“Religious Extremism in Major Campuses in Indonesia” by A’an Suryana
2022/16 “The Philippines’ China Policy and the 2022 Elections: Time for a Rethink” by Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Foreign policy does not feature prominently in Philippine elections. Instead, its relevance as an election issue depends on how it can be connected with the daily material issues faced by voters.
- There is some credible basis that the 2022 elections will be subject to foreign interference given the intensity of great power competition in the region.
- The 2022 presidential candidates can be expected to raise the country’s China policy as a subject for policy debate given the accommodationist stance of the Duterte administration towards China and its residual effects on the country’s body politic and strategic posture.
- To put the Philippines’ China policy in the consciousness of Filipino voters, campaign discourses will need to focus not only on the territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea but also on China’s impact on issues such as food security and access to natural resources, migration, business regulation, and transnational crime.
*Guest writer Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby is Associate Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University in Manila, the Philippines.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/16, 22 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
After the theatrical series of events surrounding the filing for candidacy and substitutions, the Philippines opened 2022 with the official start of the election period on January 9.[1] Recent election surveys put Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. as the top choice for president at 53%, followed by incumbent Vice President Leni Robredo at 20%, Isko Moreno and Manny Pacquiao at 8%, and Ping Lacson at 6%.[2] Polls for vice presidential candidates, meanwhile, report a 45% preference for Sara Duterte, 31% for Vicente Sotto, and 12% Kiko Pangilinan.[3]
Although the campaign period would not start until February 8, some had already crafted and disseminated catchy slogans. Marcos’ Babangon muli (to rise again) is the centerpiece of his campaign narrative, which invokes nostalgia for the so-called glory days of his father, former dictator Ferdinand Sr., who ruled the country with an iron hand for over two decades. It is also apropos today as the country grapples with the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, Babangon muli is a “unifying” brand that implies a reinstatement of the Marcos family in Malacanang.[4]
In opposition to this narrative is Robredo’s Dapat si Leni (it should be Leni), a call rooted in her public health and welfare initiatives undertaken during the pandemic despite the measly budget allotted to the Office of the Vice President. In many ways, her slogan resembles former president Benigno Aquino’s Daang matuwid (straight path), implying a moral high ground and a single-minded focus to get the job done. Volunteer groups coined the hashtag Husay at Tibay (skill and durability) to reflect her ethos as being what the country needs to weather the pandemic and the corruption that is endemic to Philippine politics.
Though foreign policy normally does not feature prominently in Philippine elections, there are good reasons why it should in the coming election – for reasons related to the economic livelihood of the Filipino people, to national pride and sovereignty, and because of geo-strategic implications.
DUTERTE’S FOREIGN POLICY NECESSITATES IT BEING AN ELECTION ISSUE
Foreign policy is generally not an election issue in the Philippines, but there are compelling reasons why the 2022 candidates should articulate a China policy, not least because a president’s preference for a particular country at the expense of other partners has ramifications extending beyond one administration. In the case of Duterte, reinvigorated bilateral relations with China translated into political benefits for him and his political coalition. Amidst mounting criticisms by North American and European countries of his controversial drug war, the Duterte administration needed an alternative political backer. China took on this role in giving support to the war on drugs, a move that the administration welcomed, considering the numerous political enemies it has at home and abroad, not least of which is the International Criminal Court (ICC) that found evidence of crimes against humanity being perpetrated in the country.[5] Furthermore, closer ties with China extended to the provision of aid in support of Duterte’s flagship Build, Build, Build programme. But while China may have offered US$24 billion in investment pledges during his visit to Beijing in October 2016, the actual outcomes of these pledges and infrastructure projects exhibited a completely different scenario of support.[6] This notwithstanding, the president remains relentless in justifying the country’s preference for China, a rhetoric that is echoed by others in his administration. A provincial governor recently voiced his opposition to live-fire exercises between the Philippines and the United States as part of the annual Balikatan exercises because “we don’t want to anger China.”[7]
This symbiotic bilateral relationship likewise allowed China to reap some benefits. In particular, the Philippines’ pivot towards Beijing downplayed the arbitration ruling on the South China Sea. The optimism about diplomatic rapprochement at the time was not entirely unfounded, but years on, some now perceive the costs to have been too great, namely marginalising discussions on the South China Sea during the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship in 2017, understating maritime incidents involving Chinese militia and Filipino fishermen, and limiting the patrols and presence of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the WPS.
In view of this, foreign policy should matter in the upcoming elections. So far, Marcos has made it clear that his China policy will be a continuation of Duterte’s pivot to China, evidenced by his meeting with Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Huang Xilian, shortly after announcing his candidacy in October 2021.[8] Robredo, on the other hand, announced a tougher stance vis-à-vis China by pursuing an “inclusive and independent” foreign policy that puts Philippine security interests first, including following through on the 2016 arbitral ruling.[9] Moreno and Lacson, meanwhile, are taking the middle ground in agreeing to the possibility of joint oil explorations with China, provided service contracts are awarded by the Philippine government.[10]
It may still be early days yet, but China policy should – at the very least – be critical in the upcoming elections. Foreign interference is a serious driver of democratic erosion globally, and elites in polarised countries such as the Philippines utilise external support to gain political advantage, such as access to credit and diplomatic backing.[11] Regrettably, this is now easily done since social media platforms allow the proliferation of disinformation campaigns by hyperpartisans.[12] This “infodemic” strikes at the core of well-functioning democracies because it engenders a dilemma: either voters fail to spot fake news, thereby making them more vulnerable to information campaigns and robbing them of informed choices, or governments regulate social media thereby stifling free speech, which is the very essence of a vibrant democracy.[13] For this very reason, a well-crafted China policy must be grounded in efforts to counter not only misinformation, but also disinformation.[14]
A second reason why foreign policy should be taken seriously in the 2022 elections is the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. To date, China continues to occupy features, build artificial islands, and conduct militarised measures that undermine the PCA’s 2016 award in favour of the Philippines. Adding salt to the wound is the incessant harassment of Filipinos in numerous maritime incidents. In June 2019, for instance, a Chinese ship hit and sank a Filipino fishing boat that was anchored in Reed Bank near Palawan.[15] The Chinese vessel immediately left the area without aiding the Filipino fishermen who were at that point floundering in the water. In April 2021, a Filipino journalist and her TV crew were chased by a Chinese Navy ship armed with heavy weapons.[16] In November 2021, the China Coast Guard launched water cannons at a resupply mission for Filipino troops aboard the BRP Sierra Madre in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal.[17] Moreover, the introduction of China’s Coast Guard Law and the swarm of militia vessels in March 2021 at Whitsun Reef, an area well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, are significant security issues that are sidestepped by Duterte’s China policy.[18] Indeed, China’s coercive actions became normalised in 2021 with the region’s attention being diverted to the COVID-19 pandemic.[19] All these snowballed into a heavily criticised defeatist attitude in confronting China’s aggression. Interestingly, the professional bureaucracy held the line and relied on the PCA award to defend Philippine jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea.[20]
The disconnect between the top officials of government and the bureaucracy spills over to the rest of the Filipino strategic community. Surveys show that despite the Philippine government’s turn to China, Filipinos preferred Japan, the United States and Australia as international partners.[21] This is understandable, considering longstanding public attitudes, incidents of Chinese harassment of Filipino fishermen, and the lack of significant economic dividends from Duterte’s pivot to China, not to mention the reality of competing security interests in the South China Sea. A majority of China-funded projects have either yet to start or to be approved. Only three have been reported to be under construction.[22] Still, Duterte continues to cite his debt of gratitude to China for its help during the pandemic, including mask and vaccine diplomacy. Moreover, this stance becomes ever more difficult to sustain as the administration gets embroiled in corruption charges regarding the Department of Health’s (DOH) mismanagement of pandemic funds and as the country faces a surge of new cases as 2022 opened.[23]
Hence, the problem lies in how the Duterte administration made the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea issue a function of Chinese development assistance to finance the president’s infrastructure programmes. In practice, this meant that the security sphere became hostage to the potential economic benefits the country could reap from its closer engagement with China. There is certainly a case to be made for radically rethinking this approach to an important neighbour. For this very reason, foreign policy in general, and China policy in particular, deserve attention in the upcoming elections.
THREE WAYS TO PLACE FOREIGN POLICY ON THE ELECTION AGENDA
Historically, foreign policy has not been a major consideration in Philippine elections. Local pollsters such as Social Weather Stations and Pulse Asia continuously record public attention for bread-and-butter issues such as employment and inflation over external defense. Consequently, foreign policy issues can be reframed in three ways in the context of the Philippines.
First, foreign policy has consequences that are deeply felt and reverberate in domestic politics. While on the surface, improved bilateral relations with China seem the epitome of diplomatic success, the socio-economic impact cannot be discounted. As a result of the Duterte administration’s pivot to China, a steady influx of Chinese citizens entered the Philippines to work in Philippine offshore gaming operators (POGO) companies, thereby driving real estate prices up.[24] Even though there are economic benefits in this scenario, there are increasing incidences of transnational crime, including sex trafficking and money laundering, the latter made possible by the fact that POGOs are unregulated and hence can easily engage in tax evasion.[25] Higher incidences of corruption in the customs and immigration agencies have also been noted that facilitated the entry of POGO workers under various modus operandi.[26]
Second, the current administration’s pivot to China constructed the seemingly inextricable link between the South China Sea issue and Chinese development assistance. Be that as it may, these two spheres can be decoupled by reframing territorial and sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the contested waters as a food security issue. The South China Sea, after all, is a resource-rich area with known reserves of 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil.[27] It also contains diverse ecosystems ranging from 3,000 species of fish and 600 species of coral reef, mangrove and seagrass, as well as turtles and seabirds that depend on the islands therein.[28] For the Philippines, the rich fishing grounds in the West Philippine Sea contribute up to 27 percent of the country’s commercial fisheries production.[29]
China’s activities, however, have compounded the pressures of overfishing, clam extraction, dredging for the construction of artificial reefs and other features, and hydrofracking. Thus, fisher folks’ inability to access fishing grounds translates into higher market prices and uncertainty in regular provisions for their families and communities. The destruction of the marine environment as a result of the construction of artificial islands disrupts the natural processes of the ecosystems therein. Furthermore, it robs coastal communities of the opportunity to sustainably rely on and replenish the natural marine resources. Framing the South China Sea issue as a gut issue requires shifting attention to the critical role of the blue economy, which is crucial to maritime safety and security. A vibrant blue economy hinges on sustainable coastal tourism, improved port infrastructure, and managed and regulated fishing. Coastal welfare is an important part of this equation because economic insecurity onshore usually translates to illicit maritime activities. Hence, improved maritime governance in fisheries – to begin with – can prevent coastal populations from turning to criminal networks and activities such as piracy incidents, armed robbery at sea, human smuggling, trafficking, slavery, and illicit trade of drugs and wildlife, among others. Likewise, better maritime governance can prevent people from having to resort to illegal means to exploit maritime resources.
A third way in which foreign policy can feature in the election agenda is to reframe it as a long-term issue that extends to future generations. Foreign policy decisions based on short-term economic benefits are unsustainable because long-term consequences spill over to other spheres. Appeasing China to garner development assistance has ramifications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and towards the broader geopolitical balance of power. Pivoting to China does not only impact the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, but also great power competition and the dynamics in the regional strategic environment. These also have long-term effects on the body politic of the Philippines.
Elections are important to the ordinary Filipino. As such, foreign interference in national elections cuts to the core not only of the Philippines’ vibrant democracy, but also of the Filipino’s deep-seated identity. More importantly, what is worse than a self-serving new president in 2022 is a president that serves the interests of another country instead of the Filipino people.
CONCLUSION
Putting foreign policy on the election agenda should be prioritised in the upcoming presidential bid in the Philippines. A well-crafted China policy, in particular, will serve the national interests of Filipinos, defend the country’s sovereign and territorial integrity, and forge a path towards pandemic recovery. Reframing foreign policy as a gut issue and as a matter of national pride not only demonstrates that the political is personal, but also that the personal – the everyday struggles, the seemingly mundane realities of ordinary Filipinos – is political.
ENDNOTES
[1] Aries A. Arugay, “The 2022 Philippine elections: like father, like daughter-te,” Fulcrum, 17 November 2021. https://fulcrum.sg/the-2022-philippine-elections-like-father-like-daughter-te/; Jorge V. Tigno, “A game of musical thrones: candidate substitutions and withdrawals in the 2022 Philippine elections,” Fulcrum, 15 December 2021. https://fulcrum.sg/a-game-of-musical-thrones-candidate-substitutions-and-withdrawals-in-the-2022-philippine-elections/.
[2] “December 2021 nationwide survey on the May 2022 elections,” Pulse Asia Research Inc., 22 December 2021. https://www.pulseasia.ph/elementor-4214/.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Neil Jerome Morales and Karen Lema, “Son of late Philippines dictator Marcos to run for president,” Reuters, 5 October 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/son-late-philippines-strongman-marcos-run-presidency-media-2021-10-05/.
[5] “China: ‘We understand and support’ the Philippines’ drug war,” Insider, 14 October 2016. https://www.businessinsider.com/afp-china-says-supports-philippines-duterte-drug-war-2016-10; “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020,” International Criminal Court, 14 December 2020. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2020-PE/2020-pe-report-eng.pdf.
[6] Willard Cheng, “Duterte heads home from China with $24 billion deals,” ABS-CBN News, 21 October 2016. https://news.abs-cbn.com/business/10/21/16/duterte-heads-home-from-china-with-24-billion-deals; Alvin Camba, “How Duterte strong-armed Chinese dam-builders but weakened Philippine institutions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/202106Camba_Philippines_final1.pdf.
[7] Frances Mangosing, “Pro-China governor opposes PH-US live-fire drills,” Inquirer.net, 13 January 2022. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1539757/pro-china-gov-opposes-ph-us-live-fire-drills.
[8] “’Great honor’: Chinese envoy meets Bongbong Marcos anew at embassy event,” CNN Philippines, 21 October 2021. https://www.cnn.ph/news/2021/10/21/China-Embassy-Bongbong-Marcos.html.
[9] Mara Cepeda, “Robredo’s China policy: recognize arbitral ruling on West PH Sea first,” Rappler, 14 October 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/robredo-china-policy-recognize-ruling-west-philippine-sea-first/.
[10] Pia Ranada, “Isko Moreno wants joint oil exploration with China in West PH Sea under service contract,” Rappler, 25 September 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/isko-moreno-wants-joint-oil-exploration-with-china-in-west-ph-sea-under-service-contract/; “Lacson: joint venture with China in WPS should follow PH Constitution,” Senate of the Philippines, 18th Congress, 31 October 2021. http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2021/1031_lacson1.asp.
[11] Alan Robles and Raissa Robles, “The Manchurian candidate: why China’s interest in the Philippine election is under scrutiny as Duterte prepares to leave office,” South China Morning Post, 20 November 2021. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3156732/manchurian-candidate-concerns-rise-over-puppet-politicians.
[12] Shibani Mahtani and Regine Cabato, “Why crafty Internet trolls in the Philippines may be coming to a website near you,” The Washington Post, 26 July 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/why-crafty-internet-trolls-in-the-philippines-may-be-coming-to-a-website-near-you/2019/07/25/c5d42ee2-5c53-11e9-98d4-844088d135f2_story.html.
[13] Ronald U. Mendoza, Imelda Deinla, Jurel Yap, “Philippines: Diagnosing the Infodemic,” The Interpreter, 1 December 2021. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/philippines-diagnosing-infodemic.
[14] The difference between misinformation and disinformation stems from intent. Misinformation is the unintentional spread of inaccurate information, while disinformation is the deliberate dissemination of wrong, false, inaccurate, or misleading information to manipulate narratives or advance a particular agenda.
[15] Jaime Laude, “Philippine fishing boat hit by China ship, sinks,” Philippine Star, 13 June 2019. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/06/13/1926016/philippine-fishing-boat-hit-china-ship-sinks.
[16] Jairo Bolledo, “Filipino TV crew chased by Chinese ships armed with missiles,” Rappler, 8 April 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/filipino-tv-crew-chased-by-chinese-ships-armed-missiles-west-philippine-sea/.
[17] “China Coast Guard blocked, water cannoned Philippine boats en route to Ayungin,” Philippine Star, 18 November 2021. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2021/11/18/2142158/china-coast-guard-blocked-water-cannoned-philippine-boats-en-route-ayungin-dfa.
[18] Yew Lun Tian, “China authorizes coast guard to fire on foreign vessels if needed,” Reuters, 22 January 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-coastguard-law-idUSKBN29R1ER; Gregory B. Poling et al., “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and Center for Advanced Defense Studies, 2021. https://amti.csis.org/pulling-back-the-curtain-on-chinas-maritime-militia/.
[19] Collin Koh, “Choppy conditions in the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, 31 December 2021. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/12/31/choppy-conditions-in-the-south-china-sea/.
[20] Jay L. Batongbacal, “The Philippines and the South China Sea arbitration award: external appeasement and internal dissension,” Fulcrum, 6 October 2021. https://fulcrum.sg/the-philippines-and-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-award-external-appeasement-and-internal-dissension/.
[21] Julio S. Amador III et al., “National security priorities and agenda in the Philippines: perceptions from the Filipino strategic community,” Amador Research Services, 2020. https://www.amadorresearchservices.com/publications/national-security-priorities-and-agenda-in-the-philippines.
[22] Andreo Calonzo, “China yet to deliver promised billions despite Duterte’s pivot,” Bloomberg, 5 July 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-04/duterte-s-pivot-to-china-yet-to-deliver-promised-billions-in-infrastructure.
[23] Adrian Ayalin and Katrina Domingo, “COA flags ‘deficiencies’ in DOH management of P67-B COVID funds,” ABS-CBN News, 11 August 2021. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/11/21/coa-spots-deficiencies-in-handling-of-p67-b-covid-funds. On 10 January 2022, the Philippines reported 33,169 new COVID-19 cases, the highest since the pandemic started in March 2020. Bonz Magsambol, “Philippines tallies 33,169 new COVID-19 cases, highest since pandemic began,” Rappler, 10 January 2022. https://www.rappler.com/nation/coronavirus-cases-philippines-january-10-2022/.
[24] Ralf Rivas, “In charts: how Duterte’s love affair with China shaped the PH economy,” Rappler, 21 July 2021. https://www.rappler.com/business/charts-how-duterte-love-affair-china-shaped-philippine-economy/.
[25] Aika Rey, “POGOs linked to crimes: forged PH passports, money-laundering, sex trafficking,” Rappler, 4 March 2020. https://www.rappler.com/nation/253332-senators-link-pogos-to-crimes/.
[26] Michelle Abad, “’Magkano at hanggang kanino?’: Hontiveros reveals bribery in entry of POGO workers,” Rappler, 17 February 2020. https://www.rappler.com/nation/252003-hontiveros-reveals-bribery-entry-pogo-workers/.
[27] “South China Sea energy exploration and development,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2022. https://amti.csis.org/south-china-sea-energy-exploration-and-development/#:~:text=The%20South%20China%20Sea%20holds,with%20much%20more%20potentially%20undiscovered.
[28] Pratnashree Basu, “In deep water: current threats to the marine ecology of the South China Sea,” Issue Briefs and Special Reports, Observer Research Foundation, 8 March 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/in-deep-water-current-threats-to-the-marine-ecology-of-the-south-china-sea/#_edn1.
[29] Leilani Chavez, “Geopolitical standoff in South China Sea leads to environmental fallout,” Mongabay, 12 August 2021. https://news.mongabay.com/2021/08/geopolitical-standoff-in-south-china-sea-leads-to-environmental-fallout/.
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2022/15 “Examining Climate-Conflict Links in Southeast Asia” by Darren Cheong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- There has been a recent growth in studies dedicated to uncovering links between climate and conflict in Southeast Asia.
- This article synthesises the findings of 11 rigorous peer-reviewed studies conducted in various Southeast Asian countries to produce insights on the exact mechanisms linking climate and intra-state conflict in the region.
- Three mechanisms linking climate and conflict are highlighted (1) economic deprivation, (2) strategic considerations by organised armed groups and (3) elite exploitation.
- The risks of climate-linked conflict are most significant for rural communities that depend heavily upon agriculture for their livelihoods, as well as in regions where there is pre-existing armed conflict.
- Climate adaptation strategies that reduce the adverse impacts of climatic events can provide an avenue to mitigate the risks of climate-linked conflict.
* Darren Cheong is Research Associate at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme (RSPS), ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/15, 21 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
The security implications of climate change have become a focus for world leaders and global policymakers in recent years. One of the leading security concerns about climate change is its potential to spark violent intra-state conflict.[1] With this growing interest in the possibility of climate change being related to conflict, researchers have also focused on uncovering whether such a link exists and if so, how they are linked.
There have been protracted debates about whether climate change is indeed linked to violent conflict. While some studies have been unequivocal about the existence of a climate-conflict link, others note that the empirical findings across studies have not been consistent and robust.[2] Experts have agreed that it is difficult to make broad generalisations about the findings of such studies and that the existence of climate-conflict links should be contextualised in specific local or country settings.[3]
Even though Southeast Asia is one of the regions projected to be most affected by climate change, the vast majority of studies looking into the climate-conflict link have not been in the region.[4] Nevertheless, there has been growing research interest in the region, and a number of studies have looked at specific pathways linking climate change to conflict. While research in the region is still relatively nascent, there is growing indication that a climate-conflict link is supported by evidence in the literature and that policymakers should take note of climate-related conflict risks. Synthesising the findings of 11 peer-reviewed studies on climate and conflict in Southeast Asia, this article aims to provide evidence-based perspectives on the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict in the region. In the context of these studies and for the purposes of this article, conflict is defined as intra-state violence that can occur on various scales. Smaller-scale civil conflict will involve events such as violent protests, riots or forced evictions while larger-scale civil conflict can involve insurgencies, rebellions and terrorist activity. These insights will be helpful in crafting prevention and mitigation strategies that target climate-related conflict.
The articles reviewed in this article were found using Boolean search strings on two academic databases: ScienceDirect and Web of Science. These studies come from various disciplines – economics, political science, geography, and anthropology – and both quantitative and qualitative studies were reviewed. A list of these studies can be found in the Appendix.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: CLIMATE DISASTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
As the mechanisms linking climate and conflict are often mediated through climate disasters, this section will provide a broad overview of the latter, occurring in the region. There is a growing consensus amongst climate disaster attribution studies that climate change has been a key factor in increasing the likelihood and intensity of climate disasters in recent decades.[5]
In Southeast Asia, there has been a considerable increase in climate-related disaster events (floods, extreme temperatures, droughts, landslides, storms, and wildfires) in recent decades. We note this increase in Figure 1, a histogram depicting the number of climate disasters from the 1960s to the present day. With each decade, climate disasters have indeed been becoming more frequent, with countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand bearing the brunt of this increase.
This histogram is also broadly reflective of recent climate risk indicators. Table 1 provides a summary of the various human and economic costs of climate disasters for Southeast Asian countries, alongside the most recent 2021 iteration of Germanwatch’s long-term climate risk ranking, a widely used index measuring climate vulnerability.[6] Five Southeast Asian countries – Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia – rank amongst the top 20 most vulnerable countries globally. From Table 1, we can see that these countries have also faced high costs from climate disaster events over the last two decades – with thousands of fatalities, millions affected, and billions of US dollars in damages.
Based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report[8] that climate change will exacerbate the frequency and intensity of climate disaster events, it is reasonable to expect that these costs will continue to increase. Bearing in mind the costs of climate disasters in Southeast Asia, the subsequent sections provides a detailed breakdown of the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict.
CLIMATE AND CONFLICT: EVIDENCE-BASED MECHANISMS
Early research on climate and conflict has been met with scepticism because of its preoccupation with uncovering broad correlations between climatic events and instances of violent conflict. While the existence of such correlations serves as a useful starting point for investigation into the climate-conflict link, they do not offer insights into the potential mechanisms that may be driving these correlations. The reason for this can be seen in Figure 2, which shows a climate disaster density map of the Philippines, overlaid with locations of conflict events[9] between 2000 to 2019.
The figure demonstrates that there is indeed a correlation between climate and conflict. Areas of high to medium disaster density experience a higher concentration of violent conflict, indicated by the darker hues of the conflict event points. From Figure 2, we cannot glean insights about what exactly might be driving this correlation. There might also be arguments that the Philippines can be characterised as a country with pre-existing tensions, most notably those associated with the Maoist and Moro insurgents. It is thus unclear if and how climate-related factors play a role in creating conflict in the Philippines.
The studies reviewed under this article have however circumvented the pitfalls of past correlational studies through the incorporation of rigorous and highly localised context-specific research designs that have allowed them to discern if, when, and under what circumstances climatic processes have led to conflict in Southeast Asia. There can, thus, be a high degree of confidence in the insights gained from these studies. The following sections outline the three main mechanisms identified in these studies, linking climate and conflict in the region: (1) economic deprivation, (2) the strategic considerations of organised armed groups, and (3) elite exploitation.[12]
Mechanism 1: Economic Deprivation
The proposition that climate and conflict are linked through economic deprivation is theoretically motivated by economic theory related to opportunity costs. If adverse climatic events undermine economic output and livelihoods, there might be the expectation that the opportunity costs of conflict would decrease and that anti-state grievances might arise.[13] Research evaluating the existence of such an effect has primarily been focused on agricultural communities whose incomes are heavily climate dependent.
Several studies have validated economic deprivation as a mechanism linking climate and conflict in Southeast Asia. In a 2016 quantitative study using provincial-level conflict data in Indonesia between 1993 and 2003, researchers found that reductions in rice yields, because of increases in temperatures during the rice-growing season, were a determinant of future upticks in violent conflict.[14] This increase in conflict is predicated on continued reductions of rice production per capita. In other words, on average, provinces that experienced increases in temperatures and reduced rice yields can prone to face increases in conflict incidences in the future. Conflict in this context has been defined as collective violence, where violence is perpetrated by groups. Examples include riots and acts of terrorism.
Another study in 2018 in the Philippines utilised data from military incident reports produced by the Philippine army to explore the effects of rainfall shocks on violent conflict.[15] These reports reflected instances where either government forces or insurgent groups had initiated attacks on one another. They concluded that above-average rainfall during wet seasons, which resulted in decreased agricultural yields due to flooding, led to more casualties and conflict incidents being reported in the subsequent year. This effect was particularly pronounced in provinces that dedicated a larger proportion of land to rice production, the Philippines’ most important crop and the main source of income for millions of farmers.
Aside from studies regarding land agriculture, a 2016 study on 260 coastal districts in Indonesia found a link between climatically induced reductions in fisheries output and increases in sea-piracy activity.[16] The author argues that this phenomenon is driven by the opportunity costs of participating in piracy being reduced for fishermen whose livelihoods have been threatened by climatic conditions.
Apart from Indonesia and the Philippines, few Southeast Asian countries have been the research focus for such research. This is not to say that economic deprivation as a mechanism for climate-linked conflict does not exist in the rest of Southeast Asia. Given that millions of people in the region depend on agriculture for their livelihood, it is reasonable to expect that future climate disasters can foment similar conflict-stirring conditions in other parts of Southeast Asia.
Table 2 provides a country-by-country breakdown of the economic contributions of the agricultural sector to Southeast Asia. We can see that the sector constitutes a considerable percentage of many Southeast Asian countries’ GDPs. More importantly, significant proportions of their populations rely on the sector for employment.
Table 2: Economic Dependence on Agriculture in Southeast Asia
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2021)
The sixth IPCC assessment report projects that Southeast Asia will face increased precipitation levels, more intense tropical cyclones, and higher flood levels under future climate change scenarios.[17] More intense and frequent climate disasters can certainly aggravate the risk of conflicts, especially in agriculturally dependent regions.
Mechanism 2: Strategic Considerations by Organised Armed Groups
In the wake of destructive climate disasters, organised armed groups may take advantage of the unrest to reorganise and bolster their own positions. This mechanism for climate-linked conflict is typically applicable to Southeast Asian countries where there are ongoing insurgencies or rebel activities.
Following climate disasters, insurgent groups have been known to actively entice disaster victims to join their movements. This enticement works in tandem with the economic deprivation mechanism, where disaster-affected communities will find the opportunity costs of participating in conflict to be reduced. In a 2016 study on all 81 provinces in the Philippines, researchers found that precipitation shocks in the form of droughts, floods and storms, coincided with significant escalations of violence during four ongoing insurgencies between 2001 and 2007.[18] Provinces that experienced these shocks were found on average to have increased onsets of violent insurgent activity. These escalations were linked to ramped up recruitment efforts by insurgent groups, who sought to play up political grievances following the loss of livelihoods from climate disasters. A case study supported by interviews which the author conducted was when the Communist Party of Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), under the guise of providing aid, organised indoctrination sessions to encourage villagers to join the group. Such recruitment drives subsequently fortified their ranks and motivated them to engage in more insurgent activity.
As climate disasters may similarly diminish the food supplies of insurgent groups, some of these groups engage in conflict to bolster dwindling resources. In a 2017 study on Thailand, researchers analysed the case study of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) in Songkhla province in the south during the extreme droughts of 2004.[19] As a response to the onset of droughts, farmers in the province had stockpiled rice in their fields in anticipation of future depressed rice outputs. This motivated the BRN-C to conduct raids on rice fields in various parts of the province to capture and control rice fields during the drought. These raids were extremely violent and often involved killing, beheading, and beatings. Part of the evidence supporting these claims was a Thai Ministry of Interior report in 2005 highlighting a 90 per cent increase in the number of villagers killed by insurgents in Songkhla province during the 2004 droughts.
These studies echo the point that climate change can be understood as a threat multiplier that amplifies the risks of existing security issues. That being said, it is not completely certain that armed conflict perpetrated by insurgent groups will flare up whenever climate disasters occur. Whether or not armed groups choose to take advantage of unrests during climate disasters will be heavily contingent upon the specific disaster and local contexts. For instance, typhoons Bopha and Haiyan in 2012 and 2013 were found to have weakened two rebel groups, the CPP-NPA and National Democratic Front (NDF) in the Philippines. In a study of those cases, the author concluded that this weakening was likely to be temporary and to be due to the typhoons being especially devastating in areas where the groups were active.[20]
Mechanism 3: Elite Exploitation
The third mechanism, elite exploitation, does not come about as a direct consequence of climate disasters. Rather, the mechanism involves local elites, under the veil of humanitarian assistance and climate change mitigation/adaptation policies, seeking to gain a foothold in ongoing land conflicts with local communities.
In the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, local populations in the island of Sicogon were forced by the local political elite to waive their rights to land on the island.[21] In exchange, they would receive either a lump-sum cash payout or a house at a relocation site in the mainland, along with immediate disaster assistance. The parcels of land the indigenous populations resided on stood in the way of a planned tourism project and was the source of ongoing land conflict between local communities and the local elite. Preying on the local populations’ desperation following typhoon Haiyan, the local elites saw an opening to dispossess them of their lands. Those who refused the offer for payouts or relocation reported becoming victims of constant harassment and threats.
To be sure, such conflicts can also take place in the absence of climate disasters. There is, for example, an ongoing pattern of local elites in Southeast Asia justifying land grabs using the veil of climate change adaptation or mitigation – a phenomenon commonly referred to as “green-grabbing”.
In Myanmar’s Northern Shan State, a 2020 study found that the justification for hydropower projects along with the Salween River has increasingly been framed in terms of climate change mitigation.[22] Villagers had also stated that this sort of framing had become more prominent since talks about dam-building began in the early 2010s. Many villagers opposed to the dam were ultimately forced to vacate lands the government wanted to acquire as part of the hydropower projects.
Elsewhere in Cambodia’s Greater Aural region, the expansion of flex crops used for biofuel production ignited conflicts between local communities and local companies backed by the governing elite.[23] Increasing the use of biofuels had been touted as a form of climate change mitigation strategy amongst global policymakers, and in 2010, the Cambodian government awarded large land concessions to two sugar companies owned by a tycoon closely associated with the country’s political elite. These companies encroached upon farmland belonging to local communities. Evictions soon turned violent, and villagers reported bulldozers, backed by army battalions, clearing their lands without warning.
In a separate region of Cambodia, in the Prey Lang Forest, a 34,007-hectare land concession was awarded to a Korean company, Think Biotech, by the Cambodian government in 2010 to execute a reforestation project under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).[24] Local communities residing within the concession were forced to give up rights to the land. In 2013, approximately 300 villagers organised local protests outside Think Biotech’s offices in Kratie province, seizing two company trucks in the process. Think Biotech’s activities continue to face resistance and protests from local communities to this day. Ironically, the project’s green credentials are now in doubt. The concession now consists of a monoculture timber plantation, whose creation had involved industrial-scale slash and burn activity. The initial aim of CDM accreditation was also dropped because the requirements to provide proof of emissions reductions were deemed “too complicated”.[25]
These case studies demonstrate that climate change can provide an avenue for local elites to assert control over resources, which might, in turn, spark conflict. In many Southeast Asian countries where land rights for rural communities are often lacking, there will be risks of elite exploitation leading to conflict. No doubt, such exploitation is not new, but climate change policies have now provided a new legitimation for local elites to justify land grabs.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY DIRECTIONS
Climate-conflict research in Southeast Asia is still nascent. The studies reviewed for this article certainly do not provide a definitive assessment of the climate-conflict link in the region. However, they can be seen as a cross section of Southeast Asia’s climate-conflict risk landscape, and certain important insights about the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict can be gleaned from them.
The main takeaway is that climate-related conflict will typically play out where livelihoods are heavily dependent upon climatic factors, i.e., in agriculture or fishery. The propensity for locals to participate in conflict in response to adverse climatic events will decrease if policies are in place to mitigate the economic harm suffered by communities during climate events.
Measures that reduce the impact of climatic events on agricultural yields have been suggested as a potential mitigation strategy for climate-linked conflict.[26] For instance, building irrigation infrastructure, diversifying crops and improving access to climate-smart agriculture technologies are some of the policy paths that governments can consider. These also have other economic and environmental benefits that will make them particularly attractive to local or federal governments.
Regarding land conflicts linked to “green grabbing”, these can be mitigated with improved land rights for rural populations that have typically relied on customary land tenures that have little to no formal recognition. Increasing the level of transparency and accountability in environmental impact assessments for projects justified in the name of climate change mitigation/adaptation will also be needed. In this regard, the role of local non-government organisations who are familiar with local environmental contexts will be important.
Since climate change is projected to severely impact Southeast Asia in the near future, climate-conflict research that is contextually sensitive to the region is needed more than ever.
Appendix: The Southeast Asia Climate-Conflict Studies Analysed for this Article
| Author(s) | Title | Journal | Year |
| Arnim Schneidel and Courtney Work | Forest plantations and climate change discourses: New powers of ‘green grabbing’ in Cambodia | Land Use Policy | 2018 |
| Benjamin Bagozzi, Ore Koren, and Bumba Mukherjee | Droughts, land appropriation, and rebel violence in the developing world. | The Journal of Politics | 2017 |
| Benjamin Crost, Claire Duquennois, Joseph H. Felter, and Daniel I. Rees | Climate change, agricultural production and civil conflict: Evidence from the Philippines | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2018 |
| Carol Hunsberger, Courtney Work, and Roman Herre | Linking climate change strategies and land conflicts in Cambodia: Evidence from the Greater Aural region. | World Development | 2018 |
| Colin Walch | Weakened by the storm: Rebel group recruitment in the wake of natural disasters in the Philippines | Journal of Peace Research | 2020 |
| Joshua Eastin | Hell and high water: Precipitation shocks and conflict violence in the Philippines | Political Geography | 2018 |
| Maria Angelina Uson | Natural disasters and land grabs: The politics of their intersection in the Philippines following super typhoon Haiyan | Canadian Journal of Development Studies | 2018 |
| Nicolas Gatti, Kathy Baylis, and Benjamin Crost | Can irrigation infrastructure mitigate the effect of rainfall shocks on conflict? Evidence from Indonesia | American Journal of Agricultural Economics | 2021 |
| Raul Caruso, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti | Climate change, rice crops, and violence: Evidence from Indonesia | Journal of Peace Research | 2017 |
| Saturnino M. Borras Jr, Jennifer C. Franco, and Zau Nam | Climate change and land: Insights from Myanmar | World Development | 2016 |
| Sebastian Axbard | Income opportunities and sea piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from satellite data | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics | 2016 |
ENDNOTES
[1] UN Security Council. “The UN Security Council and Climate Change” Security Council Report. 21 June 2021. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_security_2021.pdf
[2] Koubi, Vally. “Climate change and conflict.” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 343-360.
[3] Mach, Katharine J., Caroline M. Kraan, W. Neil Adger, Halvard Buhaug, Marshall Burke, James D. Fearon, Christopher B. Field et al. “Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict.” Nature 571, no. 7764 (2019): 193-197.
[4] Adams, Courtland, Tobias Ide, Jon Barnett, and Adrien Detges. “Sampling bias in climate–conflict research.” Nature Climate Change 8, no. 3 (2018): 200-203.
[5] Carbon Brief. “Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world”. Carbon Brief. 21 February 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-weather-around-the-world; Ornes, Stephen. “Core Concept: How does climate change influence extreme weather? Impact attribution research seeks answers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 33 (2018): 8232-8235.
[6] Eckstein, David, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer. Global Climate Risk Index 2021. Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events: Weather Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000-2019. German Watch, 2021.; von Uexkull, Nina, and Halvard Buhaug. “Security implications of climate change: A decade of scientific progress.” Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 1 (2021): 3-17.
[7] Guha-Sapir, Debby., Regina Below and Phillipe Hoyois. EM-DAT: The CRED/OFDA International Disaster Database (29 December 2021), distributed by Université Catholique de Louvain. www.emdat.be.
[8] IPCC. Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
[9] Conflict events are defined as incidents where armed force was used an organised actor, against another organised actor, or against civilians, which resulted in at least one direct death at a specified date and location.
[10] Rosvold, Elisabeth L., and Halvard Buhaug. “GDIS, a global dataset of geocoded disaster locations.” Scientific Data 8, no. 1 (2021): 1-7.
[11] Pettersson, Therése, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, and Margareta Sollenberg Magnus Öberg. “Organized violence 1989–2020, with a special emphasis on Syria.” Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 4 (2021): 809-825.
[12] An earlier study provided the mechanism framework that is utilised in this paper. Nordqvist, P., & Krampe, F. (2018). Climate change and violent conflict: sparse evidence from South Asia and South East Asia. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
[13] Salehyan, Idean, and Cullen S. Hendrix. “Climate shocks and political violence.” Global Environmental Change 28 (2014): 239-250.
[14] Caruso, Raul, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti. “Climate change, rice crops, and violence: Evidence from Indonesia.” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 1 (2016): 66-83.
[15] Crost, Benjamin, Claire Duquennois, Joseph H. Felter, and Daniel I. Rees. “Climate change, agricultural production and civil conflict: Evidence from the Philippines.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 88 (2018): 379-395.
[16] Axbard, Sebastian. “Income opportunities and sea piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from satellite data.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 2 (2016): 154-94.
[17] IPCC. Sixth Assessment Report.
[18] Eastin, Joshua. “Hell and high water: Precipitation shocks and conflict violence in the Philippines.” Political Geography 63 (2018): 116-134.
[19] Bagozzi, Benjamin E., Ore Koren, and Bumba Mukherjee. “Droughts, land appropriation, and rebel violence in the developing world.” The Journal of Politics 79, no. 3 (2017): 1057-1072.
[20] Walch, Colin. “Weakened by the storm: Rebel group recruitment in the wake of natural disasters in the Philippines.” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 3 (2018): 336-350.
[21] Uson, Maria Angelina M. “Natural disasters and land grabs: The politics of their intersection in the Philippines following super typhoon Haiyan.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 38, no. 3 (2017): 414-430.
[22] Borras Jr, Saturnino M., Jennifer C. Franco, and Zau Nam. “Climate change and land: Insights from Myanmar.” World Development 129 (2020): 104864.
[23] Hunsberger, Carol, Courtney Work, and Roman Herre. “Linking climate change strategies and land conflicts in Cambodia: Evidence from the Greater Aural region.” World Development 108 (2018): 309-320.
[24] Scheidel, Arnim, and Courtney Work. “Forest plantations and climate change discourses: New powers of ‘green grabbing’ in Cambodia.” Land Use Policy 77 (2018): 9-18.
[25] Ibid, 10.
[26] Gatti, Nicolas, Kathy Baylis, and Benjamin Crost. “Can irrigation infrastructure mitigate the effect of rainfall shocks on conflict? Evidence from Indonesia.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 103, no. 1 (2021): 211-231.
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“A Study of Vietnam’s Control over Online Anti-state Content” by Dien Nguyen An Luong
2022/14 “Rising Risks from Cross-ownership between Real Estate Developers and Banks in Vietnam” by Tuan Ho, Tuan Huu Nguyen, Trang Thi Ngoc Nguyen, and Tho Ngoc Tran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since 2010, cross-holdings in commercial banks have been considered by Vietnamese policy makers as a critical issue; this practice encourages non-compliance activities by financial institutions, such as the bypassing of credit risk regulations.
- By 2019, thanks to banking reforms led by the State Bank of Vietnam, this issue had been effectively managed.
- However, a more sophisticated form of cross-holdings has emerged in recent years, with more and more real estate developers becoming key decision-makers in local banks.
- Real estate developers’ ownership in commercial banks exposes Vietnam to the same problems that China is facing, with poorly capitalised real estate companies borrowing heavily from banks via their complex network of affiliates, thereby exposing these banks as well as the whole banking system to great risks.
- In order to deal with these risks, regulators need better tools to trace the ultimate ownership of commercial banks and mitigate ownership concentration. Requiring board diversity and enhancing the role of independent directors are some of the best practices that Vietnam can adopt.
* Tuan Ho is Senior Lecturer in Finance and Accounting at the University of Bristol and Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Tuan Huu Nguyen is Head of Risk Management at Saigon Securities Corporation. Trang Thi Ngoc Nguyen is Associate Professor of Finance, and Tho Ngoc Tran is Professor of Finance at the University of Economics – Ho Chi Minh City.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/14, 17 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
China’s economic stability has recently been threatened by the debt problem of major real estate developers, with Evergrande being the most notable case.[1] This has led to concerns that similar problems may happen to other countries in the region. In Vietnam, debates about this risk among policy makers and industry experts have intensified, as several real estate developers have recently emerged as major shareholders or key decision-makers in local banks.
This paper analyses the risks that this phenomenon poses to Vietnam’s banking system and discusses how Vietnam can handle this issue. We first review Vietnam’s banking reforms since 2011, focusing on the cross-holdings issue. We then link this to the risks posed by local real estate developers’ investment in banks, and discuss possible consequences. Finally, we recommend some policies and best practices that Vietnam can adopt to mitigate the risks.
WHY DO REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS WANT TO CONTROL BANKS?
Reducing cross-holdings in commercial banks has been an important goal for Vietnamese policy makers since 2010. The fast growth of commercial banks in the 2000s was associated with the emergence of complicated ownership structures within these banks. Some banks held shares in other banks, while some were owned by non-financial companies, both private and state-owned, which were also these banks’ major clients. Such ownership structures were established through either direct or indirect links with these companies’ affiliates.[2]
In 2010, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), the country’s central bank, decided that cross-ownership among banks was a worrying trend as this practice encouraged non-compliance activities by financial institutions and major shareholders of commercial banks, including the bypassing of credit risk regulations. At the end of 2011, four state-owned commercial banks, namely Vietcombank, BIDV, VietinBank and Agribank, were holding shares in eight private-owned joint-stock commercial banks. For example, Vietcombank held an 11 per cent stake in Military Bank, an 8.2 per cent stake in Eximbank, a 4.7 per cent stake in Oriental Bank, and a 5.3 per cent stake in Saigon Bank. Private-owned commercial banks also held each other’s shares. For example, Eximbank owned 10.6 per cent of Sacombank and 8.5 per cent of Viet A Bank.[3]
After some deliberation, in 2014, the SBV issued Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN to address this cross-holding problem.[4] The circular clarifies the definition of persons related to key decision-makers of commercial banks. It also requires additional disclosures on the ownership of related persons in commercial banks and the banks’ provision of credit to these persons. At the same time, the circular provides that a commercial bank can only hold less than 5 per cent of another financial institution’s equity. Thanks to these efforts, by June 2019, the number of pairs of financial institutions with cross-holding relationships had been reduced from 56 to only one.[5] Thereafter, SBV Governor Nguyen Thi Hong claimed that the issue of cross-holding in financial institutions had been “effectively handled”, and the problem of major shareholders manipulating banks had been managed.
However, while cross-ownership between banks may have virtually been eliminated, other types of complex ownership structures in the banking system have emerged. One particularly worrying trend is the participation of local real estate developers in banks; it is feared that this can adversely influence these banks’ lending practices.
Ownership structure reports issued by local banks suggest that most of them comply with regulations against cross-holdings issued by the SBV, such as the rules specified in Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN. However, these regulations do not cover the issue of companies that are affiliates of bank shareholders holding shares in these banks. In most cases, such companies engage in different businesses, including capital-intensive ones such as real estate. These companies’ participation in banks is not driven by these banks’ profits, dividends, or stock price appreciation. Instead, the main benefit of their participation is the ability to influence these banks’ lending practices, including non-compliance activities such as providing excessive lending to certain clients. Essentially, real estate developers who can somehow control banks can channel more credits to their real estate projects by lending to these developers’ affiliates. They can even use employees as nominees to open companies to obtain loans from banks and then channel the money back to their businesses. It is hard to trace such transactions without thorough forensic audits, which are normally conducted only when major scandals break out.
Although it is difficult to trace these transactions and obtain definitive evidence, there are clear indications that some commercial banks are being controlled by real estate developers. For example, in May 2021, Tran Thi Thu Hang, CEO of Sunshine Group, a rising real estate developer with major projects in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, became chairwoman of Kienlongbank. In the same month, Nguyen Duc Thuy, founder and major shareholder of Thaiholdings, a conglomerate with diversified interests, including in real estate and renewable energy, was elected vice-chairman of LienVietPostBank after Thaiholdings, Thuy and his family members bought large amounts of the bank’s shares. As of December 2021, although Thaiholdings and Thuy’s relatives had putatively divested from LienVietPostBank, Thuy remained the bank’s vice chairman. In a more recent case, National Citizen Bank (NCB) appointed Bui Thi Thanh Huong, CEO of Sun Group, a major real estate developer well-known for large hospitality and entertainment complexes, as its chairwoman in July 2021. NCB is known to have made several loans to Sun Group, including for a major casino project in Van Don, Quang Ninh Province.
These developments reinforce a trend that has long existed in Vietnam’s banking industry, where local tycoons try to gain control of commercial banks as a way to provide cheap funding for their businesses, especially in the real estate sector. Notable examples of such a relationship between bank and real estate developers include Techcombank and Masterise Group, VPBank and MIK Group, SEABank and BRG Group, Saigon Commercial Bank and Van Thinh Phat Group, HDBank and Sovico Group, and Sacombank and Him Lam Group.[6]
INCREASING RISKS FROM REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
Against this backdrop, there have been concerns that real estate developers may distort the lending practices of these banks to benefit their other businesses. In March 2021, it was reported by local media that new forms of cross-holdings, i.e., real estate developers controlling banks, may be driven by regulatory arbitrage. According to the Law on Credit Institutions, the total loan a financial institution can lend to a single customer must not exceed 15 per cent of its capital, and the total outstanding loan to a customer and that customer’s related persons must not exceed 25 per cent of its capital. This balance includes bonds issued by companies of the customer to the lending institution.[7]
Since most real estate developers own multiple subsidiaries, they can circumvent the limits set out by this regulation by having these subsidiaries borrow from banks. In addition, these developers may also use affiliated businesses whose owners are putatively not related to them to borrow from the same banks. In such cases, banks can lend to these affiliated groups more than 25 per cent of their own capital without knowing that they have actually crossed the limit. While the risk management system of commercial banks can raise red flags over these transactions, bank managers, who are also real estate developers or who have close connections with them, may suppress such warnings. There have been similar cases in European banks, such as Credit Suisse in the Greensill Capital scandal, where risk managers’ warnings were ignored and suppressed by the bank’s executives.[8]
The SBV’s Circular 22/2019/TT-NHNN, which came into force on 1 January 2020, further incentivises real estate developers to acquire major stakes in commercial banks.[9] This circular aims to address banks’ maturity risk and slow down the credit flows to risky sectors, including real estate. Specifically, it requires that the ratio of short-term deposits to medium and long-term loans does not exceed 40 per cent for the period between 1 January 2020 and 30 September 2020. After this period, the ratio would go down further, to 37 per cent by October 2020 and eventually to 30 per cent by 2022. Additionally, loans to the real estate sector would carry a high-risk weight of 200 per cent, a significant increase from 150 per cent.[10] This change results in higher risk-weighted assets, and thus reduces banks’ capital adequacy ratio. In other words, if a bank maintains the same level of assets (including loans and investments) as before the increase of risk weights, it is considered to be subjecting itself to higher risks. Furthermore, if the bank’s capital adequacy ratio drops too low, it will need to raise capital to maintain the minimum ratio specified by the SBV. This regulation therefore limits the asset and credit growth of commercial banks that are not well capitalised.
Due to these new restrictions, the growth of credit to the real estate sector declined from 21 per cent in 2019 to 11.89 per cent in 2020.[11] Real estate developers now therefore have stronger motivations to become major shareholders in commercial banks to gain easier access to capital. The above-mentioned cases of cross-holdings between banks and real estate developers may only be the tip of the iceberg. There could have been other cases where real estate developers have major influence on commercial banks, but it is nearly impossible for the public and the media to trace the ultimate owners of these banks due to their complex and opaque cross-holding structures.
Some industry experts have warned about the risks associated with this new form of cross-holdings in the banking system, particularly amid disruptions to the real estate market caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, Le Xuan Nghia, former vice-chairman of the National Financial Supervisory Committee, emphasised that real estate companies serving as “backyards” of commercial banks need special attention from regulators.[12] He pointed out that several real estate developers have weak balance sheets, high debt-to-total asset ratio, and low liquidity ratio, and that their financial position “may be even worse than Evergrande’s”.[13] He also argued that the true picture is blurred by a thick “financial fog”[14] and the common practice of developers using nominees, such as their drivers, house-keepers and security guards, to set up affiliates to get bank loans on their behalf. He warned that if regulators failed to supervise carefully, cases like Evergrande would soon emerge in Vietnam.
Such concerns are well-founded and informed by past scandals in which banks’ ultimate owners channelled these banks’ money to their own pocket, causing heavy losses to the banks and putting the whole financial system at risk. One primary example is the case of Pham Cong Danh and the Vietnam Construction Bank (VNCB). As the former chairman of the bank, Danh has been prosecuted and jailed for “stealing money” from his bank and using the funds to secure loans from other lenders.[15] It is estimated that between 2012 and 2014, Danh caused VND9,000 billion (USD392 million) in losses to VNCB.
However, some others downplay the risk of real estate developers’ involvement in commercial banks. For example, Nguyen Tri Hieu, a banking expert, argues that the new owners of banks have changed their mindset. Given the stricter regulations imposed by the SBV, Hieu suggests without elaboration that the participation of real estate developers as well as companies from other industries in banks may actually be a good thing for the economy. Nevertheless, Hieu also admits that they need to learn from cases like VNCB and avoid repeating the same mistake.[16]
PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We concur that if leaders of real estate companies, who are also ultimate owners of certain banks, follow the rulebooks of the SBV, the situation will be under control. Vietnam’s current banking regulations have clearly indicated the limit that a bank can lend to a client, as well as to a client and its related parties. Furthermore, with the implementation of Basel 2 and Basel 3 standards in Vietnam, capital adequacy and internal controls have been enhanced at most banks. Market discipline may also deter bad governance behaviours, and cases like VNCB can thus be prevented.
However, while it is now harder for real estate tycoons to manipulate banks, there are still certain loopholes that they can take advantage of. Through the complex networks of subsidiaries and affiliated companies, these ultimate shareholders can channel credits to their own companies, bypassing regulations on credit and lending limits for the real estate sector. For example, they can interfere so that banks will lend to affiliates that are not directly involved in the real estate sector by building up shell companies in other industries to borrow from banks. At the end of the day, money will still be channelled to their real estate business through these shell companies.
With the rise of shadow banking, fintech app and retail lending arms, these wealth transfers can become too complicated to trace as shell companies can borrow from different arms of a commercial bank. It is therefore extremely hard for regulators to determine how much a bank is exposed to an ultimate borrower. It is also difficult for regulators to monitor which banks are exposed to cross-holdings by real estate developers and act before a problem becomes too big to tackle. Real estate developers can continue to come up with new ways to manipulate banks, and regulators are usually a few steps behind.
Even if only a few banks in the financial system have these governance loopholes, there is still a significant risk for over-indebted developers to emerge from the above-mentioned unhealthy practices. There are also concerns that banks’ operating performance may deteriorate if its leaders focus on lending to their “backyard companies”, while neglecting the banks’ main businesses. This will lead to the misallocation of banks’ resources and reduce the effectiveness of the banking system in providing capital for the economy. Furthermore, due to the wish to maintain these practices to benefit themselves, bank owners may not have the incentive to promote digitalisation of the banking system. Consequently, the competitiveness of Vietnamese banks may decline compared to foreign banks.
To avoid these risks, regulators need a better information system to trace the ultimate ownership of commercial banks and mitigate ownership concentration. Furthermore, requiring board diversity and enhancing the role of independent directors are best practices that Vietnam can adopt. When ownership is not concentrated into a few large shareholders and independent directors can challenge shady business practices, banks will be better governed and better prepared to deal with external shocks. There will also be lower chances for cases like Evergrande to emerge in Vietnam.
ENDNOTES
[1] Alexandra Stevenson and Cao Li, “Why China’s Economy Is Threatened by a Property Giant’s Debt Problems,” The New York Times, 10 November 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/article/evergrande-debt-crisis.html.
[2] Xuân Thành Nguyễn, “Commercial Banks of Vietnam: From Legal and Policy Changes in the Period 2006-2010 to Restructuring Events in the Period 2011-2015,” Fulbright Economics Teaching Program, February 2016.
[3]Văn Luyện Lê and Duy Tuấn Khuất, “Sở Hữu Chéo Giữa Các Ngân Hàng Thương Mại Việt Nam Sau Khi Ra Đời Thông Tư 36,” Tạp Chí Ngân Hàng, 2 October 2017, http://tapchinganhang.gov.vn/so-huu-cheo-giua-cac-ngan-hang-thuong-mai-viet-nam-sau-khi-ra-doi-thong-tu-36.htm.
[4] The circular can be accessed at https://vanban.chinhphu.vn/default.aspx?pageid=27160&docid=178433
[5] Đình Vũ, “Thống Đốc Nguyễn Thị Hồng: Hệ Thống Ngân Hàng Không Còn Tình Trạng Sở Hữu Chéo,” Nhà Đầu Tư, 28 January 2021, https://nhadautu.vn/thong-doc-nguyen-thi-hong-he-thong-ngan-hang-khong-con-tinh-trang-so-huu-cheo-d47956.html. The only remaining case is between Asia Commercial Bank (ACB) and Real Estate Investment Hòa Phát – Á Châu (ACB holds 2.86 per cent of Hòa Phát – Á Châu while that company owns 0.046 per cent of ACB). It remains unclear why this case was not resolved.
[6] Khanh An, “Khi đại gia Việt ‘cưới’ ngân hàng”, Nhà Đầu tư, 30 July 2021, https://nhadautu.vn/khi-dai-gia-viet-cuoi-ngan-hang-d55714.html
[7] Hà Tâm, “Bóng Dáng Sở Hữu Chéo Trong Hệ Thống Ngân Hàng,” Đầu Tư Online, 3 March 2021, https://baodautu.vn/bong-dang-so-huu-cheo-trong-he-thong-ngan-hang-d138940.html.
[8] Marion Halftermeyer, “Credit Suisse Overruled Risk Managers on Greensill Loan”, Bloomberg, 11 March 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-11/credit-suisse-overruled-risk-managers-on-loan-to-greensill.
[9] Circular 22/2019 is available at: http://congbao.chinhphu.vn/noi-dung-van-ban-so-22-2019-tt-nhnn-30003?cbid=28657
[10] Kiều Linh, “‘Nắn’ Dòng Vốn Vào Bất Động Sản,” VnEconomy, 23 November 2020, https://vneconomy.vn/nan-dong-von-vao-bat-dong-san-646111.htm.
[11] Minh Phương, “Ngân Hàng Nhà Nước Nói Gì về Tín Dụng Rót Vào Bất Động Sản, Chứng Khoán?,” Báo Tin Tức, 21 June 2021, https://baotintuc.vn/thi-truong-tien-te/ngan-hang-nha-nuoc-noi-gi-ve-tin-dung-rot-vao-bat-dong-san-chung-khoan-20210621151937032.htm.
[12] “Backyards” or “backyard companies” are terms commonly used in Vietnam to refer to companies that are related to key decision-makers of a business or a government official, normally without the knowledge of the public.
[13] Đào Vũ, “Hồi Chuông Cảnh Báo Từ ‘Bom Nợ’ Evergrande,” VnEconomy, October 2021, https://vneconomy.vn/hoi-chuong-canh-bao-tu-bom-no-evergrande.htm.
[14] “Financial fog” or “sương mù tài chính” is a term coined by Le Xuan Nghia in his interview with VnEconomy to describe the lack of transparency in banks’ asset quality. Several troubled loans were not classified as bad debts thanks to SBV’s current regulations which are designed to support commercial banks and their customers during the Covid-19 pandemic.
[“15] Hai Duyen, “Vietnamese Banks Protest after Prosecutors Call for $266 Million to Be Returned at Fraud Trial,” VnExpress International, 26 January 2018, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/vietnamese-banks-protest-after-prosecutors-call-for-266-million-to-be-returned-at-fraud-trial-3704021.html.
[16] Nhuệ Mẫn, “Chuyện đại gia bất động sản góp vốn tại ngân hàng”, Đầu tư chứng khoán, 13 August 2021, https://tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn/chuyen-dai-gia-bat-dong-san-gop-von-tai-ngan-hang-post276622.html
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2022/13 “A Roadmap for Consolidating Jokowi’s Legacy” by Yanuar Nugroho and Hui Yew-Foong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While Jokowi may have entered his second term with little political constraints in formulating his priorities and shaping his legacy, the Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted his plans significantly.
- With about two years left in power, Jokowi needs a viable roadmap and rigorous implementation to achieve significant results for his stated priorities – viz. economic transformation, continued infrastructure development, human capital development, bureaucratic reform, simplification of regulations, recovery from the pandemic, moving of the capital to East Kalimantan, and preparing the National Long-Term Development Plan 2026-2045.
- Jokowi would need to establish the technocratic foundations for competent governance, which must include systematic mechanisms reinforced with a culture of meritocracy and accountability. He would also need to have a successor who shares his vision and commitment. Only then would Jokowi’s achievements be able to outlast his tenure and cement his legacy of having substantially uplifted Indonesia’s economic and social progress.
* Yanuar Nugroho is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Lecturer at Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta, and former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of Republic of Indonesia 2015-19. Hui Yew-Foong is Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/13, 16 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
On all counts, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s second term in office started on the right footing. He had won by a larger margin (compared to when he first contested in 2014) and he had the majority of parliamentarians behind him. In fact, his coalition had grown to include some parties that opposed him during the elections, and he had successfully co-opted his erstwhile opponents, Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, into his cabinet. With very little formal opposition in parliament and political considerations (since this is his second and final term) to constrain him, Jokowi enjoys significant leeway to shape his political legacy.
Having had some success in achieving his Nawacita (nine ideals) in his first term—particularly in reducing poverty and narrowing the inequality gap between Java and the rest of Indonesia by means of infrastructure development—Jokowi followed up by offering ‘five visions’ in his second term: economic transformation, continuation of infrastructure development, human capital development, bureaucratic reform, and simplification of regulations.[1] He also promised to move the national capital, and lay the foundation for achieving the Indonesia 2045 dream by formulating the National Long-Term Development Plan 2026-2045.
Unfortunately, Covid-19 intervened. Jokowi had barely started his second term and outlined his agenda when the pandemic swept through Indonesia. Plans to gear up the economy and reform the bureaucracy had to be put on hold to manage the unprecedented public health, economic and political challenges posed by the pandemic. While the pandemic may now finally be under control – if the Omicron variant does not bring on another devastating wave of infections – Jokowi and his administration have only less than three years left to consolidate his legacy. But if we take into account the fact that quite a few of his cabinet members (and the political parties backing them) will be jostling for favourable positions in preparation for the 2024 elections, Jokowi may at best have only 15 months left to materialise his plans. In this remaining time, what then should his priorities be?
This essay suggests, from a pragmatic perspective, which political promises should be prioritised and may be fulfilled within Jokowi’s remaining tenure as president. It also offers a roadmap for how these priorities may be achieved, and to what extent. The outcome will have implications for Jokowi’s legacy and how he, the second popularly elected president of Indonesia, will be remembered.
KEEPING THE PROMISES: FOCI AND PRIORITIES
The political promises of Jokowi’s first term were packaged as Nawacita (nine ideals), outlined in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019. These aim at (i) renewing the state’s obligation to protect all people and provide security to all citizens; (ii) making the government’s presence felt through reliable governance; (iii) building Indonesia from its peripheries and strengthening rural areas; (iv) rejecting a weak state by reforming the law system; (v) improving people’s lives by improving the quality of education and health and distribution of wealth; (vi) improving people’s productivity and competitiveness; (vii) achieving economic independence; (viii) revolutionising the nation’s character; and (ix) strengthening diversity and social restoration.[2] The promises of Nawacita were partially fulfilled through massive infrastructure projects that improved connectivity, and the doling out of resources that enhanced village facilities, assisted human development and revamped national health insurance, among others. However, reform in areas such as law enforcement, human rights protection and access to justice still need significant attention.[3] To be sure, the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration had achieved encouraging results, building infrastructure rapidly across the country, keeping economic growth steady at around 5% despite global volatility, capping inflation at 2.72%, pushing unemployment down to 5.3%, reducing the poverty rate, for the first time, to the single digit rate of 9.41%, and lowering the Gini coefficient (that reflects inequality) to 0.381. Although dissenters may criticise Jokowi’s lack of achievements in law enforcement,[4] protection of human rights,[5] and environmental issues,[6] the President did deliver on some of the key bread and butter issues during his 2014-2019 term in office.[7] On the foreign policy front, it is worth noting that Jokowi is now downplaying his maritime fulcrum vision to turn Indonesia into a global maritime hub.[8] This is possibly because so little progress had been made on that front that this promise was deliberately neglected and has been allowed to be ‘forgotten’.[9]
For his second term, with Maruf Amin as his vice president, Jokowi has presented five foci: economic transformation, continuation of infrastructure development, human capital development, bureaucratic reform, and simplification of regulations.[10] Also on Jokowi’s agenda are the moving of the capital to East Kalimantan and preparing the National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN) 2026-2045. These are for realising the “Indonesia 2045” dream of becoming the fourth or fifth largest economy in the world.[11]
But as Jokowi proceeded to consolidate his legacy in his second term, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Indonesia severely. From March 2020 to the end of January 2022, more than 4.34 million people were infected and 144,000 died (see Figure 1)— about 60% of them since July 2021.[12] In two months, from 1 July to 31 August 2021, 73,496 people died.
Figure 1: Cumulative Covid-19 Infection and Death Rates in Indonesia (Mar 2020 – Jan 2022)
The impact of the pandemic put a serious dent on Jokowi’s achievements. At the end of 2020, the economy had shrunk by 2.07%, unemployment had risen to 7.07%, and the poverty rate had returned to the double-digit figure of 10.19%.[13]
Undoubtedly, the fulfilment of Jokowi-Maruf’s goals has been affected. Two years into Jokowi’s second term, the Executive Office of the President (KSP) issued a progress report on the government’s performance.[14] Of the five foci, only the continuation of infrastructure development seems to be on track, though suffering some hiccups.[15] Economic transformation and human capital development have definitely been disrupted.[16],[17] Meanwhile, the bureaucratic reform and regulation simplification that are being pushed with the help of the ‘Omnibus’ Job Creation Law have not yet been implemented optimally, particularly at the subnational level where much investment actually takes place.[18] Moving the national capital to East Kalimantan has also been hampered: it is not just a matter of infrastructure development being held back by the pandemic, but also the difficulty involved in relocating civil servants (ASN) from Jakarta.[19]
The government’s hesitation to prioritise health over the economy at the beginning of the pandemic could have been due to fear that the goals set under the five foci would not be realised.[20],[21]But now that the pandemic appears to be under control, the government will need to determine its priorities among the five foci, the drafting of the RPJPN and the relocation of the capital. This requires a roadmap that sets feasible targets, which in turn will consolidate Jokowi’s legacy during the remainder of his tenure as president.
The key question then is, what should Jokowi prioritise?
A VIABLE ROADMAP
In what follows, we suggest what the viable priorities are, and a roadmap for how they can be met, following Jokowi’s own ‘framework’. First, where economic transformation is concerned, efforts should be directed towards building a productive and competitive economy through investments in productive sectors, incentives for SMEs and the informal sectors, poverty alleviation (especially eradicating extreme poverty), and village development via the village fund (dana desa).[22] In terms of physical infrastructure development, priority should be given to the boosting of productivity and tackling inequality between Java and the rest of the archipelago. This means completing connectivity infrastructure on the main islands apart from Java, such as the Trans-Sumatera, Trans-Kalimantan, Trans-Sulawesi and Trans-Papua toll roads, seaports (especially in East Indonesia), airports outside Java, and enhancing maritime transport.[23] Development of human capital should be directed towards circumventing the demographic trap––i.e., when people in the productive age range are in fact not productive. Some measures that can be implemented include ensuring universal health care coverage, compulsory education, and defragmenting existing schemes for social protection and public services.[24] At the same time, the National Talent Management (MTN), as a body for developing Indonesia’s talent ecosystem, needs to be established.[25] Bureaucratic reform is needed to improve state capacity through de-bureaucratisation, introduction of a merit system, overhaul in the capacity-building curriculum for civil servants, and the introduction of a civil service database.[26] Simplification of regulations should increase the ease of doing business. In this regard, the implementation of the Omnibus Law should ensure that effective investments take place in a hassle-free environment and generate new jobs.
Achieving the above is crucial and best driven directly by the President, since many cabinet members are associated with political parties and interests, and will be caught up in manoeuvres and campaigning for the 2024 elections. The most realistic approach is for Jokowi to install capable people as vice ministers to work on the technocratic aspects of the foci and ensure delivery of his ideas while the ministers are busy with politics.
Second, the process for COVID-19 response and economic recovery, as Jokowi himself mentioned in a presidential official release, is to transition from pandemic to endemic status.[27] Yet scholars and epidemiologists have not seen any clear strategy for meeting this target.[28] Indonesia is in need of a comprehensive plan that can carry out epidemiologic, economic, and social interventions properly. This implies the immediate execution of three measurable steps: suppression, stabilisation, and normalisation. Suppression aims to reduce the number of cases and deaths. In this stage, the government should implement a ‘pull and push’ strategy, i.e., combining mobility restriction measures with massive tracing—particularly when new variants are found and new waves hit. Stabilisation controls the transmission scale and prepares for the re-opening of social-economic activities. The focus here is the development of infection control techniques (like air circulation in high-risk public places such as restaurants, malls and factories) and strengthening surveillance for tracing and isolation. And lastly, normalisation seeks to assist people with living a normal life, albeit under medical surveillance. The government should focus on completing vaccination roll-outs (which at the moment has barely reached 60 per cent of the population) and accelerating booster shots, strengthening healthcare facilities (hospitals and clinics) with adequate healthcare workers, equipment and medicine, and encouraging a ‘new normal lifestyle’ that adheres to public hygiene protocols (Indonesian Scientists Alliance for Pandemic Resolution, 2021).[29]
The government’s re-assignment of budgetary resources from physical infrastructure development to non-physical human resources development in the 2022 State Budget (RAPBN) is a move in the right direction. The infrastructure budget is only IDR384.8 trillion—compared to the health budget at IDR255.3 trillion, social protection at IDR427.5 trillion, and education at IDR541.7 trillion.[30] This shows the government’s determination to handle the pandemic, having learnt lessons from the past 17-18 months that not doing so could in turn lead to the economic and political crisis it was trying to avoid.
The real challenge is in the implementation though, and this is where (stalled) bureaucratic reforms have implications. A complicated bureaucracy does not help in crises and pressing situations, as evidenced in delays in social assistance distribution,[31] payment of incentives for health facilities and health workers,[32] provision of compensation to the families of health-workers who had died,[33] and the vaccination process.[34] Reform of the bureaucracy will not be easy. Even though some reforms have already been implemented, such as a merit-based system for recruitment, it will be impossible to complete comprehensive reform (including single salary and voluntary severance for civil service) in the remaining time. To sidestep bureaucratic hurdles that cannot be resolved in the short term, one measure to handle the pandemic is to strengthen the role of the Directorate General for Prevention and Disease Control (P2P) of the Ministry of Health, or to give the coordinating mandate to the National Agency for Disaster Mitigation (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana or BNPB) to act as the highest authority in times of crisis and disaster. If this proves to be effective, it could become a significant legacy of Jokowi’s.
Thirdly, the moving of the national capital, taking into account the dynamics of the pandemic, needs to be planned out carefully. Since its announcement at the annual state address on 16 August 2019, no concrete step had been taken until the government handed the bill on the capital to the parliament at the end of September 2021.[35] And now, since parliament has officially ratified the Law on the Capital on 18 January 2022,[36] the development of the new capital, named ‘Nusantara’, will have to commence immediately. Physical infrastructure development must be prioritised, implemented, and strictly monitored.[37] Since moving all the ministries and personnel is a mammoth logistical task,[38] the timeline needs to be clear, feasible and well-defined, even if it means laying out a timetable that extends over a decade or two. What needs to be made publicly clear is what the current Jokowi-Ma’ruf administration is responsible for, and what subsequent administrations have to accomplish. This means that the regulatory framework derivative of the Law on the Capital (such as Governmental and Presidential Regulations, among others) and institutional framework must be put in place, including the establishment of the long-discussed Capital Authority, or a similar agency, as the executing state body.
Finally, the Jokowi administration is well-placed to formulate a vision for Indonesia 2045 through the finalisation of RPJPN 2026-2045. The RPJPN has to be ambitious and bold enough to give a clear direction and a firm framework for Indonesia to march towards becoming a developed country. This RPJPN must be able to address the nation’s main challenges, of which there are at least eight: low social mobility, rapid urbanisation, tertiarisation,[39] climate change, food security, natural resources management, energy security, and quality of institutions (Knowledge Ecosystem and Innovation, 2020).[40] Furthermore, it has to be able to plan, identify and prioritise programmes that can address the challenges above, while navigating the political landscape.[41]
CONCLUSION: CONSOLIDATING A LEGACY AND BEYOND
If the issues raised in the last section can be addressed, Jokowi will be on his way to consolidating his legacy. Moreover, if the right measures are taken, what would be consolidated is not merely a legacy but a technocratic foundation that would help Indonesia become one of the largest economies in the world. This gravitation towards technocratic competence has been evolving, from the regional governments to the national government, as direct elections of leaders has thrown up candidates that have to be accountable to the electorate, part of which implies effective and efficient governance. To consolidate this legacy beyond Jokowi’s tenure, the government needs to put in place systematic mechanisms to safeguard the Indonesian state’s technocratic competence.
First among the mechanisms is bureaucratic reform. The challenge for Jokowi is to devise a way to push and monitor these initiatives so that they get accomplished within the next two years. Second, a mechanism needs to be put in place to assess all government achievements objectively. While any form of evaluation can be contentious, what is important is that systematic evaluation tools to audit government performance be introduced to measure the quality of governance on a regular basis, which in turn would reinforce the credibility of government institutions. Third, all reports on the government’s achievements, notably those released by the Executive Office of the President, should be organised into a knowledge repository made accessible to the public. In turn, this will serve as a repository of the legacies of respective Indonesian presidents and their administrations.
The suggestions in this essay focus on measures that can help Jokowi lay the technocratic foundation for Indonesia’s governance and build Indonesia’s future. Should such measures be taken, then there will be substance for thinking of Jokowi as “Bapak Indonesia Maju”—Father of a Progressive Indonesia. But with so little time left, Jokowi will need a friendly successor to build on what he has started, although this successor would also have his/her own political vision.
A true legacy is not merely based on memories of the past that persist in the present. It is the opening of the gate to the future. Jokowi’s best legacy is a foundation upon which his successors can continue to make Indonesia not only more advanced, but also more civilised and dignified.
ENDNOTES
[1] See https://kppip.go.id/siaran-pers/lima-fokus-kerja-di-periode-kedua-pemerintahan-jokowi/ Somehow, there is no ‘standard’ to the formulation, particularly for ‘simplification of regulation’ which is also often termed as ‘ease of investment’ and ‘economic transformation’ as ‘focused and targeted APBN/state budget.’ See for example https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2019/10/20/151257765/5-visi-jokowi-untuk-indonesia?page=all.
[2] See https://www.wapresri.go.id/en/nawa-cita/#:~:text=Nine%20Priorities%20Agenda%20(Nawa%20cita)
[3] See https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1119148/mengukur-capaian-5-tahun-pemerintahan-jokowi-jk-di-bidang-politik
[4] https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2019/10/19/337/2118978/5-tahun-jokowi-jk-penegakan-hukum-dan-ham-dinilai-masih-lemah
[5] See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/20/10495561/4-tahun-presiden-jokowi-janji-penyelesaian-pelanggaran-ham-masa-lalu-yang?page=all – See also
[6] See https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/838329-setara-soal-hukum-lingkungan-jokowi-hanya-di-atas-kertas
[7] This is consistent with what he said in an exclusive interview with BBC, that he focused on few priorities (mainly infrastructure) in the first period, and in the second period, he “might [focus on] environment, innovation, and then human rights.” He said, “We cannot do everything. Not that we are not willing to, but I like working with focus, with priorities.” See “Presiden Jokowi dalam wawancara eksklusif dengan BBC: ‘Prioritas saya ekonomi, tapi bukan saya tidak senang HAM dan lingkungan’” https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-51382305
[8] See https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8231/menuju-poros-maritim-dunia/0/kerja_nyata
[9] See https://www.jpnn.com/news/menagih-janji-jokowi-soal-visi-poros-maritim-dunia; also https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190715182845-32-412333/angin-lalu-poros-maritim-di-pidato-jokowi
[10] See https://kppip.go.id/siaran-pers/lima-fokus-kerja-di-periode-kedua-pemerintahan-jokowi/
[11] This is officially stated in the document published by The Ministry of National Development Planning “Indonesia 2045” (https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/Visi%20Indonesia%202045/Dokumen%20lengkap%202045_final.pdf). Jokowi himself has been claiming so since his 2019 presidential campaign. See https://katadata.co.id/agungjatmiko/berita/5e9a51a7280af/jokowi-2045-indonesia-mampu-menjadi-negara-ekonomi-terbesar-keempat
[12] See covid19.go.id/peta-sebaran
[13] Data from Statistics Indonesia and various ministries, gathered by the ADB in the COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Program Monitoring Report accessible https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/ino-54139-001-dpta-1 see pp.2-3
[14] Full report is downloadable from the Executive Office of the President (KSP) https://drive.ksp.go.id/s/HJNc4DpL8yxLoGs/download (accessed 29 November 2021)
[15] See https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20211101/98/1460434/menhub-sebut-3-tantangan-pembangunan-infrastruktur-saat-pandemi
[16] See https://investor.id/editorial/267599/transformasi-akselerasinbsppemulihan-ekonomi-nbsp
[17] See https://www.kemenkopmk.go.id/optimalisasi-sdm-di-tengah-pandemi
[18] See https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/implementasi-uu-cipta-kerja-di-daerah-dinilai-masih-belum-solid
[19] See https://fulcrum.sg/moving-the-indonesian-capital-political-ambition-or-realistic-vision/
[20] See https://fulcrum.sg/to-lockdown-or-not-indonesias-dilemma-in-handling-the-covid-19-second-wave/
[21] See /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-113-grave-failures-in-policy-and-communication-in-indonesia-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-by-yanuar-nugroho-and-sofie-shinta-syarief/
[22] Attempts at alleviating poverty through the massive social protection scheme in response to Covid-19 has begun to bear fruits as the poverty rate returned to the pre-pandemic level of 9.71% at the end of 2021. See https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/01/17/poverty-rate-falls-to-prepandemic-level.html
[23] See https://infopublik.id/kategori/nasional-ekonomi-bisnis/584362/kemenhub-penyelesaian-infrastruktur-jadi-arah-kebijakan-pembangunan-transportasi-2022
[24] This idea has been in the government’s mind since 2016 and it needs now to be realised–or its implementation should at least be started. The social protection integration scheme must be completed by mid-2022 and can be piloted in 2022-2023, before the end of Jokowi’s term in office.
[25] As per President’s Regulation, the grand design and institutional proposals must be completed by the end of 2021 and its budgeting must be confirmed in the RAPBN 2022 to be realised in 2022-2023. See https://setkab.go.id/presiden-terbitkan-keppres-tentang-gugus-tugas-manajemen-talenta-nasional/
[26] See https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2021/07/14/membangun-kapasitas-negara
[27] See the most official source: https://www.presidenri.go.id/siaran-pers/presiden-jokowi-siapkan-transisi-dari-pandemi-ke-endemi/
[28] See https://www.kompas.com/sains/read/2021/09/11/100300823/epidemiolog-indonesia-masih-jauh-untuk-transisi-pandemi-ke-endemi-ini-yang?page=all
[29] See https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210901203436-20-688564/roadmap-indonesia-terbebas-dari-pandemi-versi-ilmuwan
[30] Before pandemic non-infrastructure budget was much lower. For example, budget for health was IDR113,6T (2019), IDR172,3T (2020), then increased to IDR326,4T (2021). Education budget is similar to it: IDR460,3T (2019), increased to IDR473,7T (2020), and IDR540,3T (2021).
[31] See https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20210714074039-532-667345/bansos-telat-cair-bukti-mensos-gagal-perbarui-data-terpadu
[32] See https://katadata.co.id/febrinaiskana/berita/6051fa9e1b99c/persatuan-perawat-soroti-pemberian-insentif-yang-terlambat
[33] See https://laporcovid19.org/post/siaran-pers-perlunya-perbaikan-tata-kelola-penyaluran-insentif-dan-santunan-kematian-bagi-tenaga-kesehatan
[34] See https://www.kompas.com/sains/read/2021/07/12/130715823/program-vaksinasi-indonesia-kenapa-lambat-ini-jawaban-menkes-budi?page=all
[35] See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/09/30/08532981/babak-baru-pemindahan-ibu-kota-ruu-ikn-diserahkan-ke-dpr?page=all
[36] See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/01/18/20300131/uu-ikn-disahkan-ini-kedudukan-bentuk-hingga-susunan-pemerintahan-ibu-kota?page=all
[37] See https://fulcrum.sg/moving-the-indonesian-capital-political-ambition-or-realistic-vision/
[38] The target would be to move about 127,000 civil servants from Jakarta to the new capital from 2023 to 2027. See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/01/17/20273641/siap-siap-ini-bocoran-jadwal-pemindahan-asn-ke-ibu-kota-negara-baru?
[39] Tertiarisation is a shift from the primary (farming, agriculture, commodity) and secondary (processing) sectors to the tertiary (service) sector.
[40] The official document can be downloaded here https://www.menpan.go.id/site/publikasi/unduh-dokumen/buku/file/6433-cetak-biru-ekosistem-pengetahuan-dan-inovasi
[41] At this point, there is the possibility of political intervention from the PDI-P. See https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/can-jokowi-salvage-legacy-derailed-covid-19; see also https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/426213/pdip-ingin-amendemen-uud-1945-fokus-pada-pphn
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2022/12 “France’s Third Path” for the Indo-Pacific? Credentials and Challenges” by Eric Frécon
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Considering itself part of the Indo-Pacific on the grounds of history and overseas territories, France has released its Indo-Pacific strategy to guide its international action in this region.
- France has substantive diplomatic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific, with its active naval diplomacy and about 8,000 French soldiers permanently deployed in five military bases across the region.
- Although France lacks the capacity to provide extensive financial or military assistance to countries in the Indo-Pacific, it can offer knowledge and expertise in environmental and climate security and in the governance of territorial waters.
- The French vision for “an inclusive Indo-Pacific” might resonate with Southeast Asia. It also suggests France’s commitment to multilateralism and offers the possibility of moving beyond the current Sino-US bipolarity.
- Paris should improve inter-agency coordination in implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy, establish a community of knowledge on the Indo-Pacific, and ensure balance between military and non-military engagements, and between multilateral and minilateral arrangements in the region.
- The AUKUS development should motivate France to cooperate more deeply with other Asian and non-aligned countries and to integrate its Indo-Pacific strategy with that of the EU, taking advantage of its presidency of the EU Council in 2022.
* Eric Frécon is a visiting academic at the Universiti Brunei Darussalam, and an adjunct fellow at the French Naval Academy-Sorbonne, the French Research Institute for Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC, Bangkok) and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris). Opinions expressed are solely his own.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/12, 15 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
As the Indo-Pacific rises in strategic importance, France has sought to reassert its identity as an Indo-Pacific power.[1] French President Emmanuel Macron gave a series of key speeches in Canberra and Réunion Island and to his ambassadors in 2018 to shed light on the French presence in Indo-Pacific and “to build a new relationship to Asia”, with a focus on Australia, China, India and Japan.[2] In 2019, France’s Ministry of Armed Forces unveiled the country’s defence strategy for the Indo-Pacific which reaffirms the need to protect not only French interests and sovereignty but also the global commons in this region.[3] That same year, France dispatched its aircraft carrier strike group (led by the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle) across the Indo-Pacific. The naval group held numerous international drills during its mission, before the frigate Vendémiaire transited the Taiwan Strait in April 2019.
Although the Covid-19 pandemic forced a pause to French Indo-Pacific initiatives, things are now back on track with France’s enhanced presence in the Indo-Pacific. The islands of Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean have benefitted from the French Navy’s support during the pandemic through operation “Résilience” which was dedicated to supporting public services and French people in the fields of health, logistics and protection.[4] In October 2020, the former French envoy to Australia, Christophe Penot, was appointed to the newly established post of Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific Region. In October 2020, the former French envoy to Australia, Christophe Penot, was appointed to the newly established post of Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific Region.[5] France also released the up-date of its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021 to guide its international action in the region.[6]
This article examines the rationale of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the niche areas where France can make meaningful impact in the region. It also argues that post-AUKUS, Paris should continue to expand and deepen its relationships with its Indo-Pacific partners, especially in synergy with the European Union (EU).
FRENCH PRESENCE AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Unlike other major powers, France’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific is not primarily motivated by trade. France’s most important trading partners are in Europe, Africa and the Americas, and only 8% of French trade in goods crosses the South China Sea.[7] Instead, the impetus for France to consolidate its footprint in the Indo-Pacific is geographic and geo-strategic. French overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans generate 93% of its exclusive economic zone, with 1.6 million French people living in the region.[8] As the Indo-Pacific becomes the world’s centre of gravity, France can leverage this unique geography to stake its position on geopolitical issues of concern, such as multilateralism, protection of the global commons and freedom of navigation.[9]
On the diplomatic front, France has been proactive in terms of ministerial and presidential visits to the region over the past decade. In 2017, François Hollande became the first French President to visit Indonesia since François Mitterrand in 1986; he also headed off to Singapore to mark his first state visit to the city-state. France is also an active participant in regional organisations in the Indo-Pacific. Paris has been chairing the Indian Ocean Commission in 2021 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2021-2022. It is a member of the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Indian OceanRim Association and the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM). France is also a member of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting since December 2021, a Dialogue Partner of the Pacific Islands Forum,[10] and a Development Partner of ASEAN, with 140 diplomatic offices or agencies stationed across the ten ASEAN member states.
On the military front, there are about 8,000 French soldiers permanently deployed in five military bases across the Indo-Pacific,[11] and 18 Defence Attachés to represent French security interests in 33 Indo-Pacific countries. France has also deployed assets in the field, including to help enforce the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on North Korea through air patrols and support capability-building programmes in countries such as Cambodia via the Francophonie.[12]
In 2020, to bolster French presence in the Indo-Pacific, there was significant attention and effort given to appointing new Subject Matters Experts (SME) and Liaison Officers (LO) both in Southeast Asia and the United Nations Command in South Korea. The French Liaison Officers are particularly important in advancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) issues in the Indo-Pacific, with their active contributions to the launch and operational efficiency of the Information Fusion Centres in Singapore, Madagascar and New Delhi. These centres facilitate intelligence sharing on maritime security.[13] France has also extended its support to anti-piracy efforts in the region. In October 2020, the Singapore-based Council of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia-Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) indicated that it “supported the intention [of Paris] to join the ReCAAP and expected [a] smooth accession process”.[14]
In terms of naval diplomacy, the annual Jeanne d’Arc mission has regularly sailed across the Indo-Pacific since 2012 (except in 2014 and 2019) and was back in the area in spring 2021, including crossing the South China Sea twice.[15] The French Navy – known as the Marine nationale – flies the country’s flag in various military missions and drills in the region. For instance, the French defence minister revealed in February 2021 details about Mission Marianne, which involved the deployment of the nuclear-powered submarine SSN Émeraude to the Indian and Pacific Oceans (including passage through South China Sea) since September 2020. As part of the mission, the French submarine conducted a joint exercise with the Indonesian Navy in the Sunda Strait.
In addition to participating in Indonesia’s Exercise Komodo and the Rim of Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), the French Navy also took the lead in Exercise La Pérouse in the Bay of Bengal in 2019, involving ships from Australia, Japan and the United States. A second edition of La Pérouse was held in March 2021, with the participation of India. It also joined the combined amphibious drills conducted by Japan and the United States in Japanese waters in May 2021.
France’s naval exchanges with the four members of the Quad have prompted questions about French support for the Quad in the context of the United States-China rivalry. The strength of the French-US partnership was affirmed by the White House in January 2021 when it referred to France as the “oldest ally”,[16] following the first call by incoming President Biden to his French counterpart.[17] However, it remains French doctrine to treat Washington as “friends, allied, but not aligned” in order to maintain room for manoeuvre.[18]
The French private sector, including the defence industry, has a prominent presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia. France has sold frigates to Singapore, submarines to Malaysia and patrol boats to the Philippines. In fact, France was the third-largest arms supplier to the region during the period between 1999 and 2018, behind only Russia and the United States.[19] The Paris-based Thales (a major defence contractor) has a large corporate footprint in Singapore with 2,100 employees, far outstripping the 1,180 people hired in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates combined.[20]
NICHE AVENUES FOR FRANCE’S INDO-PACIFIC ENGAGEMENTS
France’s capacity to expand its impact in the Indo-Pacific is limited: Paris cannot offer large-scale infrastructure financing or military equipment donations like China, Japan or the United States. Instead of hardware military assets and economic leverage, France’s niche offerings to its Indo-Pacific partners lie in its expertise in (i) environmental and climate security; and (ii) governance of territorial waters.
France has a strong focus on environmental and climate security in its Indo-Pacific partnerships. One example is the International Solar Alliance, which President François Hollande launched together with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India in 2015. France has encouraged international cooperation on anticipating the impact of climate change on military operations and limiting the environmental footprint of military operations. In 2019, France participated in a joint study for the 4th South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) which highlighted the consequences of climate change on infrastructure resilience, maritime surveillance and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.[21] Similarly, France joined Australia to conduct the Indian Ocean climate risk mapping, to “help to understand and anticipate the security consequences of climate phenomena”.[22]
Moreover, given the increasing risks of natural disasters as a result of climate change, France has sought to enhance its HADR capacity in the Indo-Pacific. The FRANZ Arrangement between France, Australia and New Zealand facilitates information-sharing for relief operations, which proved useful when Cyclone Harold hit the South Pacific islands in 2019. France has also stationed a Liaison Officer at the Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) in Singapore since its launch in 2014 and, after the tsunami on the 15th of January, a French patrol boat set sail towards Tonga with 40 tons of humanitarian aid.
France’s second offering is its extensive knowledge and expertise in managing and governing territorial waters. Because it controls the world’s second-largest EEZ, France can share expertise on promoting maritime domain awareness, handling Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and fighting maritime drug trafficking. In partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, the French Navy patrolled more than 70 days in 2021 to fight IUU fishing in the EEZs of Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Salomon Islands, Samoa and Vanuatu.[23] France can also offer lessons about maritime counterterrorism with its experience in dealing with illegal immigration and maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea.
More specifically, the unique ‘State Action at Sea’ model that France adopts for law enforcement in its territorial waters, EEZ and high seas may be of interest to other Indo-Pacific nations.[24] The model involves the establishment of an administrative and operational organisation for each of its ten maritime zones, including five overseas and two covering high seas in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. In each zone, the State is represented by a single administrative authority that can mobilise maritime assets and resources from different agencies, including the French Navy, customs and national police, for Coast Guard functions.
This model, which is “based on versatility and synergy”, could be a viable arrangement for some archipelagic Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, where administrative rivalries and budgetary constraints often hamper effective law enforcement of their maritime zones.
CHOOSING NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR CHINA
From Southeast Asia’s perspective, one advantage of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is its vision “for an inclusive Indo-Pacific”.[25] While there are calls for France to adopt a stronger stance against Beijing or to stand clearly behind Washington, President Macron has made it clear that France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is not meant “to be directed against anyone”.[26] The narrative of “don’t make us choose” – the rallying call of many Southeast Asian capitals– appears to have the edge in Paris at the moment.[27] France, however, understands the imperative for a clear-headed and disciplined relationship with China that would involve firm and frank dialogue to enable cooperation on global challenges while managing the systemic challenges that Beijing presents in other areas. It will conform to the general direction outlined by the President of the EU Commission von der Leyen: “China is certainly a partner we can negotiate with on climate issues. When it comes to economic issues, it is a tough competitor, and on matters of governance and social order, it is undoubtedly a systemic rival.”[28]
France’s posture in this regard could be described as a revival of ‘gaullo-mitterrandism’, the diplomatic doctrine named after Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand (who ruled in the 1960s and 1980s respectively).[29] Its dictum – to prioritise French national interests and values, independent of any great power, in a multilateral framework – makes particular sense in the Indo-Pacific context. The French government’s policy document titled France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific states that “Beyond any logic of blocks, we therefore intend to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific, for responding to today’s upheavals with all well-intentioned powers.”[30] This departs from the temptations of the stricter ‘atlanticism’ practised under President Sarkozy in the 2000s, or the ‘neoconservatism’ entertained by some senior officials under President Hollande in the 2010s.[31] Instead, Paris’s current Indo-Pacific strategy bears some resemblance to the non-alignment principle of the ‘Bandung spirit’ and the bebas aktif (free and active) diplomacy of Indonesia.
For France, this brand of non-alignment is manifest in its investment in relationships with other middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, especially India and Japan. Paris maintains regular strategic dialogue with New Delhi, and in 2018, the French and Indian navies gave reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities in the Indian Ocean. In November 2021, the two countries agreed to expand bilateral defence-security partnership through enhancing intelligence and information sharing, bolstering mutual capabilities, expanding military drills and pursuing new initiatives in maritime, space and cyber domains.[32] Regarding Japan, Admiral Pierre Vandier, the current Chief-of-Navy, made his first visit abroad to Tokyo in late 2020, testifying to the ‘Exceptional Partnership’ between the two countries in the wake of the Franco-Japanese Maritime Dialogue in 2019.[33]
Working with these middle powers offers an avenue for France to move beyond the narrative of Sino-US bipolarity and serve France’s strategic interest to work towards a post-hegemonic multi-polar global order.[34] Here, the hope is for great and middle powers to accompany and support the rise of the Global South, which many Indo-Pacific countries belong to. According to this ideal, the Indo-Pacific thus represents an intermediary step towards genuine pluralism where countries engage one another on a more equal footing.
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Despite its geographic residency and military footprint in the Indo-Pacific and an inclusive vision that resonates with many regional countries, France’s Indo-Pacific strategy has not gained strong visibility. To address this shortcoming, the strategy first of all needs to be coherent and balanced across two dimensions: between military and non-military engagements, and between multilateral and minilateral arrangements.
For non-military engagement, France needs to build strong links with civil society and nurture a community of knowledge about the Indo-Pacific, rather than rely only on the advice of advisors or éminence grises. It is unfortunately not yet a French habit to recognise the increasing role that national think-tanks can play in providing inputs and ideas to foreign policy-making through Tracks 1.5 and 2 discussions. Instead of only multiplying the military ports-of-call, more grants should be offered to Indo-Pacific students and thought leaders to network, research, discuss and write about Indo-Pacific-related perspectives.
Historically, France has pursued minilateral opportunities in the region, such as the Australia-France-India Trilateral Dialogue which looked more promising for France than the Quad, given the latter’s not-so-subtle anti-China orientation. Following the announcement of the tripartite security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (AUKUS) in September 2021, Paris has stepped up engagements with other middle powers such as Indonesia.[35] This, however, may not be enough. Unlike Germany, Paris has rarely bet on broad-based regional institutions in the Indo-Pacific such as the ASEAN multilateral architecture. France’s application for observer status at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) would not likely change this approach.[36] Having said that, it may be worth monitoring recent French moves towards multilateral initiatives such as the Alliance for Multilateralism organised by France and Germany alongside Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore and Ghana.[37]
Secondly, France must pursue consistency in implementing its strategy, including setting relevant goals and ensuring effective inter-ministerial coordination on Indo-Pacific engagements. Every project and policy in the Indo-Pacific requires deep and sustained involvement over the long term to succeed. The office of the French President appears wishing to take the lead to centralise the strategy. However, it is not clear if that will just remain one more voice among those of various ministries, directorates and forces already been involved. And if the Elysée Palace intends to consolidate this strategy, it should better define and sharpen gaullo-mitterandism 2.0, especially vis-à-vis Beijing, given the latter’s increasingly illiberal trends under President Xi.[38] For instance, French diplomacy should make it clearer that its “third path” does not mean “equidistance” along the continuum stretching from Beijing to Washington.
Thirdly, while AUKUS has been a shock to France, it should serve as a catalyst for its Indo-Pacific strategy and push Paris to move closer to its Asian partners (who may be worried by possible new insecurities caused by nuclearisation of the seas).[39] Just a couple of days after AUKUS was announced, French and Indian naval chiefs met, and their Ministers for Foreign Affairs held a talk. In October 2021, Indonesian and French presidents met on the side-lines of the G-20 summit, agreeing to work towards “a true strategic partnership”, followed by fruitful discussions by their two foreign ministers.[40] While it would take a while for France and Australia to mend fences, the dust has somewhat settled between Paris and Washington: US President Biden called Macron and supported the idea of European strategic autonomy, especially in developing European military capabilities.[41] In the same positive way, France worked closely with Washington in 2021, e.g. with its new status as an observer of the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercises as well as the US-Philippines Maritime Training Activity (MTA) Sama-Sama.
Last but not least, as the European dimension is indispensable to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the French Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2022 provides opportunities for Paris to leverage the EU as a force multiplier to advance its goals and agenda in the Indo-Pacific. It is true that Macron planted seeds of doubt as he did not mention the Indo-Pacific – but Africa – in his two first speeches as the next chair.[42] Nevertheless, the Indo-Pacific will be “a priority for France’s EU presidency” as declared by French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian during his November 2021 visit to Indonesia, and Paris would host an Indo-Pacific Forum on 22 February 2022.[43] The stars are aligned for this after the publication in September 2021 of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in Indo-Pacific, which explicitly refers to “ASEAN centrality”[44] and the new German chancellor has also demonstrated principled firmness vis-à-vis Russia and China on the diplomatic stage.[45] As for Southeast Asia, France should continue to support EU efforts to embed itself in ASEAN-led multilateral frameworks. Apart from its membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the programme, CRIMARIO (Critical Maritime Roads in Indian Ocean) 2, focusing mainly on Southeast Asia, the EU should proactively support and seek to participate in ASEAN-related security agencies or bodies such as the ASEANAPOL, ASEAN Naval Chiefs meetings, ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) working groups, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), among others.
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) – with its priority areas in connectivity, sustainable development and maritime cooperation – also provides practical avenues for France and the EU to “boost sustainable links” with the region. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative, which was launched in December 2021 with US$339 billion for the 2021-2027 period, is a timely vehicle towards achieving this end.[46]
ENDNOTES
[1] Historically, France always had a presence in the Indo-Pacific. French merchants and scientists have sailed through the Indian and Pacific Oceans since the 17th century. Today, due to its overseas territories, France shares a border with five countries in the Indian Ocean and twelve countries in the Pacific Ocean. There are currently 200,000 French nationals residing in various Indo-Pacific countries and 1.6 million French citizens based in the overseas French territories of Réunion Island, French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), Mayotte, New Caledonia, Wallis-et-Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island.
[2] Speech by the President of the French Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors, Élysée, 27 August 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2018/08/27/speech-by-the-president-of-the-french-republic-at-the-conference-of-ambassadors.
[3] France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, Ministry of Defence of France, May 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/regional-issues/la-strategie-de-defense-francaise-en-indopacifique2.
[4] Xavier Vavasseur, “French Navy Mistral-class LHDs to Fight COVID-19 in Reunion & Caribbean”, Naval News, 26 March 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/03/french-navy-mistral-class-lhds-to-fight-covid-19-in-reunion-caribbean/.
[5] The new position complements two existing ambassadorial appointments, namely the Permanent Representative of France to the Pacific Community and the Delegate to Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
[6] France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Government of the French Republic, 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_v2_rvb_cle432726.pdf.
[7] Katerina Ang, “Europe pivots to Indo-Pacific with ‘multipolar’ ambitions”, Nikkei Asia, 2 February 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Europe-pivots-to-Indo-Pacific-with-multipolar-ambitions.
[8] “The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France”, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/asia-and-oceania/the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france/.
[9] While France does conduct patrols to “affirm that international law is the only rule that is valid, whatever the sea where we sail”, they are slightly different from the US’ Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as the latter intrudes within 12 nautical miles of features in the South China Sea. See Sarah Zheng, “2021: South China Sea: challenge to Beijing as French nuclear submarine patrols contested waterway”, South China Morning Post, 9 February 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121125/south-china-sea-challenge-beijing-french-nuclear-submarine.
[10] The territories of French Polynesia and New Caledonia are full members of the Pacific Islands Forum.
[11] The bases are located in Djibouti, Réunion Island, Abu Dhabi, New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
[12] See for example: AFP, “‘The UN’s eyes’: French Navy enforces North Korea sanctions”, The Straits Times, 8 November 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/the-uns-eyes-french-navy-enforces-north-korea-sanctions; and “Reinforcement des capacités des forces armées cambodgiennes pour les operations de l’ONU” [Capacity building within the Cambodian armed forces dedicated to the UN operations], Francophonie, 2019, https://www.francophonie.org/renforcement-des-capacites-des-forces-armees-cambodgiennes-pour-les-operations-de-lonu-842.
[13] About France and maritime domain awareness in Indo-Pacific in general, see: Jérémy Bachelier, Eric Frécon, “France’s Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: MDA”, The Diplomat, 21 December 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/frances-defense-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/.
[14] “The 14th Governing Council Meeting of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre”, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, 15 October 2020, https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/news/2020/14th_ReCAAAP-ISC_VGC__Meeting_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf.
[15] The Jeanne d’Arc mission involves a Mistral-class vessel full of cadets undertaking their last training semester at sea and an accompanying frigate.
[16] Laura Auricchio, “The US-France relationship has always had friction”, The Washington Post, 10 November 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/11/10/us-france-relationship-has-always-had-friction/.
[17] Extract of the “Joint Statement on the Phone Call between President Biden and President Macron”, Briefing Room, The White House, 22 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/22/joint-statement-on-the-phone-call-between-president-biden-and-president-macron/.
[18] Eglantine Staunton, “Macron and Biden:“Friends, allied, but not aligned””, The Interpreter, 3 February 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/macron-and-biden-friends-allied-not-aligned.
[19] Aude Fleurant et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2020, p. 2.
[20] SGP SHD Communications, “Singapore – Overview”, Thales Group, 2022, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/countries/asia-pacific/singapore.
[21] Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua-New-Guinea and Tonga attended the meeting.
[22] Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship by the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia and His Excellency Emmanuel Macron, 2 May 2018. As a follow up, the National Security College published a report: Anthony Bergin, David Brewster,
François Gemenne and Paul Barnes, Environmental security in the eastern Indian Ocean, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: A risk mapping approach, Canberra-Paris, ANU-IRIS, May 2019.
[23] “Operation Island Chief continues protection of Pacific from illegal fishing”, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agencies, 5 August 2021, https://www.ffa.int/node/2605.
[24] Ministry of Armed Forces, National strategy for the security of maritime areas, Government of France, 22 October 2015, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2016/01/strategie_nationale_de_surete_des_espaces_maritimes_en_national_strategy_for_the_security_of_maritime_areas.pdf.
[25] Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/photos-publications-and-graphics/publications/article/france-s-partnerships-in-the-indo-pacific-apr-2021.
[26] Speech by the President of the French Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors, 27 August 2018, op. cit.
[27] See the interesting cartoon published by the Global Times, inspired by Da Vinci’s Last Supper, and how France is portrayed after the 2021 NATO summit (and its declaration about China). The Rooster (France) attends the supper chaired by the US but gives the feeling of keeping its distance from the radical and exclusive position vis-à-vis China. At least, the Rooster does not get up from the table to move away. “‘The Last G7’: Satirical cartoon mocking bloc’s attempt to suppress China goes viral”, Global Times, 13 June 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1226050.shtml.
[28] Statement by President von der Leyen with Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission, 10 December 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_6770.
[29] See Pascal Boniface, “Why the concept of gaullo-mitterrandism is still relevant”, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, 29 April 2019, https://www.iris-france.org/136272-why-the-concept-of-gaullo-mitterrandism-is-still-relevant/. For other examples of gaullo-mitterrandism, see de Gaulle’s speeches in Mexico (1964), particularly the call to walk “la mano en la mano” or “hand in hand”, Phnom Penh (1966), Québec (1967); Mitterrand in Sarajevo (1992); Chirac in Jerusalem (1995) and Johannesburg (2002); and Macron in Beirut (2020).
[30] France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, op. cit.
[31] These terms generally refer to the priority given to military options and operations, in tune with American initiatives. Author’s interview with French defence journalist Brest (France), in January 2016.
[32] “India, France to expand defence, security partnership”, India Today, 7 November 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-france-expand-defence-security-partnership-1873891-2021-11-07.
[34] Céline Pajon, “Macron in Japan: Upgrading the Franco-Japanese Strategic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific”, EastWest Institute, 26 June 2019, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/macron-japan-upgrading-franco-japanese-strategic-partnership-indo-pacific.
See Bertrand Badie, Quand le Sud réinvente le monde [How the Global South is reinventing the world], (Paris, La Découverte: 2018) and Bertrand Badie, L’Hégémonie contestée – Les nouvelles formes de domination internationale [Hegemony challenged: New Forms of International Domination], (Paris, Odile Jacob: 2019).
[35] “France’s Macron looks to Indonesia, India for deeper strategic ties”, RFI, 30 October 2021, https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20211030-france-s-macron-looks-to-indonesia-india-for-deeper-strategic-ties.
[36] France should consider the appointment of its dedicated ambassador to ASEAN, along with a full-time Defence Attaché in the Philippines.
[37] This Alliance is “an informal network of countries united in their conviction that a rules-based multilateral order is the only reliable guarantee for international stability and peace and that our common challenges can only be solved through cooperation.” See “What is the Alliance for Multilateralism?”, https://multilateralism.org/the-alliance/.
[38] Marc Julienne, “La politique chinoise de la France est devenue illisible et inaudible, parce que dépassée et insuffisamment exigeante” [The French policy on China is now unreadable and inaudible because obsolete and not enough demanding], Le Monde, 23 December 2021.
[39] Nic MacLellan, “AUKUS disrupts ‘a very peaceful part of planet Earth’”, Inside Story, 14 October 2021, https://insidestory.org.au/aukus-disrupts-a-very-peaceful-part-of-planet-earth/.
[41] “Biden’s team wants EU allies to get real on ‘strategic autonomy’”, Politico, 19 November 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-us-eu-strategic-autonomy-brussels-g20/.
[42] Message from the President, website of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 9 December 2021, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/message-from-the-president/; French President Emmanuel Macron’s Speech at the European Parliament, 19 January 2022, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/french-president-emmanuel-macron-s-speech-at-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-19-january-2022/.
[43] Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “France’s Ambitious Indo-Pacific Goals for Its EU Presidency”, GMF, 08 February 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/frances-ambitious-indo-pacific-goals-its-eu-presidency.
[44] Joanne Lin, “The EU in the Indo-Pacific: A New Strategy with Implications for ASEAN”, ISEAS Perspective, 2021/164, 16December 2021, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-164-the-eu-in-the-indo-pacific-a-new-strategy-with-implications-for-asean-by-joanne-lin/.
[45] “The new government promises to be tougher on China and Russia”, The New York Times, 8 December 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/germany-russia-china.html.
[46] Ana Pisonero-Hernandez et al., “Global Gateway: up to €300 billion for the EU’s strategy to boost sustainable links around the world”, European Commission, 1 December 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.
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““Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies” by Khairulanwar Zaini
2022/11 “The Biden Administration and Southeast Asia: One Year in Review” by Hoang Thi Ha and Ian Storey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Biden administration’s engagement with Southeast Asia in 2021 was slow to start but picked up momentum in the second half of the year with a series of high-level meetings and visits to the region by senior US officials.
- President Biden did not call or hold formal in-person meetings with any Southeast Asian leader, and his administration’s lack of a positive economic framework for the region was seen as a major shortcoming.
- Biden’s Southeast Asia policy is designed to attain two mutually-reinforcing objectives: strengthening alliances and partnerships, and addressing the challenges posed by China. To attain those goals, the administration has pursued both multilateralism and minilateral initiatives.
- The Biden administration has tried to allay Southeast Asian fears over escalating US-China rivalry and promoted a positive agenda centred on the delivery of public goods, especially COVID-19 vaccines.
- In 2022, the Biden administration’s engagement with Southeast Asia will be assessed on the value of its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a clearer articulation of its Indo-Pacific strategy, its efforts to upgrade relations with ASEAN, its filling of vacant diplomatic posts and opportunities for in-person meetings with the President.
*Hoang Thi Ha is Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies programme, and Ian Storey is Senior Fellow and co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/11, 11 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
During President Joe Biden’s first year in the White House, Southeast Asia was not one of his administration’s top priorities. After President Donald Trump’s idiosyncratic and transactional approach to foreign relations, Biden’s focus was on restoring confidence in US leadership and renewing its commitment to alliances and multilateral institutions, especially in the Euro-Atlantic region.
His record so far is mixed. America’s relations with the EU and NATO are much improved, but its chaotic withdrawal from Kabul in August 2021 will be remembered as the worst US foreign policy debacle in a generation. And although Biden tried to stabilise relations with the country’s two main rivals, China and Russia, by the end of his first year, Sino-US ties were no less contentious and relations with Russia had hit a post-Cold War low due to Moscow’s military intimidation of Ukraine.
The Biden administration’s record in Southeast Asia was also mixed, though generally positive. Due to the above-mentioned priorities, Washington’s engagement with the region was slow to start, causing much frustration in Southeast Asian capitals. In the second half of the year, however, momentum picked up as a flurry of senior officials visited the region, and culminated in a virtual US-ASEAN Summit and an American president’s full attendance at the East Asia Summit for the first time since President Barack Obama in 2016.
By the end of his first year in office, Southeast Asians could feel relatively satisfied with the Biden administration’s approach to the region. That satisfaction was, however, tempered by their expectations of what was required of America in 2022, including the need for a more detailed Indo-Pacific strategy and especially a proactive economic blueprint for the region. This Perspective reviews the Biden administration’s engagement with Southeast Asia in 2021 and assesses the prospects for a more forward-looking agenda in 2022 and beyond.
BIDEN IN CATCH-UP MODE
Kurt Campbell, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Coordinator, noted in July 2021 that “For an effective Asia strategy, for an effective Indo-Pacific approach, you must do more in Southeast Asia.”[1] This statement was borne out in the second half of 2021, with a series of US high-level visits, virtual meetings and policy speeches reiterating the importance of Southeast Asia to America’s Indo-Pacific strategy and articulating ways and means for Washington to reclaim its influence and engagement with the region. Table 1 shows US cabinet members’ engagements with Southeast Asian countries, both virtual and in-person. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi remarked, “[T]he US commitment was very noticeable.”[2]
Table 1
US High-Level Engagements with Southeast Asia in 2021
| US Official | Venue | Event |
| Secretary of State Antony Blinken | Virtual | Special ASEAN-US Foreign Ministers Meeting, 14 July |
| Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman | Indonesia Cambodia Thailand | Bilateral meetings, 29 May-4 June |
| Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin | Singapore Vietnam Philippines | Fullerton Lecture and bilateral meetings, 26-29 July |
| Secretary of State Antony Blinken | Virtual | Mekong-US Partnership, Friends of the Mekong Ministerial Meeting, US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, 2-6 August |
| Vice-President Kamala Harris | Singapore Vietnam | Bilateral meetings, 22-26 August |
| President Joe Biden | Virtual | ASEAN-US Summit, East Asia Summit, 26 October |
| Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo | Singapore Malaysia | Bilateral meetings, 16-18 November |
| Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin | Manama Dialogue | Bilateral meeting with Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, 20 November |
| Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Kritenbrink | Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand | Bilateral meetings, 27 November-4 December |
| Secretary of State Antony Blinken | Indonesia Malaysia [Thailand leg cancelled due to Covid-19 contact] | Bilateral meetings, 13-16 December |
Source: Compiled from Statements and Releases from the White House Briefing Room, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
That being said, US engagement with Southeast Asia in 2021 was in catch-up mode – to make up for diplomatic influence lost during the Trump administration amid China’s intensive neighbourhood diplomacy – rather than heralding a breakthrough investment in the region. This is understandable given the demanding foreign policy agenda of the new administration, with various regions and issue-areas competing for finite resources and attention. It also reflects the fact that Southeast Asian countries queue behind European and Northeast Asian allies and major partners such as India in the hierarchy of US foreign policy interests. It is noteworthy that President Biden has not made bilateral phone calls to any Southeast Asian leader since entering the White House (Table 2). He has however made trips to Europe for the G-7, G-20 and COP26 UN Climate Change summits, and welcomed leaders of the Quad countries, individually or collectively, in Washington D.C. He has only engaged with Southeast Asian leaders through the virtual ASEAN summit meetings in November 2021, and met Vietnam’s Prime Minister on the sidelines of the COP26 Summit.
Table 2
President Biden’s Bilateral Phone Calls with World Leaders in 2021
| Region | Number of Phone Calls |
| Europe (including Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, NATO and the European Commission) | 31 |
| Middle East | 18 |
| Northeast Asia | 6 |
| North America | 6 |
| Oceania | 3 |
| South Asia | 2 |
| Central and South America | 2 |
| Africa | 1 |
| Southeast Asia | 0 |
Source: Compiled from Statements and Releases from the White House Briefing Room, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
The following section analyses some broad contours of America’s Southeast Asia policy that started to take shape in the first year of the Biden administration.
First, the US approach to Southeast Asia is conceived and operationalised in the broader context of its Indo-Pacific strategy which centres on two mutually reinforcing objectives, namely: (i) rebuilding US alliances, partnerships and multilateral engagements in the Indo-Pacific, and (ii) addressing the systemic challenges from China as the key strategic competitor to Washington. As such, US-China competition – more than ever – is a key operating principle that underlies the conceptualisation and framing of US initiatives and messaging aimed at Southeast Asia. In the latest articulation of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained “a free and open Indo-Pacific” at three levels: at the individual level for people to be free in their daily lives in open societies; at the state level to enable countries to choose their own path and partners; and at the regional level so that goods, ideas and people can flow freely across land, cyberspace and open seas.[3] At all three levels, Southeast Asia is both the object and conduit of Washington’s broader geopolitical goals vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, despite the above, the Biden administration has been calibrated in its strategic messaging to allay the concerns by Southeast Asian states vis-à-vis US-China strategic rivalry.[4] Three key policy speeches, by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Vice President Kamala Harris and Blinken all sought to reassure Southeast Asian audiences that (i) the US is not going to force regional states to choose sides between Washington and Beijing; and (ii) the US is seeking to stabilise its strategic competition with China through necessary ‘guardrails’ to prevent escalation to open armed conflicts.[5] Washington and Beijing have indeed made efforts at the latter through high-level dialogues, especially the November 2021 Xi-Biden virtual summit.[6] However, as strategic competition has become the new paradigm of US-China relations, the sense of the inevitability of the binary choice may have increased among Southeast Asians.
Third, the US has fostered a positive agenda on the delivery of public goods to the region in the areas of climate change, sustainable development and especially COVID-19 vaccines. As remarked by Ryan Hass, “US-China competition is occurring against a backdrop of rising global challenges […]. These challenges will shape the contours of US-China competition. They may also present opportunities for Washington and/or Beijing to flex global leadership muscle by demonstrating capacity to deliver solutions.”[7] Southeast Asia was the prime target of both Chinese and American vaccine diplomacy in 2021. Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam were among the top five recipients of US vaccine donations, each receiving around 25 million shots.[8] Through its earmarked donations to the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility (COVAX), the US has made Southeast Asia a priority region for its vaccine offerings. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam together received 25 per cent of America’s total dose donations to COVAX in 2021 although they account for only 7 per cent of the world’s population.[9] Washington also fostered collaboration with its allies/partners towards this end. For example, the virtual Quad summit in March 2021 broadened its remit beyond the maritime security focus to include collaboration on global issues such as climate change, critical technologies and COVID-19 vaccines. In a December 2021 interview, Kurt Campbell remarked: “The Quad has to be relevant, and seen as value-added, particularly by Southeast Asia, by ASEAN.”[10]
Fourth, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and its Southeast Asia policy in particular, is characterised by a dual-track approach to multilateralism and minilateralism. President Biden attended the 2021 ASEAN-US Summit and the East Asia Summit via video-conferencing, and the three US policy speeches to Southeast Asian audiences in 2021 all reaffirm US support for ASEAN centrality. Rhetoric aside, these statements are informed by a pragmatic calculation concerning the strategic value of Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific and the need to maintain US access to and influence over regional institutions, diplomacy and narrative through the ASEAN-led multilateral architecture.[11] At the same time, the Biden administration has intensified minilateral coalition-building with its Indo-Pacific partners, with the consolidation of the Quad to the summit level and the formation of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral defence partnership. Compared to ASEAN, these minilaterals with higher levels of strategic convergence and commensurate capabilities among its members are expected to deliver more tangible outcomes in terms of policy coordination and joint response. Hence, the perceptions of their greater utility to Washington in advancing its strategic goals, especially to compete rigorously with China.
Fifth, despite the imperative to promote a robust democracy agenda both at home and abroad, the Biden administration’s normative approach to Southeast Asia “is more pragmatic and calibrated than its moral grandstanding would suggest”.[12] The coup d’etat by the Myanmar military on 1 February, and the ensuing political violence, was a seriously complicating factor in this regard. However, Washington has thus far managed to insulate the issue from its relationship with ASEAN, and expressed support for the grouping’s role in mediating the crisis. US cabinet members attended ASEAN-plus ministerial meetings in 2021 despite the (online) presence of the military regime’s representatives. ASEAN’s decision to invite only a non-political representative to the ASEAN summit meetings in November 2021 was partly driven by the concern that the presence of the Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing might deter other Dialogue Partner leaders from attending, especially the US president whose attendance was not confirmed until the last moment.[13] Such “quiet diplomacy” by Washington is appreciated by regional states while public pressure that cornered ASEAN into defensive reaction – as exerted by the West in the 1990s – would only jeopardise America’s geopolitical agenda in the region.
The tension between values-based and realpolitik imperatives is always a defining feature of US foreign policy, but democracy has been on the back burner despite all the rhetoric. Biden’s flagship Democracy Summit in December 2021 invited only three Southeast Asian states – Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – but US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink was quick to play down the gravity of non-invitation, saying that it “is not a commentary on the strength” of US relations with its closest partners, including Singapore.[14] Besides, the little care exhibited by most Southeast Asian states about the Democracy Summit as well as its nominal outcomes meant that this event would soon become, if not already, a footnote in the story of US-Southeast Asia relations.
A FORWARD-LOOKING US AGENDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Addressing the Missing Economic Component
America’s friends and critics alike have repeatedly drawn attention to the country’s lack of a comprehensive economic plan for the Indo-Pacific as a major shortcoming in its approach to the region.
In January 2017, one of President Trump’s first acts was to withdraw the US from the 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was resurrected a year later as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with the hope that the US would rejoin after Trump had left office. The perception was that by its withdrawal, America had ceded economic leadership of the region to China. This perception was reinforced when the ASEAN members and five of its Dialogue Partners (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020, the largest free trade bloc in the world. According to The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2021, the US registered a 10.7-point decline in economic relationships despite its significant gain in diplomatic influence in the first year of the Biden administration. The US score was 51.1 compared to China’s 99. The Lowy Institute report rightly pointed out that with the Quad and AUKUS, “America has been more proactive at leveraging its regional networks in service of its military power than it has in service of the regional economic balance of power.[15]
For domestic political reasons, the Biden administration has ruled out joining the CPTPP, at least during its first term. However, it is acutely aware that its lack of an alternative to economic structures such as the CPTPP and RCEP has created a yawning gap in its Indo-Pacific policy. Accordingly, at the EAS in October, President Biden announced that administration officials were working on an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) that would “define our shared objectives around trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology, supply chain resiliency, decarbonization and clean energy, infrastructure, worker standards”.[16] Details are due to be released in early 2022 and are eagerly anticipated by Southeast Asian states.
Climate Change
In stark contrast to his predecessor, President Biden has made addressing the challenges posed by climate change a top priority of his administration. It is also a priority issue in US-Southeast Asia relations. During their visits to the region, Vice President Harris and Assistant Secretary of State Kritenbrink discussed the issue with Southeast Asian leaders and policy makers.[17] At the virtual US-ASEAN Summit in October, President Biden announced US$102 million in new funding to strengthen their strategic partnership. From this amount, US$20.5 million has been earmarked to the US-ASEAN Climate Futures initiatives to support a range of environmental projects in the region, including decarbonisation, sustainable fisheries, clean transport technology and air pollution reduction.[18] As Southeast Asian countries are increasingly being impacted by climate change, including rising sea levels and severe weather events, they welcome cooperation with the United States. However, pressure from Washington on regional states to reduce their carbon emissions and protect their forests could create friction, especially if the Biden administration introduces climate-change related trade tariffs and restrictions.[19]
Enhancing Maritime Security
In its first year, the Biden administration doubled down on President Trump’s hard line approach towards China’s activities in the South China Sea. The administration repeatedly rebuked China’s claims and actions as unlawful and a threat to freedom of navigation.[20] The US Navy conducted regular presence missions and exercises in the South China Sea, and six freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Paracels and Spratlys (one more than during Trump’s first year in office).
As US-China tensions rise over the dispute, it is the Southeast Asian claimants that have borne the brunt of China’s grey zone tactics in the South China Sea － actions undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia to press the country’s jurisdictional claims within the so-called nine-dash line. Such tactics have included airspace incursions, harassment of drilling rigs and the deployment of survey ships, CCG vessels and large fishing fleets into their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).[21] Although the Southeast Asian claimants regularly protest China’s activities, they are unable to deter Beijing due to asymmetries in military capabilities.
Going forward, the US will be providing more assistance to the Southeast Asian claimants to help them better respond to China’s grey zone tactics and protect their sovereign rights in their EEZs. This includes improving their ability to monitor and publicise China’s military and paramilitary activities and helping their maritime law enforcement agencies tackle illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. Defence Secretary Austin discussed these issues with his Vietnamese counterpart in July, as did Vice President Kamala who emphasised the importance of US-Vietnam coast guard cooperation (a third US Coast Guard high-endurance cutter is likely to be transferred to Vietnam this year). During Blinken’s visit to Indonesia in December, the two countries signed a maritime cooperation agreement which included fisheries management.[22] In a speech delivered in Washington D.C. in September, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana specifically called for the 1952 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to be updated to address China’s grey zone tactics in the South China Sea. Talks on revising the treaty to deal with grey zone actions will have to wait until President Rodrigo Duterte’s successor takes office in July 2022.[23]
OUTLOOK
As the Biden administration enters its second year, its engagement with Southeast Asia will be assessed across five inter-connected issue-areas.
First and foremost will be the unveiling of its IPEF. Southeast Asian states will judge the initiative on whether it signals a willingness by the United States to resume a leadership role in economic rule-making in Asia, embed its economy in the region’s increasingly integrated trade networks, and arrest the concerning trend of “America’s growing irrelevance in the political economy of Asia”.[24]
Second and related will be the release of the administration’s National Security Strategy. Its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued in March 2021 was long on rhetoric and short on details.[25] Southeast Asians will want to see a clearer articulation of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, a roadmap for stable relations with China and due consideration given to Southeast Asia’s strategic interests.
Third, Southeast Asians will expect a higher level of commitment to ASEAN. The White House has already indicated that a US-ASEAN Summit is on the cards, although due to the spread of the Omicron variant of COVID-19 the meeting is likely to be virtual rather than in-person as had been planned. Nevertheless, it will provide a good opportunity to discuss ways to take the relationship forward, including an upgrade to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (as Australia and China did last year).
Fourth, notwithstanding the problems caused by some Republican senators withholding approval of President Biden’s ambassadorial nominees, the administration needs to expedite the appointment of US ambassadors to the region. Crucially, US ambassadorships to America’s two treaty allies, Thailand and the Philippines, and to ASEAN need to be filled.[26] Biden’s nominees for Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam were not approved until late 2021, and US ambassadors to Indonesia, Laos and Malaysia are Trump appointees.
Fifth, Southeast Asians will be hopeful that President Biden will travel to the region, if not in May when he will probably attend a summit of the Quad leaders in Japan, then at least later in the year for the ASEAN summit meetings in Phnom Penh. It would be an opportune occasion to launch the ASEAN-US Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
ENDNOTES
[1] Premesha Saha, “Southeast Asia forming the lynchpin in the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy”, ORF, 28 July 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/southeast-asia-forming-the-lynchpin-in-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy/.
[2] Humeyra Pamuk and Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia cites strong U.S. commitment as Blinken starts Southeast Asia tour”, Reuters, 13 December 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blinken-indonesia-us-seeks-shore-up-southeast-asia-ties-2021-12-13/.
[3] US Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, 13 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.
[4] Lee Hsien Loong, “The Endangered Asian Century”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020 issue, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loong-endangered-asian-century.
[5] See US Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Remarks at the 40th International Institute for Strategic Studies Fullerton Lecture, 27 July 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2708192/secretary-of-defense-remarks-at-the-40th-international-institute-for-strategic/; The White House, Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Indo-Pacific Region, 24 August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/24/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-indo-pacific-region/; US Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, 13 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.
[6] James Palmer, “Xi-Biden Summit Produces Few Breakthroughs”, Foreign Policy, 17 November 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/xi-biden-summit-us-china-policy/.
[7] Ryan Hass, “Performance Will Determine Prestige in US-China Geopolitical Competition”, Global Asia, December 2021, https://globalasia.org/v16no4/cover/performance-will-determine-prestige-in-us-china-geopolitical-competition_ryan-hass.
[8] “U.S. International COVID-19 Vaccine Donations Tracker – Updated as of 31 January 2022”, KFF, 31 January 2022, https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/u-s-international-covid-19-vaccine-donations-tracker/#recipient-country.
[9] Khairulanwar Zaini, ““Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies”, Trends (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022).
[10] “In Conversation: Kurt Campbell, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator”, The Lowy Institute, 1 December 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/conversation-white-house-indo-pacific-coordinator-kurt-campbell.
[11] Susannah Patton, “A seat at the table: The role of regional multilateral institutions in US Indo-Pacific strategy”, United States Studies Centre, 3 December 2021, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/a-seat-at-the-table-the-role-of-regional-multilateral-institutions-in-us-indo-pacific-strategy.
[12] Hoang Thi Ha, “Biden’s Foreign Policy to Southeast Asia: More Pragmatism than Ideology”, Fulcrum, 17 August 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/bidens-foreign-policy-to-southeast-asia-more-pragmatism-than-ideology/.
[13] Hoang Thi Ha, “The SAC Versus ASEAN: The Futility of Legal Recourse”, Fulcrum, 28 October 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/the-sac-versus-asean-the-futility-of-legal-recourse/.
[14] Dewey Sim, “Singapore’s non-invite to Biden’s democracy summit ‘not a judgment’: US diplomat Daniel Kritenbrink”, SCMP, 2 December 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3158195/singapores-non-invite-bidens-democracy-summit-not-judgment-us.
[15] Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2021, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/united-states/
[16] “Readout of President Biden’s Participation in the East Asia Summit, The White House, 27 October 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/27/readout-of-president-bidens-participation-in-the-east-asia-summit/
[17] See “Media Fact Sheet: United States-Singapore Climate Partnership”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, 23 August 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/08/20210823-US-VP-Visit-Post-JPC; “Fact Sheet: Strengthening the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership”, The White House, 25 August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/25/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-partnership/; “U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink Discusses U.S.-Indonesia Partnership, COVID-19 Vaccines, and Music in “CurioUS” Video Podcast”, US Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, 15 January 2022, https://id.usembassy.gov/u-s-assistant-secretary-of-state-daniel-j-kritenbrink-discusses-u-s-indonesia-partnership-covid-19-vaccines-and-music-in-curious-video-podcast/.
[18] “Fact Sheet: New Initiatives to Expand the U.S.-ASEAN Strategic Partnership”. The White House, 26 October 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/26/fact-sheet-new-initiatives-to-expand-the-u-s-asean-strategic-partnership/.
[19] Paul G. Harris, “A New Climate Policy in the United States: Potential
Implications for Southeast Asia”, ISEAS Perspective, 30 July 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_101.pdf.
[20] Antony J. Blinken, US Secretary of State, “Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea”, US Department of State Press Release, 11 July 2021, https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/.
[21] See Andrew Erickson, “Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at Whitsun Reef”, Foreign Policy, 29 March 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/29/china-militia-maritime-philippines-whitsunreef/; “Malaysian air force scrambles hawk jets after Chinese military planes detected near its national airspace”, Channel News Asia, 1 June 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-air-force-scramble-jets-china-national-airspace-1823011; “Contest at Kasawari: Another Malaysian Gas Project Faces Pressure”, CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 July 2021, https://amti.csis.org/contest-at-kasawari-another-malaysian-gas-project-faces-pressure/; Sebastian Strangio, “China Demanded Halt to Indonesian Drilling Near Natuna Islands: Report”, The Diplomat, 2 December 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/china-demanded-halt-to-indonesian-drilling-near-natuna-islands-report/.
[22] “Pentagon chief to nudge ties with Vietnam as human rights concerns linger”, CNA, 29 July 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/us-vietnam-lloyd-austin-visit-south-china-sea-2074196; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi At Memorandum of Understanding Signing Ceremony”, US Department of State Press Release, 14 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-at-memorandum-of-understanding-signing-ceremony/.
[23] Speech by Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, “The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty at 70”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 8 September 2021, https://www.csis.org/events/us-philippines-mutual-defense-treaty-70
[24] Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2021, op. cit.
[25] Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington D.C.: The White House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[26] See the American Foreign Service Association’s “Tracker: Current US Ambassadors”, https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments.
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2022/10 “Uncertainty Grows as Anxiety Intensifies among Thailand’s Political Parties” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Political uncertainty in Thailand has intensified with the recent unexplained “expulsion” of 21 MPs from the Phalang Pracharat Party, the largest party in the ruling coalition. Those expelled included Captain Thammanat Prompao, the party’s secretary-general.
- Thammanat and 17 MPs in his faction will join the Thai Economic Party. They claim they will continue to support General Prayut. Three other MPs will likely join another government party, Bhumjaithai.
- A known opponent of Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, Thammanat has been demanding at least two cabinet posts for his faction of MPs. He is in a position to mobilise the MPs in his faction and to woo other MPs to join him in voting with the opposition to topple the prime minister in a no-confidence vote.
- The prime minister has so far rejected the demand, reiterating that there would neither be a cabinet reshuffle nor a dissolution of the House and general election any time soon. How long the prime minister can resist Thammanat’s demand for cabinet posts is uncertain, especially with another no-confidence debate looming in June.
- The prime minister is now facing difficult choices: Giving in to Thammanat’s demand, resigning, or dissolving the House before its new session which starts on 22 May, and calling an early general election.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute. Previously he had been a researcher on ASEAN political and security cooperation at the Institute’s ASEAN Studies Centre.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/10, 10 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
On top of their internal problems, Thai political parties have entered the new year of 2022 with one old uncertainty: When will the next general election be held?
Thai politics grew even more complicated following the sudden and mysterious “expulsion” on 19 January of 21 MPs from the Phalang Pracharat Party (PPP), the largest in the 18-party ruling coalition. Those expelled included Captain Thammanat Prompao, who was secretary-general of the PPP.[1]
Thammanat is demanding at least two cabinet posts for his party faction, but has faced strong objection from Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha.
The prime minister has stated that he will neither reshuffle the cabinet nor dissolve the House of Representatives and then call an early general election any time soon.[2] He has further noted that amendments to the political party law and the election law have not yet been completed. These amendments are necessary to put into effect recent changes to the constitution concerning electoral arrangements.[3]
The prime minister has maintained that he intends to complete his four-year term, which ends in March 2023. And this year, he has one new incentive to stay on in office; Thailand is in the chair of APEC. General Prayut would love to host the annual meeting of APEC leaders – which includes U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin – in Thailand towards the end of 2022.[4]
General Prayut’s political fortunes recently brightened with his successful official visit to Saudi Arabia on 25-26 January at the invitation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The visit marked a new beginning in Thai-Saudi relations after more than three decades of “apathy” between the two countries following a Thai janitor’s theft of jewellery from a palace in Saudi Arabia in 1989.[5]
Such a significant diplomatic breakthrough[6] has boosted General Prayut’s self-confidence, making him more determined to weather the current political storm.
However, most Thai politicians suspect that, if he wishes to remain in power beyond March 2023, General Prayut will dissolve the House of Representatives and call an early general election when he sees the most advantage for parties supporting his return to the premiership.
So far, General Prayut has been keeping his cards close to his chest – much to the continual annoyance of parties in the opposition.
THE NEW THAMMANAT FACTOR
Assuming that the Election Commission approves their questionable “expulsion” from the PPP,[7] Thammanat and 17 MPs will join the Thai Economic Party, a party registered on 7 April 2020. Three of the other expelled MPs are likely to join Bhumjaithai, the second largest party in the ruling coalition.[8]
The Thai Economic Party’s leadership is awaiting an overhaul. It is widely expected that its new leader will be General Wit Thephassadin, the former chief strategist of the PPP. No surprise here; Wit is also a close friend of PPP leader General Prawit. A real surprise will be how many MPs Thammanat will persuade to leave the PPP and the micro-parties, each of which has a single MP, in the ruling coalition and to join him.[9]
Thammanat once characterized himself as the “main artery” of the ruling coalition.[10] He was in charge of corralling 11 micro-parties, each with one MP, to join the ruling coalition. He thus secured a slim majority of 253 MPs to support the premiership of General Prayut, edging out the PT-led rival coalition which had 246 MPs in the 500-member House.[11]
Even with only 18 MPs, Thammanat will be in a strong position to continue demanding at least two cabinet posts[12] for his party, considering the fact that the Chatthai Pattana Party, with only 12 MPs, holds two posts.[13]
In the next parliamentary session, which will start on 22 May, the opposition plans to call for a debate of no-confidence in the prime minister. This debate will be another opportunity for Thammanat to threaten to topple General Prayut from the premiership.
On the other hand, even if he survives the no-confidence vote, General Prayut will continue to face nightmares over the possibility of the defeat of a government bill in the House. A defeat in the House, such as rejection of a government’s bill involving a fiscal matter, is deemed serious enough for the prime minister to take responsibility by either resigning or dissolving the House and calling an early general election.
How the prime minister is going to handle this new demand and the threat from Thammanat is anybody’s guess.
Meanwhile, Deputy Finance Minister Santi Prompat – an ally of the prime minister – has been appointed the new secretary-general of the PPP.
PHUEA THAI’S DREAM
Phuea Thai (PT), Thailand’s largest political party and the opposition leader, is dreaming of a “landslide victory” in Thailand’s next general election.[14] It would therefore welcome an early general election. One of its tactics to provoke the prime minister to dissolve the House is to boycott House meetings. On 4 February, the House had to end its meeting prematurely for the sixteenth time in the current parliamentary session when not enough MPs attended to form a quorum.[15]
The PT’s dream is to take the lead in forming the next government and to pave the way for a return with impunity for its benefactor, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra—now in self-imposed exile to avoid jail after a criminal conviction.[16] Thaksin has claimed to have “a few plans” to help the PT score a “landslide victory”.[17]
Thaksin’s frequent talks—mostly on the Clubhouse social media platform—about the PT suggest his continuing active association with the party, which is a successor to two dissolved parties that he founded: Thai Rak Thai (1998 – 2007) and the People’s Power (1998 – 2008). Thaksin’s championing of the PT has thus put this party in hot water, too.
The party’s opponents have lodged two complaints with the Election Commission, asking it to investigate Thaksin’s alleged unlawful dominance over the PT.[18] As a fugitive from justice, Thaksin cannot join or have an active role in any Thai political party. If the Election Commission finds enough evidence to fault the PT, it will submit to the Constitutional Court a case against the PT for a ruling to dissolve the party.
The PT did not field anyone to compete in the two recent by-elections in the southern provinces of Songkhla and Chumphon, and it may not field a candidate for the post of governor of Bangkok in polls due in the months ahead, for fear of undercutting the independent front-runner, Dr Chadchart Sittipunt. Chadchart formerly belonged to the PT, serving as the transport minister in the Yingluck Shinawatra administration (2011-2014).
However, the PT did contest in the by-election on 30 January in Bangkok’s Constituency No. 9, in Lak Si and Chatuchak Districts. Its candidate, Surachart Tiensuwan, beat candidates from Move Forward, the Kla Party, and the PPP.[19] This victory of the PT is a tremendous boost for the chief opposition party, lending credibility to the party’s ongoing campaign of rebranding and revitalising itself to go for a “landslide victory” in the next general election.
GRIM ATMOSPHERE IN THE PPP
The PPP’s situation worsened after its candidates failed to win either of the two by-elections recently held in the South. Prior to these two losses, the PPP had scored successive victories in five other by-elections, including one in March 2021 in Nakhon Si Thammarat’s Constituency No. 3, a southern seat that used to be a stronghold of the Democrat Party.
The PPP’s losses were attributed to the serious missteps of Captain Thammanat, who used the campaign for the seats to try to showcase his leadership prowess.[20]
When his rivals inside the PPP sought to hold him responsible for the by-election losses, Captain Thammanat countered with demands for a drastic overhaul of the party’s leadership, in order to get rid of his critics. But he obviously went too far without support of his “protector”, party leader General Prawit.
However, many political observers suspect that the “explusion” was staged with the mutual consent of Captain Thammanat and party leader General Prawit.
The situation in the PPP worsened with the loss of its candidate in the recent Bangkok by-election. Coming in fourth in the by-election was Saranras Jenjaka, the wife of ex-MP Sira Jenjaka, who lost his House seat last December after the Constitutional Court ruled that his prior criminal conviction for fraud and resultant imprisonment disqualified him from membership of parliament.
The PPP’s failure to defend its House seat in the Bangkok by-election will further erode the reputation of this chief government party. Worse still, the defeat appears to indicate that many Bangkok voters are now fed up with the unending infighting in the PPP.
RETURN TO BANGKOK
The Democrat Party, Thailand’s oldest,[21] suffered a disastrous defeat in the 2019 general election, winning only 53 of the 500 House seats. It failed to win any of the 30 House seats in Bangkok. And it won only 22 of 50 seats in the South, which used to be its political stronghold. In the 2011 general election, in which the Democrat Party was beaten by the PT, the Democrat Party had at least won 159 House seats, including 23 of 33 seats in Bangkok and 50 of 53 seats in the South.
The Democrats’ hope now is to re-establish their dominant political presence both in Bangkok and the South in the next general election. The recent victories of Democrats in the two southern by-elections augur well for the party.
Since the Democrat Party did not field anyone in the Bangkok by-election[22], its next crucial test will be in the gubernatorial election in the capital, and in the simultaneous polls for members of the Bangkok Metropolitan Council and for district councils. These elections now appear likely to take place in early June.
However, the party’s candidate for the post of Bangkok governor, Dr Suchatvee Suwansawat, is not a well-known figure. He is the former rector of the King Monkut’s Institute of Technology-Lad Krabang. One recent NIDA Poll shows Suchatvee running second, with only 13.06 per cent of support among the respondents to the survey, far behind the frontrunner Chadchart, who scored 38.80 per cent.[23]
The Democrat Party hopes to receive support from former party leader Abhisit in the Bangkok elections.[24] It will have better chances in vying for seats on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council and the capital’s 30 district councils than in competing for the post of governor.
GOING HIGH WITH MARIJUANA
Bhumjaithai, the second largest government party, has been lying low and quietly enjoying its steady growth. The party initially won only 51 House seats in the 2019 general election. But the number of its House seats has since increased to 62, after it co-opted 11 MPs from two other parties.[25]
With its stronghold in the lower north-eastern province of Buriram, the Bhumjaithai Party did not contest in the two recent southern by-elections or the one in Bangkok.
The Bhumjaithai Party is a champion of decriminalising marijuana for medicinal use. Its secretary-general, Transport Minister Saksiam Chidchorb believes that growing marijuana can help generate new income for poor households.[26] The party has been pushing to remove marijuana from the list of banned drugs, and to allow every household to grow up to six marijuana plants for personal use in Thai traditional medicine. So far, the Prayut Administration has merely permitted growing the cannabis “weed” by authorised research entities for experiments on its medicinal potential.
Party leader Anutin insists that marijuana should not be considered a narcotic, and adjustment of the relevant laws to liberalise the cultivation and personal use of marijuana should be sped up.[27] On 26 January, the Bhumjaithai Party submitted to the House Speaker its draft bill on new regulations concerning the use of marijuana and cannabis hemp.
Undoubtedly, if and when the decriminalisation and free cultivation of marijuana are recognised by law, the party stands to gain a great deal of support from voters throughout the kingdom. This is why the party is considered a “sure win” to join while awaiting for the next general election.
COUNTING ON YOUNG VOTERS
Move Forward, the second largest opposition party, fared poorly in the two recent southern by-elections. Its young candidates in Songkhla and Chumphon received much fewer votes than the candidates of the Future Forward, its now dissolved predecessor party, in the 2019 general election.[28]
Move Forward’s candidate, the actor Karoonpol Tiensuwan, managed to come in second in the Bangkok by-election—a good result for a party that lacks experienced politicians. What remains unclear is whether a majority of those who voted for Karoonpol were from the younger generations.
The party has also been rather slow in finding and announcing its candidate for Bangkok governor. Only on 23 January did Move Forward announce that its spokesman, the party-list MP Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, would be that candidate.
The Move Forward Party will also come under immense pressure to find enough viable candidates to contest in all the 400 constituencies nationwide in Thailand’s next general election. In the recent by-election in Chumphon, the party faced criticism when it fielded Worapol Anansak, a 25-year-old environment activist and food deliveryman who had no prior political experience to speak of.
MORE NEW PARTIES
At the end of 2021, the records of the Election Commission showed that there were 84 parties in operation in Thailand.[29] Twenty-five of the active parties were set up after the general election on 24 March 2019. These new parties included: Thai Sang Thai, Kla, Thai Phakdi, and Ruamthai Sangchat.
The number of parties with House seats after the next general election is expected to drop drastically. At present, among the 26 parties with MPs, 11 of them have only 1 MP each. These micro-parties face “extinction” when the election rules change to benefit larger parties.
Nevertheless, more new parties are being formed in anticipation of an early general election. The newest party, just unveiled on 19 January, is named “Sang Anakhot Thai” (Building the Thai Future). Its prime movers are two former senior figures in the PPP: former party leader and finance minister Uttama Saowanayon and former party secretary-general and energy minister Sonthirat Sonthijirawong.[30]
Their “centrist” party hopes to offer its modern economic policy platform as a new option for Thai voters in the next general election.[31] Both Uttama and Sonthirat formerly worked for Dr Somkid Jatusripitak, the former deputy prime minister for economic affairs.
Without a party of his own, General Prayut depends entirely on the 18 parties in the ruling coalition to protect his premiership in the House, as well as to pass bills. Obviously, his premiership depends chiefly on the continuing goodwill and support of these volatile parties.
PRAYUT’S UPPER HAND?
This year, Thailand is the chair of APEC. General Prayut seems to be looking forward to hosting APEC economic leaders at an annual meeting in Thailand in the last quarter of 2022. This is a rare historic opportunity which few government leaders would want to miss.
Nevertheless, how long General Prayut can hold on is now in doubt, especially if he has actually lost the support of his “Big Brother” General Prawit, leader of the PPP. In addition, the party, which nominated General Prayut for the premiership in the 2019 general election, now seems to be in decline following three recent by-election defeats.
Without a party of his own, General Prayut is “floating” without any firm political foundation to stand on. And he will be vulnerable in the House, where he cannot count on any government party to continue to defend him and his government’s legislative bills indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
In the end, however, merely offering security to voters no longer seems a sufficient reason for General Prayut to continue in power.
In the emerging post-pandemic “new normal” world, Thailand urgently needs to take effective steps toward economic recovery. This is why new parties are zeroing in proposals to foster that recovery, rather than on national security, in their policy platforms. This is one crucial area in which General Prayut is clearly lacking, even though he has been in power since leading the coup of May 2014.
He remains determined to hold on, though, but whether or not he can handle Thammanat’s demand and threat is unclear. This question has intensified the uncertainty in Thai politics, much to the chagrin of political parties, especially those in the opposition.
ENDNOTES
[1] “‘ไพบูลย์’ แถลงเหตุขับ ‘ธรรมนัส’ ‘ประวิตร’ รับไม่ได้ ข้อเรียกร้องปรับโครงสร้างพรรค” [“Paiboon” clarifies the cause of expulsion of “Thammanat” is because of his demands to restructure the party, which are unacceptable to “Prawit”], Manager Online, 20 January 2022 (https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000006298, accessed 20 January 2022). Paiboon Nititawan is one of the PPP’s deputy leaders, Captain Thammanat was the PPP’s secretary-general, and General Prawit Wongsuwan is the PPP leader and a deputy prime minister. See also “ ‘ไพบูลย์’ เผยส่งเรื่องขับ 21 สส. ให้ กกต. แล้ว มั่นใจไม่เป็นโมฆะ ยัน ‘สมศักดิ์’ ร่วมประชุม” [“Paiboon” discloses that decision to expel the 21 MPs has been submitted to the EC. He is confident that it will not become invalid, affirms that “Somsak” was in the meeting”, Thai Post, 25 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/politics-news/72204, accessed 25 January 2022). Deputy PPP party leader Paiboon reported that 17 members of the PPP’s executive committee and 63 PPP MPs attended the meeting on 19 January, and that 63 of them voted in favour of the expulsion. Those who voted for it accounted for more than three-fourths of the attendance, and thus fully met the PPP’s regulation on expulsion. Nakhon Ratchasima MP Somsak Pankasem claimed that he was not in the meeting and requested reconsideration of his expulsion. Deputy PPP leader Paiboon, however, has insisted that MP Somsak was at the meeting, and there will be no reconsideration, because the Election Commission (EC) has already been notified.
[2] “‘บิ๊กตู่’ ลั่น ไม่ปรับครม. – ไม่ยุบสภา มาตามระบอบประชาธิปไตย เชื่อ ส.ว. ไม่ขัดพรรคเสียงข้างมากนั่งนายกฯ” [“Big Tu” insists: no cabinet reshuffle, no dissolving the House of Representatives. He comes in accordance with the democratic process. He believes senators would not object to having parties in the majority in control of the premiership], Manager Online, 20 January 2022. (https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000006333, accessed 20 January 2022). “Big Tu” is General Prayut’s nickname.
[3] Last November, the parliament passed two constitutional amendments. One amendment changed the system of voting to the use of separate ballots for constituency MPs and for party-list preferences. The other amendment is to increase the number of constituencies from 350 to 400, and to reduce the number of party-list seats from 150 to 100. A crucial necessary follow-up is to amend the election law to incorporate the two-ballot voting system, particularly as it relates to provisions for calculating the allocation of the party-list seats.
[4] Thailand chaired APEC for the first time in 2003. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra hosted the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Bangkok in October that year. APEC leaders attending the summit included U.S. President George W. Bush, Chinese President Hu Jintao, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, and Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This year, Thailand is chairing APEC for the second time.
[5] “ย้อนรอยเพชรซาอุฯ จาก ‘เกรียงไกร’ ถึง ‘ประยุทธ’ 30 ปี ฤาจะสิ้นอาถรรพ์ ‘บูลไดมอนด์’” [Tracing the Saudi Diamond, from “Kriangkrai” to “Prayut” over 30 years, whether the curse of the “Blue Diamond” is over]. Manager Online, 25 January 2022 (https://www.mgronline.com/crime/detail/9650000008162, accessed 27 January 2022). Kriangkrai Techamong was the Thai janitor who stole more than US$20 million worth of jewellery from a Saudi prince, loot that he smuggled back to Thailand. He was duly arrested. But a very senior police officer, Police Lt Gen Cha-lor Kerdthed organised a bloody scheme to embezzle many pieces of the confiscated jewellery. He later led a team of Thai officials to return the stolen jewellery to Saudi Arabia; it turned out that many of the returned pieces were fake. Three Saudi detectives sent to Bangkok to investigate and reportedly to look for the missing “Blue Diamond” were mysteriously murdered. Subsequently, the Saudi government recalled its ambassador to Thailand and practically downgraded diplomatic ties with Bangkok to the chargé d’affaires level. It also expelled all Thai workers and banned them from Saudi Arabia, where over 300,000 Thais used to work.
[6] The prime minister announced on his Facebook page, www.facebook.com/prayutofficial, on 26 January, “very good news” for the peoples of Thailand and Saudi Arabia resulting from his recent official visit to Riyadh. The good news included an upcoming exchange of ambassadors and the resumption of direct flights between the two kingdoms in May.
[7] The “expulsion” occurred without any formal internal investigation. Some MPs who wanted to leave the party had to lobby their fellow MPs in the PPP to vote for the “expulsion”. MPs expelled from a party may retain their House membership by joining a new party within 30 days. But MPs who resign from their party automatically forfeit House membership.
[8] “ ‘ธรรมนัส’ นำ 18 สส. ซบ ‘เศรษฐกิจไทย’ … ” [ ‘Thammanat leads 18 MPs to join ‘Thai Economic Party’ …], Manager Online, 29 January 2022 (https://www.mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000009505, accessed 30 January 2022).
[9] The ruling coalition has 10 micro-parties, nine of them has only one MP each, while the tenth, the Forest Conservation of Thailand Party, has two MPs. Captain Thammanat once described the leaders of these micro-parties as “monkeys”, and he called himself the “monkey-keeper” who has to find “bananas” to feed to them.
[10] “30 ปีไม่เคยพูดที่ไหน ‘ธรรมนัส’ เปิดใจ ‘ผมเป็นเส้นเลือดใหญ่รัฐบาล’” [ Never before in 30 years, “Thammanat” discloses he is the “artery of the government”] Thai PBS News, 12 July 2019 (https://news.thaipbs.or.th/content/281649, accessed 31 January 2022). Captain Thammanat gave a long press conference at the parliament to defend himself against accusations that he had a “shady past”, including imprisonment in an Australian prison on a heroin-related conviction in the mid-1980s. The Constitutional Court in May 2021 ruled that the conviction against Captain Thammanat took place outside Thailand, and thus had no legal bearing on Captain Thammanat’s qualification to hold public office in the country. This was when Captain Thammanat also likened himself to the “main artery” of the government, and accused his opponents of trying to attack him in order to topple the government.
[11] One of the 500 MPs, Future Forward party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, was disqualified from House membership on the opening day of the first parliamentary session after the 2019 elections on being accused of breaking the election law in failing to declare his ownership of shares in a media firm. Thanathorn was also subsequently found guilty of illegally lending more than 100 million baht to fund his own party, resulting in a decision by the Constitutional Court to dissolve the Future Forward Party in February 2020.
[12] Thammanat was sacked as a deputy minister of agriculture following his failed attempt to unseat the prime minister in the no-confidence debate in early last September. Thammanat appears to want to regain the deputy minister post for one of the MPs in his group, because it oversees the Agricultural Land Reform Office – crucial in winning the votes of the landless rural poor. Thammanat himself seems to want to return to the cabinet as the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment.
[13] The two are the minister of natural resources and the environment and deputy minister of agriculture, whose incumbents are, respectively Varawut Silpa-acha and Praphat Phothasoothon.
[14] See the author’s article, “Thailand’s Main Opposition Party Hopes for a Landslide Election Victory: A Realistic Goal or Just a Dream”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/161, 8 December 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-161-thailands-main-opposition-party-hopes-for-a-landslide-election-victory-a-realistic-goal-or-just-a-dream-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/, accessed 18 January 2022).
[15] On 4 February, the House had only 195 MPs present, whereas the minimum number of MPs in attendance must be at least 237 to form a quorum. Among the PT’s 131 MPs, only two reported their attendance. From the PPP, only 54 MPs of the chief government party’s 97 MPs were in attendance. And only one from Captain Thammanat’s faction of 18 MPs reported his attendance. The PPP leadership later explained that many of the party’s MPs were absent because they had commitments in their constituencies in the provinces on the Friday in question. Normal legislative work in the House are is on Wednesday and Thursday. Friday meetings are sometimes convened to listen to reports from various House ad hoc bodies, and thus are not considered crucial to attend. PPP leader General Prawit has asked all of the PPP’s MPs to attend every House meeting in order to foil the PT’s sabotage tactics.
[16] Thaksin has been in overseas exile, living mostly in Dubai, after fleeing Thailand in early August 2008 to avoid a two-year jail term from conviction in a conflict-of-interest case. The two-year jail term was meted out in October 2008. The penalty lapsed in October 2018 after 10 years. However, Thaksin is still facing altogether 10 years of imprisonment for three in absentia convictions: two years for illegally trying to introduce a two-digit and three-digit (Lotto-like) lottery to compete with the government’s lottery monopoly; three years for pressuring Thailand’s Export-Import Bank to lend Myanmar 40,000 million baht for the purchase of satellite equipment from Shin Satellite Co, a public company founded by Thaksin; and five years for abusing his official powers to benefit Shin Corp, another public company that he had founded. Moreover, Thaksin has also been implicated in the controversial paddy-pawning scheme and fictitious sale of rice to a non-existent Chinese buyer during the administration of his younger sister Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Yingluck was found guilty of dereliction of duty and sentenced to five years in jail on charges related to that scheme, but she fled the country in August 2017, just a few days before the verdict on her conviction was read in court. She is now in exile together with Thaksin in Dubai. See details of Thaksin’s convictions at “บทสรุปรื้อ 5 คดี ‘ทักษิณ’ ศาลฎีกาฯ สั่งจำคุกรวม 10 ปี – ยังเหลือข้าวจีทูจีใน ป.ป.ช.?” [Summary of five cases against “Thaksin”. Appeals court has sentenced him to altogether 10 years in jail. Still there is a case of G-to-G rice sale in the National Anti-Corruption Commission?], Isra News, 31 July 2020 (https://www.isranews.org/article/isranews-scoop/90809-isranews-56.html, accessed 20 January 2022).
[17] Ibid.
[18] “เดินหน้ายุบเพื่อไทย! ‘เรืองไกร’ ยื่น กกต. สอบ ‘ชลน่าน’ พิสูจน์ ‘ทักษิณ’ เป็นเจ้าของพรรคสั่งลบชื่อ ‘พัลลภ’ ” [Attempt to dissolve Phuea Thai, “Ruerng-grai” requests EC to question “Cholnan” to prove that “Thaksin” is the owner of the party who ordered deleting the name of “Panlop” from the party’s membership], Thai Post, 4 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/hi-light/57617, accessed 18 January 2022). Ruerng-grai is a lawyer representing the PPP. He has asked the Election Commission to question PT party leader Dr Cholnan Sri-kaew following a widely-publicised complaint by General Panlop Pin-manee, a former deputy director of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) and a former senior member of the PT, that he could not attend the recent PT party meeting in Khon Kaen, because Thaksin had allegedly ordered the deletion of his name from the party’s membership rolls. Dr Cholnan, however, has countered that General Panlop remains a life-time member of the PT, but that he was not allowed into the Khon Kaen meeting because of COVID-19 restrictions forcing the PT to limit attendance by not inviting older members. See “‘สนธิญา’ ไม่ปล่อย! ฟ้องยุบพรรคเพื่อไทยปม ‘วิฑูรย์ – พัลลภ’ ” [“Sonthiya” will not let go! Suing for dissolution of the Phuea Thai Party because of “Vithoon – Panlop”], Thai Post, 12 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/politics-news/62980). In his case lodged with the Election Commission, Sonthiya Sawaddee, a conservative royalist, cited the complaint made by General Panlop and a new revelation from Vithoon Nambutr, a former deputy leader of the Democrat Party who wanted to join the PT. Vithoon has claimed that he talked to Thaksin on the phone to seek support for his inclusion on the PT’s party list for allocation of the 100 party-list seats in the House after the next general election in a rank no lower than the thirtieth. Thaksin allegedly agreed. However, PT party leader Dr Cholnan has clarified that it will be up to the PT’s executive committee – not Thaksin or any other outsider – to compile the new party-list, and that the ranking has not yet been done because the next general election has not yet been scheduled.
[19] “เปิดผลคะแนนผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งซ่อม ส.ส. เขต 9 กทม.” [Voting results for candidates in the by-election for Bangkok Constituency No. 9 by-election], Thai Post, 30 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/hi-light/75938, accessed 30 January 2022). PT’s candidate Surachart won with 29,416 votes; followed by the Move Forward candidate Karoonpol with 20,361, Kla’s Artthawit with 20,047 votes, and PPP’s Saranras with 7,906 votes.
[20] Captain Thammanat made his worst mistake at a big rally one week before the voting on 16 January, when he told voters in Songkhla to choose the PPP’s candidate because he was wealthy and would thus be in a position to assist local people who were in need. The Democrats immediately seized on Captain Thammanat’s words as an “insult” to southern voters, accusing him of trying to win the by-election with a promise of money.
[21] Four of the party’s leaders became prime ministers of Thailand in nine governments: Khuang Abhaiwong (1944-1945, January – March 1946, February – April 1948), Seni Pramoj (1945 – 1946, February – March 1975, and April – September 1976), Chuan Leekpai (1992 – 1995, 1997 – 2001), and Abhisit Vejjajiva (December 2008 – August 2011).
[22] Democrat party leader Jurin Laksanawisit considers it to be “political etiquette” not to contest in a by-election in which another party in the ruling coalition is trying to defend its House seat.
[23] The full reports of the ninth NIDA Poll survey, conducted between 23-25 December 2021 are available at https://www.nidapoll-nida.ac.th/survey_detail?survey_id=538, first published on 27 December 2021 (accessed on 18 January 2022).
[24] “‘จุรินทร์’ โยนทีมหาเสียงประสาน ‘อภิสิทธิ์’ ช่วยสนามผู้ว่า กทม.” [“Jurin” let campaign team contact “Abhisit” for help in the Bangkok governor’s race], Thai Post, 22 December 2021 (https://www.thaipost.net/politics-news/50699, accessed 18 January 2022). Jurin Laksanawisit is leader of the Democrat Party, the successor to Abhisit who stepped down immediately after the party’s disastrous loss in the 2019 general election.
[25] Eleven MPs have joined the Bhumjaithai Party during the two years since the 2019 general election. An MP for Chiang Mai, Srinuan Boun-lue, was expelled from the Future Forward Party in December 2019; nine MPs from the Future Forward Party signed on after that party’s dissolution in February 2020; and one MP for Pathum Thani, Pornpimon Thammasarn, was expelled from the PT in December 2021 and then joined Bhumjaithai. MPs expelled from a party have 30 days to join a new party in order to keep their House membership. MPs from a dissolved party, like those from the Future Forward Party, have 60 days to do likewise.
[26] “ภูมิใจไทย ชูปลูกกัญชาเสรี สร้างรายได้ ปชช. ทั่วไป” [Bhumjaithai advocates free growing of marijuana for income generation of all people], Khao Sod, 17 March 2019 (https://www.khaosod.co.th/politics/news_2100949, accessed 20 January 2022).
[27] “อนุทิน ย้ำกัญชาไม่ใช่พืชยาเสพติด ใช้ทางการแพทย์ได้ แนะดูเจตนาการนำไปใช้” [Anutin emphasises that marijuana is not a narcotic plant, it has medical use, and [the authorities] should look at the intention of its usage], Infoquest Online, 12 January 2022 (https://www.infoquest.co.th/2022/163704, accessed 20 January 2022).
[28] In the by-elections held on 16 January, Move Forward’s candidate in Songkhla received only 5,417 votes, compared with 11,966 votes for Future Forward’s candidate in the same constituency in the 2019 general election; similarly, its candidate in Chumphon received only 3,520 votes, compared with 10,347 votes for Future Forward’s candidate in the 2019 general election. Move Forward’s setback is worse than anticipated. In the recent by-elections, the winners in Songkhla and Chumphon, both from the Democrat Party, received 45,578 votes and 48,981 votes, respectively. See “สรุปผลเลือกตั้งซ่อม ส.ส. ชุมพร — สงขลา” [Summary of the by-elections outcome in Chumphon – Songkhla], Thai Post, 17 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/hi-light/66159, accessed 20 January 2022).
[29] See details of the 84 parties at the web site of the Office of the Election Commission at https://www.ect.go.th/ect_th/download/article/article_20211230211301.pdf, accessed 19 January 2022).
[30] “‘อุตตม – สนธิรัตน์’ เปิดตัว ‘พรรคสร้างอนาคตไทย’ รวมบุคลากรหัวกระทิ ชูจุดยืนไม่โกง ไม่ปล้นชาติ” [“Uttama – Sonthirat” unveil “Sang Anakhot Thai Party” with top-class personnel, as well as a pledge of no corruption and no plundering], Manager Online, 19 January 2022 (https://www.mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000006035, accessed 19 January 2022).
[31] Ibid.
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