2022/3 ““Reform, Not Abolition”: The “Thai Youth Movement” and Its Demands for Reform of the Monarchy” by Anusorn Unno
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While the Thai monarchy is a highly-revered institution, the personal lives of royal family members have long been topics of comment in private settings. This comment was politicised and went public after the 19 September 2006 coup, in which the monarchy was thought to be implicated.
- Comment on the monarchy is strongest among the young. Having grown up during a transitional period for the royal institution, they have been exposed to information about the monarchy outside school curricula and mainstream media.
- Initially, young Thais chose to comment on the monarchy on social media. But after the dissolution of the Future Forward Party in February 2020, they began to make statements concerning the institution in public gatherings. Furthermore, their observations evolved from sarcasm to more direct and straightforward talk before becoming demands for reform of the monarchy.
- The call for reform of the monarchy has gradually been incorporated into the contemporary Thai youth movement. From a dream, it developed into one of the movement’s three demands, and eventually into its dominant demand.
- Although the monarchy has made no response to that demand, critics of the institution have been prosecuted. Nevertheless, the demand continues to be made. Given the critical stance on the monarchy adopted by Thai youths in general, and the strong determination of today’s youth movement in particular, it is highly likely that the Thai monarchy will sooner or later have to undergo reform, if it is not abolished.
*Anusorn Unno is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Associate Professor, Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology, Thammasat University, Bangkok.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/3, 7 January 2022
INTRODUCTION
On 10 August 2020, a student organisation called the United Front of Thammasat and Demonstration (UFTD) held a gathering at Thammasat University’s Rangsit Centre campus, during which it announced a ten-point demand for reform of the Thai monarchy.[1] The demand generated “shock” across the country.
Although comments on the institution and its members had long been prevalent in everyday conversations among Thais, this was the first time the monarchy had been openly challenged. Reform of the monarchy went on to become one of the three demands of the youth movement that emerged in Thailand in 2020-2021, and eventually its dominant demand.[2] Harsh suppression, unfair lawsuits, and a Constitutional Court ruling that “reform is abolition” notwithstanding, this demand has unabatedly been put forward.
This article examines the current “Thai youth movement”, focusing on its demand for reform of the monarchy. It considers how Thai youth began to make comments on the monarchy, primarily on social media, and then explores how those sentiments were implicit in the initial stage of students’ gatherings last year, before becoming a concrete demand. It concludes that, despite silence from the monarchy and suppression on the part of the state, demand for reform of the monarchy is unlikely to fade away, given the strong determination of the youths.[3]
ONLINE COMMENTS ON THE MONARCHY
Officially and publicly, the monarchy is regarded as a highly-revered institution in Thailand. Most state ceremonies are royal ceremonies in which participating representatives of state agencies and state-appointed groups express their allegiance. State media and other mass media outlets regularly extol the monarchy. This is true in popular culture as well, with Thais expressing love for the monarchy. These displays of love for and allegiance to the monarchy reached a peak in the reign of late King Bhumibol, and continue in the present reign of King Vajiralongkorn.
Despite such displays of love and allegiance, less than favourable comments on the monarchy are not uncommon in Thailand. The personal lives of royal family members are hot topics for gossip among close friends and relatives. The 19 November 2006 coup deposing Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra politicised this gossip because of the association of that coup with the monarchy. The Red Shirt opponents of that coup gave that association traction with the public when its leaders lamented how the monarchy was biased in favour of the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts. The tone of Red Shirt rhetoric changed from being hurt to being furious after the violent crackdown on their protests in April and May 2010. The 22 May 2014 coup, dubbed “the royal coup”, further infuriated the dissidents. After King Bhumibol’s death in 2016 and the subsequent enthronement of King Vajiralongkorn—a man whose personal life has provided much to criticise—comments on the monarchy increased even further, especially among the young and on social media like Twitter.[4]
What led Thai youth to make comments on the monarchy is information that they had gained from outside school curricula and the mainstream media—in other words, from the Internet. “Fa”, who tweeted about the monarchy, said that when he was in Grade 8, his interest in politics began with questions about the monarchy, especially about the death in 1946 of the young King Ananda Mahidol. This was because, he said, “I read on websites and I realized who the killer was and why the royal pages [held responsible] were executed.”[5] He added that when he was in Grade 10 an art teacher gave him different history books to read and told him that the story of King Naresuan (r. 1590-1605) was “a novel”. The teacher encouraged him to question official accounts of Thai history, which eventually led him to ask, “Isn’t it all a fictitious tale?”[6]
“Sit”, another tweeter, said that he had heard the stories about the monarchy that Thais exchange in private from his grandmother since he was young. However, it was when he was in Grade 9 and had access to the Internet that “I got to know more about the monarchy.”[7] His critical stance developed further when he was a university student. His previously scattered thoughts became more systematic after he attended academic seminars, public talks and camps—until he concluded, “I think we need to talk about the monarchy.”[8]
Although Thai youths were critical of the monarchy, until early 2020 their criticism remained largely online. It was not until the Constitutional Court’s dissolution on 21 February that year of the Future Forward Party that was immensely popular among the young that they began to criticise the monarchy offline, too.
OFFLINE SARCASM ABOUT THE MONARCHY
A day after the Constitutional Court’s ruling on Future Forward, the Student Union of Thailand (SUT) held a gathering at Thammasat University. Besides criticising the court and the government, students also commented on the monarchy. As one member put it, “Speeches were primarily about the government’s administration and the dissolution of the Future Forward Party. But we also touched on the monarchy. But we tried to avoid using direct language. For example, if Prayut [the Prime Minister] serves the people, he is human. If he does not serve the people, he is a dog. But I really want to know whose dog he is.”[9]
Comments on the monarchy were more evident during a gathering at Srinakharinwirot University on 26 February 2020. After the organisers gave speeches opposing the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the first participant to speak from the stage criticised the monarchy because, said the organiser, “he feels repressed [อัดอั้น] and wants to speak.”[10] Another student held a placard asking, “Is the weather in Germany good?”, while yet another, standing nearby, held one saying, “IO อห.” These placards alluded to King Vajiralongkorn, who at the time lived in Bavaria and to whom dissidents referred with the derogatory name “IO”.[11]The picture of these two students holding placards went viral, marking the first time that the monarchy was addressed at the students’ gatherings.
Comments on the monarchy in these “flash mobs”, however, remained implicit and sarcastic. Besides, the gatherings took place over only about a month and ceased with the spread of COVID-19. It was not until students resumed their gatherings in mid-July 2020 that comments on the monarchy became straightforward.
TALKING ABOUT THE MONARCHY IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD WAY
A gathering was held on 3 August 2020 at Bangkok’s Democracy Monument. Called “Chanting Spells to Protect Democracy”, it was jointly organised by groups called Mahanakorn for Democracy and the Kased Movement, the latter composed of students from Kasetsart University. It became the first student gathering that address the monarchy in a straightforward way. According to an organiser, this was because “Mahanakorn and Kasetsart students agreed that it is a time when we need to seriously address the issue of the monarchy, because what we saw from the flash mobs was merely sarcasm and we should not fall into such a trap. We should talk about the monarchy in substantive and academic terms”.[12] They also agreed that the speaker should be a man called Arnon Nampa, given his expertise as a lawyer and his constant call for student gatherings to address the issue of the monarchy. However, since it was still difficult to address that issue, the gathering adopted a theme from “Harry Potter” movies. Said another organiser, “Entertainment is able to open people’s hearts to listen and the stories in those movies match reality in as far as Voldemort is the unspeakable”.[13]
Although the atmosphere was as fanciful as in the movies, the way that Arnon addressed the monarchy in his speech was serious. He said that talking about the monarchy implicitly and sarcastically carried no weight, and it was necessary to speak in a serious and straightforward manner. He knew that everyone knew the truth but did not dare to speak it. But it was necessary to talk about the monarchy openly and publicly; otherwise, problems associated with it would not be solved. He said that, no matter what happened to him after his speech, he would have no regrets, as he would have spoken the truth.[14] A representative of the student groups then read out a joint communique calling for the abolition and amendment of laws that expand the power of the monarchy, for amendment of Article 112 of the Criminal Code on lèse majesté[15] to bring it in line with principles of democracy and human rights, and for more weight to be given to the students’ and to the people’s opinions for solving problems in accordance with democratic principles.
The gathering was not prevented, but it was monitored by deployments of police. A police superintendent told reporters that the force would decide what offences Arnon had committed. On 5 August 2020, a lawyer filed a police complaint against Arnon for his speech offending the monarchy. Two days later, Arnon received a warrant for sedition, unlawful assembly, obstructing traffic, and unauthorised use of an amplifier. However, those charges did not prevent Arnon from talking further about the monarchy in public. After reporting to the police on 8 August 2020, he spoke about the monarchy again at a gathering held by the UFTD.
DEMANDS FOR REFORM OF THE MONARCHY
A UFTD member said that after the period of “flash mobs”, the monarchy was continually addressed in gatherings such as the protest against the abduction of Wanchalearm Satsaksit[16] on 6 June 2020 and the commemoration of the 24 June 1932 Revolution 18 days later. However, it was Arnon’s speech that “made people increasingly daring enough to talk about the monarchy.”[17] As a leading student group, the UFTD then needed to think about its next gathering. As the resignation of the prime minister would not suffice to resolve the issues facing Thailand and since at the very least Article 112 needed to be abolished, the group concluded that “the gathering needed to address the issue of the monarchy.”[18]
A gathering called “Thammasat will not Tolerate” was held on 10 August 2020 at Thammasat University’s Rangsit Centre campus. Besides Arnon’s speech arguing that the monarchy’s involvement in politics needed to be questioned and Pavin Chachavalpongpun’s[19] video call supporting Arnon’s proposal to talk about the monarchy in a straightforward way, the gathering’s highlight was the reading out of the UFTD’s 10-point demand on reform of the monarchy. These points were primarily drawn from “Nitirat’s and Somsak’s proposals,”[20] and were intended “to reform, not to abolish the monarchy”.[21] Be that as it may, their pungency led them to be viewed as “piercing through the ceiling” that had prevented discussion of the monarchy in Thailand.
Other youth groups adopted these demands. On 16 August 2020, the “Free People” group held a gathering at the Democracy Monument to announce three demands, two standpoints, and one dream. That dream was the achievement of democracy with the monarchy under the constitution.[22] The UFTD was dissatisfied with this stance because “it is to reduce a main demand into a dream”[23] and, after withdrawing from the “Free People” organising committee, the UFTD held its own activity at the same gathering instead. The tension between the two groups was resolved after the “People’s Party” was, with the participation of the UFTD, formed. At a gathering held on 14 October 2020, it announced reform of the monarchy—along with the prime minister’s resignation and the drafting of a new constitution—as one of its three demands. The new group also held a gathering focused specifically on the monarchy on 26 October 2020 in front of the German embassy in Bangkok because, said an organiser, “our king often spends time living in Germany, and we want Germany to probe whether the king has the authority to endorse laws while there and whether he needs to pay German inheritance tax [on his late father’s estate].”[24]
After the dissolution of the “People’s Party”, youth groups were formed according to a “no-leader” strategy. These also pursued the three demands, but placed different degrees of emphasis on reform of the monarchy. A group called “People” put emphasis on the issue, and held a march to submit letters to King Vajiralongkorn on 8 November 2020 as well as a talk on reform of the monarchy on 10 December 2020. Another group, REDEM,[25] also gave importance to the issue; it held a march on 20 March 2021 demanding that the monarchy operate under the constitution. In contrast, a third group, Thalu Fa, “gives ousting Prayut 70 [per cent importance], drafting a new constitution 20, and reforming the monarchy 10 because our members in the provinces are not ready for the monarchy issue”, said one member.[26]
Later, however, these groups, including the UFTD, focused on reform of the monarchy and founded the “People’s Party to Abolish Article 112” group because, said one founder, “Article 112 has been widely used against the dissidents and the abolition of it is the first step to reform the monarchy.”[27] The new group launched a campaign of signature collection calling for the abolition of Article 112 in a gathering at Ratchaprasong Intersection on 31 October 2021, where a UFTD member Panasaya Sithijirawattanakul read a communique and cut her arm in the figure of “112”. It also opened a website which provides an online form for one to sign his or her name to take part in a petition. Most recently, on 12 December 2021, it held a gathering called “The People Sentence Article 112” to mark the number of signatures that it had collected—more than 230,000, and to urge more people to sign the petition so that the total could reach 1,000,000. It also vowed to vigorously continue the campaign on reform of the monarchy in the provinces next year while not abandoning demands for the prime minister’s resignation and the constitutional amendment.
RESPONSES AND PROSPECTS
The monarchy made no response after the UFTD submitted its demands in a stand-off with the police near Bangkok’s Grand Palace on 20 September 2020. Worse, arrests of critics of the monarchy soon increased,[28] and gatherings met with harsher measures. The Constitutional Court ruled on 10 November 2021 that the demands for reform affected the monarchy and warned that they would eventually lead to the abolition of the regime. Royalists also held activities opposing the students.
Besides, protesters in the provinces have not voiced open support for reform of the monarchy. In the Northeast, for example, protesters condemned Prime Minister Prayut in gatherings decrying the many problems that his administration failed to address, but they avoided addressing reform of the monarchy for fear of suffering legal repercussions. Some Northeasterners may have dared to question the monarchy, but many others have not. They fear being targeted, given the close surveillance on the part of security authorities in the region. And, while many proclaimed their support for the students on social media, they were not ready to address reform of the monarchy in public.[29]
Nevertheless, demands for reform have an impact on Thai people’s stance towards the monarchy. From being the minority, people not standing up when the royal anthem is played in movie theatres have now become the majority—a development long regarded as unthinkable. It was a significant change that on 11 November 2021 the prime minister felt it necessary to urge students at the National Defence College to be bold and to dare form part of the minority at the movies and stand up for the royal anthem. Particularly, on 5 December 2021, students surveyed the opinions of shoppers at Bangkok’s upscale Siam Paragon mall for their opinions on Article 112 and found that about 90 per cent of them, mostly members of the younger generation, favoured its abolition. It would appear only a matter of time before the Thai monarchy is reformed, if not abolished.[30]
CONCLUSION
The Thai Monarchy has existed for centuries, but the institution that we see today was only recently created during the reign of King Bhumibol. And, despite official and public displays of love for and allegiance to the monarchy by the Thai people, it has constantly faced criticism. Initially, criticism was primarily about the personal lives of royal family members and took place in private settings. But, after the political crisis that led to the 19 September 2006 coup, criticism turned to the monarchy’s involvement in politics and became more public. King Vajiralongkorn’s enthronement exacerbated the criticism, as the monarch’s personal life has now converged with his political involvement. It is among Thai youths that such criticism is strongest and fiercest.
The youths are critical of the monarchy because they were born and grew up during the transition between reigns, when the old one was being challenged and the new one had not yet been established. Besides, they have been exposed to information about the monarchy from outside school curricula and mainstream media, which makes it difficult for the system to educate them as committed royalists like members of previous generations. Their perception that the monarchy was behind the dissolution of their favourite political party also led them to criticise it more in public and later to demand its reform.
Although the monarchy has made no response to these demands and the youths have faced prosecution and harsh suppression, the latter have carried on with their demands. Judging from the critical stance taken toward the monarchy by Thai youths in general and the determination of the youth movement in particular, reform of the Thai monarchy appears inevitable.
ENDNOTES
[1] The demands were as follows:
1. Abolish Article 6 of the 2017 Constitution that does not allow anyone to make any accusation against the king, and add an article to allow parliament to examine the king’s wrongdoings, as stipulated in the constitution promulgated by the People’s Party.
2. Abolish Article 112 of the Criminal Code and allow people to exercise freedom of expression about the monarchy and give amnesty to those prosecuted for criticizing the monarchy.
3. Abolish the Crown Property Act of 2018 and make a clear division between the assets of the king under the control of the Ministry of Finance on one hand, and his personal assets on the other.
4. Reduce the amount in the national budget allocated to the king to bring it in line with the country’s economic conditions.
5. Abolish the Royal Office. Units with clear duties such as the Royal Security Command should be placed under other agencies. Unnecessary units such as the Privy Council should be disbanded.
6. Cease all giving and receiving of donations by royal charity funds so that all assets of the monarchy can be audited.
7. Cease the exercise of royal prerogative over the expression of political opinions in public.
8. Cease all public relations and education that excessively and one-sidedly extol the monarchy.
9. Search for the facts about the murder of those who criticized or had had relationships with the monarchy.
10. The king must not endorse any further coups.
Note that the People’s Party toppled Siam’s absolute monarchy in 1932.
[2] This is unprecedented in Thai political history, even when compared to the student movement of the mid-1970s which resorted to appeals to the monarchy in fighting against the military dictatorship; see Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, “The White Ribbon Movement: High School Children in the 2020 Thai Youth Protests”, Critical Asian Studies (2021) (DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2021.1883452), p. 8; Pongsapak Waiwitlikhit, “The Next Generation? A Comparison between Thailand’s 1973 Protests and Thailand’s 2020 Protests”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2020) (DOI: 10.30845/ijhss.v10n12p3), pp. 22-23
[3] Data are drawn primarily from a research project, “‘Let’s Finish It in Our Generation’: Thai Youth Movements in Contemporary Socio-political Contexts”, supported by the National Research Council of Thailand’s Spearhead Strategic Plan on Social Aspects of Thai People 4.0.
[4] Prior to the 24 March 2019 election, Thai youths used Twitter primarily to discuss entertainment. But since then, Twitter has become their key political forum. Hashtags related to the Future Forward Party such as #ฟ้ารักพ่อ (#FahLovesFather) are one example; see Aim Sinpeng, “Hashtag Activism: Social Media and the #FreeYouth Protests in Thailand”, Critical Asian Studies (2021) (DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2021.1882866), p. 5. Hashtags criticizing the monarchy have also trended constantly. These include, for example, #ขบวนเสด็จ (#RoyalMotorcade) in October 2019, which referred to a royal motorcade worsening traffic congestion in Bangkok, and #ปิดเกาะ (#CloseIsland) on New Year’s Day 2020, which alluded to the closing of certain tourist attractions in the South to provide security for Princess Sirivannavari while she was on vacation; Penchan Phoborisut, “The 2020 Student Uprising in Thailand: A Dynamic Network of Dissent”, ISEAS Perspective 2020/129, 10 November 2020 (/articlescommentaries/iseas-perspective/2020-129-the-2020-student-uprising-in-thailand-a-dynamic-network-of-dissent-by-penchan-phoborisut/, downloaded 28 October 2021), p. 3.
[5] “Fa”, interview with the author, 20 September 2021. Given the sensitivity of the issues discussed, the names of all interviewees cited here are pseudonyms.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “Sit”, interview with the author, 15 October 2021.
[8] Ibid.
[9] “Bel”, interview with the author, 21 October 2021.
[10] “Khan”, interview with the author, 18 June 2021.
[11] “IO” can be read as the Romanized version of “ไอ้โอ”, derived from the name “โอ” which many Thais used for King Vajiralongkorn when he was crown prince, or “โอรสาธิราช”. That name remains in use today. “อห.” is likely an abbreviation for an extremely strong Thai-language term of abuse.
[12] “Min,” interview with the author, 22 August 2021.
[13] “Nate”, interview with the author, 14 June 2021.
[14] This excerpt of Arnon’s speech gives the flavour of his remarks. “We have the extreme need to talk about the role of monarchy in today’s Thai politics. We have swept these problems under the carpet for many years; never really addressed them, which led to wrong solutions to the problems. We need to accept the truth that the reason why students and people gather is that many of them want to pose questions to the monarchy. […] There were allusions to a person during the gatherings, and it cannot be anyone but the king. But allusions will not carry any weight unless we talk with reason and in a straightforward way. […] Now we face severe problems as there are processes that move the monarchy away from democracy. […] The draft constitution expands the [royal] prerogative far beyond democracy. […] There was an intervention by the king in the proclamation of the constitution for the first time. […] Everyone knows, but I believe no one dares to speak. […] Many laws that expand the king’s power were secretly passed. […] This is important, but no one dares to speak. This is the reason why younger brothers and sisters asked me to speak today. […] Everyone needs to talk about it seriously and publicly. […] If we don’t talk about it, we will never solve the problem. Talking about this doesn’t mean abolishing the monarchy, but it is about rendering the monarchy’s existence in Thai society legitimate. […] Don’t make the weak talk about the monarchy and be threatened alone. Don’t let political refugees talk about the monarchy and be abducted and killed cruelly. […] The monarchy knows that someone has used it to hurt us, making us think about what the monarchy really thinks about us. […] I beg the monarchy to express its impartial political standpoint. Don’t let them threaten us. Don’t let them hurt us anymore. […] We need to talk about this problem publicly and openly. […] No matter what happens to me today […] I will not feel regret, as I have already spoken the truth. And this truth will haunt the dictators until we obtain real democracy.”
[15] Article 112 of the Criminal Code is Thailand’s law on the crime of lèse majesté. It states, “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the king, the queen, the heir-apparent or the regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.”
[16] Wanchalearm Satsaksit was a human-rights activist who worked at one time for the Phuea Thai Party. After the 22 May 2014 coup, he was charged with failing to appear in response to a summons issued by the junta, and in 2015 he was accused of violating Article 112. That latter year, he fled Thailand and took refuge in Laos before moving to Cambodia. On 4 June 2020, he was reportedly abducted by armed men in front of his condominium in Phnom Penh. He was speaking on the phone when he was abducted and uttered the words “I can’t breathe” before the line was cut. Reports of his abduction and disappearance infuriated many Thais, especially among youths, and led to gatherings to demand that the Thai and Cambodian governments take action to address Wanchalearm’s forced disappearance.
[17] “Bee”, interview with the author, 21 October 2021.
[18] “Bell, interview with the author, 21 October 2021.
[19] Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a fervent critic of the Thai monarchy. He left Thailand after the 22 May 2014 coup and was summoned to report to the junta. He is currently living in exile in Japan and is Associate Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University.
[20] Ibid. Nitirat is a group of five law professors at Thammasat University which was founded after the 19 September 2006 coup. The group made its public debut on 19 September 2010. Besides publishing articles on its website and holding seminars, it proposed an amendment to Article 112, and later collaborated with others in founding a “Campaign Committee on Article 112 Amendment.” However, after its website was closed and its member prosecuted in the wake of the 22 May 2014 coup, it faded out and was virtually dissolved. Somsak Jeamteerasakul is a former history professor at Thammasat University who is a fervent critic of the monarchy and Article 112. He left Thailand after the 22 May 2014 coup and is now living in exile in France.
[21] “Bee”, interview with the author, 21 October 2021.
[22] The three demands include an end to threats against critics of the government, the dissolution of the current parliament, and a new constitution, and the two standpoints include no future coups and no “national government.”
[23] “Bell”, interview with the author, 21 October 2021.
[24] “Min,” interview with the author, 22 August 2021.
[25] REDEM is a group formed on 24 February 2021 on the basis of the protesters’ “no-leader strategy”. It is focused on marching to strategic places, and its name is an abbreviation of “Restart Democracy”.
[26] “Den”, interview with the author, 20 September 2021.
[27] “Som”, interview with the author, 30 October 2021.
[28] Since November 2020, the number of persons charged with violation of Article 112 has risen sharply. According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 156 persons were charged with the violation of Article 112, 20 of whom are still denied bail, during this period.
[29] This conclusion draws on distinguished Thai socio-linguist and Ubon Ratchathani University lecturer Dr Saowanee Alexander’s participant observation of the protests in the Northeast, of which Red Shirt supporters constituted a large portion; personal communication, 11 December 2021.
[30] As one student put it, “It will surely end. We feel that the struggles have been passed from one generation to another generation. From being people who never said the word ‘Vajiralongkorn’, now we can say it in public. We can wear t-shirts criticizing the monarchy openly. Speaking about it and action have escalated. It will not take long if people get to know more and are braver. We may not succeed with all ten demands, but if one day we have an election and get democracy, the parliament may respond to our demands. To finish is to have the monarchy under the constitution. We saw changes because there are technologies, and now we can access information equally in both rural and urban settings. We have the upper hand because information technology is more equally accessible. People have their own judgement. We believe in this”; “Fa”, interview with the author, 20 September 2021.
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2022/2 “Malaysia on the Cusp of a New Political Order” by Liew Chin Tong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY[1]
- The discourse on Malaysia’s political history has been in flux for some time. This paper revisits the series of political, economic and social ideas that have sustained previous eras, which the author terms “political orders”, and explores what is to come.
- The history of contemporary Malaysia can be split into four such orders: a) The Merdeka Compact era (1957-1969), characterized by economic laissez-faire and ethnic elite consociationalism. b) The New Economic Policy era (1969-1990), marked by state intervention to redistribute economic opportunities, upward social mobility for ordinary Malays, and opposition from the Islamic and non-Malay flanks. c) Vision 2020-Bangsa Malaysia era (1991-2005), driven by Malaysia’s economic boom and subsequent slump in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. This coincided with a multi-ethnic state narrative and UMNO standing firmly in the middle ground despite the opposition growing on the back of the Reformasi movement. d) The “Lost Years” (2005-2021), typified by economic stagnation and policy drift, accompanied by UMNO’s rightward move and the shrinking of the Barisan Nasional coalition. Opposition movements benefited, culminating in the Bersih rallies and the electoral victory of Pakatan Harapan in 2018, which was nullified by the Sheraton parliamentary coup launched against it in 2020.
- With a highly urbanized and very well-connected online citizenry, an “educated underclass” and the influx of younger voters due to the lowering of the voting age and to automatic voter registration, a new “political order” may now be emerging. To be positively impactful, this order will need to forge a new Malaysian identity, nurture democracy and build a fairer economy.
* Liew Chin Tong is a writer and a former Deputy Defence Minister of Malaysia. He was a Member of Malaysia’s Lower House (Dewan Rakyat) from 2008 to 2018 and of the Upper House (Dewan Negara) from 2018 to 2021 and is the National Political Education Director of the Democratic Action Party (DAP). He is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/2, 6 January 2022
INTRODUCTION
Malaysian politics has been in flux for some time. The old political order has frayed and decayed, and is perhaps already beyond redemption. What will take its place is as yet unclear, and so, for now, contradictions abound. To be sure, Malaysian politics has never been static, and the country’s capacity to achieve a new equilibrium cannot be underestimated. Francis Fukuyama has proffered the idea of “political order” being “a set of political institutions” which defines the state, manages the rule of law, and struggles with democratic accountability.[2] This paper revisits the sets of political and economic ideas that sustained the political institutions in Malaysia’s previous eras, explores what caused the shift from one order to the next, and discusses what is to come in the 2020s. A new equilibrium will need to be found, encompassing key factors such as national identity, democratic efficacy and economic equity.
HISTORICAL TURNING POINTS
Political crises, demographic pressures, economic stresses, and geopolitical shifts have determined Malaysia’s previous turning points. From the onset, it is crucial to note the importance of agency and of political leadership in meeting challenges and shifting gears. Even when all the combined factors listed above are present, there is still no guarantee that change will happen. Change appears to need political leaders to guide the society at large to adapt—and reset. Of course, leaders can also be the cause of reversals and the catalyst for negative impacts.
There have been three major shifts in Malaysia’s history. Khoo Boo Teik has perceptively identified the two “political orders” of the past half century – within which economic policies and political platforms coalesced, namely the New Economic Policy (1971) and Vision 2020 (1991).[3]
Beyond that, and since 2005, Malaysia experienced the “Lost Years” during which the country in effect drifted without a working order.
Consequent to the May 1969 general election and the subsequent ethnic disturbances, the multiethnic Merdeka Compact gave way to the Malay-centric New Economic Policy (NEP) polity in 1971. And in 1991, the NEP order shifted to become a multiethnic Vision 2020-Bangsa Malaysia grand narrative. But by 2005, the UMNO-Barisan Nasional coalition had begun to move right politically and to modify its economic policy selectively, allowing a multiethnic opposition coalition to rise to prominence by occupying the middle ground on the ethno-political spectrum and espousing economic ideas that were moderately left-of-centre.[4] These shifts set the stage for an epic battle that eventually toppled UMNO in 2018. No new political order, however, has as yet emerged to take its place.
Let us revisit the last four eras and study them in greater detail.
The Merdeka Compact era (1957-1969), the intentions of which were laid out in the Federal Constitution, was very much a grand compromise between the British colonial government, the Malay Rulers, and the Alliance Party.[5] UMNO, MCA and MIC constituted the Alliance Party that won the 1955 federal elections under British rule. Politically, the coalition led by the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj, was hailed as a model of “consociationalism” in which ethnic elites made compromises among themselves on behalf of the less educated masses.[6]
The commodity-based economy of that period, which furthermore had minimal import-substitution industrialization, was not able to match the expectations of the younger generation.[7] The elite compromises that had been made were seen as not beneficial to the masses. With more parties challenging the status quo, and with ethnic tensions dominating the headlines from around the time of the 1964 general election until the 1969 general election, the Alliance Party lost support among voters from all ethnic groups; this is contrary to the erroneous view put forth in post-1969 propaganda that only non-Malays voted against the Alliance Party.[8]
The New Economic Policy era (1969-1990) was marked by hugely increased state intervention to redistribute economic opportunities, resulting in upward social mobility for ordinary Malays while leaving non-Malays in general feeling deeply disenchanted. The two-pronged objectives of the New Economic Policy (NEP) were to eradicate poverty irrespective of race, and to remove the historical identification of ethnicity with economic functions.[9] The loss of support among the Malays for UMNO, and the May 13 riots, were interpreted to have been caused by Malay poverty, by racial imbalance in employment, income and ownership, and by provocative activities on the part of non-Malay parties. A new breed of assertive and less compromising Malay leaders led by Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak Hussein amplified UMNO’s dominance over other coalition partners through the formation of Barisan Nasional to replace the Alliance.[10] A series of measures were introduced which in effect transformed the nature of democracy in the country, and which strongly curbed the ability of the opposition to act.[11]
Where economic policy was concerned, Malaysia decided to ride on the wave of outsourcing by US firms taking place at that time, and embarked on a massive export-oriented industrialization that created many manufacturing jobs. These paid relatively well, and many young Malaysians relocated from villages to urban centres, for work as well as for education. This migrant population consisting mainly of Malaysians found themselves in a new and foreign environment. Many of them turned to religion and religious activities for emotional and social support, heightening Islam’s importance and visibility in the political realm.[12]
Malaysia also discovered oil off its shores around the time of the global Oil Shock of 1973-1974. Significantly, compared to the Merdeka era, there was now much less need for domestic ethnic Chinese capital to provide employment, and thus less say would from now on be given to the Chinese businessmen’s party, the MCA. UMNO grew more and more dominant over its allies, and oil money from the mid-1970s onwards allowed the Malaysian state to pursue a more authoritarian mode of governance.
When the national economy tanked in 1985, Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and Finance Minister Tun Daim Zainuddin opened up the economy to more foreign direct investment as well as domestic investments by relaxing NEP policies. This bold move helped turn the situation around quickly. By 1988, the Malaysian economy started to boom. Most fortunately for the country, as the Japanese yen was forced to appreciate as demanded in the Plaza Accord, Japanese, and later Taiwanese and Korean firms, began relocating to Malaysia and other Southeast Asian states.
Clearly, the old political order had frayed by the mid-1980s, especially after the 1985 economic downturn. Barisan Nasional under Mahathir absorbed the Islamists – a growing societal force – and their agenda through Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s entry into UMNO in 1982, forcing the opposition PAS into a corner. PAS responded by taking the uncompromising moral high ground and pushed for heavier Islamic agenda to distinguish itself from UMNO, alienated the non-Malays and Malay middle ground as a result. The other segment of the opposition was the non-Malays, which was at that time represented by the DAP.
In the 1986 general election, challenged only by a disunited opposition, Barisan Nasional won handsomely. However, UMNO would soon experience its worst ever internal split the following year.[13] After an intense party election in April 1987, and after the court banned the party in February 1988, the defeated challenger Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was not allowed to join Mahathir’s newly-formed replacement party, UMNO Baru. Forced onto the opposition bench, Razaleigh, via his new party Semangat 46, formed separate coalitions with PAS and DAP. Although Mahathir won the 1990 general election, he knew very well that if Malay votes were to split further while non-Malay voters continued to favour the opposition, Barisan Nasional would eventually lose power.[14] Something had to be done.
Vision 2020-Bangsa Malaysia era (1991-2005) was a multi-ethnic state narrative that located UMNO firmly in the middle ground. Vision 2020 and a more Malaysian outlook were adopted—partly forced upon Mahathir and partly deemed necessary by his own political instinct and his realization of the pressing need to shift the political discourse. As the opposition formed the first coalition to face the 1990 general election, Mahathir knew that he had to woo some non-Malay voters to his side, just in case more Malay voters turned their back on his new UMNO.
It also made economic sense to espouse a Malaysian identity for the long term. Significant economic innovations made by Mahathir at this time, such as privatisation, were heavily influenced by the neoliberal revolution started by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher which was then raging on the global stage. Absorbed into the Malaysian context, the essence of that way of thinking was that as long as one has money, one can buy cultural rights and socioeconomic opportunities. And so, while non-Malay students in the 1970s had complained about university quotas affecting their educational advancement, their younger siblings in the 1990s now had the opportunity to pay for private education instead. It was this access to ‘user-pay’ cultural rights which continued to endear non-Malays to Mahathir’s party in the 1995 general election.[15]
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 badly blemished Malaysia’s global reputation and tainted Mahathir’s leadership. The country turned introvert again. As Pepinsky noted, through “international retreat and domestic offensive”, Mahathir survived young Malay voters revolting against him with the buy-in into Vision 2020-Bangsa Malaysia by non-Malay voters in the 1999 general election.[16]
The “Lost Years” (2005-2021) were typified by economic stagnation and policy drift, accompanied by UMNO’s move rightwards and the shrinking of its coalition. Opposition movements benefited from this, culminating in the Bersih rallies and in the electoral victory of Pakatan Harapan in 2018. Mahathir’s successor, Abdullah Badawi, held appeal for the middle ground, gaining great success in the 2004 general election, but was perhaps for that reason unable to withstand the strong onslaught from the UMNO right wing in 2005.[17] Hishammuddin Hussein, who was UMNO youth chief, chose to wave the keris at the UMNO general assembly, and with that, dissembled the Vision 2020-Bangsa Malaysia grand coalition that UMNO had forged since 1990 with the wider population.[18]
The political tsunami against Barisan Nasional in the 2008 general election was initially a simple expression of the social backlash against UMNO’s turn to the right. However, the opposition quickly grew confident and the Pakatan Rakyat (later Pakatan Harapan) coalition became a sustained force that proved to have the stamina to stay the course, benefiting from UMNO’s atrophy, and eventual toppling UMNO in 2018. In fact, signs of UMNO’s corrosion were already very visible by 2013. Barisan Nasional won only 47% of the popular vote that year while the opposition Pakatan Rakyat received 51%; despite that, the ruling coalition retained power by nevertheless winning 133 of the 222 parliamentary seats.
Prime Minister Najib Razak did try to move the discourse back to the centre with his 1Malaysia slogan and New Economic Model – a modest attempt to tweak the economic structure, but he capitulated when faced with resistance from right wing groups such as Perkasa and internal UMNO forces. As Najib himself became mired in one after another epic economic scandal, particularly but not restricted to the colossal 1MDB outrage, he resorted to more authoritarian measures to hold off opponents within the party and in the opposition. Expansion of publicly funded social assistance, especially for the B40 (Bottom 40%), became mainstreamed, while his imposition of Goods and Services Tax (GST) backfired massively.[19] Extensive amounts of illicitly sourced money were used to oil his party and coalition machinery and patronage networks with the voting public.[20]
DRIVERS OF CHANGE
The old political ecosystem could no longer hold. Massive political earthquakes in the form of a major split in UMNO when Najib sacked Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin on 28 July 2015; the break within PAS which resulted in that party’s progressives exiting to form Parti Amanah Negara; and the rebirth of Pakatan Rakyat as Pakatan Harapan.[21] Even after history was created with the formation of the Pakatan Harapan government in 2018, the leadership vacuum had yet to be filled. By the end of 2021, that vacuum is more pronounced than ever.
All in all, 2020 was a watershed year within an era filled with uncertainties. The end-February Sheraton Move that toppled the Pakatan Harapan government was fueled by the idea that, given the election results of 2018, a Malay-unity government could be formed through the exclusion of DAP and through the non-Malays being portrayed as the enemy. That idea, born of desperation and political envy, was immediately discredited after the Sheraton Move, when rivalry between UMNO and Bersatu quickly intensified. The “dua darjat” discriminatory divide between the well-connected elite and ordinary folks, acutely evident for all to see when the former were seen to flout Covid-19 regulations with impunity while the latter were severely punished for similar or even minor infractions. This divided Malaysians more sharply than the propagated differences between Malays and non-Malays. Class inequalities were pervasive and were keenly felt during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, as exemplified by the White Flag aid campaign that drew attention to the plight of the poorest in society. A very large group of what I term “educated underclass” in society is both a timebomb and a potential source of progressive change. For instance, as a proxy statistic, 68% of PTPTN (National Higher Education Fund Corporation) borrowers – university and college-educated adults – earn an income below RM 4,000 per month even after working for more than a decade.[22]
The country’s political reconfigurations in 2020 and 2021 have yet to coalesce into a new stable and functioning order. With a highly urbanized population, with women holding a significant place in society while being politically underrepresented, a very well-connected online citizenry, and the influx of younger voters due to the lowering of the voting age and the implementation of automatic voter registration, I argue that Malaysia is about to enter into another “political order”. While the demise of UMNO’s hegemony has been accompanied by prolonged uncertainties, it provides space for a new compact premised on a multi-ethnic middle ground attracted to polemical ideas of social and economic justice. We may hopefully call the new order the Malaysian New Deal.
While events in 2021 reflect enduring complexities in Malaysian politics, they underscore the pressing need for new settlements as well. The Emergency rule by Prime Minister Muhyiddin discredited the administration and failed in its principal mission of containing the pandemic, while the Memorandum of Understanding between Muhyiddin’s successor Ismail Sabri Yaacob and the opposition Pakatan Harapan, and the recent Melaka and Sarawak state elections, demonstrate how heavily the onus lies with the political class to respond to public demands and craft a new equilibrium that provides for an effective reformist government. A new combination of factors is needed which can bring economic growth and political stability; this need was made painfully poignant by the Covid-19 health crisis and the resultant deep economic crisis.
What needs to be accomplished? First is a New Malaysian Identity:
Without addressing identity politics, no new compact has a chance of lasting for long. The lessons learned from the last few decades testify to this. Malaysians may be culturally different, but that can easily be an asset.
Dealing with ethnic identity is not about abolishing identity but about giving meaning and purpose to a broader and more encompassing identity, in short, a new Malaysian identity based on citizen rights. Framing every issue in a racial perspective can only go so far, and Malaysian politics has obviously gone way past that point.[23]
Second is a system that is capable of Nurturing Democracy:
Malaysia has been seeing declining support for UMNO-Barisan Nasional and increasing support for its alternatives since the 2008 general elections. The new normal today is such that there is no longer a dominant party and Malaysians would be better off realizing that it can achieve better governance through more vibrant coalition building between parties of similar strength, and through an empowered parliament. The King’s statement on 18 August 2021 captures the spirit of our times succinctly, “yang menang tidak menang semua manakala yang kalah pula tidak kalah semua (winners don’t win all, losers don’t lose all).”[24]
Furthermore, Malaysia’s federalism has always tilted too much in favour of the central government. As Hutchinson has argued, “the health of Malaysia’s federal system is in jeopardy.”[25] Devolving more powers and resources to the state governments, especially Sabah and Sarawak is a necessary dynamic in building a new and stable polity.
Third is the Building of a Fairer Economy:
Malaysia needs to build a virtuous cycle of higher pay, higher quality, higher technology and higher productivity. Only if this is achieved can equitable and dynamic growth be possible and credible. The oil money that has allowed for Malaysian governments to be wasteful and ineffective without needing to tax ordinary citizens cannot last forever. But instead of focusing on tax revenue, the conversation should be broadened to ask how Malaysia can move away from a pyramid-shaped income society that has a huge bottom to one that is more diamond-shaped and reliant on a large middle class. Failure to address the structural imbalances that marginalize the “educated underclass” will assuredly trigger some form of revolt. An economy that is fairer to this “educated underclass”, above all through bolstering wages and elevating a broader segment into the middle-income tax brackets, is necessary for any stable system to evolve.[26]
Economic development and recession, democratic awakening and its associated movements, the rise or fall of identity politics – these are all key denominators in Malaysian politics. Interpreting the series of previous shifts in Malaysian history is not just an academic undertaking. It is more to show that the dynamics of history are more like a pendulum than a speeding train, and that our understanding of the past changes over time.
This helps us to imagine—emboldens us to imagine in fact—possible positive changes in the 2020s.
New orders come out of flux. Understanding the flux allows for the best possible orders to emerge.
[1] This paper was revised from a presentation delivered at an ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute webinar held on 10 November 2021. For notes on the event, see /media/event-highlights/webinar-on-in-search-of-the-next-political-order-for-malaysia/. The author records his appreciation to Dr. Francis Hutchinson and Dr. Lee Hwok Aun for their thoughtful comments.
[2] Francis Fukuyama (2014). Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. London: Profile Books, pp. 7-8.
[3] Khoo Boo Teik (2020). Malay Politics: Parlous Condition, Continuing Problems. Singapore: ISEAS.
[4] See Liew Chin Tong (2013) “Pakatan Rakyat – Building an economy for all” Website of Liew Chin Tong https://liewchintong.com/2013/01/25/pakatan-rakyat-building-an-economy-for-all-2/ (accessed on 16 December 2021); Liew Chin Tong (2018) “Empathy was what Najib lacked in his economic policies” Website of Liew Chin Tong https://liewchintong.com/2018/11/09/empathy-was-what-najib-lacked-in-his-economic-policies/ (accessed on 16 December 2021).
[5] Joseph M. Fernando (2002). The Making of the Malayan Constitution.
Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS).
[6] Arend Lijphart (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
[7] Sultan Nazrin Shah (2019). Striving for Inclusive Development: From Pangkor to a Modern Malaysia State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. As Sultan Nazrin Shah notes “Post-war reconstruction efforts had, by 1950, rehabilitated the pre-war laissez-faire trading economy, and economic momentum was again subject to the vicissitudes of global market conditions for rubber and tin.”
[8] Wong Chin Huat, James Chin and Norani Othman. (2010). “Malaysia – towards a typology of Electoral One Party State” Democratization, Vol. 17, No. 5, October 2010. pp. 926-927. According to Wong Chin Huat el al, “the Peninsula vote share of PAS soared by nearly 10% from 14.64% to 23.74%….The Peninsula vote share of the non-Malay-based opposition parties did not surge but remained roughly the same at 1964’s 26%.” In terms of vote share, the Alliance was in a minority position in seven states (Penang, 34.6%; Selangor, 41.6%; Perak, 43.6%; Negeri Sembilan, 46.2%; Kelantan 47.5%; Melaka, 48.1%; Terengganu 49.3%).
[9] Lee Hwok Aun (2021) “The New Economic Policy: Revisiting origins and misconceptions” Economic History of Malaya: https://www.ehm.my/publications/articles/the-new-economic-policy-revisiting-origins-and-misconceptions (accessed on 9 December 2021).
[10] R.S. Milne and Daine K. Mauzy (1978) Politics and Government in Malaysia Singapore: Federal Publications.
[11] For discussions on the challenges faced by the opposition in the 1970s, see, for example, Liew Chin Tong (2021) Lim Kit Siang: Patriot. Leader. Fighter. Kuala Lumpur, REFSA, Chapter 3.
[12] Zainah Anwar (1987) Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the students Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications.
[13] Harold Crouch (1996) Government and Society in Malaysia Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 114-129.
[14] Hwang In-won (2003) Personalised Politics: The Malaysian State under Mahathir. Singapore: ISEAS, Chapter 6.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Thomas B. Pepinsky (2009). Economic Crisis and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 5 and 7.
[17] On the Abdullah Badawi years, see Bridget Welsh and James U.H. Chin (2013) Awakening: the Abdullah Badawi Years in Malaysia Petaling Jaya: SIRD.
[18] Liew Chin Tong (2015) “Keris waving: a decade later” Website of Liew Chin Tong: https://liewchintong.com/2015/08/04/keris-waving-a-decade-later/ (accessed on 9 December 2021).
[19] Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun (2019) “9 May 2018: The Unexpected”, in Francis E. Hutchinson and Lee Hwok Aun (eds). The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge? Singapore: ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 10.
[20] For instance, on 21 June 2019, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission filed civil forfeiture applications against 41 individuals and entities, including RM192 million to UMNO, to recover RM270 million allegedly siphoned from 1MDB. The Star (2021) “Court of Appeal overturns forfeiture of RM 25 million seized in 1MDB suit”: https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/09/02/court-of-appeal-overturns-forfeiture-of-rm25mil-seized-in-1mdb-suit (accessed on 9 December 2021).
[21] Liew Chin Tong (2015) “Political earthquakes that realigned Malaysian politics” (3-part series) Website of Liew Chin Tong https://liewchintong.com/2020/10/20/political-earthquakes-that-realigned-malaysian-politics/ (accessed on 6 December 2021).
[22] Chromium Resources (2019) Policy Review and Strategic Plan for PTPTN (unpublished document) pp. 17.
[23] I elaborated on the point in Liew Chin Tong (2021) “Citizens Unite” Citizen Tong Newsletter: https://chintong.substack.com/p/citizens-unite
[24] Datuk Indera Ahmad Fadil Shamsuddin (Datuk Pengelola Bijaya Diraja Istana Negara) (2021), Statement by Istana Negara, 18 August.
[25] Francis Hutchinson (2014) “Malaysia’s Federal System: Overt and Covert Centralisation” Journal of Contemporary Asia, pp 422-442.
[26] See, for example, Sultan Nazrin Shah (2019), Striving for Inclusive Development: From Pangkor to a Modern Malaysia State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 10, for a comprehensive and sensible long-term economic agenda.
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2022/1 ““We are Independent Trolls”: The Efficacy of Royalist Digital Activism in Thailand” by Janjira Sombatpoonsiri
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Alongside protracted political conflicts offline, Thailand has witnessed information warfare between pro- and anti-establishment forces. This struggle has been asymmetrical in terms of institutional resources and bureaucratic networks.
- Pro-establishment forces tap into and consolidate the residual infrastructures of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Its psychological Information Operations (IOs), which can be traced back to the counter-communism campaigns of the 1960s, have recently been revamped in the face of the Southern insurgency and of political conflicts in Bangkok.
- Despite extensive IOs by the ISOC, some experts argue they have not gained substantive traction. This assessment, however, overlooks the interaction between official IOs and decentralised influence campaigns carried out by royalist media and civic groups.
- These royalist outlets and civic groups engage in a multi-tiered strategy. Pro-regime media monitor the opposition’s social media feeds and use these to create content that highlight opposition threats to the status quo.
- Their digital activism also includes online petitions and offline mobilisation that have had a tangibly detrimental impact on the opposition beyond mere contestation over narratives.
- Beyond organised activism, ordinary royalists defend the crown against ‘nation-haters’ on Twitter. By self-identifying themselves as ‘independent IOs’, digital royalists aid the regime’s online surveillance, censorship and legal harassment against those deemed threatening to the establishment. The role of these actors reinforces the ecosystem of digital repression.
*Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Assistant Professor and Project Leader at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.
ISEAS Perspective 2022/1, 5 January 2022
INTRODUCTION
Thailand has undergone information warfare. From red shirts active in the 2010s[1] to youth protesters who took to the street in 2020 and 2021[2], anti-establishment forces have used social media platforms to challenge the legitimacy of ruling elites and their ideology. Meanwhile, the security establishment has allocated a massive budget and human resources to psychological Information Operations (IOs) to counteract the opposition. The IO troops have allegedly engaged in campaigns to manipulate online narratives that are favourable to the regime and unfavourable to the opposition. The focus on military IOs has led many to over-speculate about the extensive impact of regime-organised information manipulation efforts. In March 2020 and August 2021, for instance, the opposition Move Forward Party expressed concerns about the government’s allocation of budget to IOs which have the effect of exacerbating the country’s political divide.[3] A common perception is that every anti-opposition troll on Twitter or Facebook originates from the military IOs.
However, this assumption is only half the story. This paper examines the complex intersection of: 1. regime-organised cyber troops; 2. pro-regime media outlets, and royalist activists. Unlike the first group, the pro-regime press and royalist civic groups are not necessarily sponsored by the regime, but are instead ideologically driven to defend the crown. This seems to also be the case for many ordinary Twitter users whose account profiles and digital behaviours suggest a bottom-up, unorganised pattern of influence activities against anti-establishment supporters. This plethora of actors engage in a multi-tiered strategy, from content reposting and flagging to offensive commenting. The dynamics of royalist activism run parallel with anti-establishment activism online and offline.
Royalist digital activism may have limited traction, assessed from its small social media following. But the activism is impactful and detrimental to the opposition fundamentally because royalist digital repertoires work in tandem with other digital repression tactics of the regime, especially ‘lawfare’ (the abuse of draconian laws against dissidents). For example, these activists tend to monitor online dissent and report this to the authorities, who will then file lawsuits against dissidents. Royalist digital activism is accordingly a constitutive part of ongoing digital repression in Thailand.
REGIME EFFORTS AT SOCIAL MANIPULATION
Thailand’s protracted conflicts between supporters of two competing political orders – royal nationalism and democracy – characterises the ongoing information warfare. Both pro- and anti-establishment supporters propagated their agenda initially through traditional media such as TV and radio programmes, but from 2006 onwards, the Internet (first web blogs and later social media) has become the new battleground.[4] As monarchy-related scandals and criticisms are increasingly shared on YouTube, Facebook, and more recently Twitter, the authorities have responded with an array of digital repression tactics. State agencies – such as the Royal Thai Police’s Cyber Crime Investigation Bureau, the Anti-Fake News Center affiliated with the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society and the Army’s Cyber Centre – have systems to surveil online activities effectively.[5] Once these agencies flag subversive online content, they may block it and/or pursue legal repression. Existing laws such the Computer-Related Crime Act (enacted in 2007 and amended in 2016), Article 112 and Criminal Code, Sections 326 to 333 on defamation, have been abused to stifle anti-establishment supporters with multiple charges.[6] These mechanisms of censorship and surveillance are carried out in tandem with official efforts to influence narratives in social media.
To be sure, regime efforts at content manipulation are old wine in new bottles. The tactic was extensively used in the 1960s-70s counter-communist insurgency in which the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) engaged in psychological Information Operations (IO) campaigns under the Thai Army’s command. Renamed in 1974, the ISOC morphed from the Central Security Command that was established in 1962 and become the Communist Suppression Operations Command in 1965. The ISOC’s role waned as communist threats faded in the late 1980s. But since 2006, the ISOC and its nationwide paramilitary units have been reinvigorated in response to recurring Southern Thailand insurgency and anti-establishment challenges in Bangkok.[7] In conjunction with the police’s cyber monitoring programmes, the ISOC allegedly hosts 19 to 40 cyber units[8] comprising over 1,000 rank-and-file army personnel, and possibly high school students, in the Territorial Defence Command.[9] Each unit comprises about five personnel who spend at least one hour per day influencing social media content. As of 2020, IO units reportedly received basic training workshops about social media content creation and a lump sum of 1,500 Thai Baht (around US$45) per month.[10] In 2021, some public relations start-ups were allegedly contracted to improve the quality of IO campaigns.[11] The 2020 annual budget for IOs can be up to 3.7 billion Thai Baht (about US$110 million).[12]
IO campaigns are generally classified as “black”, “white”, and “grey,” implying social media messaging to directly attack or devalue (doi kha) the opposition, commend the regime and provide partisan information, respectively.[13] One IO trooper usually runs several social media accounts by using inauthentic identifications (e.g., using a stock or stolen avatar photo as an account image). IO troopers monitor the opposition figures or groups’ social media feeds to get a sense of current contentious issues. They then respond by re-sharing flagged content but inserting new captions to counteract the opposition’s original claims. In addition, troopers respond to anti-establishment posts in the authors’ comment section. My preliminary survey of four accounts suspected to be IOs shows that these offensive comments often target Twitter accounts of opposition figures, including the exiled scholar Pavin Chachavalpongpun (@PavinKyoto), Phuea Thai politician Tosaporn Sererak (@Tsererak) and VoiceTV journalist Sirote Klampaipoon (@sirotek).[14] Recent reports from Twitter and Facebook reveal the extent of military IOs on social media sites. In December 2020, Twitter took down 926 accounts linked to the Army.[15] But the number of inauthentic Twitter accounts involved in “a large-scale information operation” during the 2020 anti-establishment protests could go up to 17,562.[16] Later in March 2021, Facebook took down 185 accounts and groups with ties to the ISOC which exhibited “coordinated inauthentic behaviour.”[17] The Move Forward party has attributed 54,800 social media accounts to military IOs.[18]
Despite this breadth of institutionalised efforts to manipulate online information, experts, including those from the Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), argue that official IOs are not always effective. According to an SIO report, of 926 accounts that Twitter took down in 2020, 471 accounts did not tweet at all, while 455 accounts produced only 21,385 tweets from 2015 to 2020. Engagements and followings of these accounts were also low; researchers conclude that regime-coordinated IOs are low-impact.[19] However, this assessment is limited to counting the number of followers and engagements, while overlooking a political environment in which regime-organised influence campaigns proliferate. In Thailand, the impact of official IOs should be considered in conjunction with decentralised IO campaigns by royalist media and activists, and ultimately with the interaction between these diverse efforts of content manipulation and other aspects of digital repression.
THE ROYALIST MEDIA-ACTIVIST NEXUS
Thailand’s royalist media represents a crossover between traditional press and social media outlets that generate pro-government, pro-military and pro-monarchy ‘news’ content. Top News, for instance, exists as a TV channel, and simultaneously publishes news reports on its website, YouTube and Facebook Pages. Other pro-regime online mouthpieces such as The Mettad, Khao Sueak and The Truth, however, operate only in the form of websites and Facebook Pages by producing their own reports to accompany poster-like content visualisation. Particularly The Mettad and Khao Sueak had emerged as a satirical mimic of pro-democracy news sites such as The Matter and Khao Sod. They later developed readership among royalist, pro-regime communities and morphed into news blogs. Although some analysts speculate that the regime that is currently led by Prayuth Chanocha may have funded or hired private companies to run these online publications,[20] at least Top News seems to have private sponsorships.[21] The Mettad states on its Facebook page that its writers are mainly volunteers. The table below compares the number of fans and engagements in November 2021 across four main royalist platforms, with Top News having the most total fans and The Truth having the largest fan growth and most active engagement with its followers (via comments, shares and reactions). As with military IOs, these outlets produce content based on their monitoring of social media feeds of the opposition’ sites. Their ‘news’ reporting frames issues from the normative perspective of royal nationalism, thereby casting anti-establishment figures as unpatriotic and disloyal, as further detailed.
- Royalist news reports cater to demands and worldviews of royalist civic groups. The latter’s digital activism in turn amplifies messages of pro-regime outlets. Contemporary and active royalist groups include:
- Thai Move Institute (สถาบันทิศทางไทย)
- Thailand Help Center for Cyber Bullying Victims (THCVC, ศูนย์ช่วยเหลือด้านกฎหมายผู้ถูกล่วงละเมิดทางสังคม)
- Rubbish Collection Organization (RCO, องค์กรเก็บขยะแผ่นดิน)
- Thai Bhakdi (ไทยภักดี)[22]
- Monarchy Watchdog and Protection Network (เครือข่ายเฝ้าระวังและปกป้องสถาบัน)
- Citizen Group to Defend the Nation, the Monarchy and Buddhism (กลุ่มพสกนิกรปกป้องสถาบันชาติ ศาสน์ กษัตริย์)
- People Army’s Network to Protect the Monarchy (เครือข่ายกองทัพประชาชนปกป้องสถาบัน)
- Vocational Students Helping the Country Group (VSHCG, อาชีวะช่วยชาติ)
- Coordination Centre of Vocational Students for the Protection of National Institutions (CVPI, อาชีวะปกป้องสถาบัน)
- Thai Raksa (ไทยรักษา)
Most of these groups have online presence in the form of Facebook pages that serve to amplify messages, facilitate digital activism and galvanise offline protest actions. As with military IOs and pro-regime outlets, royalist groups’ pages base their content on what they gather from the social media feeds of anti-establishment figures, and repost these on the groups’ Facebook pages. These page administrators also share news content retrieved from pro-regime outlets listed earlier, especially The Truth.
Beyond creating and sharing content, these different groups have seemingly collaborated in digital activism against certain campaigns or actions by the opposition. Recent online petitions such as #save112 and #AmnestyGetOut reflect this activist pattern. On 5 November 2021, the Progressive Movement (led by leading figures of the disbanded Future Forward Party) together with iLaw (legal and human rights NGO) and youth movements, launched the campaign to abolish Article 112 (offending the monarchy). Soon after, around 100,000 people signed the petition in support of this campaign.[23] On the same date, People Army’s Network to Protect the Nation, the Monarchy and Buddhism submitted its own petition that was signed by around 200,000 citizens.[24] Simultaneously, the hashtag #save112 was seen widespread on Twitter to compete with the opposition hashtag, #abolish112. In a similar vein, on 21 November 2021, Amnesty International (AI) Thailand had shown solidarity with young activists charged with Article 112 on its website. The pro-regime outlet, The Truth, initially picked up on this and criticised the AI’s statement on its Facebook Page. A few days later, the Thai Raksa group, the THCVC and other like-minded royalist groups gathered more than 500,000 signatures to pressure the authorities to ‘evict’ Amnesty International from Thailand. In parallel, the Twitter hashtag #AmnestyGetOut gained traction among royalists.
Royalist digital activism overlaps with offline activities to counter anti-establishment forces. Royalist groups detailed above have varying mandates. The Thai Move Institute is supposed to be a ‘think tank,’ thereby mostly involved in organising discussion panels and webinars. Meanwhile, the THCVC not only helps victims of alleged bullying actions by the opposition supporters but it also monitors social media posts considered to offend the royal family. They gather evidence for Article 112 lawsuits and submit this to the police.[25] The RCO shares some characteristics with the THCVC; it was founded in 2014 to surveil social media sites and file lawsuits against violators of Article 112. But regardless of their different missions, most royalist activists coalesce in organising street protests to push back against anti-establishment protests. A case in point was the occurrence of at least 120 royalist protests from July to December 2020 to deter opposition demonstrations.[26] The number peaked in mid-October 2020 when an anti-establishment activists’ gathering took place in parallel with the royal commemoration of King Rama IX’s death.[27] On the same date, the RCO and allies staged a counter protest which was equated with a fight against “national scum”[28]
Apart from organised groups, ordinary citizens take to Twitter and Facebook to defend the crown against ‘nation-haters’ (phuak chang-chaat), a term coined by the Thai Bhakdi leader and former politician of the conservative Democrat Party, Warong Dejkijvikrom, to refer to anti-establishment supporters. In contrast to the assumption that royalists on Twitter are mostly regime-backed IOs, the reality is more complex and many royalists who troll the opposition online sometimes appear to be someone’s father, mother, sibling and teacher – basically ordinary people who proudly endorse the opposition’s derogatory labelling of them as ‘minion’ or salim.[29]
These royalists who troll the opposition appear to be genuine accounts, rather than those manufactured for the purposes of IOs. A closer look into over 10,000 accounts that posted the hashtag #save112 and #AmnestyGetOut reveals that the characteristics of these users appear dissimilar to those usually associated with organised IOs. First, some accounts have been using Twitter since the early 2010s, way before regime-backed IO accounts were thought to have been created, most around 2020 and 2021.[30]
Second, account profiles of ‘independent IOs’ seem to be markedly different from manufactured IO accounts. While organised troopers’ Twitter handlers appear to comprise random alphabets (e.g., the handler of one account suspected to be IO is “@vbdP2KwUO8BtnL6”[31]), the accounts of those claiming to be ‘independent’ IOs use handlers that resonate with their real names or nicknames. This difference is also reflected in the profile pictures used: IO accounts mostly use a stock or stolen avatar photo as an account image. This is not the case for ‘independent IOs’ whose profile pictures seem to match their personal images posted together with non-political, lifestyle-based messages on their feeds.
Thirdly, IO accounts normally have between none to dozens of followers, while following hundreds of the opposition accounts. Their sole activity appears to be offensively commenting or retweeting these opposition figures’ posts. However, ostensibly independent IOs tend to have hundreds and even thousands of followers with mixed professional and political backgrounds. Moreover, their tweets combine political and non-political content. (See images below). One caveat is that it remains difficult to assess the extent to which these independent IOs are linked to the regime beyond mere ideological associations. Future research using digital anthropology that observes behaviours of the so-called independent IOs over a long duration, in tandem with systematic Twitter analytics should address this aspect.[32] For now, it looks like Thailand is facing a more diverse environment of influence activity than usually assumed.
CONCLUSION
What makes royalist digital activism effective is not the quantity of page followers or engagements, but rather its operation in tandem with other digital repression tools. Compared with the millions of followers in anti-establishment Facebook Pages such as Free Youth or Thalufah gain,[33] royalist pages such as The Mettad and The Truth, with their smaller number of followers, may be considered as having minimal traction. However, the politics of numbers matter less than a digital environment in which royalist digital activism is situated. Together with regime-organised IOs, royalist activism constitutes a mechanism of content influence that shapes pro-regime narratives, while potentially drowning out and sowing public doubt in the opposition movements in particular and democratic political order in general. This was particularly effective, for example, when organised and grassroots IO troopers relied on a royal nationalist rhetoric to frame the 2020 and 2021 protesters as nation-haters and anti-monarchists. Such framing has largely diverted public attention beyond monarchy reform to include addressing economic inequality and the government’s ineffective responses to the pandemic. Royalist media’s portrayal of protesters as vandals backed by western powers reinforces existing narratives that link democracy with disorder and external interference in Thai sovereignty.[34] In parallel with information manipulation, the regime employs a wide range of digital repression tactics such as surveillance, censorship and legal repression to control information distribution by dissidents. In particular, the weaponisation of draconian laws has so far disrupted anti-establishment activism.[35] Multiple charges that anti-establishment supporters face deters them from participating in political activities. What is more, the costs of legal threats may make people think twice about criticising the regime in digital space, thus effectively instilling self-censorship.[36]
The interplay between organised and decentralised bottom-up IO campaigns completes the cycle of digital repression. Online vigilantism by pro-regime mouthpieces and royalist actors facilitates official surveillance and censorship by flagging subversive content and reporting violations to the police. In this sense, draconian laws offer a meaningful activist path for royalist groups who diligently collect evidence and file lawsuits against those they deem disrespectful of the monarchy.
ENDNOTES
[1] Simon Montlake, “Thailand’s Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts Battle it out on Facebook.” The Christian Science Monitor, 24 May 2021 (https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0524/Thailand-s-red-shirts-and-yellow-shirts-battle-it-out-on-Facebook, downloaded 12 December 2021).
[2] Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Thai 2021 Demonstrations: Losing Traction Online,” Fulcrum: Analysis on Southeast Asia, 26 October 2021 (https://fulcrum.sg/thai-2021-demonstrations-losing-traction-online/, downloaded 12 December 2021).
[3] “เปิดไสลด์ สส.วิโรจน์อีกครั้ง เพจไหนเป็นเป้า บัญชีไหนเป็นหมายของ IO ทหาร” [MP Virot’s PowerPoint Slides: Which pages are military IO’s targets], Prachatai, 3March 2020 (https://prachatai.com/journal/2020/03/86617, downloaded 30 November 2021); “ไอโอ: คณะก้าวหน้าเปิดโปงข้อมูลเครือข่ายปฏิบัติการข่าวสารกองทัพ [IO: Move Forward Movement Reveals Military’s IO Networks], BBC News Thailand, 20 December 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-55145803, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[4] Pirongrong Ramasoota, “Internet Politics in Thailand after the 2006 Coup: Regulation by Code and a Contested Ideological Terrain,” in Access Contested: Security, Identity and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace, edited by Ronald John et al. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012), 83-114.
[5] Feldstein, Steven. The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, 113-118. The Thai military has also allegedly purchased spyware from companies such as NSO / Circles, Bluecoat and Hacking Team. Analysts speculate that this could be used to streamline current state surveillance against dissidents. See Bill Marczak et al., “Running in circles: Uncovering the clients of cyberespionage firm circles,” The Citizen Lab, University of Toronto (https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/106212/1/Report%23133–runningincircles.pdf, downloaded 2 November 2021).
[6] Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Securitization of Fake News: Policy Responses to Disinformation in Thailand,” in From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation: Social Media in Southeast Asia, eds. Aim Sinpeng and Ross Tapsell. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020, 105-125.See also Aim Sinpeng, “State Repression in Cyberspace: The Case of Thailand,” Asian Politics & Policy 5(3) (2013): 421-440; Lui Yangyue, “Transgressiveness, Civil Society and Internet Control in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 27(3) (2014): 383-407; and Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics and Resistance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 96-133.
[7] Puangthong Pawakapan, Infiltrating Society: The Thai Military’s Internal Security Affairs. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof-Ishak, 2021, 4.
[8] An army’s leaked document identifies 19 military units active in IOs. However, in an early 2020 parliamentary session, an estimation of IO units could be up to 40 units. See, “เปิดไสลด์ สส.วิโรจน์อีกครั้ง” [MP Virot’s PowerPoint Slides]; “ไอโอ” [IO]).
[9] The Territorial Defense Command of the Defense Ministry offers a military training course for high school students. Upon completion after three to five years, graduating students are exempted from annual military conscriptions..
[10] “ก้าวไกลเปิดฉากไอโอปั่นข้อความ 5.8 หมื่นบัญชี” [Move Forward MP Exposes 58,000 IO Accounts], Isranews Agency, 19 February 2021. (https://www.isranews.org/article/isranews/96156-isranews-907.html, downloaded 2 November 2021).
[11] “ไอโอ” [IO].
[12] “Opposition Alleges Army Behind Cyber Attacks on Critics, Holds PM responsible,” ThaiPBS, 261 February 2020 (https://www.thaipbsworld.com/opposition-alleges-army-behind-cyber-attacks-on-critics-holds-pm-responsible/, downloaded 2 November 2021).
[13] “IOตัวจริงแหกวงการไอโอ” (A real IO trooper exposes Information Operation system), เถื่อนทอล์ก [Thuean Talk], September 18, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BirmjL0xhK0.
[14] My thanks go to ISEAS MTS’s research officer, Amirul Adli Bin Rosli, for his assistance in detecting this pattern.
[15] Josh A. Goldstein et al. “Cheerleading without Fans: A Low-Impact Domestic Information Operation by the Royal Thai Army,” Stanford Internet Observatory, 8 October 2020 (https://stanford.app.box.com/v/202009-sio-thailand, downloaded 24 June 2021).
[16] Elise Thomas, Tracy Beattie and Albert Zhang, “#WhatsHappeningInThailand: The Power Dynamics of Thailand’s Digital Activism,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2020 (https://www.aspi.org.au/report/whatshappeninginthailand-power-dynamics-thailands-digital-activism, downloaded 2 November 2021).
[17] Patpicha Tanakasempipat, “Facebook removes Thai military-linked information influencing accounts,” Reuters, 3 March 2021 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-thailand-idUSKBN2AV252, downloaded 2 November 2021).
[18] “ไอโอ” [IO]. The Move Forward Party is what remains from the Future Forward Party which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court’s ruling in February 2021. A dozen of its party leadership is banned from the election for ten years. However, figureheads such as Thanathorn Jungrunggeungkij and Piyabutr Saengkanokkul remain active politically as founders of the Progressive Movement.
[19] Josh A. Goldstein et al., “Cheerleading without Fans,” 3.
[20] Private conversations with Orapin Yingyongpathana, September 25, 2021; Sarinee Achavanuntakul, October 13, 2021.
[21] This is gauged from the opposition’s campaign to ban products of companies that fund Top News. See “No Salim Shopping List,” Trends Map, 22 March 2021( https://www.trendsmap.com/twitter/tweet/1373914963677306881, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[22] The Thai Bhakdi Group became a political party in October 2021.
[23] “ล่าชื่อยกเลิก 112 วันเดียวทะลุแสน” [Petition to Abolish 112 Gets 100K in One Signatures in One Day], Matichon Online, 6 November 2021 (https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_3028918, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[24] The group is led by Buddha Isara, former figurehead of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) whose mass demonstrations set the stage for the 2014 military coup. See “พุทธะอิสระยื่นขวน 2 แสนรายชื่อคัดค้านแก้ไข ม.112” [Buddha Isara Submits to Chuan a Petition against 112 Abolish Petition ], Thairat Online, 6 November 2021, (https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/223642, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[25] “ปักหมุดแผนที่ 112 ปฏิบัติการประชาชนแจ้งความ” [Mapping Citizens’ Lawsuits against 112 Violators’, VoiceTV Online, 28 October 2021 (https://voicetv.co.th/read/xZ3RycdVl, downloaded 30 November 2021); “ชวนทำความรู้จักป้าแน่งน้อย และคชอ.ที่แจ้งความคนด้วยม.112 กว่าพันคน” [Introduce Auntie Naengnoi and THCVC that File Lawsuits against more than 1,000,112 Violators], Prachatai, 11 July 2021 (https://prachatai.com/journal/2021/07/93916, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[26] Own calculation based on the databases of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Programme and Mobdata Thailand.
[27] As the motorcade carrying King Rama X’s Queen Suthida and his 15-year-old son passed the protest site near the government house, protesters were seen flashing the three-finger salute – the resistance symbol – and chanted phrases such as ‘Reform the Monarchy’ and ‘My Taxes!’. See Rebecca Ratcliffe and Veena Thoopkrajae, “Thai Pro-democracy Protesters Confront Royal Visit to Bangkok,” The Guardian, 14 October 2020 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/14/thai-pro-democracy-protesters-confront-royal-visit-to-bangkok, downloaded 12 December 2021).
[28] “หมอเหรียญทองเดือด ปลุกกำลังมาล้อมกทม. รอสัญญาณเก็บขยะแผ่นดิน” [Angry Rien Thong incites mob to surround Bangkok, wait for signals to collect scum of the land], Thairath Online, 14 October 2020, (https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/1952926, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[29] Minions are a character from a Pixar Studio’s animation. Their bodies are yellow, which is also the birthday colour of King Rama IX whom royalists highly revere. Besides, minions are portrayed as a dull creature that tend to follow orders blindly, a trait that anti-establishment supporters often associate with royalists. Salim originally means a type of Thai sweet, but in light of political conflicts, it refers to royalists who are not ‘enlightened’ enough to understand that they are deceived and oppressed by the feudal elites.
[30] Josh A. Goldstein et al., “Cheerleading without Fans”; Elise Thomas et al., “#WhatsHappeningInThailand.”
[31] See https://twitter.com/vbdP2KwUO8BtnL6.
[32] See, for instance, Rongbin Han, Contesting Cyberspace in China: Online Expression and Authoritarian Resilience (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Florian Scheinder, China’s Digital Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
[33] Free Youth and Thalufah are two of several youth groups that have led anti-establishment protests in 2020 and 2021. Free Youth Facebook Page has 2 million followers, while Thalufah Page has about 262,000 followers. See also Anusorn Unno, “ ‘Thalu Gas’: The Other Version of the ‘Thai Youth Movement,’ ISEAS Perspective, 2021/146 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-146-thalu-gas-the-other-version-of-the-thai-youth-movement-by-anusorn-unno/, downloaded 13 December 2021).
[34] The storyline that US and European organisations support anti-establishment movements to overthrow the monarchy has been around as early as since the 2014 coup. In light of the 2020 protests, this conspiracy idea has gained public traction. Royalist outlets and civic groups such as The Truth and the Thai Move Institute published a list of NGOs, activists and academics who were involved in the protests and who received funding from the US (see, for instance, https://www.facebook.com/thaimoveinstitute/posts/349743986408921/). Mainstream media, including the moderate ThaiPBS, later picked up this narrative. See “Conspiracy theorists believe ‘invisible foreign hand’ behind Thai protests”, ThaiPBS World, 2 November 2020 (https://www.thaipbsworld.com/conspiracy-theorists-belief-invisible-foreign-hand-behind-thai-protests/, downloaded 2 November 2021). For further details about the online development of this conspiracy plot, see Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Manipulating civic space: Cyber trolling in Thailand and the Philippines. “ GIGA Focus Asia, No. 3, 6/2018 (https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/11574071-manipulating-civic-space-cyber-trolling-thailand-philippines/, downloaded 30 November 2021).
[35] From 18 July 2020 to 31 October 2021, 1,636 citizens were charged with either violating computer crimes law, Article 112, or Emergency Decree; or all of these combined. See Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, “ตุลาคม 64: ยอดคดีการเมืองเฉียด 900 คดี ผู้ถูกดำเนินคดีรวมอย่างน้อย 1,636 คน”
[October 2021: Political Lawsuits Nearly Reach 900 cases with at least 1,636 Citizens Being Charged], 8 November 2021 (https://tlhr2014.com/archives/37550, downloaded 13 December 2021).
[36] Janjira, “Securitization of Fake News”.
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2021/170 “Stuck in Second Gear: Indonesia’s Strategic Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific” by Evan A. Laksmana
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Indonesia has important interests to defend in the Indo-Pacific, from navigating great power politics, and securing its maritime domain and resources, to reviving ASEAN centrality.
- The Indonesian foreign policy establishment has focused its diplomatic resources on implementing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Jakarta’s strategic resources and political leadership are heavily directed inwards, leaving little bandwidth to invest in non-ASEAN options to address Indo-Pacific strategic challenges.
- Indonesia’s strategic response to the Indo-Pacific has been fractured and incoherent due to the stove-piped approach to regional affairs adopted by relevant ministries and the absence of a ‘centralised hub’ under the President’s office to manage cross-issue and inter-agency policymaking processes.
- Indonesia needs to overhaul its strategic policymaking and work with regional partners through both ASEAN and non-ASEAN options, including minilateral arrangements, to defend its interests in the Indo-Pacific.
*Evan A. Laksmana is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He was previously a Wang Gungwu Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and Senior Researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, Indonesia.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/170, 28 December 2021
INTRODUCTION
Sitting at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia has a wide range of interests in the ever-expanding region, from great power politics threatening regional stability and the centrality of ASEAN-led institutions, to the daily concerns over trans-national organised crime, illegal fishing activities, and cross-border incursions. With the emergence of duelling strategic visions for the Indo-Pacific by major powers such as Japan, China, the US, Australia and others, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officially pushed to articulate its own Indo-Pacific vision in 2018,[1] although the recent shifting of the country’s geopolitical gaze from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific has largely been performative rather than strategic.
Thus far, Indonesia’s preferred approach to strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific is anchored on ASEAN-led institutions through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).[2] Diplomatically, it has not been able to articulate non-ASEAN strategic options for the Indo-Pacific. Indonesian foreign policymakers insist instead on finding ways to better implement the AOIP, even though other ASEAN member states are of the view that the document needs a “dire update”.[3] Meanwhile, Indonesia’s broader instruments of statecraft—military, political, economic, social and others—have not been integrated into a single strategic framework geared towards the Indo-Pacific. President Joko Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) doctrine is also now considered a hollow shell, if not defunct altogether.[4]
This article analyses the strategic stakes for Indonesia in the Indo-Pacific, the limitations of Indonesia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific through the AOIP, and the political and bureaucratic hurdles to the development of an overarching Indonesian Indo-Pacific strategy. It will conclude by suggesting several policy recommendations to remedy the problems.
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
The Indo-Pacific presents a complex set and wide array of long-term strategic and short-term operational challenges for Indonesia. The following should be central considerations for Indonesian policymakers. First of all is the issue of US-China strategic rivalry. While the Indo-Pacific is theoretically about expanding the region’s strategic horizons, the centrality of the US-China strategic rivalry acts as a vortex that overrides other major currents, capturing most of the attention and focus of policymakers. The growing polarisation that comes with the US-China dynamics also shapes China’s recently worsening relations with regional powers, from Japan to South Korea and Australia. All these trends translate into shrinking strategic space and autonomy for Indonesia. Jakarta increasingly finds it harder to make strategic policy decisions—on infrastructure, technology to diplomacy—without being entangled in some form of competitive dynamics over the Indo-Pacific.
Second is the deteriorating maritime security environment. Aside from the growing pressure of great power politics, Indonesia’s maritime environment has seen a wide array of operational challenges, from illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and trans-national organised crime to armed robbery, as well as strategic ones such as the potential of conflict over the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and other regional flashpoints.[5] These challenges, of course, preceded the rise of the “Indo-Pacific” construct, but they have become pronounced since its arrival.
Third is ASEAN’s increasing lack of strategic relevance in the Indo-Pacific. For one thing, ASEAN was never designed as a problem-solver of regional security issues. It was meant to be a norms-building venue and a gateway to further cooperation. Furthermore, given ASEAN’s process-oriented approach to regional cooperation, countries that seek tangible outcomes, especially in the face of immediate security challenges, are rightly developing non-ASEAN strategic options. The rise of minilateral groupings like the Quad and AUKUS should be seen in this light.[6] For Indonesia, which has always invested in ASEAN as a primary go-to foreign policy platform, the grouping’s fading relevance in the emerging Indo-Pacific strategic context does not bode well.
Fourth, beyond but not unrelated to the US-China dynamics, are issues and developments involving other major countries, such as the problems between India and China, or between China and Australia. These have implications for Indonesia’s economic and security interests, and adopting a genuine ‘Indo-Pacific outlook’ requires Indonesia to seriously invest in understanding and building relationships with different regional partners beyond ASEAN.
THE DILEMMA OF INDONESIA’S ASEAN-BASED INDO-PACIFIC APPROACH
For the time being, the Indonesian MOFA remains fully invested in finding platforms and ideas to better implement the AOIP. It has tried to promote the AOIP in most meetings with ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners such as the US, Japan, India, and others. AOIP-related ideas have also been discussed across the foreign policy establishment, including AOIP-related programmes or events hosted by ASEAN member states. Some are considering whether existing ASEAN programmes can be relabelled as being part of AOIP. The age-old discussion of revitalising or institutionalising the East Asia Summit has, for example, made a comeback as part of the AOIP’s goals. MOFA is also planning to host the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Summit as an implementing avenue for the AOIP. AOIP-related policy ideas are likely to be repackaged within the agenda of Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, albeit that the AOIP will have to compete with other pressing ASEAN issues such as Myanmar, pandemic recovery, or the ASEAN charter review.
Beyond the AOIP, MOFA does not seem eager to explore non-ASEAN options to engage the Indo-Pacific or directly address its many strategic challenges. For one thing, the AOIP fills a discursive gap by articulating Southeast Asian views on the Indo-Pacific amid duelling Indo-Pacific visions by the major powers. Having the AOIP as ASEAN’s starting point to position itself in the Indo-Pacific is perhaps better than having nothing at all. Furthermore, some members of Indonesia’s political and business elites are convinced that Indonesia need not “annoy” China by employing the term “Indo-Pacific” for fear that Beijing would see this as Indonesia carrying the water for the US, Japan or Australia. One could argue that given these domestic voices, MOFA probably has no politically acceptable choice other than to articulate Indonesia’s voice through ASEAN despite the AOIP’s inherent limitations, flawed assumptions, and lack of strategy or resources.[7]
However, Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific strategy has not, cannot, and should not be determined by MOFA alone. The AOIP, or rather ASEAN-related mechanisms, is only but one diplomatic instrument that MOFA uses to articulate its views on the Indo-Pacific. It should not be viewed as the ideal or ultimate overarching framework for Indonesia to deal with the strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Not all relevant agencies and ministries share MOFA’s push to have the AOIP as the primary vehicle for Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Publicly, non-MOFA policymakers support Indonesia’s foreign policy positions articulated by MOFA in the AOIP. But privately, defence and maritime policymakers are aware that the AOIP or ASEAN-related processes alone are not going to fundamentally improve Indonesia’s strategic environment. Their main concern regarding the AOIP is that it offers neither path-breaking policies to address maritime tensions and great power politics, nor concrete mechanisms to achieve measurable outcomes.[8]
In this sense, MOFA is caught in a tight spot. That some ASEAN members states are not particularly excited about the AOIP or its potential implementation further exacerbates the document’s lack of strategic viability. Indonesia’s inability to move beyond the AOIP means that it will remain a strategic spectator in the Indo-Pacific. The recent complaint by Jakarta over AUKUS underlines the fact that Indonesia and ASEAN are increasingly being made strategically redundant despite major powers’ lip-service support for ASEAN centrality. MOFA cannot keep pushing ASEAN as the solution to all Indo-Pacific problems, such as, for example, China’s acrimonious relations with Australia.[9] Indonesia’s “leadership” of ASEAN should not be equated to “salesmanship” of the organisation, nor should it be conflated with “chairmanship”.
POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC HURDLES TO INDONESIA’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
Indonesia needs to develop an overarching Indo-Pacific strategy that includes a wider range of foreign policy options beyond ASEAN.[10] Ideally, such a strategy should aim to provide Indonesia with the ability and agility to independently shape and influence strategic outcomes in the Indo-Pacific. It should focus on addressing both the long-term strategic and short-term operational challenges mentioned above, and integrate different policy instruments, including diplomatic, political, economic, social, and military tools of statecraft. As such, it should ideally start with an overarching strategic outlook and policymaking process.
The problem remains that President Widodo’s GMF doctrine has not genuinely driven that process. The GMF’s implementing document, the Indonesian Sea Policy, was a bureaucratic attempt at renaming the existing maritime-related programmes developed by different state agencies and institutions, rather than a strategic effort to integrate them in a holistic manner.[11] Furthermore, Indonesia’s strategic resources remain directed inwards and the country is left with little bandwidth to invest in non-ASEAN alternatives for managing Indo-Pacific issues. The domestic tasks for the military – from counterterrorism to pandemic management – continue to grow while its external defence capabilities remain underwhelming.[12] Defence diplomacy has been lacklustre and driven too much by procurement needs. Economic resources are directed toward domestic development, rather than external engagement such as outward foreign direct investment, an area where the country lags behind other regional players.[13]
At the bureaucratic level, Indonesia does not have a ‘centralised hub’ under the President to develop coherent and sustainable inter-agency strategic policymaking processes and options. It does not have a National Security Council-equivalent, for example. Instead, it has three Coordinating Ministers system for (i) economic and industrial affairs, (ii) political, legal, and security affairs, and (iii) maritime affairs and investment. Each of these offices coordinates the policies of a given set of agencies and ministries, but does not integrate or develop cross-agency policy options per se. The power of each minister also does not depend on the statutory authorities as much as it does on the political heft he or she each carry (e.g., how much the President trusts him or her).
How Indonesia deals with China in the North Natuna Sea, for example, is often an indication of how this coordination system does not work. China’s maritime challenge demands the synergy of inputs, resources, and options of various agencies under three different coordinating ministries.[14] The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) generally fall under the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs.
Indonesia’s economic engagement with China falls specifically under Luhut Pandjaitan, the President’s “Special Envoy and Coordinator for China Cooperation” and the Coordinating Minister for Maritime and Economic Affairs. His coordinating ministry also coordinates the Ministry of Fisheries. However, the Coordinating Ministry of Economic and Industrial Affairs is also tasked with domestic and international economic engagements. In China-related economic affairs, the Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, Erick Thohir, is increasingly becoming part of the equation. In June 2021, he represented Indonesia at the inaugural meeting of the China-Indonesia High-level Dialogue Cooperation Mechanism, along with Luhut and other officials.[15] Such ministry-level overlap in dealing with China is further complicated by the overlapping authorities of different maritime-related agencies.[16] The regular North Natuna Sea maritime crises between Indonesia and China are emblematic of Indonesia’s broader strategic lethargy, if not paralysis.
The above descriptions point to the lack of a common unifying “threat” that can mobilise all agencies and ministries to develop a shared strategic framework. Anchoring an Indo-Pacific strategy on the “China challenge” may well be a non-starter for Indonesia. Different Indonesian agencies and ministries—and certainly different political, security and business elites—view China differently. The absence of a ‘centralised hub’ that serves as a national security council certainly exacerbates the policy process problem.
More importantly, Indonesia currently has a president that does not seem eager to manage daily geopolitical or strategic affairs, to say the least. He has continued to emphasise Indonesia’s domestic-oriented foreign policy in his second term.[17] Widodo’s personal detachment from the strategic and foreign policymaking processes has meant that “there has been no captain; no single voice speaking authoritatively from Jakarta to the world, nor giving foreign policy leadership across the ministerial spectrum.”[18] Consequently, bureaucratic politics and interests often drive Indonesia’s strategic policies. Left to their own devices, different ministers or agency heads find ways to expand their corporate interests while presenting their policies as broadly aligned with the President’s vague directives. MOFA is left with little strategic guidance and push in developing creative and unconventional – i.e., “non-ASEAN” – foreign policy options for the Indo-Pacific. Under these conditions, the development of a full-blown strategic process and framework to manage the strategic challenges of the Indo-Pacific remains elusive.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY ASPIRATIONS
Indonesia needs to overhaul its strategic policymaking structure and abandon its stove-piped approach to regional affairs. Without a centralised strategic hub to manage and integrate cross-issue and inter-agency policy processes, Indonesia’s strategic response on the Indo-Pacific will remain fractured, incoherent, and haphazard. While dramatic changes may have to politically wait for a new administration in 2024, there are some ideas that policymakers should already consider.
First, Indonesia needs to develop strategic options beyond ASEAN. Policymakers need to accept that ASEAN is only fit for purpose on areas that involve confidence building and norms-building. For pressing strategic and operational challenges, whether over the South China Sea, Myanmar, or other Indo-Pacific flashpoints like Taiwan, Indonesia needs to invest in non-ASEAN options. These options may include minilateral security arrangements with India and Japan for the Indo-Pacific, or with Vietnam and Malaysia over the North Natuna Sea.
Second, Indonesia needs to invest in its own strategic resources, not just intellectual or normative leadership. This would require Indonesia to rethink how it organises its defence establishment and develop a strategic framework for defence diplomacy. The military, for example, needs to make difficult choices about reducing personnel costs in favour of training and exercises as well as technological modernisation. Defence diplomacy should also be less about military procurement alone and more about developing strategic ties across the region.
MOFA also needs a significant budgetary boost from its underwhelming annual allocation (currently around SGD760 million). Added resources may help MOFA develop better diplomatic investment and resources over a wide range of Indo-Pacific affairs. Trying to better understand the challenges involving the Indian Ocean, for example, requires Indonesia to elevate its diplomatic presence and profile in India and other South Asian states. Trying to have more leverage over Myanmar also requires a stronger influence and investment in the country. In short, if we expect MOFA to develop a genuine Indo-Pacific outlook, the government needs to provide the resources it needs to raise Indonesia’s diplomatic presence and profile across the region.
Third, Indonesia could start establishing an office of strategic affairs under the executive office of the President. The debate about developing a National Security Council has not been moving forward due to the fact that the future institution is attached to a stalled National Security draft bill that has been discussed since the mid-2000s. The bill essentially envisions a “principals’ committee” model of national security council stacked with the ministers of defence and foreign affairs, the police and military chiefs, and others, when what Indonesia needs is in fact an executive office under the President to integrate and develop strategic options. Such a move is easily done, since the President does not need to pass a law to establish the apparatus of his own office.
Finally, Indonesia’s foreign policy establishment needs to move its energy and focus beyond issues with high domestic-political salience but low regional-strategic saliency, e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While MOFA naturally must follow the President’s domestic proclivities, it should still invest time and resources into broader Indo-Pacific strategic affairs, whether over the India-China border problems, Myanmar, or great power politics involving the US and China. Shying away from geopolitical affairs in favour of domestic ones is not only misplaced but also potentially cuts down Indonesia’s strategic options when regional or bilateral crises arise.
ENDNOTES
[1] Analysts should be cautious in drawing a straight line from the so-called “Indo-Pacific Treaty” idea proposed by then-Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa in 2013 to the current AOIP. In the early days of current Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi’s first term, the term “Indo-Pacific” only appeared once in the ministry’s 2015-2019 strategic planning document. So MOFA did not initially consider the Indo-Pacific as a priority theatre or strategic focus early in Marsudi’s term; one can also argue that as the new foreign minister, Marsudi may have wanted to distance herself from the predecessor’s signature idea. The AOIP, in short, remains the preferred concept of Marsudi’s MOFA and its importance within the ministry explains why the “Indo-Pacific Treaty” idea rarely, if ever, makes an appearance in recent policy pronouncements.
[2] See David Scott, “Indonesia grapples with the Indo-Pacific: outreach, strategic discourse, and diplomacy.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 38.2 (2019): 194-217.
[3] See Thomas Daniel, “How Asean should defend its primacy”, New Straits Times, 11 December 2021. Available at https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2021/12/753286/how-asean-should-defend-its-primacy (accessed on 12 December 2021). It should also be noted that other than from Indonesia, we have not seen high-level public urgency by other ASEAN leaders to call for a speedy implementation of the AOIP.
[4] See Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia as “Global Maritime Fulcrum”: A post-Mortem Analysis”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 8 November 2019.
[5] See Ioannis Chapsos and James A. Malcolm. “Maritime security in Indonesia: Towards a comprehensive agenda?” Marine Policy 76 (2017): 178-184.
[6] See for example Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (ed), Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN (London: Routledge, 2020).
[7] See Pou Sothirak, “Re-thinking ‘Asean Outlook on Indo-Pacific’”, The Bangkok Post, 20 July 2019. Available at https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1715795/re-thinking-asean-outlook-on-indo-pacific (accessed on 10 December 2021); Evan A. Laksmana, “Flawed Assumptions: Why the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is Defective”, AsiaGlobal Online, 19 September 2019. Available at https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/flawed-assumptions-why-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-is-defective/ (accessed on 10 December 2021).
[8] Author private conversation with Indonesian defence officials, Jakarta, 14 October 2021.
[9] Rizal Sukma, “Is AUKUS a problem or blessing for ASEAN?”, The Jakarta Post, 1 October 2021.
[10] See the debate in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific”. International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 1 (2020): 111-129.
[11] Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum?” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 23 March 2017.
[12] Natalie Sambhi, “Generals gaining ground: Civil-military relations and democracy in Indonesia”, Brookings Institution, 22 January 2021. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/generals-gaining-ground-civil-military-relations-and-democracy-in-indonesia/ (accessed 10 December 2021)
[13] See Maxensius Tri Sambodo, “Indonesia’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.” in Outward Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 20170, 128-151.
[14] See Lyle J. Morris and Giacomo Persi Paoli. A Preliminary Assessment of Indonesi’s Maritime Security Threats and Capabilities (RAND, 2018)
[15] See “Wang Yi and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan Co-chair the Inaugural Meeting of the China-Indonesia High-level Dialogue Cooperation Mechanism”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 6 June 2021. Available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1881771.shtml
[16] See for example Hadyu Ikrami and Leonardo Bernard. “Indonesia’s Maritime Governance: Law, Institutions and Cooperation.” The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law 6.2 (2018): 134-171.
[17] Shafiah F Muhibat and M Waffaa Kharisma, “Jokowi’s second term needs innovative foreign policy”, East Asia Forum, 4 September 2019. Available at https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/09/04/jokowis-second-term-needs-innovative-foreign-policy/ (accessed 10 December 2021).
[18] Donald E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2016: Garuda Hovering.” Southeast Asian Affairs 2017 (ISEAS Publishing, 2017), 164.
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2021/169 “Calculating the Carbon Footprint and Minimum Greenhouse Gas Production of SMEs in Southeast Asia” by Michael T Schaper and Ryan Wong Yee Yang
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Few attempts have been made to gauge the overall level of greenhouse gas emissions produced by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), even though they account for more than 90% of all firms globally and in ASEAN.
- There are currently estimated to be more than 71 million SMEs in Southeast Asia today, employing almost 205 million persons.
- We employ a series of highly conservative assumptions to estimate the minimum (baseline) amount of greenhouse gases emitted by the most common form of SME in Southeast Asia, which is equivalent to a single-person, home-based service sector firm.
- We estimate the very basic amount of emissions produced by such an SME in ASEAN to be at least 0.145 tonnes of CO2 (t CO2) per person, per annum.
- In total, our figures suggest that SMEs in Southeast Asia account for a minimum of 29.7 million tCO2 of emissions annually. This is more than the total annual national emissions of Brunei or Cambodia, and close to that of Laos.
- These figures only provide a base level of emissions; they are highly conservative and are very likely to be an under-estimation of the actual level of SME emissions in the region.
* Michael Schaper is Visiting Senior Fellow with ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and an Adjunct Professor with the John Curtin Institute of Public Policy, Curtin University, Western Australia. Email: michael.schaper@gmail.com. Ryan Wong is Lead Researcher at the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/169, 24 December 2021
INTRODUCTION
As the old management adage goes, you can’t manage what you can’t measure. However, the world faces a conundrum in terms of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) generated by business and industry: there are few, if any, estimates of the aggregate output of small- and medium-sized enterprises, even though they constitute the majority of the world’s business entities.
Doing so is a difficult process, fraught with both practical and methodological challenges. Yet if no effort is made in this direction, policymakers will not be able to gauge the relative contribution of SMEs to global warming in order to develop policies needed to help these firms reduce emissions and ultimately move to net zero.
In this paper, we lay out a process for calculating the very smallest minimum GHG output of any firm, and then use it to subsequently estimate highly conservative, minimal levels of emissions by the SME sector in aggregate. A small, basic “back of the envelope” approach is suggested, based on the likely emissions generated by a single, self-employed small business person working from home. This is the simplest and the most common form of SME found in the ASEAN region (as well as globally), and has the benefit of being intuitively easy to understand, to calculate, and to tweak if more complex modelling is also sought.
HOW MUCH EMISSIONS DO SMEs PRODUCE?
A first step in estimating SME emissions in Southeast Asia is to gauge the number of small firms in existence. Unfortunately, small business data sets and demographic figures in the region are bedevilled by a paucity of comprehensive, harmonised information.
Globally, SMEs account for at least 90% of all business enterprises. In most economies, though, this figure is closer to 95% or more, and in ASEAN, they represent at least 97% of all firms (ADB 2020). Exactly how many such businesses actually exist is still a matter of some conjecture, as there is no universal definition of what constitutes a small firm and no authoritative single international data set of the total number of such enterprises. Multilateral agencies such as the OECD (2018c) and International Labour Organisation (2019) have attempted to strengthen the calibre of these statistics by undertaking targeted studies and business surveys in parts of ASEAN, especially in high growth or poorly resourced countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos and Myanmar. However, these efforts have not been coordinated across the region and maintained over the years. In contrast, there is much more systematic SME data collection in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.
A detailed examination of SME numbers and employment across ASEAN in 2020 (Schaper 2020), based on publicly available official data from relevant national government agencies, indicated a minimum of 70 million SMEs, employing 140 million persons. However, this underestimated the likely real number of firms and employment, as some nations (Laos PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam) did not publish a full set of data for employment, whilst the number of firms in Myanmar was not publicly available.
Our estimate of the current real number is approximately 71.2 million firms, employing almost 205 million individuals, as shown in Table 1 below. This is based on updated data from publicly available national government sources, as well as imputed figures in those countries where public information is not available. Where information has not been accessible in the public domain, firm numbers and employment sizes in a country have been calculated from other national and regional averages provided by reliable national and multilateral statistical databases. However, this remains an approximation rather than a definitive enumeration.
Table 1: Number of SMEs in Southeast Asia
| Number of SMEs | Total Number of Businesses | SMEs as % of All Firms | Persons Employed by SMEs | |
| Brunei (2019) | 5,900 | 6,000 | 97.20% | 130,200 |
| Cambodia (2019) | 460,000 | 510,000 | 90% + | 1,200,000 |
| Indonesia (2018) | 64,194,000 | 64,199,600 | 99.90% | 131,728,800 |
| Laos (2018) | 178,200 | 178,600 | 99.80 | 3,050,200 |
| Malaysia (2019) | 1,151,300 | 1,344,900 | 85.61% | 7,807,000 |
| Myanmar (2015) | 126,200 | 127,000 | 99.4 | 12,577,800 |
| Philippines (2018) | 998,300 | 1,003,100 | 99.50% | 5,714,200 |
| Singapore (2019) | 271,800 | 273,100 | 99.50% | 2,520,000 |
| Thailand (2019) | 3,077,800 | 3,084,300 | 99.80% | 13,950,200 |
| Vietnam (2019) | 744,800 | 760,000 | 98% | 26,210,700 |
| Total | 71,208,300 | 71,486,600 | 99.60% | 204,889,100 |
Figures rounded to the nearest hundred. Sources: Schaper (2020), Michael (2017), World Bank (2021a), World Bank (2021b), World Bank (2021c), World Bank (2021d), Pisei (2019), OECD (2018a), OECD (2018b), OECD (2018c), World Bank (2019), DSMOP (2021), PSA (2021), ADB (2020), BoT (2020), and GSO (2021).
Given their sheer numbers, the role of small firms in responding to climate change should not be overlooked. Indeed, the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change has argued that “… private sector action, including that by SMEs, will be critical in addressing climate change” (UNFCCC/UNESCAP 2021: 1).
But how much GHGs do SMEs produce? This is a difficult phenomenon to measure. Major research work on GHGs, such as the various IPCC reports (2021, 2014) that attempt to synthesise the many individual studies on climate change, do not provide data on the quantum of emissions produced by small firms. Some other estimates of SME-induced emissions have been made but are generally country- or region-specific and highly generalised. For example, some cited research in the UK has suggested that SME-induced emissions account for at least 12% of that nation’s emissions (Hailstone 2021); however, another UK study suggests this figure may instead be as low as 6%, with the average emissions of an individual employing firm in the manufacturing or retail sectors being 4.4 tonnes (Small 99, 2021). This is a wide variation, and so perhaps it is not surprising that Blundel & Hampton (2021:1) have concluded in a recent review of SMEs and climate change issues that “…there is a serious lack of comprehensive data on greenhouse gas emissions …”. At present, then, no researchers can clearly state what quantum of GHGs are currently being produced by SMEs.
DIFFICULTIES IN MEASURING THE EMISSIONS OF SMEs
In some respects, a lack of information should not be surprising. There are many problems in effectively collecting emissions data from the SME sector – much more so than amongst larger firms.
As noted above, the lack of a universally-accepted definition of an SME is one factor. Most countries have their own unique definition of a “small business,” meaning that different data sets are usually not measuring exactly the same types of business entities.
Calculating the exact number of firms in each country is another problem, since many different databases are used. These may range from formal registrations with a national taxation authority in some countries, or business name registration systems, whilst other national data sets only count companies and exclude non-corporate structures. Some nations include the self-employed, and/or the informal sector, but others do not. Some countries maintain highly detailed records which are publicly available, whilst others do not (for a detailed discussion of this issue, see Schaper 2020).
Finally, there is substantial difficulty in segmenting the SME sector by size and industry. Some nations enumerate their counts of businesses by firm size category, splitting their counts into micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, whilst others collapse all of these into just one or two groups. Some nations publish data using highly complex industry and trading sector classifications, whilst other jurisdictions provide very little breakdown of their SME population by field of industry. It is not currently possible to definitively provide a breakdown across ASEAN of SMEs by industry sector.
There are also major impediments due to the fact that we are dealing with an individual enterprise unit. Data keeping often gets problematic, especially amongst the self-employed and micro-sized enterprises; few of these rarely collect emissions data. Even calculating “typical” or average figures can be difficult: SMEs are found in every industry sector, and since every industry tends to produce a unique and different pattern of emissions output, it is hard to generalise between sectors. Furthermore, individual firms do not follow industry norms: some firms may produce above average emissions while others may operate well below these levels.[1] Finally, SMEs are also highly heterogeneous; medium-sized firms, for example, often operate in a very different manner and produce emissions at levels that are quite different from that of micro-firms or sole traders. In reality, every business is somewhat different to one another, and it is almost impossible to measure the greenhouse gas output of all businesses at all times.
Despite this, a number of government agencies, NGOs and multilateral bodies have attempted to provide simple tools to allow SMEs to calculate their own emissions. Today there are a number of websites and other (usually online) sources that can be used by small firms to gauge their firm-level Scope 1 and 2 emissions output (see, for example, US EPA 2021; Nature Conservancy 2021). However, whilst useful at the individual firm level, they do not provide an easily-utilised tool for calculating likely baseline SME emissions across a country or region.
What is needed is a simple methodological process that can be used to economically and speedily estimate likely GHG emissions for the small business sector as a whole.
WHAT IS THE MOST REPRESENTATIVE OR “TYPICAL” FORM OF SME?
There is a very wide diversity of SMEs in existence across Southeast Asia. There are both informal and formal sector enterprises. Some businesses employ staff, but many are non-employing, consisting only of owner-operators; in contrast, employing firms can range from those with just one or two workers to some with dozens of employees. Some ventures are operated full-time, but many others only trade on a part-time basis. SMEs are also found in almost every industry sector, ranging from artisans and traditional streetside vendors to farms, retail operations, professional service providers, manufacturing, construction, transport and high-tech emergent new industries.
At first glance, then, it can seem difficult to assume what the typical characteristics of this polyglot group of businesses are. However, in recent years, some general norms have been established, notwithstanding problems in the paucity and variation of SME statistics internationally.
The most common form of business enterprise is the self-employed service sector firm, according to analysis undertaken by a number of multilateral bodies. The ILO (2019) recently observed that the self-employed sole trader in the service sector remains the single largest group of SMEs, both globally and regionally, and is especially large in developing economies. Many of these service sector operators are tradespeople, professionals, managers and other service providers, who produce no goods as such but rather earn their income from their own knowledge, skills and labour – and thus have only a limited carbon footprint. The ADB’s recent review (2020) of SMEs across ASEAN estimated that services accounted for somewhere between 61-89% of all trading enterprises, whereas manufacturing-based enterprises accounted for just 5-17% of firms.
In other words, the most common (frequently occurring) type of SME is likely to be an enterprise consisting of one individual working in the service sector. Although few countries keep data on business locations, commentators and researchers have typically observed that the most common location is the home. Working from home is a much cheaper, flexible and convenient mode than formally renting premises is. In fact, home-based businesses typically represent more than half of all firms (US Small Business Administration 2018; Eurostat 2019). This proportion is likely to have increased since the advent of Covid-19.
For these reasons, in this paper, we base our calculations of the minimum level of emissions as that produced by one individual service sector operator working from home.
DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY: SIMPLE IS BEST
A number of researchers and commercial organisations (Anthesis 2021; Ecometrica 2021; Skillett & Ventress 2020; Crow & Ariane 2020) have attempted in the last two years to gauge the likely emissions output of a single individual working at home. This can form the basis of a simple “ready reckoner” for calculating the likely baseline, minimum emissions of a group of SMEs. Although somewhat different assumptions are used by each study, they nevertheless adopt a broadly similar approach employing three steps:
1. Calculate the base level of business-related annual minimum energy (kWHs) produced by an individual working at home.
This focuses only on the basic typical emission-producing (Scope 1) activities common to persons conducting commercial activity – specifically electric usage by office equipment, air-conditioning or heating, a laptop, flat screen monitor, mobile phone, printer and room lighting. It excludes private (after working hours) energy consumption, for example. Typically, this data is collected or estimated in the form of kilowatt hours (kWh). Estimates vary, but the conservative estimate put forward by Ecometrica (2021) is approximately 1.2 kWh of energy use per home office per working day per person.
In most cases, the business is only assumed to operate 5 days a week for 48 weeks a year, after allowing for leave, public holidays and unexpected interruptions. This equates to 240 working days a year – again, a very conservative figure and likely an underestimation of actual working time and of business-related energy consumption.
2. Convert the KWHs into emissions.
Region- or nation-specific data (if available) is required here, since the production of energy (kWh) in different parts of the world can vary significantly, depending on the mixture of energy sources and efficiency of conversion. The latter is determined by the technology type, plant size, and outdoor temperature (Noussan & Neirotti 2020).
3. Multiply by the number of persons working in the SME sector.
This requires using actual or assumed numbers of employees in aggregate; once again, the level of data and its accuracy will vary significantly from one country to another.
WHAT ARE THE ESTIMATED EMISSIONS?
Using the above formula, we estimate the GHG emissions of the SME sector in ASEAN to be the following:
1. Determine the annual level of energy (kWh or MWh) consumed by an individual working at an SME.
By comparing the energy usage at home before and during the pandemic, Ecometrica provided a baseline figure of 1.2 kWh [2] per home office per working day per person. We adopt the estimated typical operating time of a small firm to be 240 days a year (with the assumption that businesses work five days a week, for 48 weeks a year).
Therefore, the calculation is: 1.2 kWh x 5 days a week x 48 weeks a year = 288 kWh (or 0.288 MWh) of energy used by each person in an SME each year.
2. Convert the kWh or MWh quantum into emissions.
The emissions generated for every kilowatt hour (kWh) of energy can vary across countries and regions depending on the energy mix and grid efficiency. For our purposes, the Grid Emission Factors[3] specific to the Southeast Asian region have been used.
The Asian Development Bank has provided a Grid Emission Factor for each of the ten ASEAN member states.[4] We obtained an average to represent the regional estimate, which is 0.5620 tCO2/MWh. It is assumed here that all the energy consumed have come from major electricity grid(s) in the country. Mini grids and home-based energy generators frequently used in the unelectrified rural areas in less developed countries were not accounted for.
The general formula for calculating greenhouse gas emissions (Asian Development Bank 2017) is:
GHG emissions = EC x Eelec /(1 – %L)
Whereby
EC = electricity consumption, MWh/year
Eelec = electricity emission factor, tCO2/MWh; if electricity is from the grid, this refers to the grid emission factor
%L = transmission and distribution losses expressed as decimal equivalent (e.g., 20% loss is expressed as 0.20)
Therefore, the annual GHG emissions of a Southeast Asian working in an SME = 0.288 MWh/year x 0.562 tCO2/MWh x 0.897[5] = 0.145 tCO2/year
3. Multiply by the number of persons working in the SME sector.
We use the estimates of the total number of persons working in SMEs in ASEAN as per Table 1 above, which is 204,889,100.
Total minimum annual regional GHG emissions produced by SMEs = 0.145 tCO2/year x 204,889,100 persons = 29,708,920 tCO2/year.
In other words, SMEs in Southeast Asia accounted for a minimum of 29.7 million tonnes of CO2.
COMPARATIVE SIGNIFICANCE
How important are 29.7 million tonnes in the overall level of GHG emissions?
At first glance, it may not seem especially high. After all, ASEAN member states generated 1,670 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent during the 2020 calendar year (Ritchie & Roser 2020). This means that, based on our limited calculations, SMEs accounted for only 1.8% of the total annual emissions produced in the region. And this 1.8% figure seems low compared to the estimated 6-24% of all UK emissions attributed to SMEs in that country.
However, this may underestimate the significance of SME emissions. At 29.7 million tonnes per annum, the SME sector in the region as a whole is already producing more GHGs than the total annual national emissions of Brunei or Cambodia, and is close to that of Laos (see Table 2).
Table 2: Territorial GHG Emissions Amongst ASEAN Nations in 2020
| MTCO2e | Population (approx.) | |
| Brunei | 10 | 0.44 million |
| Cambodia | 15 | 16.7 million |
| Indonesia | 590 | 273.5 million |
| Laos | 34 | 7.3 million |
| Malaysia | 273 | 32.4 million |
| Myanmar | 36 | 54 million |
| Philippines | 136 | 109.5 million |
| Singapore | 46 | 5.8 million |
| Thailand | 258 | 69.8 million |
| Vietnam | 254 | 97.3 million |
| Total | 1,652 |
Source: Global Carbon Project (2021). MTCO2e = million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. “Territorial” = emitted within the designated country. Global total in 2021 was 34,807 MTCO2e.
And is 1.8% of all regional emissions a much lower figure than that of SMEs in other regions across the globe? This research has not been done, but the issue is certainly worthy of more detailed examination.
We believe our figures for the ASEAN region should be regarded as a very bare minimum, given the conservative assumptions employed to calculate it. In practice, we believe the overall amount of SME-generated emissions is much higher. Our “ready reckoner” approach excludes small firms in heavy industry, emission-intensive activities, as well as the impact of supplementary business-related emissions generated, such as air conditioning, work-related travel or domestic vehicle usage. For these reasons, the cited figure above should be treated as a floor figure, below which total real emissions are unlikely to fall.
LIMITATIONS
A degree of caution is needed when utilising these data. It is important to note that calculating emissions is a somewhat fraught exercise, with the capacity for results to vary significantly depending upon the assumptions used. Conservative values will result in a much lower estimated level of GHG emissions than might otherwise be the case.
Likewise, calculations are also impacted by the accuracy of data sets available to researchers. As we have noted above, the count of SMEs in ASEAN and the total number of employees may not be fully accurate, due to both poor data availability and inconsistent definitions. Moreover, many more SMEs operate in so-called “dirty” industries (which produce high levels of GHGs, such as small-scale manufacturing, travel, transportation, agriculture and the like) than is assumed here; as such, the real level of emissions is likely to be much higher.[6]
CONCLUSION
There is no small degree of irony that although climate change is recognised as one of the most pressing global issues currently facing the business and political community, yet knowledge about it is largely based on incomplete and highly variable assumptions and calculations. There is little, if any, doubt that warming is occurring and must be reversed, but there is considerable divergence in how the extent of warming is measured.
Be that as it may, these figures may not be perfect, but at least they provide a starting point for analysis and discussion. This study welcomes refinement and enhancements from other researchers.
In the effort to slow global warming, all sources of emissions need to be considered. SMEs have usually been overlooked, at least in part because they have been too difficult to measure. This paper shows a simple way to begin doing so. It also indicates that micro, small and medium-sized businesses are significant factors to consider in climate change policy – after all, their impact is bigger than that of some entire nations. Although these data is only initial, and highly conservative, they nevertheless indicate that more attention, not less, on the SME sector is warranted in future.
REFERENCES
Anthesis (2021) Estimating Energy Consumption & GHG Emissions For Remote Workers, February, London: Anthesis.
Asian Development Bank (2017) Guidelines for Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Asian Development Bank Projects [online] Additional Guidance (accessed 02 December 2021)
Asian Development Bank (2020) Asia SME Monitor [online] ADB Monitor (accessed 03 November 2021).
Blundel, Richard & Hampton, Sam (2021) “How Can SMEs Contribute To Net Zero? An Evidence Review” State of the Art Review, No.51, July, Warwick UK: Enterprise Research Centre.
Crow, Daniel & Millot, Ariane (2020) Working From Home Can Save Energy and Reduce Emission. But How Much? IEA, Paris [online] https://www.iea.org/commentaries/working-from-home-can-save-energy-and-reduce-emissions-but-how-much (accessed 5 October 2021).
Ecometrica (2021) White Paper: The Ecometrica Homeworker Model – Estimating The Additional Energy Consumption and Associated Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Home Working, January, Edinburgh: Ecometrica.
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Fresner, Johannes; Morea, Fabio; Krenn, Chrstina; Uson, Juan Aranda & Tomasi, Fabio (2017) “Energy Efficiency in Small and Medium Enterprises: Lessons Learned From 280 Energy Audits Across Europe” Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol.142 No.4, January, pp.1650-1660.
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Hailstone, Jamie (2021) “Why Small Business Need To Think About Climate Change Too” Air Quality News, 4th February [online] https://airqualitynews.com/2021/02/04/why-small-businesses-need-to-think-about-climate-change-too/ (accessed 26 August 2021).
International Labour Organization (2019)“Small Businesses and Self-Employed Provide Most Jobs Worldwide and in Asia” [online] https://www.ilo.org/asia/media-centre/news/WCMS_723553/lang–en/index.htm, 19 October (accessed 16 March 2020).
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Nature Conservancy (2020) Carbon Sustainability Playbook: A Roadmap for Small and Medium Enterprises Ready For Climate Action, Minneapolis: Nature Conservancy for Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota.
Noussan, Michel & Neirotti, Francesco (2020) “Cross-Country Comparison of Hourly Electricity Mixes for EV Charging Profiles” Energies, Vol.13 No.10, May.
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Skillett, Luke & Ventress, Lindsay (2020) Homeworking Emissions Whitepaper, London: EcoAct.
Schaper, M.T. (2020) “The Missing (Small) Businesses of Southeast Asia” ISEAS Perspectives, No.79, 22nd July, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies-Yusof Ishak Institute.
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UNFCCC/UNESCAP (2021) “Building SMEs Capacity on Climate Action: Experiences From South-East Asia,” Draft Concept Note, July [online] 25.06 -Draft CN and Agenda – Side event on CB Needs.pdf (unfccc.int) (accessed 09 August 2021).
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ENDNOTES
[1] As a case in point, a detailed energy audit of some 280 SMEs in the European Union across a different range of industries and countries by Fresner et al (2018) showed variances of up to 3:1 between different firms in the same industry.
[2] This 1.2kWh is merely energy used for powering the home office equipment including a laptop, a flat screen, and a printer. Energy required for space cooling and heating is not incorporated.
[3] The UNFCCC defines Grid Emission Factors as the amount of carbon dioxide emitted, along with the provision of electricity by a specific electricity system. It serves as a baseline for gauging the changes to emission intensity due to the deployment of Clean Development Mechanism projects in the renewable energy sector.
[4] For grid emission factors, see Appendix C at the following site: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/296466/guidelines-estimating-ghg.pdf
[5] The average of transmission loss percentage across all Southeast Asian countries except Lao PDR is 10.3%. (IEA data on World Bank portal)
[6] Given the difficulty of obtaining accurate data about the number of firms operating in these “dirty industries” across all of ASEAN, and of calculating realistic average emissions for them, we have refrained from doing so in this paper.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/168 “The Nature of Recent Chinese Migration to Thailand” by Aranya Siriphon and Fanzura Banu
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Xin yimin (lit: new migrants) refers to the new wave of skilled and urban migrants from China. Since the 2000s, many have been moving into Southeast Asia. In Thailand, their number has doubled in the last two decades.
- Unlike previous overseas Chinese migrants who largely aimed to settle permanently in a destination, the new ones in Thailand today are of a more transient nature.
- These new Chinese migrants to Thailand can be classified into four groups: a) The first consists of people who migrate for business and economic activities; China is the third largest investor in Thailand, mainly in the manufacturing sector, with Bangkok as the favoured location. It also includes members of the staff working for official or private institutes, voluntary teachers, and professional freelancers. b) The second consists of individuals who migrate for education purposes, at all levels. Tertiary level students, in particular, enrol in private institutions, mainly in Bangkok and Chiang Mai. c) The third consists of people migrating for a lifestyle change. Tourists fall under this category, since some tend to eventually migrate to Thailand after being enamoured by its lifestyle and culture. d) The fourth refers to migrants of the above categories who move on to engage in e-commerce businesses, selling Thai products and international brands to Chinese customers.
- New communities have emerged in the wake of this migrant inflow, and new communities such as Huai Khwang Chinatown in Bangkok have appeared.
*Aranya Siriphon is Visiting Fellow at Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is also Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University. Fanzura Banu is Research Officer at the Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/168, 22 December 2021
INTRODUCTION
Xin yimin, 新移民, new migrants, is a term used in China to refer to people who left China after the reform era began in the 1980s. These migrants are considered products of ‘new China’, better educated, more skilled and more urbanized, and are effectively not the same class of people as the emigrants of the pre-World War II period who were escaping war and hunger.[1] After China’s open-door policy began, many of its citizens moved to developing countries in Southeast Asia and other regions in search of business opportunities and economic prosperity.
According to United Nations (UN) data,[2] Chinese emigrants to other parts of the world numbered 5,786,954 in 2000, and numbered twice as many in 2020, at 10,461,000 (Figure 1).
Emigrants from China to Southeast Asia numbered 526,422 in 2000; by 2020, they had increased to 688,000. Within this number, Singapore ranks first as the most popular destination where 426,000 Chinese migrants resided in 2020. Thailand came second, hosting 77,000, and Indonesia third with 76,000 (see figure 2).
Adopting the concept of ‘transient migration’[3], this paper argues that unlike traditional Chinese migrants which aimed for permanent settlement, new Chinese migrants in Thailand today are transient by nature and do not necessarily wish to settle in Thailand; they are there temporarily, and are often just passing through. This paper provides empirical data and information about these xin yimin (new migrants) in Thailand, and seeks to identify their group differentiation, migration objectives, and their situational appropriation in Thailand. The paper is part of a larger research project[4] which applies qualitative methods based on fieldwork done in 2019, when Chinese residents living in Chiang Mai were interviewed. Information and data were also collected from relevant academic literature, news outlets and other documentation.
CLASSIFYING RECENT CHINESE MIGRATION TO THAILAND
The situations under which Xin yimin in Thailand live are a reflection of diverse forms of migration based on variety of reasons, often related to business and commerce, leisure and relaxation, tourism or lifestyle change, and international education. In short, these migrants are employees of large and small-scale enterprises, entrepreneurs, governmental staff and experts, international students and their accompanying family members, and short and long-term stay tourists (Chinese seniors, retirees, political refugees etc.). They usually migrate transnationally to access better living conditions and economic opportunities through business, work, education and lifestyles, which today appear within the context of changing patterns of global capitalism and nation-state development.[5]
Generally, we can categorize the xin yimin into four groups, differentiated by their reasons for migration or by their economic activities in Thailand: 1) Migration for business purposes and economic activities; 2) Migration for the purpose of acquiring an international education, and those who accompany them; 3) Leisure and lifestyle migration, and 4); Migration mixing education and leisure with business.
Migration for Business and Economic Activities
This group resides in Thailand for business purposes of various forms, sizes and scales, and comprises of individualentrepreneurs with self-employment, brokers, small and medium enterprises (SME), private companies and enterprising entities engaged in commercial, industrial or professional activities. It also includes staff working for official or private institutes, voluntary teachers and freelancers.
– Chinese Investors in Thailand
Chinese investors in Thailand operate two forms of businesses: 1) 100 per cent shareholding company with foreign ownership, and 2) small and medium enterprises (SME) with the shareholding of 51 per cent foreigners and 49 per cent Thai. These are regulated under the Foreign Business Act B.E.2542 (A.D 1999) of Thai National Law.
According to the Department of Business Development (DBD) of Thailand,[6] overall foreign investors operating industries in Thailand in 2021 amount to 101,960 companies, with a total investment value of US $117,777 million, a 4.11 per cent increase since 2020.
The top three foreign groups of investors in Thailand in 2021 are from Japan, Singapore and China. Japan ranks first, with an investment value of US $31,697 million in 10,200 Japanese companies, and accounting for 26.94 per cent of total investments. Singapore ranks second, with US $12,236 million invested in 6,485 companies and accounting for 10.40 per cent of the total investments. China comes third, with an investment value of US $8,091 million in 19,009 companies, making up 6.68 per cent of total investments (Figure 3).
Chinese investors in Thailand are concentrated in five industry groups: 1) Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes (13 companies, with investment value at US $588.9 million; 2) Manufacture of accessories for motor vehicles (81 companies, with investment value of US $337.2 million; 3) Buying-selling of non-residential buildings, (1,465 companies with an investment value of US $334.8 million); 4) Commercial banks (2 companies, with investment value of US $333.3 million; and 5) Inter-industry credit granting (7 companies, with investment value of US $204.4 million) (Figure 4).
Although Chinese investors operate throughout Thailand, they tend to locate their business in Bangkok; there are 435 such companies in the capital. In the eastern region, 115 Chinese companies conduct their business in Chonburi Province, through buying and selling own-account non-residential buildings, logistics and transportation, and medical supplies and equipment. In Northern Thailand, Chiang Mai is the most popular location, with 78 Chinese companies doing retail sales via internet, hotels, resort hotels and accommodation, construction of residential buildings, buying and selling of condominiums, residential buildings, and goods wholesaling. To the South, it is Phuket that is the main province, where 33 Chinese companies are registered, mainly doing business in hotels, resorts and accommodation, tourism business, buying and selling condominiums and residences to Chinese customers, wholesaling goods, logistics, and transportation. Besides the industries mentioned above, other industries popular with Chinese investors in Thailand include agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, mining, construction and service to household repair, education service, health and social service, culture, sports and entertainment.
– Staff and Professional Workers
The second group identified as staff and professionalsworking for official institutes mainly refers to the Confucian Institutes’ and language instructors (CI),[7] Chinese teachers working for private schools or Chinese language institutes. Additionally, it includes nomadic employees, professional managers, executive managers, entrepreneurial employees or part-time freelancers who work for Chinese companies. As for CI, the Hanban[8] sent the first batch of volunteer teachers (VCTs) to Thailand in 2003, and the number has soared to 1,506 staffs in 2017. Over 2,000 staffs were dispatched to Thailand in 2018 which included all CI staffs in work ranking: directors, volunteer teachers, government teachers (GCTs), officers and assistants to serve in sixteen Confucian institutes and twenty-one Confucian classrooms.[9] From 2003 to 2018, more than 10,000 Chinese volunteer teachers have been dispatched to over 1,000 Thai schools and universities, making Thailand the world’s largest recipient country of Chinese volunteer teachers.[10]
– Education Migration
This category refers to Chinese students who seek international education, enrolling in several levels of higher education ranging from kindergarten to secondary education. This includes accompanying guardians popularly called peidu mama (陪读妈妈), or study mother, as well as other family members.
According to the Ministry of Education of China,[11] over 2.5 million students studied abroad from 2016 to 2019. At the Higher Education (HE) level, the number reached 700,000 in 2019. Thailand in 2020 received 14,418 Chinese students at the HE level, with 10,078 enrolled in private universities and 4,340 in state universities (see figure 5).[12] The central region, especially Bangkok, is the most popular area for enrollment of Chinese students in HE study programmes, with Chiang Mai in the north coming second.
Apart from Chinese students enrolled at the HE level, Thailand has received Chinese students into international schools from the elementary to the secondary level. According to the International Schools Association of Thailand (ISA),[13] the country currently has at least 128 international schools registered with the ISA and following Western-style English-based education. Most of these schools are located in Bangkok. Chiang Mai has the second largest number of international schools—21 of these were established recently to serve the high market surge in Chinese children seeking English-based education in Thailand. The number of Chinese students enrolled from kindergarten to high school level at international schools in Chiang Mai is noted in the fact that approximately 1,400, 1,800, and 2,000 students received full-time student visas of the non-immigrant education visa type “ED” in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.[14] In 2019, these students were accompanied by around 1,000 study parents or other caregivers.
– Leisure and Lifestyle Migration
Many lifestyle migrants from China first visited a Thai destination as a tourist. Liking what they experience, they may then decide to migrate there in search of a better lifestyle or a more fulfilling way of life.[15] Thailand is an evident option for this type of lifestyle migration by people from all over the world. In 2019, Thailand received 10.99 million Chinese visitors, which amounts to 27 per cent of all tourists to the country that year, making China the biggest source of tourists to Thailand, contributing about US $17 billion in revenue.[16]
The new trend of long-stay residence consists of especially senior Chinese or retirees. This is a group to note as it has increased in size gradually in recent years. In Chiang Mai, there has been an increase of 117 retired Chinese in 2016 to 563 in 2019. This is related to the new migration policy of the Thai government aimed at accelerating economic growth. The government provides a one-year renewable visa for retirees over the age of 50 who make a deposit of US $22,300.
– Combining Lifestyle Migration with Business
This category refers to those whose main objectives of migration are those described above concerning education, student caregivers, and seekers of lifestyle change, but who beyond that, are involved in business activities. The two main groups of so-called ‘entrepreneur study parents’, and ‘entrepreneur students’ practicing ‘Daigou’, 代购—being purchasing agents who import foreign products via e-commerce to serve Chinese customers in mainland China and Chinese residents who reside elsewhere—gain experiences from interacting with both communities in Thailand and China. ‘Entrepreneur study parents’ refers to parents who accompany their children studying abroad who simultaneously conduct online businesses. ‘Entrepreneur students’ refer to Chinese students doing the same thing.
For both groups, their normal routine allows them to be regularly engaged in their main tasks while gaining market knowledge about migrant situations and engaging in online business via Chinese e-commerce platforms such as WeChat and Guimi mall. This combined lifestyle can be effectively associated with the advancement of China’s internet infrastructure, the improved online business ecosystem, and the growing e-commerce market supported by the Chinese state and by general global flows.[17]
Noticeably, when situating Chiang Mai to understand Chinese tourists and residents under the second, the third, and the fourth groups who practice international education and leisure lifestyle migrations coming together with business, two particular narratives emerge on how Chinese migrants imagine Chiang Mai.Firstly, Manshenghuo, 慢生活, means slow life, leisure, and at ease with which Chinese people can live a simple life as they wish and not have any particular work to finish. Secondly, Maicun, 迈村, narrates the characteristic of Chiang Mai as a village. Although cun, or “village”, implies the lower level of modernized development of Chiang Mai compared to Chinese cities of the same scale, Chiang Mai in Chinese eyes serves as a friendly ‘natural environment’ for safer living, and a ‘human environment’ for more humane living.
EMERGING COMMUNITIES
Of the multiple emerging communities in Thailand, Huai Khwang in Bangkok is most noteworthy. Unlike Sampheng-Yaowarat in Bangkok — the first ‘Chinatown’ in Thailand that has been around since 1892 and which was built by settlers from southern China — Huai Khwang emerged as a ‘new Chinatown’ in 2016, attracting recent Chinese migrants to reside there and form a new community. 7,000 new migrants were first identified as a new community in Huai Khwang district, near the Chinese embassy and the China Cultural Centre. Chinese travelers, especially volunteer teachers for CI and graduates of Thai universities, and Chinese residents (Chinese wives accompanying husbands who have started their own business, Chinese women married to Thai nationals, etc.) found this area convenient, being close to the Chinese Embassy, having easy access to the Chinese bank, filled with authentic Chinese restaurants, logistics services, medical facilities, convenient mass transit stations, and accommodation with Chinese-speaking staff.
Gradually, many of these new migrants shifted from volunteer teaching to running small-scale commercial enterprises. In accordance with Thai Law, the Chinese usually work in collaboration with Thai counterparts to conduct trade and business in Thai goods (e.g., latex rubber pillow stores, bird’s nest tonic shops, cosmetics outlets, handbag stores, crocodile skin belts). Some serve as brokers for mainland Chinese in purchasing fixed assets, such as properties and education institutes. Although both licensed and non-licensed businesses can be found in this area, it is mostly non-licensed businesses that proliferate by providing transport, logistic, warehouse services.[18] Some tend to move to other provinces or back to China after their experiment in business activities.
CONCLUSION
Xin yimin in Thailand come in four categories, based on their reasons for migration. Those who migrate for business opportunities or employment prefer Bangkok, with manufacturing being the biggest industry with major Chinese investments, compared to other industries such as banking and real-estate. The second group of new migrants are those who migrate for education. Available data point to these students being mostly self-funded and their preference for private universities suggests that these migrants are financially well off. The third category relates to lifestyle migration which often begins with them coming on tour and choosing to migrate later. The fourth group comprises of those migrating for reasons relating to education or to a search for lifestyle change who go into online businesses.
It can be observed that the slower pace of life in Thailand is a great attraction. With the inflow of these types of immigrants, new communities appear. Huai Khwang in Bangkok, for example, is a notable example of this, signally the need for further studies on the phenomenon of Chinese migration to Thailand in the 21st century.
ENDNOTES
[1] Kuhn, P. Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 321–33
[2] United Nations (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division), International Migrant Stock 2020: Destination and Origin. Available at www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock (accessed on 23 October 2021)
[3] Gomes, C. Transient Mobility and Middle-Class Identity: Media and Migration in Australia and Singapore. (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan,2017); Gomes, C., Leong, S. and Yang, P. Editorial: Why Transitions. Transitions: Journal of Transient Migration, 1(1), pp 7–11, 2017.; Xiang, B. Preface: Hundreds of Millions in Suspension. Transitions: Journal of Transient Migration, 1(1), pp. 3–5,2017; Yeoh, B.S.A. Afterword: Transient Migrations: Intersectionalities, Mobilities and Temporalities. Transitions: Journal of Transient Migration, 1 (1), pp. 143-146, 2017.
[4] A small research project entitled “New Chinese Diaspora and Transnational Mobile Practices in Chiang Mai, Thailand”, working under the larger project on “Transnational Chinese Diaspora in the Era of Globalization”, coordinated by Prof. Yos Santasombat, Ph.D., Chiang Mai University and financially supported by the Thailand Research Fund (TRF) during 2018-2020.
[5] See, for example, Castles, S. Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective. Journal of Ethics and Migration Studies, 36 (10), pp. 1565–586, 2010; Bell, M. and Ward, G. Comparing Temporary Mobility with Permanent Migration. Tourism Geographies: International Journal of Place, Space and the Environment, 2 (1), pp. 87-107, 2000.
[6] see more detail in the data source at https://datawarehouse.dbd.go.th/ provided by the Department of Business Development (DBD.), Ministry of Commerce, and the data is updated on 30 September 2021.
[7] The Confucius Institute (CI) was handed over to the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF), self-described in 2020 as a non-governmental private organization, following international claims that CIs were China’s overseas propaganda set-up.
[8] Hanban is known as Confucius Institute Headquarters locating in Beijing. According to its official website, Hanban is a public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, aiming to provide Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide. Under the criticism during a decade, Hanban finally changed its name in 2020 to the Centre for Language Education and Cooperation. More detail at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3091837/chinas-confucius-institutes-rebrand-after-overseas-propaganda. (Retrieved on 13 October, 2021).
[9] Li Jiangyu. “Practicing ‘Nation-State Work’ Abroad: International Chinese Teachers of Confucius Institutes in Thailand.”, PhD dissertation, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, 2020.
[10] Cited in Wang Yujiao. Confucius Institutes in Thailand: Revealing the Multi-dimensionality of China’s Public Diplomacy. Journal of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, 37 (3), 99–113, 2019.
[11] More detail at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/23/c_139611486.htm (retrieved on 12 October 2021)
[12] Thailand Higher Education website, http://www.info.mua.go.th/info/ (retrieved on 12 November 2020)
[13] For more detail, see http://www.isat.or.th (accessed on 2 June, 2020)
[14] Chiang Mai Immigration Office. 2019. Nonimmigrant Visa Statistics classified by Countries and Territories 2019. Thailand: Immigration Bureau.
[15] Please see lifestyle migration in for example, Benson, M. and O’Reilly, K.(eds.), Lifestyle Migration: Expectations, Aspirations, and Experiences. (Farnham, Ashgate,2009); Torkington, K. Defining Lifestyle Migration. Dos Algarves, 19, pp. 99–111, 2010.; Hayes, M. Gringolandia: Lifestyle Migration under Late Capitalism (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2018); Duncan, T, Cohen, S. and Thulemark, M. Lifestyle Mobilities: Intersections of Travel, Leisure and Migration (London: Routledge, 2013).
[16] See details at https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1842844/foreign-tourist-arrivals-up-4-in-2019, published on 4 January 2020 (retrieved on 12 October 2021)
[17] Aranya Siriphon and Li Jiangyu. Final Report on Chinese Diaspora and Transnational Mobile Practices in Chiang Mai, Thailand (Thailand: Chiang Mai University and Thailand Research Fund2020).
[18] Please see Supang Chantavanich. China’s Rising Influence in Thailand: Translocal Human Mobility and Its Impact. In Suthiphand Chirathivat, Buddhagarn Rutchatorn and Wasutadon Nakawiroj. (eds.) China’s Rise in Mainland ASEAN, pp 133–154. (World Scientific Publisher, 2020); Ongkulna, A. From Chinese Tourists to Residents: The Situation of Chinese Citizens in Thailand (in Thai) https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/health/587 (retrieved on 12 October 2021)
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/167 “The Profound Impact of the BERSIH Movement since 2007” by Khoo Boo Teik
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, best known by its Malay acronym, BERSIH, organized five massive rallies in Kuala Lumpur between November 2007 and November 2016. While BERSIH failed to achieve its original goal to reform the electoral system, the movement made a significant impact on the Malaysian political milieu.
- BERSIH’s deeper influence was shown by the dynamic ways in which each rally developed its key message of popular dissent and gave voice to grievances beyond the core issue of electoral reform. The most profound meaning of the entire BERSIH progression was seen in an unfolding popular re-imagination of community and nation across ethnic and non-ethnic divides. The movement progressively mobilised civil disobedience across diverse groups throughout the country and among Malaysian communities overseas.
- The defeat of Barisan Nasional in the general election of 2018 brought hopes of far-reaching electoral reform but those were dashed by the collapse of the Pakatan Harapan government in February 2020. Presently BERSIH continues to campaign for electoral reform as a crucial basis of democratic politics.
- While current conditions inhibit open mass mobilization, BERSIH offers a valuable living political memory to new and young activists exploring ‘clean and fair’ solutions to the social and political problems highlighted by the Covid-19 pandemic.
* Khoo Boo Teik, is Professor Emeritus, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, and Research Fellow Emeritus, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan; and Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore (April to September 2021).
ISEAS Perspective 2021/167, 21 December 2021
The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, best known by its Malay acronym, BERSIH, is a movement formed in 2005–6 that is dedicated to the reform of Malaysia’s electoral system.[1] In its Joint Communiqué of 23 November 2006, BERSIH expressed a goal of correcting structural flaws, institutional biases and administrative malpractices in the electoral system that systematically and disproportionately favoured the ruling coalition over the opposition parties.[2] There could not be ‘clean and fair elections’, BERSIH reasoned, unless the Election Commission (EC) removed such obstructions to democratic politics as extensive gerrymandering, constituency malapportionment, restricted media, unequal access to public facilities and resources, et cetera.[3]
In pursuit of its cause, BERSIH organised five massive rallies, each attended by tens of thousands of participants, in Kuala Lumpur between November 2007 and November 2016. These rallies were internationally famous for their dramatic challenges to successive regimes that tried in vain to suppress them. The first rally, BERSIH 2007,[4] launched by the main opposition parties with the support of 32 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), carried a slate of four points of electoral reform. In 2010 a committee of civil society members rebranded the coalition ‘BERSIH 2.0’ under which name they led four rallies, namely, BERSIH 2.0 in 2011, BERSIH 3 in 2012, BERSIH 4 in 2015, and BERSIH 5 in 2016. At these rallies, BERSIH 2.0 raised more demands for reform, added its NGO allies, diversified the social composition of its marchers, and extended its geographical reach.
Despite all that, BERSIH failed in its basic mission to make the regime and its Electoral Commission (EC) reform the electoral system ahead of the 12th General Election (GE12) of 2008, the 13th General Election (GE13) of 2013, and the 14th General Election (GE14) of 2018. What, then, did BERSIH accomplish? How did the five rallies influence Malaysian politics?
These questions cannot be answered by narrowly evaluating BERSIH’s performance against its stated intents. In fact, BERSIH will probably be remembered less for not achieving its goals and more for its intangible ways of moving popular struggles to change social and political thinking over a decade. This essay interprets BERSIH in this manner by reviewing the movement from three angles – the distinctive imprint of each rally, the changes in praxis from rally to rally, and the meanings which BERSIH in its entire progression created that were as significant as they were unsuspected.
MOMENTS AND IMPRINTS
The standard coverage of BERSIH sees it as a social movement of electoral reform which places the scrupulous conduct of ‘clean and fair elections’ at the heart of a functioning democracy.[5] There is nothing at all wrong with that view. From BERSIH’s inception, its organizers had campaigned to end fraud and injustice related to the integrity of electoral rolls, the use of postal ballots for the uniformed forces, access to public facilities, freedom of the media, the duration of election campaigns, the intervention of public institutions, the practices of ‘money politics’ and ‘dirty politics’, and so on. Moreover, the masses of people who joined the rallies or variously supported them shared the ultimate goal of ‘clean and fair elections’. But each BERSIH rally turned on different matters and took unexpected directions as its organizers and marchers faced the regime and its enforcers under uncertain conditions. Each of the five rallies, therefore, had its definitive moment and left a distinct imprint on the political terrain.
Shattering stasis
On 10 November 2007, the first BERSIH rally was launched with four demands made of the EC: the use of indelible ink on polling day, clean electoral rolls, abolition of postal ballots, and equal access to print and broadcast media.[6] The EC ignored the demands,[7] and the regime met the rally with police repression. That introduced a pattern of face-off between regime and rally whereby BERSIH failed in its declared mission but gained striking success of another kind.
As the largest street mobilization up to that point, BERSIH 2007 shattered an apparent political stasis set by Mahathir Mohamad’s retirement in November 2003, the stunning victory of the Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front) at the 11th General Election (GE11) in April 2004, and Anwar Ibrahim’s release from prison in September 2004.[8] The Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, or Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, or People’s Justice Party) had deployed the non-divisive issue of ‘clean and fair elections’ to convince themselves and the electorate that they were ready to reconstruct an alternative front against the regime. A free Anwar acted as the parties’ bridge and broker. As he recalled, if DAP, PAS and PKR were ‘focused on a common platform, they [could] set aside their differences and … work together to fight corruption, ensure better governance and restore the integrity of our institutions’.[9]
By coincidence, the original BERSIH rally took place between two other protests in 2007 – a Bar Council-led ‘Walk for Justice’ against judicial corruption on 26 September, and a Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf)-organised march against ‘Indian marginalisation’ on 25 November.[10] No one coordinated the three events but their proximity appeared to connect the causes of judicial reform, electoral reform, and social reform. The regime had exorcised the spectre of Reformasi only to meet its rebirth in BERSIH.
Goaded into defiance
At GE12, the opposition made unprecedented gains. Yet neither BERSIH 2007 nor the election result prodded the regime towards electoral reform. In response, many NGOs established a politically unaffiliated BERSIH 2.0 in 2010 to promote a non-partisan campaign for electoral reform.[11] (On 23 November 2021, the Steering Committee announced that it would drop ‘2.0’ from its name. From this point in the essay, BERSIH 2.0 will only refer to the rally of 2011[12]). When the EC refused to reform the conduct of elections, the BERSIH Committee organised a second rally on 9 July 2011.[13]
This time BERSIH 2.0 raised its demands from four to eight – to no avail. The regime replied with repression. It refused to permit BERSIH 2.0 to be held at Stadium Merdeka, and banned paraphernalia associated with the rally. On 9 July 2011, the police locked down Kuala Lumpur. The confrontation between regime and rally defined a moment of resistance: people had not forgotten electoral reform but regarded BERSIH 2.0 as nothing if not defiance of the regime. Tens of thousands of citizens breached the lockdown, with one of them exulting: ‘they did not give us the stadium, so we took KL instead’.[14] Many protesters who did not join BERSIH 2007 were ‘goaded’ into marching with BERSIH 2.0.[15] As they shed passivity for activism, tear-gassed but spirited first-time protesters claimed to have lost their fears of protest, the police, and arrest.[16] Later, the BERSIH Chairperson, Ambiga Sreenevasan, noted, ‘People don’t feel safer to attend protests – they’re just less afraid of the consequences.’[17]
A memory of disenfranchisement
On Federal Territory Day, 1 February 2012, Lembah Pantai Member of Parliament Nurul Izzah Anwar declared that, ‘The time has come for us to enjoy a [Kuala Lumpur City Hall] that can be held responsible to the ratepayers, and can be replaced if it refuses to listen.’[18] Adding that, ‘The time has come [to have] … a mayor who is elected by the people,’ she urged, ‘Let’s rise up, Kuala Lumpur!’[19] On 28 April 2012, Kuala Lumpur rose in the shape of BERSIH 3 in such manner as to recall a 40-year-old struggle over the political space of the national capital.
The demands were the same and so was their rejection by the regime. Two things were crucially dissimilar. First, timing was important: a general election could be called in 2012, and the opposition might better its previous result if elections were ‘clean and fair’. Second, the regime did not prohibit BERSIH 3.0 but City Hall barred the rally from its intended terminus of Dataran Merdeka (Independence Square).
From the whole country came the participants some of whom unveiled their own concerns besides electoral reform. Yet the progress of the rally enacted a remarkable ‘Kuala Lumpur-centred’ spectacle. At the instruction of City Hall, the police cordoned off Dataran Merdeka, rendering it an isolated spot ringed by an estimated 200,000 marchers. In reality BERSIH 3 practically mocked a moment 40 years earlier, when Kuala Lumpur was excised from Selangor and made ‘Federal Territory’. So reconstituted, the capital lost all its former state constituencies, and its residents were disenfranchised at state level.[20] Consequently, whoever led the federal government would control City Hall whatever the result of Kuala Lumpur’s parliamentary elections – which at GE12 had BN winning only one of the capital’s eleven parliamentary seats. In a wholly unplanned way, BERSIH 3.0 unearthed a memory of disenfranchisement that enabled rule by fiat instead of electoral mandate. Besides, the momentary ‘siege of Dataran Merdeka’ showed how remote the regime stood from the populace. The impact of BERSIH 3.0 apparently caused GE13 to be put off until 2013.[21]
Flux and realignments
The fourth part of the BERSIH progression was bewildering. Superlatives abounded: BERSIH 4 drew the largest number of participants ever, lasted 36 hours (29–30 August 2015),[22] and effused a carnivalesque air. The rally was simultaneously swept into a flux: Anwar was again imprisoned, Hadi Awang took PAS out of Pakatan Rakyat (PR, or People’s Pact), Najib was engulfed in a huge financial scandal, and Mahathir began to attack Najib and UMNO.
Having striven to be a non-partisan promoter of electoral reform, BERSIH was suddenly a site of passionate politics. The BERSIH Committee declared BERSIH 4 ‘the manifestation of the people’s … vote of no confidence [against] Najib,’[23] and demanded his resignation, But PAS, whose members swelled the sizes of past protests, boycotted BERSIH 4, thus shrinking its Malay presence. The PAS move hinted of its tentative accommodation with the Najib regime. The resulting massive Chinese majority at the rally confirmed the Chinese voters’ contempt for Najib and UMNO-BN.[24] The Chinese were angered – as only urban, financially savvy, middle-classes could be – by exposés of ‘disappeared’ money of unimaginably large sums. And they found an unlikely ally in Mahathir! His participation in the rally was not unanimously favoured by the BERSIH organisers, or his NGO critics who regarded ‘Najib’s rot’ to be part of ‘Mahathir’s legacy’. But Mahathir warmed to BERSIH 4 and joined it on both days – discarding his lifelong disdain for dissident demonstrations as he groped towards a political comeback.
The agenda of electoral reform was once more decentred as BERSIH 4 retrieved the anti-corruption discourse of Reformasi at a dizzying juncture of power realignments. Never before had major political fractures happened simultaneously – to PAS, PR, and UMNO. Evidently, not obedience but dissension, and not unity but rupture defined the order of the day. Since GE12 and GE13, the regime and the opposition had been locked in a stalemate.[25] On principle, the BERSIH Committee abjured a scenario of ‘regime change’ via disorderly demonstrations and street battles.[26] On the ground, spirited slogans and evocative expressions revealed the rally-makers’ intent: the crisis of the regime had ripened – it was time to push UMNO-BN off the cliff, albeit by democratic procedures.
Culmination: a different campaign
By 2016, dissident civil society had expended much time, energy, money, and emotion in street protests, multimedia networking, and election campaigns without achieving electoral reform, let alone BN’s defeat. The BERSIH Committee sensed ‘the frustration of Malaysians who have passionately worked for change for many years’. Pleading that ‘our work is not yet done’,[27] however, the Committee decided to hold a fifth rally. In its call to ‘continue the struggle for reform, justice, and human rights’,[28] BERSIH 5 went beyond electoral reform and the format of a rally in Kuala Lumpur. The Committee issued a long list of explicitly political demands and planned for a BERSIH 5 rally in Kuala Lumpur on 19 November 2016 to be preceded by a seven-week BERSIH Convoy that popularized its message to the rest of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak.
The demands, old and new, were couched in the familiar idiom of civil society – fair elections, clean government, strengthened parliamentary democracy, the right to dissent, and empowering Sabah and Sarawak. Yet BERSIH 5 was willy-nilly drawn into an electoral campaign to defeat the 59-year-old regime and create a ‘New Malaysia’.[29] Radically changed circumstances left little room for a non-partisan ‘people’s movement’.[30] The political terrain had been cloven by the core crisis of 1MDB.[31] On one side stood Najib and UMNO and their use of state power to preempt a thorough investigation of ‘the heist of the century’,[32] and Najib’s suspected complicity in it. On the other was an opposition coalition that was re-built, almost unbelievably, on an Anwar-Mahathir rapprochement to ‘Save Malaysia’ from kleptocracy and its economic and political consequences.
A decade of tortured politics served up a semblance of the milieu and mood of BERSIH 2007. Before that rally, there was mass public disappointment that Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had reneged on his promises to prosecute ‘high-profile corruption’. Now there was anger that Najib forestalled investigations of the most brazen financial scandal. Public discontent with fuel price increases, among others, during the Abdullah years resurfaced over rising costs of living blamed on Najib’s Goods and Services Tax which was in turn attributed to the loss of state revenue due to 1MDB. In 2016 as in 2007, the opposition urgently needed revival. Its frayed coalition launched the original rally to regain cohesiveness and a sizeable social base before GE12. For the final rally, an unsettled coalition tested its viability and expanded its constituency ahead of GE14. As they met at the displays of dissent in BERSIH 5 and the BERSIH Convoy, the opposition, civil society, and unaffiliated voters could gauge their own strength vis-à-vis the regime.
STRUGGLES AND THE IMAGINATION OF COMMUNITY
Perhaps it was unsurprising that BERSIH’s demands for electoral reforms met the regime’s unyielding rejection. By the time of BERSIH 2007, the UMNO-led regime had assumed that it would rule with an incontestable majority, without interruption, and, by default, with no end. In UMNO’s scheme of things, these features of the political system rested on the exact opposite of ‘clean and fair elections’ that formed BERSIH’s goal. Were it not so, the regime might have found it less costly to accede, at least partially, to BERSIH’s initial, limited, demands. But a stubborn refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the campaign for electoral reform, aggravated by fumbled attempts to suppress it, provoked several notable results. Every rally left its special imprint at a separate moment. But the BERSIH progression produced a profound socio-political transformation. The critical signs of the changes that arose from rally to rally were the multiplying demands that cohered around the issue of electoral reform, the eventual shift in the target of protest, and the unsuspected re-imagination of community and society.
First, BERSIH and its protesters became more numerous, experienced, nuanced, and emboldened in dissent from rally to rally. Between 2007 and 2016, the ‘latent meaning’ of BERSIH’s mobilization could not be ‘read off its literal slogans and proclaimed aims’.[33] It was not a question of the BERSIH Committee concealing its actual objectives. Behind the single issue of electoral reform, rather, ‘a much wider world of associations and affects contaminate[d] it and transform[ed] it into the expression of much more general trends’.[34] The rally-goers marched for ‘clean and fair elections’ but also to reclaim their right to the city and its public spaces, enact a history of elected local government before disenfranchisement, resume a battle against oligarchic corruption, and so on.
Second, the ambit of BERSIH increasingly incorporated other social groups whose own objectives were dismissed by the regime. As it were, ‘the frustration of a plurality of demands by [the regime] created a spontaneous equivalence between them’[35] – as people whose demands were unmet in one area became aware of demands unmet in other areas. An early instance of ‘equivalence’ was glimpsed in September and November 2007. The coincidentally close staging of the Bar Council, BERSIH and HINDRAF protests made the legal profession, the opposition parties and their NGO allies, and the Indian community aware of one another’s unresolved problems.[36] Over the subsequent decade, the BERSIH progression crafted an imagined unity of electoral reform with other unsatisfied appeals and frustrated initiatives. The convergence of different streams of dissent was established as a feature of BERSIH as its rallies were joined by movements with their distinct concerns, such as Anak Felda,[37] Anti-Lynas,[38] and Kelantan oil royalty.[39] The multiplying demands for reform – judicial, electoral, social, ecological, and political – all rejected by the regime, fused as a general rejection of the regime.
Third, BERSIH’s intervention re-imagined ‘the people’ differently from the static and divisive ethno-religious identities the state had packaged for a passive populace.[40] The BERSIH movement progressed by building physical and virtual coalitions. Coming off Reformasi, BERSIH 2007 had a preponderant Malay presence. Even so, its social composition was re-shaped by the multiethnic professional profile of the Bar Council and the mobilization of HINDRAF.[41] For BERSIH 2.0, deepening social dissent drew a Malay majority, a visible non-Malay presence, and a significant representation of environmentalists, FELDA settlers, and supporters of Kelantan.
The formation of the multiethnic civil society-based BERSIH Steering Committee marked a key moment when the BERSIH rallies began to recompose the nation symbolically with successive waves of mass participation that bridged ethnic, urban-rural, generational, gender, territorial, and other divides. As an observer noted, the first and best known BERSIH Chairperson, Ambiga Sreenevasan, broke ‘three Malaysian glass ceilings’ when, as a ‘woman who is neither Malay nor a Muslim’, she led ‘the first successful multiracial mass movement in Malaysia.’[42] The Chinese formed a conspicuous majority in BERSIH 4 when PAS withdrew its support. But the Chinese, ethnically speaking, were the last to rally in large numbers because so many other components of ‘the people’ were already part of the BERSIH movement. The protest of the Chinese, not bound to ‘old Chinese politics’, reflected the anger of the largest urban professional and middle-classes at the scandal of 1MDB. Mahathir’s attendance at BERSIH 4 ironically recalled a Malay epiphany during Reformasi: a government without UMNO was not unthinkable.
Finally, BERSIH went global from BERSIH 3 onwards. Solidarity rallies held by Malaysians in numerous cities around the world captured a telling facet in BERSIH’s symbolic constitution of ‘the people’. Many of those protesting Malaysians were emigres who experienced nationhood again in a common vision of ‘clean and fair elections’ and all else that the slogan had come to embrace.
WHAT OF BERSIH TODAY?
‘A single detail is sometimes enough to sketch an ideological picture.’[43] The ‘single detail’ here is the spirited response by a PAS veteran to an UMNO MP’s harassment of Ambiga:
“… the Seri Gading MP was wrong to ask only for Ambiga to be hanged. Why didn’t he ask for National Laureate Datuk Samad Said to be hanged? For his demand to be fair and non-racist, he should ask for Pak Samad to be hanged. Let all who protested in the series of BERSIH rallies be hanged. Have a special grave for all.”[44]
The ‘ideological picture’ is of a fresh appreciation of the levels and channels of popular solidarity that the BERSIH progression achieved across ethnic and non-ethnic lines.[45]
Composing the people on the basis of equivalences in shared struggles is dynamic and fluid, even unstable, as the BERSIH progression showed.[46] Yet it is valuable to dissident forms of participation in public life which uphold a high sense of morality – of doing what is principled with non-partisan spirit, practising non-violent civil disobedience, and building communities based on unity and empathy in common struggle.
A detached observer might conclude that BERSIH lost the battle for electoral reform but won the war in GE14, only to watch the prospects for far-reaching change dashed by the manipulated ‘regime change’ of March 2020.[47] Today, BERSIH continues its campaign of electoral reform and the democratic politics that remains the ultimate objective.[48] But under current conditions which deter open mass mobilization, perhaps the long-term political value of the BERSIH progression lies elsewhere. The many-faceted betrayal of the Pakatan Harapan government in March 2020 exposed exactly the kind of politics that was anathema to the BERSIH organizers and their multitudes of supporters, as well as young and otherwise disillusioned activists. Many new groups emerging on the ground and in social media are wary of the ‘same old, same old’ in the sterile politicking of the day. They prefer to explore innovative ways of promoting solidarity under conditions of pandemic, economic difficulties, and social suffering.[49] No one can peddle simplistic takeaways, or quick fixes, let alone any panacea, to them. But in the multiple meanings of BERSIH, perhaps they may creatively discover ‘clean and fair’ solutions to the many problems that remain since BERSIH began.[50]
Acknowledgement
I wish to thank ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute for my Visiting Senior Fellowship which gave me an excellent chance to write on contemporary Malaysian politics. In this regard, I very much appreciate the kind assistance of Francis Hutchinson, Lee Hwok Aun, and the staff of the Institute. Francis, Hwok Aun, and Fong Chin Wei gave critical suggestions that helped me to revise a draft of this essay. I am very grateful to Khoo Ying Hooi for presenting me with a copy of her fine book on BERSIH; Donald Nonini for sharing his insights into the populist content of the BERSIH movement; and Toh Kin Woon for improving my understanding of the BERSIH Steering Committee of which he was a respected member.
ENDNOTES
[1] Bersih means ‘clean’ in Malay; the full Malay name of the coalition is Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil. On the origin of BERSIH, see Khoo Ying Hooi, The BERSIH Movement and Democratisation in Malaysia: Repression, Dissent and Opportunities, Petaling Jaya, Selangor: SIRD, and Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020, pp. 63–66.
[2] Bersih 2.0, Joint Communiqué, https://www.bersih.org/rallies/bersih1/joint-communique/ (accessed on 18 November 2021).
[3] There are many studies of the defects of the electoral system. The non-specialist reader may find it handy to consult a single volume, Elections and Democracy in Malaysia, edited by Mavis Puthucheary and Norani Othman, Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaaan Malaysia, 2015, especially Chapters 1, 10, 11, and 17.
[4] The rally was simply known as BERSIH then. Here ‘2007’ is appended to distinguish it from later rallies that bore numerals.
[5] The latest, extended, study of BERSIH, informed by social movement theory, is Khoo, The BERSIH Movement and Democratisation in Malaysia.
[6] The demands reflected widespread suspicions of, respectively, repeated voting, electoral rolls padded with ‘phantom voters’, manipulated deployment of uniformed service voters whose balloting was allegedly supervised by their officers, and the ruling coalition’s monopoly of state and privately-owned media.
[7] EC agreed to use indelible ink for GE12 but retracted its decision before polling day, which backfired on BN.
[8] Mahathir’s departure removed the principal target of mass derision, BN’s triumph signaled UMNO’s recovery of Malay support, and Anwar’s freedom closed a traumatic incident.
[9] Asia Inc, ‘A new alliance’, Interview with Anwar Ibrahim, May-June 2008, p. 34.
[10] For a study of HINDRAF against a history of the Indians in Malaysia, see Farish Ahmad Noor, The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) of Malaysia: Communitarianism Across Borders? RSIS Working Paper No. 163, Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2008, https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10220/40159/1/WP163.pdf, accessed on 29 October 2021. Also see Anantha Raman Govindasamy, ‘Social movements in contemporary Malaysia: The cases of BERSIH, HINDRAF and Perkasa’, in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia, edited by Meredith L Weiss, London and New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 116–126.
[11] The first 14-member BERSIH 2.0 committee excluded political party representatives because BERSIH 2007 had realized the opposition’s core objective, and, the new committee insisted on non-partisan advocacy of electoral reform in the national interest. Yet BERSIH and the opposition had a synergistic relationship. Only the latter could mobilize large numbers of participants; BERSIH 2.0 was a band of small NGOs with few troops. But BERSIH had civil society eminence that could move the politically uncommitted.
[12] Press Release from BERSIH, https://www.facebook.com/BERSIH2.0, accessed on 14 December 2021.
[13] Nathaniel Tan, ed., 9 July 2011: What Really Happened? Kuala Lumpur: Kinibooks, 2011, is a useful compilation of participant and other accounts of BERSIH 2.0.
[14] Toffee, ‘No Stadium Merdeka but the whole of KL instead’, Tan, ed., 9 July 2011, p. 41.
[15] The idea of people being goaded ‘to do something about what they already know is wrong’ comes from one interpretation of Gandhi’s grasp of the purpose of non-violent civil disobedience (James Green, ‘An Interview with Norman Finkelstein’, Counterpunch, 28–30 September 2012, http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/09/28/an-interview-with-norman-finkelstein-2/, accessed on 2 October 2012).
[16] An iconic case is told by Nigel Aw, ‘Auntie Bersih: The Arts Were My Awakening’, in Tan, 9 July 2011, pp. 60–62.
[17] Laura Tribe, ‘Interview: Organizing Malaysia’s largest protests in over 50 years’, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, 25 September 2012,
http://www.cjfe.org/resources/features/interview-organizing-malaysias-largest-protests-over-50-years, accessed on 8 November 2016.
[18] ‘Pursue your right to elect your mayor, KL folk told’, Malaysiakini, 1 February 2012, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/187996, accessed on 1 February 2012.
[19] Ibid.
[20] In Parliament, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak said, ‘When Kuala Lumpur becomes Federal territory, Selangor will no longer have power over Kuala Lumpur and it will not be necessary for the residents of Kuala Lumpur to be represented in the State Assembly’ (Malaysia, House of Representatives, Official Report, Third Parliament, vol. III, 26 April 1973: 821; emphasis added).
[21] Parliament was expected to be dissolved in time for a June 2012 election after the regime accelerated the passage of several bills in a day while making time ‘stand still’ according to the ‘stopped clock’ in Parliament. After BERSIH 3, Najib thought the better of it. Interview with Jeyakumar Devaraj, Penang, June 2012.
[22] Ending before midnight’s transition to National Day 2015.
[23] Kamles Kumar, ‘Bersih says fourth rally a vicarious vote of no confidence’, The Malay Mail, 15 August 2015, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2015/08/15/bersih-says-fourth-rally-a-vicarious-vote-of-no-confidence/952093, accessed on 24 October 2021. Also see Shannon Teoh, ‘Bersih plans overnight rally in August to demand Najib’s resignation’, The Straits Times, 29 July 2015, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/bersih-plans-overnight-rally-in-august-to-demand-najibs-resignation, accessed on 24 October 2021.
[24] They were ethnically the last to join the mass rallies. Absent from Reformasi, remote from HINDRAF, and under-represented in BERSIH 2007, they supported the BERSIH campaign from BERSIH 2.0 onwards.
[25] In the principal arena of Peninsular Malaysia at any rate.
[26] Thomas Fann, ‘Bersih 4 is not about regime change’, Malaysiakini, 5 August 2015, https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/307373, accessed on 24 October 2021.
[27] Bersih Steering Committee, ‘Why Bersih is marching for the fifth time on Nov 19’, Malaysiakini, 14 September 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/355714, accessed on 27 October 2021.
[28] Ibid.
[29] ‘We urge all Malaysians to stand united – SATUKAN TENAGA – and participate in Bersih Convoy and Bersih 5 Rally for a reformed and new Malaysia – Malaysia Baru’ (ibid.).
[30] Which was how BERSIH continued to call itself; ibid.
[31] The new conjuncture is examined in Khoo Boo Teik, The Unrealized Mahathir-Anwar Transitions: Social Divides and Political Consequences, Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak, Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue 15, 2021, pp. 18–23.
[32] Sarawak Report, ‘HEIST OF THE CENTURY – How Jho Low Used PetroSaudi As “A Front” To Siphon Billions Out Of 1MDB!’, sarawakreport.org, 28 February 2015, http://www.sarawakreport.org/2015/02/heist-of-the-century-how-jho-low-used-petrosaudi-as-a-front-to-siphon-billions-out-of-1mdb-world-exclusive/, accessed on 18 September 2017.
[33] Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why Constructing a People Is the Main Task of Radical Politics’, Critical Inquiry, 32 (4), (Summer), 2006, p. 656. Laclau observes that, ‘To take the one-issue character of mobilization at face value would be the same as reducing the analysis of a dream to its manifest content.’
[34] Ibid.
[35] For Laclau, an ‘equivalential logic’ operates whereby ‘the frustration of an individual demand transforms [it] into a claim as far as people see themselves as bearers of rights that are not recognized’ (ibid., p. 655).
[36] ‘If we are for judicial reform, if we are for electoral reform, and if we are for social reform, then we must all be Bar Council, Bersih and Hindraf’ (Khoo Boo Teik, ‘Rage Against the Machine’, Aliran Monthly, 27, 9, 2007, p. 6.
[37] The National Association of Felda Settlers’ Children, which was very critical of policies and practices of the management of the Federal Land Resettlement Authority (Felda) under the Najib regime.
[38] A ‘green’ campaign against rare-earth processing in Kuantan, Pahang, was named Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas!
[39] Kelantan, under PAS rule since 1990, demanded payment of royalty for oil extracted in the state.
[40] I am grateful to Donald Nonini for discussing the ideas in this section with me.
[41] Rather than dwell on the ‘Hindu’ part of HINDRAF, Sim Kwang Yang noted that, ‘The Hindraf leadership and their protesters were probably from the middle class within the Indian community. But they must have plucked a sensitive nerve of all Malaysian Indians, including all the far flung, widely scattered, and hitherto long-suffering silent Indian underclass’ (‘Hear Hindraf’s cry for freedom’, Malaysiakini, 18 October 2008, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/91519, accessed on 18 October 2008).
[42] Bakri Musa, ‘BERSIH 3.0 Broke Many Glasses (Including a Few Glass Ceilings)’, 8 May 2012, http://www.bakrimusa.com/archives/bersih-3-0-broke-many-glasses-including-a-few-glass-ceilings; accessed on 8 May 2012. As Bar Council President, Ambiga led the Walk for Justice in 2007.
[43] The line comes from Serge Halimi, ‘Divided and conquered’, LE MONDE diplomatique, September 2016, file:///C:/Users/Boo%20Teik/Documents/Working%20files%202016/ISEAS%202021%20Proposals/Serge%20Halimi.html, accessed on 11 May 2021.
[44] Subky Abdul Latif, ‘Gantung Ambiga atau gantung diri?’ [Hang Ambiga or hang oneself?], The Malaysian Insider, 10 July 2012, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/opinion/article/gantung-ambiga-atau-gantung-diri1/; accessed on 10 July 2012; author’s translation. BERSIH 2.0 Co-Chairperson, A. Samad Said, brought his literary eminence, octogenarian presence and more to the movement, especially when he and Ambiga led the second rally. His poem, Unggun Bersih [The Flame of Bersih], is reproduced in Tan, ed., 9 July 2011, p. 158. I wish to thank Nathaniel Tan for the English translation of the title of the poem.
[45] In a way, the ideological picture could take in such questions of shared civic consciousness as: ‘What are our civic obligations in relation to the larger multicultural society we live in? What is in our Constitution? What are our rights? And how do we envision living and sharing the nation with each other? What is it like to be in someone else’s shoes? How can we treat each other respectfully as equals and humans first?’ (Khoo Gaik Cheng, ‘Bersih 4, citizenship and civics in Malaysia’, New Mandala, 7 September 2015, https://www.newmandala.org/bersih-4-citizenship-and-civics-in-malaysia/, accessed on 20 November 2021).
[46] Notably by PAS’s withdrawal from BERSIH 4 and BERSIH 5.
[47] Khoo, The Unrealized Mahathir-Anwar Transitions, pp. 28–31.
[48] As the current BERSIH Chairperson reaffirmed recently, ‘Bersih 2.0 is an electoral reform watchdog that pushes for reforms that strengthen our democracy’ (Thomas Fann, ‘In Response to Dr Kua Kia Soong’s Allegations About BERSIH 2.0’, BERSIH 2.0, 13 July 2021, https://www.bersih.org/in-response-to-dr-kua-kia-soongs-allegations-about-bersih-2-0/, accessed on 15 July 2021). The BERSIH 2.0 website provides the best source of information on the activities of the movement.
[49] Khoo Boo Teik, ‘Recurring Themes in the Politics of Parti Keadilan Rakyat’, Perspective, Issue 2021 No. 144, 11 November 2021, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 6–7.
[50] ‘The crucial role of the Bersih movement lies not only in triggering democratic transition thus far, but also in paving the way for continued political change’ (Khoo, The Bersih Movement and Democratisation in Malaysia, p. 181).
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/166 ““Adapting to Nature”: A Preliminary Assessment of Vietnam’s Mekong Water Diplomacy since 2017” by Truong-Minh Vu and Tram Nguyen
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Adopted in November 2017, the Vietnamese Government’s Resolution 120 on “Climate Resilience and Sustainable Development of the Mekong Delta Region” has provided a long-term strategic vision and outlined the direction for Vietnam’s water diplomacy to address problems threatening its Mekong Delta.
- After four years of implementing the Resolution, Vietnam has achieved some positive outcomes in gaining international recognition and support towards the sustainable development of the Delta.
- However, the reluctance of some ASEAN maritime states in engaging with Mekong issues, as well as the differences among Mekong countries and the major powers involved in the sub-region regarding how to address these issues, continue to hamper the realization of the Resolution’s goals.
- A reasonable way to tackle these issues could be the adoption of a win-win approach that goes beyond water issues, in order to facilitate the achievement of key priorities pursued by the individual parties involved.
* Truong-Minh Vu is a lecturer at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities – Ho Chi Minh City. He has also been a senior fellow of The Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs (SPEA) since 2018. Tram Nguyen is a lecturer at the School of Business, International University, Vietnam National University – HCMC.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/166, 17 December 2021
INTRODUCTION
The Mekong Delta is Vietnam’s most fertile region, accounting for much of the country’s rice, aquatic and fruit export. However, in recent years, climate change and extreme weather events, including floods, droughts, and saltwater intrusion, have been affecting the livelihood and food security of 17 million people living in the Delta, as well as the whole region’s ecological system. The construction of upstream hydropower infrastructure and intense economic activities in the region have also contributed to the degradation of water quality and change in water flow and alluvial soil.
Acknowledging the need for a long-term strategic vision and for international cooperation to address the problems threatening the Mekong Delta region (MDR), on 17 November 2017, the Vietnamese government issued Resolution 120/NQ-CP on “Climate Resilience and Sustainable Development of the Mekong Delta Region” (hereafter “Resolution 120”), also known as the “Thuan Thien” (Adapting to Nature) Resolution.[1] Resolution 120 emphasizes the need to put humans at the centre of development and adopts the sustainable and economical use of natural resources as the key development principle. The document also calls for regional and bilateral cooperation towards effective and sustainable use of water and other resources in the Mekong River Basin, based on mutual benefits.
Resolution 120 outlines three activities for Vietnam’s Mekong water diplomacy: (i) coordinating bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Mekong upstream countries, as well as major river basins and deltas in the world; (ii) promoting Vietnam’s active participation in the Mekong River Commission (MRC), existing cooperative mechanisms of Mekong River Basin countries, and cooperative mechanisms between Mekong River Basin countries and development partners; and (iii) developing strategic partnerships with other countries and international development partners to mobilize external resources (funding, knowledge, and technology) towards addressing climate change and promoting sustainable development in the MDR. The National Committee on Climate Change, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are tasked with implementing these goals. This paper provides a preliminary assessment of Vietnam’s Mekong water diplomacy since the adoption of Resolution 120.
VIETNAM’S MEKONG WATER DIPLOMACY SINCE THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 120
Involvement in Bilateral Cooperation and Intra-regional Mechanisms with Upstream Countries
Vietnam has consistently contributed to the success of Mekong regional cooperative mechanisms by actively proposing and implementing initiatives, getting involved in drafting key documents, and allocating resources to support joint projects. In March 2018, Vietnam hosted the 10th Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Summit on Development Triangle Area and the 6th Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit, along with its sideline event, the GMS Business Summit.[2] Following the completion of the MRC’s Study on Sustainable Management and Development of the Mekong River, including the Impact of the Hydropower Development Projects (also known as the Council Study) in 2017, meetings were held among the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Vietnam National Mekong Committee, and representatives from key NGOs, development partners, academia and civil society. These meetings resulted in the development of several Council Study national uptake action plans.[3] Vietnam also participated in the implementation of the MRC’s Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement procedure by organizing national consultation activities for Laos’ Pak Lay hydropower project.
In 2020, the State Audit Office of Vietnam proposed an environmental audit on water management in the Mekong River Basin. Started in March 2021, the audit assessed the fulfilment of UN sustainable development goals concerning the use, management and protection of water resources in the Mekong River Basin. Two upper-stream countries – Myanmar and Thailand – agreed to participate in this initiative.[4] On data sharing, in November 2018, the Vietnam National Space Center signed a memorandum of understanding with the MRC on using satellite data from the Vietnam Data Cube system in monitoring and assessing water and other resources in the Mekong River Basin.[5]
At meetings organized under intra-regional cooperative mechanisms, Vietnamese officials highlighted the critical situation of the Mekong Delta and urged member countries to cooperate in water resource management and promote sustainable development in the region. For example, at the 3rd MRC Summit in 2018, then-Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc raised the water security problems in the Mekong region and called for the effective implementation of MRC regulations, cooperative mechanisms for water resource management, and transparent data sharing among Mekong countries. At the 2019 Ministerial Meeting of Lancang–Mekong Water Resources Cooperation, then-Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Le Cong Thanh reiterated these points and called for the effective implementation of the Five-year Action Plan on Lancang–Mekong Water Resources Cooperation (2018-2022). Environmental degradation was once again underscored as one of the urgent issues for the Mekong–Lancang Cooperation (MLC) countries at the 6th MLC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in June 2021. Addressing the meeting, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son advocated for data sharing, joint efforts in water resource management, and greater coordination with other cooperative mechanisms.
Vietnam’s active participation in these mechanisms shows that it considers not only national interests but also the region’s sustainable development prospects. This approach is faithful to a core principle of water diplomacy, i.e. water diplomacy is more than just water resource management, but also a means to achieve the broader long-term objective of improving regional security, stability, and prosperity.[6] Nevertheless, the outcomes of Vietnam’s water diplomacy so far have been mixed. This can be attributed to the nature of intra-regional cooperation in the Mekong region. Except for the MRC, all existing intra-regional cooperative mechanisms are non-binding policy consultation platforms.[7] Most of the meetings under these mechanisms can be classified as action-orientated conferences, which focus mainly on building basic principles and guidelines for interaction and collective action, rather than formulating legal norms. [8] Additionally, comprised of mostly ASEAN countries, they reflect ASEAN’s diplomacy features, including lenient management, consensus-based decision-making, and prioritization of maintaining dialogue over conflict settlement. [9] As meetings often conclude with an agreement on statements of intent rather than a legal framework, implementation deficits can easily arise. [10]
Involvement in Inter-regional Cooperation
Due to its economic potential and geopolitical significance, the Mekong sub-region has attracted the attention of global powers, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, all with their mechanisms[11] to engage with the riparian countries.[12] As Hanoi welcomes a multilateral approach to water resource management and sustainable development in the Mekong, it has actively participated in these mechanisms. In November 2020, Vietnam co-chaired the 10th Mekong–Republic of Korea Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the 12th Mekong–Japan Summit Meeting. In January 2021, Vietnam and the United States co-hosted the first Friends of the Mekong Policy Dialogue under the Mekong-US Partnership.
One central challenge to the Mekong sub-region lies in balancing the developmental and geopolitical interests of multiple internal and external actors. While Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar have relied on China for hydropower infrastructure development, Vietnam has tried to avoid technological dependence on its northern neighbor and resisted China’s infrastructural hegemony in the region.[13] Inter-regional cooperative mechanisms led by the great powers not only open new windows of opportunity for downstream Mekong countries to address water-related concerns but could also transform the regional order. By boosting ties with external actors and assuming a leading role in inter-regional mechanisms, Vietnam is gradually increasing its diplomatic clout in the sub-region.
Within ASEAN, Vietnam is looking for a common position on the issue of water security in the Mekong basin. As the 2020 Chair of ASEAN, Vietnam hosted the “ASEAN Forum on Sub-regional Development: Converging Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation with ASEAN Goals” in September 2020. The forum discussed the importance of sub-regional cooperation in enhancing ASEAN connectivity and economic links, the challenges to sub-regional cooperation, and the role of development partners.[14] Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister and Chair of the forum, Nguyen Quoc Dung, emphasized the strategic role of a prosperous, peaceful and sustainable Mekong sub-region to ASEAN’s regional position and the future of the ASEAN community. In the joint communiqué of the meeting, ASEAN countries agreed to promote sub-regional cooperation frameworks, including those in the Mekong region, and align sub-regional development with the comprehensive development of ASEAN.[15]
Vietnam’s attempt to get ASEAN involved in the Mekong has met with mixed responses from other members. Maritime ASEAN states have not shown much enthusiasm for Hanoi’s proposal as they think that the Mekong issues should be addressed through sub-regional frameworks.[16] However, it is too early to evaluate Vietnam’s efforts. The 2020 ASEAN Forum on Sub-regional Development is the first of its kind, and so far, the only time that the ASEAN Coordinating Council has tabled this issue in a separate session.[17] Additionally, sub-regional issues might be viewed as having less urgency than the Covid-19 pandemic, which has been the primary concern of all countries and a key point of discussion in ASEAN meetings.[18]
Strengthening Strategic Partnerships with Development Partners
As of 2021, Vietnam has engaged more than 20 development partners in the implementation of Resolution 120. These development partners, with diverse experiences, expertise and resources, have committed to lend Vietnam a total of US$2.2 billion to facilitate the implementation of the Resolution.[19]
The World Bank is one of Vietnam’s most active and largest partners. The organization has engaged in cross-cutting collaboration with Vietnam in three major fields of governance: environmental sustainability, inclusive economic growth, and human resource and knowledge development.[20] Most World Bank projects are funded through its Investment Project Financing instrument, which provides the MDR with not only the necessary budget but also knowledge transfer and technical assistance for the long-term success of project implementation and institutionalization.[21] The Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment has also been working with the World Bank on a future budget support programme of US$1.05 billion to improve infrastructure, prevent droughts and saltwater intrusions, and adapt to climate change in the MDR.
Another long-term partner of the MDR is the Netherlands. Resolution 120 specifically mentions the diplomatic task of expanding and strengthening the Strategic Partnership with the Netherlands on climate change adaptation and water management, which was established in 2010. Both countries have also affirmed that sustainable agriculture and food security remain the key pillars in the Vietnam–Netherlands Comprehensive Partnership.[22] The Dutch Fund for Climate and Development, with a budget of EUR160 million (US$185 million), also committed to fund businesses seeking to support climate-resilient ecosystem and community in the Mekong Delta.
Additionally, the United States, France, Germany, Japan, Australia and the European Union have also expressed their appreciation for and commitment to the implementation of Resolution 120.[23] These diplomatic endorsements show that Vietnam has successfully expanded and strengthened strategic collaboration with development partners to mobilize resources for the MDR. International support in terms of knowledge sharing, technology transfer, and investment is crucial to Vietnam’s proactive adaptation to nature and to its bid to turn challenges of climate change into opportunities.
THE WAY FORWARD FOR VIETNAM’S MEKONG WATER DIPLOMACY
After four years of implementing Resolution 120, Vietnam’s water diplomacy has yielded positive outcomes. Through its active participation in bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, Vietnam has shed light on the pressing water security issues facing the MDR. Proactive engagement with various stakeholders within and outside the Mekong sub-region has earned Vietnam international support in the form of knowledge sharing, technology cooperation, and investment. Similar to the South China Sea dispute, Vietnam seeks to internationalize and multilateralize the Mekong issue. Particularly, Hanoi has taken some initial steps to generate greater international awareness of transboundary water management problems in the Mekong River Basin, starting with raising the topic in ASEAN meetings. Moving forward, Vietnam should continue to advocate for the inclusion of key sub-regional matters in the broader regional agenda.
By delivering clear and consistent messages on problems facing the MDR and the effective management of the Mekong River Basin’s resources to a broader foreign audience, Vietnam can further garner international attention and support in realizing Resolution 120’s development goals while enhancing the country’s diplomatic credentials in sub-regional mechanisms. With the involvement of external actors in the Mekong region, discussions on China’s control of the upstream Mekong through hydropower dams will gain momentum. One of the tasks for the next five years is to enhance Vietnam’s presence in the MLC and encourage China to be transparent and responsive about sharing water-related data, especially information about the planning and operation of its hydropower dams, as well as how water is discharged downstream.[24] Additional attention from the international community might induce greater cooperation from China, and thus make this task more achievable.
Another challenge ahead for Vietnam is to harmonize its interests with those of the upper-stream countries. Transboundary water management in the Mekong River Basin is a complex issue as each country follows a different development path and has divergent interests in the Mekong River. For example, Laos and Cambodia aim to harness the Mekong’s hydropower potential for energy generation.[25] However, Vietnam, as the most downstream country, is concerned about the negative impacts of upstream hydropower dams on the survival of the MDR and has therefore advocated for the effective and sustainable management of transboundary water in the region.
To address this challenge, firstly, Vietnam needs to cooperate with other Mekong countries in conducting joint studies and generating scientific analyses and assessments of the situation of the Mekong River Basin. Vietnam should also continue to promote information sharing and data transparency. These measures would produce agreed-upon scientific knowledge and shared understanding between parties, resulting in a more collaborative decision-making process and more trustful relationships. Second, Vietnam should propose mutually beneficial options that allow one side to achieve their most important priorities, while satisfying the other side’s top interests.[26] This approach requires Vietnam and its partners to look beyond the surface to understand the underlying drivers of Mekong countries’ water policies. Consequently, the possibilities for effective transboundary water management may lie in other economic sectors, such as agriculture and energy production, and water negotiations should therefore not be viewed as a zero-sum game.[27]
CONCLUSION
Vietnam’s water diplomacy since the adoption of Resolution 120 in November 2017 reflects the country’s concerns over the MDR’s sustainable development prospects in the context of climate change and intensive human interventions in the Mekong River Basin. Treating Mekong issues as a national security matter, Vietnam has mobilized resources for the development of the MDR and promoted regional cooperation towards a sustainable Mekong River Basin.
However, the divergence in development direction and interests of Mekong countries, as well as the region’s complex interactions with external actors, remains a challenge. The key to overcoming these barriers is a win-win approach to water diplomacy, in which water is viewed as a shared resource, and all parties realize that they can best achieve mutually beneficial outcomes by addressing common water issues while taking into consideration the broader economic, social and environmental contexts that each country is facing.
ENDNOTES
[1] Full text of the Resolution (in Vietnamese) is available at: http://dwrm.gov.vn/uploads/laws/file/2017/120-nq-cp-ve-phat-trien-ben-vung-dbscl-thich-ung-bdkh.pdf
[2]VOV World, “Vietnam Contributes to Regional Economic Connectivity through GMS”, 15 March 2018, https://vovworld.vn/en-US/content/NTQ1OTEz.vov.
[3] MRC, “Basin-Wide Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Production: Final Report”, 2019, https://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Basin-wide-Assessment-of-Climate-Change-Impacts-on-Hydropower-Production_report-13May19.pdf.
[4] Nhan Dan Online, “Vietnam to Host Audit of Water Management Cooperation in Mekong River Basin”, 23 December 2020, https://en.nhandan.vn/scitech/item/9426402-vietnam-to-host-audit-of-water-management-cooperation-in-mekong-river-basin.html.
[5] VNSC, ‘Vietnam National Space Center coordinates with Mekong River Commission in exploiting satellite data application’, 4 December 2018, https://vnsc.org.vn/en/news-events/vietnam-national-space-center-coordinates-with-mekong-river-commission-in-exploiting-satellite-data-application/.
[6] Susanne Schmeier and Zaki Shubber, ‘Anchoring water diplomacy – The legal nature of international
river basin organizations’, Journal of Hydrology 567 (2018): 114-120.
[7] Han Phoumin and Minh Thu To, “Water Resources Management in the Mekong Basin”, in Subregional Development Strategy in ASEAN after COVID-19: Inclusiveness and Sustainability in the Mekong Subregion (Mekong 2030), edited by Fukunari Kimura (Jakarta: ERIA, 2019), pp. 161–190.
[8] Volker Ritterberger, “Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making: The Case of UN-Sponsored World Conferences”, European Journal of Political Research 11 (1983): 167-182.
[9] Koichi Sato, “The Rise of China’s Impact on ASEAN Conference Diplomacy: A Study of Conflict in the South China Sea”, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 2, no. 2 (2013): 95-110.
[10] Rittergerger, ‘Global Conference Diplomacy’.
[11] The inter-regional cooperative mechanisms include Mekong–US Partnership, Mekong–Japan Summit, Mekong–Republic of Korea Summit, Mekong–Ganga Cooperation, and Mekong–Australia Partnership.
[12] Fabio Figiaconi, “Geopolitical Competition in the Indo-Pacific: The Mekong Region”, ISPI Online, 2 April 2020, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/geopolitical-competition-indo-pacific-mekong-region-25627.
[13] Chris Sneddon and Coleen Fox, “Power, Development, and Institutional Change: Participatory Governance in the Lower Mekong Basin”, World Development 35, no. 12 (2007): 2161-2181; Truong-Minh Vu and Maximilian Mayer, “Hydropower infrastructure and regional order making in the Sub-Mekong region”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 61, no. 1 (2019).
[14] Viet Nam News, “Mekong sub-regional co-operation must converge with ASEAN goals: official”, 14 June 2020, https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/749602/mekong-sub-regional-co-operation-must-converge-with-asean-goals-official.html.
[15] Full text of the joint communiqué is available at: https://asean.org/joint-communique-of-the-53rd-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting/
[16] Hoang Thi Ha and Farah Nadine Seth, “The Mekong River Ecosystem in Crisis: ASEAN Cannot be a Bystander”, ISEAS Perspective (2021/69).
[17] An Nhien, “ASEAN Cần Tập Trung Vào Các Khía Cạnh Khác Nhau Của Phát Triển Tiểu Vùng’” Công An Nhân Dân Online, 9 September 2020, https://cand.com.vn/Su-kien-Binh-luan-thoi-su/ASEAN-can-tap-trung-vao-cac-khia-canh-khac-nhau-cua-phat-trien-tieu-vung-i580025/; Asian Development Bank, “ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting – Masatsugu Asakawa”, 10 September 2020, https://www.adb.org/news/speeches/asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-masatsugu-asakawa; ASEAN Vietnam 2020, “ASEAN Forum on Sub-Regional Development Opens”, 14 July 2020, https://www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/asean-forum-on-sub-regional-development-opens.
[18] Phan The Thang, “Vietnam’s efforts and initiatives as ASEAN Chair 2020 – Challenges of and response to the COVID-19 pandemic”, Vietnam Pictorial, 14 May 2020, https://vietnam.vnanet.vn/english/vietnams-efforts-and-initiatives-as-asean-chair-2020—challenges-of-and-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/446014.html.
[19] VGP, “Preliminary Outcomes Of Three-year Implementation Of Resolution On Climate-resilient development Of Mekong Delta”, 13March 2021, http://news.chinhphu.vn/Home/Preliminary-Outcomes-Of-Threeyear-Implementation-Of-Resolution-On-Climateresilient-development-Of-Mekong-Delta/20213/43202.vgp
[20] “WBG Country Partnership Framework for Vietnam 2018 – 2022: Key Priorities”, World Bank, 5 July 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2017/07/05/wbg-country-partnership-framework-for-vietnam-2018-2022-key-priorities.
[21] World Bank, “Investment Project Financing (IPF)”, worldbank.org/en/what-we-do/products-and-services/financing-instruments/investment-project-financing.
[22] Vietnam Investment Review, “Vietnam-Netherlands Issue Joint Statement”, 9 April 2019, https://vir.com.vn/vietnam-netherlands-issue-joint-statement-66987.html.
[23] Ousmane Dione, “Mekong Delta Conference”, World Bank, 19 June 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2019/06/19/mekong-delta-conference.
[24] VGP, “Preliminary Outcomes Of Three-year Implementation”.
[25] Vu and Mayer, “Hydropower infrastructure and regional order making in the Sub-Mekong region”.
[26] Shafiqul Islam and Lawrence Susskind, “Using Complexity Science and Negotiation Theory to Resolve Boundary-Crossing Water Issues, Journal of Hydrology 562 (2018): 589-598.
[27] ibid.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/165 “What Awaits Sarawak in the State Election?” by Lee Poh Onn and Kevin Zhang
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Sarawak is heading to state elections on 18 December 2021.
- The incumbent ruling coalition, the Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), should retain control of the state, and probably with more than a two-thirds majority.
- GPS was formerly Sarawak Barisan Nasional (BN), but it departed from the federal Barisan Nasional coalition after the latter’s defeat in May 2018. GPS was established on 12 June 2018 in its stead. Sarawak BN (now GPS) has been in power in Sarawak since 1974.
- GPS is Perikatan Nasional (PN)-friendly, pledging support for the Ismail Sabri government but without being in a formal alliance. It holds a sizeable 18 parliamentary seats in the present Ismail Sabri government, which controls 114 seats in the Federal coalition, making it a potential kingmaker and hence having leverage to extract concessions from the federal government.
- The recent passing of the constitutional amendment recognising Sabah and Sarawak as two of the three entities that make up Malaysia in the Malaysia Agreement 1963, and also restoring the right to Sarawak to define individuals who qualify as native will work in favour of GPS as it has been pushing for these rights to be restored.
- Nevertheless, new and largely Sarawak-based parties are expected to score some gains. In particular, Parti Sarawak Bersatu (PSB), a new local party (which has attracted some high-profile political figures from other parties), has been mounting a credible campaign against the GPS.
- PSB is seen as more likely than Pakatan Harapan (PH) to make some inroads for the opposition, owing to the failure of the PH federal coalition to fulfil its electoral promises. There is also the image problem for PH, which is seen as a squabbling coalition with a bad track record over its 22 months in federal power.
- The current Covid 19 situation is likely to reduce voter turnout to between 65% and 70%. However, the new standard operating procedures and constraints on campaigning will probably disadvantage the opposition more than the GPS.
* Lee Poh Onn is Senior Fellow, and Kevin Zhang is Research Officer with the Malaysia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. We would like to thank Francis E. Hutchinson for his feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/165, 16 December 2021
INTRODUCTION
Sarawak, in East Malaysia was due for a state election after the government’s five-year term ended on 6 June 2021, with state elections to take place within 60 days from 7 June 2021. This was put on hold because of Covid-19 with the State Constitution temporarily suspended, superseded and taken over by Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021 promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This came into force from 11 January 2021 to 1 August 2021. On 31 July 2021, the Yang Pertuan Agong declared that Sarawak would remain in a local state of emergency until 2 February 2022, following the advice by the Federal Cabinet and also after discussion with the Sarawak government to keep the pandemic in check.[1]
Rumours then started in early November that the localised emergency could be ended earlier. This was because the Melaka state election was to take place that month. Despite calls by the opposition for the election to be only held after 2 February 2022, the Agong made the difficult decision on 3 November 2021 to end the emergency, paving the way for a state election to be held before February 2022.[2] The Sarawak state legislative assembly was dissolved on 3 November,[3] and an election had to be held within 60 days.[4] On 24 November 2021, Election Commission (EC) chairman, Abdul Ghani Salleh, announced that nomination would be held on 6 December, early voting on 14 December[5] for security personnel and polls to take place on 18 December 2021.[6]
Issues that have dominated past state elections continue to be important, such as the freedom of religion, being equal partners in Malaysia under the Malaysia Agreement 1963, regaining petroleum and gas rights, the protection of native customary rights, and the continuing use of English and Bahasa Malaysia as official languages of the state. The Parti Bersatu Sarawak (PSB), made up of former politicians from SUPP, PKR as well as native leaders who are presently not in any political positions, have now formed a formidable grouping against the GPS, actively campaigning for the above issues. The Parti Bumi Kenyalang (PBK), another new party, has also mustered enough candidates to mount a sizeable opposition numerically.[7] The Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), and the Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) will campaign under their own logos and have decided not to use the PH logo. This may be perceived as a sign of disunity as the PH logo was widely used in past elections. This will also be an election where social media will figure more prominently than past elections.
This perspective examines factors that are likely to affect the outcome of the 12th Sarawak state election (SSE12). The current Covid-19 situation with new standard operating procedures will be an important issue that will impact the electoral process. The rise of the PSB in Sarawak, continuing turmoil in federal politics and the Malaysia Agreement 1963) are among other important issues that will be examined. Lessons from the 14th General Elections held in 2018 (GE 14) such as in-fighting of parties, native customary rights, and politics of development are important but have been discussed in an earlier paper.[8] GPS is likely to win more than a two-thirds majority, but less than the 72 of 82 seats won in 2016.[9] Turnout is expected to be 65 per cent or less because of Covid-19; turnout has averaged 68 per cent historically under normal circumstances.[10]
SARAWAK: DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHY, DIFFERENT POLITICS
Sarawak is unique. The Malay and Melanau make up about 30 per cent of the total population, the Dayak about 45 per cent and the ethnic Chinese about 24 per cent. Forty-three per cent of Sarawak’s population is Christian, and only 30 per cent Muslim. Since 1978, Sarawak is the only state in Malaysia that held its state elections separately from its parliamentary elections. The prerogative lies with each state to decide when to hold state elections.[11]
GPS is a coalition made up of the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), Party Rakyat Sarawak (PRS) and the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP).[12] GPS was formerly Sarawak Barisan Nasional (SBN) and has been in power in Sarawak since 1974. Sarawak BN departed from the federal Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition after the defeat of BN in the parliamentary elections held in May 2018 (GE 14). GPS was established on 12 June 2018, from the former coalition of parties in SBN.
GPS is Perikatan Nasional (PN)-friendly, pledging support for the Ismail Sabri government but is not in a formal alliance with it. It also holds a sizeable 18 parliamentary seats of the 114 seats controlled by the Ismail Sabri government. This places GPS in a strong bargaining position.
Presently the GPS controls most of the Malay/Melanau (Muslim Bumiputera) and Dayak (non-Muslim Bumiputera) seats, while the SUPP controls less than half of the total ethnic Chinese seats, with the remainder being controlled by the DAP (Appendix 1). Despite that, the GPS has allocated 18 seats for the SUPP to contest in, up from the 13 seats in the 2016 election. Some of these seats were contested by BN direct candidates in the 2016 election.[13] Map 1 shows the various state seats in Sarawak.
COVID-19 AND THE NEW STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
Three hundred and forty-nine candidates are contesting in 82 state seats. GPS has put in place 82 candidates, PH 62 candidates, Perikatan Nasional (PN – PAS) 1, PSB 70 candidates, PBK 73 candidates, Sarawak People’s Aspiration Party (Aspirasi) 15 candidates, Parti Bansa Dayak Bersatu Baru 11, and Parti Sedar Rakyat Sarawak (SEDAR), 5 candidates. There are also 30 independent candidates.[14]
Straight fights will take place in only four state seats, three-cornered fights in 13 seats, four-cornered fights in 33 seats, five-cornered fights in 24 seats, six-cornered fights in seven seats and an eight-cornered fight in one seat.[15] Such multi-cornered fights will work in favour of GPS, especially for its non-marginal seats where GPS candidates enjoy strong support, and the multitude of opposition candidates will most probably split opposition votes. In the 2016 state election, over 69 seats were supported by 56 per cent of the voters or more, and as such can be considered safe seats for the GPS.[16]
The GPS-led state government, aware that its five-year mandate was expiring in June 2021, was eager to contain Covid-19 infections within the state even as numbers were rising elsewhere in Malaysia.[17] This strategy was initially successful. Despite a surge in daily new infections nationwide from late March to late May 2021, infection numbers remained relatively stable. The Malaysian vaccine taskforce also prioritised Sarawakians for Covid-19 vaccinations ostensibly because of the need to build up immunity against COVID-19 before the state election. In late June, Sarawak accounted for 20 to 25 per cent of total vaccinations administered in Malaysia despite comprising less than 10 per cent of the nation’s population. GPS, for its part, claimed that the prioritisation was due to the ruling coalition possessing strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the federal government of which GPS is a crucial faction. One key political narrative long propagated by GPS is that it needs a strong mandate from the people, so as to negotiate strongly with whichever coalition that will be controlling the federal government.[18]
Despite the relatively high vaccination rates, a surge of Covid-19 infections occurred in Sarawak beginning from late July 2021, increasing almost tenfold at its peak in mid-September. At its height, Sarawak recorded more than three thousand new Covid-19 infections daily, with deaths rising in number accordingly.
Admittedly, daily new infections have been on a consistent downward trend since September, with fewer than 100 daily cases for most of December. However, fresh memories of the Covid-19 surge is likely to dampen voters’ turnout. The move to hold an early election, in spite of plausible health risks posted by the Covid-19 pandemic, was also widely perceived as an attempt to avoid the influx of young voters aged 18 to 21 which would be included in the electoral role come January 2022 under the Undi-18 Bill. GPS’ decision to hold an early election was therefore not well received, as seen in criticisms from the Sarawak opposition.
The standard operating procedures (SOPs) for urban and rural seats make this a different election from past polls when gatherings of over 1,000 attendees were not unsurprising. Physical campaigning under stringent conditions is only allowed in areas with low 4G coverage (ceramahs), and only 64 out of the 82 seats can have physical campaigning.[19] A maximum of 150 people is allowed for each rally, and the audience is limited to residents from that kampong or longhouse. Any form of entertainment during the campaign is not allowed, and food provided must be in the form of packed food; among many other limitations.[20]
In addition, GPS also has immense resources and can use boats and helicopters to reach remote areas during the campaign. This is something the opposition lacks. In terms of rural outreach, the strategy of co-opting headmen to influence society and to control villagers has been and will be another tool used to win political support.
Chong Chien Jen, DAP Sarawak Chairman, questioned ceramahs being held indoors, as the virus is more likely to spread in enclosed areas. Booking such venues by the opposition would be difficult as these venues are controlled by village development and security committees (JKKK) controlled by the GPS.[21] The number of areas with poor 4G coverage also not only limited the opposition from using social media but also points to the poor track record of GPS in developing 4G capabilities in Sarawak. Overall the 4G coverage for the whole of Sarawak averages 52.2 percent in 2021.[22]
PARTI SARAWAK BERSATU: RISE AND RISE?
On 9 November 2020, the Parti Sarawak Bersatu (PSB) became the leader of the opposition bench in the Sarawak Legislative Assembly (DUN). The DAP which initially had six state seats, the same as PSB, was reduced to five when Padungan assemblyman Wong King Wei resigned from DAP on 26 July 2020[23] “disillusioned with the direction and the way the party has been managed…”[24] Incidentally, the PSB has indicated that it will be contesting in as many state seats as possible, rejecting any cooperation with Pakatan Harapan (PH and its DAP component) parties despite the risk of three-cornered fights benefiting GPS.[25]
The Parti Sarawak Bersatu (PSB) started life as the United People’s Party, a breakaway from the GPS component party, the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP). PSB has in recent months been announcing a slew of upcoming election candidates and promises to field a credible multi-ethnic slate in a majority of the state assembly’s 82 seats.[26] It has also come up with a very detailed manifesto for the Sarawak election, promising to protect Sarawak’s rights in national politics, and also looking after the interests of all Sarawakians in an equitable manner.[27] However, the PSB is a new party with no proven track record in governing the whole of Sarawak.
PSB is seen as more likely than PH (and its DAP component party) to pose a threat to GPS, owing to the failure of the former PH federal coalition to fulfil its promise to return Sarawak’s rights under the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). There is also the image problem for PH, which is seen as a squabbling coalition with a bad track record over its 22 months in federal power. PH is also perceived as a federal coalition and a peninsula-based party, unlike PSB, a Sarawak-based party. On 24 October 2021, the new Sarawak National Party (SNAP) announced that it has thrown its support behind PSB.[28]
Dayak seats may fall to the PSB in the forthcoming state election if native leaders together with Baru Bian in PSB can mount a cohesive campaign to garner Dayak support, especially in rural areas. There are 58 rural state constituencies in Sarawak that PSB could viably contest in,[29] with 13 marginal GPS seats in which the PSB could put up a strong show (see Table 2 below). Likewise, there are four marginal PSB seats that could also potentially fall to GPS (see Table 2).
For PSB, despite the generally positive coverage, and its visually and also substance-wise strong manifestos, there is the perception that some of its candidates have “defected” to another party after their victory. See Chee How in the Batu Lintang state assembly constituency faces this problem. Selected Batu Lintang constituents have voiced that he defected from PH to PSB, although he was in reality sacked from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (in PH) before he joined PSB.[30] Baru Bian, another PSB candidate, is likewise perceived to have left PKR for PSB.
PSB already has six state seats in Sarawak arising from the movement of members away from other parties, as indicated in Table 1 below.
TURMOIL IN FEDERAL POLITICS
The Ismail Sabri government holds 114 seats against 105 seats held by the opposition,[31] with GPS contributing a sizeable 18 seats. A weak coalition at the federal level in Peninsular Malaysia has ensured that the Sarawak government continues to receive “goodies” from the Ismail Sabri government. To commemorate the 58th Malaysia Day, Ismail Sabri pledged more than RM 9 billion to Sabah and Sarawak, while he also affirmed his government’s commitment to the Malaysia Agreement 1963.[32] RM4.66bil was been set aside for Sabah and RM4.47bil for Sarawak. In addition, RM 3.61 billion have been allocated to Sabah and RM 4.09 billion to Sarawak over the next five years to develop 5G connectivity.[33]Warisan was however not invited to the discussion by the opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim as well as by the Ismail Sabri Yaakob government.
GPS has been well-rewarded in the allocation of cabinet positions and obtained the key Senior Ministerial portfolio of Works in 2020 and also in 2021. Eight GPS representatives were also re-appointed.[34] Petronas withdrew its legal challenge against the Sarawak state government over the State Sales Tax on petroleum products in 2020. In September 2020, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) and its subsidiaries handed over a cheque for RM2.96 billion to the Sarawak government as payment of arrears for the State Sales Tax (SST) on petroleum products. Sarawak is the only state in Malaysia exempted from the National Gas Distribution Ordinance.[35] Extra funding has also been promised for Sarawak’s dilapidated schools.
GPS has therefore pledged support for the federal Perikatan Nasional (PN) but only as an informal political alliance (PN plus GPS). GPS is now not only in a better position to bargain on the Federal stage, but has also managed to disassociate itself from the stance of UMNO and PAS in terms of its religious issues by saying that it is not in a formal coalition with PN. This is especially useful since Sarawak’s demographic make-up generally renders the politics of Ketuanan Melayu and Ketuanan Islam controversial and unacceptable.[36] Both UMNO and PAS have pushed for Muafakat Nasional and Ketuanan Melayu, which Sarawak politicians and GPS have strongly said that they do not endorse.[37]
The backdoor entry of two Bersatu members through defections warrants close observation. Ali Biju (previously from Sarawak PKR, now in Bersatu) was appointed Deputy Minister for Energy and Natural Resources, and Willie Mongin (also from PKR, now in Bersatu) as Deputy Minister for Plantation Industries and Commodities in the federal government.[38] Both are also active at the state level: Ali Biju is Member of the Sarawak State Legislative Assembly for Krian while Willie Mongin contested the Mambong during the 2016 Sarawak state election, although he did not win the seat. Although Bersatu is not UMNO, it is still part of the federal PN coalition. This cross over has in effect given PN a foothold in Sarawak politics. It was reported on 24 October 2021 that GPS was not in negotiation with Bersatu for seat sharing in the forthcoming state election.[39]
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MALAYSIA AGREEMENT
Sarawakians have felt that their rights as enshrined in the MA 63 have been eroding over time.[40] One of the main contentions that will arise in the forthcoming elections is the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) where the claim for equal status by Sabah and Sarawak as signatories of the agreement have been whittled down in 1976 to being one of 13 states in Malaysia.[41] In early October, Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaffar, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Law and Parliamanet), stated that a bill to restore the rights of the parties in line with the Malaysia Agreement 1963 would be tabled by the end of October 2021.[42] On 14 December 2021, this bill was passed,[43] now recognising Sabah and Sarawak as two of the three entities that make up Malaysia, and also restoring the right to Sarawak to define individuals that qualify as natives.[44] In addition, Malaysia Day and MA63 will be formally mentioned and will form part of the Federal Constitution. Whether coincidental or orchestrated, the restoration of these rights will strongly work in favour of GPS in the few days leading up to the election as it has been pushing for such rights for the state.
Religious Freedom
In terms of religious freedom, the Sarawak government has been actively supporting other religions through its Unit for Other Religions (UNIFOR), established on 27 April 2017.[45] Sarawak is the only state in Malaysia to have a unit dedicated to helping the different houses of worship other than Islam.[46]Through UNIFOR, churches and missionary schools have received funding for their projects.[47] The Sarawak government has worked hard to maintain religious freedom in the state under the Malaysia Agreement 1963. Sarawakians are free to use the term Allah and communities have been co-existing peacefully with one another. In Sarawak, a household may consist of members of various religions living together in harmony.
CONCLUSION
This paper has identified factors that can influence the outcome of the approaching Sarawak state election. GPS should win the coming state election. This will be due to the benefits of incumbency, including the fact that the new standard operating procedures for campaigning will work in its favour. Also, the use of social media in urban areas will not advantage the opposition, as such areas are already in their hands.
Turmoil in the federal government has ensured that it will deliver “goodies” to Sarawak. This strengthens the argument that Sarawakians must continue to vote and support GPS if they wish to continue receiving such perks from Peninsular Malaysia. GPS has also been rewarded in the allocation of cabinet positions, which ensures that Sarawakian concerns will be looked after at the Federal level.
However, carrying out the election in the midst of Covid-19 may work against GPS. Despite the “threat” posed by PSB and the possibility of it wresting marginal seats away from GPS, there is likelihood that the GPS may also be able to take marginal seats from the PSB.
Nonetheless, GPS is very likely to win the forthcoming election, although the extent of its victory will also be undermined by some of the factors examined in this paper.
ENDNOTE
[1] “Emergency in Sarawak necessary to postpone state election: PMO”, 31 July 2021, The New Straits Times, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/07/713488/emergency-sarawak-necessary-postpone-state-election-pmo. Accessed 31 July 2021.
[2] “King consents to lift Emergency in Sarawak”, The Star, 3 November 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/11/03/emergency-in-sarawak-lifted. Accessed 3 November 2021.
[3] The decision was made after a request by the Governor of Sarawak (and former Chief Minister of Sarawak), Abdul Taib Mahmud, on 2 November, and also in consultation with the Malaysian Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri on 3 November 2021.
[4] “Sarawak state assembly automatically dissolved with Emergency lifted, say experts”, The Star, 3 November 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/11/03/sarawak-state-assembly-automatically-dissolved-with-emergency-lifted-say-experts. Accessed 3 November 2021.
[5] The turnout for early voting was at 89 percent. These were made up of the police, armed forces, health ministry officials, national security council authorities, local council authorities, media and all the parties involved in the early voting process. See Hana Naz Harun, “89 pct early voter turnout for 12th Sarawak election”, The New Straits Times, 14 December 2021, https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2021/12/754324/89-pct-early-voter-turnout-12th-sarawak-election. Accessed 15 December 2021.
[6] This will include members of the security forces, comprising the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM), Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM) and General Operations Force (PGA) as well as their spouses.
[7] The PBK, sharing a very similar logo to the GPS may create confusion for voters who are not able to read or those who are careless. Besides possible confusion between the GPS and PBK logo, the GPS is for the first time using the symbol of a hornbill, unlike the previous blue BN dacing (scales) symbol of Barisan Nasional used in previous parliamentary and state elections. See “Don’t mark wrong ‘bird’ on ballot paper, choose longest name, says Piasau’s Ting” The Borneo Post, 9 December 2021, https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/12/09/dont-mark-wrong-bird-on-ballot-paper-choose-longest-name-says-piasaus-ting/. Accessed 9 December 2021. See also James Chin, “Sarawak polls: Is it GPS’ race to lose?”, Between the Lines, no date, Accessed 12 December 2021.
[8] These issues were discussed in some detail in Lee Poh Onn, “What Matters for the Sarawak State Election”, ISEAS Perspective 2020/109, /wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_109.pdf., 2 October 2020.
[9] Currently GPS holds on to 68 seats, with some assemblypersons having joined the PSB.
[10] Ram Anand, “Sarawak polls feature many firsts, but no shocks anticipated”, The Straits Times, 5 December 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/sarawak-polls-features-many-firsts-but-no-shocks-anticipated. Accessed 6 December 2021, and Goh Pei Pei, “Sarawak election during the pandemic advantageous to GPS, say analysts”, The New Straits Times, 19 June 2021, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/06/700204/sarawak-election-during-pandemic-advantageous-gps-say-analysts. Accessed 5 December 2021.
[11] In 1978, domestic factional problems in his coalition made then-Chief Minister Abdul Rahman Ya’kub push the state election to a year later. Over time, Sarawak’s unique practice of holding state elections in a different time frame from national polls has held fast.
[12] The PBB more or less represents the Malay/Melanau Muslim Bumiputera community, SUPP the Chinese, and PDP and PRS the non-Muslim Bumiputera community.
[13] BN direct candidates were required to return to their parties or join any other Sarawak Barisan Nasional component party upon winning a seat in the 2016 Sarawak state election.
[14] Please see The Borneo Post, https://12thsarawakelection.theborneopost.com/. Accessed 11 December 2021.
[15] Tarrance Tan, “Sarawak Polls: 349 candidates vying for 82 state seats after nomination ends”, The Star, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/12/06/sarawak-polls-349-candidates-vying-for-82-state-seats-after-nomination-ends. Accessed 6 December 2021.
[16] See Table 2 of this perspective.
[17] A successful containment of infections would have been “proof” of the GPS’ excellent governance capacity and a highly valuable track record before Sarawakians head for the polls.
[18] Apart from Labuan, by 20th July 2021, Sarawak had the highest share of total population with full vaccination (34 per cent) among all states, at more than double the national average (15 per cent). See “Covid-19: Over 15 million doses of vaccines given as of Tuesday (July 20)”, The Star, 21 July 2021,https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/07/21/covid-19-over-15-million-doses-of-vaccines-given-as-of-tuesday-july-20. Accessed 21 July 2021.
[19] For a complete list of state seats where limited physical campaigning is allowed, please refer to: “Prosedur Operasi Standard (SOP) Pencegahan Covid-19 bagi Pelaksanaan Pilihan Raya Umum (PRU) Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN) Sarawak Ke-12”The Borneo Post, 5 December 2021, https://www.theborneopost.com/newsimages/2021/12/SOP-PENCEGAHAN-COVID-19-PRU-DUN-SARAWAK-KE-12-SARAWAK-05122021-Final.pdf. Accessed 5 December 2021.
[20] Interstate travel for campaigning purposes will also not be allowed for candidates, and they are only allowed to campaign in their specific constituencies. Only the top five leaders of a party are allowed to interstate. All organisers, administrators, candidates and speakers must take an antigen rapid test (ART) before conducting a rally. All ceramahs can only be carried out with a police permit, cannot exceed two hours, must end by 10 pm and cannot be conducted in open air or public spaces. See “Ceramah allowed in 64 state seats with poor 4G coverage”, The Star, 6 December 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/12/06/ceramah-allowed-in-64-state-seats-with-poor-4g-coverage. Accessed 6 December 2021.
[21] “Chong questions election SOP over ceramah done indoors”, The Borneo Post, 8 December 2021, https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/12/08/chong-questions-election-sop-over-ceramah-done-indoors/. Accessed 8 December 2021.
[22] Sixty-four out of the 82 state seats do not have good internet coverage. Areas like Kuching (87.6% coverage), Samarahan (71.9%), Serian (72.7%) were the exceptions but other divisions like Bintulu (22.2%), Kapit (40.3%), Miri (43.2%), Siri Aman (49.5%), Sarikei (44.3%) had poor coverage. See Part 1 – Digitalizing Sarawak with Better Connectivity Through SALURAN Initiative. 15 August 2021, Sarawak Multimedia Authority, https://www.sma.gov.my/upload/file_folder/Publication//SALURAN%20Advertorial-ENG.pdf. Accessed 25 November 2021.
[23] “Asfia: PSB to lead opposition bench in DUN, Soon Koh to be opposition leader” The Borneo Post, 8 November 2020, https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/11/08/asfia-psb-to-lead-opposition-bench-in-dun-soon-koh-to-be-opposition-leader/. Accessed 10 November 2020.
[24] “Padungan rep Wong King Wei announces resignation from DAP”, The Borneo Post Online, 27 July 2020, < https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/07/27/padungan-rep-wong-king-wei-announces-resignation-from-dap/>, accessed 16 September 2020. Wong also mentioned that DAP’s credibility was at stake: “[D]uring the 22-month rule under Pakatan Harapan (PH), what we said in front of the people and what we promised the people seemed to have gone down the drain. If we were to bring up our ideas and dreams as well as promises, the credibility of DAP would be in question.”
[25] “As GPS rides high in Sarawak, no sign of opposition joining forces”, op. cit..
[26] John Teo, “PSB is party to watch in Sarawak”, The New Straits Times, 13 April 2020, https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2020/04/583908/psb-party-watch-sarawak. Accessed 13 September 2021.
[27] “See: PSB’s election manifesto warmly welcomed by the people”, The Borneo Post, 10 December 2021, https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/12/10/see-psbs-election-manifesto-warmly-welcomed-by-the-people/. Accessed 10 December 2021.
[28] This was made by its protem president Edmund Stanley Jugol though the party has not been approved by the Registrar of Societies as yet. If they are not recognised in time, SNAP Baru has stated that it will fully back PSB candidates. See “SNAP Baru pledges support to PSB – protem president”, Borneo Post Online, 24 October 2021, https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/10/24/snap-baru-pledges-support-to-psb-protem-president/. Accessed 24 October 2021.
[29] Derived from Appendix 1 of Lee Poh Onn, “ What Matters for the Sarawak State Election”, op. cit., pp. 12-18.
[30] Annabelle Lee, “Uphill battle for Batu Lintang incumbent to shed ‘frog’ label”, MalaysiaKini, 9 December 2021, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/602307. Accessed 12 December 2021.
[31] “Ismail Sabri Yaakob sworn in as Malaysia’s new prime minister”, The Straits Times, 21 August 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ismail-sabri-to-be-sworn-in-as-malaysias-new-pm. Accessed 21 August 2021.
[32] “RM9bil for Sabah and Sarawak”,The Star, 17 September 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/09/17/rm9bil-for-sabah-and-sarawak. Accessed 17 September 2021.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Fadillah was re-appointed as the Senior Minister (Works) along with Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Minister Datuk Alexander Nanta Linggi; Tourism, Arts and Culture Minister Datuk Seri Nancy Shukri, and former Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives Minister Datuk Seri Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar, who has been appointed as the Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Law). Deputy ministers Datuk Hanifah Hajar Taib (Sabah and Sarawak Affairs) and Datuk Aaron Ago Dagang (Health) were also re-appointed, while Datuk Hasbi Habibollah and Datuk Henry Sum Agong swapped portfolios to be appointed Rural Development and Transport deputy ministers respectively. See “Fadillah: Appointment of eight GPS reps in new Cabinet is recognition for Sarawak, state coalition”, The Star, 27 August 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/08/27/fadillah-appointment-of-eight-gps-reps-in-new-cabinet-is-recognition-for-sarawak-state-coalition. Accessed 4 September 2021.
[35] “As GPS rides high in Sarawak, no sign of opposition joining forces”, Malaysia Now, 24 February 2021, https://www.malaysianow.com/news/2021/02/24/as-gps-rides-high-in-sarawak-no-sign-of-opposition-joining-forces/. Accessed 25 February 2021.
[36] James Chin, “Sabah and Sarawak in the 14th General Election 2018 (GE 14): Local Factors and State Nationalism”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 37, no, 3 (2018), p. 175.
[37] “‘Extreme’ Umno not welcome in Sarawak, says Abang Johari”, Borneo Post, 3 September 2020, https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/09/03/extreme-umno-not-welcome-in-sarawak-says-abang-johari/. Accessed 5 November 2021.
[38] “Are Ali and Willie winning the battle but losing the war?”, Dayak Daily, 11 March 2020, https://dayakdaily.com/are-ali-and-willie-winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war/. Accessed 4 September 2021.
[39] Alexander Nanta Linggi stated that “no such negotiations have ever taken place and that no such negotiation will ever take place between the two parties”. See “No negotiations between GPS and Bersatu on sear sharing for Sarawak elections, says Nanta”, The Star Online, 24 October 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/10/24/no-negotiations-between-gps-and-bersatu-on-seat-sharing-for-sarawak-election-says-nanta. Accessed 24 October 2021.
[40] These were some of the rights under the Malaysia Agreement 1963: Islam’s status as a national religion was not applicable to Sabah and Sarawak, immigration vested in the hands of the state governments, Borneanisation of the civil service was also to proceed as quickly as possible, no amendments to safeguards could be made without the agreement of the Sabah and Sarawak governments, the indigenous peoples of both Sabah and Sarawak would enjoy the same position given to the Malay community in Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak was to be given a high degree of autonomy over financial affairs, education, development expenditure and tariff. See James Chin. 2019. “The 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63): Sabah and Sarawak and the Politics of Historical Grievances”. In Minorities Matter: Malaysian Politics and People Volume III, edited by Sophie Lemière, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, pp. 79-80.
[41] Johan Arriffin Samad. 2021. “The 1963 Malaysia Agreement: Pakatan’s Failed restoration and Perikatan’s Fledgling Initiatives. In Sabah from the Ground: The 2020 Elections & The Politics of Survival, edited by Bridget Welsh, Vilashini Somiah and Benjamin Y.H. Loh. Singapore and Malaysia: ISEAS Publishing and the Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (SIRD), p. 47.
[42] “Constitutional amendment Bill to restore MA63 rights to be tabled by end of October”, The Star, 6 October 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/10/06/constitutional-amendment-bill-to-restore-ma63-rights-to-be-tabled-by-end-of-october. Accessed 6 October 2021.
[43] 199 lawmakers supporting the bill and 21 MPs not present See “Dewan Rakyat approves amendments to Constitution related to MA63 by more than two-thirds majority”, The Star, 14 December 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/12/14/dewan-rakyat-approves-amendments-to-constitution-related-to-ma63-by-more-than-two-thirds-majority. Accessed 14 December 2021.
[44] The states of the Federation now comprises the states of Malaya namely Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, Penang, Selangor and Terengganu; and the Borneo states, Sabah and Sarawak. See Ram Anand, “Malaysia amends Constitution to elevate status of Sabah and Sarawak”, The Straits Times, 14 December 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-amends-constitution-to-elevate-status-of-sabah-and-sarawak. Accessed 14 December 2021.
[45] The establishment of UNIFOR was the brainchild of former Sarawak Chief Minister Adenan Satem. Through UNIFOR, an inclusive approach is adopted for all religions. UNIFOR was established to safeguard religious harmony and look after for the needs of other religions besides Islam in multiracial Sarawak. UNIFOR runs as a unit in the Chief Minister’s Department under the portfolio of Sarawak’s Deputy Chief Minister Douglas Uggah Embas.
[46] “Uggah: Proposed Unifor complex another reflection of CM’s inclusive policy”, The Borneo Post Online, 12 September 2020,< https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/08/05/uggah-proposed-unifor-complex-another-reflection-of-cms-inclusive-policy/>, accessed 12 September 2020.
[47] For example, fourteen houses of worship and religious organisations in the Layar state constituency recently received grants. See “Layar religious organisations receive grants”, The Borneo Post Online, 12 September 2020, <https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/09/12/layar-religious-organisations-receive-grants/>, accessed 12 September 2020. The St Basil’s Parish in Kuching received a total of RM 1.4 million for its expansion plans; the Sibu Nan Hai Buddhist Society received assistance worth RM700,000; St Edward’s Church of Kampung Skio in Serembu received RM100,000; the Liew Shan Pang Temple received RM50,000, and; the Tanjung Durian Buddhist Village received RM200,000 in 2019 to renovate existing premises. About RM 50 million have been disbursed to UNIFOR each year in 2020 and 2021 to look after the needs of various non-Muslim religious organisations. See “Three bodies in Serembu receive RM350,000 Unifor fund”, The Borneo Post Online, 1 February 2020, <https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/02/01/three-bodies-in-serembu-receive-rm350000-unifor-fund/>, accessed 12 September 2020. See also “123 mission schools receive initial grants of RM15 million from UNIFOR”, TVSTV, https://tvstv.my/2021/10/30/123-mission-schools-receive-initial-grants-of-rm15-million-from-unifor/. Accessed 30 October 2021.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/164 “The EU in the Indo-Pacific: A New Strategy with Implications for ASEAN” by Joanne Lin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The European Council reached agreement on an EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in April 2021, and in September, it presented a Joint Communication providing further rationale for its strategy. This paves the way for the EU to join the other long-standing advocates of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
- This paper looks into the various dimensions of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy and examines the similarity of its approach with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and how the two regional blocs may find synergy in implementing their respective guiding documents.
- The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy can add a strong normative dimension to the Indo-Pacific region to allow it to work closely with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. As is the case with ASEAN, the EU places importance on building partnerships and reinforcing multilateral cooperation.
- The presence of the EU may help dilute major power rivalries in the region. ASEAN was mentioned 31 times in the EU’s Joint communication on its strategy, including a specific section on the “Centrality of ASEAN”. ASEAN appears to be at the core of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
* Joanne Lin is Lead Researcher in Political-Security Affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/164, 16 December 2021
INTRODUCTION
On 19 April 2021, The European Council agreed on an EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.[1] A Joint Communication was subsequently presented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 16 September 2021,[2] providing further rationale for its approach and to its strategy.
This paves the way for the EU to join the other long-standing advocates of the Indo-Pacific region, predominantly the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), i.e. Australia, India, Japan and the United States (U.S.), and other countries that have a lesser degree of Indo-Pacific commitment such as ASEAN member states, as well as New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom – all of which are ASEAN’s dialogue partners.
This paper looks briefly into various dimensions of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Specifically, it examines the similarity of its approach to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and how the two regional blocs may find synergy in implementing their respective guiding documents.
WHY EU, WHY NOW
France, Germany and the Netherlands – countries of considerable economic and diplomatic influence in the Indo-Pacific region – first announced their policies on Indo-Pacific at the national level,[3] and these then provided the push for an EU-wide strategy on that strategic region.
Even though several of the EU member states remain ambivalent and have no real foreign policy interest in the Indo-Pacific arena, the EU had realised that it could not afford not taking a position. This was because “the world’s centre of gravity is moving towards the Indo-Pacific, both in geo-economic and geo-political terms. The futures of the EU and the Indo-Pacific are interlinked”, according to EU’s High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell.[4]
The EU felt compelled to deepen its engagement with partners in the Indo-Pacific to respond to emerging dynamics in a region rich in trade and resources. It realised the importance of access to the open markets and the need to strengthen its supply chains. Equally important is its need to bolster its strategic reach and relevance.
Thus, the key tenet of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is to shape a rules-based international order to better address global challenges, including climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Indo-Pacific region also holds potential for the EU to reinforce its priorities such as the promotion of the 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals[5] and of a multilateral rules-based international order.
Another compelling reason is the need for the EU to offer a rules-based alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[6] In this aspect, the EU is also standing on the same side as Australia, Japan and the U.S. in the promotion of quality and transparent infrastructure cooperation.[7]
A development running parallel to this was the adoption in 2019 of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). ASEAN had also been gearing itself towards a new understanding of the Indo-Pacific.[8] However, due to ambivalence among its member states, ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific did not develop into a strategy but remains an outlook, as the name of AOIP implies. It was ASEAN’s effort at coming up with its collective leadership to maintain its central role in the region which prompted the EU to ponder over its own hesitancy over the Indo-Pacific construct.
PREMISE OF THE EU’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY IN THE REGION
Despite the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” concept originating from the Trump’s Administration,[9] the EU clearly does not have an outright intention to join a U.S.-led containment strategy[10] directed against China,[11] neither does it exhibit any zero-sum mentality when it comes to the Indo-Pacific construct.
Although the EU is cautious of developments in China, including human rights violations and Beijing’s military build-up in the Indo-Pacific, the EU stays clear of the rivalry between China and the U.S. Instead, it has explicitly stated that its approach to the region encourages cooperation, and not confrontation[12] and it would like to see an Indo-Pacific that is less securitised and politicised. In fact, the EU intends to encourage China to play a constructive role in the Indo-Pacific region. Some degree of balancing China may be acceptable, but economically, it does not wish to dissociate itself from China.
The EU’s strategy also promotes a rules-based international order and other principles such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and international commitments. This has led some scholars to reason that the ‘rules-based order’ and ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ may sometimes be used as omnibus terms for these high principles.[13]
Similar to the objectives of all other Indo-Pacific partners, the EU would like to keep ASEAN at the centre of the regional architecture. This is not only due to the geographical location of ASEAN, between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, but also because all Indo-Pacific partners are also dialogue partners of ASEAN. They are all a part of one or more ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ADMM-Plus, and therefore have vested strategic commitments to ASEAN.
What is positive for the EU is the fact that the Indo-Pacific is still a relatively young concept. There is no clear and single definition of its geographical scope, strategic objectives, or specific areas of cooperation. As such, it does not restrict the EU from defining its own strategy in accordance with its own normative interest in the Indo-Pacific region, and does not impose its alignment to any groupings, including the QUAD. The EU has a free hand in determining what it wants to bring to the Indo-Pacific region and how it wants to do it.
WHAT IS THE EU BRINGING TO THE INDO-PACIFIC?
While it may be hard to reconcile the diverse interests and aspirations of the various Indo-Pacific partners, some pragmatic cooperation among the partners may help shape some norms geared towards collaboration.
The EU is certain that its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region will be principled and long-term, and places emphasis on partnership, trade, and maritime security at the core of its Indo-Pacific strategy. It has identified seven priority areas, namely sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; and human security.
These are in line with some of the priority areas found in the approaches taken by France, Germany and the Netherlands in relation to the Indo-Pacific.
Concretely, the EU has plans to (i) conclude Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with several countries, including Malaysia and Thailand; (ii) complete or resume trade negotiations with several countries including a region-to-region trade agreement with ASEAN; (iii) forge green alliances in the fight against climate change; (iv) strengthen ocean governance; (v) establish Digital Partnership Agreements; (vi) implement connectivity partnerships including with India and Japan; (vii) enhance naval deployment in the Indo-Pacific and ensure maritime security; (viii) strengthen cooperation on research and innovation with like-minded partners; and (ix) reinforce support to healthcare systems and pandemic preparedness.[14]
Strategically, the EU has vested interests in the waterways of the Indo-Pacific; 40% of its foreign trade passes through the South China Sea.[15] Hence, maritime security and governance is a key tenet of its strategy. Apart from the EU’s support for Indo-Pacific countries’ fisheries management and the fight against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, it may have other security objectives.
The EU has plans to enhance the naval presence of its member states in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, it seeks to conduct more joint exercises and port calls with Indo-Pacific partners, including multilateral exercises, to protect freedom of navigation in the region.[16] These could well align with the EU’s principles of ensuring a rules-based maritime order, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but could also be deemed as adding ‘fuel’ to a sea that is already packed with military vessels.
There is no doubt that the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy can add a strong normative dimension[17] to the region. It also affords the EU to work closely with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners in addressing common challenges, build trust, set standards, and promote good regulatory practices in the region. Like ASEAN, partnership and reinforcing multilateral cooperation are at the core of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
THE EU STRATEGY AND THE ASEAN OUTLOOK ON THE INDO-PACIFIC
The EU, being a regional organisation and sharing key similarities[18] with ASEAN in its approach to the Indo-Pacific, affords some possibility of synergy. In addition, its presence may help dilute major power rivalries in the region.[19]
ASEAN and the EU are often seen as natural partners in integration. Both organisations are recognised for being successful regional organisations in their respective regions. A key premise for the ASEAN-EU strategic partnership is the shared values concerning effective and sustainable multilateralism, a rules-based international order, as well as free and fair trade.[20]
Where ASEAN and the EU will strongly converge is really the strong values underpinning the Indo-Pacific order. In addition, there is also the strong focus they have on establishing partnership, working with like-minded partners in addressing common challenges and building trust – including with China.
As such, in the EU’s Joint Communication on its strategy,[21] ASEAN was mentioned 31 times. It also has a specific section on the “Centrality of ASEAN”. The EU emphasised the dynamism and breath of its partnership with ASEAN and underscored its support of ASEAN centrality and other ASEAN-led processes.
Similar to the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)[22] was envisioned to be inclusive, and to promote key principles.[23] Four key areas of cooperation were identified, namely: (i) maritime cooperation; (ii) connectivity; (iii) UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030; and (iv) economic and other possible areas of cooperation.
The Outlook recognises the complementarity of existing cooperation frameworks such as the EAS, ARF and the ADMM-Plus. Hence, the establishment of new mechanisms or infrastructure is not necessary. ASEAN is currently working on how to further mainstream cooperation within the framework of the AOIP with its external partners. The EU has on several occasions, including at the ASEAN’s Post-Ministerial Conference with the EU in August 2021, expressed its support for the AOIP. Furthermore, it has also indicated its interest in exploring synergy between the EU Indo-Pacific strategy and the AOIP.
There are several areas of potential convergence between the AOIP and the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This includes broadly the following:
(i) Working towards universally agreed commitments such as the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change including through high-level dialogues.
(ii) Fostering inclusive economic growth and working towards a region-to-region trade agreement. This includes bridging the level of ambition between the two regions and finding common areas of focus.
(iii) Further promoting connectivity including through the recently concluded ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA) encompassing 37 countries (the first region-to-region agreement), as well as EU’s support for the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. This is worth noting that connectivity is a core component of ASEAN-EU relations.
(iv) Enhancing dialogues on maritime security as well as other areas of security such as transnational crime, piracy, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, non-proliferation, and disarmament.
(v) Accelerating green and digital transition, including support of the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 and the development of standards in emerging technologies. This will help promote convergence between data protection regimes to ensure safe and free data flows.
Another potential area of cooperation is in strengthening both regions’ preparedness and capacity to respond to the current and future health emergencies. The importance of jointly combating the COVID-19 pandemic and “build back better”[24] has been emphasised in all meetings between the ASEAN and the EU. EU’s strong support for the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework will also be welcomed by ASEAN.
Strategically, the EU has also indicated its wish to establish maritime areas of interest in the Indo-Pacific and possibly for other Indo-Pacific partners to join in the initiative as well. It is also seeking a stronger role in the ASEAN security architecture through the request to participate in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) or at least in its Expert Working Groups (EWG). The EU’s interest to join the East Asia Summit has also been noted by ASEAN. However, while recognising the EU’s wish to play a stronger role in the region through ASEAN-led mechanisms, ASEAN is also mindful that the EU as a regional grouping (versus a sovereign state) brings with it other factors worthy of consideration.
According to a speech by Singapore’s Minister of Education, Chan Chun Sing,[25] “Europe is neither the U.S. or China. It will have to develop shared perspective on its role in global affairs beyond European-centric issues. It will need new mechanisms to project its collective interests without being circumscribed by the lowest common denominator”. As such, ASEAN and the EU will need to calibrate its cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and consider the diverse interests of its member states.
ASEAN and the EU will be celebrating the 45th anniversary of dialogue relations next year in Brussels. The occasion will present an opportunity for ASEAN and the EU to further discuss alignments in the Indo-Pacific, and to underscore the strong values of both blocs.
ENDNOTES
[1] Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 16 April 2021, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7914-2021-INIT/en/pdf (accessed on 23 November 2021).
[2] Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU strategy for cooperation in the Ind-Pacific, 16 September 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2021).
[3] Rahul Mishra, The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is Good News for ASEAN, 4 August 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/eus-indo-pacific-strategy-good-news-asean (accessed on 24 November 2021).
[4] EU, EU and Indo-Pacific: natural partners, Press Release, 16 September 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_4704 (accessed on 25 November 2021)
[5] Ibid.
[6] Rahul Mishra, The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is Good News for ASEAN, 4 August 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/eus-indo-pacific-strategy-good-news-asean (accessed on 24 November 2021).
[7] Dr Jeffrey Wilson, Diversifying Australia’s Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Diplomacy, 16 April 2019, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/diversifying-australias-indo-pacific-infrastructure-diplomacy/
[8] Rahul Mishra, The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is Good News for ASEAN, 4 August 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/eus-indo-pacific-strategy-good-news-asean (accessed on 24 November 2021).
[9] The Biden Administration has yet to release a new strategy on the Indo-Pacific. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has informed ASEAN Foreign Ministers that a new comprehensive strategy for the wider Indo-Pacific region will be released soon, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/blinken-says-us-soon-will-release-new-strategy-indo-pacific-region-2021-09-23/ (accessed on 25 November 2021).
[10] According to a speech made by former Vice President Mike Pence, the U.S. “will continue to assert American interests across the Indo-Pacific.”, Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China, 4 October 2018, https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018
[11] Felix Heiduk, Gudrun Wacker, From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, Significance, Implementation and Challenges, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Research Paper 2020/RP 09, 01.07.2020, 43 Seiten, (English Version of SWP-Studie 9/2020) September 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020RP09/ (accessed on 23 November 2021).
[12] EU, Questions and Answers: EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 16 September 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_4709 (accessed on 25 November 2021)
[13] William Choong, The Quad and the Indo-Pacific: Going Slow to Go Further, FULCRUM, 4 October 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/the-quad-and-the-indo-pacific-going-slow-to-go-further/ (accessed on 25 November 2021).
[14] EU, Questions and Answers: EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 16 September 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_4709 (accessed on 25 November 2021)
[15] EU, Factsheet of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, September 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-indo-pacific_factsheet_2021-09_final.pdf (accessed on 25 November 2021).
[16] EU, Questions and Answers: EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 16 September 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_4709 (accessed on 25 November 2021)
[17] Rahul Mishra, The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is Good News for ASEAN, 4 August 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/eus-indo-pacific-strategy-good-news-asean (accessed on 24 November 2021).
[18] Ambivalence among ASEAN and EU member states will mean that the two partners can safely use a flexible approach and focus on soft issues. It can afford both partners the advantage of contributing to the region without being seen as a threat.
[19] Gregory Tiberghien-Romer, Aadil Sud and Walter Brenno-Colnaghi, Enter EU: The Challenges and Cooperation Potential of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, EIAS Policy Brief, 19 October 2021, https://eias.org/policy-briefs/enter-eu-the-challenges-and-cooperation-potential-of-the-indo-pacific-strategy/ (accessed on 25 November 2021).
[20] EU Mission to ASEAN, EU ASEAN Strategic Partners Blue Book 2021, https://euinasean.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Blue-Book-2021.pdf (accessed on 30 November 2021)
[21] Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU strategy for cooperation in the Ind-Pacific, 16 September 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2021).
[22] ASEAN, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, 23 June 2019, https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf
[23] These principles include openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, and respect for international laws such as the UN Charter and the 1982 UNCLOS, among others.
[24] ASEAN and EU, Co-Chairs’ Press Release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, 1 December 2021, https://asean.org/co-chairs-press-release-of-the-23rd-asean-eu-ministerial-meeting/ (accessed on 30 November 2021).
[25] Chan Chun Sing, Speech by Minister for Education, Mr Chan Chun Sing, at the 41st IISS-Asia Fullerton Lecture, “Singapore Amid Great Power Rivalry”, Ministry of Education Singapore, 9 November 2021, https://www.moe.gov.sg/news/speeches/20211109-speech-by-minister-for-education-mr-chan-chun-sing-at-the-41st-iiss-asia-fullerton-lecture-singapore-amid-great-power-rivalry (accessed on 24 November 2021).
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |