2022/15 “Examining Climate-Conflict Links in Southeast Asia” by Darren Cheong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- There has been a recent growth in studies dedicated to uncovering links between climate and conflict in Southeast Asia.
- This article synthesises the findings of 11 rigorous peer-reviewed studies conducted in various Southeast Asian countries to produce insights on the exact mechanisms linking climate and intra-state conflict in the region.
- Three mechanisms linking climate and conflict are highlighted (1) economic deprivation, (2) strategic considerations by organised armed groups and (3) elite exploitation.
- The risks of climate-linked conflict are most significant for rural communities that depend heavily upon agriculture for their livelihoods, as well as in regions where there is pre-existing armed conflict.
- Climate adaptation strategies that reduce the adverse impacts of climatic events can provide an avenue to mitigate the risks of climate-linked conflict.
* Darren Cheong is Research Associate at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme (RSPS), ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/15, 21 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
The security implications of climate change have become a focus for world leaders and global policymakers in recent years. One of the leading security concerns about climate change is its potential to spark violent intra-state conflict.[1] With this growing interest in the possibility of climate change being related to conflict, researchers have also focused on uncovering whether such a link exists and if so, how they are linked.
There have been protracted debates about whether climate change is indeed linked to violent conflict. While some studies have been unequivocal about the existence of a climate-conflict link, others note that the empirical findings across studies have not been consistent and robust.[2] Experts have agreed that it is difficult to make broad generalisations about the findings of such studies and that the existence of climate-conflict links should be contextualised in specific local or country settings.[3]
Even though Southeast Asia is one of the regions projected to be most affected by climate change, the vast majority of studies looking into the climate-conflict link have not been in the region.[4] Nevertheless, there has been growing research interest in the region, and a number of studies have looked at specific pathways linking climate change to conflict. While research in the region is still relatively nascent, there is growing indication that a climate-conflict link is supported by evidence in the literature and that policymakers should take note of climate-related conflict risks. Synthesising the findings of 11 peer-reviewed studies on climate and conflict in Southeast Asia, this article aims to provide evidence-based perspectives on the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict in the region. In the context of these studies and for the purposes of this article, conflict is defined as intra-state violence that can occur on various scales. Smaller-scale civil conflict will involve events such as violent protests, riots or forced evictions while larger-scale civil conflict can involve insurgencies, rebellions and terrorist activity. These insights will be helpful in crafting prevention and mitigation strategies that target climate-related conflict.
The articles reviewed in this article were found using Boolean search strings on two academic databases: ScienceDirect and Web of Science. These studies come from various disciplines – economics, political science, geography, and anthropology – and both quantitative and qualitative studies were reviewed. A list of these studies can be found in the Appendix.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: CLIMATE DISASTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
As the mechanisms linking climate and conflict are often mediated through climate disasters, this section will provide a broad overview of the latter, occurring in the region. There is a growing consensus amongst climate disaster attribution studies that climate change has been a key factor in increasing the likelihood and intensity of climate disasters in recent decades.[5]
In Southeast Asia, there has been a considerable increase in climate-related disaster events (floods, extreme temperatures, droughts, landslides, storms, and wildfires) in recent decades. We note this increase in Figure 1, a histogram depicting the number of climate disasters from the 1960s to the present day. With each decade, climate disasters have indeed been becoming more frequent, with countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand bearing the brunt of this increase.
This histogram is also broadly reflective of recent climate risk indicators. Table 1 provides a summary of the various human and economic costs of climate disasters for Southeast Asian countries, alongside the most recent 2021 iteration of Germanwatch’s long-term climate risk ranking, a widely used index measuring climate vulnerability.[6] Five Southeast Asian countries – Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia – rank amongst the top 20 most vulnerable countries globally. From Table 1, we can see that these countries have also faced high costs from climate disaster events over the last two decades – with thousands of fatalities, millions affected, and billions of US dollars in damages.
Based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report[8] that climate change will exacerbate the frequency and intensity of climate disaster events, it is reasonable to expect that these costs will continue to increase. Bearing in mind the costs of climate disasters in Southeast Asia, the subsequent sections provides a detailed breakdown of the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict.
CLIMATE AND CONFLICT: EVIDENCE-BASED MECHANISMS
Early research on climate and conflict has been met with scepticism because of its preoccupation with uncovering broad correlations between climatic events and instances of violent conflict. While the existence of such correlations serves as a useful starting point for investigation into the climate-conflict link, they do not offer insights into the potential mechanisms that may be driving these correlations. The reason for this can be seen in Figure 2, which shows a climate disaster density map of the Philippines, overlaid with locations of conflict events[9] between 2000 to 2019.
The figure demonstrates that there is indeed a correlation between climate and conflict. Areas of high to medium disaster density experience a higher concentration of violent conflict, indicated by the darker hues of the conflict event points. From Figure 2, we cannot glean insights about what exactly might be driving this correlation. There might also be arguments that the Philippines can be characterised as a country with pre-existing tensions, most notably those associated with the Maoist and Moro insurgents. It is thus unclear if and how climate-related factors play a role in creating conflict in the Philippines.
The studies reviewed under this article have however circumvented the pitfalls of past correlational studies through the incorporation of rigorous and highly localised context-specific research designs that have allowed them to discern if, when, and under what circumstances climatic processes have led to conflict in Southeast Asia. There can, thus, be a high degree of confidence in the insights gained from these studies. The following sections outline the three main mechanisms identified in these studies, linking climate and conflict in the region: (1) economic deprivation, (2) the strategic considerations of organised armed groups, and (3) elite exploitation.[12]
Mechanism 1: Economic Deprivation
The proposition that climate and conflict are linked through economic deprivation is theoretically motivated by economic theory related to opportunity costs. If adverse climatic events undermine economic output and livelihoods, there might be the expectation that the opportunity costs of conflict would decrease and that anti-state grievances might arise.[13] Research evaluating the existence of such an effect has primarily been focused on agricultural communities whose incomes are heavily climate dependent.
Several studies have validated economic deprivation as a mechanism linking climate and conflict in Southeast Asia. In a 2016 quantitative study using provincial-level conflict data in Indonesia between 1993 and 2003, researchers found that reductions in rice yields, because of increases in temperatures during the rice-growing season, were a determinant of future upticks in violent conflict.[14] This increase in conflict is predicated on continued reductions of rice production per capita. In other words, on average, provinces that experienced increases in temperatures and reduced rice yields can prone to face increases in conflict incidences in the future. Conflict in this context has been defined as collective violence, where violence is perpetrated by groups. Examples include riots and acts of terrorism.
Another study in 2018 in the Philippines utilised data from military incident reports produced by the Philippine army to explore the effects of rainfall shocks on violent conflict.[15] These reports reflected instances where either government forces or insurgent groups had initiated attacks on one another. They concluded that above-average rainfall during wet seasons, which resulted in decreased agricultural yields due to flooding, led to more casualties and conflict incidents being reported in the subsequent year. This effect was particularly pronounced in provinces that dedicated a larger proportion of land to rice production, the Philippines’ most important crop and the main source of income for millions of farmers.
Aside from studies regarding land agriculture, a 2016 study on 260 coastal districts in Indonesia found a link between climatically induced reductions in fisheries output and increases in sea-piracy activity.[16] The author argues that this phenomenon is driven by the opportunity costs of participating in piracy being reduced for fishermen whose livelihoods have been threatened by climatic conditions.
Apart from Indonesia and the Philippines, few Southeast Asian countries have been the research focus for such research. This is not to say that economic deprivation as a mechanism for climate-linked conflict does not exist in the rest of Southeast Asia. Given that millions of people in the region depend on agriculture for their livelihood, it is reasonable to expect that future climate disasters can foment similar conflict-stirring conditions in other parts of Southeast Asia.
Table 2 provides a country-by-country breakdown of the economic contributions of the agricultural sector to Southeast Asia. We can see that the sector constitutes a considerable percentage of many Southeast Asian countries’ GDPs. More importantly, significant proportions of their populations rely on the sector for employment.
Table 2: Economic Dependence on Agriculture in Southeast Asia
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2021)
The sixth IPCC assessment report projects that Southeast Asia will face increased precipitation levels, more intense tropical cyclones, and higher flood levels under future climate change scenarios.[17] More intense and frequent climate disasters can certainly aggravate the risk of conflicts, especially in agriculturally dependent regions.
Mechanism 2: Strategic Considerations by Organised Armed Groups
In the wake of destructive climate disasters, organised armed groups may take advantage of the unrest to reorganise and bolster their own positions. This mechanism for climate-linked conflict is typically applicable to Southeast Asian countries where there are ongoing insurgencies or rebel activities.
Following climate disasters, insurgent groups have been known to actively entice disaster victims to join their movements. This enticement works in tandem with the economic deprivation mechanism, where disaster-affected communities will find the opportunity costs of participating in conflict to be reduced. In a 2016 study on all 81 provinces in the Philippines, researchers found that precipitation shocks in the form of droughts, floods and storms, coincided with significant escalations of violence during four ongoing insurgencies between 2001 and 2007.[18] Provinces that experienced these shocks were found on average to have increased onsets of violent insurgent activity. These escalations were linked to ramped up recruitment efforts by insurgent groups, who sought to play up political grievances following the loss of livelihoods from climate disasters. A case study supported by interviews which the author conducted was when the Communist Party of Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), under the guise of providing aid, organised indoctrination sessions to encourage villagers to join the group. Such recruitment drives subsequently fortified their ranks and motivated them to engage in more insurgent activity.
As climate disasters may similarly diminish the food supplies of insurgent groups, some of these groups engage in conflict to bolster dwindling resources. In a 2017 study on Thailand, researchers analysed the case study of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) in Songkhla province in the south during the extreme droughts of 2004.[19] As a response to the onset of droughts, farmers in the province had stockpiled rice in their fields in anticipation of future depressed rice outputs. This motivated the BRN-C to conduct raids on rice fields in various parts of the province to capture and control rice fields during the drought. These raids were extremely violent and often involved killing, beheading, and beatings. Part of the evidence supporting these claims was a Thai Ministry of Interior report in 2005 highlighting a 90 per cent increase in the number of villagers killed by insurgents in Songkhla province during the 2004 droughts.
These studies echo the point that climate change can be understood as a threat multiplier that amplifies the risks of existing security issues. That being said, it is not completely certain that armed conflict perpetrated by insurgent groups will flare up whenever climate disasters occur. Whether or not armed groups choose to take advantage of unrests during climate disasters will be heavily contingent upon the specific disaster and local contexts. For instance, typhoons Bopha and Haiyan in 2012 and 2013 were found to have weakened two rebel groups, the CPP-NPA and National Democratic Front (NDF) in the Philippines. In a study of those cases, the author concluded that this weakening was likely to be temporary and to be due to the typhoons being especially devastating in areas where the groups were active.[20]
Mechanism 3: Elite Exploitation
The third mechanism, elite exploitation, does not come about as a direct consequence of climate disasters. Rather, the mechanism involves local elites, under the veil of humanitarian assistance and climate change mitigation/adaptation policies, seeking to gain a foothold in ongoing land conflicts with local communities.
In the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, local populations in the island of Sicogon were forced by the local political elite to waive their rights to land on the island.[21] In exchange, they would receive either a lump-sum cash payout or a house at a relocation site in the mainland, along with immediate disaster assistance. The parcels of land the indigenous populations resided on stood in the way of a planned tourism project and was the source of ongoing land conflict between local communities and the local elite. Preying on the local populations’ desperation following typhoon Haiyan, the local elites saw an opening to dispossess them of their lands. Those who refused the offer for payouts or relocation reported becoming victims of constant harassment and threats.
To be sure, such conflicts can also take place in the absence of climate disasters. There is, for example, an ongoing pattern of local elites in Southeast Asia justifying land grabs using the veil of climate change adaptation or mitigation – a phenomenon commonly referred to as “green-grabbing”.
In Myanmar’s Northern Shan State, a 2020 study found that the justification for hydropower projects along with the Salween River has increasingly been framed in terms of climate change mitigation.[22] Villagers had also stated that this sort of framing had become more prominent since talks about dam-building began in the early 2010s. Many villagers opposed to the dam were ultimately forced to vacate lands the government wanted to acquire as part of the hydropower projects.
Elsewhere in Cambodia’s Greater Aural region, the expansion of flex crops used for biofuel production ignited conflicts between local communities and local companies backed by the governing elite.[23] Increasing the use of biofuels had been touted as a form of climate change mitigation strategy amongst global policymakers, and in 2010, the Cambodian government awarded large land concessions to two sugar companies owned by a tycoon closely associated with the country’s political elite. These companies encroached upon farmland belonging to local communities. Evictions soon turned violent, and villagers reported bulldozers, backed by army battalions, clearing their lands without warning.
In a separate region of Cambodia, in the Prey Lang Forest, a 34,007-hectare land concession was awarded to a Korean company, Think Biotech, by the Cambodian government in 2010 to execute a reforestation project under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).[24] Local communities residing within the concession were forced to give up rights to the land. In 2013, approximately 300 villagers organised local protests outside Think Biotech’s offices in Kratie province, seizing two company trucks in the process. Think Biotech’s activities continue to face resistance and protests from local communities to this day. Ironically, the project’s green credentials are now in doubt. The concession now consists of a monoculture timber plantation, whose creation had involved industrial-scale slash and burn activity. The initial aim of CDM accreditation was also dropped because the requirements to provide proof of emissions reductions were deemed “too complicated”.[25]
These case studies demonstrate that climate change can provide an avenue for local elites to assert control over resources, which might, in turn, spark conflict. In many Southeast Asian countries where land rights for rural communities are often lacking, there will be risks of elite exploitation leading to conflict. No doubt, such exploitation is not new, but climate change policies have now provided a new legitimation for local elites to justify land grabs.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY DIRECTIONS
Climate-conflict research in Southeast Asia is still nascent. The studies reviewed for this article certainly do not provide a definitive assessment of the climate-conflict link in the region. However, they can be seen as a cross section of Southeast Asia’s climate-conflict risk landscape, and certain important insights about the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict can be gleaned from them.
The main takeaway is that climate-related conflict will typically play out where livelihoods are heavily dependent upon climatic factors, i.e., in agriculture or fishery. The propensity for locals to participate in conflict in response to adverse climatic events will decrease if policies are in place to mitigate the economic harm suffered by communities during climate events.
Measures that reduce the impact of climatic events on agricultural yields have been suggested as a potential mitigation strategy for climate-linked conflict.[26] For instance, building irrigation infrastructure, diversifying crops and improving access to climate-smart agriculture technologies are some of the policy paths that governments can consider. These also have other economic and environmental benefits that will make them particularly attractive to local or federal governments.
Regarding land conflicts linked to “green grabbing”, these can be mitigated with improved land rights for rural populations that have typically relied on customary land tenures that have little to no formal recognition. Increasing the level of transparency and accountability in environmental impact assessments for projects justified in the name of climate change mitigation/adaptation will also be needed. In this regard, the role of local non-government organisations who are familiar with local environmental contexts will be important.
Since climate change is projected to severely impact Southeast Asia in the near future, climate-conflict research that is contextually sensitive to the region is needed more than ever.
Appendix: The Southeast Asia Climate-Conflict Studies Analysed for this Article
| Author(s) | Title | Journal | Year |
| Arnim Schneidel and Courtney Work | Forest plantations and climate change discourses: New powers of ‘green grabbing’ in Cambodia | Land Use Policy | 2018 |
| Benjamin Bagozzi, Ore Koren, and Bumba Mukherjee | Droughts, land appropriation, and rebel violence in the developing world. | The Journal of Politics | 2017 |
| Benjamin Crost, Claire Duquennois, Joseph H. Felter, and Daniel I. Rees | Climate change, agricultural production and civil conflict: Evidence from the Philippines | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2018 |
| Carol Hunsberger, Courtney Work, and Roman Herre | Linking climate change strategies and land conflicts in Cambodia: Evidence from the Greater Aural region. | World Development | 2018 |
| Colin Walch | Weakened by the storm: Rebel group recruitment in the wake of natural disasters in the Philippines | Journal of Peace Research | 2020 |
| Joshua Eastin | Hell and high water: Precipitation shocks and conflict violence in the Philippines | Political Geography | 2018 |
| Maria Angelina Uson | Natural disasters and land grabs: The politics of their intersection in the Philippines following super typhoon Haiyan | Canadian Journal of Development Studies | 2018 |
| Nicolas Gatti, Kathy Baylis, and Benjamin Crost | Can irrigation infrastructure mitigate the effect of rainfall shocks on conflict? Evidence from Indonesia | American Journal of Agricultural Economics | 2021 |
| Raul Caruso, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti | Climate change, rice crops, and violence: Evidence from Indonesia | Journal of Peace Research | 2017 |
| Saturnino M. Borras Jr, Jennifer C. Franco, and Zau Nam | Climate change and land: Insights from Myanmar | World Development | 2016 |
| Sebastian Axbard | Income opportunities and sea piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from satellite data | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics | 2016 |
ENDNOTES
[1] UN Security Council. “The UN Security Council and Climate Change” Security Council Report. 21 June 2021. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_security_2021.pdf
[2] Koubi, Vally. “Climate change and conflict.” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 343-360.
[3] Mach, Katharine J., Caroline M. Kraan, W. Neil Adger, Halvard Buhaug, Marshall Burke, James D. Fearon, Christopher B. Field et al. “Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict.” Nature 571, no. 7764 (2019): 193-197.
[4] Adams, Courtland, Tobias Ide, Jon Barnett, and Adrien Detges. “Sampling bias in climate–conflict research.” Nature Climate Change 8, no. 3 (2018): 200-203.
[5] Carbon Brief. “Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world”. Carbon Brief. 21 February 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-weather-around-the-world; Ornes, Stephen. “Core Concept: How does climate change influence extreme weather? Impact attribution research seeks answers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 33 (2018): 8232-8235.
[6] Eckstein, David, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer. Global Climate Risk Index 2021. Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events: Weather Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000-2019. German Watch, 2021.; von Uexkull, Nina, and Halvard Buhaug. “Security implications of climate change: A decade of scientific progress.” Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 1 (2021): 3-17.
[7] Guha-Sapir, Debby., Regina Below and Phillipe Hoyois. EM-DAT: The CRED/OFDA International Disaster Database (29 December 2021), distributed by Université Catholique de Louvain. www.emdat.be.
[8] IPCC. Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
[9] Conflict events are defined as incidents where armed force was used an organised actor, against another organised actor, or against civilians, which resulted in at least one direct death at a specified date and location.
[10] Rosvold, Elisabeth L., and Halvard Buhaug. “GDIS, a global dataset of geocoded disaster locations.” Scientific Data 8, no. 1 (2021): 1-7.
[11] Pettersson, Therése, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, and Margareta Sollenberg Magnus Öberg. “Organized violence 1989–2020, with a special emphasis on Syria.” Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 4 (2021): 809-825.
[12] An earlier study provided the mechanism framework that is utilised in this paper. Nordqvist, P., & Krampe, F. (2018). Climate change and violent conflict: sparse evidence from South Asia and South East Asia. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
[13] Salehyan, Idean, and Cullen S. Hendrix. “Climate shocks and political violence.” Global Environmental Change 28 (2014): 239-250.
[14] Caruso, Raul, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti. “Climate change, rice crops, and violence: Evidence from Indonesia.” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 1 (2016): 66-83.
[15] Crost, Benjamin, Claire Duquennois, Joseph H. Felter, and Daniel I. Rees. “Climate change, agricultural production and civil conflict: Evidence from the Philippines.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 88 (2018): 379-395.
[16] Axbard, Sebastian. “Income opportunities and sea piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from satellite data.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 2 (2016): 154-94.
[17] IPCC. Sixth Assessment Report.
[18] Eastin, Joshua. “Hell and high water: Precipitation shocks and conflict violence in the Philippines.” Political Geography 63 (2018): 116-134.
[19] Bagozzi, Benjamin E., Ore Koren, and Bumba Mukherjee. “Droughts, land appropriation, and rebel violence in the developing world.” The Journal of Politics 79, no. 3 (2017): 1057-1072.
[20] Walch, Colin. “Weakened by the storm: Rebel group recruitment in the wake of natural disasters in the Philippines.” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 3 (2018): 336-350.
[21] Uson, Maria Angelina M. “Natural disasters and land grabs: The politics of their intersection in the Philippines following super typhoon Haiyan.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 38, no. 3 (2017): 414-430.
[22] Borras Jr, Saturnino M., Jennifer C. Franco, and Zau Nam. “Climate change and land: Insights from Myanmar.” World Development 129 (2020): 104864.
[23] Hunsberger, Carol, Courtney Work, and Roman Herre. “Linking climate change strategies and land conflicts in Cambodia: Evidence from the Greater Aural region.” World Development 108 (2018): 309-320.
[24] Scheidel, Arnim, and Courtney Work. “Forest plantations and climate change discourses: New powers of ‘green grabbing’ in Cambodia.” Land Use Policy 77 (2018): 9-18.
[25] Ibid, 10.
[26] Gatti, Nicolas, Kathy Baylis, and Benjamin Crost. “Can irrigation infrastructure mitigate the effect of rainfall shocks on conflict? Evidence from Indonesia.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 103, no. 1 (2021): 211-231.
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“A Study of Vietnam’s Control over Online Anti-state Content” by Dien Nguyen An Luong
2022/14 “Rising Risks from Cross-ownership between Real Estate Developers and Banks in Vietnam” by Tuan Ho, Tuan Huu Nguyen, Trang Thi Ngoc Nguyen, and Tho Ngoc Tran
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since 2010, cross-holdings in commercial banks have been considered by Vietnamese policy makers as a critical issue; this practice encourages non-compliance activities by financial institutions, such as the bypassing of credit risk regulations.
- By 2019, thanks to banking reforms led by the State Bank of Vietnam, this issue had been effectively managed.
- However, a more sophisticated form of cross-holdings has emerged in recent years, with more and more real estate developers becoming key decision-makers in local banks.
- Real estate developers’ ownership in commercial banks exposes Vietnam to the same problems that China is facing, with poorly capitalised real estate companies borrowing heavily from banks via their complex network of affiliates, thereby exposing these banks as well as the whole banking system to great risks.
- In order to deal with these risks, regulators need better tools to trace the ultimate ownership of commercial banks and mitigate ownership concentration. Requiring board diversity and enhancing the role of independent directors are some of the best practices that Vietnam can adopt.
* Tuan Ho is Senior Lecturer in Finance and Accounting at the University of Bristol and Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Tuan Huu Nguyen is Head of Risk Management at Saigon Securities Corporation. Trang Thi Ngoc Nguyen is Associate Professor of Finance, and Tho Ngoc Tran is Professor of Finance at the University of Economics – Ho Chi Minh City.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/14, 17 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
China’s economic stability has recently been threatened by the debt problem of major real estate developers, with Evergrande being the most notable case.[1] This has led to concerns that similar problems may happen to other countries in the region. In Vietnam, debates about this risk among policy makers and industry experts have intensified, as several real estate developers have recently emerged as major shareholders or key decision-makers in local banks.
This paper analyses the risks that this phenomenon poses to Vietnam’s banking system and discusses how Vietnam can handle this issue. We first review Vietnam’s banking reforms since 2011, focusing on the cross-holdings issue. We then link this to the risks posed by local real estate developers’ investment in banks, and discuss possible consequences. Finally, we recommend some policies and best practices that Vietnam can adopt to mitigate the risks.
WHY DO REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS WANT TO CONTROL BANKS?
Reducing cross-holdings in commercial banks has been an important goal for Vietnamese policy makers since 2010. The fast growth of commercial banks in the 2000s was associated with the emergence of complicated ownership structures within these banks. Some banks held shares in other banks, while some were owned by non-financial companies, both private and state-owned, which were also these banks’ major clients. Such ownership structures were established through either direct or indirect links with these companies’ affiliates.[2]
In 2010, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), the country’s central bank, decided that cross-ownership among banks was a worrying trend as this practice encouraged non-compliance activities by financial institutions and major shareholders of commercial banks, including the bypassing of credit risk regulations. At the end of 2011, four state-owned commercial banks, namely Vietcombank, BIDV, VietinBank and Agribank, were holding shares in eight private-owned joint-stock commercial banks. For example, Vietcombank held an 11 per cent stake in Military Bank, an 8.2 per cent stake in Eximbank, a 4.7 per cent stake in Oriental Bank, and a 5.3 per cent stake in Saigon Bank. Private-owned commercial banks also held each other’s shares. For example, Eximbank owned 10.6 per cent of Sacombank and 8.5 per cent of Viet A Bank.[3]
After some deliberation, in 2014, the SBV issued Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN to address this cross-holding problem.[4] The circular clarifies the definition of persons related to key decision-makers of commercial banks. It also requires additional disclosures on the ownership of related persons in commercial banks and the banks’ provision of credit to these persons. At the same time, the circular provides that a commercial bank can only hold less than 5 per cent of another financial institution’s equity. Thanks to these efforts, by June 2019, the number of pairs of financial institutions with cross-holding relationships had been reduced from 56 to only one.[5] Thereafter, SBV Governor Nguyen Thi Hong claimed that the issue of cross-holding in financial institutions had been “effectively handled”, and the problem of major shareholders manipulating banks had been managed.
However, while cross-ownership between banks may have virtually been eliminated, other types of complex ownership structures in the banking system have emerged. One particularly worrying trend is the participation of local real estate developers in banks; it is feared that this can adversely influence these banks’ lending practices.
Ownership structure reports issued by local banks suggest that most of them comply with regulations against cross-holdings issued by the SBV, such as the rules specified in Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN. However, these regulations do not cover the issue of companies that are affiliates of bank shareholders holding shares in these banks. In most cases, such companies engage in different businesses, including capital-intensive ones such as real estate. These companies’ participation in banks is not driven by these banks’ profits, dividends, or stock price appreciation. Instead, the main benefit of their participation is the ability to influence these banks’ lending practices, including non-compliance activities such as providing excessive lending to certain clients. Essentially, real estate developers who can somehow control banks can channel more credits to their real estate projects by lending to these developers’ affiliates. They can even use employees as nominees to open companies to obtain loans from banks and then channel the money back to their businesses. It is hard to trace such transactions without thorough forensic audits, which are normally conducted only when major scandals break out.
Although it is difficult to trace these transactions and obtain definitive evidence, there are clear indications that some commercial banks are being controlled by real estate developers. For example, in May 2021, Tran Thi Thu Hang, CEO of Sunshine Group, a rising real estate developer with major projects in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, became chairwoman of Kienlongbank. In the same month, Nguyen Duc Thuy, founder and major shareholder of Thaiholdings, a conglomerate with diversified interests, including in real estate and renewable energy, was elected vice-chairman of LienVietPostBank after Thaiholdings, Thuy and his family members bought large amounts of the bank’s shares. As of December 2021, although Thaiholdings and Thuy’s relatives had putatively divested from LienVietPostBank, Thuy remained the bank’s vice chairman. In a more recent case, National Citizen Bank (NCB) appointed Bui Thi Thanh Huong, CEO of Sun Group, a major real estate developer well-known for large hospitality and entertainment complexes, as its chairwoman in July 2021. NCB is known to have made several loans to Sun Group, including for a major casino project in Van Don, Quang Ninh Province.
These developments reinforce a trend that has long existed in Vietnam’s banking industry, where local tycoons try to gain control of commercial banks as a way to provide cheap funding for their businesses, especially in the real estate sector. Notable examples of such a relationship between bank and real estate developers include Techcombank and Masterise Group, VPBank and MIK Group, SEABank and BRG Group, Saigon Commercial Bank and Van Thinh Phat Group, HDBank and Sovico Group, and Sacombank and Him Lam Group.[6]
INCREASING RISKS FROM REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
Against this backdrop, there have been concerns that real estate developers may distort the lending practices of these banks to benefit their other businesses. In March 2021, it was reported by local media that new forms of cross-holdings, i.e., real estate developers controlling banks, may be driven by regulatory arbitrage. According to the Law on Credit Institutions, the total loan a financial institution can lend to a single customer must not exceed 15 per cent of its capital, and the total outstanding loan to a customer and that customer’s related persons must not exceed 25 per cent of its capital. This balance includes bonds issued by companies of the customer to the lending institution.[7]
Since most real estate developers own multiple subsidiaries, they can circumvent the limits set out by this regulation by having these subsidiaries borrow from banks. In addition, these developers may also use affiliated businesses whose owners are putatively not related to them to borrow from the same banks. In such cases, banks can lend to these affiliated groups more than 25 per cent of their own capital without knowing that they have actually crossed the limit. While the risk management system of commercial banks can raise red flags over these transactions, bank managers, who are also real estate developers or who have close connections with them, may suppress such warnings. There have been similar cases in European banks, such as Credit Suisse in the Greensill Capital scandal, where risk managers’ warnings were ignored and suppressed by the bank’s executives.[8]
The SBV’s Circular 22/2019/TT-NHNN, which came into force on 1 January 2020, further incentivises real estate developers to acquire major stakes in commercial banks.[9] This circular aims to address banks’ maturity risk and slow down the credit flows to risky sectors, including real estate. Specifically, it requires that the ratio of short-term deposits to medium and long-term loans does not exceed 40 per cent for the period between 1 January 2020 and 30 September 2020. After this period, the ratio would go down further, to 37 per cent by October 2020 and eventually to 30 per cent by 2022. Additionally, loans to the real estate sector would carry a high-risk weight of 200 per cent, a significant increase from 150 per cent.[10] This change results in higher risk-weighted assets, and thus reduces banks’ capital adequacy ratio. In other words, if a bank maintains the same level of assets (including loans and investments) as before the increase of risk weights, it is considered to be subjecting itself to higher risks. Furthermore, if the bank’s capital adequacy ratio drops too low, it will need to raise capital to maintain the minimum ratio specified by the SBV. This regulation therefore limits the asset and credit growth of commercial banks that are not well capitalised.
Due to these new restrictions, the growth of credit to the real estate sector declined from 21 per cent in 2019 to 11.89 per cent in 2020.[11] Real estate developers now therefore have stronger motivations to become major shareholders in commercial banks to gain easier access to capital. The above-mentioned cases of cross-holdings between banks and real estate developers may only be the tip of the iceberg. There could have been other cases where real estate developers have major influence on commercial banks, but it is nearly impossible for the public and the media to trace the ultimate owners of these banks due to their complex and opaque cross-holding structures.
Some industry experts have warned about the risks associated with this new form of cross-holdings in the banking system, particularly amid disruptions to the real estate market caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, Le Xuan Nghia, former vice-chairman of the National Financial Supervisory Committee, emphasised that real estate companies serving as “backyards” of commercial banks need special attention from regulators.[12] He pointed out that several real estate developers have weak balance sheets, high debt-to-total asset ratio, and low liquidity ratio, and that their financial position “may be even worse than Evergrande’s”.[13] He also argued that the true picture is blurred by a thick “financial fog”[14] and the common practice of developers using nominees, such as their drivers, house-keepers and security guards, to set up affiliates to get bank loans on their behalf. He warned that if regulators failed to supervise carefully, cases like Evergrande would soon emerge in Vietnam.
Such concerns are well-founded and informed by past scandals in which banks’ ultimate owners channelled these banks’ money to their own pocket, causing heavy losses to the banks and putting the whole financial system at risk. One primary example is the case of Pham Cong Danh and the Vietnam Construction Bank (VNCB). As the former chairman of the bank, Danh has been prosecuted and jailed for “stealing money” from his bank and using the funds to secure loans from other lenders.[15] It is estimated that between 2012 and 2014, Danh caused VND9,000 billion (USD392 million) in losses to VNCB.
However, some others downplay the risk of real estate developers’ involvement in commercial banks. For example, Nguyen Tri Hieu, a banking expert, argues that the new owners of banks have changed their mindset. Given the stricter regulations imposed by the SBV, Hieu suggests without elaboration that the participation of real estate developers as well as companies from other industries in banks may actually be a good thing for the economy. Nevertheless, Hieu also admits that they need to learn from cases like VNCB and avoid repeating the same mistake.[16]
PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We concur that if leaders of real estate companies, who are also ultimate owners of certain banks, follow the rulebooks of the SBV, the situation will be under control. Vietnam’s current banking regulations have clearly indicated the limit that a bank can lend to a client, as well as to a client and its related parties. Furthermore, with the implementation of Basel 2 and Basel 3 standards in Vietnam, capital adequacy and internal controls have been enhanced at most banks. Market discipline may also deter bad governance behaviours, and cases like VNCB can thus be prevented.
However, while it is now harder for real estate tycoons to manipulate banks, there are still certain loopholes that they can take advantage of. Through the complex networks of subsidiaries and affiliated companies, these ultimate shareholders can channel credits to their own companies, bypassing regulations on credit and lending limits for the real estate sector. For example, they can interfere so that banks will lend to affiliates that are not directly involved in the real estate sector by building up shell companies in other industries to borrow from banks. At the end of the day, money will still be channelled to their real estate business through these shell companies.
With the rise of shadow banking, fintech app and retail lending arms, these wealth transfers can become too complicated to trace as shell companies can borrow from different arms of a commercial bank. It is therefore extremely hard for regulators to determine how much a bank is exposed to an ultimate borrower. It is also difficult for regulators to monitor which banks are exposed to cross-holdings by real estate developers and act before a problem becomes too big to tackle. Real estate developers can continue to come up with new ways to manipulate banks, and regulators are usually a few steps behind.
Even if only a few banks in the financial system have these governance loopholes, there is still a significant risk for over-indebted developers to emerge from the above-mentioned unhealthy practices. There are also concerns that banks’ operating performance may deteriorate if its leaders focus on lending to their “backyard companies”, while neglecting the banks’ main businesses. This will lead to the misallocation of banks’ resources and reduce the effectiveness of the banking system in providing capital for the economy. Furthermore, due to the wish to maintain these practices to benefit themselves, bank owners may not have the incentive to promote digitalisation of the banking system. Consequently, the competitiveness of Vietnamese banks may decline compared to foreign banks.
To avoid these risks, regulators need a better information system to trace the ultimate ownership of commercial banks and mitigate ownership concentration. Furthermore, requiring board diversity and enhancing the role of independent directors are best practices that Vietnam can adopt. When ownership is not concentrated into a few large shareholders and independent directors can challenge shady business practices, banks will be better governed and better prepared to deal with external shocks. There will also be lower chances for cases like Evergrande to emerge in Vietnam.
ENDNOTES
[1] Alexandra Stevenson and Cao Li, “Why China’s Economy Is Threatened by a Property Giant’s Debt Problems,” The New York Times, 10 November 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/article/evergrande-debt-crisis.html.
[2] Xuân Thành Nguyễn, “Commercial Banks of Vietnam: From Legal and Policy Changes in the Period 2006-2010 to Restructuring Events in the Period 2011-2015,” Fulbright Economics Teaching Program, February 2016.
[3]Văn Luyện Lê and Duy Tuấn Khuất, “Sở Hữu Chéo Giữa Các Ngân Hàng Thương Mại Việt Nam Sau Khi Ra Đời Thông Tư 36,” Tạp Chí Ngân Hàng, 2 October 2017, http://tapchinganhang.gov.vn/so-huu-cheo-giua-cac-ngan-hang-thuong-mai-viet-nam-sau-khi-ra-doi-thong-tu-36.htm.
[4] The circular can be accessed at https://vanban.chinhphu.vn/default.aspx?pageid=27160&docid=178433
[5] Đình Vũ, “Thống Đốc Nguyễn Thị Hồng: Hệ Thống Ngân Hàng Không Còn Tình Trạng Sở Hữu Chéo,” Nhà Đầu Tư, 28 January 2021, https://nhadautu.vn/thong-doc-nguyen-thi-hong-he-thong-ngan-hang-khong-con-tinh-trang-so-huu-cheo-d47956.html. The only remaining case is between Asia Commercial Bank (ACB) and Real Estate Investment Hòa Phát – Á Châu (ACB holds 2.86 per cent of Hòa Phát – Á Châu while that company owns 0.046 per cent of ACB). It remains unclear why this case was not resolved.
[6] Khanh An, “Khi đại gia Việt ‘cưới’ ngân hàng”, Nhà Đầu tư, 30 July 2021, https://nhadautu.vn/khi-dai-gia-viet-cuoi-ngan-hang-d55714.html
[7] Hà Tâm, “Bóng Dáng Sở Hữu Chéo Trong Hệ Thống Ngân Hàng,” Đầu Tư Online, 3 March 2021, https://baodautu.vn/bong-dang-so-huu-cheo-trong-he-thong-ngan-hang-d138940.html.
[8] Marion Halftermeyer, “Credit Suisse Overruled Risk Managers on Greensill Loan”, Bloomberg, 11 March 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-11/credit-suisse-overruled-risk-managers-on-loan-to-greensill.
[9] Circular 22/2019 is available at: http://congbao.chinhphu.vn/noi-dung-van-ban-so-22-2019-tt-nhnn-30003?cbid=28657
[10] Kiều Linh, “‘Nắn’ Dòng Vốn Vào Bất Động Sản,” VnEconomy, 23 November 2020, https://vneconomy.vn/nan-dong-von-vao-bat-dong-san-646111.htm.
[11] Minh Phương, “Ngân Hàng Nhà Nước Nói Gì về Tín Dụng Rót Vào Bất Động Sản, Chứng Khoán?,” Báo Tin Tức, 21 June 2021, https://baotintuc.vn/thi-truong-tien-te/ngan-hang-nha-nuoc-noi-gi-ve-tin-dung-rot-vao-bat-dong-san-chung-khoan-20210621151937032.htm.
[12] “Backyards” or “backyard companies” are terms commonly used in Vietnam to refer to companies that are related to key decision-makers of a business or a government official, normally without the knowledge of the public.
[13] Đào Vũ, “Hồi Chuông Cảnh Báo Từ ‘Bom Nợ’ Evergrande,” VnEconomy, October 2021, https://vneconomy.vn/hoi-chuong-canh-bao-tu-bom-no-evergrande.htm.
[14] “Financial fog” or “sương mù tài chính” is a term coined by Le Xuan Nghia in his interview with VnEconomy to describe the lack of transparency in banks’ asset quality. Several troubled loans were not classified as bad debts thanks to SBV’s current regulations which are designed to support commercial banks and their customers during the Covid-19 pandemic.
[“15] Hai Duyen, “Vietnamese Banks Protest after Prosecutors Call for $266 Million to Be Returned at Fraud Trial,” VnExpress International, 26 January 2018, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/vietnamese-banks-protest-after-prosecutors-call-for-266-million-to-be-returned-at-fraud-trial-3704021.html.
[16] Nhuệ Mẫn, “Chuyện đại gia bất động sản góp vốn tại ngân hàng”, Đầu tư chứng khoán, 13 August 2021, https://tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn/chuyen-dai-gia-bat-dong-san-gop-von-tai-ngan-hang-post276622.html
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2022/13 “A Roadmap for Consolidating Jokowi’s Legacy” by Yanuar Nugroho and Hui Yew-Foong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While Jokowi may have entered his second term with little political constraints in formulating his priorities and shaping his legacy, the Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted his plans significantly.
- With about two years left in power, Jokowi needs a viable roadmap and rigorous implementation to achieve significant results for his stated priorities – viz. economic transformation, continued infrastructure development, human capital development, bureaucratic reform, simplification of regulations, recovery from the pandemic, moving of the capital to East Kalimantan, and preparing the National Long-Term Development Plan 2026-2045.
- Jokowi would need to establish the technocratic foundations for competent governance, which must include systematic mechanisms reinforced with a culture of meritocracy and accountability. He would also need to have a successor who shares his vision and commitment. Only then would Jokowi’s achievements be able to outlast his tenure and cement his legacy of having substantially uplifted Indonesia’s economic and social progress.
* Yanuar Nugroho is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Lecturer at Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta, and former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of Republic of Indonesia 2015-19. Hui Yew-Foong is Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/13, 16 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
On all counts, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s second term in office started on the right footing. He had won by a larger margin (compared to when he first contested in 2014) and he had the majority of parliamentarians behind him. In fact, his coalition had grown to include some parties that opposed him during the elections, and he had successfully co-opted his erstwhile opponents, Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, into his cabinet. With very little formal opposition in parliament and political considerations (since this is his second and final term) to constrain him, Jokowi enjoys significant leeway to shape his political legacy.
Having had some success in achieving his Nawacita (nine ideals) in his first term—particularly in reducing poverty and narrowing the inequality gap between Java and the rest of Indonesia by means of infrastructure development—Jokowi followed up by offering ‘five visions’ in his second term: economic transformation, continuation of infrastructure development, human capital development, bureaucratic reform, and simplification of regulations.[1] He also promised to move the national capital, and lay the foundation for achieving the Indonesia 2045 dream by formulating the National Long-Term Development Plan 2026-2045.
Unfortunately, Covid-19 intervened. Jokowi had barely started his second term and outlined his agenda when the pandemic swept through Indonesia. Plans to gear up the economy and reform the bureaucracy had to be put on hold to manage the unprecedented public health, economic and political challenges posed by the pandemic. While the pandemic may now finally be under control – if the Omicron variant does not bring on another devastating wave of infections – Jokowi and his administration have only less than three years left to consolidate his legacy. But if we take into account the fact that quite a few of his cabinet members (and the political parties backing them) will be jostling for favourable positions in preparation for the 2024 elections, Jokowi may at best have only 15 months left to materialise his plans. In this remaining time, what then should his priorities be?
This essay suggests, from a pragmatic perspective, which political promises should be prioritised and may be fulfilled within Jokowi’s remaining tenure as president. It also offers a roadmap for how these priorities may be achieved, and to what extent. The outcome will have implications for Jokowi’s legacy and how he, the second popularly elected president of Indonesia, will be remembered.
KEEPING THE PROMISES: FOCI AND PRIORITIES
The political promises of Jokowi’s first term were packaged as Nawacita (nine ideals), outlined in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019. These aim at (i) renewing the state’s obligation to protect all people and provide security to all citizens; (ii) making the government’s presence felt through reliable governance; (iii) building Indonesia from its peripheries and strengthening rural areas; (iv) rejecting a weak state by reforming the law system; (v) improving people’s lives by improving the quality of education and health and distribution of wealth; (vi) improving people’s productivity and competitiveness; (vii) achieving economic independence; (viii) revolutionising the nation’s character; and (ix) strengthening diversity and social restoration.[2] The promises of Nawacita were partially fulfilled through massive infrastructure projects that improved connectivity, and the doling out of resources that enhanced village facilities, assisted human development and revamped national health insurance, among others. However, reform in areas such as law enforcement, human rights protection and access to justice still need significant attention.[3] To be sure, the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration had achieved encouraging results, building infrastructure rapidly across the country, keeping economic growth steady at around 5% despite global volatility, capping inflation at 2.72%, pushing unemployment down to 5.3%, reducing the poverty rate, for the first time, to the single digit rate of 9.41%, and lowering the Gini coefficient (that reflects inequality) to 0.381. Although dissenters may criticise Jokowi’s lack of achievements in law enforcement,[4] protection of human rights,[5] and environmental issues,[6] the President did deliver on some of the key bread and butter issues during his 2014-2019 term in office.[7] On the foreign policy front, it is worth noting that Jokowi is now downplaying his maritime fulcrum vision to turn Indonesia into a global maritime hub.[8] This is possibly because so little progress had been made on that front that this promise was deliberately neglected and has been allowed to be ‘forgotten’.[9]
For his second term, with Maruf Amin as his vice president, Jokowi has presented five foci: economic transformation, continuation of infrastructure development, human capital development, bureaucratic reform, and simplification of regulations.[10] Also on Jokowi’s agenda are the moving of the capital to East Kalimantan and preparing the National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN) 2026-2045. These are for realising the “Indonesia 2045” dream of becoming the fourth or fifth largest economy in the world.[11]
But as Jokowi proceeded to consolidate his legacy in his second term, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Indonesia severely. From March 2020 to the end of January 2022, more than 4.34 million people were infected and 144,000 died (see Figure 1)— about 60% of them since July 2021.[12] In two months, from 1 July to 31 August 2021, 73,496 people died.
Figure 1: Cumulative Covid-19 Infection and Death Rates in Indonesia (Mar 2020 – Jan 2022)
The impact of the pandemic put a serious dent on Jokowi’s achievements. At the end of 2020, the economy had shrunk by 2.07%, unemployment had risen to 7.07%, and the poverty rate had returned to the double-digit figure of 10.19%.[13]
Undoubtedly, the fulfilment of Jokowi-Maruf’s goals has been affected. Two years into Jokowi’s second term, the Executive Office of the President (KSP) issued a progress report on the government’s performance.[14] Of the five foci, only the continuation of infrastructure development seems to be on track, though suffering some hiccups.[15] Economic transformation and human capital development have definitely been disrupted.[16],[17] Meanwhile, the bureaucratic reform and regulation simplification that are being pushed with the help of the ‘Omnibus’ Job Creation Law have not yet been implemented optimally, particularly at the subnational level where much investment actually takes place.[18] Moving the national capital to East Kalimantan has also been hampered: it is not just a matter of infrastructure development being held back by the pandemic, but also the difficulty involved in relocating civil servants (ASN) from Jakarta.[19]
The government’s hesitation to prioritise health over the economy at the beginning of the pandemic could have been due to fear that the goals set under the five foci would not be realised.[20],[21]But now that the pandemic appears to be under control, the government will need to determine its priorities among the five foci, the drafting of the RPJPN and the relocation of the capital. This requires a roadmap that sets feasible targets, which in turn will consolidate Jokowi’s legacy during the remainder of his tenure as president.
The key question then is, what should Jokowi prioritise?
A VIABLE ROADMAP
In what follows, we suggest what the viable priorities are, and a roadmap for how they can be met, following Jokowi’s own ‘framework’. First, where economic transformation is concerned, efforts should be directed towards building a productive and competitive economy through investments in productive sectors, incentives for SMEs and the informal sectors, poverty alleviation (especially eradicating extreme poverty), and village development via the village fund (dana desa).[22] In terms of physical infrastructure development, priority should be given to the boosting of productivity and tackling inequality between Java and the rest of the archipelago. This means completing connectivity infrastructure on the main islands apart from Java, such as the Trans-Sumatera, Trans-Kalimantan, Trans-Sulawesi and Trans-Papua toll roads, seaports (especially in East Indonesia), airports outside Java, and enhancing maritime transport.[23] Development of human capital should be directed towards circumventing the demographic trap––i.e., when people in the productive age range are in fact not productive. Some measures that can be implemented include ensuring universal health care coverage, compulsory education, and defragmenting existing schemes for social protection and public services.[24] At the same time, the National Talent Management (MTN), as a body for developing Indonesia’s talent ecosystem, needs to be established.[25] Bureaucratic reform is needed to improve state capacity through de-bureaucratisation, introduction of a merit system, overhaul in the capacity-building curriculum for civil servants, and the introduction of a civil service database.[26] Simplification of regulations should increase the ease of doing business. In this regard, the implementation of the Omnibus Law should ensure that effective investments take place in a hassle-free environment and generate new jobs.
Achieving the above is crucial and best driven directly by the President, since many cabinet members are associated with political parties and interests, and will be caught up in manoeuvres and campaigning for the 2024 elections. The most realistic approach is for Jokowi to install capable people as vice ministers to work on the technocratic aspects of the foci and ensure delivery of his ideas while the ministers are busy with politics.
Second, the process for COVID-19 response and economic recovery, as Jokowi himself mentioned in a presidential official release, is to transition from pandemic to endemic status.[27] Yet scholars and epidemiologists have not seen any clear strategy for meeting this target.[28] Indonesia is in need of a comprehensive plan that can carry out epidemiologic, economic, and social interventions properly. This implies the immediate execution of three measurable steps: suppression, stabilisation, and normalisation. Suppression aims to reduce the number of cases and deaths. In this stage, the government should implement a ‘pull and push’ strategy, i.e., combining mobility restriction measures with massive tracing—particularly when new variants are found and new waves hit. Stabilisation controls the transmission scale and prepares for the re-opening of social-economic activities. The focus here is the development of infection control techniques (like air circulation in high-risk public places such as restaurants, malls and factories) and strengthening surveillance for tracing and isolation. And lastly, normalisation seeks to assist people with living a normal life, albeit under medical surveillance. The government should focus on completing vaccination roll-outs (which at the moment has barely reached 60 per cent of the population) and accelerating booster shots, strengthening healthcare facilities (hospitals and clinics) with adequate healthcare workers, equipment and medicine, and encouraging a ‘new normal lifestyle’ that adheres to public hygiene protocols (Indonesian Scientists Alliance for Pandemic Resolution, 2021).[29]
The government’s re-assignment of budgetary resources from physical infrastructure development to non-physical human resources development in the 2022 State Budget (RAPBN) is a move in the right direction. The infrastructure budget is only IDR384.8 trillion—compared to the health budget at IDR255.3 trillion, social protection at IDR427.5 trillion, and education at IDR541.7 trillion.[30] This shows the government’s determination to handle the pandemic, having learnt lessons from the past 17-18 months that not doing so could in turn lead to the economic and political crisis it was trying to avoid.
The real challenge is in the implementation though, and this is where (stalled) bureaucratic reforms have implications. A complicated bureaucracy does not help in crises and pressing situations, as evidenced in delays in social assistance distribution,[31] payment of incentives for health facilities and health workers,[32] provision of compensation to the families of health-workers who had died,[33] and the vaccination process.[34] Reform of the bureaucracy will not be easy. Even though some reforms have already been implemented, such as a merit-based system for recruitment, it will be impossible to complete comprehensive reform (including single salary and voluntary severance for civil service) in the remaining time. To sidestep bureaucratic hurdles that cannot be resolved in the short term, one measure to handle the pandemic is to strengthen the role of the Directorate General for Prevention and Disease Control (P2P) of the Ministry of Health, or to give the coordinating mandate to the National Agency for Disaster Mitigation (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana or BNPB) to act as the highest authority in times of crisis and disaster. If this proves to be effective, it could become a significant legacy of Jokowi’s.
Thirdly, the moving of the national capital, taking into account the dynamics of the pandemic, needs to be planned out carefully. Since its announcement at the annual state address on 16 August 2019, no concrete step had been taken until the government handed the bill on the capital to the parliament at the end of September 2021.[35] And now, since parliament has officially ratified the Law on the Capital on 18 January 2022,[36] the development of the new capital, named ‘Nusantara’, will have to commence immediately. Physical infrastructure development must be prioritised, implemented, and strictly monitored.[37] Since moving all the ministries and personnel is a mammoth logistical task,[38] the timeline needs to be clear, feasible and well-defined, even if it means laying out a timetable that extends over a decade or two. What needs to be made publicly clear is what the current Jokowi-Ma’ruf administration is responsible for, and what subsequent administrations have to accomplish. This means that the regulatory framework derivative of the Law on the Capital (such as Governmental and Presidential Regulations, among others) and institutional framework must be put in place, including the establishment of the long-discussed Capital Authority, or a similar agency, as the executing state body.
Finally, the Jokowi administration is well-placed to formulate a vision for Indonesia 2045 through the finalisation of RPJPN 2026-2045. The RPJPN has to be ambitious and bold enough to give a clear direction and a firm framework for Indonesia to march towards becoming a developed country. This RPJPN must be able to address the nation’s main challenges, of which there are at least eight: low social mobility, rapid urbanisation, tertiarisation,[39] climate change, food security, natural resources management, energy security, and quality of institutions (Knowledge Ecosystem and Innovation, 2020).[40] Furthermore, it has to be able to plan, identify and prioritise programmes that can address the challenges above, while navigating the political landscape.[41]
CONCLUSION: CONSOLIDATING A LEGACY AND BEYOND
If the issues raised in the last section can be addressed, Jokowi will be on his way to consolidating his legacy. Moreover, if the right measures are taken, what would be consolidated is not merely a legacy but a technocratic foundation that would help Indonesia become one of the largest economies in the world. This gravitation towards technocratic competence has been evolving, from the regional governments to the national government, as direct elections of leaders has thrown up candidates that have to be accountable to the electorate, part of which implies effective and efficient governance. To consolidate this legacy beyond Jokowi’s tenure, the government needs to put in place systematic mechanisms to safeguard the Indonesian state’s technocratic competence.
First among the mechanisms is bureaucratic reform. The challenge for Jokowi is to devise a way to push and monitor these initiatives so that they get accomplished within the next two years. Second, a mechanism needs to be put in place to assess all government achievements objectively. While any form of evaluation can be contentious, what is important is that systematic evaluation tools to audit government performance be introduced to measure the quality of governance on a regular basis, which in turn would reinforce the credibility of government institutions. Third, all reports on the government’s achievements, notably those released by the Executive Office of the President, should be organised into a knowledge repository made accessible to the public. In turn, this will serve as a repository of the legacies of respective Indonesian presidents and their administrations.
The suggestions in this essay focus on measures that can help Jokowi lay the technocratic foundation for Indonesia’s governance and build Indonesia’s future. Should such measures be taken, then there will be substance for thinking of Jokowi as “Bapak Indonesia Maju”—Father of a Progressive Indonesia. But with so little time left, Jokowi will need a friendly successor to build on what he has started, although this successor would also have his/her own political vision.
A true legacy is not merely based on memories of the past that persist in the present. It is the opening of the gate to the future. Jokowi’s best legacy is a foundation upon which his successors can continue to make Indonesia not only more advanced, but also more civilised and dignified.
ENDNOTES
[1] See https://kppip.go.id/siaran-pers/lima-fokus-kerja-di-periode-kedua-pemerintahan-jokowi/ Somehow, there is no ‘standard’ to the formulation, particularly for ‘simplification of regulation’ which is also often termed as ‘ease of investment’ and ‘economic transformation’ as ‘focused and targeted APBN/state budget.’ See for example https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2019/10/20/151257765/5-visi-jokowi-untuk-indonesia?page=all.
[2] See https://www.wapresri.go.id/en/nawa-cita/#:~:text=Nine%20Priorities%20Agenda%20(Nawa%20cita)
[3] See https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1119148/mengukur-capaian-5-tahun-pemerintahan-jokowi-jk-di-bidang-politik
[4] https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2019/10/19/337/2118978/5-tahun-jokowi-jk-penegakan-hukum-dan-ham-dinilai-masih-lemah
[5] See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/20/10495561/4-tahun-presiden-jokowi-janji-penyelesaian-pelanggaran-ham-masa-lalu-yang?page=all – See also
[6] See https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/838329-setara-soal-hukum-lingkungan-jokowi-hanya-di-atas-kertas
[7] This is consistent with what he said in an exclusive interview with BBC, that he focused on few priorities (mainly infrastructure) in the first period, and in the second period, he “might [focus on] environment, innovation, and then human rights.” He said, “We cannot do everything. Not that we are not willing to, but I like working with focus, with priorities.” See “Presiden Jokowi dalam wawancara eksklusif dengan BBC: ‘Prioritas saya ekonomi, tapi bukan saya tidak senang HAM dan lingkungan’” https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-51382305
[8] See https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8231/menuju-poros-maritim-dunia/0/kerja_nyata
[9] See https://www.jpnn.com/news/menagih-janji-jokowi-soal-visi-poros-maritim-dunia; also https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190715182845-32-412333/angin-lalu-poros-maritim-di-pidato-jokowi
[10] See https://kppip.go.id/siaran-pers/lima-fokus-kerja-di-periode-kedua-pemerintahan-jokowi/
[11] This is officially stated in the document published by The Ministry of National Development Planning “Indonesia 2045” (https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/Visi%20Indonesia%202045/Dokumen%20lengkap%202045_final.pdf). Jokowi himself has been claiming so since his 2019 presidential campaign. See https://katadata.co.id/agungjatmiko/berita/5e9a51a7280af/jokowi-2045-indonesia-mampu-menjadi-negara-ekonomi-terbesar-keempat
[12] See covid19.go.id/peta-sebaran
[13] Data from Statistics Indonesia and various ministries, gathered by the ADB in the COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Program Monitoring Report accessible https://www.adb.org/projects/documents/ino-54139-001-dpta-1 see pp.2-3
[14] Full report is downloadable from the Executive Office of the President (KSP) https://drive.ksp.go.id/s/HJNc4DpL8yxLoGs/download (accessed 29 November 2021)
[15] See https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20211101/98/1460434/menhub-sebut-3-tantangan-pembangunan-infrastruktur-saat-pandemi
[16] See https://investor.id/editorial/267599/transformasi-akselerasinbsppemulihan-ekonomi-nbsp
[17] See https://www.kemenkopmk.go.id/optimalisasi-sdm-di-tengah-pandemi
[18] See https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/implementasi-uu-cipta-kerja-di-daerah-dinilai-masih-belum-solid
[19] See https://fulcrum.sg/moving-the-indonesian-capital-political-ambition-or-realistic-vision/
[20] See https://fulcrum.sg/to-lockdown-or-not-indonesias-dilemma-in-handling-the-covid-19-second-wave/
[21] See /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-113-grave-failures-in-policy-and-communication-in-indonesia-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-by-yanuar-nugroho-and-sofie-shinta-syarief/
[22] Attempts at alleviating poverty through the massive social protection scheme in response to Covid-19 has begun to bear fruits as the poverty rate returned to the pre-pandemic level of 9.71% at the end of 2021. See https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/01/17/poverty-rate-falls-to-prepandemic-level.html
[23] See https://infopublik.id/kategori/nasional-ekonomi-bisnis/584362/kemenhub-penyelesaian-infrastruktur-jadi-arah-kebijakan-pembangunan-transportasi-2022
[24] This idea has been in the government’s mind since 2016 and it needs now to be realised–or its implementation should at least be started. The social protection integration scheme must be completed by mid-2022 and can be piloted in 2022-2023, before the end of Jokowi’s term in office.
[25] As per President’s Regulation, the grand design and institutional proposals must be completed by the end of 2021 and its budgeting must be confirmed in the RAPBN 2022 to be realised in 2022-2023. See https://setkab.go.id/presiden-terbitkan-keppres-tentang-gugus-tugas-manajemen-talenta-nasional/
[26] See https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2021/07/14/membangun-kapasitas-negara
[27] See the most official source: https://www.presidenri.go.id/siaran-pers/presiden-jokowi-siapkan-transisi-dari-pandemi-ke-endemi/
[28] See https://www.kompas.com/sains/read/2021/09/11/100300823/epidemiolog-indonesia-masih-jauh-untuk-transisi-pandemi-ke-endemi-ini-yang?page=all
[29] See https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210901203436-20-688564/roadmap-indonesia-terbebas-dari-pandemi-versi-ilmuwan
[30] Before pandemic non-infrastructure budget was much lower. For example, budget for health was IDR113,6T (2019), IDR172,3T (2020), then increased to IDR326,4T (2021). Education budget is similar to it: IDR460,3T (2019), increased to IDR473,7T (2020), and IDR540,3T (2021).
[31] See https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20210714074039-532-667345/bansos-telat-cair-bukti-mensos-gagal-perbarui-data-terpadu
[32] See https://katadata.co.id/febrinaiskana/berita/6051fa9e1b99c/persatuan-perawat-soroti-pemberian-insentif-yang-terlambat
[33] See https://laporcovid19.org/post/siaran-pers-perlunya-perbaikan-tata-kelola-penyaluran-insentif-dan-santunan-kematian-bagi-tenaga-kesehatan
[34] See https://www.kompas.com/sains/read/2021/07/12/130715823/program-vaksinasi-indonesia-kenapa-lambat-ini-jawaban-menkes-budi?page=all
[35] See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/09/30/08532981/babak-baru-pemindahan-ibu-kota-ruu-ikn-diserahkan-ke-dpr?page=all
[36] See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/01/18/20300131/uu-ikn-disahkan-ini-kedudukan-bentuk-hingga-susunan-pemerintahan-ibu-kota?page=all
[37] See https://fulcrum.sg/moving-the-indonesian-capital-political-ambition-or-realistic-vision/
[38] The target would be to move about 127,000 civil servants from Jakarta to the new capital from 2023 to 2027. See https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/01/17/20273641/siap-siap-ini-bocoran-jadwal-pemindahan-asn-ke-ibu-kota-negara-baru?
[39] Tertiarisation is a shift from the primary (farming, agriculture, commodity) and secondary (processing) sectors to the tertiary (service) sector.
[40] The official document can be downloaded here https://www.menpan.go.id/site/publikasi/unduh-dokumen/buku/file/6433-cetak-biru-ekosistem-pengetahuan-dan-inovasi
[41] At this point, there is the possibility of political intervention from the PDI-P. See https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/can-jokowi-salvage-legacy-derailed-covid-19; see also https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/426213/pdip-ingin-amendemen-uud-1945-fokus-pada-pphn
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2022/12 “France’s Third Path” for the Indo-Pacific? Credentials and Challenges” by Eric Frécon
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Considering itself part of the Indo-Pacific on the grounds of history and overseas territories, France has released its Indo-Pacific strategy to guide its international action in this region.
- France has substantive diplomatic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific, with its active naval diplomacy and about 8,000 French soldiers permanently deployed in five military bases across the region.
- Although France lacks the capacity to provide extensive financial or military assistance to countries in the Indo-Pacific, it can offer knowledge and expertise in environmental and climate security and in the governance of territorial waters.
- The French vision for “an inclusive Indo-Pacific” might resonate with Southeast Asia. It also suggests France’s commitment to multilateralism and offers the possibility of moving beyond the current Sino-US bipolarity.
- Paris should improve inter-agency coordination in implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy, establish a community of knowledge on the Indo-Pacific, and ensure balance between military and non-military engagements, and between multilateral and minilateral arrangements in the region.
- The AUKUS development should motivate France to cooperate more deeply with other Asian and non-aligned countries and to integrate its Indo-Pacific strategy with that of the EU, taking advantage of its presidency of the EU Council in 2022.
* Eric Frécon is a visiting academic at the Universiti Brunei Darussalam, and an adjunct fellow at the French Naval Academy-Sorbonne, the French Research Institute for Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC, Bangkok) and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris). Opinions expressed are solely his own.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/12, 15 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
As the Indo-Pacific rises in strategic importance, France has sought to reassert its identity as an Indo-Pacific power.[1] French President Emmanuel Macron gave a series of key speeches in Canberra and Réunion Island and to his ambassadors in 2018 to shed light on the French presence in Indo-Pacific and “to build a new relationship to Asia”, with a focus on Australia, China, India and Japan.[2] In 2019, France’s Ministry of Armed Forces unveiled the country’s defence strategy for the Indo-Pacific which reaffirms the need to protect not only French interests and sovereignty but also the global commons in this region.[3] That same year, France dispatched its aircraft carrier strike group (led by the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle) across the Indo-Pacific. The naval group held numerous international drills during its mission, before the frigate Vendémiaire transited the Taiwan Strait in April 2019.
Although the Covid-19 pandemic forced a pause to French Indo-Pacific initiatives, things are now back on track with France’s enhanced presence in the Indo-Pacific. The islands of Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean have benefitted from the French Navy’s support during the pandemic through operation “Résilience” which was dedicated to supporting public services and French people in the fields of health, logistics and protection.[4] In October 2020, the former French envoy to Australia, Christophe Penot, was appointed to the newly established post of Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific Region. In October 2020, the former French envoy to Australia, Christophe Penot, was appointed to the newly established post of Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific Region.[5] France also released the up-date of its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021 to guide its international action in the region.[6]
This article examines the rationale of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the niche areas where France can make meaningful impact in the region. It also argues that post-AUKUS, Paris should continue to expand and deepen its relationships with its Indo-Pacific partners, especially in synergy with the European Union (EU).
FRENCH PRESENCE AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Unlike other major powers, France’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific is not primarily motivated by trade. France’s most important trading partners are in Europe, Africa and the Americas, and only 8% of French trade in goods crosses the South China Sea.[7] Instead, the impetus for France to consolidate its footprint in the Indo-Pacific is geographic and geo-strategic. French overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans generate 93% of its exclusive economic zone, with 1.6 million French people living in the region.[8] As the Indo-Pacific becomes the world’s centre of gravity, France can leverage this unique geography to stake its position on geopolitical issues of concern, such as multilateralism, protection of the global commons and freedom of navigation.[9]
On the diplomatic front, France has been proactive in terms of ministerial and presidential visits to the region over the past decade. In 2017, François Hollande became the first French President to visit Indonesia since François Mitterrand in 1986; he also headed off to Singapore to mark his first state visit to the city-state. France is also an active participant in regional organisations in the Indo-Pacific. Paris has been chairing the Indian Ocean Commission in 2021 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2021-2022. It is a member of the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Indian OceanRim Association and the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM). France is also a member of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting since December 2021, a Dialogue Partner of the Pacific Islands Forum,[10] and a Development Partner of ASEAN, with 140 diplomatic offices or agencies stationed across the ten ASEAN member states.
On the military front, there are about 8,000 French soldiers permanently deployed in five military bases across the Indo-Pacific,[11] and 18 Defence Attachés to represent French security interests in 33 Indo-Pacific countries. France has also deployed assets in the field, including to help enforce the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on North Korea through air patrols and support capability-building programmes in countries such as Cambodia via the Francophonie.[12]
In 2020, to bolster French presence in the Indo-Pacific, there was significant attention and effort given to appointing new Subject Matters Experts (SME) and Liaison Officers (LO) both in Southeast Asia and the United Nations Command in South Korea. The French Liaison Officers are particularly important in advancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) issues in the Indo-Pacific, with their active contributions to the launch and operational efficiency of the Information Fusion Centres in Singapore, Madagascar and New Delhi. These centres facilitate intelligence sharing on maritime security.[13] France has also extended its support to anti-piracy efforts in the region. In October 2020, the Singapore-based Council of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia-Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) indicated that it “supported the intention [of Paris] to join the ReCAAP and expected [a] smooth accession process”.[14]
In terms of naval diplomacy, the annual Jeanne d’Arc mission has regularly sailed across the Indo-Pacific since 2012 (except in 2014 and 2019) and was back in the area in spring 2021, including crossing the South China Sea twice.[15] The French Navy – known as the Marine nationale – flies the country’s flag in various military missions and drills in the region. For instance, the French defence minister revealed in February 2021 details about Mission Marianne, which involved the deployment of the nuclear-powered submarine SSN Émeraude to the Indian and Pacific Oceans (including passage through South China Sea) since September 2020. As part of the mission, the French submarine conducted a joint exercise with the Indonesian Navy in the Sunda Strait.
In addition to participating in Indonesia’s Exercise Komodo and the Rim of Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), the French Navy also took the lead in Exercise La Pérouse in the Bay of Bengal in 2019, involving ships from Australia, Japan and the United States. A second edition of La Pérouse was held in March 2021, with the participation of India. It also joined the combined amphibious drills conducted by Japan and the United States in Japanese waters in May 2021.
France’s naval exchanges with the four members of the Quad have prompted questions about French support for the Quad in the context of the United States-China rivalry. The strength of the French-US partnership was affirmed by the White House in January 2021 when it referred to France as the “oldest ally”,[16] following the first call by incoming President Biden to his French counterpart.[17] However, it remains French doctrine to treat Washington as “friends, allied, but not aligned” in order to maintain room for manoeuvre.[18]
The French private sector, including the defence industry, has a prominent presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia. France has sold frigates to Singapore, submarines to Malaysia and patrol boats to the Philippines. In fact, France was the third-largest arms supplier to the region during the period between 1999 and 2018, behind only Russia and the United States.[19] The Paris-based Thales (a major defence contractor) has a large corporate footprint in Singapore with 2,100 employees, far outstripping the 1,180 people hired in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates combined.[20]
NICHE AVENUES FOR FRANCE’S INDO-PACIFIC ENGAGEMENTS
France’s capacity to expand its impact in the Indo-Pacific is limited: Paris cannot offer large-scale infrastructure financing or military equipment donations like China, Japan or the United States. Instead of hardware military assets and economic leverage, France’s niche offerings to its Indo-Pacific partners lie in its expertise in (i) environmental and climate security; and (ii) governance of territorial waters.
France has a strong focus on environmental and climate security in its Indo-Pacific partnerships. One example is the International Solar Alliance, which President François Hollande launched together with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India in 2015. France has encouraged international cooperation on anticipating the impact of climate change on military operations and limiting the environmental footprint of military operations. In 2019, France participated in a joint study for the 4th South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) which highlighted the consequences of climate change on infrastructure resilience, maritime surveillance and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.[21] Similarly, France joined Australia to conduct the Indian Ocean climate risk mapping, to “help to understand and anticipate the security consequences of climate phenomena”.[22]
Moreover, given the increasing risks of natural disasters as a result of climate change, France has sought to enhance its HADR capacity in the Indo-Pacific. The FRANZ Arrangement between France, Australia and New Zealand facilitates information-sharing for relief operations, which proved useful when Cyclone Harold hit the South Pacific islands in 2019. France has also stationed a Liaison Officer at the Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) in Singapore since its launch in 2014 and, after the tsunami on the 15th of January, a French patrol boat set sail towards Tonga with 40 tons of humanitarian aid.
France’s second offering is its extensive knowledge and expertise in managing and governing territorial waters. Because it controls the world’s second-largest EEZ, France can share expertise on promoting maritime domain awareness, handling Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and fighting maritime drug trafficking. In partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, the French Navy patrolled more than 70 days in 2021 to fight IUU fishing in the EEZs of Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Salomon Islands, Samoa and Vanuatu.[23] France can also offer lessons about maritime counterterrorism with its experience in dealing with illegal immigration and maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea.
More specifically, the unique ‘State Action at Sea’ model that France adopts for law enforcement in its territorial waters, EEZ and high seas may be of interest to other Indo-Pacific nations.[24] The model involves the establishment of an administrative and operational organisation for each of its ten maritime zones, including five overseas and two covering high seas in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. In each zone, the State is represented by a single administrative authority that can mobilise maritime assets and resources from different agencies, including the French Navy, customs and national police, for Coast Guard functions.
This model, which is “based on versatility and synergy”, could be a viable arrangement for some archipelagic Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, where administrative rivalries and budgetary constraints often hamper effective law enforcement of their maritime zones.
CHOOSING NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR CHINA
From Southeast Asia’s perspective, one advantage of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is its vision “for an inclusive Indo-Pacific”.[25] While there are calls for France to adopt a stronger stance against Beijing or to stand clearly behind Washington, President Macron has made it clear that France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is not meant “to be directed against anyone”.[26] The narrative of “don’t make us choose” – the rallying call of many Southeast Asian capitals– appears to have the edge in Paris at the moment.[27] France, however, understands the imperative for a clear-headed and disciplined relationship with China that would involve firm and frank dialogue to enable cooperation on global challenges while managing the systemic challenges that Beijing presents in other areas. It will conform to the general direction outlined by the President of the EU Commission von der Leyen: “China is certainly a partner we can negotiate with on climate issues. When it comes to economic issues, it is a tough competitor, and on matters of governance and social order, it is undoubtedly a systemic rival.”[28]
France’s posture in this regard could be described as a revival of ‘gaullo-mitterrandism’, the diplomatic doctrine named after Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterrand (who ruled in the 1960s and 1980s respectively).[29] Its dictum – to prioritise French national interests and values, independent of any great power, in a multilateral framework – makes particular sense in the Indo-Pacific context. The French government’s policy document titled France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific states that “Beyond any logic of blocks, we therefore intend to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific, for responding to today’s upheavals with all well-intentioned powers.”[30] This departs from the temptations of the stricter ‘atlanticism’ practised under President Sarkozy in the 2000s, or the ‘neoconservatism’ entertained by some senior officials under President Hollande in the 2010s.[31] Instead, Paris’s current Indo-Pacific strategy bears some resemblance to the non-alignment principle of the ‘Bandung spirit’ and the bebas aktif (free and active) diplomacy of Indonesia.
For France, this brand of non-alignment is manifest in its investment in relationships with other middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, especially India and Japan. Paris maintains regular strategic dialogue with New Delhi, and in 2018, the French and Indian navies gave reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities in the Indian Ocean. In November 2021, the two countries agreed to expand bilateral defence-security partnership through enhancing intelligence and information sharing, bolstering mutual capabilities, expanding military drills and pursuing new initiatives in maritime, space and cyber domains.[32] Regarding Japan, Admiral Pierre Vandier, the current Chief-of-Navy, made his first visit abroad to Tokyo in late 2020, testifying to the ‘Exceptional Partnership’ between the two countries in the wake of the Franco-Japanese Maritime Dialogue in 2019.[33]
Working with these middle powers offers an avenue for France to move beyond the narrative of Sino-US bipolarity and serve France’s strategic interest to work towards a post-hegemonic multi-polar global order.[34] Here, the hope is for great and middle powers to accompany and support the rise of the Global South, which many Indo-Pacific countries belong to. According to this ideal, the Indo-Pacific thus represents an intermediary step towards genuine pluralism where countries engage one another on a more equal footing.
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Despite its geographic residency and military footprint in the Indo-Pacific and an inclusive vision that resonates with many regional countries, France’s Indo-Pacific strategy has not gained strong visibility. To address this shortcoming, the strategy first of all needs to be coherent and balanced across two dimensions: between military and non-military engagements, and between multilateral and minilateral arrangements.
For non-military engagement, France needs to build strong links with civil society and nurture a community of knowledge about the Indo-Pacific, rather than rely only on the advice of advisors or éminence grises. It is unfortunately not yet a French habit to recognise the increasing role that national think-tanks can play in providing inputs and ideas to foreign policy-making through Tracks 1.5 and 2 discussions. Instead of only multiplying the military ports-of-call, more grants should be offered to Indo-Pacific students and thought leaders to network, research, discuss and write about Indo-Pacific-related perspectives.
Historically, France has pursued minilateral opportunities in the region, such as the Australia-France-India Trilateral Dialogue which looked more promising for France than the Quad, given the latter’s not-so-subtle anti-China orientation. Following the announcement of the tripartite security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (AUKUS) in September 2021, Paris has stepped up engagements with other middle powers such as Indonesia.[35] This, however, may not be enough. Unlike Germany, Paris has rarely bet on broad-based regional institutions in the Indo-Pacific such as the ASEAN multilateral architecture. France’s application for observer status at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) would not likely change this approach.[36] Having said that, it may be worth monitoring recent French moves towards multilateral initiatives such as the Alliance for Multilateralism organised by France and Germany alongside Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore and Ghana.[37]
Secondly, France must pursue consistency in implementing its strategy, including setting relevant goals and ensuring effective inter-ministerial coordination on Indo-Pacific engagements. Every project and policy in the Indo-Pacific requires deep and sustained involvement over the long term to succeed. The office of the French President appears wishing to take the lead to centralise the strategy. However, it is not clear if that will just remain one more voice among those of various ministries, directorates and forces already been involved. And if the Elysée Palace intends to consolidate this strategy, it should better define and sharpen gaullo-mitterandism 2.0, especially vis-à-vis Beijing, given the latter’s increasingly illiberal trends under President Xi.[38] For instance, French diplomacy should make it clearer that its “third path” does not mean “equidistance” along the continuum stretching from Beijing to Washington.
Thirdly, while AUKUS has been a shock to France, it should serve as a catalyst for its Indo-Pacific strategy and push Paris to move closer to its Asian partners (who may be worried by possible new insecurities caused by nuclearisation of the seas).[39] Just a couple of days after AUKUS was announced, French and Indian naval chiefs met, and their Ministers for Foreign Affairs held a talk. In October 2021, Indonesian and French presidents met on the side-lines of the G-20 summit, agreeing to work towards “a true strategic partnership”, followed by fruitful discussions by their two foreign ministers.[40] While it would take a while for France and Australia to mend fences, the dust has somewhat settled between Paris and Washington: US President Biden called Macron and supported the idea of European strategic autonomy, especially in developing European military capabilities.[41] In the same positive way, France worked closely with Washington in 2021, e.g. with its new status as an observer of the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercises as well as the US-Philippines Maritime Training Activity (MTA) Sama-Sama.
Last but not least, as the European dimension is indispensable to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the French Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2022 provides opportunities for Paris to leverage the EU as a force multiplier to advance its goals and agenda in the Indo-Pacific. It is true that Macron planted seeds of doubt as he did not mention the Indo-Pacific – but Africa – in his two first speeches as the next chair.[42] Nevertheless, the Indo-Pacific will be “a priority for France’s EU presidency” as declared by French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian during his November 2021 visit to Indonesia, and Paris would host an Indo-Pacific Forum on 22 February 2022.[43] The stars are aligned for this after the publication in September 2021 of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in Indo-Pacific, which explicitly refers to “ASEAN centrality”[44] and the new German chancellor has also demonstrated principled firmness vis-à-vis Russia and China on the diplomatic stage.[45] As for Southeast Asia, France should continue to support EU efforts to embed itself in ASEAN-led multilateral frameworks. Apart from its membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the programme, CRIMARIO (Critical Maritime Roads in Indian Ocean) 2, focusing mainly on Southeast Asia, the EU should proactively support and seek to participate in ASEAN-related security agencies or bodies such as the ASEANAPOL, ASEAN Naval Chiefs meetings, ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) working groups, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), among others.
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) – with its priority areas in connectivity, sustainable development and maritime cooperation – also provides practical avenues for France and the EU to “boost sustainable links” with the region. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative, which was launched in December 2021 with US$339 billion for the 2021-2027 period, is a timely vehicle towards achieving this end.[46]
ENDNOTES
[1] Historically, France always had a presence in the Indo-Pacific. French merchants and scientists have sailed through the Indian and Pacific Oceans since the 17th century. Today, due to its overseas territories, France shares a border with five countries in the Indian Ocean and twelve countries in the Pacific Ocean. There are currently 200,000 French nationals residing in various Indo-Pacific countries and 1.6 million French citizens based in the overseas French territories of Réunion Island, French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), Mayotte, New Caledonia, Wallis-et-Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island.
[2] Speech by the President of the French Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors, Élysée, 27 August 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2018/08/27/speech-by-the-president-of-the-french-republic-at-the-conference-of-ambassadors.
[3] France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, Ministry of Defence of France, May 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/regional-issues/la-strategie-de-defense-francaise-en-indopacifique2.
[4] Xavier Vavasseur, “French Navy Mistral-class LHDs to Fight COVID-19 in Reunion & Caribbean”, Naval News, 26 March 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/03/french-navy-mistral-class-lhds-to-fight-covid-19-in-reunion-caribbean/.
[5] The new position complements two existing ambassadorial appointments, namely the Permanent Representative of France to the Pacific Community and the Delegate to Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
[6] France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Government of the French Republic, 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_v2_rvb_cle432726.pdf.
[7] Katerina Ang, “Europe pivots to Indo-Pacific with ‘multipolar’ ambitions”, Nikkei Asia, 2 February 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Europe-pivots-to-Indo-Pacific-with-multipolar-ambitions.
[8] “The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France”, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/asia-and-oceania/the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france/.
[9] While France does conduct patrols to “affirm that international law is the only rule that is valid, whatever the sea where we sail”, they are slightly different from the US’ Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as the latter intrudes within 12 nautical miles of features in the South China Sea. See Sarah Zheng, “2021: South China Sea: challenge to Beijing as French nuclear submarine patrols contested waterway”, South China Morning Post, 9 February 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121125/south-china-sea-challenge-beijing-french-nuclear-submarine.
[10] The territories of French Polynesia and New Caledonia are full members of the Pacific Islands Forum.
[11] The bases are located in Djibouti, Réunion Island, Abu Dhabi, New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
[12] See for example: AFP, “‘The UN’s eyes’: French Navy enforces North Korea sanctions”, The Straits Times, 8 November 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/the-uns-eyes-french-navy-enforces-north-korea-sanctions; and “Reinforcement des capacités des forces armées cambodgiennes pour les operations de l’ONU” [Capacity building within the Cambodian armed forces dedicated to the UN operations], Francophonie, 2019, https://www.francophonie.org/renforcement-des-capacites-des-forces-armees-cambodgiennes-pour-les-operations-de-lonu-842.
[13] About France and maritime domain awareness in Indo-Pacific in general, see: Jérémy Bachelier, Eric Frécon, “France’s Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: MDA”, The Diplomat, 21 December 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/frances-defense-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/.
[14] “The 14th Governing Council Meeting of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre”, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, 15 October 2020, https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/news/2020/14th_ReCAAAP-ISC_VGC__Meeting_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf.
[15] The Jeanne d’Arc mission involves a Mistral-class vessel full of cadets undertaking their last training semester at sea and an accompanying frigate.
[16] Laura Auricchio, “The US-France relationship has always had friction”, The Washington Post, 10 November 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/11/10/us-france-relationship-has-always-had-friction/.
[17] Extract of the “Joint Statement on the Phone Call between President Biden and President Macron”, Briefing Room, The White House, 22 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/22/joint-statement-on-the-phone-call-between-president-biden-and-president-macron/.
[18] Eglantine Staunton, “Macron and Biden:“Friends, allied, but not aligned””, The Interpreter, 3 February 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/macron-and-biden-friends-allied-not-aligned.
[19] Aude Fleurant et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2020, p. 2.
[20] SGP SHD Communications, “Singapore – Overview”, Thales Group, 2022, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/countries/asia-pacific/singapore.
[21] Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua-New-Guinea and Tonga attended the meeting.
[22] Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship by the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia and His Excellency Emmanuel Macron, 2 May 2018. As a follow up, the National Security College published a report: Anthony Bergin, David Brewster,
François Gemenne and Paul Barnes, Environmental security in the eastern Indian Ocean, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: A risk mapping approach, Canberra-Paris, ANU-IRIS, May 2019.
[23] “Operation Island Chief continues protection of Pacific from illegal fishing”, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agencies, 5 August 2021, https://www.ffa.int/node/2605.
[24] Ministry of Armed Forces, National strategy for the security of maritime areas, Government of France, 22 October 2015, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2016/01/strategie_nationale_de_surete_des_espaces_maritimes_en_national_strategy_for_the_security_of_maritime_areas.pdf.
[25] Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/photos-publications-and-graphics/publications/article/france-s-partnerships-in-the-indo-pacific-apr-2021.
[26] Speech by the President of the French Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors, 27 August 2018, op. cit.
[27] See the interesting cartoon published by the Global Times, inspired by Da Vinci’s Last Supper, and how France is portrayed after the 2021 NATO summit (and its declaration about China). The Rooster (France) attends the supper chaired by the US but gives the feeling of keeping its distance from the radical and exclusive position vis-à-vis China. At least, the Rooster does not get up from the table to move away. “‘The Last G7’: Satirical cartoon mocking bloc’s attempt to suppress China goes viral”, Global Times, 13 June 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1226050.shtml.
[28] Statement by President von der Leyen with Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission, 10 December 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_6770.
[29] See Pascal Boniface, “Why the concept of gaullo-mitterrandism is still relevant”, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, 29 April 2019, https://www.iris-france.org/136272-why-the-concept-of-gaullo-mitterrandism-is-still-relevant/. For other examples of gaullo-mitterrandism, see de Gaulle’s speeches in Mexico (1964), particularly the call to walk “la mano en la mano” or “hand in hand”, Phnom Penh (1966), Québec (1967); Mitterrand in Sarajevo (1992); Chirac in Jerusalem (1995) and Johannesburg (2002); and Macron in Beirut (2020).
[30] France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, op. cit.
[31] These terms generally refer to the priority given to military options and operations, in tune with American initiatives. Author’s interview with French defence journalist Brest (France), in January 2016.
[32] “India, France to expand defence, security partnership”, India Today, 7 November 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-france-expand-defence-security-partnership-1873891-2021-11-07.
[34] Céline Pajon, “Macron in Japan: Upgrading the Franco-Japanese Strategic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific”, EastWest Institute, 26 June 2019, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/macron-japan-upgrading-franco-japanese-strategic-partnership-indo-pacific.
See Bertrand Badie, Quand le Sud réinvente le monde [How the Global South is reinventing the world], (Paris, La Découverte: 2018) and Bertrand Badie, L’Hégémonie contestée – Les nouvelles formes de domination internationale [Hegemony challenged: New Forms of International Domination], (Paris, Odile Jacob: 2019).
[35] “France’s Macron looks to Indonesia, India for deeper strategic ties”, RFI, 30 October 2021, https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20211030-france-s-macron-looks-to-indonesia-india-for-deeper-strategic-ties.
[36] France should consider the appointment of its dedicated ambassador to ASEAN, along with a full-time Defence Attaché in the Philippines.
[37] This Alliance is “an informal network of countries united in their conviction that a rules-based multilateral order is the only reliable guarantee for international stability and peace and that our common challenges can only be solved through cooperation.” See “What is the Alliance for Multilateralism?”, https://multilateralism.org/the-alliance/.
[38] Marc Julienne, “La politique chinoise de la France est devenue illisible et inaudible, parce que dépassée et insuffisamment exigeante” [The French policy on China is now unreadable and inaudible because obsolete and not enough demanding], Le Monde, 23 December 2021.
[39] Nic MacLellan, “AUKUS disrupts ‘a very peaceful part of planet Earth’”, Inside Story, 14 October 2021, https://insidestory.org.au/aukus-disrupts-a-very-peaceful-part-of-planet-earth/.
[41] “Biden’s team wants EU allies to get real on ‘strategic autonomy’”, Politico, 19 November 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-us-eu-strategic-autonomy-brussels-g20/.
[42] Message from the President, website of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 9 December 2021, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/message-from-the-president/; French President Emmanuel Macron’s Speech at the European Parliament, 19 January 2022, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/french-president-emmanuel-macron-s-speech-at-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-19-january-2022/.
[43] Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “France’s Ambitious Indo-Pacific Goals for Its EU Presidency”, GMF, 08 February 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/frances-ambitious-indo-pacific-goals-its-eu-presidency.
[44] Joanne Lin, “The EU in the Indo-Pacific: A New Strategy with Implications for ASEAN”, ISEAS Perspective, 2021/164, 16December 2021, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-164-the-eu-in-the-indo-pacific-a-new-strategy-with-implications-for-asean-by-joanne-lin/.
[45] “The new government promises to be tougher on China and Russia”, The New York Times, 8 December 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/germany-russia-china.html.
[46] Ana Pisonero-Hernandez et al., “Global Gateway: up to €300 billion for the EU’s strategy to boost sustainable links around the world”, European Commission, 1 December 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.
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““Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies” by Khairulanwar Zaini
2022/11 “The Biden Administration and Southeast Asia: One Year in Review” by Hoang Thi Ha and Ian Storey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Biden administration’s engagement with Southeast Asia in 2021 was slow to start but picked up momentum in the second half of the year with a series of high-level meetings and visits to the region by senior US officials.
- President Biden did not call or hold formal in-person meetings with any Southeast Asian leader, and his administration’s lack of a positive economic framework for the region was seen as a major shortcoming.
- Biden’s Southeast Asia policy is designed to attain two mutually-reinforcing objectives: strengthening alliances and partnerships, and addressing the challenges posed by China. To attain those goals, the administration has pursued both multilateralism and minilateral initiatives.
- The Biden administration has tried to allay Southeast Asian fears over escalating US-China rivalry and promoted a positive agenda centred on the delivery of public goods, especially COVID-19 vaccines.
- In 2022, the Biden administration’s engagement with Southeast Asia will be assessed on the value of its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a clearer articulation of its Indo-Pacific strategy, its efforts to upgrade relations with ASEAN, its filling of vacant diplomatic posts and opportunities for in-person meetings with the President.
*Hoang Thi Ha is Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies programme, and Ian Storey is Senior Fellow and co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/11, 11 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
During President Joe Biden’s first year in the White House, Southeast Asia was not one of his administration’s top priorities. After President Donald Trump’s idiosyncratic and transactional approach to foreign relations, Biden’s focus was on restoring confidence in US leadership and renewing its commitment to alliances and multilateral institutions, especially in the Euro-Atlantic region.
His record so far is mixed. America’s relations with the EU and NATO are much improved, but its chaotic withdrawal from Kabul in August 2021 will be remembered as the worst US foreign policy debacle in a generation. And although Biden tried to stabilise relations with the country’s two main rivals, China and Russia, by the end of his first year, Sino-US ties were no less contentious and relations with Russia had hit a post-Cold War low due to Moscow’s military intimidation of Ukraine.
The Biden administration’s record in Southeast Asia was also mixed, though generally positive. Due to the above-mentioned priorities, Washington’s engagement with the region was slow to start, causing much frustration in Southeast Asian capitals. In the second half of the year, however, momentum picked up as a flurry of senior officials visited the region, and culminated in a virtual US-ASEAN Summit and an American president’s full attendance at the East Asia Summit for the first time since President Barack Obama in 2016.
By the end of his first year in office, Southeast Asians could feel relatively satisfied with the Biden administration’s approach to the region. That satisfaction was, however, tempered by their expectations of what was required of America in 2022, including the need for a more detailed Indo-Pacific strategy and especially a proactive economic blueprint for the region. This Perspective reviews the Biden administration’s engagement with Southeast Asia in 2021 and assesses the prospects for a more forward-looking agenda in 2022 and beyond.
BIDEN IN CATCH-UP MODE
Kurt Campbell, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Coordinator, noted in July 2021 that “For an effective Asia strategy, for an effective Indo-Pacific approach, you must do more in Southeast Asia.”[1] This statement was borne out in the second half of 2021, with a series of US high-level visits, virtual meetings and policy speeches reiterating the importance of Southeast Asia to America’s Indo-Pacific strategy and articulating ways and means for Washington to reclaim its influence and engagement with the region. Table 1 shows US cabinet members’ engagements with Southeast Asian countries, both virtual and in-person. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi remarked, “[T]he US commitment was very noticeable.”[2]
Table 1
US High-Level Engagements with Southeast Asia in 2021
| US Official | Venue | Event |
| Secretary of State Antony Blinken | Virtual | Special ASEAN-US Foreign Ministers Meeting, 14 July |
| Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman | Indonesia Cambodia Thailand | Bilateral meetings, 29 May-4 June |
| Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin | Singapore Vietnam Philippines | Fullerton Lecture and bilateral meetings, 26-29 July |
| Secretary of State Antony Blinken | Virtual | Mekong-US Partnership, Friends of the Mekong Ministerial Meeting, US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, 2-6 August |
| Vice-President Kamala Harris | Singapore Vietnam | Bilateral meetings, 22-26 August |
| President Joe Biden | Virtual | ASEAN-US Summit, East Asia Summit, 26 October |
| Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo | Singapore Malaysia | Bilateral meetings, 16-18 November |
| Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin | Manama Dialogue | Bilateral meeting with Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, 20 November |
| Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Kritenbrink | Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand | Bilateral meetings, 27 November-4 December |
| Secretary of State Antony Blinken | Indonesia Malaysia [Thailand leg cancelled due to Covid-19 contact] | Bilateral meetings, 13-16 December |
Source: Compiled from Statements and Releases from the White House Briefing Room, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
That being said, US engagement with Southeast Asia in 2021 was in catch-up mode – to make up for diplomatic influence lost during the Trump administration amid China’s intensive neighbourhood diplomacy – rather than heralding a breakthrough investment in the region. This is understandable given the demanding foreign policy agenda of the new administration, with various regions and issue-areas competing for finite resources and attention. It also reflects the fact that Southeast Asian countries queue behind European and Northeast Asian allies and major partners such as India in the hierarchy of US foreign policy interests. It is noteworthy that President Biden has not made bilateral phone calls to any Southeast Asian leader since entering the White House (Table 2). He has however made trips to Europe for the G-7, G-20 and COP26 UN Climate Change summits, and welcomed leaders of the Quad countries, individually or collectively, in Washington D.C. He has only engaged with Southeast Asian leaders through the virtual ASEAN summit meetings in November 2021, and met Vietnam’s Prime Minister on the sidelines of the COP26 Summit.
Table 2
President Biden’s Bilateral Phone Calls with World Leaders in 2021
| Region | Number of Phone Calls |
| Europe (including Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, NATO and the European Commission) | 31 |
| Middle East | 18 |
| Northeast Asia | 6 |
| North America | 6 |
| Oceania | 3 |
| South Asia | 2 |
| Central and South America | 2 |
| Africa | 1 |
| Southeast Asia | 0 |
Source: Compiled from Statements and Releases from the White House Briefing Room, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
The following section analyses some broad contours of America’s Southeast Asia policy that started to take shape in the first year of the Biden administration.
First, the US approach to Southeast Asia is conceived and operationalised in the broader context of its Indo-Pacific strategy which centres on two mutually reinforcing objectives, namely: (i) rebuilding US alliances, partnerships and multilateral engagements in the Indo-Pacific, and (ii) addressing the systemic challenges from China as the key strategic competitor to Washington. As such, US-China competition – more than ever – is a key operating principle that underlies the conceptualisation and framing of US initiatives and messaging aimed at Southeast Asia. In the latest articulation of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained “a free and open Indo-Pacific” at three levels: at the individual level for people to be free in their daily lives in open societies; at the state level to enable countries to choose their own path and partners; and at the regional level so that goods, ideas and people can flow freely across land, cyberspace and open seas.[3] At all three levels, Southeast Asia is both the object and conduit of Washington’s broader geopolitical goals vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, despite the above, the Biden administration has been calibrated in its strategic messaging to allay the concerns by Southeast Asian states vis-à-vis US-China strategic rivalry.[4] Three key policy speeches, by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Vice President Kamala Harris and Blinken all sought to reassure Southeast Asian audiences that (i) the US is not going to force regional states to choose sides between Washington and Beijing; and (ii) the US is seeking to stabilise its strategic competition with China through necessary ‘guardrails’ to prevent escalation to open armed conflicts.[5] Washington and Beijing have indeed made efforts at the latter through high-level dialogues, especially the November 2021 Xi-Biden virtual summit.[6] However, as strategic competition has become the new paradigm of US-China relations, the sense of the inevitability of the binary choice may have increased among Southeast Asians.
Third, the US has fostered a positive agenda on the delivery of public goods to the region in the areas of climate change, sustainable development and especially COVID-19 vaccines. As remarked by Ryan Hass, “US-China competition is occurring against a backdrop of rising global challenges […]. These challenges will shape the contours of US-China competition. They may also present opportunities for Washington and/or Beijing to flex global leadership muscle by demonstrating capacity to deliver solutions.”[7] Southeast Asia was the prime target of both Chinese and American vaccine diplomacy in 2021. Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam were among the top five recipients of US vaccine donations, each receiving around 25 million shots.[8] Through its earmarked donations to the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility (COVAX), the US has made Southeast Asia a priority region for its vaccine offerings. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam together received 25 per cent of America’s total dose donations to COVAX in 2021 although they account for only 7 per cent of the world’s population.[9] Washington also fostered collaboration with its allies/partners towards this end. For example, the virtual Quad summit in March 2021 broadened its remit beyond the maritime security focus to include collaboration on global issues such as climate change, critical technologies and COVID-19 vaccines. In a December 2021 interview, Kurt Campbell remarked: “The Quad has to be relevant, and seen as value-added, particularly by Southeast Asia, by ASEAN.”[10]
Fourth, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and its Southeast Asia policy in particular, is characterised by a dual-track approach to multilateralism and minilateralism. President Biden attended the 2021 ASEAN-US Summit and the East Asia Summit via video-conferencing, and the three US policy speeches to Southeast Asian audiences in 2021 all reaffirm US support for ASEAN centrality. Rhetoric aside, these statements are informed by a pragmatic calculation concerning the strategic value of Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific and the need to maintain US access to and influence over regional institutions, diplomacy and narrative through the ASEAN-led multilateral architecture.[11] At the same time, the Biden administration has intensified minilateral coalition-building with its Indo-Pacific partners, with the consolidation of the Quad to the summit level and the formation of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral defence partnership. Compared to ASEAN, these minilaterals with higher levels of strategic convergence and commensurate capabilities among its members are expected to deliver more tangible outcomes in terms of policy coordination and joint response. Hence, the perceptions of their greater utility to Washington in advancing its strategic goals, especially to compete rigorously with China.
Fifth, despite the imperative to promote a robust democracy agenda both at home and abroad, the Biden administration’s normative approach to Southeast Asia “is more pragmatic and calibrated than its moral grandstanding would suggest”.[12] The coup d’etat by the Myanmar military on 1 February, and the ensuing political violence, was a seriously complicating factor in this regard. However, Washington has thus far managed to insulate the issue from its relationship with ASEAN, and expressed support for the grouping’s role in mediating the crisis. US cabinet members attended ASEAN-plus ministerial meetings in 2021 despite the (online) presence of the military regime’s representatives. ASEAN’s decision to invite only a non-political representative to the ASEAN summit meetings in November 2021 was partly driven by the concern that the presence of the Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing might deter other Dialogue Partner leaders from attending, especially the US president whose attendance was not confirmed until the last moment.[13] Such “quiet diplomacy” by Washington is appreciated by regional states while public pressure that cornered ASEAN into defensive reaction – as exerted by the West in the 1990s – would only jeopardise America’s geopolitical agenda in the region.
The tension between values-based and realpolitik imperatives is always a defining feature of US foreign policy, but democracy has been on the back burner despite all the rhetoric. Biden’s flagship Democracy Summit in December 2021 invited only three Southeast Asian states – Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – but US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink was quick to play down the gravity of non-invitation, saying that it “is not a commentary on the strength” of US relations with its closest partners, including Singapore.[14] Besides, the little care exhibited by most Southeast Asian states about the Democracy Summit as well as its nominal outcomes meant that this event would soon become, if not already, a footnote in the story of US-Southeast Asia relations.
A FORWARD-LOOKING US AGENDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Addressing the Missing Economic Component
America’s friends and critics alike have repeatedly drawn attention to the country’s lack of a comprehensive economic plan for the Indo-Pacific as a major shortcoming in its approach to the region.
In January 2017, one of President Trump’s first acts was to withdraw the US from the 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was resurrected a year later as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with the hope that the US would rejoin after Trump had left office. The perception was that by its withdrawal, America had ceded economic leadership of the region to China. This perception was reinforced when the ASEAN members and five of its Dialogue Partners (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020, the largest free trade bloc in the world. According to The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2021, the US registered a 10.7-point decline in economic relationships despite its significant gain in diplomatic influence in the first year of the Biden administration. The US score was 51.1 compared to China’s 99. The Lowy Institute report rightly pointed out that with the Quad and AUKUS, “America has been more proactive at leveraging its regional networks in service of its military power than it has in service of the regional economic balance of power.[15]
For domestic political reasons, the Biden administration has ruled out joining the CPTPP, at least during its first term. However, it is acutely aware that its lack of an alternative to economic structures such as the CPTPP and RCEP has created a yawning gap in its Indo-Pacific policy. Accordingly, at the EAS in October, President Biden announced that administration officials were working on an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) that would “define our shared objectives around trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology, supply chain resiliency, decarbonization and clean energy, infrastructure, worker standards”.[16] Details are due to be released in early 2022 and are eagerly anticipated by Southeast Asian states.
Climate Change
In stark contrast to his predecessor, President Biden has made addressing the challenges posed by climate change a top priority of his administration. It is also a priority issue in US-Southeast Asia relations. During their visits to the region, Vice President Harris and Assistant Secretary of State Kritenbrink discussed the issue with Southeast Asian leaders and policy makers.[17] At the virtual US-ASEAN Summit in October, President Biden announced US$102 million in new funding to strengthen their strategic partnership. From this amount, US$20.5 million has been earmarked to the US-ASEAN Climate Futures initiatives to support a range of environmental projects in the region, including decarbonisation, sustainable fisheries, clean transport technology and air pollution reduction.[18] As Southeast Asian countries are increasingly being impacted by climate change, including rising sea levels and severe weather events, they welcome cooperation with the United States. However, pressure from Washington on regional states to reduce their carbon emissions and protect their forests could create friction, especially if the Biden administration introduces climate-change related trade tariffs and restrictions.[19]
Enhancing Maritime Security
In its first year, the Biden administration doubled down on President Trump’s hard line approach towards China’s activities in the South China Sea. The administration repeatedly rebuked China’s claims and actions as unlawful and a threat to freedom of navigation.[20] The US Navy conducted regular presence missions and exercises in the South China Sea, and six freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Paracels and Spratlys (one more than during Trump’s first year in office).
As US-China tensions rise over the dispute, it is the Southeast Asian claimants that have borne the brunt of China’s grey zone tactics in the South China Sea － actions undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia to press the country’s jurisdictional claims within the so-called nine-dash line. Such tactics have included airspace incursions, harassment of drilling rigs and the deployment of survey ships, CCG vessels and large fishing fleets into their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).[21] Although the Southeast Asian claimants regularly protest China’s activities, they are unable to deter Beijing due to asymmetries in military capabilities.
Going forward, the US will be providing more assistance to the Southeast Asian claimants to help them better respond to China’s grey zone tactics and protect their sovereign rights in their EEZs. This includes improving their ability to monitor and publicise China’s military and paramilitary activities and helping their maritime law enforcement agencies tackle illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. Defence Secretary Austin discussed these issues with his Vietnamese counterpart in July, as did Vice President Kamala who emphasised the importance of US-Vietnam coast guard cooperation (a third US Coast Guard high-endurance cutter is likely to be transferred to Vietnam this year). During Blinken’s visit to Indonesia in December, the two countries signed a maritime cooperation agreement which included fisheries management.[22] In a speech delivered in Washington D.C. in September, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana specifically called for the 1952 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to be updated to address China’s grey zone tactics in the South China Sea. Talks on revising the treaty to deal with grey zone actions will have to wait until President Rodrigo Duterte’s successor takes office in July 2022.[23]
OUTLOOK
As the Biden administration enters its second year, its engagement with Southeast Asia will be assessed across five inter-connected issue-areas.
First and foremost will be the unveiling of its IPEF. Southeast Asian states will judge the initiative on whether it signals a willingness by the United States to resume a leadership role in economic rule-making in Asia, embed its economy in the region’s increasingly integrated trade networks, and arrest the concerning trend of “America’s growing irrelevance in the political economy of Asia”.[24]
Second and related will be the release of the administration’s National Security Strategy. Its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued in March 2021 was long on rhetoric and short on details.[25] Southeast Asians will want to see a clearer articulation of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, a roadmap for stable relations with China and due consideration given to Southeast Asia’s strategic interests.
Third, Southeast Asians will expect a higher level of commitment to ASEAN. The White House has already indicated that a US-ASEAN Summit is on the cards, although due to the spread of the Omicron variant of COVID-19 the meeting is likely to be virtual rather than in-person as had been planned. Nevertheless, it will provide a good opportunity to discuss ways to take the relationship forward, including an upgrade to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (as Australia and China did last year).
Fourth, notwithstanding the problems caused by some Republican senators withholding approval of President Biden’s ambassadorial nominees, the administration needs to expedite the appointment of US ambassadors to the region. Crucially, US ambassadorships to America’s two treaty allies, Thailand and the Philippines, and to ASEAN need to be filled.[26] Biden’s nominees for Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam were not approved until late 2021, and US ambassadors to Indonesia, Laos and Malaysia are Trump appointees.
Fifth, Southeast Asians will be hopeful that President Biden will travel to the region, if not in May when he will probably attend a summit of the Quad leaders in Japan, then at least later in the year for the ASEAN summit meetings in Phnom Penh. It would be an opportune occasion to launch the ASEAN-US Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
ENDNOTES
[1] Premesha Saha, “Southeast Asia forming the lynchpin in the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy”, ORF, 28 July 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/southeast-asia-forming-the-lynchpin-in-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy/.
[2] Humeyra Pamuk and Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia cites strong U.S. commitment as Blinken starts Southeast Asia tour”, Reuters, 13 December 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blinken-indonesia-us-seeks-shore-up-southeast-asia-ties-2021-12-13/.
[3] US Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, 13 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.
[4] Lee Hsien Loong, “The Endangered Asian Century”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020 issue, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loong-endangered-asian-century.
[5] See US Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Remarks at the 40th International Institute for Strategic Studies Fullerton Lecture, 27 July 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2708192/secretary-of-defense-remarks-at-the-40th-international-institute-for-strategic/; The White House, Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Indo-Pacific Region, 24 August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/24/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-indo-pacific-region/; US Department of State, Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, 13 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.
[6] James Palmer, “Xi-Biden Summit Produces Few Breakthroughs”, Foreign Policy, 17 November 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/xi-biden-summit-us-china-policy/.
[7] Ryan Hass, “Performance Will Determine Prestige in US-China Geopolitical Competition”, Global Asia, December 2021, https://globalasia.org/v16no4/cover/performance-will-determine-prestige-in-us-china-geopolitical-competition_ryan-hass.
[8] “U.S. International COVID-19 Vaccine Donations Tracker – Updated as of 31 January 2022”, KFF, 31 January 2022, https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/u-s-international-covid-19-vaccine-donations-tracker/#recipient-country.
[9] Khairulanwar Zaini, ““Building a Sailboat in a Storm”: The Evolution of COVAX in 2021 and Its Impact on Supplies to Southeast Asia’s Six Lower-Income Economies”, Trends (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022).
[10] “In Conversation: Kurt Campbell, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator”, The Lowy Institute, 1 December 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/conversation-white-house-indo-pacific-coordinator-kurt-campbell.
[11] Susannah Patton, “A seat at the table: The role of regional multilateral institutions in US Indo-Pacific strategy”, United States Studies Centre, 3 December 2021, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/a-seat-at-the-table-the-role-of-regional-multilateral-institutions-in-us-indo-pacific-strategy.
[12] Hoang Thi Ha, “Biden’s Foreign Policy to Southeast Asia: More Pragmatism than Ideology”, Fulcrum, 17 August 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/bidens-foreign-policy-to-southeast-asia-more-pragmatism-than-ideology/.
[13] Hoang Thi Ha, “The SAC Versus ASEAN: The Futility of Legal Recourse”, Fulcrum, 28 October 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/the-sac-versus-asean-the-futility-of-legal-recourse/.
[14] Dewey Sim, “Singapore’s non-invite to Biden’s democracy summit ‘not a judgment’: US diplomat Daniel Kritenbrink”, SCMP, 2 December 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3158195/singapores-non-invite-bidens-democracy-summit-not-judgment-us.
[15] Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2021, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/united-states/
[16] “Readout of President Biden’s Participation in the East Asia Summit, The White House, 27 October 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/27/readout-of-president-bidens-participation-in-the-east-asia-summit/
[17] See “Media Fact Sheet: United States-Singapore Climate Partnership”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, 23 August 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/08/20210823-US-VP-Visit-Post-JPC; “Fact Sheet: Strengthening the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership”, The White House, 25 August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/25/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-partnership/; “U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink Discusses U.S.-Indonesia Partnership, COVID-19 Vaccines, and Music in “CurioUS” Video Podcast”, US Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, 15 January 2022, https://id.usembassy.gov/u-s-assistant-secretary-of-state-daniel-j-kritenbrink-discusses-u-s-indonesia-partnership-covid-19-vaccines-and-music-in-curious-video-podcast/.
[18] “Fact Sheet: New Initiatives to Expand the U.S.-ASEAN Strategic Partnership”. The White House, 26 October 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/26/fact-sheet-new-initiatives-to-expand-the-u-s-asean-strategic-partnership/.
[19] Paul G. Harris, “A New Climate Policy in the United States: Potential
Implications for Southeast Asia”, ISEAS Perspective, 30 July 2021, /wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_101.pdf.
[20] Antony J. Blinken, US Secretary of State, “Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea”, US Department of State Press Release, 11 July 2021, https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/.
[21] See Andrew Erickson, “Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at Whitsun Reef”, Foreign Policy, 29 March 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/29/china-militia-maritime-philippines-whitsunreef/; “Malaysian air force scrambles hawk jets after Chinese military planes detected near its national airspace”, Channel News Asia, 1 June 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-air-force-scramble-jets-china-national-airspace-1823011; “Contest at Kasawari: Another Malaysian Gas Project Faces Pressure”, CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 July 2021, https://amti.csis.org/contest-at-kasawari-another-malaysian-gas-project-faces-pressure/; Sebastian Strangio, “China Demanded Halt to Indonesian Drilling Near Natuna Islands: Report”, The Diplomat, 2 December 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/china-demanded-halt-to-indonesian-drilling-near-natuna-islands-report/.
[22] “Pentagon chief to nudge ties with Vietnam as human rights concerns linger”, CNA, 29 July 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/us-vietnam-lloyd-austin-visit-south-china-sea-2074196; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi At Memorandum of Understanding Signing Ceremony”, US Department of State Press Release, 14 December 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-at-memorandum-of-understanding-signing-ceremony/.
[23] Speech by Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, “The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty at 70”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 8 September 2021, https://www.csis.org/events/us-philippines-mutual-defense-treaty-70
[24] Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2021, op. cit.
[25] Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington D.C.: The White House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[26] See the American Foreign Service Association’s “Tracker: Current US Ambassadors”, https://afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments.
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2022/10 “Uncertainty Grows as Anxiety Intensifies among Thailand’s Political Parties” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Political uncertainty in Thailand has intensified with the recent unexplained “expulsion” of 21 MPs from the Phalang Pracharat Party, the largest party in the ruling coalition. Those expelled included Captain Thammanat Prompao, the party’s secretary-general.
- Thammanat and 17 MPs in his faction will join the Thai Economic Party. They claim they will continue to support General Prayut. Three other MPs will likely join another government party, Bhumjaithai.
- A known opponent of Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, Thammanat has been demanding at least two cabinet posts for his faction of MPs. He is in a position to mobilise the MPs in his faction and to woo other MPs to join him in voting with the opposition to topple the prime minister in a no-confidence vote.
- The prime minister has so far rejected the demand, reiterating that there would neither be a cabinet reshuffle nor a dissolution of the House and general election any time soon. How long the prime minister can resist Thammanat’s demand for cabinet posts is uncertain, especially with another no-confidence debate looming in June.
- The prime minister is now facing difficult choices: Giving in to Thammanat’s demand, resigning, or dissolving the House before its new session which starts on 22 May, and calling an early general election.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute. Previously he had been a researcher on ASEAN political and security cooperation at the Institute’s ASEAN Studies Centre.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/10, 10 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
On top of their internal problems, Thai political parties have entered the new year of 2022 with one old uncertainty: When will the next general election be held?
Thai politics grew even more complicated following the sudden and mysterious “expulsion” on 19 January of 21 MPs from the Phalang Pracharat Party (PPP), the largest in the 18-party ruling coalition. Those expelled included Captain Thammanat Prompao, who was secretary-general of the PPP.[1]
Thammanat is demanding at least two cabinet posts for his party faction, but has faced strong objection from Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha.
The prime minister has stated that he will neither reshuffle the cabinet nor dissolve the House of Representatives and then call an early general election any time soon.[2] He has further noted that amendments to the political party law and the election law have not yet been completed. These amendments are necessary to put into effect recent changes to the constitution concerning electoral arrangements.[3]
The prime minister has maintained that he intends to complete his four-year term, which ends in March 2023. And this year, he has one new incentive to stay on in office; Thailand is in the chair of APEC. General Prayut would love to host the annual meeting of APEC leaders – which includes U.S. President Joe Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin – in Thailand towards the end of 2022.[4]
General Prayut’s political fortunes recently brightened with his successful official visit to Saudi Arabia on 25-26 January at the invitation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The visit marked a new beginning in Thai-Saudi relations after more than three decades of “apathy” between the two countries following a Thai janitor’s theft of jewellery from a palace in Saudi Arabia in 1989.[5]
Such a significant diplomatic breakthrough[6] has boosted General Prayut’s self-confidence, making him more determined to weather the current political storm.
However, most Thai politicians suspect that, if he wishes to remain in power beyond March 2023, General Prayut will dissolve the House of Representatives and call an early general election when he sees the most advantage for parties supporting his return to the premiership.
So far, General Prayut has been keeping his cards close to his chest – much to the continual annoyance of parties in the opposition.
THE NEW THAMMANAT FACTOR
Assuming that the Election Commission approves their questionable “expulsion” from the PPP,[7] Thammanat and 17 MPs will join the Thai Economic Party, a party registered on 7 April 2020. Three of the other expelled MPs are likely to join Bhumjaithai, the second largest party in the ruling coalition.[8]
The Thai Economic Party’s leadership is awaiting an overhaul. It is widely expected that its new leader will be General Wit Thephassadin, the former chief strategist of the PPP. No surprise here; Wit is also a close friend of PPP leader General Prawit. A real surprise will be how many MPs Thammanat will persuade to leave the PPP and the micro-parties, each of which has a single MP, in the ruling coalition and to join him.[9]
Thammanat once characterized himself as the “main artery” of the ruling coalition.[10] He was in charge of corralling 11 micro-parties, each with one MP, to join the ruling coalition. He thus secured a slim majority of 253 MPs to support the premiership of General Prayut, edging out the PT-led rival coalition which had 246 MPs in the 500-member House.[11]
Even with only 18 MPs, Thammanat will be in a strong position to continue demanding at least two cabinet posts[12] for his party, considering the fact that the Chatthai Pattana Party, with only 12 MPs, holds two posts.[13]
In the next parliamentary session, which will start on 22 May, the opposition plans to call for a debate of no-confidence in the prime minister. This debate will be another opportunity for Thammanat to threaten to topple General Prayut from the premiership.
On the other hand, even if he survives the no-confidence vote, General Prayut will continue to face nightmares over the possibility of the defeat of a government bill in the House. A defeat in the House, such as rejection of a government’s bill involving a fiscal matter, is deemed serious enough for the prime minister to take responsibility by either resigning or dissolving the House and calling an early general election.
How the prime minister is going to handle this new demand and the threat from Thammanat is anybody’s guess.
Meanwhile, Deputy Finance Minister Santi Prompat – an ally of the prime minister – has been appointed the new secretary-general of the PPP.
PHUEA THAI’S DREAM
Phuea Thai (PT), Thailand’s largest political party and the opposition leader, is dreaming of a “landslide victory” in Thailand’s next general election.[14] It would therefore welcome an early general election. One of its tactics to provoke the prime minister to dissolve the House is to boycott House meetings. On 4 February, the House had to end its meeting prematurely for the sixteenth time in the current parliamentary session when not enough MPs attended to form a quorum.[15]
The PT’s dream is to take the lead in forming the next government and to pave the way for a return with impunity for its benefactor, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra—now in self-imposed exile to avoid jail after a criminal conviction.[16] Thaksin has claimed to have “a few plans” to help the PT score a “landslide victory”.[17]
Thaksin’s frequent talks—mostly on the Clubhouse social media platform—about the PT suggest his continuing active association with the party, which is a successor to two dissolved parties that he founded: Thai Rak Thai (1998 – 2007) and the People’s Power (1998 – 2008). Thaksin’s championing of the PT has thus put this party in hot water, too.
The party’s opponents have lodged two complaints with the Election Commission, asking it to investigate Thaksin’s alleged unlawful dominance over the PT.[18] As a fugitive from justice, Thaksin cannot join or have an active role in any Thai political party. If the Election Commission finds enough evidence to fault the PT, it will submit to the Constitutional Court a case against the PT for a ruling to dissolve the party.
The PT did not field anyone to compete in the two recent by-elections in the southern provinces of Songkhla and Chumphon, and it may not field a candidate for the post of governor of Bangkok in polls due in the months ahead, for fear of undercutting the independent front-runner, Dr Chadchart Sittipunt. Chadchart formerly belonged to the PT, serving as the transport minister in the Yingluck Shinawatra administration (2011-2014).
However, the PT did contest in the by-election on 30 January in Bangkok’s Constituency No. 9, in Lak Si and Chatuchak Districts. Its candidate, Surachart Tiensuwan, beat candidates from Move Forward, the Kla Party, and the PPP.[19] This victory of the PT is a tremendous boost for the chief opposition party, lending credibility to the party’s ongoing campaign of rebranding and revitalising itself to go for a “landslide victory” in the next general election.
GRIM ATMOSPHERE IN THE PPP
The PPP’s situation worsened after its candidates failed to win either of the two by-elections recently held in the South. Prior to these two losses, the PPP had scored successive victories in five other by-elections, including one in March 2021 in Nakhon Si Thammarat’s Constituency No. 3, a southern seat that used to be a stronghold of the Democrat Party.
The PPP’s losses were attributed to the serious missteps of Captain Thammanat, who used the campaign for the seats to try to showcase his leadership prowess.[20]
When his rivals inside the PPP sought to hold him responsible for the by-election losses, Captain Thammanat countered with demands for a drastic overhaul of the party’s leadership, in order to get rid of his critics. But he obviously went too far without support of his “protector”, party leader General Prawit.
However, many political observers suspect that the “explusion” was staged with the mutual consent of Captain Thammanat and party leader General Prawit.
The situation in the PPP worsened with the loss of its candidate in the recent Bangkok by-election. Coming in fourth in the by-election was Saranras Jenjaka, the wife of ex-MP Sira Jenjaka, who lost his House seat last December after the Constitutional Court ruled that his prior criminal conviction for fraud and resultant imprisonment disqualified him from membership of parliament.
The PPP’s failure to defend its House seat in the Bangkok by-election will further erode the reputation of this chief government party. Worse still, the defeat appears to indicate that many Bangkok voters are now fed up with the unending infighting in the PPP.
RETURN TO BANGKOK
The Democrat Party, Thailand’s oldest,[21] suffered a disastrous defeat in the 2019 general election, winning only 53 of the 500 House seats. It failed to win any of the 30 House seats in Bangkok. And it won only 22 of 50 seats in the South, which used to be its political stronghold. In the 2011 general election, in which the Democrat Party was beaten by the PT, the Democrat Party had at least won 159 House seats, including 23 of 33 seats in Bangkok and 50 of 53 seats in the South.
The Democrats’ hope now is to re-establish their dominant political presence both in Bangkok and the South in the next general election. The recent victories of Democrats in the two southern by-elections augur well for the party.
Since the Democrat Party did not field anyone in the Bangkok by-election[22], its next crucial test will be in the gubernatorial election in the capital, and in the simultaneous polls for members of the Bangkok Metropolitan Council and for district councils. These elections now appear likely to take place in early June.
However, the party’s candidate for the post of Bangkok governor, Dr Suchatvee Suwansawat, is not a well-known figure. He is the former rector of the King Monkut’s Institute of Technology-Lad Krabang. One recent NIDA Poll shows Suchatvee running second, with only 13.06 per cent of support among the respondents to the survey, far behind the frontrunner Chadchart, who scored 38.80 per cent.[23]
The Democrat Party hopes to receive support from former party leader Abhisit in the Bangkok elections.[24] It will have better chances in vying for seats on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council and the capital’s 30 district councils than in competing for the post of governor.
GOING HIGH WITH MARIJUANA
Bhumjaithai, the second largest government party, has been lying low and quietly enjoying its steady growth. The party initially won only 51 House seats in the 2019 general election. But the number of its House seats has since increased to 62, after it co-opted 11 MPs from two other parties.[25]
With its stronghold in the lower north-eastern province of Buriram, the Bhumjaithai Party did not contest in the two recent southern by-elections or the one in Bangkok.
The Bhumjaithai Party is a champion of decriminalising marijuana for medicinal use. Its secretary-general, Transport Minister Saksiam Chidchorb believes that growing marijuana can help generate new income for poor households.[26] The party has been pushing to remove marijuana from the list of banned drugs, and to allow every household to grow up to six marijuana plants for personal use in Thai traditional medicine. So far, the Prayut Administration has merely permitted growing the cannabis “weed” by authorised research entities for experiments on its medicinal potential.
Party leader Anutin insists that marijuana should not be considered a narcotic, and adjustment of the relevant laws to liberalise the cultivation and personal use of marijuana should be sped up.[27] On 26 January, the Bhumjaithai Party submitted to the House Speaker its draft bill on new regulations concerning the use of marijuana and cannabis hemp.
Undoubtedly, if and when the decriminalisation and free cultivation of marijuana are recognised by law, the party stands to gain a great deal of support from voters throughout the kingdom. This is why the party is considered a “sure win” to join while awaiting for the next general election.
COUNTING ON YOUNG VOTERS
Move Forward, the second largest opposition party, fared poorly in the two recent southern by-elections. Its young candidates in Songkhla and Chumphon received much fewer votes than the candidates of the Future Forward, its now dissolved predecessor party, in the 2019 general election.[28]
Move Forward’s candidate, the actor Karoonpol Tiensuwan, managed to come in second in the Bangkok by-election—a good result for a party that lacks experienced politicians. What remains unclear is whether a majority of those who voted for Karoonpol were from the younger generations.
The party has also been rather slow in finding and announcing its candidate for Bangkok governor. Only on 23 January did Move Forward announce that its spokesman, the party-list MP Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, would be that candidate.
The Move Forward Party will also come under immense pressure to find enough viable candidates to contest in all the 400 constituencies nationwide in Thailand’s next general election. In the recent by-election in Chumphon, the party faced criticism when it fielded Worapol Anansak, a 25-year-old environment activist and food deliveryman who had no prior political experience to speak of.
MORE NEW PARTIES
At the end of 2021, the records of the Election Commission showed that there were 84 parties in operation in Thailand.[29] Twenty-five of the active parties were set up after the general election on 24 March 2019. These new parties included: Thai Sang Thai, Kla, Thai Phakdi, and Ruamthai Sangchat.
The number of parties with House seats after the next general election is expected to drop drastically. At present, among the 26 parties with MPs, 11 of them have only 1 MP each. These micro-parties face “extinction” when the election rules change to benefit larger parties.
Nevertheless, more new parties are being formed in anticipation of an early general election. The newest party, just unveiled on 19 January, is named “Sang Anakhot Thai” (Building the Thai Future). Its prime movers are two former senior figures in the PPP: former party leader and finance minister Uttama Saowanayon and former party secretary-general and energy minister Sonthirat Sonthijirawong.[30]
Their “centrist” party hopes to offer its modern economic policy platform as a new option for Thai voters in the next general election.[31] Both Uttama and Sonthirat formerly worked for Dr Somkid Jatusripitak, the former deputy prime minister for economic affairs.
Without a party of his own, General Prayut depends entirely on the 18 parties in the ruling coalition to protect his premiership in the House, as well as to pass bills. Obviously, his premiership depends chiefly on the continuing goodwill and support of these volatile parties.
PRAYUT’S UPPER HAND?
This year, Thailand is the chair of APEC. General Prayut seems to be looking forward to hosting APEC economic leaders at an annual meeting in Thailand in the last quarter of 2022. This is a rare historic opportunity which few government leaders would want to miss.
Nevertheless, how long General Prayut can hold on is now in doubt, especially if he has actually lost the support of his “Big Brother” General Prawit, leader of the PPP. In addition, the party, which nominated General Prayut for the premiership in the 2019 general election, now seems to be in decline following three recent by-election defeats.
Without a party of his own, General Prayut is “floating” without any firm political foundation to stand on. And he will be vulnerable in the House, where he cannot count on any government party to continue to defend him and his government’s legislative bills indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
In the end, however, merely offering security to voters no longer seems a sufficient reason for General Prayut to continue in power.
In the emerging post-pandemic “new normal” world, Thailand urgently needs to take effective steps toward economic recovery. This is why new parties are zeroing in proposals to foster that recovery, rather than on national security, in their policy platforms. This is one crucial area in which General Prayut is clearly lacking, even though he has been in power since leading the coup of May 2014.
He remains determined to hold on, though, but whether or not he can handle Thammanat’s demand and threat is unclear. This question has intensified the uncertainty in Thai politics, much to the chagrin of political parties, especially those in the opposition.
ENDNOTES
[1] “‘ไพบูลย์’ แถลงเหตุขับ ‘ธรรมนัส’ ‘ประวิตร’ รับไม่ได้ ข้อเรียกร้องปรับโครงสร้างพรรค” [“Paiboon” clarifies the cause of expulsion of “Thammanat” is because of his demands to restructure the party, which are unacceptable to “Prawit”], Manager Online, 20 January 2022 (https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000006298, accessed 20 January 2022). Paiboon Nititawan is one of the PPP’s deputy leaders, Captain Thammanat was the PPP’s secretary-general, and General Prawit Wongsuwan is the PPP leader and a deputy prime minister. See also “ ‘ไพบูลย์’ เผยส่งเรื่องขับ 21 สส. ให้ กกต. แล้ว มั่นใจไม่เป็นโมฆะ ยัน ‘สมศักดิ์’ ร่วมประชุม” [“Paiboon” discloses that decision to expel the 21 MPs has been submitted to the EC. He is confident that it will not become invalid, affirms that “Somsak” was in the meeting”, Thai Post, 25 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/politics-news/72204, accessed 25 January 2022). Deputy PPP party leader Paiboon reported that 17 members of the PPP’s executive committee and 63 PPP MPs attended the meeting on 19 January, and that 63 of them voted in favour of the expulsion. Those who voted for it accounted for more than three-fourths of the attendance, and thus fully met the PPP’s regulation on expulsion. Nakhon Ratchasima MP Somsak Pankasem claimed that he was not in the meeting and requested reconsideration of his expulsion. Deputy PPP leader Paiboon, however, has insisted that MP Somsak was at the meeting, and there will be no reconsideration, because the Election Commission (EC) has already been notified.
[2] “‘บิ๊กตู่’ ลั่น ไม่ปรับครม. – ไม่ยุบสภา มาตามระบอบประชาธิปไตย เชื่อ ส.ว. ไม่ขัดพรรคเสียงข้างมากนั่งนายกฯ” [“Big Tu” insists: no cabinet reshuffle, no dissolving the House of Representatives. He comes in accordance with the democratic process. He believes senators would not object to having parties in the majority in control of the premiership], Manager Online, 20 January 2022. (https://mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000006333, accessed 20 January 2022). “Big Tu” is General Prayut’s nickname.
[3] Last November, the parliament passed two constitutional amendments. One amendment changed the system of voting to the use of separate ballots for constituency MPs and for party-list preferences. The other amendment is to increase the number of constituencies from 350 to 400, and to reduce the number of party-list seats from 150 to 100. A crucial necessary follow-up is to amend the election law to incorporate the two-ballot voting system, particularly as it relates to provisions for calculating the allocation of the party-list seats.
[4] Thailand chaired APEC for the first time in 2003. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra hosted the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Bangkok in October that year. APEC leaders attending the summit included U.S. President George W. Bush, Chinese President Hu Jintao, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, and Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This year, Thailand is chairing APEC for the second time.
[5] “ย้อนรอยเพชรซาอุฯ จาก ‘เกรียงไกร’ ถึง ‘ประยุทธ’ 30 ปี ฤาจะสิ้นอาถรรพ์ ‘บูลไดมอนด์’” [Tracing the Saudi Diamond, from “Kriangkrai” to “Prayut” over 30 years, whether the curse of the “Blue Diamond” is over]. Manager Online, 25 January 2022 (https://www.mgronline.com/crime/detail/9650000008162, accessed 27 January 2022). Kriangkrai Techamong was the Thai janitor who stole more than US$20 million worth of jewellery from a Saudi prince, loot that he smuggled back to Thailand. He was duly arrested. But a very senior police officer, Police Lt Gen Cha-lor Kerdthed organised a bloody scheme to embezzle many pieces of the confiscated jewellery. He later led a team of Thai officials to return the stolen jewellery to Saudi Arabia; it turned out that many of the returned pieces were fake. Three Saudi detectives sent to Bangkok to investigate and reportedly to look for the missing “Blue Diamond” were mysteriously murdered. Subsequently, the Saudi government recalled its ambassador to Thailand and practically downgraded diplomatic ties with Bangkok to the chargé d’affaires level. It also expelled all Thai workers and banned them from Saudi Arabia, where over 300,000 Thais used to work.
[6] The prime minister announced on his Facebook page, www.facebook.com/prayutofficial, on 26 January, “very good news” for the peoples of Thailand and Saudi Arabia resulting from his recent official visit to Riyadh. The good news included an upcoming exchange of ambassadors and the resumption of direct flights between the two kingdoms in May.
[7] The “expulsion” occurred without any formal internal investigation. Some MPs who wanted to leave the party had to lobby their fellow MPs in the PPP to vote for the “expulsion”. MPs expelled from a party may retain their House membership by joining a new party within 30 days. But MPs who resign from their party automatically forfeit House membership.
[8] “ ‘ธรรมนัส’ นำ 18 สส. ซบ ‘เศรษฐกิจไทย’ … ” [ ‘Thammanat leads 18 MPs to join ‘Thai Economic Party’ …], Manager Online, 29 January 2022 (https://www.mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000009505, accessed 30 January 2022).
[9] The ruling coalition has 10 micro-parties, nine of them has only one MP each, while the tenth, the Forest Conservation of Thailand Party, has two MPs. Captain Thammanat once described the leaders of these micro-parties as “monkeys”, and he called himself the “monkey-keeper” who has to find “bananas” to feed to them.
[10] “30 ปีไม่เคยพูดที่ไหน ‘ธรรมนัส’ เปิดใจ ‘ผมเป็นเส้นเลือดใหญ่รัฐบาล’” [ Never before in 30 years, “Thammanat” discloses he is the “artery of the government”] Thai PBS News, 12 July 2019 (https://news.thaipbs.or.th/content/281649, accessed 31 January 2022). Captain Thammanat gave a long press conference at the parliament to defend himself against accusations that he had a “shady past”, including imprisonment in an Australian prison on a heroin-related conviction in the mid-1980s. The Constitutional Court in May 2021 ruled that the conviction against Captain Thammanat took place outside Thailand, and thus had no legal bearing on Captain Thammanat’s qualification to hold public office in the country. This was when Captain Thammanat also likened himself to the “main artery” of the government, and accused his opponents of trying to attack him in order to topple the government.
[11] One of the 500 MPs, Future Forward party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, was disqualified from House membership on the opening day of the first parliamentary session after the 2019 elections on being accused of breaking the election law in failing to declare his ownership of shares in a media firm. Thanathorn was also subsequently found guilty of illegally lending more than 100 million baht to fund his own party, resulting in a decision by the Constitutional Court to dissolve the Future Forward Party in February 2020.
[12] Thammanat was sacked as a deputy minister of agriculture following his failed attempt to unseat the prime minister in the no-confidence debate in early last September. Thammanat appears to want to regain the deputy minister post for one of the MPs in his group, because it oversees the Agricultural Land Reform Office – crucial in winning the votes of the landless rural poor. Thammanat himself seems to want to return to the cabinet as the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment.
[13] The two are the minister of natural resources and the environment and deputy minister of agriculture, whose incumbents are, respectively Varawut Silpa-acha and Praphat Phothasoothon.
[14] See the author’s article, “Thailand’s Main Opposition Party Hopes for a Landslide Election Victory: A Realistic Goal or Just a Dream”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/161, 8 December 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-161-thailands-main-opposition-party-hopes-for-a-landslide-election-victory-a-realistic-goal-or-just-a-dream-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/, accessed 18 January 2022).
[15] On 4 February, the House had only 195 MPs present, whereas the minimum number of MPs in attendance must be at least 237 to form a quorum. Among the PT’s 131 MPs, only two reported their attendance. From the PPP, only 54 MPs of the chief government party’s 97 MPs were in attendance. And only one from Captain Thammanat’s faction of 18 MPs reported his attendance. The PPP leadership later explained that many of the party’s MPs were absent because they had commitments in their constituencies in the provinces on the Friday in question. Normal legislative work in the House are is on Wednesday and Thursday. Friday meetings are sometimes convened to listen to reports from various House ad hoc bodies, and thus are not considered crucial to attend. PPP leader General Prawit has asked all of the PPP’s MPs to attend every House meeting in order to foil the PT’s sabotage tactics.
[16] Thaksin has been in overseas exile, living mostly in Dubai, after fleeing Thailand in early August 2008 to avoid a two-year jail term from conviction in a conflict-of-interest case. The two-year jail term was meted out in October 2008. The penalty lapsed in October 2018 after 10 years. However, Thaksin is still facing altogether 10 years of imprisonment for three in absentia convictions: two years for illegally trying to introduce a two-digit and three-digit (Lotto-like) lottery to compete with the government’s lottery monopoly; three years for pressuring Thailand’s Export-Import Bank to lend Myanmar 40,000 million baht for the purchase of satellite equipment from Shin Satellite Co, a public company founded by Thaksin; and five years for abusing his official powers to benefit Shin Corp, another public company that he had founded. Moreover, Thaksin has also been implicated in the controversial paddy-pawning scheme and fictitious sale of rice to a non-existent Chinese buyer during the administration of his younger sister Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Yingluck was found guilty of dereliction of duty and sentenced to five years in jail on charges related to that scheme, but she fled the country in August 2017, just a few days before the verdict on her conviction was read in court. She is now in exile together with Thaksin in Dubai. See details of Thaksin’s convictions at “บทสรุปรื้อ 5 คดี ‘ทักษิณ’ ศาลฎีกาฯ สั่งจำคุกรวม 10 ปี – ยังเหลือข้าวจีทูจีใน ป.ป.ช.?” [Summary of five cases against “Thaksin”. Appeals court has sentenced him to altogether 10 years in jail. Still there is a case of G-to-G rice sale in the National Anti-Corruption Commission?], Isra News, 31 July 2020 (https://www.isranews.org/article/isranews-scoop/90809-isranews-56.html, accessed 20 January 2022).
[17] Ibid.
[18] “เดินหน้ายุบเพื่อไทย! ‘เรืองไกร’ ยื่น กกต. สอบ ‘ชลน่าน’ พิสูจน์ ‘ทักษิณ’ เป็นเจ้าของพรรคสั่งลบชื่อ ‘พัลลภ’ ” [Attempt to dissolve Phuea Thai, “Ruerng-grai” requests EC to question “Cholnan” to prove that “Thaksin” is the owner of the party who ordered deleting the name of “Panlop” from the party’s membership], Thai Post, 4 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/hi-light/57617, accessed 18 January 2022). Ruerng-grai is a lawyer representing the PPP. He has asked the Election Commission to question PT party leader Dr Cholnan Sri-kaew following a widely-publicised complaint by General Panlop Pin-manee, a former deputy director of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) and a former senior member of the PT, that he could not attend the recent PT party meeting in Khon Kaen, because Thaksin had allegedly ordered the deletion of his name from the party’s membership rolls. Dr Cholnan, however, has countered that General Panlop remains a life-time member of the PT, but that he was not allowed into the Khon Kaen meeting because of COVID-19 restrictions forcing the PT to limit attendance by not inviting older members. See “‘สนธิญา’ ไม่ปล่อย! ฟ้องยุบพรรคเพื่อไทยปม ‘วิฑูรย์ – พัลลภ’ ” [“Sonthiya” will not let go! Suing for dissolution of the Phuea Thai Party because of “Vithoon – Panlop”], Thai Post, 12 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/politics-news/62980). In his case lodged with the Election Commission, Sonthiya Sawaddee, a conservative royalist, cited the complaint made by General Panlop and a new revelation from Vithoon Nambutr, a former deputy leader of the Democrat Party who wanted to join the PT. Vithoon has claimed that he talked to Thaksin on the phone to seek support for his inclusion on the PT’s party list for allocation of the 100 party-list seats in the House after the next general election in a rank no lower than the thirtieth. Thaksin allegedly agreed. However, PT party leader Dr Cholnan has clarified that it will be up to the PT’s executive committee – not Thaksin or any other outsider – to compile the new party-list, and that the ranking has not yet been done because the next general election has not yet been scheduled.
[19] “เปิดผลคะแนนผู้สมัครรับเลือกตั้งซ่อม ส.ส. เขต 9 กทม.” [Voting results for candidates in the by-election for Bangkok Constituency No. 9 by-election], Thai Post, 30 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/hi-light/75938, accessed 30 January 2022). PT’s candidate Surachart won with 29,416 votes; followed by the Move Forward candidate Karoonpol with 20,361, Kla’s Artthawit with 20,047 votes, and PPP’s Saranras with 7,906 votes.
[20] Captain Thammanat made his worst mistake at a big rally one week before the voting on 16 January, when he told voters in Songkhla to choose the PPP’s candidate because he was wealthy and would thus be in a position to assist local people who were in need. The Democrats immediately seized on Captain Thammanat’s words as an “insult” to southern voters, accusing him of trying to win the by-election with a promise of money.
[21] Four of the party’s leaders became prime ministers of Thailand in nine governments: Khuang Abhaiwong (1944-1945, January – March 1946, February – April 1948), Seni Pramoj (1945 – 1946, February – March 1975, and April – September 1976), Chuan Leekpai (1992 – 1995, 1997 – 2001), and Abhisit Vejjajiva (December 2008 – August 2011).
[22] Democrat party leader Jurin Laksanawisit considers it to be “political etiquette” not to contest in a by-election in which another party in the ruling coalition is trying to defend its House seat.
[23] The full reports of the ninth NIDA Poll survey, conducted between 23-25 December 2021 are available at https://www.nidapoll-nida.ac.th/survey_detail?survey_id=538, first published on 27 December 2021 (accessed on 18 January 2022).
[24] “‘จุรินทร์’ โยนทีมหาเสียงประสาน ‘อภิสิทธิ์’ ช่วยสนามผู้ว่า กทม.” [“Jurin” let campaign team contact “Abhisit” for help in the Bangkok governor’s race], Thai Post, 22 December 2021 (https://www.thaipost.net/politics-news/50699, accessed 18 January 2022). Jurin Laksanawisit is leader of the Democrat Party, the successor to Abhisit who stepped down immediately after the party’s disastrous loss in the 2019 general election.
[25] Eleven MPs have joined the Bhumjaithai Party during the two years since the 2019 general election. An MP for Chiang Mai, Srinuan Boun-lue, was expelled from the Future Forward Party in December 2019; nine MPs from the Future Forward Party signed on after that party’s dissolution in February 2020; and one MP for Pathum Thani, Pornpimon Thammasarn, was expelled from the PT in December 2021 and then joined Bhumjaithai. MPs expelled from a party have 30 days to join a new party in order to keep their House membership. MPs from a dissolved party, like those from the Future Forward Party, have 60 days to do likewise.
[26] “ภูมิใจไทย ชูปลูกกัญชาเสรี สร้างรายได้ ปชช. ทั่วไป” [Bhumjaithai advocates free growing of marijuana for income generation of all people], Khao Sod, 17 March 2019 (https://www.khaosod.co.th/politics/news_2100949, accessed 20 January 2022).
[27] “อนุทิน ย้ำกัญชาไม่ใช่พืชยาเสพติด ใช้ทางการแพทย์ได้ แนะดูเจตนาการนำไปใช้” [Anutin emphasises that marijuana is not a narcotic plant, it has medical use, and [the authorities] should look at the intention of its usage], Infoquest Online, 12 January 2022 (https://www.infoquest.co.th/2022/163704, accessed 20 January 2022).
[28] In the by-elections held on 16 January, Move Forward’s candidate in Songkhla received only 5,417 votes, compared with 11,966 votes for Future Forward’s candidate in the same constituency in the 2019 general election; similarly, its candidate in Chumphon received only 3,520 votes, compared with 10,347 votes for Future Forward’s candidate in the 2019 general election. Move Forward’s setback is worse than anticipated. In the recent by-elections, the winners in Songkhla and Chumphon, both from the Democrat Party, received 45,578 votes and 48,981 votes, respectively. See “สรุปผลเลือกตั้งซ่อม ส.ส. ชุมพร — สงขลา” [Summary of the by-elections outcome in Chumphon – Songkhla], Thai Post, 17 January 2022 (https://www.thaipost.net/hi-light/66159, accessed 20 January 2022).
[29] See details of the 84 parties at the web site of the Office of the Election Commission at https://www.ect.go.th/ect_th/download/article/article_20211230211301.pdf, accessed 19 January 2022).
[30] “‘อุตตม – สนธิรัตน์’ เปิดตัว ‘พรรคสร้างอนาคตไทย’ รวมบุคลากรหัวกระทิ ชูจุดยืนไม่โกง ไม่ปล้นชาติ” [“Uttama – Sonthirat” unveil “Sang Anakhot Thai Party” with top-class personnel, as well as a pledge of no corruption and no plundering], Manager Online, 19 January 2022 (https://www.mgronline.com/politics/detail/9650000006035, accessed 19 January 2022).
[31] Ibid.
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2022/9 “Climate Finance in Southeast Asia: Trends and Opportunities” by Melinda Martinus and Qiu Jiahui
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Developed countries were committed to mobilising by 2020 US$100 billion in climate finance annually to assist vulnerable countries. However, the Covid-19 crisis stalled the delivery of the pledge and as of 2019, such climate finance reached only US$ 79.6 billion.
- For Southeast Asia, a region frequently cited as being one of the most vulnerable regions threatened by climate change, the broken promise on climate finance is highly disappointing.
- In the most updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for instance, seven out of ten ASEAN countries (excepting Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore) have set more ambitious carbon emission reductions conditional upon receiving international assistance from advanced economies.
- This article provides key trends of climate finance inflows to the region throughout 2000-2019. It also informs strategic directions and offers some considerations for climate negotiations with international partners, such as determining the financial needs, attracting more donors and utilising a wide range of financial instruments to fill financial gaps, and directing more funding for adaptation projects.
*Melinda Martinus is Lead Researcher (Socio-Cultural Affairs) at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Qiu Jiahui is Research Officer at the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/9, 9 February 2022
INTRODUCTION
Climate finance has been one of the most contentious issues in global climate politics. At the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 15), developed countries committed to mobilising by 2020 US$100 billion climate finance annually to assist vulnerable countries. The pledge has been key to building trust between states to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius, as specified in the Paris Agreement.
However, the spread of Covid-19 in late 2019 devastatingly halted the delivery of the pledge. A study by the World Resource Institute pointed out that international climate finance decreased during the pandemic.[1] Even before the pandemic, climate finance had been falling short. As of 2019, climate finance reached only US$79.6 billion.[2] The deadline has come and gone with the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 26) giving assurance that the target will be fulfilled by 2023, delaying the commitments by another three years, and undermining the credibility of developed countries and the overall progress in addressing the global climate crisis.[3]
For Southeast Asia, a region frequently cited as being one of the most vulnerable regions threatened by climate change, the broken promise of climate finance is highly disappointing. In many climate summits and meetings with international partners, Southeast Asian leaders frequently seek assistance to enhance their fiscal capacities to fund their long-term climate goals, namely green infrastructure development, institutional strengthening, and extending climate assistance to the poor and vulnerable populations.[4] In the most updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the UNFCCC, seven out of ten ASEAN countries, with the exception of Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore, have set more ambitious carbon emission reductions conditional upon receiving international assistance from advanced economies.[5]
This article gives an overview of international climate assistance distributed to Southeast Asian countries, provides key trends analysis and highlights gaps in climate assistance mobilised in the region from 2000 to 2019. Using data from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other resource flows to developing countries from bilateral and multilateral development cooperation, it analyses climate-related development finance data inflows to ASEAN countries. It further informs strategic directions for the regional policymakers and offers some considerations for future climate negotiations with international partners.
CLIMATE ASSISTANCE TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Trend 1: 10.56% of the Global Climate Finance went to ASEAN Countries
From 2000 to 2019, developed countries mobilised a total of US$ 533 billion in climate finance for developing countries. Thus, on average, nearly US$28 billion were given to developing countries in the past 20 years annually. The pledge made at COP 15 in Copenhagen was to provide an annual sum of US$100 billion in climate finance by 2020. In 2019, only US$79.60 billion was mobilised.
Figure 1 Climate Finance Provided to Developing Countries (2000-2019)
Source: OECD (adapted from the Financial Times article: “COP26: where does all the climate finance money go?”). Figures for 2020 are not available.
ASEAN countries (except Brunei and Singapore) received a total of US$56 billion or 10.56% of the total assistance between 2000 and 2019. On average, developed countries provided only US$86 per person in eight ASEAN countries over 20 years, or as little as US$4 per person annually.[6]
Trend 2: Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam are the Top Three Climate Finance Recipients in ASEAN
Of the eight ASEAN countries that were recipients of assistance mobilised by developed countries over the past 20 years, the three with the highest populations — Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam – were the top recipients. However, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam are the top three recipients of assistance received per capita. Cambodia and Laos are among the lowest per-capita GDP countries in the region. Meanwhile, Myanmar, the poorest country with a GDP per capita of US$1,250[7] received a relatively modest amount of climate assistance per capita over those 20 years of US$4.30 on average, compared to US$9.39 and US$11.39 for Cambodia and Laos respectively.
Trend 3: Lack of Climate Adaptation Finance in The Region
The Global Climate Risk Index developed by GermanWatch ranked four ASEAN countries, Myanmar, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand among the top ten countries most affected by extreme weather events from 1999 to 2018.[8] Although Southeast Asia is frequently referred to as one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, assistance on climate adaptation finance that can provide the region with the capacity to reverse effects of climate change such as floods, drought, and extreme weather, and to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations is still lacking.
The region received a total of US$28.37 billion in assistance to fund climate mitigation projects between 2000 to 2019. In comparison, it only received US$10.42 billion assistance to invest in adaptation capacities. Simply put, climate mitigation projects attracted almost three times as much funding as climate adaptation projects did.
Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia received the highest amount of climate mitigation assistance (US$13.7 billion), while Vietnam received the largest amount of climate adaptation assistance (US$5 billion).
Trend 4: Japan is the Biggest Donor in the Region
The Japanese government is by far the biggest bilateral and multilateral donor in the region. The Japanese government provided 65% of total bilateral climate finance between 2000 to 2019, outstripping Germany’s 11.8% and France’s 8.4% contribution. Similarly, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), where Japan is the top contributor to the institution’s funds, provided 32.8% of the total multilateral climate finance. However, both donors’ contributions to the region were concentrated in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
The role of the Japanese government in assisting the region’s transition to a green economy is important for the region. In the Southeast Asia Climate Outlook 2021 Survey conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Southeast Asians think that Japan is the second most trusted partner in helping the world achieve Paris-aligned goals and in sharing their climate expertise to the region, after the European Union. Interestingly, Japan’s climate leadership was polled as the first choice in the Mekong countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, as well as in the Philippines.[9]
Trend 5: Transport & Storage, Energy, and Agriculture and Forestry, Fishing are the Top Three Most Funded Sectors in the Region
Transport and Storage, Energy, and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing are the top three most funded sectors in the region, receiving a total of US$17.6 billion, US$12.8 and US$ 6.1 billion respectively from 2000 to 2019. Meanwhile, adaptation-specific sectors, such as water supply and sanitation, disaster preparedness, and reconstruction and rehabilitation, albeit much needed, received less than US$5 billion each in the same period.
NDCs and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted to the UNFCCC by ASEAN countries contain details of the amount of climate finance needed to achieve their Paris pledges. While some countries identified specific sectors where international financial support is needed, others have gone further to estimate the amount of finance needed for specific sectors and projects. Figure 9 shows comparisons between sectors and focuses on climate mitigation and adaptation finance received from 2000 to 2019 versus climate finance needs reported by ASEAN countries. In general, international climate finance has been channelled consistently to the priority sectors of ASEAN countries, although there is some mismatch.
For instance, Indonesia’s climate pledge highlighted the need to prioritise (1) Energy and Transport, (2) Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry, (3) Waste, and (4) Agriculture. These four sectors received the highest climate finance provided by donors. Indonesia also articulated a commitment to slash carbon emissions from the Energy and Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU). However, this sector has yet to receive significant funding from donors. Similarly, Malaysia and Cambodia articulated their priority in enhancing their infrastructure and health sectors in response to climate change, yet these sectors have not garnered significant support from donors (see Annex 1 for detailed analysis).
Trend 6: Loans Comprise the Majority of Climate Finance in the Region
There is yet to be a multilaterally agreed definition of climate finance; this is considered by some countries to be an obstacle in the proper accounting of climate finance.[10] OECD’s definition includes grants, debt instruments, mezzanine finance instruments, equity and shares, debt relief, guarantees and other unfunded contingent liabilities in its estimates of climate finance. This led to an estimated amount of US$79.2 billion in global climate finance in 2019. The proportion of global climate finance delivered in the form of debt instruments increased from 14.91% in 2000 to 63.89% in 2019.
Focusing on the ASEAN-8 recipients, the proportion of finance in the form of debt instruments reached 85.5% in 2019, compared to 53.2% in 2000. The proportion of debt instruments shot up to 90.9% in 2003, and has stayed within 65% to 90% since. Mostly, debt instruments consistently made up over 80% of finance in 2015-2019. Of this debt finance, 0% was non-concessionary in 2000, compared to 48.62% in 2019. As such, the proportion of climate debt offered under more generous terms than market loans is decreasing steadily. Compared to the global context, climate development finance flows to ASEAN countries are more likely to be in the form of debt instruments such as standard loans, with similar rising trends in non-concessionary debt finance.
The Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020[11] conducted by Oxfam found that while reported public climate finance has increased over the years, this is largely due to the rise of non-concessional loans and other non-grant instruments, a trend which is also observed on the part of ASEAN recipients. The report highlighted that the grant equivalent of global reported public climate finance in 2017-2018 was just US$25 billion, less than half the face-value figure of US$59.5 billion in the same period. To avoid overstating international climate assistance, Oxfam urged countries to report the grant equivalent of their climate finance to the UNFCCC, which would provide an estimation of the amount of money given away in a concessional loan compared to a standard market loan. This practice has been adopted for development finance reported to the OECD since 2018.
The growing magnitude of debt instruments in overall climate finance is not surprising, given the rising popularity of sustainable finance globally and in the region, but this raises concerns of debt burden. The Jubilee Debt Campaign estimated[12] that spending on external debt is over five times higher than on climate adaptation in lower income countries, bolstering developing countries’ argument[13] that overwhelming debt restricts their ability to take climate action. Oxfam argues that some climate-financed projects may not be as profitable in low-income societies, which may have difficulty generating the revenue needed for repayments.[14] The proportion of debt instruments in climate finance received by lower-income ASEAN countries can be seen in Figure 11.
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar respectively received 60.5%, 46.7% and 74.7% of their climate finance in the form of debt instruments. This amounts to around US$1.8 billion, US$716.9 million and US$2.9 billion respectively, over two decades. Yet, the overall debt burden in these countries is already high. Between 2018 and 2020, Laos spent an average of US$509 million per year, Myanmar spent an average of US$492.3 million per year, and Cambodia spent over US$1billion per year on principal repayments. In the same period, the average ratio of external debt to Gross National Income was 63.7% for Cambodia, 94.0% for Laos and 16.0% for Myanmar.[15]
Japan was the largest provider of climate finance to the ASEAN region in 2000-2019, contributing 65.1% of all bilateral climate finance received, while France was the third largest provider. Both are also among the largest providers of climate finance globally.[16] In contrast to other major providers, almost all of Japan’s and France’s contributions are in the form of concessional and developmental debt (95.0% and 97.3% respectively). In contrast, Germany, Japan, the US and Australia were the largest providers of grant-based finance.
RECOMMENDATIONS
International climate finance is needed to enable developing countries to adopt more ambitious NDCs under the Paris Agreement. The climate finance mobilised by developed countries for ASEAN has highlighted several gaps and opportunities for future climate finance cooperation.
- The pledge to provide US$100 billion climate finance annually has yet to be achieved. Developed countries will be expected to provide more to keep this pledge in future climate negotiations. Data show that ASEAN countries (except Brunei and Singapore) received a sum of US$56 billion or 10.56% of the total assistance over 20 years. Further study is needed to evaluate whether the number or proportion is enough, given Southeast Asia’s projections of climate risks and the population numbers exposed to the risks.
- Most climate finance received in the region is in the form of loans. ASEAN governments should also be more articulate in determining to what extent loans can assist lower-income countries in climate action without adding to their existing financial burdens.
- The ASEAN region currently receives much bilateral and multilateral climate assistance from the government of Japan. Given the region’s investment attractiveness, ASEAN needs to better communicate their climate visions to other bilateral and multilateral partners so that they can play more critical roles in filling the financial gaps in the future.
- Although studies show that Southeast Asia is in dire need of climate adaptation, the region did not receive enough financial assistance on climate adaptation-related projects. Projects such as Nature-based solutions (NBS) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) have been attractive and proven bankable. Donors must continue mobilising funding for scaling and replication of these projects across the region. At the same time, ASEAN countries need to articulate better adaptation pledges as well as make adaptation investments bankable to attract more capital from other sources.
- Determining the instruments for climate action has been a contentious issue in many climate conferences. While economists and policymakers are still examining the prospect of various climate instruments, ASEAN governments must consider utilising a wide variety of instruments. Such an approach will help diversify financial sources.[17]
- The analysis in Figure 9 suggests that some sectors are underfunded, such as infrastructure and health (Cambodia) and IPPU (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam). ASEAN countries need to articulate their climate finance needs more clearly in their NDCs, e.g. defining conditional and unconditional targets at sector level, identifying sectors that need climate finance, and estimating amounts needed if possible, so that international finance can better match their contribution to the Paris Agreement.
Appendix 1
Methodology and Analysis on Most Funded Sectors Versus Sectors in Need of Climate Finance
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted to the UNFCCC contain details of the climate finance needed for each country to fulfil its conditional targets. Figure 9 compares sectoral focuses on climate mitigation and adaptation finance received in 2000-2019 versus climate finance needs reported by ASEAN countries (where data are available from their NDCs and/or BURs), while detailed figures can be found in Tables 1 and 2 below. While some countries have identified specific sectors where international financial support is needed, others have gone further to estimate the amount of finance needed for specific sectors and projects. It should be noted that sector categories differ for climate finance received (from OECD data) and climate finance needs (from country reports), which allows for only a general comparison between the two.
Cambodia
The sector allocation of mitigation finance received by Cambodia so far is generally aligned with its needs. Both show an emphasis on forestry, agriculture and other land-use activities. Past finance flows also focused on multi-sector projects. Notably, the waste sector has the second greatest need for mitigation finance, after forestry. In terms of adaptation, Cambodia’s top identified financial needs were for Infrastructure (climate resilience and response measures), Water and Agriculture. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Water Supply and Sanitation are indeed among the top sectors for which Cambodia received adaptation finance, though more focus may be needed for Infrastructure and Energy measures. For longer-term finance (2025-2050), Cambodia has indicated in its Long-Term Strategy for Carbon Neutrality that its international climate finance needs for meeting its 2050 carbon neutrality target amount to US$2.3 billion. It intends to allocate such funds to the Transport (public transport and rail freight), Forestry and Energy (carbon capture and storage and grid flexibility) sectors.
Indonesia
Indonesia identified the greatest need for finance in the Energy and transport, LULUCF, Waste and Agriculture sectors. This matches the sectors in which it received the most climate mitigation finance in 2000-2019, with a significant amount allocated to multi-sector activities as well. Indonesia did not indicate sector-specific needs for adaptation finance.
Laos
There is a good match between the sector allocation in finance received and finance needed, with the main focus being on Forests, Energy, Transport and Waste. In terms of amount, mitigation finance received in 2000-2019 was much less than what Laos needs now to achieve its 2030 targets. For instance, Laos received about US$ 178 million for the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries sector in 2000-2019, compared to the US$ 3.4 billion it requires in the forestry sector this decade. This indicates a need to ratchet up the volume of climate finance flows to the country to meet demand, while maintaining similar sector priorities. Laos did not indicate sector-specific needs for adaptation finance.
Malaysia
Malaysia specified mitigation finance needs in two sectors: Energy and Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU). The top five sectors in which Malaysia received climate mitigation finance included Industry, Mining and Construction, while Energy was the sixth most financed sector, and may be an area for greater attention in future. For climate adaptation finance, Malaysia indicated its needs in the Water and Health sectors. Health was among the top sectors in climate adaptation finance received, while the Water sector has received less than 100,000 USD in adaptation finance so far.
Myanmar
Myanmar’s sector priorities for climate mitigation finance needs were Energy, Agriculture and Transport. In 2000-2019, it mainly received mitigation finance in the Energy, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sectors. Moving forward, a greater emphasis on the Transport sector may be needed. For adaptation finance needs, Myanmar indicated its need for support in the Agriculture and Health sectors, but did not specify the amounts. Both of these sectors have also been prioritised in past adaptation finance.
Thailand
Thailand identified its greatest mitigation finance needs in the Energy, Transport and Waste sectors. These sectors also received the most mitigation finance in 2000-2019. In adaptation, Thailand identified needs in Agriculture, Health and Water (amounts not specified), while its top receiving sectors of adaptation finance in the past two decades included Water Supply and Sanitation, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing as well as Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. While the latter includes support for healthcare services in the aftermath of disasters, more comprehensive and holistic support for the Health sector may be needed.
Vietnam
Vietnam’s estimated mitigation finance needs are the greatest in the Energy sector, followed by Agriculture, Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), IPPU and Waste. In 2000-2019, it received the greatest mitigation finance in Energy, Transport and Storage, General Environment Protection, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Water Supply and Sanitation. Future mitigation finance flows to Vietnam may need greater focus on the IPPU sector. Vietnam did not indicate sector-specific needs for adaptation finance.
The Philippines
While comparisons were not made for the Philippines due to a lack of sector-specific information on its climate finance needs and 2030 targets, the country has strongly signalled its need for international support on mitigation. Its updated NDC states an unconditional economy-wide target of 2.71% in emissions reduction and avoidance, while its conditional target of 75% in emissions reduction is much more ambitious. Hence, its climate mitigation potential is largely contingent on aid. So far, the mitigation finance it has received has been dominated by spending in the Transport and Storage sector, which amounts to 6.9 billion USD, or 80.7% of all mitigation finance received in 2000-2019. The Philippines’ reported national circumstances, as detailed in its updated NDC, emphasise adaptation gaps in disaster management as well as infrastructure in the food and agriculture and health sectors. In 2000-2019, the adaptation finance it received was mainly in Disaster Preparedness, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Water Supply and Sanitation, as well as multi-sector activities.
Table 1. ASEAN Countries’ Climate Mitigation Finance Needs (2019 million USD)
ENDNOTES
[1] Natalia Alayza and Molly Caldwell, “Financing Climate Action and the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Analysis of 17 Developing Countries,” October 28, 2021, https://www.wri.org/research/financing-climate-action-and-covid-19-pandemic.
[2] Leslie Hook and Joanna S. Kao, “COP26: Where Does All the Climate Finance Money Go?,” Financial Times, November 3, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/d9e832b7-525b-470b-89db-6275853315dd.
[3] William Worley, “Report: $100B Climate Finance Commitment Won’t Be Met until 2023,” Devex, October 25, 2021, https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/report-100b-climate-finance-commitment-won-t-be-met-until-2023-101923.
[4] Ry Sochan, “Developed Countries Should Pledge More to Tackle Climate Change, Says PM,” October 8, 2020, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50771436/developed-countries-should-pledge-more-to-tackle-climate-change-says-pm/.
Petir Garda Bhwana, “COP26; Jokowi Calls for More Climate Help from Developed Countries,” Tempo, November 2, 2021, https://en.tempo.co/read/1523866/cop26-jokowi-calls-for-more-climate-help-from-developed-countries
[5] Writers’ analysis based on the updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of ASEAN Member States.
[6] Assuming the total population of ASEAN countries without Brunei and Singapore is 654 million (2020).
[7] Statista, “ASEAN Countries – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita 2016-2026,” in Statista, accessed January 6, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/804307/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-the-asean-countries/.
[8] David Eckstein et al., “GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2020 Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2018 and 1999 to 2018” (Germanwatch, December 2019).
[9] Sharon Seah, Melinda Martinus, and Jiahui Qiu, “Southeast Asia Climate Outlook 2021 Survey Report” (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, September 16, 2021), /wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Southeast-Asia-Climate-Outlook-2021-Survey-Report.pdf.
[10] International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), “ Summary report, 31 October – 12 November 2021 Glasgow Climate Change Conference” (IISD, 2021), https://enb.iisd.org/Glasgow-Climate-Change-Conference-COP26-summary.
[11] Oxfam, “Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020” (Oxfam, 2020), https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621066/bp-climate-finance-shadow-report-2020-201020-en.pdf.
[12] Jubilee Debt Campaign, “Lower Income Countries Spend Five Times More on Debt Payments than Dealing with Climate Change” (Jubilee Debt Campaign, October 2021), https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Lower-income-countries-spending-on-adaptation_10.21.pdf.
[13] Zoha Shawoo, “Climate Finance Needs to Acknowledge the Unmitigated Debt Crisis,” November 2, 2021, https://www.sei.org/perspectives/climate-finance-acknowledge-debt-crisis/.
[14] Joe Thwaites, “Analysis: Why Climate-Finance ‘flows’ Are Falling Short of $100 Bn Pledge,” October 25, 2021, https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-why-climate-finance-flows-are-falling-short-of-100bn-pledge.
[15] The World Bank, “International Debt Statistics” (Washington DC, 2021), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/36289/9781464818004.pdf.
[16] Thwaites, “Analysis: Why Climate-Finance ‘flows’ Are Falling Short of $100 Bn Pledge.”
[17] UNFCCC, “TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE FINANCE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA” (Bonn, Germany, 2021).
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2022/8 “Myanmar’s National Unity Government: A Radical Arrangement to Counteract the Coup” by Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Myanmar military deposed the National League for Democracy government on 1 February 2021, and by April 2021, it had formed the State Administrative Council (SAC) to run the country. In opposition to this turn of events, democratically elected lawmakers side-lined by the coup quickly formed the National Unity Government (NUG) as an alternative political representation for the country, and in effect, as a government-in-hiding.
- The NUG’s cabinet line-up is manifestly and consciously diverse. This exhibits its intent to attract support from Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organisations.
- The NUG has been making a series of pronouncements to display its ambition 1) to redress past injustices against various communities and ethnic nationality groups across Myanmar, and 2) to establish its legitimacy domestically and abroad.
- Moving forward, NUG’s great challenge lies in managing the disparate interests of the ethnic armed groups, and of regional and international interlocutors.
* Moe Thuzar is Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Htet Myet Min Tun is a Research Intern at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/8, 28 January 2022
INTRODUCTION
Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) emerged on 16 April 2021 amidst the political crisis following the military putsch that had deposed the Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) never took the seat of government despite its electoral victory, and was instead deposed on 1 February by the military. In its stead, the military-backed State Administrative Council (SAC) was formed in April to govern the country.
In a daring move in opposition to this turn of events, elected lawmakers side-lined by the coup decided to establish the National Unity Government (NUG) on 16 April 2021.
Given its unhappy circumstances, the NUG has been striving to gain as much support as it can from Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). In fact, as many as 13 of the 26 members of its cabinet line-up are from ethnic nationalities.[1] This includes the acting president and prime minister.[2] A third of the cabinet are women, an LGBTQ+ human rights activist is the NUG minister for human rights, and at least two deputy ministers are from political parties that contested for seats against the NLD in 2020.[3]
The NUG is seeking to concretise the NLD’s tentative pledge[4] made after its 2020 election victory to form a “national unity” government.[5] The high level of attention it is paying to Myanmar’s ethnic nationalities and their federalist aspirations goes beyond the NLD’s vision.
While the NLD had emphasised democracy before federalism, the NUG is prioritising federalism. It also exhibits greater inclusion of ethnic and other stakeholder interests, and views itself to be laying the foundation for “a federal union that seeks to address decades of structural violence against all the people of Myanmar regardless of race and religion”.[6]
In particular, policy pronouncements made by the NUG includes a reversal of NLD-era statements that had defended atrocities committed by the military against the Rohingya.
In this paper, we examine the NUG’s proposed alternatives to the nation-building visions of both the State Administration Council (SAC) and the NLD. Optimistic and ambitious, the NUG’s state- and peace-building proclamations present a significant departure from the past.[7] Our review finds that the NUG wishes 1) to redress past injustices against various communities and ethnic nationality groups across Myanmar, and 2) to establish its legitimacy domestically and abroad.
THE NUG BEFORE AND AFTER 16 APRIL
The NUG’s first appointments date from as early as a month after the coup. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH),[8] formed on 5 February, drew on the electoral legitimacy of its members[9] to provide legal grounding for the anti-junta movement that started almost immediately after the coup. The CRPH appointed on 5 March “an interim government” comprising four “acting ministers”: foreign affairs; Union Government and President’s Office; labour, immigration, population, education, health and sports; and planning, finance and industry, commerce, and investment and foreign economic relations.[10] On 10 March, former Amyotha Hluttaw Speaker Mahn Win Khaing Than was named acting vice-president.[11]
The CRPH released the Federal Democracy Charter 2021[12] on 31 March, and announced on April 1 the dissolution of the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. The 2021 charter draws from past proposals for a federal future for the country,[13] and lists core principles and a road map towards establishing a civilian-led Federal Democratic Union and a Federal Army.[14] The road-map included the creation of an interim National Unity Government (NUG), and a National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) as a consultative platform for the CRPH, political parties, EAOs, representatives of the civil disobedience movement (CDM), and civil society organisations (CSOs).
The CRPH appointed the NUG on 16 April, with 11 ministries and a 26-member cabinet that retained President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.[15] Acting Vice-President Mahn Win Khaing Than became Prime Minister, and Duwa Lashi La replaced him as the NUG’s Acting Vice-President, later becoming Acting President.[16]
The NUG’s pronouncements and efforts since 16 April seem to recognise the importance of addressing unfinished business from the NLD’s previous term.[17] The NUG’s scope of EAO and stakeholder consultation also goes beyond that of the SAC’s ceasefire overtures.[18]
THE CRPH, NUG AND NUCC
The CRPH appoints the NUG and its cabinet. These latter two are accountable to the CRPH, which exercises legislative and oversight functions in the interim. The CRPH also led and coordinated the development of the 2021 Federal Democracy Charter.[19] That charter states that the NUG is an interim body. The NUCC does not have a similar qualifier to its description. The NUG is thus ‘mandated’ by the CRPH to coordinate with the NUCC in implementing the 2021 charter objectives.
The NUG functions as the executive branch implementing the charter’s political objectives, while the NUCC serves as the consultative body discussing and deciding on issues, particularly those related to state or region-level governance plans.[20] Both the NUG and CRPH participate in the NUCC, and contribute to the NUCC’s preparations for convening a People’s Assembly to develop the new federal constitution to replace the 2008 Constitution.[21]
The CRPH and NUG are thus companion structures to the NUCC as well as participants in NUCC deliberations. Though formally launched in November, the NUCC’s informal establishment predated the NUG’s appointment. Figure 1 explains the steps on the road-map.
The road-map’s second step, the establishment of a “platform/structure where political parties, ethnic armed organisations and civil society organisations including women and youth organisations can work together to discuss and validate political agreements and future activities”, refers to the NUCC. Formation of the NUG is the fourth step. The CRPH serves the interim legislative function for the political process. To date, there are no interim judiciary appointments although the NUG has a Ministry of Justice, and the 2021 Federal Democracy Charter calls for the NUG and NUCC to “collaborate and negotiate to develop and implement interim judicial policy and plans”.[22]
No single entity or individual leads the NUCC, which emphasises collective leadership by the different organisations/entities involved in it.[23] These number 28 at the time of writing, and include the CRPH and NUG, and representatives of eight EAOs who are either direct participants or part of the region/state consultative councils representing several (but not all) ethnic nationality groups.[24]
Figure 1. Political Road-Map for the Federal Democracy Union
A BREAK FROM THE PAST?
The NUG seems to be the main channel communicating to the international community the sentiments of domestic forces resisting the military. More a government-in-hiding rather than a government-in-exile, the NUG recognises the importance of maintaining popular support for it across the country, as well as having claim to territorial presence.
Though not the first parallel government structure to emerge in Myanmar, the NUG differs from past parallel government moves in 1969-1973 and 1988.[25]
The NUG is not the first effort to include representatives of ethnic and other key stakeholder groups resisting a coup. The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) that emerged in the aftermath of the 1990 elections annulled by the then military regime, made a similar attempt. Learning from the NCGUB’s experience, however, the NUG has focused its legitimacy assertions on both the domestic and external fronts, using external relations and networks to reinforce and justify its domestic-oriented policy pronouncements. The NUG’s strategic approach to communicating its positions, policies and pronouncements internationally make effective use of its external support network and social media.
Table 1 summarises the NUG’s key policies/pronouncements from April to December 2021. The NUG’s Acting President, official spokesperson and various ministers have shared aspects and details of these policies in their interactions with representatives of governments or legislatures of several countries in the international community.
The NUG’s a) admission of accountability for past treatment of the Rohingya, b) mobilisation of a Covid-19 Task Force at the height of the pandemic’s devastating spread across Myanmar in July 2021, and c) foreign policy assertions with several external interlocutors, provide three examples of the NUG’s focus on leveraging international attitudes and sympathy as much as possible.
With its eye on the international front, the NUG seems most active in foreign policy. The NUG’s undertaking to accord Rohingya citizenship, repeal the 1982 Citizenship Law, and account for the atrocities committed against the Rohingya, constitute concrete deliverables. The NUG’s Covid-19 Task Force illustrates practical partnerships with ethnic networks/communities to tackle the shared health challenge arising from the pandemic, and negotiate with the international community for vaccine support.
The People’s Defensive War – which the NUG announced on 7 September – may constitute the most controversial policy; the international community held mixed views and reactions to this move.[26] Be that as it may, the NUG’s call to arms was widely welcomed, supported and acted upon across Myanmar. Its establishment of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) in May and the subsequent proliferation of many local PDF chapters/groups serve as a barometer of on-ground sentiments. At the same time, this also indicates the challenge that the NUG faces – the delicate task of balancing many interests, with ethnic armed groups and organisations, and with regional and international interlocutors.[27]
Table 1. NUG Pronouncements from April to December 2021
| Policy/Position/Pronouncement | Date | Description/Remarks |
| Federalism The NUG’s Union Vision states that: “We shall build a peaceful Federal Democracy Union which guarantees freedom, justice and equality.”[28] | April 2021 | The NUG’s Union Values include gender equality and basic human rights; equality and self-determination; collective leadership; diversity and non-discrimination; and protection of minority rights.[29] |
| Foreign Policy The NUG continues to uphold the independent, active and non-aligned foreign policy, but focuses on establishing “friendly relations with nations that support the complete abolishment of dictatorship”.[30] | 30 May 2021 | The over-arching foreign policy thrust is on gaining international recognition, (including securing Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations and ASEAN) and delegitimise the SAC junta. |
| Rohingya – NUG has announced it will cooperate with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to ensure Myanmar’s compliance with international legal obligations regarding the Rohingya[31] – Rohingya policy position[32] – Acceptance of International Criminal Court (ICC) scrutiny[33] | 31 May 2021 3 June 2021 Letter sent 17 July 2021, publicly announced 20 August 2021 | The NUG’s Rohingya policy acknowledges the atrocities committed by the military against the Rohingya, and also undertakes to accord the Rohingya visibility as Myanmar citizens. The NUG accepted ICC jurisdiction in August and has indicated its interest (as early as March by the CRPH) to accede to the Rome Statute.[34] On 20 January 2022, NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung shared to the media that Myanmar’s Ambassador to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun, had formally applied to represent Myanmar on behalf of the NUG at the ICJ’s hearing on the case of Gambia vs Myanmar scheduled for 21 February 2022. [35] |
| Covid-19 Task Force[36] | 21 July 2021 | The NUG’s Covid-19 Task Force is a collaborative effort between the NUG’s Ministry of Health, and ethnic health organisations. It gives a lead role to Dr Cynthia Maung, Chair of the Ethnic Health Committee, and not to the NUG Health Minister Dr Zaw Wai Soe. The NUG’s vaccine plans for people in ‘liberated areas’ prioritised working with ethnic health networks for vaccination, and negotiating with the WHO’s COVAX facility six million vaccine doses in August 2021. |
| Responsible Investment – Guidelines announced[37] -Announcement listing eight companies pursuing “illegal investments” in Myanmar, and a special directive demanding immediate and unconditional suspension[38] | 21 July 2021 31 August 2021 | In May, NUG clarified its differentiation[39] between existing investors (prior to the Feb 1 coup) and those that signed investment agreements with the SAC junta after Feb 1, signalling that it “would not push companies into a corner”, a message intended for those companies that had inked investment agreements with Myanmar prior to the 1 February coup. The NUG’s Ministry for Planning, Finance and Investment has posted on its website a “boycott list” of military-affiliated companies.[40] This was followed by a list naming eight companies seeking “unlawful” investment permits from the SAC-controlled Myanmar Investment Commission.[41] Various NUG ministries have welcomed the withdrawal (on 21 January 2022) of TotalEnergies and Chevron Corp from Myanmar. The ministries for planning, finance and investment, and for electricity and energy, have called for responsible divestment moves to consult the NUG.[42] |
| Fund-raising and financial – Spring Lottery[43] – Online tax payment invitation – Sale of NUG Bonds[44] – Confirming digital currency USD Tether as legal tender[45] | 15 August 2021 October 2021 22 November 2021 11 December 2021 (Earlier on 2 July 2021, the NUG welcomed donations using cryptocurrencies Tether and Binance) | The NUG aims to fund-raise through three main channels – the sale of lottery tickets, the sale of two-year bonds, and invitations to pay taxes, all of which are conducted online. These initiatives are aimed at covering funding needs for vaccine procurement, and to provide some financial support for CDM and the People’s Defence Forces under the NUG’s chain of command. The NUG also plans to tax business owners. As at October 2021, the NUG had received $150,000 in tax revenue.[46] Within hours of launching the bond sales on 22 November, the NUG sold more than $6 million worth of bonds (see Note 39). |
| Defence – Formation of People’s Defence Forces [47] – Declaration of a “People’s Defensive War” [48] – Establishment of a military command structure (Central Command and Coordination Committee or C3C)[49] | 5 May 2021 7 September 2021 28 October 2021 | The CRPH started talks with various EAOs in March 2021, towards the vision of a federal union, amidst growing calls for a “people’s army” to resist and respond to the Myanmar military’s lethal use of force against civilian protestors. On 14 March, the CRPH issued a declaration “informing the people of their right to self-defence”.[50] Building on the CRPH’s moves, the NUG formed the People’s Defence Force or PDF on 5 May, as a precursor to establishing a ‘Federal Union Army’ which would incorporate the PDF and various EAOs fighting the Myanmar military. The PDF was intended as the NUG’s armed wing. By May, many young people and civilian protestors had fled to EAO-controlled areas to receive training, including urban guerrilla warfare. Several local PDF chapters also sprang up, and actively clashed with Myanmar military troops in areas such as Sagaing. The Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing regions witnessed the first targeted killings of military-appointed local administrators in May. By June, at least 58 PDF chapters had been formed, of which 12 were active, but not necessarily linked to the NUG.[51] The NUG issued in May a “code of conduct” urging that PDFs “must not threaten, target or attack civilians” or target civilian locations. The NUG’s chain of command structure in October was also intended to provide a central coordinating body to coordinate discrete local (and ethnic) resistance against the military.[52] Further details on the composition of this central command structure have not yet been announced. The NUG Ministries of Defence and of Home Affairs and Immigration both publish on the NUG Facebook page updates of clashes with military forces. The Ministry of Defence terms the clashes “battles” and the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration refers to the People’s Defensive War. |
| Information, Communication and Technology – Kickstarting Radio NUG [53] | 20 August 2021 | Also known as Public Voice (or People’s Voice) Radio, Radio NUG first aired on 20 August 2021. It has regular morning and evening FM broadcasts, and spiked a demand for shortwave radios when it first launched. Though there have been at least two other anti-junta FM stations launched since the 1 February coup, Radio NUG is the NUG’s official radio channel.[54] NUG Defence Minister U Yee Mon has explained the launch of Radio NUG as responding to the need for “emergency communications” in the “next phase” of the anti-junta movement.[55] |
| Education Launch of mobile learning programmes[56] | 17 June 2021 | The NUG Ministry of Education has focused on its home-based learning (HBL) programme which has a dedicated Facebook page starting 20 July 2021. The ministry uses this “Myanmar Basic Education Home” (MBEH)Facebook channel as the primary platform for public awareness on its HBL programmes, and to transmit HBL classes starting September 2021. Spanning kindergarten to Grade 11, and also including special needs and IT education, the MBEH channel has delivered over 2400 courses from September to December 2021.[57] |
The NUG exhibits a more inclusive national unity vision, and its fund-raising initiatives are aimed at a wider support-base, as the purchase of lottery tickets and bonds are not limited only to citizens or nationals residing in Myanmar. The Myanmar diaspora’s support for the CRPH and the NUG has been substantial in terms of cash donations and facilitation of humanitarian assistance through informal channels. Aung Myo Min’s appointment as human rights minister is a first for any government in Myanmar – parallel or otherwise – in walking the inclusion talk for the LGBTQ community.
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
With most of the NUG’s policies and positions communicated via social media, mainly Facebook and Twitter, the role of the NUG Ministry for Information, Communication and Technology seems minimal. However, U Htin Lin Aung, the minister for this portfolio, was formerly the CRPH’s “International Representative” and presumably continues his liaison role to communicate NUG’s views and positions to various external interlocutors away from the public eye. He is not alone in this latter task. Minister for International Cooperation Dr Sa Sa is also the NUG’s official spokesperson. Myanmar Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) U Kyaw Moe Tun openly declared his support for the NUG in February 2021, and continues to share information on the situation in Myanmar with the UN Secretary-General and Permanent Representatives of other UN member states, using his incumbent status as Myanmar’s representative to the UN.
Among the NUG’s 17 ministries, those for justice and commerce have Facebook pages but not websites. The NUG ministry of justice announced in November 2021 the temporary formation of an “All Myanmar Judicial Employees’ Association” to address judiciary aspects of NUG and NUCC “policies and plans”.[58] The nature of how the NUG has to operate renders it unable to implement an effective judiciary.
Similarly, the NUG ministry of commerce is unable to pursue an active commercial policy towards boosting economic growth and consumption. The ministry communicates public announcements mainly through its Facebook page. It has conducted seminars and trainings (on commercial diplomacy, inclusive business, and cross-border trade facilitation, among others), met with workers’ organisations in industrial zones in Yangon, and published salient facts about the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to which the NLD government had acceded in November 2020. It has also donated funds for persons fleeing conflict in areas along the Thai-Myanmar border. Minister for Commerce Dr Khin Ma Ma Myo (who previously held deputy defence minister responsibilities)[59] denounced the military-owned and operated Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) in November, calling for a boycott of military-owned or affiliated businesses.[60]
The NUG’s ministry of federal union affairs serves as a clearing house of reference documents and papers on federalism, including constitution-drafting at federal and state-levels, as well as information/background papers on federal education and dialogue.
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS[61]
The NUG’s policies and pronouncements are also made with a view to seeking/justifying recognition as a government, with external interlocutors. Its ongoing consultations with ethnic groups and other stakeholders in the country show the NUG’s objective to assert its position as an essential counterpart for dialogue in international and regional efforts responding to the Myanmar crisis. Foremost among the efforts have been those aimed at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The NUG faces a challenge in its efforts to engage with ASEAN collectively. Even with ASEAN’s decision to disinvite the SAC chief to its highest-level Summit meetings,[62] the SAC occupies the Myanmar seat at working-level meetings. Nevertheless, the NUG continues to express its willingness to engage with ASEAN, appointing an Ambassador to ASEAN in October 2021.[63] Earlier in April, after ASEAN’s discussions with the SAC chief to agree to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, the NUG Prime Minister issued a statement responding to the adoption of the Consensus. This statement indicated the NUG’s position on engaging ASEAN, including its disappointment that Myanmar’s representation at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in April “could not include the true situation and interests of the Myanmar people – which the NUG represents”. The statement mainly highlighted the SAC’s disingenuity and requested ASEAN to engage with the NUG in implementing the Consensus.[64]
The NUG’s main foreign policy “victory” has been at the UN. The NLD-appointed Ambassador to the UN Kyaw Moe Tun seized international attention and domestic imaginations in Myanmar with his emotional speech delivered to a UN plenary session on 26 February, supporting the anti-junta movement.[65] The US and China – both members of the UN Credentials Committee – agreed in September to maintain the incumbent in Myanmar’s UN seat, effectively denying the SAC’s assertions that its appointee (to replace Kyaw Moe Tun whom the SAC sacked following his defiance) is the country’s legal representative to the UN.
Since April, the NUG has stepped up its external relations with a variety of interlocutors by appointing representatives in third countries. To date, the NUG has established representative offices in six countries – Australia, France, South Korea, the US, the UK, and Czech Republic.[66] Various NUG ministers have held online meetings with lawmakers from Canada, Australia, the European Union, Spain, and Japan, as well as senior government representatives from the United States, Germany and Sweden.[67]
The international community’s engagements with the NUG, however, have fallen short of explicit recognition. The European Parliament[68] and the French Senate[69] enacted resolutions in October that indicated support for the NUG as the “legitimate representative” of the Myanmar people, and the Czech Republic[70] recognised the NUG’s Liaison Officer in May. Although some Asian nations maintain informal communications with the NUG, they have as yet shown no interest in formal recognition.
CONCLUSION
The NUG’s pronouncements, coupled with its participation in the NUCC, indicate that the anti-junta opposition has much broader interests and aims for national reconciliation beyond the NLD’s vision.
The CRPH, NUCC and NUG provide a collective platform for an inclusive, consultative, and decentralised form of governance, navigating decades-long fault-lines. Though the intertwined and inter-connected nature of these bodies’ interactions may prove confusing to external interlocutors, it is important to appreciate the consultative decision-making process.
Myanmar’s complex history of failed promises and competing visions for a federal future has an equally strong bearing on the motivations and making of the 1 February coup, as well as on the development and evolution of the anti-junta movement post-coup. The NUG’s emergence is part of this process.
The NUG’s moves and choices are also affected by the public sentiment and disappointment in Myanmar on the sluggishness of international diplomacy in responding to the Myanmar crisis, especially as the military continues to commit atrocities against local communities. The increasing number of clashes between local defence forces (with or without EAO support) and junta security forces show how communities across Myanmar seem more determined than ever to take matters into their own hands.
The NUG’s current situation of being a government-in-hiding hampers its agility. Even so, there are areas where the NUG can consolidate its legitimacy and support. These are in providing alternative education opportunities, and expanding the health policy beyond the Covid-19 response. In other words, the NUG can prove its effectiveness in delivering essential social services to wider swathes of the populace, especially in ethnic areas.
Delivering on this, and other federalism promises, may be the determining factor for many in Myanmar to place their faith in the NUG’s offer for a future that breaks from the country’s troubled past of broken trust and promises, and Bamar-dominant political interests.[71]
ENDNOTES
[1] Myanmar Now, “CRPH announces lineup of interim ‘national unity government”, 16 April 2021 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/crph-announces-lineup-of-interim-national-unity-government, downloaded 15 December 2021).
[2] Acting President Duwa Lashi La is of Kachin ethnicity and Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than is a Karen (Kayin).
[3] The Irrawaddy, “Who’s Who in Myanmar’s National Unity Government”, 16 April 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/whos-myanmars-national-unity-government.html, downloaded 15 December 2021).
U Aung Myo Min, the NUG minister for human rights, was a student activist in the 1988 democracy uprising, and spent over 20 years in exile before returning to Myanmar in 2013. He founded the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma in 2000, which was later renamed Equality Myanmar (in 2012). He continued to serve as Equality Myanmar’s Executive Director up to the time of his appointment to the NUG cabinet on 3 May 2021. He has received several international awards for his work on human rights and equality.
See Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, “Appointment of Union Ministers and Deputy Ministers”, 3 May 2021 (https://crphmyanmar.org/appointment-of-union-ministers-and-deputy-ministers/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
See also Frontier Myanmar, “Aung Myo Min: ‘Treat us as human beings, not as a problem’”, 16 February 2016 ( https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/aung-myo-min-treat-us-as-human-beings-not-as-a-problem/, downloaded 2 January 2022).
Bio-data of Aung Myo Min: https://mohr.nugmyanmar.org/en/%e1%80%95%e1%80%bc%e1%80%8a%e1%80%ba%e1%80%91%e1%80%b1%e1%80%ac%e1%80%84%e1%80%ba%e1%80%85%e1%80%af%e1%80%9d%e1%80%94%e1%80%ba%e1%80%80%e1%80%bc%e1%80%ae%e1%80%b8/
U Laphai Maw Htun Awng, the NUG deputy minister for energy and electricity, is an ethnic Kachin who contested in the 2020 election, as a candidate for the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, and lost to the Ta’ang National Party candidate in a five-cornered fight for a seat in Shan State Constituency 5. Laphai Maw Htun Awng has been active in research and advocacy on transparency and accountability issues in natural resource extraction in Myanmar. He is an Obama Foundation Fellow, and was a Fulbright fellow at Cornell Institute for Public Affairs.
Bio-data of Laphai Maw Htun Awng at: https://moee.nugmyanmar.org/en/deputy-minister/
See ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, “Myanmar After the Coup: Insights from the Inside”, 21 May 2021 (/mec-events/myanmar-after-the-coup-insights-from-inside/ and /media/event-highlights/webinar-on-myanmar-after-the-coup-insights-from-inside/,downloaded 2 January 2022).
See also Thiha Lwin, “Shan Party Candidate Alleges Fraud in Myanmar’s General Election”, 24 December 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/shan-party-candidate-alleges-fraud-myanmars-general-election.html, downloaded 2 January 2022).
Daw Ei Thinzar Maung, the NUG deputy minister for women, youth and social affairs, was a student activist. She contested against (and lost to) the NLD candidate in Yangon’s Pabedan Township, representing the Democratic Party for a New Society. After the 1 February military coup, Ei Thinzar Maung was at the fore of the earliest anti-junta protests. She was among three Myanmar ladies listed in the Times 100 list of most influential people for 2021.
See Coconuts Yangon, “Three Myanmar women among ‘most influential’ of 2021: Time”, 16 September 2021 (https://coconuts.co/yangon/news/three-myanmar-among-most-influential-people-of-2021-time/, downloaded 2 January 2022).
See also Abby Seiff, “Fearless”, Mekong Review, Issue 23, May 2021 (https://mekongreview.com/fearless/, downloaded 2 January 2022).
Bio-data of Ei Thinzar Maung at: https://mowyca.nugmyanmar.org/about/deputy-minister
[4] Hay Man Pyae, “Despite landslide victory, NLD appeals to ethnic parties to join its ‘national unity government’”, Myanmar Now, 13 November 2020 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/despite-landslide-victory-nld-appeals-to-ethnic-parties-to-join-its-national-unity-government, downloaded 15 December 2021)
[5] The NLD’s national unity government pledge sought to reach out to (and appease) the ethnic political parties after the NLD’s relations with some of them soured during its 2016-2020 term. There had been mergers of several ethnic political parties prior to the 2020 elections, to push back against what they perceived as NLD (and by extension Bamar) dominance. These ethnic political parties – both new and existing – lost to NLD candidates in several ethnic-nationality dominant constituencies in the 2020 elections. So too did the military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), the NLD’s main ‘opponent’. After its initial statement of intent for national unity, the NLD held talks with several ethnic parties. Some talks, for example, those with the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) – one of the biggest ethnic parties – were claimed to be successful. Some failed, as in the case of Mon Unity Party (MUP), one of whose members eventually joined the SAC. See Thet Zin Soe, “NLD claims success in talks with Shan ethnic parties”, The Myanmar Times, 17 January 2021 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/nld-claims-success-talks-shan-ethnic-parties.html, downloaded 5 January 2022) and Zin Lin Htet, “Myanmar’s NLD, Mon Unity Party Fail to Meet Due to Venue Dispute”, The Irrawaddy, 5 January 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-nld-mon-unity-party-fail-meet-due-venue-dispute.html, downloaded 5 January 2022). However, the NLD did not announce further details about the composition of its new government. Instead, its attention seemed to mainly focus on refuting the election fraud allegations first started by the USDP and later picked up by the military, particularly Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Members of parliament (MPs) appointed by the military and those few elected from the USDP and other political parties threatened a boycott of the Hluttaw (Myanmar’s parliament) when it would convene on 1 February 2021, which added to a more sombre than jubilant cast of mood prior to that projected convening of the Hluttaw.
[6] Personal communication with support team for the NUG Foreign Ministry, 19 April 2021.
[7] This view was shared by a leading expert on peace and reconciliation in Southeast Asia, 19 April 2021.
See also Ashley South, “Towards ‘Emergent Federalism’ in Post-Coup Myanmar”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2021), ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, pp. 439-60.
[8] Online Burma/Myanmar Library, “Statement by the Representatives of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (National League For Democracy) (2/2021), 5 February 2021”
(https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/2021-02-05-Statement-by-the-Representatives-of_the-Pyidaungsu-Hluttaw_NLD_2-2012-en-tu-red.pdf, downloaded 15 December 2021).
[9] Frontier Myanmar, “NLD lawmakers in Nay Pyi Taw defy military, take oath of office”, 4 February 2021 (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/nld-lawmakers-in-nay-pyi-taw-defy-military-take-oath-of-office/, downloaded 15 December 2021).
[10] Daw Zin Mar Aung (foreign affairs) and U Lwin Ko Latt (Union Government/President’s Office) are elected lawmakers from the NLD and members of the CRPH. U Tin Tun Naing, holding the planning and finance/investment/commerce portfolios, is an elected NLD lawmaker. Dr Zaw Wai Soe, (labour/education/health) was Rector of University of Medicine-1, Yangon, and had served as vice-chairman of the Yangon Covid-19 Prevention, Control and Treatment Committee. He participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) following the February 1 coup. See The Irrawaddy,
“Defying Military Regime, Myanmar’s CRPH Names Four Acting Ministers”, 2 March 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/defying-military-regime-myanmars-crph-names-four-acting-ministers.html, downloaded 20 December 2021).
Since then, Lwin Ko Latt has taken up the home affairs and immigration portfolio, and the CRPH appointed Mon politician Nai Tun Pe (aka Nai Suwunna or Nai Thuwunna) to the labour portfolio on 3 May 2021. Nai Tun Pe concurrently serves as Chair of the Mon State Interim Consultative Council (MISCC) which also participates in the NUCC. A former member of the Mon Unity Party (MUP), Nai Tun Pe resigned from that party in March 2021 when the MUP aligned with the SAC junta.
Dr Zaw Wai Soe continues to hold both health and education portfolios.
Bio-data of Zin Mar Aung: https://mofa.nugmyanmar.org/union-minister/
Bio-data of Tin Tun Naing: https://mopfi.nugmyanmar.org/union-minister/
Bio-data of Lwin Ko Latt: https://mohai.nugmyanmar.org/en/%e1%80%95%e1%80%bc%e1%80%8a%e1%80%ba%e1%80%91%e1%80%b1%e1%80%ac%e1%80%84%e1%80%ba%e1%80%85%e1%80%af%e1%80%9d%e1%80%94%e1%80%ba%e1%80%80%e1%80%bc%e1%80%ae%e1%80%b8/
Bio-data of Dr Zaw Wai Soe: https://moh.nugmyanmar.org/biography-minister/
Bio-data of Nai Tun Pe: https://mol.nugmyanmar.org/ministers/union-minister-biography/
[11] An NLD member since 2013, and former Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw (or Upper House) in Myanmar’s parliament, Mahn Win Khaing Than’s political antecedents date back to 1947; his grandfather Mahn Ba Khaing was a member of Aung San’s Interim Government of Burma, and was assassinated along with Aung San on 19 July 1947. Mahn Win Khaing Than’s NUG role can also be interpreted as a link to the inclusive nature of the 1947 Interim Government of Burma led by Aung San, who was Aung San Suu Kyi’s father.
See Yohei Muramatsu, “Myanmar ‘provisional government’ appoints leader to counter junta”, 10 March 2021 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-provisional-government-appoints-leader-to-counter-junta, downloaded 20 December 2021).
Bio-data of Mahn Win Khaing Than: https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/prime-minister-mahn-winn-khaing-thann/
[12] Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, “Federal Democracy Charter Part-I: Declaration of Federal Democracy Union, 2021” and “Federal Democracy Charter Part-II: Interim Constitutional Arrangement, 2021”, April 2021 (https://crphmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Federal-Democracy-Charter-English.pdf, downloaded 21 December 2021).
[13] Since 1947, Burma/Myanmar has gone through several constitution-making attempts in tandem with conversations held with ethnic nationality groups on federalism. Prior to independence in 1948, the Panglong Agreement of 12 February 1947, and a draft Constitution by the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) then led by Aung San, constituted efforts by political leaders of the time to engage with ethnic groups. Federalism was a “key demand” by the ethnic minorities, and the 1947 Constitution – drafted by a constituent Assembly (boycotted by at least two key stakeholder groups at the time) – was criticised by several ethnic groups for not being inclusive enough and not going far enough in recognizing territorial and cultural claims (and autonomy).
After independence in 1948, several EAOs and the Communist Party of Burma took up arms against the government, and domestic stability deteriorated despite the government’s efforts at peace talks and amnesties. This led to perceptions that equated ethnic demands for federalism with a breakup of the country. A national conference on federalism and constitutional reform took place in February 1961, resulting in a Federal Proposal (to amend the 1947 Constitution) drawing from the ideas in the Panglong Agreement and the AFPFL Draft Constitution related to territorial recognition, self-determination, equality, autonomy, and the right to secession.
A constitutional reform conference scheduled for 2 March 1962 did not take place; Commander-in-Chief Ne Win seized power, deposing U Nu’s AFPFL government. This constitutional reform conference was to have discussed a proposal for Burma Proper to be a state alongside the seven other states named after major ethnic groups, in a federal system. Though Ne Win made attempts at both peace talks and constitutional discussions with ethnic armed groups and other stakeholders, both processes broke down as Ne Win’s expectations were for his Burmese Way to Socialism to prevail. The word ‘federalism’ became a taboo term, and Ne Win instituted the 1974 Constitution that had a “USSR-style” of recognizing ethnic nationalities.
After Ne Win’s socialist regime crumbled into direct military rule in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC) military regime initiated another round of peace talks (resulting in unwritten ceasefire agreements) with ethnic armed groups, and a military-controlled constitution-making process that sputtered over 1993 to 2007, with several suspensions and walkouts. Parallel to the SLORC/SPDC’s ‘National Convention’ process, the NLD and several of the EAOs came up with their own parallel effort for a federal union. Forming the National Council of the Union of Burma, they produced a first draft of a “Constitution of the Federal Union of Burma”.
The SPDC confirmed the resulting 2008 Constitution in a referendum widely viewed as flawed. Though the 2008 Constitution addressed some elements of the 1961 Federal Proposal, and refers to “cultural and traditional rights of national races”, there is no mention on federalism. The 2008 Constitution mainly privileged the military’s leadership role in governance.
Over the 2011-2020 period, both the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and NLD administrations drew from past constitutional “touch-stones” in pursuing peace talks and discussions on federalism with the EAOs.
See Melissa Crouch, “Constitutional Touchstones: Peace Processes, Federalism and Constitution-Making in Myanmar”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2020, pp 1350-1372. (https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/18/4/1350/6122371?redirectedFrom=fulltext, downloaded 20 December 2021).
See also Mael Raynaud, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Myanmar: A Modern Mandala System?”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/155, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 23 November 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-155-asymmetrical-federalism-in-myanmar-a-modern-mandala-system-by-mael-raynaud/, downloaded 23 November 2021).
[14] See entry on Defence in this paper’s Table 1.NUG Pronouncements from April to December 2021
See also
Sebastian Strangio, “Can Myanmar’s New ‘People’s Defense Force’ Succeed?”, 6 May 2021, (https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/can-myanmars-new-peoples-defense-force-succeed/, downloaded 27 December 2021).
Myanmar Now, “‘We’re about 80% there,’ CRPH’s foreign minister says on federal union talks”, 20 March 2021 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/were-about-80-there-crphs-foreign-minister-says-on-federal-union-talks, downloaded 27 December 2021).
Michael Safi and Observer reporter, “Myanmar’s besieged resistance dreams of ‘people’s army’ to counter junta”, 20 March 2021(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/20/myanmars-besieged-resistance-dreams-of-peoples-army-to-counter-junta, downloaded 27 December 2021).
The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Resistance Fighters Continue to Battle Junta Troops in Sagaing”, 23 May 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-resistance-fighters-continue-to-battle-junta-troops-in-sagaing.html, downloaded 27 December 2021).
The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Military-Appointed Administrators Killed By Anonymous Attackers”, 6 May 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-appointed-administrators-killed-by-anonymous-attackers.html, downloaded 27 December 2021).
Reporter in Yangon and Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Rise of armed civilian groups in Myanmar fuels fears of full-scale civil war”, 1 June 2021 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/01/rise-of-armed-civilian-groups-in-myanmar-fuels-fears-of-civil-war, downloaded 2 January 2022).
[15] Myanmar Now, “CRPH announces lineup of interim ‘national unity government’”, 16 April 2021 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/crph-announces-lineup-of-interim-national-unity-government, downloaded 15 December 2021).
At the time of writing, there are 17 ministries in the NUG – defence; health; planning, finance and investment; foreign affairs; education; home affairs and immigration; federal union affairs; humanitarian affairs and disaster management; human rights; natural resources and environmental conservation; international cooperation; women, youths and children affairs; labour; justice; communication, information and technology; electricity and energy; commerce. Led by Acting President and Prime Minister, the cabinet is made of 16 ministers and 16 deputy ministers. See National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/, downloaded 4 January 2022).
[16] The CRPH announced Duwa Lashi La’s appointment as NUG Vice President (and current Acting President) on 13 April 2021. Duwa Lashi La was active in the Kachin National Consultative Assembly (established in 2017 to provide inputs to the 21st Century Panglong peace talks or the Union Peace Conference convened by the National League for Democracy government), serving as its president from 2019 to January 2021. The Kachin National Consultative Assembly is the most politically authoritative body in Kachin State (The Irrawaddy, 16 April 2021). Duwa Lashi La holds a law degree from Rangoon University (1970) and practiced law until he retired in 1994. In his retirement years, he was active in several civil society endeavours in partnership with international donors, ranging from education initiatives such as the Institute for Liberal Arts and Sciences in areas under the control of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), to regional development activities in Northern Shan State. Bio-data of Duwa Lashi La: https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/acting-president-duwa-lashi-la/
[17] Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “NLD shrugs off threat of USDP hluttaw boycott”, Frontier Myanmar, 26 January 2021 (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/nld-shrugs-off-threat-of-usdp-hluttaw-boycott/, downloaded 15 December 2021).
[18] Personal communication with support team for the NUG Acting President, 23 January 2022.
The NUG is aware of the challenges presented by decades of broken trust and historical legacies in its ongoing consultations with various EAOs and stakeholders.
In December 2021, the NUG reached out to the Arakan Army (AA) as part of its EAO/stakeholder consultation efforts. See Mizzima, “National Unity Government (NUG), makes overtures to AA overthrow military”, 13 December 2021 (https://mizzima.com/article/national-unity-government-nug-makes-overtures-aa-overthrow-military , downloaded 26 January 2022).
Reaching out to the AA is important for the NUG, as the AA largely has administrative control of Rakhine State. Until recently, the AA had largely stayed on the sidelines of the anti-junta resistance movement.
See Radio Free Asia, “Arakan Army Eclipsing Government in Administering Myanmar’s Rakhine State Amid Cease-fire”, 23 August 2021 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aa-08232021210057.html, downloaded 26 January 2022). See also The Irrawaddy, “Ethnic Armies Condemn Myanmar Junta’s Kayah Massacre”, 28 December 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ethnic-armies-condemn-myanmar-juntas-kayah-massacre.html , downloaded 30 December 2021).
[19] The 2021 Federal Democracy Charter has two parts: Part-I sets out main goals, objectives and principles, and Part-II details the interim constitutional arrangements, including duties of the NUG and NUCC. See Note 12.
[20] See Htet Myet Min Tun and Moe Thuzar, “ Myanmar’s National Unity Consultative Council: A Vision of Myanmar’s Federal Future”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 5 January 2022 (https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-national-unity-consultative-council-a-vision-of-myanmars-federal-future/, downloaded 5 January 2022)
[21] အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ (NUCC) ပထမဆုံးသတင်းစာရှင်းလင်းပွဲ (တိုက်ရိုက်ထုတ်လွှင့်မှု) [First Press Conference by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) (Live Broadcast)], Myanmar Now News, YouTube video, 2:41:42. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6O6ITKCI9j4&t=5846s
See also National Unity Government, Twitter post, 16 November 2021, 9.18 PM. (https://twitter.com/NUGMyanmar/status/1460598240265621505, accessed 20 December 2021).
The NUCC convened its first People’s Assembly on 27 January 2022. See Mizzima- News in Burmese, ပြည်သူ့ညီလာခံ ဖွင့်ပွဲအခမ်းအနား [Opening Ceremony of People’s Assembly] , 27 January 2022, Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=284447260338400, accessed 27 January 2022).
[22] Federal Democracy Charter 2021, Part-2, Chapter 6.
[23] This emphasis on collective leadership stems from the principle highlighted in the Federal Democracy Charter 2021. While the NUCC is one of the mechanisms for realising this principle of collective leadership, there continue to be many practical challenges, not least the need to bridge the gap between the NUCC’s “grand mandate” and the fragmentation of representation. See Aye Chan and Billy Ford, “A New Myanmar Forum Aims to Unite Democratic Forces”, United States Institute of Peace, 3 November 2021 https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/11/new-myanmar-forum-aims-unite-democratic-forces, downloaded 27 December 2021).
[24] Nyan Hlaing Lin, “NUCC outlines goals as it seeks to widen membership”, Myanmar Now, 21 November 2021 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/nucc-outlines-goals-as-it-seeks-to-widen-membership, downloaded 20 December 2021).
See also Myanmar Peace Monitor, NUCC consists of eight EAOs including the KNPP” (https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/308971/nucc-consists-of-eight-eaos-including-the-knpp/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[25] In 1962, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces General Ne Win deposed Premier U Nu in a military coup. Ne Win later included Nu in a 32-member Internal Unity Advisory Board appointed in 1969. A majority of the members in that body recommended in June 1969 that the country return to a multiparty political system, with greater autonomy for the ethnic states. Earlier in February 1969, Nu had submitted a separate report to Ne Win, proposing that Ne Win hand power back to him. After leaving the country for India in April 1969, Nu then travelled to the United Kingdom, and announced at a press conference in London in August 1969 his plans to overthrow Ne Win’s regime in a year. Over 1969-73, Nu attempted – and failed – to mount an armed resistance movement to overthrow Ne Win from the Thai-Burma border, allegedly with financial support from the US’ Central Intelligence Agency. Nu’s last assertion as Burma’s ‘legitimate prime minister’ was in 1988. After returning to Burma in 1980 following an amnesty offer by Ne Win, Nu formed a parallel government to the Burma Socialist Programme Party government at the height of the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. The formation of this parallel government took place on 9 September 1988, just nine days before the military coup. Under the military rule of the SLORC/SPDC, another parallel government attempt emerged in 1990, after the SLORC had annulled the results of the 1990 elections in which the NLD had won a landslide victory. Headed by Dr Sein Win, Aung San Suu Kyi’s cousin, who had contested and won a seat in the 1990 elections, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) kept the democracy movement alive overseas, calling for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and keeping up international pressure on the SLORC/SPDC junta.
See Robert Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2015 and Megan Clymer, “Min Ko Naing, “Conqueror Of Kings”
Burma’s Student Leader”, Journal of Burma Studies, Vol. 8, 2003, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University. pp. 46, 52
See also The Irrawaddy, “Previous Military Regimes and Parallel Governments in Myanmar”, 22 April 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/previous-military-regimes-parallel-governments-myanmar.html , downloaded 6 December 2021).
[26] Grant Peck, “SAC-M: NUG’s Call for People’s Defensive War Unfortunate but Understandable”, Special Advisory Council – Myanmar, 9 September 2021 (https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/2021/09/sac-m-nugs-call-for-peoples-defensive-war-unfortunate-but-understandable/, downloaded 4 January 2022).
[27] National Unity Government Myanmar, Twitter Post, 17 May 2021, 11:05 PM. (https://twitter.com/nugmyanmar/status/1394308198941659138?lang=en, accessed 20 December 2021).
See also Sebastian Strangio, “Foreign Governments, Experts Urge Peace After Myanmar Opposition Announces Mass Uprising”, 9 September 2021 (https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/foreign-governments-experts-urge-peace-after-myanmar-opposition-announces-mass-uprising/, downloaded 27 December 2021).
[28] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Union Vision and Values (https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/, accessed 20 December 2021).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, 30 May 2021 (https://mofa.nugmyanmar.org/foreign-policy/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[31] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Press Statement 1/2021, 3 May 2021 (https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/2021/05/30/press-statement-1-2021/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[32] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State, 3 June 2021 (https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/2021/06/03/policy-position-on-the-rohingya-in-rakhine-state/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[33] National Unity Government Myanmar, Twitter Post, 20 August 2021, 11:22 PM. (https://twitter.com/nugmyanmar/status/1428739347717648389?lang=en, accessed 20 December 2021).
[34] The NUG’s Rohingya policy signals the clearest departure from the NLD’s foreign policy, and sets a high bar for any future government, elected or otherwise, with regard to the treatment and inclusion of the long-neglected and much-persecuted Rohingya community. Prior to announcing this policy, several NUG cabinet members, starting with NUG minister for humanitarian affairs and disaster management Dr Win Myat Aye and including the NUG minister for women, youth and children’s affairs Naw Susanna Hla Hla Soe had on separate occasions expressed regret over past treatment of the Rohingya at the hands of the military. NUG Deputy Minister for women, youth and children’s affairs Ei Thinzar Maung had spoken up for the Rohingya earlier in 2020 in condemned genocide.
See PVTV Myanmar, “Minister of MOHADM, Dr Win Myat Aye’s Speech (April 28/2021)”, YouTube video, 7:51. 28 April 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-bFyxC7YgA
Poppy McPherson, Twitter Post, 22 April 2021, 5:53 PM.
(https://twitter.com/poppymcp/status/1385169986549809155, accessed 5 January 2021).
See also Emily Fishbein, “‘Genocide is un-Burmese’: Breaking taboos, activists speak up for Rohingya” , The Christian Science Monitor, 24 March 2020 (https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2020/0324/Genocide-is-un-Burmese-Breaking-taboos-activists-speak-up-for-Rohingya, downloaded 5 January 2022).
[35] DVB English, Twitter Post, 20 January 2022, 11:33 PM (https://twitter.com/DVB_English/status/1484187338117124099 , accessed 21 January 2022).
[36] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Ministry of Health, Covid-19 Task Force Statement, 22 July 2021 (https://moh.nugmyanmar.org/covid-19-task-force-statement/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[37] The three guiding principles for investments and business operations are to promote human rights, to eliminate business interactions that sustain the military junta, and to promote employees’ welfare and safety. See Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment, Announcement 6/2021 “Three-Pillar Framework Guiding Responsible Investment and Continued Operations”, 21 July 2021 (https://mopfi.nugmyanmar.org/announcement-6-2021/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[38] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment, Announcement 10/2021, “Publication of a list of Illegal Investments and
a Special Directive demanding their immediate and unconditional suspension”, 30 August 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/2021-08-30-MOPFI-Announcement-No.10-tu-en.pdf, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[39] John Liu and Rory Wallace, “Myanmar’s parallel government grapples with foreign investment dilemma”, Nikkei Asia, 26 May 2021 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-s-parallel-government-grapples-with-foreign-investment-dilemma, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[40] National Unity Government, Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment, “Boycott List” (https://mopfi.nugmyanmar.org/boycott-list/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[41] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar’s Shadow Govt Calls on Firms to Shun Junta”, 1 September 202 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-shadow-govt-calls-on-firms-to-shun-junta.html, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[42] Three NUG ministries issued official statements in response to the Total and Chevron withdrawal announcements: The Ministry for International Cooperation/Office of the NUG Spokesperson, the Ministry for Planning, Finance and Investment, and the Ministry for Electricity and Energy. Of these three, NUG Spokesperson Dr Sa Sa chose to put his name to the ministry’s statement. The statements by Dr Sa Sa and by the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment were posted on the NUG’s Facebook page, on 22 and 23 January 2022. The Ministry of Electricity and Energy statement was posted on the NUG’s Twitter page.
See Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment – NUG, “Statement in Support of TotalEnergies and Chevron Corp Divestment from Myanmar (1/2022), 23 January 2022. (https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=237312825238615&set=pcb.237312981905266, downloaded 24 January 2022), Ministry of International Cooperation (MOIC)-Office of the Union Minister NUG Spokesperson, “Statement Regarding the Withdrawal of Total Energies and Chevron”, 21 January 2022 (https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=236843661952198&set=a.228804786089419, downloaded 24 January 2022) and National Unity Government Myamar, Twitter Post, 23 January 2022, 8:51 PM (https://twitter.com/NUGMyanmar/status/1485233827639398407/photo/1, downloaded 24 January 2022)
[43] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Press Release (13/2021), 22 August 2021 (https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/2021/08/22/press-release-13-2021/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[44] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Civilian Govt’s Bond Sale Raises Over $6 Million in Under 12 Hours”, 23 November 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-civilian-govts-bond-sale-raises-over-6-million-in-under-12-hours.html, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[45] Ira Purnik, “Myanmar’s NUG announces adoption of USDT as official currency”, Money Control, 13 December 2021 (https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/cryptocurrency/myanmars-nug-announces-adoption-of-usdt-as-official-currency-7821601.html, downloaded 2 January 2022).
See also Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment – NUG, “ အမိန့်ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ် (၄/၂၀၂၁)” [Order No. 4.2021], 11 December 2021 (https://www.facebook.com/MoPFINUG/photos/a.114937487404692/251267307105042/, downloaded 2 January 2022).
The NUG’s adoption of Tether supersedes an earlier initiative by a Myanmar exile group. Their “Myanmar Dollar Project” (MYD) proposed to use Nano as a “free, instant, and eco-friendly third-generation cryptocurrency to support democracy in Myanmar”, offering 25% of the MYD’s 110 billion coins to the NUG. The NUG does not seem to have taken up the MYD’s offer. See KrAsia, “ As Myanmar’s economy crumbles, some see crypto as the nation’s path to financial freedom”, 8 September 2021 (https://kr-asia.com/as-the-economy-crumbles-a-group-of-burmese-imagine-a-future-of-financial-freedom-with-crypto, downloaded 10 January 2022).
Analysts from Inya Economics are sceptical that cryptocurrency as legal tender will see any widespread take-up by the populace, citing as obstacles the unfamiliarity by a large majority of people in Myanmar with cryptocurrency, as well as the country’s poor legal and digital infrastructure, among others.
See Pan Myat Thu, Su Nandar Aung and Ye Zaw Khant, “Cryptocurrency and Its Future in Myanmar”, Inya Economics, 3 August 2021 ( https://www.inyaeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Cryptocurrency-Its-Future-in-Myanmar-English-Version-.pdf, downloaded 10 January 2022).
[46] Nyan Hlaing Lin, “Myanmar’s shadow government launches plan to tax business owners”, Myanmar Now, 6 November 2021 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmars-shadow-government-launches-plan-to-tax-business-owners, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[47] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar’s Shadow Government Forms People’s Defense Force “, 5 May 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-shadow-government-forms-peoples-defense-force.html, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[48] Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Press Release (14/2021)
13 September 2021 (https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/2021/09/13/press-release-14-2021/, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[49] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Civilian Government Forms Military Command Structure”, 29 October 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-civilian-government-forms-military-command-structure.html, downloaded 20 December 2021).
[50] CRPH Myanmar, Twitter Post, 15 March 2021, 3:25 PM. (https://twitter.com/crphmyanmar/status/1371361961452085250?lang=en, downloaded 27 December 2021)
[51] Reporter in Yangon and Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Rise of armed civilian groups in Myanmar fuels fears of full-scale civil war”.
[52] Myanmar Now, “NUG establishes ‘chain of command’ in fight against regime “, 28 October 2021 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/nug-establishes-chain-of-command-in-fight-against-regime, downloaded 5 January 2022).
[53] National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, “Kickstarting Radio NUG”, 18 August 2021 (https://mocit.nugmyanmar.org/2021/08/18/news-and-event-02-2021/, downloaded 2 January 2022)
[54] Myanmar Mix, “Radio broadcast gives voice to Myanmar revolution”, 20 August 2021 (https://www.myanmarmix.com/en/articles/radio-broadcast-gives-voice-to-myanmar-revolution, downloaded 2 January 2022).
[55] Radio Free Asia, “Facebook Campaign For Myanmar Shadow Government at UN Garners Millions of Supporters”, 20 August 2021 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/campaign-08202021202155.html, downloaded 2 January 2022).
[56] KrAsia, “From telehealth to ‘Zoom diplomacy,’ Myanmar’s government in exile embarks on a wave of unprecedented digital changes”, 17 August 2021 ( https://kr-asia.com/from-telehealth-to-zoom-diplomacy-myanmars-government-in-exile-embarks-on-a-wave-of-unprecedented-digital-changes , downloaded 24 January 2022).
[57] National Unity Government of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Education, “၂၀၂၁ မေလမှ အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ပြည်သူသို့ အစီရင်ခံ တင်ပြခြင်း”, [Reporting to the Public on Activities Implemented from May to September 2021] , 8 January 2022 https://moe.nugmyanmar.org/en/%e1%80%80%e1%80%bc%e1%80%b1%e1%80%8a%e1%80%ac%e1%80%81%e1%80%bb%e1%80%80%e1%80%ba%e1%80%99%e1%80%bb%e1%80%ac%e1%80%b8/message-from-may-to-october/ , downloaded 24 January 2022).
[58] Mizzima News, “NUG announces temporary formation of All Myanmar Judicial Employees Association”, 11 November 2021 (https://mizzima.com/article/nug-announces-temporary-formation-all-myanmar-judicial-employees-association, downloaded 30 December 2021).
[59] On 22 August 2021, the SAC accused her publicly in the state-run newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar, of masterminding PDF attacks in Shan and Kayah States. See Global New Light of Myanmar, edition of 22 August 2021, pg. 7 (https://cdn.myanmarseo.com/file/client-cdn/2021/08/22-8-20211.pdf, downloaded 30 December 2021).
As deputy minister for defence, Khin Ma Ma Myo affirmed the establishment of a “defense acquisition department” in the NUG’s ministry of defense See Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar Shadow Government Forms Militia to Oppose Military Junta”, 5 May 2021 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/pdf-05052021221913.html, 2 January 2022).
Khin Ma Ma Myo took up the commerce portfolio on 25 August 2021.
An academic with a PhD in international relations, and two masters’ degrees from Yangon University and the International University of Japan, Khin Ma Ma Myo set up a think-tank in 2015. Khin Ma Ma Myo’s bio-data is not available on the NUG website. Information on her education qualifications and academic pursuits are listed in various online resources.
See University of Yangon, Dr Khin Ma Ma Myo. (https://www.uy.edu.mm/department/dr-khin-ma-ma-myo/, downloaded 27 December 2021).
Phyo Thiha Cho, “‘Politicians should design a clear roadmap for change and restore public trust’ – Khin Ma Ma Myo”, Myanmar Now, 15 October 2015 (https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/politicians-should-design-a-clear-roadmap-for-change-and-restore-public-trust-khin-ma-ma-myo, downloaded 27 December 2021).
Khin Ma Ma Myo (2021) LinkedIn profile. https://www.linkedin.com/in/khin-ma-ma-myo-a712a812/?originalSubdomain=mm
The Asia Foundation, “Directory of Policy Institutes in Myanmar, September 2016 Version”, September 2016 (https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Directory_Policy_Institutes_TAF_Sep2016.pdf, downloaded 27 December 2021).
[60] Burma News International, “NUG Calls For Boycott Of Military Companies In Burma”, 12 November 2021 (https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/nug-calls-boycott-military-companies-burma, downloaded 5 January 2022)
See also Ministry of Commerce , National Unity Government of Myanmar, “အကြမ်းဖက်စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများဆိုင်ရာ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် (၂/၂၀၂၁)” [Announcement regarding Terrorist Businesses (2/2021)], 10 November 2021 (https://www.facebook.com/mocNUGMyan/photos/a.234124328593475/274603424545565/, downloaded 5 January 2022).
[61] This section expands on arguments and updates in three earlier analyses published by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s Fulcrum blog.
See Moe Thuzar and Romain Caillaud, “Myanmar and the United Nations: Fighting for a Seat at the Table”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 16 September 2021” (https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-and-the-united-nations-fighting-for-a-seat-at-the-table/, downloaded 2 January 2022).
Moe Thuzar, “ASEAN Snubs the State Administration Council (For Now)”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 19 October 2021 (https://fulcrum.sg/asean-snubs-the-state-administration-council-for-now/, downloaded 2 January 2022).
Moe Thuzar, “Myanmar: Recognition is the Name of the Game”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 6 December 2021 (https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-recognition-is-the-name-of-the-game/, downloaded 2 January 2022)
[62] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei Darussalam, “Statement of the Chair of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting”, 16 October 2021 (http://www.mfa.gov.bn/Lists/Press%20Room/news.aspx?id=947 , downloaded 5 December 2021).
[63] Republic of Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Notification No. 8/2021, “Appointment of Ambassador to ASEAN”, 24 October 2021. (https://mofua.nugmyanmar.org/article-details/appointment-of-nug-ambassador-to-asean , downloaded 5 December 2021).
[64] Statement by H.E. Mahn Winn Khaing Thann, Prime Minister, National Unity Government of Myanmar on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held in Jakarta, Indonesia on 24 April 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/2021-04-27-Statement-by-H.E.-Mahn-Win-Khaing-Than_Prime_Minister_NUG_on-the-ASEAN-Leaders-top-en-red.pdf, downloaded 5 January 2022).
Further, the NUG’s foreign ministry issued in January 2022 a special issue of its newsletter, focusing on assessing the SAC’s implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. See National Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Unity Government of Myanmar, “Special Issue on Five-Point Consensus” Myanmar Updates, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2022 ( https://mofa.nugmyanmar.org/2022/01/04/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-newsletter-volume-2-no-1/ , downloaded 5 January 2022).
[65] On 26 February, a military invalidated the results of the November 2020 election while Kyaw Moe Tun urged UN member states to use “any means necessary” to stop the coup. The SAC junta fired Kyaw Moe Tun the following day.
[66] Nikkei Asia, “Myanmar shadow government sets up office in South Korea”, 18 September 2021 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-shadow-government-sets-up-office-in-South-Korea, downloaded 5 January 2022).
[67] The NUG’s external engagements are listed extensively on the NUG Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: https://mofa.nugmyanmar.org/.
[68] The Irrawaddy, “European Parliament Throws Support Behind Myanmar’s Shadow Government”, 8 October 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/european-parliament-throws-support-behind-myanmars-shadow-government.html, downloaded 2 December 2021).
[69] Senate regular session of 2021-2022, Résolution portant sur la nécessité de reconnaître le Gouvernement d’unité nationale de Birmanie [Resolution on the need to recognise the National Unity Government of Burma], 5 October 2021 (http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas21-002.html?msdynttrid=98vRsq7rRg-q_tMPy7aMZwHyMEzuV_iIvUwLQNtNMQ0, downloaded 3 December 2021).
[70] Republic of Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, Minsitry of Foreign Affairs “H.E. Mr. Martin Tlapa, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, sent a letter of recognition to U Lin Thant as a Liaison Officer of the NUG to the Czech Republic”, 234 May 2021 (https://mofa.nugmyanmar.org/2021/05/24/h-e-mr-martin-tlapa-deputy-foreign-minister-of-the-czech-republic-sent-a-letter-of-recognition-and-congratulation-to-u-lin-thant-as-a-liaison-officer-of-myanmar-to-the-czech-republic-from-the-nation/ , downloaded 2 December 2021).
[71]There are mixed views among analysts on the NUG’s ability to function as a government. The NUG’s People’s Defensive War shifted the tone of the anti-junta movement, seemingly to distract attention from the pursuit of federal objectives. Additionally, a personal communication from a Myanmar think-tank researcher on 13 January 2022 shared with the authors that the NUG’s decision-making processes were facing criticism within its ranks.
In November 2021, three individuals involved in facilitating the nationwide ceasefire negotiations under the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) administration claimed to be on a “hit-list” issued by the NUG and its PDF armed wing. This hit-list claim was shared with several international diplomats in Myanmar. NUG spokesperson Dr Sa Sa refuted these claims on his Facebook page on 10 November 2021, as “vicious rumours”. The same day, NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung also refuted the claims in an interview with Voice of America (VOA) Burmese.
See Dr Sa Sa. 2021. “H.E. Dr Sasa’s Appeal to the Political and Diplomatic Communities to End Vicious Rumours Regarding the NUG”, 10 November 2021. (https://www.facebook.com/DrSasa22222/posts/he-dr-sasas-appeal-to-the-political-and-diplomatic-communities-to-end-vicious-ru/429622938628569 )
See also Kyaw Kyaw Thein, “လုပ္ႀကံစာရင္းဆိုတာမ်ိဳး NUG မွာ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ေရာ မူဝါဒပါမရွိ – – ေဒၚဇင္မာေအာင္” [The NUG has no objective or policy of a hit-list – Daw Zin Mar Aung], VOA Burmese, 10 November 2021 (https://burmese.voanews.com/a/inteview-with-daw-zin-mar-aung/6307455.html , downloaded 16 January 2022).
The hit list news was discussed in situation updates on Myanmar as well as other media reports on Myanmar. See The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Military-Linked Trio Claim to Be on Shadow Govt’s ‘Hit List’, 15 November 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-linked-trio-claim-to-be-on-shadow-govts-hit-list.html , downloaded 16 January 2022) and Asian Network for Free Elections, “Myanmar Situation Update 15- 21 November 2021” (https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Myanmar-Situation-Update-15-21-November-2021.pdf , downloaded 16 January 2022).
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