchathani with 5,409 products. Except for Chiang Mai, the provinces listed here are all located in Isan, illustrating the significance of the OTOP programme to the regional economy and to local livelihoods.

But how much profit does OTOP actually generate for producers? The programme is so extensive that differentiated data are not publicly available at a single source. In the OTOP Data pages on the CDD’s official OTOP website, annual profits for 2015 through 2019 for each of the three major Mueang Thong fairs are listed. In 2019, combined profits from the three fairs totalled 3,488.7 million baht (US$106.2 million).[13] How this figure translates into the earnings of separate producer groups is impossible to know without further differentiation and research. Many groups take out significant loans to cover costs such as transportation of people and products to the fairs, as well as accommodation and food for the nine-day stays in Bangkok. The CDD provides booth spaces for groups to set up their product displays, but offers no other material support to facilitate participation. Village-level producers often barely break even or, in bad years, remain in debt after the fairs end, and they worry about the time they spend at the fairs away from home, where they could be engaging in more productive activities like farming or the actual making of their products.[14] [15] Yet they also fear that if they refuse the invitation from CDD officers to attend the Mueang Thong festivals, they will not be invited again in the future, and this could impact their local opportunities as well.[16] Though some producers derive their primary source of income from OTOP, most depend on OTOP profits as a still-crucial component of a patchwork or “multi-sited” livelihood that may include smallholder farming, wage labour, remittances, and commerce-related activities, among others.[17] Such multi-sited livelihoods are emblematic of the conditions of precarity that shape the lives of many Thai people, and OTOP is but one more trickle of income joining multiple streams which remain insufficient.

The CDD allocates significant budgetary resources to the OTOP programme. The total budget for the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in 2021 was 333.40 billion baht, with 6.17 billion baht going to the CDD.[18] The CDD used 46.7 per cent (2.89 billion baht) of this amount for internal operational costs such as salaries of personnel, and the rest for its programming, with 13 major projects and programmes in 2021. The Programme to Develop Community Products received 291.3 million baht, or 8.9 per cent of this programming budget, making it the fourth most-funded project out of the 13 initiatives.[19] For comparison, in 2020, the MOI’s budget was 412.57 billion baht, and the CDD received 6.59 billion baht in total. 43.3 per cent (2.85 billion baht) of this amount was again used for internal costs, and the rest was distributed across 15 major projects and programmes.[20] The Programme to Develop Community Products received 412.6 million baht, or 11.0 per cent of the programming budget. Additional programmes in both 2021 and 2020 included OTOP components in their objectives, such as the “Programme to Promote the Development of Mechanisms and Structures to Absorb Economic Value and Distribute Income”, and the “Programme to Enhance the Potential of Young Farmers and Entrepreneurs and Community Enterprises that Produce Community Products”, meaning that OTOP received funding outside of its main category, and illustrating the infiltration of OTOP across CDD programmes as a major signifier “community economy”.

PANDEMIC IMPACTS

The decrease in the OTOP budget for 2021 may be due in part to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, though the CDD’s budget documents do not explicitly establish a causal relationship. As COVID-19 spread, plans for upcoming OTOP festivals were quickly cancelled. Producers were faced with a surplus of products and few customers, as Thai people initially reduced domestic travel and spent less money amidst fears of job loss and increased economic precarity. The government has extended multiple stimulus packages to support individuals registered with the Social Security scheme and workers in the informal sector, and has focused especially on strategies for reviving the tourism sector. Many Thai people, however, continue to struggle with the pandemic’s multifarious effects.

Isan is the most populous and historically poorest region of Thailand, and in an Asia Foundation study, Thailand’s Inequality: Myths and Reality of Isan, conducted from late 2017 to April 2019 and consisting of a randomized survey of 1,400 households and 160 interviews, 55 per cent of respondents noted that the country was moving in a bad direction, with 74 per cent citing a bad economy.[21] These findings resonate with the 2020 World Bank Report that tracked an increase in Thailand’s official poverty rate from 7.21 per cent to 9.85 per cent between 2015 and 2018.[22] The pandemic has only increased inequality in a country whose wealth gap tops world rankings. A 2020 Asia Foundation study, Enduring the Pandemic: Surveys of the Impact of COVID-19 on the Livelihoods of Thai People, concludes that the incomes of 70 per cent of the Thai workforce have fallen since the pandemic started.[23] The report also emphasizes that 55 per cent of workers who are informally employed are especially subject to loss of income; most OTOP producers would fall into this category. In the meantime, by July 2021, the aggregated assets of the kingdom’s 50 richest families had risen more than 20 per cent to US$160 billion since such wealth was last measured in June 2020.[24]

The CDD has responded to the pandemic in multiple ways, and with varying degrees of success. It has sought to encourage shopping for OTOP goods via digital platforms instead of in-person. The homepage of every provincial CDD office website features a menu of premium OTOP products that can seemingly be purchased directly from the CDD website. Upon clicking to select specific products, however, potential customers are directed to webpages that list the physical address and contact information of the producer group in question. The customer must then contact producers to inquire about the product, and the initial promise of convenience is eclipsed by realities of the difficulty of operationalizing large-scale online commerce for thousands of small-scale producers spread across 76 provinces.[25] A CDD officer based in Surin emphasized that most OTOP producers have barely made any money from their products since the pandemic started.[26]

Out of the five categories of OTOP products – food, beverages, household goods and souvenirs, textiles and clothing, and non-food herbal products – registered products in the categories of food and textiles and clothing are typically most numerous in any given year.[27] Thus, as the pandemic continues, many CDD officers at the provincial and district level have focused on expanding access and opportunities within the categories of food and textiles.[28] In Buriram province, which has the highest numbers of both producer groups and OTOP products, they have urged makers of products that are not selling well to switch to making OTOP food products, especially foods that can be sent to Thai people suffering from COVID-19. Textile producers have participated in CDD trainings where they compete to design official “district patterns” that capture the identity of their district. These patterns are then distributed among producer groups, and the finished textiles are marketed to local officials and teachers who can incorporate them into their uniforms.[29] Holding training courses is still difficult; the number of participants remain limited, and many are unwilling to participate out of fear of COVID-19 transmission.

CONCLUSION

Although participation in OTOP might contribute to rural Thai people’s ability to cover monthly bills and debt payments, it offers little hope for upward mobility or escape from the burden of constant indebtedness. In July 2021, household debt in Thailand reached an 18-year high, at 90.5 per cent of the GDP. In Isan in 2017, debt was estimated at 75 per cent of annual household income, compared to the national average of 60 per cent.[30]

Though the CDD’s stated objective across many of its programmes is to support Thai people so that they can reduce debt, OTOP does not offer mechanisms for producers to be able to do this. It exists within the formal sector but is characterized by informal-like working practices,[31] and producers are not able to rely on the programme for consistent income or other forms of protection usually guaranteed by formal-sector employment. The existence and features of OTOP thus represent an adaption to precarity rather than a pathway to reduce it. Moreover, the consumerist rationale of OTOP only reinforces social and economic hierarchies as wealthy Thai people enact roles as patrons at OTOP festivals, buying goods to do good.

Achieving actual good outcomes for participants in OTOP programmes will require different strategies from the CDD, and a thorough understanding of how precarity is experienced by Thai people in rural areas – not as something they have brought upon themselves due to different kinds of “lack”, but as a condition intimately shaped by Thailand’s own approach over time to “development” and “modernization”.

The COVID-19 pandemic has only heightened livelihood instability for millions of Thai people who have sought to make do and get by from within the confines of state-sponsored programmes such as OTOP. But OTOP does not offer a clear path to economic recovery or community flourishing. As post-pandemic plans are considered and implemented, new approaches are desperately needed that harness the energy and resources directed towards OTOP and use them in initiatives designed from specific bottom-up contexts.

ENDNOTES


[1] Krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [Community Development Department] (2022a) Phleng March Phatthana Chumchon [Community Development March] [online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBfqjHX534E&list=PLGMLybXvLRg87as1mYx2RAHBMC2_VdP-Q&index=2] YouTube (accessed 14 March 2022).

[2] Delineating and defining “rural Thailand” is a challenging – and sometimes unproductive –  task, as Jonathan Rigg illuminates in his 2019 monograph, More Than Rural: Textures of Thailand’s Agrarian Transformation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press). Rigg maintains, “There is no discrete population of peasants with their feet in the paddy fields and their mind in the village. Millions of ‘farmers’ have worked in urban contexts and industrial employment, often overseas. They have engaged with the wider world, often for many years, and have knowledge of that world. Moreover, millions more rural migrants reside in urban areas, even if they do not ‘live’ there. Rural Thais are not cut off and isolated from the key currents of transformation; indeed, they have played a large role in forging and propelling those currents” (2019:2). For in-depth analysis of Thailand’s “political peasants” see Andrew Walker, Thailand’s Political Peasants: Power in the Modern Rural Economy (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012) and for discussion of “cosmopolitan villagers” see Charles Keyes, “‘Cosmopolitan’ Villagers and Populist Democracy in Thailand” (South East Asia Research, 20(3) 2012, 343–360), and Finding Their Voice: Northeastern Villagers and the Thai State (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2014).

[3] For an analysis on the need to take the concept of “precarity” seriously when analyzing the Thai economy and the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, see Mike Montesano, “Thailand: Time to Acknowledge Precarity?” [online: /wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_119.pdf] Perspective 119, 2020, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (accessed 18 March 2022).

[4] Krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [Community Development Department] (2022) Prawat krom [History of the Department] [online: https://www.cdd.go.th/related-links/%e0%b8%9a%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%81%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%a0%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a2%e0%b9%83%e0%b8%99/about-us/%e0%b8%9b%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%b0%e0%b8%a7%e0%b8%b1%e0%b8%95%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%81%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%a1] Community Development Department (accessed 14 March 2022). The “History of the Department” section of the CDD’s webpage reads: “In 1940, rural reconstruction plans were developed with two objectives: to evolve the lives and spirits of people in rural areas so that they are in an appropriate position to be good citizens, and to promote better living conditions” (Ibid.).

[5] Provinces in Thailand are made up of districts called amphoe, which in turn are made up of subdistricts called tambon.

[6] Krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [Community Development Department (CDD)] (2016) Phaen yutthasat krom pahtthana chumchon ๒๕๖๐ – ๒๕๖๔ [Strategy Plan for the Community Development Department 2017-2021] [online: https://plan.cdd.go.th/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2017/05/yut60-64.pdf] Community Development Department (accessed 14 March 2022).

[7] This approach to sustainable development was delineated by the late Rama IX in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. It centres on values of moderation, prudence and reasonableness, or, in the words of the king, “[being] happy with however little we have” (NESDB 2007). Scholars note tensions that make observance of the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy impossible; “development”, or capitalist modernisation, has always been propelled by the creation of desires for material things (Sulak Sivaraksa, A Buddhist Vision for Renewing Society: Collected Articles by a Concerned Thai Intellectual. Bangkok: Tienwan, 1986, in Rigg 2019). The philosophy is articulated to target individuals, especially those who are also members of Thailand’s rural populations. It thus functions as a technology to discipline the poor, with members of the elite political ruling class positioned as exceptions, possessing no desirous behaviours in need of reform. Possibilities for structural critique are foreclosed in favour of discourses that blame the poor for dynamics shaped by government policies created in Bangkok. For an extensive analysis of the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy, see: Robert Dayley, “Thailand’s Agrarian Myth and its Proponents.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 46(4) 2011: 342-360; Eli Elinoff, “Sufficient Citizens: Moderation and the Politics of Sustainable Development in Thailand,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 37 (1) 2014: 89-108; S. Ivarsson, “King, Coup and Sufficiency Economy: The Quest for Political Legitimacy,” NIAS Nytt 3, 2007: 23-26; Darunee Jongudomkarn & Laura Camfield, “Exploring the Quality of Life of People in North Eastern and Southern Thailand.” WeD working paper 11, ESRC Research Group on Wellbeing in Developing Countries, University of Bath, Bath, UK, 2005; Pornkasem Kantamara, “The ‘New Theory’ for the Agricultural Sector,” in Sufficiency Thinking: Thailand’s Gift to an Unsustainable World, eds. Gayle Avery & Harald Bergsteiner, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2016, 55-74; Rigg 2019; Amalia Rossi, “Turning Red Rural Landscapes Yellow? Sufficiency Economy and Royal Projects in the Hills of Nan Province, Northern Thailand,” ASEAS-Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 5(2) 2012: 275-291; Danny Unger, “Sufficiency Economy and the Bourgeois Virtues,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 36(3) 2009: 139-156; and Walker 2012.

[8] Despite OTOP’s name, which suggests that each tambon has only one product, many subdistricts are home to more than one producer or producer group, and thus a variety of products are available.

[9] Samnak songsoem phumpanya thongthin lae wisahakit chumchon krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [The Office for the Promotion of Local Knowledge and Community Enterprises, Community Development Department] (2019) Phalittaphan OTOP [OTOP Products] [online: https://cep.cdd.go.th/otop-data/%e0%b8%9c%e0%b8%a5%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%95%e0%b8%a0%e0%b8%b1%e0%b8%93%e0%b8%91%e0%b9%8c-otop] Community Development Department (accessed 14 March 2022).

[10] The programme is modelled after Japan’s OVOP, or “One Village, One Product” programme, which was launched in 1979 as a strategy to alleviate the impacts of rapid industrialization, such as rural out-migration and social atomisation, on the Japanese countryside. Then-governor and Oita Prefecture local Morihiko Hiramatsu worked with people in villages in the prefecture to develop already-popular food staples, focusing on improving them and their sales through community-based participation and revitalization rather than through reliance on government policies and subsidies (Yoopin Claymone and Watunyu Jaiborisudhi, “A study on one village one product project (OVOP) in Japan and Thailand as an alternative of community development in Indonesia.” International Journal of East Asian Studies 16(1) 2011: 51-60). OVOP goods were intended to be sold and consumed primarily within local communities of production, in line with the programme’s commitment to environmental protection and economical resource use (Ibid.). These details about OVOP comprise key differences with OTOP that even CDD officers are quick to point out – namely, OTOP in Thailand is “top-down”, managed and implemented through policy directives created at the national level (“Yot”, CDD officer at national office, Interview with the author, 2018). OTOP was terminated in 2006 after Thaksin was ousted in a military coup, but by that time participants and consumers were already attached to it, and called for its reinstatement. Seeking to rebrand the programme that was closely linked to Thaksin and his so-called populist agenda, officials changed the name to Phalittaphan Chumchon, or Community Products, but to no avail. OTOP had been too catchy a term, and people continued to call the programme by its original name. After five months, the government relented and readopted OTOP. Since then, every successive government has included OTOP as part of its policy agenda (Ibid.).

[11] “Pom,” CDD officer in Surin Province, Interview with the author, 2019.

[12] The term “producer groups” actually refers to both groups and individuals as well, who engage in the production of OTOP products, as individuals are permitted to register and receive the same considerations and opportunities as groups. Differentiated data on the number of multiple-person groups versus individuals registered as “groups” have not been located at the time of this article’s publication.

[13] The CDD allocates approximately 85 million baht as the budget for each festival, or 2.6 million USD (Samnak songsoem phumpanya thongthin lae wisahakit chumchon krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [The Office for the Promotion of Local Knowledge and Community Enterprises, Community Development Department] [OPLKCE] (2022) Kantalat [Marketing] [online: https://cep.cdd.go.th/otop-data/%e0%b8%81%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%95%e0%b8%a5%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%94] Community Development Department (accessed 14 March 2022).

[14] “Yi,” OTOP producer in Surin Province, Interview with the author, 2019.

[15] These worries are also tempered by the enjoyment and pleasure that many producers experience at fairs, where they have the chance to spend extended time with friends from their home provinces and from around Thailand whom they have met through OTOP and only see when they travel to the fairs in Bangkok.

[16] “Suphap,” OTOP producer in Surin Province, Interview with the author, 2019.

[17] More than Rural: Textures of Thailand’s Agrarian Transformation, 2019.

[18] Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) (2021) Raingan kanwikhro ngop praman raijai prajam pi ngop praman 2564 [Report of analysis of the annual budget for budget year 2021] [online: https://www.parliament.go.th/ewtadmin/ewt/parbudget/download/article/article_20200826093713.pdf] Parliamentary Budget Office (accessed 14 March 2022).

[19] The 12 programmes that do not have an explicit focus on OTOP still included OTOP-related components in programme objectives and funding categories. The least-funded project for 2021 was the Programme to Promote the Management of Community Tourism, which received only 12.4 million baht, or 0.37 per cent of the programming budget of 3.29 billion baht. The project that received the most funding in 2021 was the Project to Develop Sufficiency Economy Villages, with allocated funds of 1.22 billion baht, or 37.1 per cent of the remaining budget for CDD projects and programmes (PBO 2021).

[20] Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) (2020) Raingan kanwikhro ngop praman raijai prajam pi ngop praman 2563 [Report of analysis of the annual budget for budget year 2020] [online: https://www.parliament.go.th/ewtadmin/ewt/parbudget/download/article/article_20191213151321.pdf] Parliamentary Budget Office (accessed 14 March 2022).

[21] The Asia Foundation; Rattana Lao, ­Thomas I. Parks, Charn Sangvirojkul, Aram Lek-Uthai, Atipong Pathanasethpong, Pii Arporniem, ­Thannaporn Takkhin, & Kroekkiat Tiamsai (2019) Thailand’s Inequality: Myths & Reality of Isan [online: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/TH_Isan_report_2019_re.pdf] Bangkok: The Asia Foundation (accessed 18 March 2022).

[22] Thailand does have a notable record for reducing poverty and eradicating extreme poverty: “Over the past three decades, and since official poverty data were first published in 1988, Thailand has made substantial gains on key social and economic development. Official poverty rates reduced from 65.2% in 1988 to 9.85% in 2018” (The World Bank, “Publication: Taking the Pulse of Poverty and Inequality in Thailand”, 5 March 2020 [online: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/614661586924075867/pdf/Taking-the-Pulse-of-Poverty-and-Inequality-in-Thailand.pdf] The World Bank (accessed 18 March 2022).

[23] The Asia Foundation; Thomas Parks, Matthew Chatsuwan & Sunil Pillai (2020) Enduring the Pandemic: Surveys of the Impact of COVID-19 on the Livelihoods of Thai People [online: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Enduring-the-Pandemic-Covid-19-Impact-on-Thailand-Livlihoods-Sept-2020.pdf] Bangkok: The Asia Foundation (Accessed 18 March 2022).

[24] Forbes, “Wealth Of Thailand’s 50 Richest On Forbes List Rises Amid Pandemic Challenges.” 8 July 2021 [online: https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2021/07/07/wealth-of-thailands-50-richest-on-forbes-list-rises-amid-pandemic-challenges/?sh=592972875e2e] Forbes, (Accessed 18 March 2022).

[25] The publicity generated by these sites may still benefit some producers and help them to make sales over Facebook Marketplace or LINE, which are common channels for direct producer-to-consumer OTOP sales. However, even though many producers do have smartphones with internet access, they lack the necessary knowledge and skills—in areas such as taking appealing product photos—to set up lucrative online shops.

[26] “Joy,” CDD officer in Surin Province, Interview with the author, 2022.

[27] Samnak songsoem phumpanya thongthin lae wisahakit chumchon krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [The Office for the Promotion of Local Knowledge and Community Enterprises, Community Development Department] [OPLKCE] (2019) Phalittaphan OTOP [OTOP Products] [online: https://cep.cdd.go.th/otop-data/%e0%b8%9c%e0%b8%a5%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%95%e0%b8%a0%e0%b8%b1%e0%b8%93%e0%b8%91%e0%b9%8c-otop] Community Development Department (accessed 14 March 2022). Samnak songsoem phumpanya thongthin lae wisahakit chumchon krom Kanphatthana Chumchon [The Office for the Promotion of Local Knowledge and Community Enterprises, Community Development Department] [OPLKCE] (2020) Botsarup Puborihan [Executive Summary] [online: https://cep.cdd.go.th/wp-content/uploads/sites/108/2020/06/%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B8%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%9C%E0%B8%B9%E0%B9%89%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B4%E0%B8%AB%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A3.pdf] Community Development Department (accessed 14 March 2022).

[28]  “Lek,” CDD officer in Buriram Province, Interview with the author, 2022.

[29] The district pattern concept is reminiscent of a campaign launched in December 2020, when Princess Sirivannavari Nariratana designed a textile pattern that was bestowed upon producers across Thailand. The pattern comprised of a repeating, hooked letter “S” for Sirivannavari, with a border of hearts that symbolises her love for all Thai people. The CDD helps to promote the production of this pattern, recognizing it as an opportunity for producers to sell goods to government workers in all places and at all levels. The “S” textiles appear repeatedly in the CDD march video, both on the looms of weavers and on the bodies of CDD workers, as well as on the CDD OTOP homepage, emphasizing the department’s commitment to this royal initiative and state efforts to reinvigorate the status of the Thai monarchy after the death of Rama IX. Not all producers enjoy making these S textiles, however. They feel forced to produce them, and they are not keen to wear the pattern themselves, viewing it as something expressly designed to clothe civil servants to fulfil government policy (“Ploy,” OTOP producer, Interview with the author, 2021). Sharing these sentiments publicly is difficult and dangerous due to Article 112 of Thailand’s criminal code, or the lèse majesté law, which forbids defaming, insulting or threatening members of the Thai royal family. Most producers keep quiet and keep weaving, as the S textiles have enabled them to make some money during hard times.

[30] Thailand’s Inequality: Myths & Reality of Isan, 2019.

[31] More than Rural: Textures of Thailand’s Agrarian Transformation, 2019: 186-187.

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2022/34 “Labelling Fake News: The Politics of Regulating Disinformation in Thailand” by Janjira Sombatpoonsiri

 

The Anti-Fake News Centre was launched on 1 November 2019. Image taken from FaceBook on 7 April 2022: https://www.facebook.com/AntiFakeNewsCenter/about/?ref=page_internal.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • In Thailand, determining what news is true or fake appears to be a political matter. The Thai authorities associate “fake news” with public harm and as a national threat, giving rise to stringent regulatory responses.
  • Official hostility toward “fake news” is influenced by virulent political conflicts that have been played out in off- and online spaces. Since the 2006 coup, various laws to punish those sharing false information and bureaucratic agencies to surveil social media content, have been created. Built on existing legal-bureaucratic tools, the latest anti-fake news regulations will potentially streamline national responses to “fake news” by establishing anti-fake news agencies in every ministry and across 76 governor offices.
  • Such legal-bureaucratic instruments are subject to political misuse through biased identification of false and true information, and discriminatory lawsuits. These are exemplified by the Anti-Fake News Centre whose fact-check system is skewed toward official interpretation of political events, therewith at times dismissing criticisms of the government as false news.
  • In addition, the record of charges against purveyors of “fake news” reveals that opposition politicians and civil society critics are primary targets of the regulatory measures. In contrast, regime-backed cyber troopers who weaponise disinformation against government critics have rarely met the same legal consequences. 
  • Political misuse of regulatory measures not only reinforce censorship and autocratic propensities, but also sow public mistrust in official mechanisms to curb disinformation. This sentiment potentially undermines fact-check systems at large, making the public even more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns which genuinely do exist.

*Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Assistant Professor and Project Leader at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

ISEAS Perspective 2022/34, 7 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

In June 2021, amid Thailand’s uphill battle against Covid-19, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan instructed the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) and security agencies to take tough action against purveyors of fake news that “cause confusion among the public, affecting the government’s disease control operations.”[1] Meanwhile, Prime Minister Prayut Chanocha told the Council of State (the government’s legal advisory body) to look into the laws in foreign countries, including India, aimed at countering the spread of fake news.[2] These calls set the stage for new anti-fake news regulations, which were approved by the cabinet in February 2022 and, at the time of writing, reviewed by the Legislative Review Board.[3] The new regulations, in a nutshell, streamline national agencies and offices of provincial governors to better monitor “fake news” that “creates social divisions, ruins the country’s reputation, and damages the economy.”[4] But these latest regulations are a déjà vu; similar regulatory measures have long been enforced.

Instead of mitigating disinformation per se, these measures have often been used as a political weapon fundamentally because they endow the government and its elite allies with power to determine what news is true or fake, and to punish purveyors of the latter information.

This article traces the trajectory of Thailand’s efforts to regulate online information since 2006 which culminated in the 2022 anti-fake news regulations, and how regulatory measures have been politically misused. The first section addresses the perspectives of Thai authorities on what constitutes “fake news”. The following section elucidates the interplay between anti-establishment activism in the off- and online spaces, and the establishment’s legal-bureaucratic pushbacks. The third section deep-dives into how the “fake news” regulations have been politically exploited, by examining the Anti-Fake News Centre Thailand’s (AFNC) fact-check system. Founded in 2019, the AFNC often cites official sources as true news despite these merely being an official interpretation of political events. This practice is linked to penalties against alleged “fake news” purveyors; these tend to be opposition politicians or civil society critics contradicting the official truth. In contrast, cyber troopers that spread distorted information on behalf of the establishment have not faced similar legal setbacks. The last section suggests that politicising and weaponising “fake news” regulations not only reinforce censorship and autocratic propensities, but also sow public mistrust in official mechanisms for curbing disinformation. This sentiment potentially undermines fact-check systems at large, making the public even more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns that genuinely do exist.

CONTESTED MEANINGS OF “FAKE NEWS”

The phenomenon of “fake news” is not entirely new.[5] It has recently gained international traction in light of, among other things, the 2016 US elections and Brexit. In these events, false online information was attributed to the eroding of democracy,[6] while political leaders instrumentalised the term “fake news” to downplay criticisms.[7]  Because of the term’s vague and controversial connotations, many media experts instead prefer more fine-grained terms such as mis-, dis- and malinformation. Disinformation is content that is “intentionally false and designed to cause harm…when disinformation is shared, it often turns into misinformation. Misinformation also describes false content, but the person sharing does not realise that it is false or misleading.” Malinformation “describes genuine information that is shared with an intent to cause harm.”[8]

In Thailand, however, the term “fake news” (in Thai Khao Bplom) remains stubbornly popular especially in official use. This is possibly because maintaining a clear-cut dichotomy between what is considered as true and false information makes it convenient to associate information diverging from that of official sources with falsehood that yields harmful effects on the public at large. For example, the MDES defines “fake news” as information that appears on social media platforms or in a computer system, and that is entirely or partially false, causing damage to citizens and the country.[9] The key word here is “causing damage” which has been reiterated time and again by representatives of the MDES as a reference to “fake news”.[10] In the policy rhetoric of the security apparatus, “fake news” is even considered a security threat. In 2020, then-army chief General Apirat Kongsompong, in a public speech, pointed out that “the threat now is fake news… It’s like cyber warfare… Some political parties… have the platform of their propaganda directed to (people) who are 16 and 17 [years old]…They try to indoctrinate them with fake news.”[11] Similarly, in the policy white papers of the National Security Council and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), “fake news” are linked with cyber threat, a cause of national disharmony, and distorted perceptions about the monarchy.[12] While Thailand may be plagued with disinformation (e.g. in the areas of health-related scams and commercial crimes), it is the rise of digital dissent that best explains this level of official hostility toward disinformation.

EVOLUTION OF REGULATIONS IN DIGITAL SPACE

Thailand’s political conflicts have played out in off- and online spaces. Particularly, after the 2006 military putsch in light of anti-Thaksin Shinawatra movements, Thaksin supporters and anti-coup activists took to social networking sites, in tandem with local radio stations, to express their frustration. This sentiment exacerbated in 2008 after the Constitutional Court disbanded the Thaksin-backed People’s Power Party. Blaming royalist elites for this debacle, Thaksin supporters and pro-democracy activists staged mass protests in 2009 and 2010, which were met with bloody military crackdowns. Insulting comments and vulgar memes against the royal family appeared on Facebook and YouTube;[13] this was a form of transgressive digital activism the authorities were unwilling to tolerate.[14] 

The governments and its elite allies soon established multiple bureaucratic bodies to enforce a plethora of laws.[15] The genesis of this process is dated to the 2007 Computer-related Crimes Act (CCA). Despite its original aim to curtail online scams and pornography, the law primarily penalises those importing into a computer system “forged or false computer data…to cause public panic.”[16] Concurrently, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) – founded in 2002 and initially granted some power to regulate online content – morphed into the government’s strong arm to police digital space. In June 2010, the Democrat Party-led government strengthened cross-ministry collaboration to enforce the CCA and to protect the monarchy amid the 2009-2010 protests. That year, the police created the “Cyber Scouts” programme to monitor anti-monarchy content online.[17] In 2011, the Yingluck Shinawatra-led government established the Cyber Operation Centre and the Technology Crime Suppression Division.[18]

The 2014-2019 period of military rule consolidated and expanded this bureaucratic-legal infrastructure. The 2014 coup-makers were gravely concerned about popular resistance especially through the use of social media platforms. Upon its seizure of power, the junta packed once independent and civilian entities such as the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) with military loyalists. In 2016, the military government launched a set of “digital economy” bills, which toughened the CCA to punish those importing “distorted,” “forged” and “false” information into a computer system;[19] and replaced the MICT with the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society. Despite its diverse mandates, the MDES’ tangible achievement is developing the Anti-Fake News Centre Thailand in 2019, the initiative that was experimented on in 2017 through the creation of Central Centre to Monitor Social Media Content under the junta-appointed National Reform Committee.[20] Also in 2019, the Cybersecurity and National Intelligence Bills were passed to enhance capacities that among other things aid state surveillance of “fake news”.[21] In 2020, the police’s Technology Crime Suppression Division set up the cyber police bureau to monitor cybercrimes and threats, including “fake news”.[22] In August 2021, the MDES updated the regulation under the CCA to compel computer software providers (e.g. App Stores) and social media platforms to retain users’ traffic data. [23]

Introduced in May-June 2021 and approved in February 2022, the new anti-fake news regulations build upon these existing legal-bureaucratic instruments. Once the legislative review panel finally approves the regulations, three tiers of governmental agencies will be established: the central coordination centre (under the MDES), coordination centres in each of the 20 ministries, and similar centres in each of the 76 governor offices. The central coordination centre will oversee the centres at the ministerial and provincial levels, and create volunteer networks to monitor “fake news” in social media. Upon the report of false information pertaining to the areas of responsibility of a certain ministry or a province, a respective ministerial or provincial centre will file complaints against those involved in circulating it. The authorities will also be compelled to remove false content posted on an online platform, and publish “true” information within one hour. If the authorities fail to carry out this procedure, they will be subject to disciplinary actions.[24]

These latest anti-fake news measures have stirred criticisms of the vague definition of what constitutes true and false information, and of the government acting as the only arbiter of truth. What is more, as with preceding laws, these regulations could serve as an additional tool to censor and suppress dissent.

HOW OFFICIAL MECHANISMS ARE POLITICISED AND WEAPONISED

Regulating fake news is a political matter when governments and their elite allies are endowed with the power to decide what news is true and fake, and to penalise purveyors of the latter information. In unpacking the misuse of fake news regulations, this section analyses: 1) online content the authorities flag as true and false; and 2) who are targeted or not with “fake news” charges.

AntiFake News Centre and the Politicisation of Factcheck System

A thorough investigation of the Anti-Fake News Centre Thailand’s database reveals how labelling fake news is politicised. The AFNC receives reports concerning online information; identifies these as false, distorted or true news; and publishes fact-checked information. Within the AFNC’s search function from 1 October 2019 to 31 January 2022, this author found 244 fact-checked stories related to government policies, which represent some of the most common complaints the Centre received.[25] Of these 244 reports, the AFNC flagged 148 news as false, 64 as true and 23 as distorted.[26] Based on this author’s classification, the 148 news items labelled as false are about government policies pertinent to; i) the economy and citizens’ livelihoods (56); ii) public services (48); iii) public health (25); iv) general governance, including news related to the monarchy (11); and v) religion (8). Reports of false information regarding the economic and public health policies featured most prominently because of the health-related anxiety during the pandemic, declining trust in official sources of information regarding Covid-19 measures, and economic desperation caused by lost income and rising unemployment. Regarding the latter driver, many posted on their social media news about the government’s massive increase in pension and cash assistance, most of which the AFNC validly refuted as untrue. The Centre also labelled as false conspiracy-based news concerning religious matters, such as government policies to allow mass migration of Muslims to Thailand or to make Islamic teachings a compulsory course in the official curriculum at the expense of Buddhist lessons.[27]

The AFNC seems to be neutral and accurate in flagging non-political content, especially when that affects public services and citizens’ livelihood (e.g. the scam about the national post office giving away discount coupons to people to go shopping).[28] But when it comes to content that can have major political impact on government legitimacy, things get tricky. The Centre at times conflates facts with interpretations of what these facts mean, resulting in opinions divergent from official interpretations being labelled as fake news. Take for example the online news concerning the government’s failure to manage its public debt, following the pandemic-induced economic recession. In September 2021, the government increased the ceiling of public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio from 60 to 70 per cent in order to borrow more for various policies. Parts of the public, already bearing inherent mistrust in the government’s handling of the economic crisis, were alarmed and therefore interpreted this policy change as an economic misstep.[29] Instead of acknowledging the root cause of this perception, the AFNC branded it fake news by showing “true” economic figures, and concluding from these facts that the government could still manage its debt.[30]

Relatedly, sources of “true” information that the AFNC cites in its fact-check system mostly stem from ministries or other state-affiliated agencies, inevitably associating true news with official facts. These official facts are, however, inseparable from official narratives that may benefit the “truth management” carried out by incumbent elites.[31] A telling case is the government’s Covid-19 vaccine (mis)management. In mid-2021, Covid-19 severely hit the country and the government’s prioritisation of Sinovac and AztraZeneca vaccines drew heavy public criticisms. In September that year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) came under attack after its minister allegedly advised the Prime Minister against accepting Singapore’s donation of 100,000 Moderna vaccine doses, reasoning that such an act would amount to a loss of face for Thailand. The MOFA reportedly recommended the “swap” option instead of donation.[32] Soon after, the AFNC cited the MOFA statement to label as false the information that Thailand had rejected the vaccine donation from Singapore, while highlighting the view that the MOFA in fact preferred exchanging/swapping vaccines with partner countries.[33] It would appear that this official response is different from the news flagged as fake only in wording and not in content, a damage control tactic on which the MOFA sometimes relies.[34]

Moreover, some official facts cited as true by the AFNC can later lose their validity due to the situation’s volatility. A case in point is the March 2020 news regarding Thai Airways’ bankruptcy. The AFNC classified that claim to be fake news, and cited Thai Airways as its source of true information.[35] However, the offending news turned out not to be entirely false. In June 2021, the Thai Airways was in fact on the verge of bankruptcy, and was saved when its creditors approved its debt restructuring plan. [36] As of the time of writing, the AFNC has yet to address this issue.

The Weaponisation of Fake NewsPenalties

Intertwined with the AFNC’s monitoring system is legal punishment of “fake news” purveyors, as earlier described. The laws involved are oftentimes instrumentalised to suppress criticism of the government and its elite allies. Between November 2019 and December 2021, the AFNC reported more than 23 million shares of “fake news.” Of this number, the police filed lawsuits against 1,193 violators, and at least 287 persons were convicted as of 2021.[37] At times those charged with violating the CCA are ordinary citizens. For instance, on 23 March 2020, a Facebook user posted that when he landed at Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, he did not encounter any Covid-19 screening. After the airport operators’ alleged that his post was not factual and could cause public panic, this Facebook user was charged and held without bail for 12 days.[38]

In other cases, the accused violators are high-profile opposition politicians, scholars and activists whose criticisms of government policies are blatantly deemed as false. Such a lawsuit adds to a series of other charges that these figures have to spend time, energy and money fighting in court.[39] A case in point is the leader of the dissolved Future Forward Party, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. In March 2021, he criticised the government for mishandling the vaccine campaign and giving unfair advantage to Siam Bioscience, a domestic producer of AztraZeneca owned by King Maha Vajiralongkorn. Soon after this exposé, the MDES and Prime Minister’s Office filed the complaint that his “fake news” damaged royal reputation, thus violating both Article 112 (royal offence) and the CCA.[40] However, Thanatorn’s disclosure coincided with public suspicion regarding the government’s lack of transparency in prioritising the AstraZeneca vaccine at the expense of other vaccines.[41] Supposedly independent bodies, including the Election Commission (EC), have similarly weaponised fake news allegations against those accusing them of being involved in irregularities during the 2019 elections. A host of journalists, intellectuals and pro-democracy activists such as Sirote Klampaiboon, Nutta Mahattana, Pinkaew Laungaramsri, have been charged with disseminating false information, soon after criticising the EC’s partisanship.[42]

These penalties against fake news purveyors are, however, one-sided. Based on this author’s search, the AFNC flagged as fake at least two news items concerning the Future Forward Party. That party, together with other opposition politicians and dissidents, has systematically been targeted by organised disinformation campaigns, many of which are allegedly sponsored by the army.[43] The disinformation ranges from the Party’s close ties with the Illuminati Movement to pro-democracy activists’ collaboration with George Soros and the West to overthrow the monarchy.[44] When targets of these campaigns pressed the AFNC and the MDES for tougher responses to the campaigns, their efforts have not yielded substantive outcomes.[45] And when in 2021, the current minister of MDES, Chaiyawut Tanakamanusorn, was asked how he would curtail information campaigns that demonise opposition activists, his response was; “I don’t know. I didn’t do it.”[46]

CONCLUSION

In Thailand, “fake news” regulations can be used as a political tool to inflict censorship and suppress dissent. This development has already entrenched autocracy by creating high political costs for critics of the government and its elite allies. The examples of the EC abusing fake news allegations, moreover, show the difficulty in addressing electoral irregularities in connection with the military-supported Palang Pracharat Party that became the ruling party after the 2019 elections. This tendency could contribute to an uneven electoral playing field that has been sustaining the Prayut regime. It will not be surprising if “fake news” regulations such as those recently approved are exploited again in the looming snap elections. 

What is more, political misuse of laws and regulations can erode public trust in state mechanisms that are supposed to tackle the disinformation that is increasingly affecting citizens, especially health-related scams and commercial crimes. When organisations such as the AFNC are politically partisan, citizens have little option for institutional fact-check systems. Existing tools such as Cofact, AFP Thailand and Thai PBS provide bottom-up avenues for fact-checking information that might be false or misleading. But compared to institutional fact-check systems, organisational creators of these channels may not have the resources to make these tools more accessible to the general public.

Ultimately, weaponising anti-fake news laws against government critics damages the rule of law, and may even push critics and their supporters to endorse biased information unfavourable to the government and its elite allies. Instead of mitigating the problem, political misuse of “fake news” regulations and mechanisms may counterproductively drive the proliferation of disinformation and fail to inoculate the public against it.

ENDNOTES


[1] “Prawit tells officials to clamp down on fake news,” Bangkok Post, 10 June 2021 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2129671/prawit-tells-officials-to-clamp-down-on-fake-news, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[2] Ibid.

[3] “ข่าวปลอม: ร่างระเบียบสำนักนายกฯ ปราบเฟคนิวส์ ความพยายามล่าสุดของรัฐบาลในการกลบเสียงวิจารณ์” [Fake news: Draft by Prime Minister’s Office to crackdown on fake news, latest government’s attempt to stifle criticisms], BBC News Thai, 4 February 2022(https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-60239430, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[4] “Govt adopts multi-level approach to fake news,” Bangkok Post, 2 February 2022 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2257207/govt-adopts-multi-level-approach-to-fake-news, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[5] Michael Buehler, et al. “How information disorder affirms authoritarianism and destabilizes democracy,” USAID, December 2021 (https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00Z3JC.pdf, downloaded 14 March 2022), 12-13.

[6] Andrew S. Ross and Damian J. Rivers, “Discursive deflection: Accusation of “fake news” and the spread of mis- and disinformation in the Tweets of President Trump. Social Media+ Society 4 (2) (2018), https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118776010

[7] Kate Farhall, et al. “Political Elites’ Use of Fake News Discourse across Communication Platforms,” International Journal of Communication 13(2019): 4353-4375.

[8] See more in Wardle Claire and Hossein Derakhshan. “Information disorder toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking,” Council of Europe, 27 September 2017 (https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c, downloaded 22 March 2022).

[9] “ประกาศกระทรวงดิจิตทัลเพื่อเศรษฐกิจและสังคม เรื่องหลักเกณฑ์การเก็บรักษาข้อมูลจราจรทางคอมพิวเตอร์ของผู้ให้บริการ” [Announcement of Digital Economic and Society Ministry on regulations of service providers’ storage of traffic data], Royal Gazette no. 138 special sect. 188 gnor, 13 August 2021 (www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2564/E/188/T_0009.PDF, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[10] See for instance, “เปิดทางการ ‘ศูนย์ต้านข่าวปลอม’” [Official Inauguration of the Anti-Fake News Centre], Manager Online, 1 November 2019 (https://mgronline.com/cyberbiz/detail/9620000105150, downloaded 14 March 2022); “ชัยวุฒิ ธนาคมานุสรณ์ ชี้มีขบวนการสร้างข่าวปลอมยุคโควิด-19” [Chaiyawut Thanakamanusorn shows networks that create fake news in times of COVID-19], BBC News Thai, 24 July 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-57951587, downloaded 14 March 2022).

[11] Kay Johnson et al. “The Threat Now is Fake News: Thai Army Chief Describes Hybrid War,” Reuters, 9 August  2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-military/the-threat-now-is-fake-news-thai-army-chief-describes-hybrid-war-idUSKCN1UZ1L3, downloaded 14 March 2022).

[12] See, for instance, National Security Council, “National Security Policy, 2015-2021,” http://www.nsc.go.th/Download1/policy58.pdf (accessed 23 January 2020); Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), “ISOC Strategy, B.E. 2555-2559 (A.D. 2012-2016) ”, http://www.isocthai.go.th/GorPorRor/4YearsPlan(2555-2558)Completed.pdf (accessed 23 January 2020); Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), “ISOC Strategy, B.E. 2560-2564 (A.D. 2017-2021),” https://www.isoc.go.th/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/strategy2560-2564.pdf (accessed 23 January 2020).

[13] Anonymous, “Anti-Royalism in Thailand since 2006: Ideological Shifts and Resistance,” Journal of

Contemporary Asia 48(3): 363-94; Arthit Suriyawongkul, “Facebook Politics: Culture-Politics on Thai Online Social Network (2010-2012)” (Master’s Thesis, Thammasat University, 2012), 30-5.

[14] Lui Yangyue, “Transgressiveness, Civil Society and Internet Control in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 27(3) (2014): 383-407.

[15] Irene Poetranto and Adam Senft, “Internet Governance during Crisis: the Changing Landscape of Thailand,” GigaNet: Global Internet Governance Academic Network, Annual Symposium 2016 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2909377, downloaded 2 March 2022), 4-5

[16] Computer-Related Crimes Act, B.E. 2550 (2007), Royal Gazette no. 124, sect. 27 kor, June 18, 2007, p. 4.

[17] Suchit Leesa-nguansuk, “Ministers sign computer-related crime MOU,” Bangkok Post, 23 June 2010 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/tech/39215/ministers-sign-computer-related-crime-mou, downloaded  15 March 2022).

[18] Aim Sinpeng, “State Repression in Cyberspace: The Case of Thailand,” Asian Politics & Policy 5(3) (2013): 430.

[19] “(Amended) Computer-Related Crimes Act B.E. 2560 (2016),” Royal Gazette no. 134, sect. 10 kor, January 24, 2016, 24.

[20] Amnesty International Thailand, “ ‘มีคนจับตาอยู่จริงๆ’ ข้อจำกัดเสรีภาพในการแสดงออกออนไลน์ในประเทศไทย” [‘We are really watched’: Restrictions of freedom of online expression in Thailand], March 2020 (https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa39/2157/2020/th/, downloaded 2 March 2022), 10.

[21] “Cybersecurity Law 62: Possibility of State Surveillance of Dissidents,” iLaw, 25 February 2019 (https://ilaw.or.th/node/5173, downloaded 2 March 2022); “พรบ.ข่าวกรองแห่งชาติ’ 62 บังคับใช้ เปิดช่องใช้เครื่องมืออิเล็กทรอนิกส์ล้วงข้อมูล” [2019 National Intelligence Act enforced, paving the way for use of surveillance technologies], The Standard, 17 April 2019 (https://thestandard.co/ratchakitcha-national-intelligence/, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[22] “Cyber cops unit to be set up,” Bangkok Post, 12 June 2020 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1933404/cyber-cops-unit-to-be-set-up, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[23] Suchit Leesa-nguansuk, “Data legal upgrade sparks concern,” Bangkok Post, 17 August 2021 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/2166227/data-legal-upgrade-sparks-concerns, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[24] “ครม.รับหลักการร่างระเบียบสำนักนายกฯ ปราบข่าวปลอม ตั้งศูนย์ประสานทุกกระทรวง ทุกจังหวัด” [Cabinet approves draft regulations of Prime Minister’s Office to crack down on fake news and establish coordination centres in every province], Prachatai, 1 February 2022 (https://prachatai.com/journal/2022/02/97059, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[25] Other themes include health products, commerce, and natural disaster. 

[26] Nine articles contain general information of the AFNC work.

[27] These conspiracies tend to be disseminated by nationalist Buddhist groups active on Facebook and Line (a chat application). See Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Buddhist Majoritarian Nationalism in Thailand: Ideological Contestation, Narratives and Activism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia (forthcoming in 2022).

[28] See “ข่าวปลอม ไปรษณีย์ไทยติดต่อประชาชนผ่านไลน์ Post Family 15 ให้ดาวน์โหลดแอปฯ เพื่อแลกซื้อสินค้าลด 80%” [Fake news: Thai Post Office contact people via Line to download Post Family application to get 80% discount coupons], Manager Online, 2 November 2021 (https://m.mgronline.com/factcheck/app-detail-purchase/9640000108637, downloaded 16 March 2022).

[29] “หนี้สาธารณะ: นักเศรษฐศาสตร์เห็นพ้องเพิ่มเพดานหนี้ แต่รัฐบาลต้องใช้เงินให้เกิดประโยชน์” [Public debts: Economists agree but govt expenditure should be beneficial for the people], BBC News Thai, 21 September 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-58638110, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[30] Anti-fake News Centre Thailand, “ข่าวปลอม อย่าแชร์ รัฐบาลกู้เงินจนหนี้ท่วมการคลัง ไม่สามารถจัดการหนี้ได้” [Fake news. Don’t share: Govt borrows too much and can’t manage its debts], 7 January 2022 (https://www.antifakenewscenter.com/เศรษฐกิจ/ข่าวปลอม-อย่าแชร์-รัฐบาลกู้เงินจนหนี้ท่วมการคลัง-ไม่สามารถจัดการหนี้ได้/, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[31] See, for instance, Chaiwat Satha-anand, ความรุนแรงกับการจัดการ ‘ความจริง’: ปัตตานีในรอบกึ่งศตวรรษ [Violence and ‘truth’ management: Pattani in the past 50 years]. Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 2008.

[32] “ทอม เครือโสภณ ซัดเดือดรมว.ต่างประเทศ ปมไม่ยอมรับริจาควัคซีน เหตุกลัวเสียหน้า” [Tom Kreuasohpon attacks MOFA for declining vaccine donation for fear of losing face], Matichon TV, 8 September 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQflW-Tnj64, viewed 16 March 2022).

[33] Anti-Fake News Centre, “ข่าวปลอม อย่าเชร์ รัฐมนตรีกระทรวงต่างประเทศปฎิเสธการรับบริจาควัคซีน Moderna” [Fake News. Don’t share. MOFA declines Moderna vaccine donation], 10 September 2021 (https://www.antifakenewscenter.com/นโยบายรัฐบาล-ข่าวสาร-ข่าวปลอม-อย่าเชร์-รัฐมนตรีกระทรวงต่างประเทศปฎิเสธการรับบริจาควัคซีน-moderna/, downloaded 16 March 2022).

[34] For instance, in Southern Thailand conflict, the MOFA makes sure that parties to the ongoing peace talks do not use words such as armed conflict or peace negotiation for fear that this would permit international intervention. See Romadon Panjor, “Politics of Words in Pa(t)tani: Constructing Peace in Ethnopolitical Conflict” (MA thesis), Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 2015.

[35] Anti-Fake News Centre, “ข่าวปลอม อย่าแชร์ การบินไทยจ่อล้มละลาย” [Fake news. Don’t share. Thai Airways about to get bankrupt], 24 March 2020 (https://www.antifakenewscenter.com/เศรษฐกิจ/ข่าวปลอม-อย่าแชร์-การบิ/, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[36] “Thai Airways creditors approve restructuring plan,” Bangkok Post, 19 May 2021 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/2118327/thai-airways-creditors-approve-restructuring-plan, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[37] “ดีอีเอสโชว์ตัวเลขคนไทยแชร์ข่าวปลอมมากถึง 23 ล้านคน พบสื่อมวลชนให้ความสนใจปัญหาข่าวปลอมมากขึ้น” [DES shows statistics of 23 million Thais sharing fake news, finds media pays more attention to the problem of fake news], Anti-Fake News Centre Thailand, 31 December 2021 (https://www.antifakenewscenter.com/activity/ดีอีเอส-โชว์ตัวเลขคนไทย-แชร์ข่าวปลอมมากถึง-23-ล้านคน-พบสื่อมวลชนให้ความสนใจปัญหาข่าวปลอมมากขึ้น/, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[38] Robert Brian Smith and Mark Perry, “‘Fake News’ Legislation in Thailand: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” Athens Journal of Law 6(3) (2020): 258.

[39] Amnesty International Thailand, ‘มีคนจับตาอยู่จริงๆ’, 12-14

[40] “Thai police charge Thanathorn with insulting over vaccines,” Nikkei Asia, 30 March 2021 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Thai-police-charge-Thanathorn-with-insulting-king-over-vaccines, downloaded 16 March 2022).

[41] Emmy Sasipornkarn, “COVID: Thailand’s slow vaccine rollout sparks anger,” DW, 20 May 2021 (https://www.dw.com/en/thailand-covid-vaccination/a-57599302, downloaded 16 March 2022).

[42] Amnesty International Thailand, “มีคนจับตาอยู่จริงๆ”, 13-17.

[43] See for instance Josh A. Goldstein et al. “Cheerleading without Fans: A Low-Impact Domestic Information Operation by the Royal Thai Army,” Stanford Internet Observatory, 8 October 2020 (https://stanford.app.box.com/v/202009-sio-thailand, downloaded 24 June 2021).

[44] See, for example, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “We are independent trolls: The Efficacy of Royalist Digital Activism in Thailand,” ISEAS Perspective 2022/1 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-1-we-are-independent-trolls-the-efficacy-of-royalist-digital-activism-in-thailand-by-janjira-sombatpoonsiri/, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[45] “ศูนย์ต้านข่าวปลอมยังไม่รับคำร้อง ‘อนาคตใหม่’ ปมเฟคนิวส์” [Anti-Fake News Centre doesn’t accept FFP’s complaints about fake news], Thansettakij, 19 November 2019 (https://www.thansettakij.com/politics/414978, downloaded 2 March 2022).

[46] “ชัยวุฒน์ ธนาคมานุสรณ์ ชี้มีขบวนการสร้างข่าวปลอม” [Chaiyawut Tanakamananusorn expose organised movements to create fake news], BBC News Thai, 24 July 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-57951587, downloaded 16 March 2022).

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