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2021/162 “Mind the Gaps, Fill the Needs: A Strategic Outlook for the Philippine-US Alliance” by Julio S. Amador III

 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (R) meets with Philippines Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin (L) at the State Department in Washington, DC, on 9 September 2021. Photo: Jacquelyn Martin/POOL/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Based on a 2020 survey, the United States remains a trustworthy ally to the Philippine national security establishment.
  • The Philippines begrudgingly notes the disparity of treatment across US alliances in Asia as well as Washington’s shift to enhancing engagements with non-treaty partners while failing to upkeep its alliances in Southeast Asia.
  • Alliance management should be high on the agenda of the next Philippine administration if it is to address strategic deficits in the current engagement which is focused on defence and security.
  • More holistic approaches to alliance management deserve attention in high-level strategic dialogues, including strengthening cooperation in the economic and political spheres, among others.
  • The Philippines must also step up to play its part and articulate its key interests better. It needs to own up to its obligations under the MDT to fully upgrade its military and defence capabilities, and better project its value-proposition in retaining the alliance.

* Guest writer, Julio S. Amador III, is the Interim President of the Foundation for the National Interest, a new Manila-based think-tank focusing on strategic and security issues, and Founder of the Philippine Strategic Forum.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/162, 10 December 2021

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INTRODUCTION

Tensions between the Philippines and the US have always been brewing beneath the surface, despite historically cordial diplomatic relations and generally convergent strategic interests on key foreign policy issues, such as regional balance of power and military modernisation. Critics of the relationship in the Philippines range from those who seek to reinforce the alliance by rectifying the perceived unequal treatment of Manila when compared to other US military partners, to the more radical option of rethinking the very wisdom of the alliance amidst the rise of China as the US’ strategic competitor. These underlying concerns became more pronounced under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, which saw the alliance unnerved by otherwise previously dismissible concerns.[1] The Visiting Forces Agreement, and pretty much the entire security alliance, was in jeopardy, but fortunately things did not go too far.[2]

Historically, the alliance has been mutually beneficial to both countries. The US found a reliable ally in the Philippines on numerous instances, including the Korean War,[3] the Vietnam War,[4] the Cold War,[5] and the Global War on Terror,[6] among others. Meanwhile, the Philippines receives aid from the United States to modernise its military, and has been working with American advisers for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns. In the fight against the Islamic State and during the Battle of Marawi,[7] the US extended technical assistance and invested millions of dollars in training and intelligence funding for the Philippines.[8]

Based on a 2020 survey of Filipino security elites, the US continues to be critical in the Philippines’ defence and foreign policies as the preferred partner of choice, alongside other members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) (See Table 1).[9] The Philippines also indicated its calibrated support of the Quad[10] and more recently the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact[11] – both of which are US-led initiatives that seek to reinforce its place in the region. 

The perception of the US as a stabilising factor in the region is a prevalent view in the Philippines. However, the deficits in its economic and technological engagements,[12] as well as the modest amount of American foreign military assistance to Manila as compared to other US treaty allies and non-treaty partners,[13] leave many to wonder about and question its commitment in general and also its asymmetric treatment across regional security partners in particular.

PHILIPPINE-US ALLIANCE: AN ENHANCED AGENDA

Disparities across US Alliances in Asia

The disparity of treatment across US alliances in Asia has been noted[14] and has not escaped the attention of Manila’s security establishment. The development of new defence capabilities and improvement of interoperability between the US and countries such as Japan,[15] South Korea,[16] and Australia[17] has been undertaken through deeply institutionalised relations and ironclad commitments established between their militaries. In contrast, alliance sceptics in the Philippines have railed against the Obama administration’s ambiguity on whether a possible conflict between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea (SCS) would trigger US obligations under Article IV of the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT). 

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have since made commitments to apply the MDT in the SCS, but the vacillation from one position to another reflects broader ambivalence and uncertainty. Prioritisation for an alliance as critical as the MDT appears lacklustre. For example, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance mentions by name only Vietnam and Singapore – two important partners but not US allies in Southeast Asia.[18] For many in Asia, especially in the Philippines, US Vice President Kamala Harris’ visit to Singapore and Hanoi last August 2021 depicts the shift in US regional priorities. In his early 2021 Asia tour, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Seoul and Tokyo but omitted Manila and Bangkok – the only two US allies in Southeast Asia.[19] Newly minted Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Daniel J. Kritenbrink, on his trip to the Asia Pacific only had plans to visit Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Singapore, but not Manila.[20]

In the light of the Philippines’ importance to the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, the disparaging effect of being frequently left out in high-level visits and security dialogues is a potent elixir for alliance disruptions as evidenced by the Duterte administration’s reactions. Manila is taking notice of these developments, regardless of how major or minor they may seem.

Alliances Maintenance in Asia

The above developments fit into the assessment by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that US ties with its alliances in Southeast Asia have substantially weakened in recent years, with relatively little effort by Washington to strengthen its alliances with the Philippines (and Thailand).[21] According to the CSIS report titled Alliances in Need of Upkeep, the changing strategic environment, shifting internal politics, and China’s growing influence and aggressive outreach have contributed to this downward trend. This neglect has and will come at a strategic cost. Ties with the Philippines (and Thailand) remain important for the United States because of the benefits of peacetime bilateral cooperation as well as in defence planning above or just below the threshold of conflict. The US strategy in the Indo-Pacific will be severely affected and weakened if China manages to sway the two countries closer to its ambit. After all, Southeast Asia forms a lynchpin of the strategy and the SCS disputes remain a core regional flashpoint.[22]

The same report brings attention to the lack of diversity in Philippine-US security cooperation with a tunnel-vision focus on counter-terrorism operations in Mindanao. Cooperation in other areas of shared interest remains under-developed, especially in maritime domain awareness and cybersecurity.[23] China’s grey zone challenges in these fields have gone unaddressed for years, primarily due to the Philippines’ underdeveloped capabilities. It also does not help that these operations exploit the slow, deliberative nature of decision-making in the Philippines and the US,[24] which has resulted in severe response deficits in the SCS.[25] It is imperative for both Washington and Manila to address the lack of coordination and pre-planned responses to China’s grey zone activities.

To meet these challenges, it is important for the US to increase the frequency of air and naval joint exercises to ensure the combat-readiness and interoperability of its armed forces. Deploying more frequently, and developing clearer doctrines for conflicts short-of-war, would prepare the US (and the Philippines) for short-term contingencies. Under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the two countries can undertake necessary US-funded construction at jointly agreed locations, and deploy US air assets and long-range weapons. Priority must therefore be given to the full implementation of the EDCA to strengthen the Mutual Defence Treaty and cement the many logistical agreements between the countries. Both the US and the Philippine defence and foreign policy community should push for its full implementation in the remaining months of the Duterte administration.[26] If successful, this will build momentum for full implementation of the EDCA under the next administration in 2022.

The CSIS report also argues that the Philippines and the US must devise in advance a strategy to operate in an escalatory but sub-conflict space as a response to grey zone challenges. It calls for the strategy to both leverage the full policy toolkit of the alliance and utilise non-military approaches in economic, political and other spheres. Going beyond traditional security arrangements will showcase the US as a balancing force against China’s investment-heavy strategy within the Philippines. Doing so would also complement the Philippines’ thrusts in non-traditional areas which its defence establishment sees as top security concerns (see Table 2).[27]

Strengthening other Areas of Cooperation

In the short term, COVID-19 continues to pose the greatest threat to the well-being of Filipinos. Yet, bilateral cooperation on health-related initiatives remains under-utilised. In terms of public diplomacy, vaccine donations and vaccine distribution support from the US would likely resonate more with the Philippine public at this juncture than any action related to the SCS. US assistance in the post-conflict reconstruction of communities through education and capacity-building benefits the overall counter-terrorism efforts under the alliance and disincentivises individuals from joining terrorist organisations in the first place.

In addressing the need to go beyond counter-terrorism operations in Mindanao, investing in emerging technologies would also be an encouraging development. This includes cost-effective unmanned aerial vehicles, low earth orbit sensors, and automated platforms to process remote sensing data.[29] This would demonstrate the depth of American resolve in maintaining a competitive edge in warfighting in the Indo-Pacific. In pursuit of new and emerging technologies, integrating allies at an early stage into discussions would facilitate and ensure better defence posture and synchronous strategies.

Stronger Diplomatic Initiatives and Exchanges

The Philippine-US alliance suffers from a lack of consistent and impactful dialogue at Track 1.0 and 1.5. While opportunities for Track 2.0 dialogues do exist, they are relatively anaemic compared to the US’ vibrant exchanges with other allies such as Japan and South Korea. Track 1.5 and Track 2.0 mechanisms that prioritise strategic and economic issues must also be implemented to shadow official discussions. Dialogues like these provide unofficial avenues for robust discussion and exchange relevant to the rejuvenation of the alliance.

The time is also ripe to firmly establish the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD) as the primary coordinating mechanism on strategic and security matters. The Philippines and the US successfully held their ninth BSD on 14-15 November 2021 in Washington, DC.[30] Both have also intensified dialogue on defence and economic cooperation – a welcome development. A series of statements resounding a stronger and enduring partnership was released to mark the 75th anniversary of the diplomatic ties.[31]

It is likewise imperative to formalise a “2+2” Dialogue that involves both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence and their US counterparts. This would replace the Council of Foreign Ministers that was originally mandated to coordinate the implementation of the MDT. Beyond counter-terrorism efforts and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations which feature prominently in the BSD, higher-order strategic and security issues must be the top priority of these exchanges and not just operational and technical issues. The US should also bolster investment in the human resource development of the Philippine civil service as well as its nongovernmental sector. This means increasing people-to-people exchanges on various levels, from the senior level down to student exchanges, and creating concrete generational and organisational networks that further Philippine-US. bilateral ties.

The withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan has served as a lesson on US commitment for the Philippines. Given the Philippines’ strategic and geographic importance to the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, the relationship is not a one-way street towards mendicancy. Before its departure from Afghanistan, Washington’s commitment to that country lasted more than two decades at a huge expense.

How much more burden and expense is the US willing to shoulder for the sake of strategic competition when its key interests for its global pre-eminence are on the line? Must a crisis happen before both countries take their alliance management seriously?

CONCLUSION

The Philippines continues to be a valuable and dependable ally of the United States. No other country in Southeast Asia is as supportive and welcoming of the US as the Philippines, despite occasional incidences of a different outlook within the present administration. Losing influence and footing in the Philippines will have debilitating effects on the US’ strategic goals and defence against an increasingly aggressive China. If non-treaty partners are able to receive much more resources and commitments from Washington than the Philippines, the next Philippine administration may come up with negative conclusions about US priorities in Asia.

The Philippines, however, must also step up and do its part. The MDT states that parties must undertake self-help.[32] The Philippines needs to own up to its obligations to fully upgrade its military and defence capabilities. Notions of historical abandonment notwithstanding, investing in and developing its own capabilities and capacities should not simply depend on external actors such as the US alone, especially in the long-run. In the ever complex geopolitical rivalry between major powers, the Philippines needs to be strategic, self-sufficient, and self-reliant in utilising all of its military and diplomatic tools, wherever and whenever needed.

The next few years are more critical than ever. Ultimately, the Philippines and the US must define their parameters for cooperation under the MDT, study its full potential to include cybersecurity, and continue alliance management at the strategic level. Both must also expand shared and coordinated contingency planning, especially to prepare for possible crises such as in the South China Sea. For the alliance to endure in times of unprecedented regional uncertainty, Washington will have to commit in clearer terms and Manila will have to take a hard long look at itself to understand what it wants, why it wants it, and how it aims to achieve it in coordination with the US.


ENDNOTES

[1] Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby, “Alliance Lessons for the Future”, Philippine Strategic Forum, 1 October 2021, https://www.stratforumph.com/post/alliance-lessons-for-the-future; Julio S. III Amador, “Is It Really Mutual? The Philippines-US Alliance in Perspective”, Philippine Strategic Forum, 3 May 2021, https://www.stratforumph.com/blog/page/5.

[2] CNN Philippines Staff, “Duterte Cancels Order to Terminate VFA with US”, CNN Philippines, 20 July 2021, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/7/30/Visiting-Forces-Agreement-Philippines-United-States-Duterte-Austin.html.

[3] Ben Cal, “SoKor Thanks Anew PH Military Assistance in Korean War”, Government Website, Philippine News Agency, October 18, 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1083430.

[4] HistoryNet, “The Philippines: Allies During the Vietnam War”, HistoryNet, 2021, https://www.historynet.com/the-philippines-allies-during-the-vietnam-war.htm.

[5] Elliot Newbold, “The Philippines in the Cold War: Lessons for Today”, The Asia Dialogue, 6 April 2018, https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/06/elliot-philippine-freedom-and-the-global-cold-war-lessons-for-today/.

[6] US Congressional Research Services, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation” (Congressional Research Service, 26 July 2007), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31265.html; Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security”, ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute 24, no. 2 (August 2002): 294–312, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798598.

[7] Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State Holding on in Philippines, Despite Millions in US Spending”, Voice of America News, 12 August 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_islamic-state-holding-philippines-despite-millions-us-spending/6194285.html.

[8] Neil Jerome Morales and Simon Lewis, “US Joins Battle as Philippines Takes Losses in Besieged City”, Reuters, 10 June 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-idUSKBN19107I.

[9] Julio S. III Amador, et al., “National Security Priorities and Agenda of the Philippines: Perceptions from the Filipino Strategic Community” (Amador Research Services, 2020), 17, https://784ea9bd-30e1-4b3b-9db0-677e32265b72.filesusr.com/ugd/8ce9d3_b329c32c56d442988f532952b508f2a9.pdf.

[10] Amador et al., 16.

[11] Department of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of the Honorable Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., Secretary of Foreign Affairs, On the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership”, Government Website, Department of Foreign Affairs, 19 September 2021, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements-and-advisoriesupdate/29484-statement-of-foreign-affairs-teodoro-l-locsin-jr-on-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-aukus-enhanced-trilateral-security-partnership.

[12] Gregory B. Poling, Simon Tran Hudes, and Andreyka Natalegawa, “Alliances in Need of Upkeep: Strengthening the US-Philippines and US-Thailand Partnerships”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 5 August 2021, 15, https://www.csis.org/analysis/alliances-need-upkeep-strengthening-us-philippines-and-us-thailand-partnerships.

[13] Michael Wesley (Ed.), Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, Australian National University Press, 2017, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/ad3f6315-86ff-4244-bd8c-f923dd971522/632976.pdf; Gregory B. Poling, Simon Tran Hudes, and Andreyka Natalegawa, “The Unlikely, Indispensable US-Vietnam Partnership”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 6 July 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unlikely-indispensable-us-vietnam-partnership; White House, “FACT SHEET: Strengthening the US-Singapore Strategic Partnership”, 23 August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/23/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-singapore-strategic-partnership/; ForeignAssistance.gov, “Aid Trends”, Data last updated on November 19, 2021, https://foreignassistance.gov/aid-trends.

[14] Humeyra Pamuk and Doina Chiacu, “US State, Defense Secretaries to Travel to Japan and South Korea next Week”, Reuters, 10 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asia-trip-idUSKBN2B21HB.

[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation”, Foreign Government Website, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014, US-Japan Enhanced Defense Cooperation.

[16] US Department of State, “US Security Cooperation With Korea”, Foreign Government Website, US Department of State, January 20, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-korea/.

[17] Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, “Australia to Pursue Nuclear-Powered Submarines through New Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership”, Foreign Government Website, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security-partnership.

[18] Joseph R. Jr. Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” (Washington, DC, US: The White House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

[19] Anthony Kuhn, “On Asia Tour, US Secretary Of State Blinken Meets With Local Journalists”, National Public Radio, 22 March 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/22/979886076/on-asia-tour-u-s-secretary-of-state-meets-with-local-journalists.

[20] US Department of State, “Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink’s Travel to Southeast Asia November 27 to December 4”, 26 November 2021, https://www.state.gov/assistant-secretary-of-state-for-east-asian-and-pacific-affairs-daniel-j-kritenbrinks-travel-to-southeast-asia-november-27-to-december-4/.

[21] Poling, Hudes, and Natalegawa, “Alliances in Need of Upkeep: Strengthening the US-Philippines and US-Thailand Partnerships”.

[22] Premesha Saha, “Southeast Asia forming the lynchpin in the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy”, Observer Research Foundation, 28 July 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/southeast-asia-forming-the-lynchpin-in-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy/; Manoj Joshi, “The beating heart of the Indo-Pacific strategy is the South China Sea”, Observer Research Foundation, 17 July 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/beating-heart-indo-pacific-strategy-south-china-sea/

[23]  Ibid., 16.

[24]  Ibid., 6–7.

[25]  Ibid., 7–8.

[26] Renato C. De Castro, “Commentary: 2014 EDCA Enables 1951 MDT Commitments”, Philippine Star, 25 September 2021, https://www.philstar.com/news-commentary/2021/09/25/2129642/commentary-2014-edca-enables-1951-mdt-commitments.

[27] Amador et al., “National Security Priorities and Agenda of the Philippines: Perceptions from the Filipino Strategic Community”, 12.

[28] Each respondents are allowed to identify up to three security concerns.

[29]  Ibid., 16.

[30] Joyce Ann L. Rocamora, “US-PH Dialogue on defense, economic cooperation set Nov. 14”, Philippine News Agency, 12 November 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1159620.

[31] Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, “Joint Vision for a 21st Century United States-Philippines Partnership”, 16 November 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-vision-for-a-21st-century-united-states-philippines-partnership/.

[32] Carlos P. Romulo et al., “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America”, Official Gazette, 30 August 1951, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1951/08/30/mutual-defense-treaty-betweenthe- republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-united-states-of-america-august-30-1951/.

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2021/161 “Thailand’s Main Opposition Party Hopes for a Landslide Election Victory: A Realistic Goal or Just a Dream?” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

 

A protester holds up a sign referencing article 112, Thailand’s lèse majesté royal defamation law, during a demonstration in Bangkok on 14 November 2021, after a Thai court ruled that speeches by protest leaders calling for royal reforms amounted to a bid to overthrow the country’s monarchy. Picture: Jack TAYLOR, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Phuea Thai (PT), Thailand’s main opposition party, is aiming at scoring a landslide victory in the country’s next general election, which is expected to take place in the third quarter of 2022.
  • PT success may help allow the party’s chief patron, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, to end his self-imposed exile overseas, now in its thirteenth year, and return to Thailand with impunity.
  • PT has recently undergone a rebranding exercise, which has included the adoption of a new party logo and a new slogan, as well as the installation of a new party leader and a younger group of executive committee members.
  • The party has also appointed Thaksin’s younger daughter, Paethongtarn, as its new advisor on “inclusiveness and innovation”. She looks likely to be one of PT’s three nominees for the premiership in the country’s next general election.
  • PT has faced challenges in articulating a position on Thailand’s lèse majesté law, which many younger voters would like to see scrapped.
  • It is not clear that Thaksin’s predicament as an exile is of concern to those new voters.

* Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/161, 8 December 2021

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INTRODUCTION

Phuea Thai (PT), Thailand’s main opposition party, has begun gearing up for a crucial mission: scoring a “landslide” victory in the country’s next general election and thus becoming the indisputable leader and core of the next government.

Unfortunately, two recent developments have diverted public attention away from the rejuvenation of PT and disrupted its campaign. They may even force the party to return to the drawing board and to move forward more carefully in future.

First, the Constitutional Court ruled on 10 November that it was unconstitutional for three student protest leaders[1] to have raised a ten-point demand for reform of the Thai monarchy at a rally at Thammasat University on 10 August 2020, and at various subsequent protest rallies. The justices of the Constitutional Court ruled[2] 8-1 that the three protestors had abused their political rights and civil liberties in seeking “to overthrow the democratic regime of government with the King as the Head of State”.[3]

This ruling has made it more difficult for PT to support, directly or indirectly, any proposed reforms of the monarchy, especially abolishing or amending the lése majesté law. The party’s ally in the parliamentary opposition, the Move Forward Party (MFP), has been trying unsuccessfully to soften the law by removing the harsh compulsory jail term of 3 to 15 years per conviction.

A week later came the defeat of opposition parties’ effort to push through the first reading of the “people’s draft” constitutional amendment bill. On 17 November, the ruling coalition teamed up with senators to reject the draft bill by an overwhelming 473-206 margin.[4]  

This vote defeat was yet another setback for PT, which needs to attract the support of young voters.

Young voters are mostly in favour of scrapping the lèse majesté law, as well as removing all “vestiges of dictatorship” from the constitution. Many of them supported the “people’s bill”, which included abolishing the Senate and empowering the House of Representatives to play a more effective role in checking and balancing the executive branch of government. Not least, it would have empowered opposition members in the House of Representatives in that role.[5]

WHY WOO YOUNG VOTERS?

On the basis of the 2020 population census,[6] it can be extrapolated that by the end of 2021 there will be about 7.68 million of Generation Z voters in 18-26-year-old range. About 3.2 million Thais aged between 18 and 21 years old will be first-time voters if the next general election is held in 2022. In addition, there will also be another 8.39 million of Generation Y voters, in the 27–35-year-old range. Together, these Generation Y and Z Thais may amount up to 16.07 million votes.

In the country’s last general election, held on 24 March 2019, the Phalang Pracharat Party (PPP) and PT received 8.44 million and 7.88 million votes, respectively. Unexpectedly, Future Forward, then barely two years old, came third with 6.33 million votes.[7] Future Forward’s candidates were mostly young and energetic, and clearly capable of winning support from young voters.

A survey conducted by the NIDA Poll in the third quarter of 2021 found that, among respondents aged 18-25 years, 30.77 per cent supported the MFP, a successor to the dissolved Future Forward Party. Similarly, among respondents aged 26–35 years, 32.59 per cent supported the MFP. Support for PT among these two groups of younger voters was only 18.88 per cent and 16.61 per cent respectively.[8]

Among the older respondents, more prospective voters tended to support PT than the MFP. In the 36–45 age group, the figures were 20.43 per cent for PT and 13.54 per cent for the MFP; in the 46–59 age group, 26.07 and 11.06 per cent; and among voters aged 60 and above, 24.41 PT and only 6.3 per cent, respectively.[9]

Another survey in October found that MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat had overtaken Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha in popularity. The 41-year-old former agro-business CEO received 32.94 per cent support, compared to General Prayut’s support level of 28.67 per cent. Nevertheless, PT was the most popular party in the survey; its support level of 32.94 per cent exceeded that of the MFP, which was at 25.21 per cent.[10]

These numbers suggest, and PT seems to realise, that the party must zero in on Thailand’s 16 million young voters. Hence its recent initiatives in rebranding, in changing the party’s leadership, in offering support for LGBTQ+ people, and in attempting to address the lèse majesté law were largely aimed at attracting young and also progressive voters to the PT banner.

REBRANDING AND NEW LEADERSHIP

In early October, PT introduced a new, completely red, party logo. The blue colour in the previous logo was removed. The blue in Thailand’s tri-colour national flag represents the monarchy, whereas the red represents the nation, and the white, the religion.

But PT spokesperson Jiraporn Sinthupai, an MP for Roi-et Province, cautioned against reading too much into the change to the party’s logo. She explained that it was intended to make that logo stand out, as one completely different from the many other parties’ logos that use the tri-colours. She added that the red in the new logo represented the energy to drive towards election victory and democracy.[11]

PT also soon adopted a new party slogan: “Tomorrow, the Phuea Thai Party: For the people’s better life.”[12] This slogan is intended to build on the previous slogan: “Phuea Thai Party: Its heart is the people”.

Following these changes, a new PT leadership team was announced at the party’s general assembly in Khon Kaen on 28 October. Cholnan Sri-kaew, a 59-year-old medical doctor and MP for the northern province of Nan replaced 80-year-old Chiang Mai MP Sompong Amornvivat as party leader. Prasert Chantha-ruangthong, an MP for Nakhon Ratchasima, retained his post as party secretary-general, but many of the new 23-member executive committee were “new faces”.[13] Several well-known PT veterans stepped aside or moved to join the PT’s strategy committee.[14]  

SUDDEN U-TURN ON THE LÈSE MAJESTÉ LAW

Soon after PT’s new campaign took off, the party was shaken by political turbulence when it had to back down from a new attempt to lead in tackling Thailand’s lèse majesté law.

On 31 October, the PT’s chief legal advisor, Chaikasem Nitisiri, posted an announcement on the party’s website declaring that PT, the party with the largest number of MPs in the House, was ready to bring the people’s grievances concerning the lèse majesté law and the law on sedition—Sections 112 and 116 of the Criminal Code—up for consideration in the parliament. The purpose would be “scrutiny on the authorities in the justice system, from the police, the public prosecutors, the courts, and the corrections service to find out whether they have abided by the true objectives of the laws”.[15]

Moreover, Chaikasem, who served as the justice minister in the 2011-2014 Yingluck Shinawatra administration, also pledged that PT would “amend the laws and unjust regulations for the release of prisoners of thought, and for the prevention of any increase in the [arrest] of prisoners of thought, which will constitute the beginning of recovery of trust in the justice system in Thailand.”[16]  

Thaksin apparently was taken aback by Chaikasem’s sudden initiative in tackling the lèse majesté law – which could be taken by its opponents as a sign that PT was switching to an anti-monarchy stance, perhaps related to its dropping the blue colour from the new party logo. He quickly put on record on his Facebook page his objection to any move to amend Section 112.[17] Thaksin stated that the lèse majesté law had “never been a problem”; the real problem, in his opinion, came from the unscrupulous authorities in the justice system “who use this issue to create disunity in society”.[18]

Immediately, as if taking a cue from Thaksin, PT leader Dr Cholnan clarified that the party would not take the lead in an effort to amend Section 112. Rather, it would merely volunteer to be “the medium” to use the legislative mechanism for the prevention of clashes of ideas outside of the parliament.[19]

Thaksin’s crucial advice not only changed PT’s policy direction on the lèse majesté law, but also aroused one watchdog activist to file a complaint with the Election Commission to ask it to investigate Thaksin’s alleged interference in directing PT.[20]

THAKSIN’S NEW TRUMP CARD?

The PT meeting in Khon Kaen brought a development more exciting than the installation of new leadership for the party. This was the introduction of Thaksin’s youngest daughter, Paethongtarn, as a new PT advisor on inclusiveness and innovation. In her debut speech, the 35-year-old real estate CEO and mother of an infant girl mentioned three crucial points: She understood the young generations’ problems and shared their aspirations for a better life, and she could help bridge generational gaps. She was very close to her father, Thaksin.  And her father ardently wished to return to Thailand.[21]

Neither Paethongtarn nor Thaksin would confirm or deny that she was going to be one of PT’s three nominees for the premiership in Thailand’s next general election. Ex-PT leader Sompong could only confirm that Thaksin’s divorced wife, Pojamarn Damapong, would not be among the three nominees. Thaksin and Pojamarn legally divorced at the Thai consulate in Hong Kong in November 2008, after 32 years of marriage.

Thaksin has himself dismissed speculation about his former wife’s vying for the next premiership. During a video call to PT MPs on 12 October, he mentioned at least three reasons: Khunying Pojamarn’s age, 65; her dislike of politics; and her weakness as a public speaker.[22]

More importantly, Thaksin casually disclosed that he had “a few plans” for PT to score a landslide victory in the next general election. He claimed that each of his plans would convince some PT MPs who had accepted bribes to defect to government parties to return the money and stay put in PT.  He emphasised that only with a resounding landslide victory could the PT become the indisputable head and core of the next government coalition.

Unfortunately, Thaksin’s talk about his “plans” for PT has led to additional accusations of his alleged illegal “control, domination, or directing” of the party.[23]

PT leader Dr Cholnan insisted that there was no issue, because Thaksin was talking to PT MPs at an informal dinner gathering, not a formal party meeting.  But Ruerng-gai Leekitwattana, a legal advisor to the PPP (and a defector from PT), on 26 October filed a case requesting the Election Commission to examine whether Thaksin and PT MPs violated the political party law during the video call in question.[24]

Quite obviously, one of Thaksin’s plans is to put in place his youngest daughter to vie for the next premiership.

THAKSIN KNOWS BEST

Thaksin’s political track record is phenomenal. He gained the historic distinction of being the first elected Thai civilian to serve a full four-year term as premier, from 2001-2004. In the general election of February 2005, his party won a landslide victory with 377 seats, or a 75.4 per cent majority in the House, leaving in the dust the Democrat Party with only 96 seats.[25]

Thaksin was ousted in a coup on 19 September 2006, while he was in New York City preparing to address the United Nations General Assembly.  He returned to Thailand on 28 February 2008 to face trial in a number of criminal cases. At first he seemed confident of acquittal. The prime minister at the time was Samak Sundaravej, the leader of the People Power Party, a successor to the Thai Rak Thai Party, which was dissolved on 30 May 2007.

Mysteriously, Thaksin and his wife received government permission to leave the country, purportedly to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games, in early August 2008. Both failed to return to appear in court on 11 August in a case involving Thaksin’s authorisation for his wife to bid for a plot of government-owned land in Bangkok’s Ratchadaphisek area.  He was convicted in absentia for this conflict of interest in the execution of his duties and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. His wife, Pojamarn, was acquitted. The couple appeared in public in London on 21 October 2008, and Thaksin’s overseas exile began.

Even though Thaksin has been out of the country for well over a decade, he has maintained close ties with a large group of veteran politicians who belonged to the defunct Thai Rak Thai Party. After Samak’s forced resignation from the premiership on 30 September 2008, Thaksin managed to install his brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat, as Samak’s successor. Somchai’s premiership ended when the People Power Party was dissolved on 2 December 2008.

Thaksin fought back by setting up PT with assistance from many of his experienced political allies. This time around, his achievement was even more spectacular. In just 59 days, he turned one of his younger sisters, Yingluck, into the first female prime minister of Thailand. PT’s simple and winning slogan was “Thaksin thinks, Yingluck acts!” The party won a majority of 265 House seats, beating once again the Democrat Party, which won only 159 seats.[26]

Yingluck emerged as a fresh newcomer in Thai politics. She held no leadership post in PT, and therefore did not need to worry about party issues or legislative work. This pragmatic model may soon be replicated in the case of Thaksin’s youngest daughter, Paethongtarn.

NEW ELECTION SYSTEM

In the March 2019 general election, PT did win the largest number of House seats, 136, while the PPP came second with 116. However, the formula used to allocate the 150 party-list seats in relation to the parties’ shares of the popular vote and constituency seats, meant that PT did not qualify for any of the former seats.

The PPP received about 8.44 million votes, or about 23.74 per cent of the total. It won only 97 constituency seats, and was given 19 party-list House seats.

Recent constitutional amendments, backed by both PT and the PPP, to return to the use of separate ballots to indicate candidate and party preference, and to increase the number of constituency seats from 350 to 400 while reducing the number of party-list seats from 150 to 100, were promulgated in the Royal Gazette on 21 November.

Large and well-funded parties like PT and the PPP will benefit from the new election system. They have the capability and resources to field highly competitive candidates in all 400 constituencies and to mount active campaigns nationwide. On the other hand, small parties will face an uphill struggle to win any House seat – unlike in the 2019 general election, when 12 micro-parties each won a single seat.

With the return of the two-ballot voting system, Thaksin is confident that PT will win again. But he has emphasised that it must score a landslide victory, because—in the absence of support from any of the 250 senators, who are mostly conservative and anti-Thaksin—it might still lose in the voting for the premier in the parliament.[27]

If PT manages to hold majority control of the House, no one will want to take the premiership without its consent. For the PT can easily force whoever is holding the premiership to resign or dissolve the House by defeating a major draft bill sponsored by the government.

POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP IN PARLIAMENT

This is precisely the dilemma that General Prayut currently faces, because he does not belong to any party. Although he was nominated for the premiership by the PPP, he is now in a serious power struggle with the PPP’s secretary-general Captain Thammanat Prompao. Captain Thammanat tried but failed to oust General Prayut from the premiership in a no-confidence vote in early September.[28]  

General Prayut retaliated by dropping Captain Thammanat, who had served as deputy minister of agriculture, from the cabinet. All available indications show that the two have not settled their conflict, and Captain Thammanat remains quite capable of sabotaging any major government bill in the House.

Nevertheless, General Prayut has maintained that he will not dissolve the House[29] – unless he is forced to do so. He remains intent on completing his four-year term as premier in the first quarter of 2023. And he has no intention just yet to join a political party, old or new,[30] although he would welcome the PPP’s re-nomination to serve another term in the run-up to the next general election.

In recent weeks, a new party called “Thai Sangsan” or “Creative Thailand” has emerged as a potential “spare party” for General Prayut to join and lead into the next general election. The new party is also widely reported to be linked to the former permanent secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Chatchai Promlerd, who retired from government service at the end of September.

CONCLUSION

Questions remain on whether Thaksin and the PT will be able to achieve a landslide victory in the next general election.  Thaksin’s active role in coming up with “plans” and “advice” could backfire and, even worse, lead to the downfall of PT. He may be able to use his youngest daughter as yet another political proxy. But how effective she can be is the question, especially when Thaksin cannot openly intervene in PT’s activities to assist her.

Most young voters care more about their lives and livelihoods. And pay little attention to Thaksin’s predicament in exile.

As things stand now, PT needs more new ideas to compete with the MFP for the votes of the young and the restless. Failing that, the party’s mission to score a landslide victory, as well as Thaksin’s wish to return to Thailand, will remain a sweet but empty dream.


ENDNOTES

[1] Arnon Nampa, a human rights lawyer; Panupong “Mike” Jadnok, a labour activist; and Panusaya “Rung” Sithijirawattanakul, a Thammasat University student leader were the three protest leaders involved. Chiefly because of their repeated arrests for alleged violations of the law, all three have been denied bail and put in temporary detention while awaiting trial on numerous charges, including violations of the lèse majesté law in Section 112 of the Criminal Code. If convicted, they face punishment under this law of a jail term ranging from 3 to 15 years. Based on iLaw’s compilation, at least 156 people have been put under arrest during the past 12 months under the same law. Arnon is facing 16 counts of lèse majesté violations; both Panupong and Panusaya each faces nine counts. iLaw is a non-profit organisation whose mission includes promoting the rule of law and disseminating knowledge on human rights, political rights and civil liberties.

[2] “ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญเปิดคำวินิจฉัยฉบับเต็ม คดีล้มล้างการปกครอง” [Constitutional Court unveils its full ruling in sedition case], Thai PBS, 10 November 2021 (https://news.thaipbs.or.th/content/309570, accessed 24 November 2021). The full text of the Constitutional Court’s ruling was published in the Royal Gazette on 29 November 2021; see http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2564/A/080/T_0022.PDF.

[3] Section 49 of the 2017 Constitution reads in part: “No person shall exercise the rights or liberties to overthrow the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State. …”

[4] “ตามคาดโดนสอยร่วง ร่างแก้ไขเพิ่มเติมรัฐธรรมนูญฉบับประชาชน พ่าย 206 ต่อ 473” [As expected, rejection of the people’s draft constitutional amendment bill, defeat of 206 to 473 votes], Thai Rat Online, 18 November 2021 (https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2244108,accessed 24 November 2021). Of those who opposed the bill, 249 were government MPs, and 224 senators. Only three senators voted for the bill, which required a majority of the two houses (362 votes), including at least one third of the 250 senators (83 votes) to pass the first reading.

[5] “สรุปร่าง “รื้อระบอบประยุทธ์” ยกเลิก ส.ว. รื้อองค์กรอิสระ เพิ่มอำนาจฝ่ายค้าน” [Summary of ‘Demolition of the Prayut regime’: scrapping the Senate, demolishing autonomous organs, increasing power of the opposition], iLaw,27 April 2021, www.ilaw.or.th, (accessed 24 November 2021). The petition endorsing the “people’s” draft constitutional amendment bill received the support of 135,247 voters, far more than the 50,000 needed.

[6] See details of the 2020 census at the website of the National Statistical Office at (http://statbbi.nso.go.th/staticreport/page/sector/th/01.aspx, accessed 24 November 2021).

[7] Official data on the outcome of the 24 March 2019 general election are available at (www.th.wikipedia.org/wiki/การเลือกตั้งสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎรเป็นการทั่วไป_พ.ศ.2562, accessed 24 November 2021).

[8] “ภูมิภาค อาชีพ และวัย กับการสนับสนุนพรรคการเมือง (จบ)” [Regions, occupations, and age groups and support for political parties (conclusion)], Manager Online, 19 November 2021 (www.mgronline.com/daily/detail/9640000114721, accessed 24 November 2021).

[9] Ibid.

[10] “ดุสิตโพลชี้ เพื่อไทย คะแนนเสียงนำเลือกตั้งหน้า แต่ประชาชนอยากได้ ‘พิธา’ เป็นนายกฯ” [Dusit Poll shows Phuea Thai Party will be leading in the next election, but people want ‘Pita’ as the prime minister], Thai Post, 31 October 2021 (www.thaipost.net/news/15597, accessed 26 November 2021).

[11] “เพื่อไทยเปลี่ยนโลโก้ใหม่เป็นสีแดง” [Phuea Thai changes logo to red], Thai Rat Online, 19 October 2021 (www.thairath.co.th/news/politics/2223086, accessed 24 November 2021).

[12] In Thai, “พรุ่งนี้ เพื่อไทย เพื่อชีวิตใหม่ประชาชน”. In other words, whatever the Thai people aspire to, the Phuea Thai Party shall deliver it.

[13] “เปิด 23 รายชื่อ กรรมการบริหารพรรคเพื่อไทย ชุดใหม่ รับศึกเลือกตั้ง” [Disclosing list of 23 members of the Phuea Thai’s executive committee, a new team to fight the general election], Thai Rat Online, 28 October 2021 (www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2230096, accessed 24 November 2021).

[14] “เข็น ‘ชัยเกษม’ ประธานยุทธศาสตร์เพื่อไทย ‘อ้วน’ – ‘เลี้ยบ’ – ‘มิ้ง’ นั่งกรรมการ” [Pushing ‘Chaikasem’ to be chairman of Phuea Thai’s Strategy Committee; ‘Uan’, ‘Liap’ and ‘Ming’ sit as committee members], Thai Post Online, 28 October 2021 (www.thaipost.net/politics-news/14125, accessed 24 November 2021). “Uan” is the nickname of former PT secretary-general Phumtham Wechayachai; “Liap” is the nickname of Dr Surapong Suebwonglee; and ‘Ming’ is the nickname of Dr Prommin Lertsuridej. These three, as well as Chaikasem Nitisiri, served as ministers in the administrations of Thaksin and Yingluck. The strategy committee includes Dr Surapong Suebwonglee, the new CEO or operations director of the party and a trusted lieutenant of Thaksin. Dr Surapong’s return to manage the PT tends to underline Thaksin’s determination to help PT win big in the next general election.

[15] “เพื่อไทย ออกแถลงการณ์ผลักดันแก้ ม.112, ม. 116 ในสภา” [ Phuea Thai issues a declaration on pushing for the amendment of Section 112 and Section 116 in parliament], Krungthep Thurakit, 1 November 2021 (https:// www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/969144, accessed 26 November 2021). Chaikasem was the Phuea Thai Party’s number 3 nominee for the premiership in the 2019 general election. Its first-ranked nominee was Sudarat Keyuraphan, and number 2 was Chadchart Sitthipan; both of them have left the party, the latter to run as an independent for the post of governor of Bangkok in polls likely to take place early next year.

[16] Ibid.

[17] See Facebook.com/thaksinofficial, 2 November 2021.

[18] Ibid.

[19] “หมอชลน่าน แจงจุดยืน เพื่อไทยไม่ได้แก้ ม. 112 แค่ตัวกลาง” [Dr Cholnan clarifies Phuea Thai’s stand, not for amending Section 112, will merely serve as the medium], Khom Chat Luek, 2 November 2021 (www.komchadluek.net/news/490993, accessed 26 November 2021).

[20] “‘ศรีสุวรรณ’ ร้อง กกต. สอบ ‘โทนี่’ ครอบงำเพื่อไทย สั่งถอยแก้ 112” [‘Srisuwan’ asks Election Commission to investigate ‘Tony’ for dominating Phuea Thai in ordering it to back down from amending Section 112], Thai Post, 8 November 2021 (www.thaipost.net/news-update/20841, accessed 26 November 2021). As a fugitive from justice, Thaksin, whose alias on the Clubhouse social media platform is Tony Woodsome, is prohibited from being a member of any political party or interfering in its political activities. If PT is found guilty of following unlawful guidance from Thaksin, it could face dissolution by the Constitutional Court. Srisuwan Janya is the head of a political watchdog group who has frequently filed cases against political parties and politicians with either the Election Commission or the Constitutional Court.

[21] “เพื่อไทย แลนด์สไลด์ เปิดตัว ‘แพทองธาร ชินวัตร’” [Phuea Thai landslide introduces “Paethongtarn Shinawatra”], Voice TV, 28 October 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0xMJ9MWMNVQ, accessed 25 November 2021).

[22] Thaksin’s video call took place during a birthday dinner for PT deputy leader Kriang Gallapatinan at a restaurant in Bangkok on 12 October 2021. Kriang asked Thaksin to invite Potjamarn to take over the party leader’s post.

[23] “คลิป ‘อดีตนายกฯ ทักษิณ’ ครอบงำ ‘พรรคเพื่อไทย’ ” …? ตอบโจทย์, [Clip! “Former PM Thaksin” dominating the Phuea Thai Party’ …? Question Time Programme], Thai PBS, 19 October 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAP_U5533WA, accessed 25 November 2021).

[24] “ ‘เรืองไกร’ ร้อง กกต. ยุบเพื่อไทย สอบคลิป ‘โทนี่’ วิดีโอคอล ‘เกรียง’ อ้างจัดเลี้ยงวันเกิด” [“Ruerng-gai” calls on Election Commission to dissolve Phuea Thai; examining the video call of “Tony”, “Kriang” claims it was only a birthday party], Matichon Online, 26 October 2021 (www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_3010260, accessed 25 November 2021). If the Election Commission finds enough evidence of Thaksin’s breaking the political party law, it will submit the case for a decision by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court in February 2020 dissolved the Future Forward Party after finding evidence of party leader Thanathorn Juangroongrerngkit controlling his party through illegal loans of over 191.2 million baht to ease the cash flow in the young party.

[25] See the official results of the 2005 general election at https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/การเลือกตั้งสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎรไทยเป็นการทั่วไป_พ.ศ._2548 (accessed 25 November 2021).

[26] See the official results of the 2011 general election at https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/การเลือกตั้งสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎรไทยเป็นการทั่วไป_พ.ศ._2554(accessed 25 November 2021).

[27] PT came first in the last general election, but the prospective coalition of seven parties in whose formation it participated had only 246 seats, whereas the PPP-led coalition of 19 parties (including 11 of the 12 micro-parties) squeezed through with a razor-thin majority of 254 seats in the 500-member House. The pro-Prayut coalition had overwhelming support in the Senate. General Prayut won the premiership on 5 June 2019 with 500 votes, from 251 MPs and 249 of the 250 senators. Thanathorn, the opposing coalition’s candidate from premier, received only 244 votes from opposition MPs, and none from any of the senators.

[28] See the background of their quarrel in the author’s article, “Thai PM Remains Vulnerable Without a Party of His Own,” ISEAS Perspective2021/127, 28 September 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-127-thai-pm-remains-vulnerable-without-a-party-of-his-own-by-termsak-chalermpalanupap/, accessed 25 November 2021).

[29] Should the House be dissolved before the new constitutional amendments can be incorporated into the political party law and the election law through normal legislation, then General Prayut would need an emergency decree, endorsed by the king, to use the new election system in the next general election.

[30] “‘บิ๊กตู่’ ย้ำไม่ยุบสภา อยู่กับพรรคเดิมหรือไม่ ให้ฟัง ‘ลุงป้อม’ ชี้สะดุดบ่อย เพราะใจร้อน คิดหลายเรื่อง” [“Big Tu” reiterates that he will not dissolve the House; on the question whether he will stay with the same party, says just listen to “Uncle Pom”; has stumbled a few times because impatient, thinking about many things], Manager Online, 24 November 2021 (www.mgronline.com/politics/detail/9640000116675, accessed 25 November 2021). “Big Tu” is the nickname of General Prayut, and “Uncle Pom” is the nickname of Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, the leader of the PPP.

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“Hashtag Campaigns during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Malaysia: Escalating from Online to Offline” by Pauline Pooi Yin Leong and Amirul Adli Rosli

 

2021/160 “Asymmetric Territorial Arrangements and Federalism in Myanmar” by Mael Raynaud

 

A protester sets fire to a copy of the 2008 Constitution during a demonstration against the military coup in Yangon’s South Okkalapa township on 1 April 2021. Photo: STR/AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • After the abolition of the 2008 Constitution, the opposition to Myanmar’s State Administration Council regime is attempting to imagine and design a federal system of government for the country.
  • That system will certainly include asymmetric territorial arrangements, and thus see territorial arrangements in Myanmar returning to the “mandala system” that characterized the precolonial period.
  • Such arrangements will have to respect “the constraints of reality”, and their realization will therefore present certain difficulties.
  • To overcome these difficulties, the democracy movement must do more to focus on substantive issues of governance.

*Mael Raynaud is a political analyst specializing in decentralization, federalism, and education reform in Myanmar. His research project is supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS).

ISEAS Perspective 2021/160, 3 December 2021

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INTRODUCTION

Following the coup of 1 February 2021, members of parliament belonging to the National League for Democracy, which had won Myanmar’s November 2020 general elections in a landslide, formed a body called the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). In some of its first and most symbolic decisions, the CRPH abolished the country’s 2008 Constitution, lifted the designation as terrorist organizations from all ethnic armed organizations, and appointed a National Union Government (NUG).[1] With the support of various organizations belonging to the democratic opposition, ethnic civil society groups and some of the ethnic armed organizations, organized as a National Unity Consultative Council,[2] the CRPH/NUG, produced a “Federal Democracy Charter”.[3] This document was meant to pave the way for a return to democracy and the adoption of a federal system.[4]

The issues of federalism and relations between the predominantly Bamar state and ethnic nationalities have been at the core of Burmese politics since 1947, when independence leader General Aung San and representatives of the country’s Shan, Kachin, and Chin minorities signed the Panglong Agreement. Failure to resolve these issues has led to 70 years of internal conflict. As I have argued in an earlier analysis, “democracy, federalism and the role of the military cannot be separated, and together they form the basis of modern Myanmar politics”.[5]

The Federal Democracy Charter[6] is neither the first nor the only constitutional project to offer an alternative to the 2008 Constitution. This article also examines the “second draft” of the “Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma”, adopted on 12 February 2008 by the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee (FCDCC),[7] as well as the 2008 Constitution itself.[8]

The FCDCC’s second draft was the result of a process initiated in 2000 by organizations representing ethnic nationalities. This process was a response to a constitutional draft published in 1997 by the National Coalition for the Union of Burma and written by members of the Burma Lawyers’ Council. The preparation of alternative democratic draft charters reflected tensions between, on the one hand, Bamar-dominated political organizations, first and foremost the NLD, and on the other, ethnic organizations. These tensions remain salient today, particularly in the relations between the NUG and ethnic political organizations.[9] 

Beyond the text of these competing constitutional projects, and their significant differences, the aim of a federal constitution is to answer the demands formulated by organizations representing ethnic nationalities, through the transformation of a highly centralized state into a federal one. The expectation of the parties advocating such a constitution is that the adoption of a federal system would finally allow Myanmar to enjoy the peace and democracy that the country has never known.[10]

The process of building a federal order is also one through which Myanmar tries to heal the wounds created by the colonial creation of a “modern” Weberian state through the return to some of the dynamics of the pre-colonial political order. That order is often described as a “Mandala system”. In constitutional terms, the return to that system is most evident in the recourse to “asymmetric territorial arrangements”—that is, to the existence in the polity of territories enjoying a special status.[11]

The 2008 Constitution, which enshrines the existence of Naga, Danu, Palaung, Kokang and Pa-O “Self-Administered Zones” and of a Wa “Self-Administered Division”,[12] provides for such arrangements.[13] So too does the FCDCC’s second draft, with its “Autonomous Regions”[14] and “Reserved Territories”.[15] While the Federal Democracy Charter does not refer to autonomous zones, it is not impossible that a future full constitutional draft prepared by the CRPH/NUG will do so. The National Unity Consultative Council has announced that the process of drafting a federal constitution will continue throughout 2022 and beyond, during a press conference held on 16 November 2021.[16]

David Williams has shown the importance of autonomous zones in any future federal system for Myanmar, even while warning that “asymmetrical systems can be complicated, cumbersome, and difficult to operationalize, especially for those who have had more experience at waging war than at waging peace”.[17]

At a time when Myanmar once again looks to forge a federal future,[18] this article describes elements of such a future that constitution-drafter must respect. In writing a federal constitution, the limits to the speed and the breadth of the technically possible changes to the structure and administration of the state, the reality of conflict, and the evolution of the aspirations, political loyalties and demography of the people of Myanmar, will constitute “the constraints of reality”.[19]

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS AND ASYMMETRY

The 1 February coup meant the de facto suspension of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution. Popular rejection of the coup and the potential for violence—in particular the risk of assassination attempts against candidates—make its reinstatement unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future.[20] The Federal Democracy Charter and the FCDCC’s second draft are also unlikely ever to be adopted as the country’s constitution. Already in 2009, Williams noted that the objection “that these constitutions will never actually become law . . . is almost certainly correct, but even these early drafts may influence whatever constitutional settlement Burma ultimately achieves”.[21]

Indeed, Williams considers the aim of processes to draft these federal constitutions as, first and foremost, “to build up consensus” and “to educate the democracy movement in constitutionalism so that it can effectively negotiate a settlement when the time comes to go to the bargaining table”. Critically, and most importantly in the context of this article, a related objective is “to discourage symbolic politics and encourage focus on substantive governance issues”.[22]

These considerations lead Williams to recommend that the first question that delegates to a constitution-drafting process in Myanmar need to address “in very concrete ways” is “how should power be divided between the [U]nion government and the states?”.[23] And it is this need that suggests a first level of asymmetry in a future federal constitution.

The Myanmar state was, until the end of January 2021, composed[24] of the Union, with its seat in Naypyitaw, seven states and seven regions, 74 districts, 330 townships, and more than 17,000 village tracts and wards. The latter were divided between more than 3,000 urban wards and more than 13,000 village tracts, and made of more than 70,000 villages. Critically, the 2008 Constitution also enshrined[25] five Self-Administered Zones—Naga, Palaung, Danu, Pa-O and Kokang—and the Wa Self-Administered Division. On the ground, the Myanmar state also devolved locally exercised power in security and other areas to various Border Guard Forces and to dozens of militias.[26] Outside of government control, a number of ethnic armed organizations struggle against the Myanmar military, and therefore the central state, and claim to administer territories. The United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Organization, the Restauration Council for Shan State and the Karen National Union are the most serious and the most advanced in their efforts to build proto-statehood, complete with taxation systems and the delivery of services.[27]

The seven states and the seven regions[28] enjoyed equal status under the 2008 Constitution. They differed only in name, in a rare acknowledgement of Myanmar’s ethnic diversity. An asymmetric federal constitution could grant “ethnic” states more autonomy from the centre than to the supposedly “Bamar” regions. The Melbourne Forum on Constitution Building in Asia and the Pacific explains that “asymmetry typically involves greater autonomy for one or more parts of the country than for others. Usually this means that a particular region has more legislative, executive or, sometimes, judicial powers to govern its own people than is the case elsewhere. Autonomy also can include distinctive governance arrangements”.[29]

None of the constitutional initiatives under discussion here appears to consider this solution, however. The FCDCC’s second draft states that “the Federal Union shall be composed of States with full rights of self-determination and having equal political powers vested in by this Constitution [sic]”.[30] The Federal Democracy Charter affirms in its “Guiding Principles” that “the member states of the Union and the people in these states are the original owners of sovereignty”, and that “the Federal Democracy Union is established with member states which have equal rights and right to self-determination in full. All the member states of the Union (all the federal units) are equal in terms of politics”.

Furthermore, the Federal Democracy Charter stipulates that “member states of the Federal Union have the right to develop and enact State Constitutions”, and the FCDCC’s second draft states that “the Member States of the Federal Union shall have the right to draft and enact their respective State Constitutions”.[31]

However, while the Federal Democracy Charter does not specify the number, the names or the boundaries of the states, the FCDCC’s second draft offers a list of the states that would comprise the Federal Union.

Article 49. Member States of the Federal Union and Federal Territories

The National States and Nationalities States are:

(1) Kachin National State

(2) Karen National State

(3) Karenni National State

(4) Chin National State

(5) Bama National State

(6) Mon National State

(7) Tenasserim Nationalities State

(8) Arakan National State

(9) Shan National State

(10) Irrawaddy Nationalities State

(11) ……..

(12) …….. [32]

This article thus provides for the moulding of the Yangon, Bago, Magwe, Mandalay and Sagaing Regions provided for under the 2008 Constitution into a single state. It offers a slight variation on the much discussed “8 states solution”.[33] The fact that the inhabitants of this “super” state would include well over half of the population of Myanmar seems likely to lead to an asymmetric arrangement. Such an arrangement would be required to maintain balance—ironically, in the interest of the “smaller” states. However, it would also arguably go against the desires, and the right of self-determination, of the people of the “Bamar” states for which the 2008 Constitution provided, who have grown attached to their subnational parliaments and governments.[34]

That constitution also divided the powers of the Union, the states and regions, and the self-administered zones among, respectively, Schedules One, Two, and Three, as found in Articles 96, 188 and 196.[35] Interestingly, while the powers of the Union parliament are defined in some detail in Article 103 (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (J), (H), (I) and (J) of the FCDCC’s second draft, Article 108 simply stipulates that “the legislatures of the Member States shall retain all legislative powers not delegated exclusively or concurrently to the Assembly of the Federal Union by this constitution”. The logic being that the powers of the Union need to be specified explicitly, while the states would be responsible for an “everything else” left to the imagination. The Federal Democracy Charter, merely a charter offering a vision for the future rather than a fully articulated constitution, stops at recognizing that the “power of the Union, power of the states and concurrent powers shall be determined and enacted”. Like the FCDCC’s second draft, though, it suggests that “only the powers necessary to exercise for the common interests of the member states of the Union shall be conferred to the Union”.[36]

In the interest of administrative and political coherence, it may be impossible to leave some powers to the complete discretion of each state, of course. Neither the Federal Democracy Charter nor the second draft of the FCDCC’s Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of the Republic of Burma mentions districts, townships, or village tracts and wards. Nor does either offer an alternative to dividing the country into those units. Each leaves, again, such details to subnational constitutions, or to future negotiations. Issues such as the dual powers of chief ministers under article 249 of the 2008 Constitution,[37] which the debates on amending that charter to provide for their election did not address,[38] demonstrate the impossibility of building a federal system without thinking through the relations between the “federal” and the “subnational” levels first, just as Williams’s statement of priorities suggests.

In other words, not only do these documents leave the most difficult questions associated with the design of a federal system to an unspecified and unknown future, but the important debates on “substantive governance issues” for which Williams called a decade ago are still not taking place.

CONFLICT, PEACE, ASYMMETRY AND FEDERALISM

These lapses are nowhere so evident as with the issue of asymmetric territorial arrangements. Nevertheless, both the 2008 Constitution and the FCDCC’s second draft provide for such arrangements, in the form, respectively, of Self-Administered Zones and of “Autonomous Zones” and “Reserved Territories”.

According to the Melbourne Forum on Constitution Building in Asia and the Pacific, “asymmetry may be useful for conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. Asymmetrical arrangements can meet claims for (relative) autonomy and self-determination, counteract secessionist movements and resolve conflicts between the central government and substate units, while at the same time maintaining the integrity of the state as a whole”.[39]

The 2008 Constitution offered a simple criterion for creating special administrative zones. Members of an ethnic nationality should be a majority population in a grouping of two or more townships, but not already have a state to their name.[40] Therefore, Kachin, Shan, Mon or Karen populations could not be granted a special administrative zone. The FCDCC’s second draft shares this approach.

Article 53. Rights of Indigenous Ethnic Minorities

(A) The rights of indigenous ethnic minorities within member States of the Federal Union shall be safeguarded.

(B) In order to protect the rights of the minorities, the Constitutions of the States shall designate and provide for autonomous regions, national areas and special territories, as necessary.

(C) Nationalities that have not obtained the status of a National State have the right to seek the formation of an autonomous region or a national area within the state or states they reside.

Depending on the timing and the evolution of the peace process, however, it is possible that at the very least the most powerful Rakhine, Kachin, Shan and Karen ethnic armed organizations will be granted autonomous zones. From a military perspective, it is widely understood by observers of and participants in Myanmar’s seven-decade-old civil war that ethnic armed organizations cannot seriously threaten or “take”, let alone maintain control over, any significant town or city. The Myanmar military, for its part, cannot eradicate those armed organizations or dislodge them from their own capitals or the territory they most firmly control. From a political perspective, it is unlikely that a settlement that ethnic armed organizations find satisfactory enough to lead them to disarm before the adoption of a federal constitution is possible. In that sense, the reality of conflict is liable to remain one of the most significant “constraints of reality” that the writers of a future federal constitution need to respect.

In addition, ethnic armed organizations provide education and health services beyond the territories that they control—both in the contested areas[41] described as areas of hybrid governance[42] and in government-controlled areas. In a federal system, it is likely that the education systems developed by those organizations will co-exist with the public education systems of the various states.[43] For instance, design of a federal system will need to take into account future relations between the Karen Education and Culture Department, the likely de facto public education system in a Karen autonomous region, on the one hand, and the ministry of education of Karen State, Mon State, or Irrawaddy State on the other.

This issue, in turn, begs the question of the relations among ethnic armed organizations, the ethnic service providers associated with them, and ethnic political parties.[44] Already, between early 2011 and January 2021, an unspoken division of labour emerged, whereby ethnic armed organizations worked within the framework of the peace process, and ethnic political parties worked within the framework of the 2008 Constitution—in the national and subnational parliaments in particular.

CONCLUSION

While the design and adoption of a federal system may be a long-term undertaking, the fact that Myanmar should adopt such a system has now been accepted in principle by all significant constituencies in the country’s body politic. It is therefore encouraging that debates are taking place, and constitutional projects being developed. It is less encouraging to see that these efforts often fail to tackle concrete issues of governance, not only because doing so would be helpful in reaching a consensus, but also because it would perhaps force parties toward greater realism about what a federal system could look like. The limits to the morphing—rather than the complete overhaul—of the Myanmar state, the capacity of its political and civil-servant corps, and “the constraints of reality” in designing a federal system are the ground on which debates should be based. The fact that “ethnic” states are in fact multi-ethnic, and that their population share a wide range of political aspirations—some different from the objectives of ethnic armed organizations and ethnic political parties—join the reality of conflict to create a situation where different relationships with the central state are very likely to demand translation into an asymmetry in the federalism that the country ultimately adopts.


ENDNOTES

[1] Mael Raynaud, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Myanmar: A Modern Mandala System ?”, ISEAS Perspective,23 November 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-155-asymmetrical-federalism-in-myanmar-a-modern-mandala-system-by-mael-raynaud/. downloaded 23 November 2021).

[2] Aye Chan and Billy Ford, “A New Myanmar Forum Aims to Unite Democratic Forces”, United States Institute of Peace, 3 November 2021 (https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/11/new-myanmar-forum-aims-unite-democratic-forces, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[3] The text of the Federal Democracy Charter is available on the CRPH’s website (https://crphmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Federal-Democracy-Charter-English.pdf, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[4] Hkawn Htoi, Zarchi Oo and Carl Stauffer, “How Myanmar’s Coup Opens Opportunity for National Reconciliation”, United States Institute of Peace, 20 August 2021 (https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/08/how-myanmars-coup-opens-opportunity-national-reconciliation, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[5] Tinzar Htun and Mael Raynaud, “Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution – Avenues for reform and decentralization and steps towards a federal system” (Yangon: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018).

[6] It is not a full constitutional draft either. Rather, it is a charter that lays out a vision for the future and offers general principles that could serve as a basis for a future constitution. A final draft of the Federal Constitution is said to be due for publication in December 2021; Saw Thonya, “Draft Federal Union Constitution to be finalized in December”, Burma News International, 24 May 2021 (https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/draft-federal-union-constitution-be-finalized-december, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[7] This draft is available at https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/pdf/The-constitution-of-the-federal-republic-of-the-union-of-burma-second-draft.pdf (downloaded 16 November 2021).

[8] For a comprehensive analysis of the 2008 Constitution, see Melissa Crouch, The Constitution of Myanmar: A Contextual Analysis (Melbourne: Hart Publishing, 2019).

[9] For a history of the competing constitutional processes developed by the Ethnic Nationalities Council, the National Coalition for the Union of Burma, and drafters of the 2008 Constitution, see David C. Williams, “Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma’s Struggle to Build a New Order”, Texas Law Review Volume 87 (2009): 1657-1693.

[10] Tinzar Htun and Mael Raynaud, “Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution”.

[11] Mael Raynaud, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Myanmar: A Modern Mandala System?”.

[12] Article 56, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008).

[13] Melbourne Forum on Constitution-building in Asia and the Pacific, “Asymmetric Constitutional Arrangements in Decentralized Systems”, Melbourne Forum Constitutional Insights n°3 (October 2018).

[14] Article 53, second draft of the FCDCC’s “Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma”.

[15] Article 195, second draft of the FCDCC’s “Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma”.

[16] National Unity Consultative Council Press Conference, 16 November 2021, Myanmar Now Youtube channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6O6ITKCI9j4, downloaded 19 November 2021).

[17] David C. Williams, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Burma”, in Social Difference and Constitutionalism in Pan-Asia, edited by Susan H. Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press 2014), pp. 137-164.

[18] Bertil Lintner, “Finding a Federal Model that Fits”, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2014 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/finding-federal-model-fits.html, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[19] Mael Raynaud, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Myanmar: A Modern Mandala System?”.

[20] Not everyone agrees; see “Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution cannot be abolished, can only be amended: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing”, Eleven Media, 2 October 2021 (https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/myanmars-2008-constitution-cannot-be-abolished-can-only-be-amended-senior-general-min-aung, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[21] David C. Williams, “Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma’s struggle to Build a New Order”, p. 1685.

[22] Ibid., p. 1659.

[23] Ibid., p. 1682.

[24] Article 51, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008).

[25] Article 56, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008).

[26] John Buchanan, “Militias in Myanmar” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016).

[27] Mael Raynaud, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Myanmar: A Modern Mandala System?”.

[28] Article 49, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008).

[29] Melbourne Forum on Constitution-building in Asia and the Pacific, “Asymmetric Constitutional Arrangements in Decentralized Systems”, p. 2.

[30] Article 2, second draft of the FCDCC’s “Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma”.

[31] Article 50, second draft of the FCDCC’s “Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma”.

[32] Points 11 and 12 appear in the text of the draft charter, and are meant to show that the FCDCC is open to the creation of additional states.

[33] Mael Raynaud, “Panglong Spirit Under the 2008 Constitution”, Tea Circle, 16 August 2016 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2016/08/16/panglong-spirit-under-the-2008-constitution-part-ii/, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[34] Thein Than Win and Mael Raynaud, “Decentralization: Bamars Care About Governing Their Own Regions, Too”, Tea Circle, 8 April 2019 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2019/04/08/decentralization-bamars-care-about-governing-their-own-regions-too/, downloaded 16 November 2021).

[35] Tinzar Htun and Mael Raynaud, “Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution”.

[36] Federal Democracy Charter, Chapter IV, Part III: “Fundamental Policies for Building Federal Democracy Union”.

[37] The first part of Article 249 of the 2008 Constitution vests chief ministers with the power to implement the laws passed by their respective state and regional parliaments. The same article also provides that state and regional chief ministers be responsible for the local implementation of Union laws. This raises the issue of “federal good faith” when a chief minister belongs to a different party to that which controls the Union Government and is as a result tasked with implementing laws that she or he may oppose.

[38] Mael Raynaud, “The Pros and Cons of Electing Chief Ministers”, Tea Circle, 30 September 2019 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2019/09/30/the-pros-and-cons-of-electing-chief-ministers/, downloaded on 16 November 2021).

[39] Melbourne Forum on Constitution-building in Asia and the Pacific, “Asymmetric Constitutional Arrangements in Decentralized Systems”, p. 3.

[40] By the same logic, “national races with a suitable population” in a state or region not bearing their name were granted an “ethnic affairs” minister.

[41] Adam Burke, Nicola Williams, Patrick Barron, Kim Jolliffe, Thomas Carr, “The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2017).

[42] Ashley South, “Hybrid Governance and the Politics of Legitimacy in Myanmar’s Peace Process”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2017) (DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2017.1387280).

[43] Kim Jolliffe and Emily Speers Mears, “Strength in Diversity: Towards Universal Education in Myanmar’s Ethnic Areas” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016).

[44] Su Mon Thant, “Party Mergers in Myanmar: A New Development”, Trends in Southeast Asia 8/2020 (/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/TRS8_20.pdf, downloaded 16 November 2021).

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2021/159 “Islamic Populism and Voting Trends in Indonesia” by Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Kennedy Muslim

 

Muslims attend Friday prayers with social distancing measures in place due to the Covid-19 pandemic at the Golden Dome mosque in Depok, West Java, on 17 September 2021. Photo: Adek Berry, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • In recent years, the global populist surge driven by religio-political sentiments has taken root in various developing democracies exploiting pre-existing religio-political cleavages within society.
  • India with its ruling Hindu-centric nationalist right-wing party BJP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Turkey under the “new Islamic sultan” Recep Tayyip Erdogan are two of the most prominent examples of illiberal populist rulers employing religious rhetoric in rallying their supporters and in the process severely undermining the pluralist-secularist nature of the state.
  • Indonesia is another such case. Although the “left–right” ideological spectrum is inadequate in deciphering the landscape of Indonesia’s electoral system, a comparable “left–right” religio-political cleavage can nevertheless be identified within the “pluralist –Islamist” voting bloc spectrum found in this country.
  • This paper uses quantitative survey analysis to empirically determine the percentage of Indonesian voters classified as Islamic populists. Pro-Islamic populists comprised 16.3%, while 33.9% identified with the anti-Islamic populists.  
  • A strong correlation is found between former presidential candidate and current Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto’s supporters and their propensity for displaying a high level of pro-Islamic populist attitudes. Vice versa, President Jokowi’s supporters display a consistent tendency of being anti-Islamic populists.

* Burhanuddin Muhtadi is Visiting Fellow of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Associate Professor at State Islamic University, Jakarta; and Kennedy Muslim is Senior Researcher at Indikator Politik Indonesia.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/159, 2 December 2021

Download PDF Version

INTRODUCTION

There is growing consensus that populism is a thin ideology that can travel and attach itself across a wide ideological spectrum, from socialism to ethno-nationalism to religio-political convictions such as Islamism).[1] Consequently, the literature on Islamic populism has also grown rapidly in the last decade along with the increase in populism globally, both in established and new democracies, including Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia.

In this article, we take a look at the emerging concept of Islamic populism. Building on previous works by other scholars, we have developed a series of measurements for this variant of populism. We applied these measurements in a representative national survey in February 2020[2] to determine the proportion of the electorate which would fall within the Islamic populist camp in Indonesia. We explored the correlations between those with Islamic populist tendencies and support for Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and alternatively for Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 presidential election, and between Indonesian voters with Islamic populist tendencies and their support of various political parties in the 2019 legislative election.

RELIGIOUS POPULISM IN ASIA

The religio-political strand in global populist surge which gained significant ground within the context of established democracies, such as Hindu-centric populism in India and Islamic populism in Turkey, marked the establishment of a populism cloaked in religious morality rhetoric. Populist actors, including Islamists who propagate Islamic populism, generally separate society into two groups that are homogeneous and antagonistic: “righteous people” versus the “corrupt elites”.[3] While it is true that most ideologies are based upon fundamental opposition between the people and the elite, in populism the opposition relies on moral concepts, where the “righteous people” possess higher morality by representing the general will, while the elites are considered as immoral.[4] Islamic populism in Indonesia adopts a strategy similar to that used by religious populist actors in other countries. In Turkey, the AKP has successfully led a cross-class alliance and exploited the grievances and marginalisation of ‘pious” Turkish Muslims long oppressed by the secular Kemalist establishment. In Indonesia, similar self-reinforcing narratives of socio-economic injustices arising from the marginalisation of the “righteous people” have drawn on pre-existing religio-racial, regional and class divisions, as well as the existence of minorities (i.e., ethnic Chinese) painted as being in cahoots with, and puppets of the “neo-liberal” Western elites.

The defining characteristic of Islamic populism is not that it is anti-elitist, but also that it is anti-pluralist. For populists, including those of the Islamic strand, pluralism, legitimate opposition and checks and balances inherent in democracy generally hinder the popular will. Anyone who declares opposition to the general will is considered part of the corrupt elites. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan retorted when responding to criticism directed at him after his Islamist party appointed him as the presidential candidate in August 2014: ‘We are the People – who are you?’[5] In India, the “Hindu First” message is implied in the rhetoric of its ruling BJP party to the exclusion of the Muslim minority within the country, threatening the secular-pluralist foundation of that country enshrined in the constitution.

Islamic populism in Indonesia also shares a similar characteristic with Indian religious populism on the issue of allocation of material resources. It believes that the state should adopt a practice of exclusion-and-inclusion when distributing state resources, both monetary and non-monetary.[6] In a highly unequal country like Indonesia,[7] Islamic populists demand that the “natives” receive (more) state resources than, for example, the Chinese minority which is portrayed as having enjoyed privileges for decades, resulting in their supposed control of economic life in Indonesia. According to this line of reasoning, the ethnic Chinese must be excluded from access to resources, while indigenous groups must be prioritised.

HOW PREVALENT IS ISLAMIC POPULISM?

In this section, we examine the level of support for Islamic populism in Indonesia. Using the theoretical framework offered by Mietzner (2020) who argues that Islamic populism has surged in Indonesia due to several latent ingredients in the socio-political history of the country,[8] we have sought to gauge the levels of Islamic populism by asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following three statements:

  1. Muslims in Indonesia should receive preferential treatment compared to other religious groups.
  2. Chinese Indonesians should have fewer rights than Indonesian Muslims.
  3. Indonesia must be ruled in accordance with Islamic sharia law.

Each respondent was asked to show his/her agreement on each item by using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree).[9]

Based on our findings,[10] 16.3% of Indonesians in 2020 can be classified as being pro-Islamic populism, while 33.9% were anti-Islamic populism. Despite its relatively small percentage, what Islamic populists lack in numbers is more than compensated for by their militant and active mobilisation capabilities. This was demonstrated through groups such as the 212 movement, also known as Defend Islam Action, on the eve of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election in their mass actions against Governor Basuki Purnama (an ethnic Chinese popularly known Ahok), demanding that he be tried for blasphemy against Islam.

ISLAMIC POPULIST SUPPORT AND PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE

In this section, we consider the connection between Islamic populist attitudes and presidential choice in the 2019 presidential election. We compare the mean scores on the Islamic scale to that for the presidential vote. Figure 2 shows both the mean scores and the confidence interval for the mean scores (>95%) for the presidential choice in 2019 on the Islamic populism scale. Where the confidence interval does not cross the reference line, the relationship between Islamic populist attitude and presidential vote is statistically significant, at the 5% level.

We discover that Prabowo supporters display a higher attitudinal tendency on the Islamic populism scale. Jokowi’s supporters, on the other hand, display a notably lower tendency for Islamic populist attitude on this scale. The question that then begs to be answered is why do Prabowo supporters tend towards Islamic populism, especially when, personally and ideologically, Prabowo has no Islamist views and no history of being close to the Islamist camp before the 2014 election. Furthermore, Prabowo comes from a secular and pluralist background. His mother and several of his siblings are Christians. What appears relevant is that Prabowo has been both an enabler and a beneficiary of Islamist populism.[11] Since 2014, Prabowo did not hesitate in using Islamist issues to form a coalition with Islamist organisations in an attempt to defeat Jokowi. Prabowo supporters propagated massively on social media that Jokowi was a Christian, a communist, and a Chinese stooge. In 2016, Prabowo nominated Anies Baswedan as candidate for governor of Jakarta against the Christian-Chinese governor Ahok, and in doing that, he had full support from all Islamist groups. In 2019, Prabowo again took advantage of the divisive religious issue and garnered the support of Islamist groups, and on a larger scale than in 2014.

It is our assessment that this bloc of Islamic populists, though seemingly a minority, will remain a very significant constituency in upcoming elections. This is evidenced from Prabowo’s credible performance in the 2019 election in the face of significant challenges. In the 2014 election, Prabowo had stronger support among political parties and arguably greater resources than in the 2019 Presidential Election when he faced an uphill battle fighting the incumbent President Jokowi. In 2019, Prabowo was supported by a smaller coalition comprising mainly of conservative and right-wing Islamist parties such as PKS and PAN and with fewer financial resources. Even with the odds stacked heavily against him, Prabowo managed to secure 44.50% of the votes, less than a 3% drop in his 46.85% vote share in 2014. It should also be noted that due to the alarming rise in identity politics and the political entrepreneurialism of several major Islamic populist actors during the 2016-2019 period, Jokowi was also under heavy political pressure at the time to pick Ma’ruf Amin, a prominent conservative Islamic cleric, as his running mate to burnish his Islamic credentials and to shield him from attacks by right-wing Islamic populist groups. A major caveat to this strategy should also be made that appeasing the minority Islamic populists (which, according to our data comprises only 16.3% of the electorate) by advocating Islamic populist priorities has strong limitations – by itself, this would not secure victory in a majority-pluralist country like Indonesia. It is entirely plausible that a Islamic populist presidential candidate may appear in the 2024 election, who has stronger Islamist credentials than Prabowo, and if such a person is paired with a “centrist” figure, then that combination may secure a ticket to the second round of the presidential run-off in a 3-way or 4-way presidential contest in 2024.

ISLAMIC POPULIST ATTITUDES AND PARTY CHOICE

We also explore the relationship between Islamic populist support and party choice, based on the national survey we conducted in 2020.

Variations in support for Islamic populism are more visible in each party’s constituent base. The constitution of the coalition of parties supporting Jokowi and Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election alone does not explain the level of support they enjoyed from Islamic populists. Interestingly, Golkar, the main party supporting Jokowi, has a mass base that has a mean score of Islamic populism support that is higher than that for PKS and almost on par with that for PAN. Golkar’s level of support from Islamic populists is only slightly below that from Prabowo’s Gerindra voters, who scored the highest mean on the Islamic populism scale. The current Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan made the interesting observation that there exists a long tradition of migration of old Masyumi (the biggest Islamic party in the 1950s) supporters to Golkar after the dissolution of the Islamic party by Soekarno in 1960.[12] Aside from that, Golkar’s traditional leadership pool has been dominated by HMI (Muslim Students Association) alumni figures since the era of Akbar Tanjung. From KPU (General Election Commission) and survey data, we also found that Golkar’s support for Jokowi in the 2019 election cost them votes in their traditional regional bases in West Java, West Sumatra, Banten and South Kalimantan; Golkar loyalists, especially those sympathising with Islamic populism in those provinces, switched their votes to Gerindra. As illustrated in Figure 4, Gerindra managed to increase their overall vote share in 2019 to 12.57%, up from 11.81% in 2014. With that, it replaced Golkar as the second biggest party after PDI-P. Golkar’s overall vote share in 2019 (12.31%) suffered a significant drop from their 2014 vote share (14.75%).

Figure 3 also shows that voters who scored below the mean on the Islamic populism scale tended to support parties that are more nationalist and anti-Islamist in orientation, i.e., Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Demokrat Party, NasDem, PKB and PDI-P; these voters are thus placed in the anti-Islamic populism camp.

CONCLUSION

This study has shown the similarities that exist between religio-political populism in Indonesia and that in other Asian democracies such as India and Turkey;  the strength of its appeal among Indonesian voters has also been affirmed. We determined the overall level of support for Islamic populism and against it, as well as a relationship between Islamic populism the voting pattern in the 2019 elections. Prabowo supporters tended to hold pro-Islamic populism sentiments compared to Jokowi’s voters based on the established definition of Islamic populism in the survey. Likewise, in general, opposition parties tended to represent voters who had been disappointed with the existing order and these have Islamic populist attitudes.

Based on the latest survey data from several credible pollsters, including from Indikator[13] in August 2021, there is strong indication that Prabowo’s support level (26.2%) has declined significantly due to the Islamic populist voters shifting their support to Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan (15.5%).

It remains to be seen in the 2024 election whether Islamic populism attitudes among voters remain as high as in 2019, especially after the imprisonment of Rizieq Shihab, one of the most prominent charismatic Islamic populist actors in recent Indonesian political history. This has coincided with the latest Democracy Index for 2020 Report by Economist Intelligence Unit[14] which showed a further decline for Indonesia to its lowest point of 6,30, putting it in the “flawed democracies” category or at 64th place out of 167 countries.

Ironically, the score on civil liberties for Jokowi’s government is also at its lowest, marked by among other things the disbandment of FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) on December 2020. FPI was the main advocate of Islamic populism in the last 2019 election. The emergence of identity politics since the 2014 election and rising anti-pluralist sentiments especially during the mass Jakarta protest or 212 Action in 2016, led to the crackdown on vocal Islamist groups and actors after the 2019 election. These two factors in combination—the rising of identity politics among Islamist populist groups and the state crackdowns on Islamist organisations—contribute to the growing illiberal trend that weakens Indonesian democracy.

The debate is now on whether the “disappearance” of a charismatic populist actor will weaken Islamic populism or whether it will deepen the sense of grievance and marginalisation circulating within the Indonesian ummah.


ENDNOTES

[1] Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist,’ in Government and Opposition 39 (4) (2004): 541–563.

[2] Field observations were carried out simultaneously in all regions on 5-10 February 2020. The population for this survey were Indonesian citizens with the right to vote, who were thus 17 years old and above, or already married when the survey was conducted. Using a questionnaire, the interviews were conducted face-to-face by our interviewers on 1,220 voting-age adults who were selected with multistage random sampling. These were proportionally distributed over the 34 provinces. Based on this sample size, the estimated margin of error is ±2.9% at 95% confidence level, assuming a simple random sampling design.

[3] Cas Mudde, ‘Populism: An Ideational Approach,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Cristóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), (Oxford University Press, 2017): 4.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Jan-Werner Muller, ‘Parsing populism: Who is and who is not a populist these days?’ in IPPR, 13/10/2015: https://www.ippr.org/juncture/parsing-populism-who-is-and-who-is-not-a-populist-these-days

[6] Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America,’ in Government and Opposition, 48(2) (2013): 147–174.

[7] Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Eve Warburton & Aninda Dewayanti, ‘Perceptions of Inequality in Indonesia: A Matter of Partisan Politics?’ in Perspective (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019).

[8] Among others “(a) pre-existing religio-racial, regional or class divisions, the politicisation of socioeconomic inequalities within the framework of those divisions, (c) the availability of minorities as mobilising targets for populist campaigns, and (d) the willingness of established parties to support populists in order to retain political significance.” See, Marcus Mietzner, ‘Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: chauvinists, Islamists and technocrats.’ Australian Journal of International Affairs (2020): 1–19.

[9] The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the variables used to measure Islamic populism above is 0.815, meaning that the variables have a high degree of internal consistency.

[10] To establish what the general level of Islamic populism in Indonesia is, we composed an index developed from the responses to the three questions above. A score of between 66.6668-100 (that is, if a respondent answered all questions or almost all questions in the affirmative) leads to the classification as ‘pro-Islamic populism’; a score of between 33.3334-66.6667 denotes ‘neutral’ and a score of 0-33.3333 indicates ‘anti-Islamic populism.’

[11] Mietzner, ‘Rival populisms,’ 2020: 7.

[12] Anies Rasyid Baswedan (2004). Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory. Asian Survey, 44(5), 669–690. doi:10.1525/as.2004.44.5.669

[13] https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Rilis-Indikator-25-Agustus-2021.pdf

[14] The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, “Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health?” https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/ 

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /supportISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
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Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng  
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

“Urban Biodiversity and Nature- Based Solutions in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Indonesia and Malaysia” by Alex M. Lechner, Michelle Li Ern Ang, Juin Yan Ooi, Badrul Azhar, J. Miguel Kanai, Perrine Hamel and Saut Sagala

 

2021/158 “The Kunming-Vientiane Railway: A Post-pandemic ‘Deus ex machina’ for the Lao Economy?” by Nick J. Freeman

 

The Laos-China Railway is scheduled to open on 3 December 2021. Picture from CGTN Facebook.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Laos’s first major railway, due to open in December 2021, will create a new link with the Chinese market. As such, it has the potential to be a game changer for the Lao economy.
  • The timing is fortuitous, with Laos preparing for post-pandemic recovery in 2022. The World Bank and others are calling for a pivot in the country’s economic growth model, away from what they deem to be an unsustainable emphasis on power generation and mineral extraction.
  • If the new railway does help develop parts of the Lao economy – such as tourism and export-oriented production – which in turn generates more jobs, then an inclusive and sustainable economic growth model can be envisaged.
  • But the opening of the railway itself does not guarantee such a prospect. Laos needs to develop economic ‘muscle tissue’ to ensure that the potential of the railway is translated into tangible results. This necessitates an investment in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure, in everything from logistics hubs to regulations, so that Lao firms can properly get on board.
  • Recent developments in the field of crypto-currency mining in Laos may be a fillip for the economy, allowing the country to leverage its hydropower capacity. This kind of ‘fintech mining’, as opposed to mineral extraction, may prove to be a new component of ‘Laos Inc.’.

*Nick J. Freeman, is Associate Fellow in the Myanmar Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and an independent economic consultant.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/158, 30 November 2021

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INTRODUCTION

On 3December 2021, the new railway line linking Kunming in China to Vientiane in Laos will be formally opened. With the exception of the 3.5-kilometre-long railway line across the Mekong River linking the Thai border town of Nong Khai to the Lao border point at Thanaleng, opened in 2009, this marks the first standard-gauge railway line in the country. The railway will be operated by a joint venture, the Laos-China Railway Co. Ltd., that is 70 per cent owned by the China Railway Group conglomerate, and 30 per cent by the Lao National Railway State Enterprise (LNRE), under the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

Construction work on the Laos-China railway commenced in 2016. The 430-kilometre line comprises almost 200 kilometres of tunnels and over 160 bridges; it has been a considerable undertaking. With express trains travelling in excess of 120 kilometres per hour, the time for passengers and freight to get from Vientiane to the Chinese border crossing at Boten will be reduced from 15 hours by road to under four hours by train. The World Bank estimates that the cost of transporting freight to China will decrease by 30 per cent or more.[1]

The Lao government’s original decision to invest in the railway, and thereby to increase its external debt obligation with China in order to underwrite a large part of the cost, attracted some controversy. Can a railway estimated to have cost US$5.9bn, equivalent to a third of Laos’s GDP, deliver an adequate return? Views on this issue have varied. But regardless of this debate, the completed line is now poised to open, and the railway has the potential – and the word ‘potential’ needs to be stressed – to be a major ‘game changer’ for the Lao economy. The ‘trick’ lies in converting that potential into tangible reality.

When construction began on the railway, the global pandemic was more than three years away. Now, the first trains will probably commence running with cross-border passenger traffic remaining restricted. The official launch may thus be akin to a ‘soft opening’. It was recently reported that Laos’s prime minister envisages freight being the main form of traffic at first, until cross-border passenger traffic returns to some kind of normalcy.[2]

But looking beyond the pandemic and the gradual lifting of travel restrictions in 2022, one can easily envisage both passengers and freight using the line. A dedicated ‘dry port’ is being developed at Thanaleng, close to Vientiane, for freight traffic. Its facilities will include a bonded warehouse, a trans-shipment station, a container port and other logistical services.[3] There will be ten main train stations along the line, including one at the UNESCO world heritage site of Luang Prabang. Tourists from China visiting Laos are expected to use the line, while Lao companies will be presented with an opportunity to transport their goods more easily, speedily and cheaply to China’s huge market.

As any Lao exporter would affirm, the high cost of transporting goods out of the landlocked country has been a perennial burden, making it difficult to compete on price with producers in other countries. It is hoped that the long-standing dependence on a relatively small number of road transport companies able to get containers to and from Bangkok port, a group depicted by some as a cartel, will be punctured by the opening of the railway line.

However, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and others have cautioned that harnessing the full economic potential of the railway line is not a given, and will depend on the successful enactment of various changes genuinely linking the railway to the Lao economy at large. This is not just about having the right physical infrastructure in place to ensure that people and cargo can transit to and from chosen destinations. It is also about having the right ‘soft infrastructure’ of laws and regulatory frameworks for railway traffic to proceed smoothly, without getting caught up in excessive red tape, or encountering the kinds of delays that deter people and companies away from using it.[4]

Further, for the railway to be a commercial success, it will need to catalyse new cargo and passenger traffic, and not simply rely on existing road traffic shifting over to it. More passengers and freight volumes will be needed, and these should not depend excessively on transit flows — that is, freight (and passengers) going from Malaysia and Thailand to China and passing through Laos.

THE RAILWAY IN CONTEXT

The development of the Laos-China railway has obviously not occurred in splendid isolation. And the Lao economy has not been immune from the impact of the global pandemic. International tourism has been virtually non-existent for 18 months, and, at the time of writing, borders remain largely closed to passenger traffic, whether air, road or rail. The World Bank estimates that GDP growth in 2020 was just 0.4 per cent, and it is currently forecasting 2.2 per cent growth for 2021. For its part, the Asian Development Bank put GDP growth in 2020 at -0.5 per cent and is forecasting 2.3 per cent growth in 2021. The IMF opted for -0.4 per cent growth in 2020 and a forecast of 2.1 per cent for 2021. Not only have domestic jobs been lost as a direct consequence of Covid-19, there has also been an influx of Lao citizens returning home after losing their jobs abroad.

In January 2021, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) held its five-yearly congress, at which then-Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith was elevated to the posts of general secretary of the party and president of the state. He is on public record as having said that Laos’s debt situation has been inadequately addressed, and that the country’s public finances have not been managed well.[5] A new socio-economic development plan was also unveiled at the party congress, envisaging average annual GDP growth of 4 per cent, and graduation away from less developed country (LDC) status is now anticipated in 2026.[6] The subsequent National Assembly meeting, held in March, and prior to a second Covid-19 surge in the country, elected Phankham Viphavanh as the new prime minister. Laos’s leadership now faces the task of reviving the national economy in 2022.

In September 2021, the World Bank issued a new draft country economic memorandum (CEM) for Laos that advocates leveraging the country’s strategic location to bring about a more inclusive and sustainable growth model.[7] Laos’s earlier emphasis on energy generation and mineral extraction to drive economic growth has, the World Bank argues, created relatively few jobs while causing both environmental and macro-economic difficulties that would suggest that such an economic growth model is unsustainable.[8] Add construction and forestry-related activities to the country’s sources of economic growth, and it becomes clear that the economy is not adequately diversified. And, while the rate of natural resource depletion has come down markedly since 2011, installed electricity capacity will continue to grow in the years ahead, as more hydropower projects come on line.

Despite this heavy emphasis on resources, government revenues from the resource sector account for less than 2 per cent of Laos’s GDP, notes the World Bank, citing data sourced to the Ministry of Finance. A notable reason for this anomaly appears to be the price at which electricity is sold, both domestically and to neighbouring countries—at average tariff rates that are below the state-owned power utility’s own cost recovery levels. This in turn has served to increase the debt exposure of state-owned power company, Électricité du Laos (EdL), much of which is guaranteed by the government. Meanwhile, the country’s foreign exchange reserves, as measured by months of ‘import cover’, have remained below three months.

In such a context, it is understandable that hopes are being pinned on the Laos-China railway to create a more diversified economy. Foreign exchange earnings from in-bound Chinese tourists to Laos, as well as increased export earnings from larger quantities of Lao goods being shipped to China’s massive market, are perhaps the two most obvious scenarios for such diversification. However, even as the formal opening of the railway arrives, available information on what precisely the railway service will entail – frequency of trains, pricing for tickets and freight costs, and more – has been scarce. If Lao companies were genuinely expected to be prepared for the railway’s opening, and to adjust their business plans in order to take advantage of this ‘game changer’, then they have not had much information to go on.

GOING CRYPTO

In a surprise development, in September 2021 the Lao government announced that it would be piloting crypto-currency mining and trading, becoming the first government in Southeast Asia to formally do so.[9] Six companies were granted permission to participate in the trial exercise that is akin to a regulatory sandbox initiative.[10] One reason for the surprise was that only a month earlier, the Bank of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the country’s central bank, had issued a warning against the use of crypto-currencies by Lao citizens.[11] But, with some reports suggesting that crypto-currency mining and trading—including as a means of payment—were already occurring illicitly in the country, this pilot scheme may be the government’s attempt to get ahead of the issue and to instil some degree of control.

Under the pilot scheme, the six participating companies will be able to both mine and sell crypto-currencies, although presumably not to citizens in Laos. They will pay a capped fee for the energy they use to do so. The initiative will be overseen by the Ministry of Technology and Communications, with inputs from the finance, planning and investment, energy and mines, and public security ministries, as well as EdL and the central bank. A key determinant of its success will be ensuring that organized crime gangs do not infiltrate the exercise, whether from China or elsewhere, given the need for vigilance around money laundering and other illicit ventures.

In May 2021, the Chinese government announced that it would be banning crypto-currency mining and trading. Prior to this, China had been by far the world’s biggest player in the crypto-mining space, accounting for over 75 per cent of all power used by computers in Bitcoin mining.[12] That figure dropped to zero by August of this year. A vacuum on the supply side of the crypto-currency market was thus created, and a number of Chinese players are likely to have been looking for alternative locations to host their activities. Since one of the main criteria for successful crypto-mining is access to electricity, both to power and then to cool the banks of computers used, Laos is an attractive location for that activity.[13]

Some media reports suggest that the Lao government anticipates earnings of around Kip29 trillion, or some US$190 million, from Bitcoin mining in 2022, although it is not clear how such a figure was arrived at, given the volatility of crypto-currency prices. Also unclear is how precisely the government will derive income from the pilot project, other than presumably in the form of a corporate tax on the crypto-miners.

Going one step further, in October 2021, it was reported that the Lao government had agreed to study the potential for a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in partnership with a Japanese FinTech company – Soramitsu.[14]

Some observers will raise legitimate concerns over the risks of embracing crypto-currencies, particularly in countries where the ability to enact, and then enforce, appropriate regulations is limited by constraints on institutional capacity. There is clearly a need for Laos to tread carefully in this space, and to manage expectations around what can reasonably be achieved. That being said, the pace at which the Lao government has responded to a perceived opening in the market caused by China’s withdrawal from the crypto-mining business and its lateral thinking around harnessing its natural resource wealth reflect a degree of initiative and innovation that commentators often imply are lacking in Laos. As always, the main determinant of success will be the effectiveness of execution.

CONCLUSION

As a potent symbol of modernity, the sight of a high-speed electric train passing through Laos’s mountainous north is an evocative one, not unlike other major infrastructural investment projects, such as the Nam Theun II dam. It marks another step in Laos’s economic development, and a departure from its less developed country status of the past. Not surprisingly, considerable national pride and emotion, as well as money, have been invested in the railway. In this context, the railway might be seen as injecting new vitality into the Lao corporate sector, as it recovers from the impact of the pandemic. It represents a ‘shot in the arm’, as it were, for the country’s economy. Like corporate communities around the world, Lao businesses have suffered during the pandemic, and will need support to revive and prosper in the years ahead.

But another way to look at the railway might be as a ‘Deus ex machina’ (from the Latin, literally meaning ‘God from the machine’): a plot device occasionally used in plays or novels whereby a dilemma faced by a key character is abruptly resolved by an external event. This is not only because the railway itself provides a physical means by which people and goods can be transported more cheaply and more speedily between Laos and China; it is also because the railway will ideally help catalyse a series of second-order developments necessary to make it a real success, and for it to generate the economic returns desired by the Lao government. For the railway to be a full-blown economic success, new policy, legal and regulatory measures and other governmental interventions to reap its full potential, will be necessary.

As policy advisors often note, enacting economic reform is rarely easy. It often comes up against entrenched groups or institutions that are resistant to change, is undercut by more immediate policy priorities, or simply hits the buffers imposed by lethargy. In such cases, an external prompt or dynamic – a ‘Deus ex machina’ – is often required to create the impetus to move economic reforms forward, and ensure their enactment by the state agencies mandated to deliver on them. The train arriving at Platform One in Vientiane’s new railway station may well serve that purpose.

The Lao government has committed considerable sums of money and political capital to make this railway happen. It now needs to secure a return on that investment, as measured by vigorous use of the train service, in both directions, comprising passengers and goods. It simply cannot afford to have the railway become an under-utilised asset. As such, we can expect the Lao government to have adequate incentive to move forward with developing the hard and soft infrastructure necessary to make the railway a success.

While developing a set of skills around railway logistics may not sound quite as exciting as crypto-currency mining, it does have a more predictable economic up-side, and almost certainly entails fewer risks. Most importantly, it has a greater chance of helping meet the need for a more inclusive economic growth path for the country in the years ahead. As the Lao economy starts to come out of the pandemic-induced hiatus of 2020-21, and ‘Laos Inc.’ attempts to revive its fortunes, the new railway will hopefully prove to be a worthwhile asset.


ENDNOTES

[1] A representative of the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry has said that the chamber expects logistics costs to drop by 50-70 per cent. See ‘Laos-China railway to boost China-ASEAN economic cooperation’, Vientiane Times, 5 November 2021. Passenger fares for the railway have yet to be announced at the time of writing, although an unconfirmed table of ticket prices suggest that a one-way ticket between Vientiane and Boten on the Chinese border would be between Kip 320,000 (US$30) and 220,000 (US$20), depending on the speed of the train taken.

[2] The rolling stock to be used on the line, unveiled in Vientiane in late October, is clearly designed for the transportation of people, not freight. Prime Minister Dr Phankham Viphavanh is reported to have made the comment about freight traffic at a virtual press conference in early October.

[3] Thanaleng is where the smaller-gauged 3.5-kilometer railway to the Thai town of Nong Khai currently terminates, having crossed over the Friendship Bridge. A spur is being built to connect Thanaleng with the Laos-China railway, scheduled to be completed in time for the main railway’s opening on 2 December 2021.

[4] Laos passed a railway law in late 2018 and refreshed its customs law in mid-2020. One legal advisor has noted the need for additional regulations around issues concerning customs clearance mechanisms and integrated transport and logistics systems.

[5] The World Bank’s latest (August 2021) economic monitor report for Laos notes, “The risk of external debt distress remains high, while reserve buffers remain low. The cost of financing has risen due to growing debt levels, an increasing reliance on non-concessional borrowing, and rating downgrades by Fitch and Moody’s. On average, $1.3 billion of public external debt service (not including guarantees) are due each year during 2021-25, of which more than half are on commercial terms. … Meeting external debt service obligations is more difficult in the context of limited foreign reserve buffers, which totaled about US$1.2 billion in May 2021, and low foreign currency revenues, with debt-service obligations exceeding current reserve levels” [https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/08/20/lao-pdr-economic-update-august-2021-a-path-to-recovery], p. 2.

[6] The graduation date had originally been 2024, but the United Nations recently announced that Laos, Bangladesh and Nepal would need an additional two years, given the adverse impact of the pandemic. Upon graduating from less developed country (LDC) status, Laos will no longer be eligible for some preferential tariff schemes awarded to countries classified in this category, such as the EU’s ‘everything but arms’ (EBA) scheme.

[7] World Bank, ‘Lao PDR Country Economic Memorandum – Summary’, 17 September 2021 [https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/brief/lao-pdr-country-economic-memorandum-summary].

[8] The World Bank notes that poverty reduction has continued in Laos; the poverty headcount dropped from 46 per cent in 1992/93 to 18.6 per cent by 2018/19. But it also notes that the Gini index that measures income inequality has been rising, from 30.5 to 38.8 over the same time period.

[9] “Prime Minister’s Notification 1158”, 9 September 2021; John Reed, ‘Laos pushes into crypto as it authorizes mining and trading’, Financial Times, 15 September 2021 [https://www.ft.com/content/3a820200-0128-42b3-be6c-f5abd6381efa]; and Sebastian Strangio, ‘Despite crime concerns, Laos authorizes cryptocurrency trial’, The Diplomat, 16 September 2021 [https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/despite-crime-concerns-laos-authorizes-cryptocurrency-trial].

[10] They are reported to comprise Wap Data Technology Laos, Phongsubthavy Road and Bridge Construction Co., Sisaket Construction Co., Boupha Road-Bridge Design Survey Co., Joint Development Bank, and the Phousy Group.

[11] Phayboune Thanabouasy, ‘Bank of Laos warns public against use of cryptocurrency’, Laotian Times, 18 August 2021 [https://laotiantimes.com/2021/08/18/bank-of-laos-warns-public-against-use-of-cryptocurrency].

[12] Other major players in crypto-currency mining include Russia, the United States, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Ireland, Iran and Canada, among others.

[13] The Laos-China railway is electrified, and its construction required the erection of over 2,200 transmission poles along its length. In 2020, a majority stake in Laos’s national power grid was sold to the China Southern Power Grid.

[14] Lubomir Tassev, ‘Laos to study digital currency with help from Japanese Fintech, report reveals’, Bitcoin.com [https://news.bitcoin.com/laos-to-study-digital-currency-with-help-from-japanese-fintech-report-reveals].

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /supportISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng  
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

2021/157 “The ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: What’s in a Name?” by Hoang Thi Ha

 

The ASEAN-China CSP was formally launched at the Commemorative Summit to celebrate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China dialogue relations, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in attendance. In this picture, Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah (C) takes part in the ASEAN-China Summit on the sidelines of the 2021 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summits held online in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, on 26 October 2021. Photo: Hakim S. Hayat, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • China’s proposal to ‘upgrade’ its relations with ASEAN to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (CSP) is part of Beijing’s active neighbourhood diplomacy, which is given added emphasis and urgency by Sino-US tensions and China’s estrangement from the West.
  • The CSP proposal signals a calibrated and invested Chinese strategy to actively reshape its relations with ASEAN in China’s own image, promoting China’s status as primus inter pares among ASEAN Dialogue Partners and consolidating the centrality of Chinese leadership and influence in the regional order.
  • ASEAN does not view its CSP with China as signifying an elevated status compared to other dialogue relations. Its decision to establish CSP with both China and Australia demonstrates the grouping’s desire to maintain a state of equilibrium in its relations with all major powers and foster an inclusive multi-polar regional order.
  • Since ASEAN-China relations are defined not by its label but by its content which has both positive and contentious aspects, its future depends on both sides’ ability to bridge the dichotomy between the robust expansion of their economic-functional cooperation and the continuing lack of mutual trust.

*Hoang Thi Ha is Fellow and Lead Researcher (Political-Security) at the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme (RSPS), ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/157, 24 November 2021

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INTRODUCTION

The 24th ASEAN-China summit in October 2021 announced the establishment of the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), adding a new nomenclature but not necessarily a new category in ASEAN’s dialogue relations.[1] The ASEAN-China CSP was formally launched at the Commemorative Summit to celebrate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China dialogue relations, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in attendance.[2] Before the CSP, both sides had maintained a strategic partnership since 2003 – the most longstanding strategic partnership among all ASEAN Dialogue Partners. Does the CSP mean anything new for ASEAN-China relations and does it mean the same thing for both sides? This article unpacks the term ‘CSP’ and examines the perspectives of China and ASEAN in the establishment of an ASEAN-China CSP.

THE ASEAN-CHINA COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP – WHAT’S IN A NAME?

‘CSP’ is a recent nomenclature in modern international relations. It is often associated with China’s partnership diplomacy which is defined as entailing “closer ties between states” and adhering to “a goal-driven rationale of alignment … without targeting any third party”.[3] Through this global network of partnerships, China differentiates itself from and competes with the US’ alliance system (even though Washington has also increasingly leveraged partnership diplomacy with its non-allied partners).[4] Unlike the US’ treaty-based, threat-driven and security-centric alliance system, China’s partnership diplomacy places greater emphasis on cultivating political relationships and promoting economic cooperation. It is essentially an exercise of Chinese statecraft, with ample room for diplomatic manoeuvring and semantic innovation. According to Georg Strüver, the “strong emphasis placed on partnership diplomacy in recent official discourse is unprecedented and leads to the assumption that partnerships might play an even bigger role in the structuring of China’s external relations in the years to come.”[5]

There are different levels in China’s partnership system, corresponding to the importance that Beijing attaches to each partner, the substance of China’s relations with that country/organisation and other contextual peculiarities. ‘CSP’ is considered the second-highest level of bilateral ties, above ‘strategic partnership’ and below ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’.[6] However, one should not read these terms in a strictly hierarchical order. As shown in Table 1, there are various titles describing China’s relations with the ten ASEAN member states, but they do not necessarily connote a hierarchy of importance or substance. For example, China’s “all-round cooperative partnership” with Singapore does not necessarily rank lower than its “strategic cooperative partnership” with Brunei or “comprehensive strategic cooperation” with The Philippines.

Table 1: China’s bilateral partnerships with ASEAN member states[7]

Title of China’s bilateral ties with…ASEAN member states
Strategic cooperative partnershipBrunei
Comprehensive strategic partnershipCambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia
Comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperationVietnam, Laos
Comprehensive strategic cooperative partnershipMyanmar, Thailand
All-round cooperative partnershipSingapore
Comprehensive strategic cooperationThe Philippines

A speech by then-Premier Wen Jiabao on the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership in 2004 provides a reference for China’s broad understanding of CSP: “comprehensive” means all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered cooperation; “strategic” means long-term and stable relations that transcend differences in ideology and social system, bearing the large picture of the overall relationship; and “partnership” means equal-footed, mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation.[8] These general characteristics are, however, hard to measure and open to highly subjective application. China also does not set clear criteria for the dozens of CSP that it has established with various foreign partners. What ‘CSP’ stands for is not always clear in China’s relationship with a particular country, and it becomes even more elusive when analysed comparatively with other relations. According to a research paper on China’s partnership diplomacy, “the practice of strategic partnerships has escaped tight criteria or definitions.”[9]

Generally speaking, ‘CSP’ signifies a high level of maturity in the relationship as reflected in the breadth and depth of cooperation, shared normative frameworks and institutionalised cooperative mechanisms, and high-level political commitment and priority that both sides attach to each other. All these elements can be found in China’s relations with ASEAN as well as with its ten member states. The breadth and depth of their cooperation and exchanges at multi-levels – governmental, business and people-to-people, bilateral and multilateral – are not merely a function of geography but also the outcome of decades of diplomatic and economic relationship building, through regular high-level visits, dialogue and cooperation mechanisms in various sectors, extensive free trade agreements and deep participation in the regional production networks driven by the global supply chains.

China’s Perspective on CSP with ASEAN

China’s push to ‘upgrade’ its strategic partnership with ASEAN to CSP is part of Beijing’s active neighbourhood diplomacy, which is further emphasised during Xi Jinping’s leadership. In a foreign policy address in 2014, Xi said “we should promote neighbourhood diplomacy, turn China’s neighbourhood areas into a community of common destiny” and “conduct diplomacy with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision.”[10] This activism in periphery diplomacy – befitting China’s newfound confidence as a great power and leveraging its economic gravity in the region – seeks to reshape the power relationships and renegotiate the normative content of the regional order towards a more China-centric one. China’s neighbourhood diplomacy is gaining even more prominence and urgency with the rise of Sino-US strategic tensions and China’s increased estrangement from the West.

According high priority to ASEAN in its neighbourhood diplomacy, China has been calibrating a holistic and invested strategy for the long-term development of ASEAN-China relations that fits into the Chinese vision of the regional order.[11] China’s proposal of a CSP with ASEAN is but the latest manifestation of this strategy, signalling “higher priority in foreign affairs and more extensive cooperation across multiple sectors”.[12]  Speaking at an event commemorating the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China relations in October 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed the importance to “draw up a new blueprint and set a new benchmark for the long-term development of bilateral relations”.[13] A CSP with ASEAN would signal such a new benchmark and set the stage for a new blueprint for the relations.

During his speech, Wang Yi proposed five points as the key thrusts of ASEAN-China CSP: (i) upholding good neighbourliness and enhancing mutual strategic trust; (ii) deepening Covid-19 response cooperation; (iii) focusing on development and fostering new growth drivers; (iv) safeguarding peace and stability, bearing in mind the larger picture; and (v) upholding solidarity and coordination in the UN system and defending justice and fairness in the global governance. Put together, they demonstrate China’s deliberate approach to not only deepen but also actively reshape relations with ASEAN and its member states in China’s own image, from a position of strength and confidence. Notably, for example, point (v) seeks to position ASEAN and its member states on the same side with Beijing in the regional and international multilateral systems.

Another underlying factor of China’s push for CSP with ASEAN is its keen attention to form and status, especially in relations with neighbouring countries over whom China’s sense of hierarchy and entitlement is more pronounced. By proposing the CSP, China was aiming to score another “first” in its relations with ASEAN – after being the first Dialogue Partner to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (2003), the first to establish a strategic partnership and launch FTA negotiations with ASEAN, and the first and only nuclear weapon state willing to sign on to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) with no reservations. The establishment of the CSP would further consolidate China’s status as the most advanced, most committed and most substantial Dialogue Partner in all ASEAN’s dialogue relations.

Before the CSP proposal, China since 2013 had invested its diplomatic capital in promoting the ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny (CCD) proposal. While China has successfully socialised the CCD concept with some mainland Southeast Asian countries, the response of ASEAN as a whole has been lukewarm because the concept is ill-defined and has deterministic and exclusionary connotations.[14] Similar to the CCD, the CSP proposal seeks to enhance China’s image as primus inter pares compared to other ASEAN Dialogue Partners and consolidate China’s stature as the predominant power in its Southeast Asian periphery.

The push for CSP with ASEAN can also be seen as part of China’s efforts to strengthen its discourse power. According to a report by the Atlantic Council in 2020, one of the designated narratives for Chinese government institutions to promote China’s discourse power is “the country’s leadership prospect among developing countries” and one of the means towards this end is through “popular proposals for multilateral and bilateral cooperation”.[15] A CSP with ASEAN would serve as a propaganda instrument to amplify the positive narrative about China, especially its development and connectivity-focused diplomacy with the developing countries. The imperative for Beijing to foster this positive narrative has intensified as China’s international image in the developed world has taken sharp downturns following the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, according to many public polls worldwide.[16]

ASEAN’s Perspective on CSP with China

ASEAN had had extensive internal debate throughout 2021 before consensus was reached on establishing CSP with China. The debate focused on two key questions.

First, what are the parameters to set CSP apart as a new nomenclature in ASEAN’s dialogue relations system? If it is meant as an upgrade from the existing ASEAN-China strategic partnership, what would be the new offerings and/or substantive concessions that China would bring to the table? Only unveiled at the last minute by Xi Jinping at the Commemorative Summit, China’s pledged support was substantial indeed, including an additional donation of 150m Covid-19 vaccine doses, additional US$5 million contribution to the Covid-19 ASEAN Response Fund, vaccine joint production and technology transfer, US$1.5 billion development assistance in the next three years and purchase of US$150 billion of agricultural products from ASEAN in the next five years.[17] These offerings are very much attuned to the top priorities of all ASEAN member states at the moment, namely effective pandemic control and accelerated post-pandemic economic rebound. 

There was also a motion within ASEAN to link CSP establishment with China’s express support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).[18] This may not be straightforward given China’s steadfast opposition to anything ‘Indo-Pacific’ which Beijing associates with a strategy by Washington and its allies/partners to counter and contain China. However, the launch of the ASEAN-China CSP saw China overcome its visceral aversion to the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ and embrace the AOIP in the most explicit manner. The Joint Statement of the Commemorative Summit reaffirmed “the principles of the AOIP while recognising that it is ASEAN’s independent initiative” and agreed to “advance cooperation in the relevant areas identified in the AOIP to develop enhanced strategic trust and win-win cooperation”. In his speech, Xi Jinping spoke of a “prosperous home together” that includes cooperation between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the AOIP.[19] By embracing the AOIP, China has exercised a pragmatic flexibility that both pleases ASEAN and serves China’s enlightened self-interest. The Outlook indeed offers the most inclusive and China-friendly vision of the Indo-Pacific. It also contains practical pathways for economic-functional cooperation which are amenable to China’s development-based approach.[20]

Second, how is ASEAN to situate the ASEAN-China CSP in the larger picture of its external relations with other Dialogue Partners, with an eye on keeping a state of equilibrium among them? There is no denial of the fact that China is among if not the most substantive and substantial partner of ASEAN, leading the pack in many measures. ASEAN’s dialogue relations with China span across around 50 sectoral cooperation mechanisms, compared to about 20 with the US.[21] China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009 and ASEAN became China’s top trading partner in 2020.[22] China is viewed by the majority of Southeast Asian foreign policy elites as the most influential power in the region in both political-strategic and economic terms, according to the State of Southeast Asia survey from 2019 to 2021.[23] It is exactly because of China’s growing and predominant regional influence that ASEAN has been prudent to avoid any designation that may lend the primus inter pares quality to its relations with China.

China has scored first-mover advantage in various foreign policy initiatives towards ASEAN, including establishing strategic partnership, negotiating the FTA, and signing the TAC. But ASEAN also has a track record of proliferating these initiatives to other Dialogue Partners. For example, the club of ASEAN’s “strategic partners” started first with China in 2003, followed by Japan (2005), the ROK (2010), India (2012), Australia (2014), New Zealand and the US (2015), Russia (2018) and most recently the EU (2020).  Save for Canada (and the UK who just became the 11th ASEAN Dialogue Partner in August 2021), ‘strategic partnership’ has been applied to all Dialogue Partners despite the different degrees of their regional engagement and cooperation with ASEAN. Once proliferated, the term started to lose its special shine.

Keeping to this inclusive nature of ASEAN’s external relations – and considering the merits of Australia’s engagement with the region – ASEAN also agreed to establish CSP with Australia at the first annual ASEAN-Australia Summit in October 2021. The ASEAN-Australia CSP has the same characteristics – “meaningful, substantive and mutually beneficial” – as with China. It is also noteworthy that despite concerns expressed by some ASEAN states on the recent Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) trilateral security pact, ASEAN’s decision to establish the CSP with Australia appeared to be more straightforward and less contentious than the CSP with China.[24] Canberra’s swoop for the same designation has somewhat stolen the limelight of the ASEAN-China CSP, triggering a commentary on Global Times that berated Australia’s initiative as “geopolitical backbiting” and belittled the AU$154 million package that Canberra brought to its new ASEAN initiatives.[25]

The decision to establish [emphasis added] the CSP with both Australia and China – even as Beijing-Canberra relations have hit new lows this year due to a range of political, strategic and trade tensions – is an ASEAN masterstroke of hedging and soft balancing among the major powers. It is an act of embracing and defying the gravity of Chinese influence at the same time. By doing so, ASEAN continues to follow the pathways of “omni-enmeshment of major powers and complex balance of influence”.[26] ASEAN intentionally did not use the words “elevate” or “upgrade” so as to avoid giving the impression that its relationship with China and Australia by virtue of the CSP now stands above those with other Dialogue Partners. This calibrated response indicates that ASEAN member states have conscientiously exercised their agency by leveraging this diplomatic tug-of-war among the contending partners in the ASEAN setting for their own benefit.

CONCLUSION

With the ASEAN-China CSP, China can now claim another title in its partnership system and a new achievement in its active neighbourhood diplomacy. Yet, the significance of the CSP should be put in perspective. ASEAN has adopted this new and open-ended nomenclature without giving it an elevated status compared to other Dialogue Partners. China’s CSP initiative and ASEAN’s nuanced response unveil their different visions of the regional order. ASEAN remains faithful to an inclusive multi-polar order where all major powers co-exist and compete so that regional states can diversify their options and maximise their autonomy. For Beijing, it should be an exclusionary and hierarchical order where China’s centrality in regional leadership is restored and external powers’ influence relegated to the margins. Intriguingly, in his speech, Xi Jinping spoke highly of “inclusiveness” and “open regionalism” as common values of both ASEAN and China.[27] Xi’s emphasis on “inclusiveness” and “open regionalism” can be interpreted in two ways. First, these values – which Xi said “draw[ing] wisdom from East Asian civilisation” – are framed in the narrower context of ASEAN-China relations. Second, this could be China’s tacit criticism of the more exclusionary minilateral groupings led by Washington, especially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the recent security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (AUKUS).

The future of the ASEAN-China partnership is defined not by its label but by its content and how both sides are going to shape it. At this, it is important to acknowledge both positive and problematic aspects of the relations. China tends to amplify only the positive elements, especially in economic cooperation and “new growth drivers” such as digital and green technologies, connectivity and pandemic response, which are much welcomed and embraced by ASEAN member states. However, emphasis on the positive content alone will not remove contentious security issues that continue to undermine mutual trust.[28] These include, among others, the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea where China’s assertive behaviour continues unabated regardless of its push towards early conclusion of a code of conduct in the SCS, threatening the maritime rights and interests of other Southeast Asian claimant states.[29] Going forward, a key measure of maturity in ASEAN-China relationship is the ability to bridge the emerging dichotomy between the persistent trust deficit driven by this security dilemma and the robust expansion of bilateral economic-functional cooperation.


ENDNOTES

[1] Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN-China Summit, 26 October 2021, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/63.-Final-Chairmans-Statement-of-the-24th-ASEAN-China-Summit.pdf.

[2] Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development, 22 November 2021, https://asean.org/joint-statement-of-the-asean-china-special-summit-to-commemorate-the-30th-anniversary-of-asean-china-dialogue-relations-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-for-peace-security-prosperity-and-sustain.

[3] Georg Strüver, “International Alignment between Interests and Ideology: The Case of China’s Partnership Diplomacy”, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), March 2016.

[4] See “Full Text of Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Speech on China’s Diplomacy in 2014”, China Daily, 26 December 2014. Wang Yi said: “[W]hat makes such a partnership different from a military alliance is that it does not have any hypothetical enemy nor is it targeted at any third party, thus keeping relations between countries unaffected by military factors. It aims to handle state-to-state relations with a cooperative rather than confrontational, and a win-win rather than zero-sum approach.” At the Commemorative Summit on 22 November 2021, Xi Jinping also said: “We need to pursue dialogue instead of confrontation, build partnerships instead of alliances, and make concerted efforts to address the various negative factors that might threaten or undermine peace.”

[5] Georg Strüver, op. cit.

[6] SCMP Reporter, “Quick guide to China’s diplomatic levels”, South China Morning Post, 20 January 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1903455/quick-guide-chinas-diplomatic-levels.

[7] Author’s compilation based on public sources.

[8] Speech by H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China: “Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and the European Union, 6 May 2004, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:pwWRUXFH_AIJ:www.chinamission.be/eng/zt/t101949.htm+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=sg.

[9] Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy”, ESPO Working Paper No. 8, 29 Jun 2014, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459948.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was held in Beijing”, 29 November 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml.

[11] Hoang Thi Ha, “Understanding China’s Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny and ASEAN’s Ambivalent Response”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, No. 2 (2019), pp. 223–54 .

[12] Farah Nadine Seth and Sharon Seah, “The ASEAN-China Partnership: Balancing Merits and Demerits”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/120, 10 September 2021, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-120-the-asean-china-partnership-balancing-merits-and-demerits-by-farah-nadine-seth-and-sharon-seah.

[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Attends and Addresses the Opening Ceremony of the Conference on Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”, 28 July 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1895951.shtml.

[14] Hoang Thi Ha, op. cit.

[15] “China’s Shift Toward Discourse Power”, Atlantic Council, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep27615.5.pdf.

[16] See: Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”, Pew Research Centre, 6 October 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries; Laura Silver, China’s international image remains broadly negative as views of the U.S. rebound, Pew Research Centre, 30 June 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/30/chinas-international-image-remains-broadly-negative-as-views-of-the-u-s-rebound; Richard Q. Turcsányi, Matej Šimalčík, Kristína Kironská, Renáta Sedláková, et al., European Public Opinion on China in the Age of COVID-19, Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and partnershttps://ceias.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/COMP-poll-report_3.pdf; Lowy Institute Poll 2020, China, The Lowy Institute, https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/china.

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,  For a Shared Future and Our Common Home, Speech by Xi Jinping at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1919473.shtml.

[18] Author’s interviews with ASEAN member states’ officials.

[19] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, op. cit.

[20] Hoang Thi Ha, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in New Bottle?”, ISEAS Perspective 2019 No. 51, 25 June 2019, /images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_51.pdf.

[21] Author’s estimation, based on the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership.

(2021-2025), https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/15.-ASEAN-US-Plan-of-Action-2021-2025-Final.pdf; and the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2021 – 2025), https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ASEAN-China-POA-2021-2025.pdf.

[22] Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN-China Summit, op. cit.

[23] State of Southeast Asia Survey Reports, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019-2021, /category/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey.

[24] Author’s interviews with ASEAN member states’ officials.

[25] “GT Voice: Australia’s empty gestures won’t hinder China-ASEAN ties”, Global Times, 28 October 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1237565.shtml.

[26] Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 113-157.

[27] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, op. cit.

[28] Hoang Thi Ha, “Southeast Asians’ Declining Trust in China”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/15, 18 February 2021, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/iseas-perspective-2021-15-southeast-asians-declining-trust-in-china-by-hoang-thi-ha.

[29] See “Beijing rattles oil companies in South China Sea off Vietnam”, Energy Voice, 13 August 2020, https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/asia/258490/beijing-oil-china-vietnam; Samir Puri, “What the Whitsun Reef incident tells us about China’s future operations at sea”, IISS, 9 April 2021,https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/04/whitsun-reef-incident-china; Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, “China’s Recent Foray into the North Natuna Sea is Problematic”, Fulcrum, 22 September 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/chinas-recent-foray-into-the-north-natuna-sea-is-problematic; Amy Chew, “China harasses Malaysian oil and gas vessels on a ‘daily’ basis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative says”, SCMP, 25 October 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3153648/china-harassing-malaysian-oil-and-gas-vessels-daily-basis-asia.

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2021/156 “Growing Shariatisation in Indonesia: The Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI) Moment?” by Norshahril Saat

 

Former MUI Chairman Ma’ruf Amin is now the country’s second in command, as vice president to Mr Joko Widodo. Photo: Taken in Jakarta on 23 October 2019 by Adek Berry, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government (2004-2014), the MUI (Ulama Council of Indonesia) became more assertive in the public sphere than under Suharto’s New Order. It issued numerous exclusivist fatwas (religious opinions) targeting religious minorities and wanted the state to oversee Islamic banking and finance.
  • In 2016 and 2017, MUI leaders, especially its chairman Ma’ruf Amin, were involved in an active campaign that eventually led to Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s defeat in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. In the 2019 presidential election, Joko Widodo named Ma’ruf as his running mate and the pair eventually won.
  • This article examines MUI’s evolution from a state “lackey” to an organisation with significant influence. Between 1998 and 2018, MUI had not been able to exercise its influence on matters it most wanted: namely, halal certification, shariah banking, and shariah society. This was partly due to internal fragmentation.
  • MUI today is, however, more homogenous, with conservatives filling up critical positions within it. The Indonesia Sharia Summit 2021 held recently bears testimony to the shariatisation project becoming mainstream in Indonesia today, and this is driven by business enterprises and growing middle-class Muslims. This paper examines whether this trend could be MUI’s biggest window of opportunity to assert its influence.

* Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/156, 24 November 2021

Download PDF Version

INTRODUCTION

In 1975, Indonesia president Suharto formed the MUI (Ulama Council of Indonesia), envisioning it as a national body of Islamic scholars (ulama) that issued fatwas and recommendations (Islamic rulings and legal opinions).[1] However, the underlying political consideration for its formation was to appease conservative quarters angered by the government’s secularising and developmental approach and the marginalising of Islam’s public role. Suharto also wished to check the powers of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), then the most prominent Islamic political party. By forming MUI, Suharto wanted to create the impression that his regime was not anti-Islam. MUI’s stature was not strong during its formative years. Had it not been for Hamka (Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah), a prominent ulama, appointed as its first chairman, it would not have had any credibility. Several of its board members were political appointees and military men. Critics considered MUI a government “lackey” although it occasionally adopted dissenting views on the government, such as over the latter’s family planning programme. 

After the fall of the New Order in 1998, MUI became more assertive when pushing its conservative agenda. For instance, during its seventh congress in 2005, MUI restated its fatwas on the deviancy of the Ahmadiyah sect issued in 1980, causing many public relations problems for the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government.[2]  International human rights groups were critical of the SBY government for not doing enough to curtail MUI.[3] MUI also did not counter the fatwa on Shi’a deviancy published by its East Jawa chapter, even though in 1984, MUI’s position was for Indonesian Muslims (largely Sunnis) to be mindful of the differences between them and Shi’as. The MUI fatwa in 1984 fell short of declaring the Shi’as deviant.[4] The East Jawa fatwa, however, fanned unnecessary tensions between the Sunnis and Shi’as in Sampang (East Jawa) and became the ideological basis for violent attacks on the minority Shi’as.[5]

In 2005, MUI issued the infamous SIPILIS fatwa, an acronym for anti-secularism, pluralism and liberalism. This was meant to inhibit differences of opinions on religious matters.[6] MUI leaders’ involvement in ousting Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in 2017, and the elevation of its chairman Ma’ruf Amin as the country’s vice president in 2019, were further manifestations of its renewed assertiveness.

But apart from issuing these controversial fatwas, MUI’s lobbying behind the scenes for greater shariatisation has often escaped public scrutiny. Tracing its evolution from a relatively weak institution under Suharto to greater assertiveness during the SBY presidency, this article seeks to ascertain MUI’s social and religious standing under the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) presidency (since 2014). In the past, MUI had witnessed internal power struggles and ideological competition even during the years of its perceived assertiveness, but the question is whether this remains the case today. Moreover, how does increasing shariatisation in Indonesia alter MUI’s standing vis-à-vis other Islamic organisations? Does the increase in religious conservatism in Indonesia offer MUI its biggest window of opportunity to further assert its role in the public sphere?

This article argues that three factors help advance MUI’s cause under the Jokowi presidency: Ma’ruf Amin’s position as vice-president; the conservatives gaining a stronger foothold in the institution which also means more organisational unity; and rising middle class requesting for a shariah-compliant lifestyle. Still, MUI’s public influence remains curtailed due to structural factors and inter-organisational rivalry. Clearly, rivalry within MUI mainly hinges on the contest between NU and Muhammadiyah members, although different political affiliations also contribute to its disunity. While MUI has been championing shariatisation over the years, many other actors, including non-ulama and politicians, are jumping on the bandwagon to have a slice of the growing sharia-compliant industries such as Islamic banking and finance, halal certification, and shariah tourism.

MUI UNDER THE NEW ORDER: A STATE “LACKEY”

In the 1970s, Suharto wanted to reverse society’s image that his regime was anti-Islam and secular. He needed a peak institution that could represent diverse Muslim voices and which would concurrently serve the regime’s interest; MUI was to serve this purpose.[7] The formation of MUI was also directed at weakening the influence then exerted by NU, the largest Islamic organisation in the country. Interestingly, while NU ulama were admitted as MUI members, a Muhammadiyah leader Hamka was offered to be its first chairman; Muhammadiyah is NU’s rival. At the outset, NU’s ideological differences with Muhammadiyah pivot on who represents the true Islam. NU represents traditionalist Islam that is more accepting of local practices such as visitations to graves of pious Muslims, the celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (maulid), and communal prayers for the deceased (tahlilan); all these are frowned upon by the modernist-oriented Muhammadiyah.

While MUI was never part of the state apparatus, it received funding—or financial assistance—from the government.  For that, observers considered it part of the New Order government. Some even labelled it Majelis “Ular” Indonesia replacing the term Ulama (religious scholars) with another “U” word, ular which means snakes. Two clear examples support this image of MUI being a state lackey: it supported the government’s birth control programme; and allowed the raising of money through the national lottery scheme (Porkas). Many Muslims in the country objected to both.[8] Other examples of MUI’s controversial stances in agreeing with the state were its religious rulings on frog breeding, mechanical slaughtering of animals, and the permissibility of eating rabbit meat.

MUI critics, however, have tended to overlook the times it clashed with the Suharto regime. There were times when it issued fatwas not in line with the inclusive and secularist spirit of the New Order. For example, it declared the Ahmadiyah deviants despite the sect’s century-old existence in the country. Similarly, it declared Shi’as as not representing mainstream Islam, urging Indonesian Muslims to be mindful of Sunni-Shi’a theological differences; however, the fatwa issued in the 1980s fell short of declaring Shi’as deviant. The MUI chairman also disallowed Muslims to wish Christians “Merry Christmas”. Some have indeed argued that it was because of MUI’s differences with the Suharto government that its chairman, Hamka, resigned.

LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS WITHIN MUI

MUI leaders often claim that the organisation is a “tenda besar” or big tent, the apex institution covering all Islamic organisations in Indonesia. In truth, the MUI of the 1990s and 2000s was run by “disgruntled” NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, plus some academics and independent ulama.

Interestingly, during the New Order period (1966-1998), NU only held the MUI chairmanship for three years; this was under Syukri Ghozali from 1981 to 1984. Suharto seemed more comfortable with Muhammadiyah leaders because he was personally more inclined towards modernism, and he saw NU as a bigger threat given its huge followership.  Between 1984 and 1998, Hassan Basri, whose organisational affiliation was unclear, was the MUI chairman rather than an NU ulama. By contrast, after the fall of the New Order, Muhammadiyah only held the chairmanship for a year, and that was because chairman Sahal Mahfudz—also from NU—passed on in 2014, and Din Syamsuddin of Muhammadiyah—the vice chairman to Sahal— assumed the vacant position. The latter’s chairmanship lasted until 2015 and he was then replaced by Ma’ruf Amin, NU leader and politician who went on to become vice-president of Indonesia in 2019. Ma’ruf was replaced by another conservative NU leader Miftachul Akhyar in 2020. The presidents after Suharto were thus more comfortable with NU, and wanted to tap on the organisation’s huge following. With the fall of the New Order, NU’s fortunes clearly underwent a revival, after long being suppressed by the Suharto regime.

NU’s dominance in MUI in the post New Order period, however, does not fully explain the internal leadership dynamics within MUI. To understand this, one has to consider NU’s internal dynamics. NU too has always been a fragmented organisation despite being primarily a traditionalist organisation. Interestingly, the NU leaders who participated in MUI were those from the conservative camp.[9] Arguably, conservative NU leaders sought refuge in MUI to get away from the progressive NU faction led by former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur) who was helming NU then. Under Gus Dur’s leadership, conservatives such as Ma’ruf Amin and Ichwan Sam were somewhat sidelined in NU; thus they carved out a space for themselves in MUI and focused their efforts there. Following Gus Dur’s passing in December 2009, NU became gradually dominated by the conservatives again. The only consolation was that the ‘Gus Durian’—the term used for those who followed his progressive ideology—continues to have their footing in NU. Those who continued to struggle for Gus Dur’s progressive outlook formed other platforms – these included The Wahid Institute, LKiS, and Fahmina. These organisations continue to struggle for pluralism.

GROWING MUI ASSERTIVENESS POST-NEW ORDER

The post-New Order era saw MUI becoming bolder and more assertive in flexing its influence. Some commentators have even suggested that MUI had contributed to Suharto’s resignation. It was reported that Ali Yafie, an NU-affiliated MUI chairman from 1998 to 2000, was one of nine national figures who requested Suharto’s resignation, a taboo subject then.[10] There were of course many factors that led to Suharto’s resignation, but MUI leaders have always cited this occasion to argue that the institution played a part in hastening the fall of the New Order regime.

After the New Order, MUI’s priorities changed. It sought to enforce elements of shariah provisions into government legislations to secure its authority as the country’s peak Islamic organisation vis-à-vis NU and Muhammadiyah. In 2001, tensions between MUI and the government surfaced regarding the halalness of the Japanese-brand food seasoning ajinomoto. There were allegations that it contained pork enzymes; pork consumption is forbidden in Islam. The tension was between two NU figures: Sahal Mahfudz— then the MUI chairman—and Gus Dur—then the Indonesian president. MUI called for the product to be withdrawn, while the Gus Dur government said Muslims could continue to consume it.  The 2005 MUI congress demonstrated the shift of MUI’s attitude from being merely the state’s spokesperson to being an assertive organisation in its own right. Scholars argue that its fatwas against Ahmadiyah, Shi’as, and liberals coincided with Indonesian Muslims’ growing conservatism. Incidentally, there were violent attacks against followers of the sects after these rulings were issued, and while MUI was not directly involved, many contend that it could have provided more leadership to prevent violence or calm the situation, which it failed to do. Some attackers had taken the cue from MUI fatwas to launch the attack. Other scholars say that president SBY became pliant to MUI’s advice, for example when he named Ma’ruf Amin as one of his presidential council members.

While many have emphasised its political and religious role, MUI in fact has a more extensive project, namely, pushing for shariatisation and securing its role in the halal certification process and Islamic banking and finance. This had its origins in the SBY presidency, and though partly driven by religion, is essentially about politics and capitalism. Any halal certification or advisory body can earn commissions or charge administrative fees from every licence issued or advice given. It can also compel businesses to shut if they do not meet the body’s halal standards. MUI wants to monopolise this role.

Under the SBY presidency, MUI had repeatedly failed to alter rules and regulations in its favour. It made some inroads in the field of shariah banking and finance; for instance, banks wanting to adopt shariah-compliant instruments were required to appoint MUI members as advisors. As it is, they must be consulted on shariah matters or transactions, and in return, MUI will grant shariah certificates as endorsements. But MUI’s attempt to replicate this arrangement on halal certification for food and medicines were unsuccessful, and they were weakened by direct competition with the Ministry of Religion (Kemenag). Halal certification is a lucrative business, and MUI’s halal certification institution LPPOM-MUI is tasked to oversee it, and to issue halal certificates to firms who meet its criteria concerning slaughtering techniques and more. However, in 2014, State Law No 33/2014 was passed to ascertain that MUI’s role is restricted to theological aspects of the certification process, which is the less lucrative part. Meanwhile, the religious ministry is the authoritative body that issues certificates and charges for these. The law kicked in in 2019.

MUI UNDER JOKOWI PRESIDENCY: CREEPING SHARIATISATION

MUI continued to request for more significant public role during the Jokowi presidency. The Jokowi presidency can be divided into his first term (2014-2019) and the current second term (2019 -present). I contend that there is an apparent difference between MUI and state relations between these two periods. During Jokowi’s first term, the state initially tried to continue past policies of marginalising MUI or slowing down its demands. Consistent with the Suharto government, progressives were appointed as ministers of religion ahead of the conservatives.  The appointment of Lukman Hakim Saifuddin in 2014 serves as a case in point. 

The Aksi Bela Islam of 2016 and 2017, which sought to demand for Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama to apologise and resign for blasphemy, was the turning point. About 200,000 Muslims protested against the Christian, Chinese Jakarta governor for making offensive remarks against their faith. These were the largest gathering after the Reformasi which toppled Suharto in 1998, reminding President Jokowi of the need to appeal to conservatives. MUI was not directly involved with these 212 movements, but the movement’s leaders cleverly used MUI’s fatwa to claim legitimacy, arguing that the movement’s objective was to defend the MUI fatwa (GNPF-MUI). Moreover, Ma’ruf Amin, then MUI chairman, and Bachtiar Nasir, a MUI Board member, became the key symbols in rallying the protesters.[11]  In one of the rallies, Jokowi appeared and shared the same stage with the rally leaders. Later, Ma’ruf was also named as a key witness during Ahok’s trial, and the former Jakarta governor was subsequently jailed. Among the conservatives, the role of MUI leaders in the protests boosted the organization’s image as the “defender of Islam”. This also signalled to the political elites that MUI was a force to be reckoned with.

Suffering from the “black campaign” during the 2014 election and being surprised by the scale of the 212 movements, Jokowi had to battle the 2019 election against Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno who campaigned using religion. This left Jokowi with little choice but to consider a Muslim figure to win over the Muslim voters. But instead of naming progressives like Mahfud MD, the former constitutional court judge, as his running mate, Jokowi settled for Ma’ruf Amin instead. This indirectly placed MUI in the highest political order since its formation in 1975.

Internally, MUI under the current Jokowi presidency remains under the control of the conservatives. Those who reigned under Ma’ruf’s chairmanship continue to helm the institution.  There had been aspirations early on that the Jokowi presidency would provide opportunity for young progressive voices in Indonesia to take over the helm in MUI. However, young scholars who were initially rumoured to be possible leaders in MUI were not elected to the institution. This means that MUI will remain a conservative institution. MUI’s general passivity in tackling attacks against minorities in East Kalimantan recently indicates that its stance has not changed since the 2005 fatwa. MUI vice president Anwar Abbas even said MUI must not be pressured to alter its fatwas against Ahmadiyah, and instead blamed the Ahmadiyahs for provoking the mainstream Muslim community.

Jokowi’s only instrument for controlling the conservatives is through the minister of religion appointment. The minister holds the key to financial resources and can tweak policies that undermine MUI’s authority. In 2019, Jokowi appointed a military figure Fachrul Razi as the minister of religion. The president justified the appointment of an army general to the post as necessary to quell radicalism, but he was also likely seeking to side-line the religious figures from repeating the 2016 and 2017 mass mobilisation. Fachrul’s appointment lasted only slightly more than a year, however, and in December 2020, he was replaced by an NU and PKB politician Yaqut Cholil Qoumas. There is little discussion why Yaqut was selected and how much Ma’ruf had a say in this appointment. For the record, Ma’ruf is currently NU’s supreme leader, but he too has a history in the formation of PKB.  However, some argue that Jokowi himself has a strong liking for PKB.[12]

CONCLUSION: THE MUI MOMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE ENVIRONMENT

The current push for greater shariatisation in Indonesian society serves MUI’s push to assert its authority. Shariatization has become so mainstream that it has now been promoted by non-ulama, politicians and the business community. They have shown strong interest to boost the banking, finance and tourism sectors in the halal market. Numerous platforms have been created in Indonesia to promote shariah economics and finance. Jokowi too realises the potential of shariatisation. In a recent interview, he remarked:

“The halal market has global potential. As the largest Muslim majority country, Indonesia must not only be a consumer. We have the potential to be a supplier for the global halal market. That is why we are now preparing infrastructure to support our entry, including by setting up a bank for funding and capacity building for halal products.”[13]

MUI aspires to be the leading organisation providing theological opinions on halal consumption since it has a long history fronting shariatisation. Today, Ma’ruf Amin is deemed to be the spokesperson on Islamic banking, finance and tourism. He currently chairs the Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah (MES) or Shariah Economy Society, and its prominent members include Puan Maharani (Megawati’s daughter and chair of MPR or People’s Consultative Assembly) and current MUI chairman Miftachul Akhyar.[14] In 2001, the MES was established to grow the sector, encouraging the existing finance and banking sector to implement Syariah principles.[15] Other indicators of the sector emerging is the growth of Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI). In February 2021, three Syariah banks merged with BSI to make it more competitive at the global level.[16] On 22 and 23 September 2021, Ma’ruf was invited to deliver the keynote address for the Indonesia Sharia Summit 2021 entitled Kemaslahatan Untuk Bangkit Bersama (Wellbeing to Raising Again Together). The event was organised by the Metro Media Group Network. The project also included shariah banking practitioners, as well as social media influencers.[17] These examples show MUI’s and Ma’ruf’s strategy to assert influence in Indonesian society beyond his vice-presidency.


ENDNOTES

[1] Fatwa-making in Indonesia is decentralized and Islamic institutions in the country have their fatwa-making bodies. Religious rulings issued by these bodies apply to their members. One should note, nonetheless, that in Islam, fatwas are legally non-binding.

[2] Sekretariat Majjelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa: Majelis Ulama Indonesia Sejak 1975 (Edisi Terbaru) p.109-121.

[3] Andras Harsono, “Indonesia’s Ahmadiyah Push Back Against Discriminatory Laws,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/23/indonesias-ahmadiyah-push-back-against-discriminatory-laws

[4] Ibid, p.55.

[5] Aan Suryana, The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia: Minority Faiths and Vigilantism, (London and New York: Routledge, 2020).

[6] Sekretariat Majjelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa: Majelis Ulama Indoensia Sejak 1975, pp.95-103.

[7] M Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesia Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988. (Jakarta: Indonesia Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, 1993), 53. The strategy was in line with his method of streamlining political parties too. In 1973, the president streamlined the country’s political party structure into three groups: mass-based party (Golkar), Islamic-based party (PPP) and nationalist (PDI). The PPP (United Development Party) also included NU which was then a political party.

[8] Bramantyo, P. Indonesia: Ban on MUI? AsiaViews. 2 February 2009.

[9] In other words, they can be referred to as the conservative traditionalists, and their opponents as the modernist traditionalists.

[10] Syafiq Hasyim, “Indonesia’s MUI Today: Truly Moderate or Merely Pragmatic,” ISEAS: Perspective, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/iseas-perspective-2020-3-indonesias-mui-today-truly-moderate-or-merely-pragmatic-by-syafiq-hasyim/

[11] Syafiq Hasyim, “Indonesia’s MUI Today: Truly Moderate or Merely Pragmatic,” ISEAS: Perspective, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/iseas-perspective-2020-3-indonesias-mui-today-truly-moderate-or-merely-pragmatic-by-syafiq-hasyim/

[12] Budiarti Utami Putri, “Yaqut Cholil Qoumas Jadi Menag, PKB: Itu kecitaan Pak Jokowi Pada Kami,” Tempo.co, 22 December 2020, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1416818/yaqut-cholil-qoumas-jadi-menag-pkb-itu-kecintaan-pak-jokowi-pada-kami

[13] Kishore Mahbubani, “Jokowi on transforming Indonesia: Fulfilling the people’s mandate,” The Straits Times, 9 October 2021.

[14] In 1991, Bank Muamalat was formed, and this was followed by other institutions. The sector remained dormant when first mooted, as a result of President Suharto’s ambivalent attitude towards Islamic revivalism.

[15] Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah Website, https://www.ekonomisyariah.org/tentang-kami/profil-organisasi/

[16] Bank Syariah Indonesia Website, https://www.bankbsi.co.id/company-information/tentang-kami

[17] The Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy Sandiaga Uno also delivered a speech endorsing the project during the conference. This was consistent with his earlier call, when he urged Indonesian youths to take advantage of the sharia economics which has grown from 5.72 per cent since 2019. These are related to halal food, fashion, agriculture. He added that the sharia economy is identified with CHSE (cleanliness, health, safety and Environmental sustainability). See Antaranews, “Menparekraf ajak anak muda kembangkan ekonomi Syariah,” 13 July 2021.

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2021/155 “Asymmetrical Federalism in Myanmar: A Modern Mandala System?” by Mael Raynaud

 

Protesters take part in a demonstration against the military coup in Yangon on 10 November 2021, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The military coup that took place in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 amounted to a de facto suspension of the country’s 2008 Constitution.
  • Following the coup, Myanmar’s democratic opposition, which had long opposed the constitution, announced its abolition. It is now working towards developing, and adopting, a federal system of government for the country.
  • This federal future is largely inspired by Myanmar’s political organization in the precolonial era, i.e. before the imposition of the Weberian state. Pre-colonial Burma, like much of the rest of the region, was defined by shifting power relations that have been described as a “Mandala” system.
  • Today, Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups have developed “proto-states” that deliver services and other forms of governance independently of the central state.
  • Ethnic demands for federalism include asymmetric territorial arrangements, involving terms such as “Reserved Territories” or “Autonomous Regions”. The 2008 Constitution itself enshrined the existence of six “Self-Administered Zones” for ethnic nationalities that were not granted the status of “state”.
  • Any future federal system in Myanmar is therefore likely to be “asymmetrical” in nature, though it is highly unlikely that Myanmar will do away with the modern Weberian state.
  • Asymmetrical federalism in Myanmar will thus be a system where a modern Mandala system and the Weberian state co-exist.

*Mael Raynaud is a political analyst specializing in decentralization, federalism and education reform in Myanmar. His research project is supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS)

ISEAS Perspective 2021/155, 23 November 2021

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INTRODUCTION

On 1 February 2021, the Burmese military staged a coup d’état, and assumed power under the State Administration Council (SAC). This ended an experience of limited, and yet very real, democratization, that lasted exactly ten years.[1] While the coup amounted to the de facto suspension of the 2008 Constitution,[2] the military insisted that its assumption of power was in fact constitutional, stating that its objective was to protect and maintain the constitutional order and to organize fresh elections once more accurate voters’ lists had been produced.[3]

On 3 February, elected members of parliament from the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD)[4] formed in response a Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH).[5] Two and half months later, on 16 April, the CRPH appointed a National Unity Government (NUG) consisting of members of the NLD, ethnic political parties, civil society organizations and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).

The three most important “decisions” made by the CRPH, beyond denouncing the SAC, were to lift the status of terrorist organizations from all EAOs, to symbolically abolish the 2008 Constitution, and to produce a Federal Democracy Charter. These were published on 31 March.[6]

Constitutions, and the vexing issue of federalism, have long been at the center of Burmese politics.[7] Political and armed organizations claiming to represent the interests of ethnic nationalities have demanded greater levels of autonomy, and the adoption of a federal system. These demands have been and remain a contentious issue in relations between these organizations and the central state,[8] which is widely seen as being dominated by the country’s Buddhist Bamar majority.[9] The storied Panglong Agreement signed by Aung San and “representatives of the Shan States, Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills” on 12 February 1947—a date still celebrated as Union Day in contemporary Myanmar—is probably more relevant for the much-discussed but elusive[10] “Panglong Spirit” that it inspires than for its actual content. Nevertheless, it remains the foundation on which both ethnic nationalities[11] and, more recently, the NLD[12] and now the CRPH/NUG[13] would build a federal system.

While the text of the Panglong Agreement does not mention the words “federal” or “federalism”, it has left many in Myanmar’s body politic with the lasting notion that the country should be independent, democratic, and federal.[14] Critically, that text does stipulate that “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle”.[15]

With the military’s de facto suspension of the 2008 Constitution, its symbolic abolition by the CRPH/NUG, and its quasi-universal rejection by the people of Myanmar,[16] the country is once again trying to imagine a future for itself.[17] A consensus seems to exist in favour of freedom  from military rule, of democracy and federalism, and of moving beyond the limits of the hybrid system that defined the political order of the past decade.[18]

FEDERALISM: A MANDALA SYSTEM OR A WEBERIAN STATE?

Demands for federalism in Myanmar often go beyond challenging military rule. Fundamentally, the emphasis put on the recognition of ethnic rights, including autonomy and self-determination, in those demands call into question the European concepts that led to the colonial creation of the “modern” state[19] in Burma,[20] as in so many other parts of the world.[21] From necessarily inaccurate and misleading lists of ethnic groups[22] to the concepts of nation-state, the centralized state, and even fixed borders—not to mention the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence[23]—it is the Weberian State itself that is challenged, if not opposed, by many  ethnic political organizations. For instance, they insist that their “communities” be defined as “ethnic nationalities”, and not as “ethnic minorities”. That is not only because of the large number of “non-Bamar” in Myanmar, but also because many of these groups consider themselves “nations” that never lived under Bamar domination prior to colonization. This conviction is central to their relationship, or their opposition, to the state, and to their understanding of federalism.[24]

From a historical perspective, using the phrase “pre-colonial Burma” and thus suggesting that the country’s history is defined by a period “before” and “after” European intrusion, one is faced with the reality that Myanmar as we know it today simply did not exist prior to colonization.[25] Ethnic nationalities regularly insist on this truth.[26] In that sense, the debates around federalism are debates meant to answer not only the question “how do we make sense of this territory as one single ‘country’, when historically we never were one nation?”, -but also “how does federalism reflect the fact that Myanmar is made up of several nations, and not just one?”

It is striking that in the course of decades of struggle against the central state, a number of EAOs[27] have built proto-states.[28] Health care provision is a case in point. Nilar Khaing and I have argued elsewhere that, “as with all nation building efforts, both [the central state and EAOs] see the provision of health care – along with education[29] and other services – as a way to establish their authority, and to control territories and populations”.[30]

In these competing nation-building projects, we can recognize both James C. Scott’s idea of the hill tribes of Burma as “self-governing peoples . . .  that have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppression of state-making projects in the valleys”,[31] and Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both limited and sovereign”.[32] In other words, both ethnic nationalities and the central state—and particularly the Burmese military—resort to nationalism, in the sense that “it invents nations where they do not exist”.[33]

Seen in this light, the work done within the framework of the Myanmar peace process,[34]  demands for federalism, and the provision in the 2008 Constitution for subnational parliaments and governments and for Self-Administered Zones[35] amount to a reconstruction of the political order that existed prior to Britain’s colonization of Burma, the so-called “mandala system”.[36] In characterizing that system, Oliver Wolters noted that “the map of earlier South East Asia was defined by “a patchwork of mandalas, or circles of kings … In practice, the mandala represented a particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries and where smaller centers tended to look in all directions for security … Happenings on the mandala fringes were as significant as those at the centers”.[37]

PRE-COLONIAL BURMA’S MANDALA SYSTEM

Aurore Candier, who likens the mandala to the notion of a “sphere d’influence”, tells us that this system stands on the submission and loyalty of subordinates at the peripheries of the kingdom, symbolized by the payment of tribute to the king.[38] She refers to the palace and its direct vicinity as the “central mandala”, and the rest of the kingdom as the “second mandala”. The mandala has also been referred to as a “segmentary state” and a “galactic polity”.[39]

Inasmuch as the mandala system is seen as a series of circles centered around the king, it is important to distinguish between two distinct, but related, types of circles. The first would be drawn along social, economic, and political lines, what I have dubbed the “social stupa”.[40] According to Michael Aung-Thwin, “Burmese social organization was arranged horizontally into a pyramidal scheme of three major divisions. At the top was the royalty, their clearly definable kin and the higher (court) officialdom; below them were the lower (provincial) officialdom; and at the bottom lay the commoners, the bulk of Burmese society”.[41]

The second would separate what the British would later call “Burma Proper”, and the “Frontier Areas” along geographic and ethnic lines. As William J. Koenig puts it, “pre-colonial society was characterized by major divisions between the lowland and upland people . . . The primary ethnic division was between the Burmans and the subject Mon and Shan”.[42]  Koenig included neither the Kingdom of Arakan[43] nor the Chin, Kachin or Karen tribes in this list. This exclusion supports the claims of the political leaders of these communities since the struggle for independence that their “nations” were not natural elements in the building of a country called “Burma”.

Koenig describes the second mandala as the “myo-za system”, made of towns (myo) and villages, with a myo-za at the head of each town and a ywa-za serving as the village headman. He includes the Shan sawbwa as rulers of local fiefs, indicating the closer relations that Shan “princes” entertained with the palace in Mandalay, although, in typical mandala fashion, they often also looked as vassals to Siam or China. This would be comparable to the mueang of Siam, in their shifting relations to centers of power within and beyond the territory now known as Thailand. From the perspective of the palace in Mandalay, Koenig considers that “the administrative goal was to prevent other centers of power from developing within the polity and competing with the monarchy”[44].

The Burman kings also developed relations of overlord to vassal with upland peoples, though these relations were characterized by more violence. For Oliver B. Pollak, “poor communications and ethnic diversity created center-periphery tensions between the Irrawaddy heartland and the outlying areas. An uneasy state of conquest, incorporations and vassal status existed between the central Burmans and the encircling Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karen and Mon”.[45]

FEDERALISM AS A MODERN MANDALA SYSTEM

Recent processes of decentralization on the one hand and on the other hand, the existence of Self-Administered Zones enshrined in the 2008 Constitution, the peace process, and demands for federalism—not least those associated to the creation of “Reserved Territories” or “Autonomous Regions”[46]— have unmistakable similarities to the mandala system of old. Nor is the possibility that Myanmar may organically evolve in the direction of its political organization prior to colonization and the colonial creation of the “modern” Weberian State, in a return to some sort of “original” state, surprising.

The violence that has followed the coup is in itself a reminder of Myanmar’s political geography. Urban guerrilla warfare in the main cities, resistance in rural areas that witnessed communist insurgency in the post-independence era and continued civil war in ethnic “states” represent circles of resistance to an over-centralized state, led by a military for whom G. E. Harvey’s qualification of Burma’s pre-colonial monarchy as “sanguinary despotism” seems to fit like a glove.[47]

But Myanmar has evolved significantly in recent years, both in its political and demographic reality. If circles were to be drawn today, with a central mandala based in Naypyidaw, and a second mandala made of the supposedly “Bamar” regions that would include both Yangon and Mandalay, it should be noted that those regions have themselves developed a strong interest in decentralization.[48] This development is related to the fostering of local political eco-systems.[49]

A third mandala, then, would be comprised of the areas of ethnic states, including their seven respective capitals. Even in the context of a federal system, these areas are likely to remain within the political and administrative reality of the Myanmar state because of the inertia of a state apparatus that had already struggled at the local level with the new responsibilities granted to it by the process of decentralization.[50] The fact that “ethnic states” are now more diverse, that their population tends to vote in ways largely similar to the rest of the country, and show a “relatively strong attachment to Myanmar”, is another relevant factor.[51] Federalism, in that sense, would see a necessarily limited transformation of the Myanmar state apparatus, as opposed to its complete overhaul. It is not impossible, though, that ethnic states would be granted powers broader than those granted to the seven Bamar-majority regions.[52]

Both the 2008 Constitution, through the creation of “Self-Administered Zones”, and the draft for a federal constitution developed by organizations representing ethnic nationalities, with its reference to “Reserved Territories” and “Autonomous Regions”, recognize the de facto existence of territories controlled by EAOs. The reality of conflict suggests that a form of status quo is likely to continue as long as it remains impossible for the country’s military to eradicate the EAOs, and that it is just as impossible for EAOs to take, let alone control, any major city—including the seven capitals of ethnic states where subnational governments and parliaments are based.

The activities of most EAOs do not respect administrative boundaries defined by the Myanmar state. The Kachin Independence Organization is active in northern Shan State, the Karen National Union in Mon State, and the Arakan Army in Chin State. The notion of “contested areas”,[53] over which both the central government and EAOs claim control and in which they both provide services, as well as the overlapping maps of what each group considers its territory, demonstrate the fluidity of political control that defines the mandala system—already a reality in many parts of the country.

In that sense, Myanmar’s political geography is not only made of a series of circles of power, but also of a series of centers of power, the most obvious being the headquarters of various EAOs. Entire communities either exist in a social pyramid at the top of which one does not find generals from the Myanmar military but rather the leaders of the local EAO, or feel the sway of competing polities,[54] or both.

A MODERN MANDALA SYSTEM WITHIN A WEBERIAN STATE?

This de facto recreation of a poly-centric political system reminiscent of the “mandala” of pre-colonial Burma, with multiple layers and a great variety in the relations between various centers and various peripheries, has led David C. Williams to refer to the concept of asymmetrical federalism.[55] Any modern mandala system, or form of asymmetrical federalism, needs to be understood with reference to two different sets of power systems. One is the political and administrative system of the Myanmar state, in which political parties, including ethnic political parties, participate.[56] The other is the reality of conflict, and the power bases of various ethnic armed organizations.[57]

EAOs strive to establish “proto-states”, developing administrative systems able to provide services in sectors such as health, education or justice. The more successful these efforts are, the more the territories under their control will—ironically—experience the development of a state with Weberian attributes.

In that sense, the issue is less that of a retreat, or collapse, of the Weberian state and its replacement by new forms of mandala systems, and more the co-existence of both systems, in an asymmetric form of federalism.[58]


ENDNOTES

[1] Mael Raynaud, “The Dynamics Behind Myanmar’s Political Consensus”, Tea Circle, 29 June 2017. (https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/06/29/the-dynamics-behind-myanmars-political-consensus/, downloaded 25 October 2021).

[2] For a comprehensive analysis of the 2008 Constitution, see Melissa Crouch, The Constitution of Myanmar: A Contextual Analysis (Melbourne: Hart Publishing, 2019).

[3] The coup took place the very day that the two chambers of parliament, elected on 8 November 2020, were to convene and elect the president and the two vice presidents. The president was in turn to form a new government. The reasons given for the coup—widespread fraud during the elections and widely inaccurate voters’ lists—contradict the observations of the European Union, international monitors such as the Carter Center and local monitors such as the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections, which all deemed the elections free and fair.

[4] Members of parliament from ethnic parties later joined the CRPH. While lacking access to the resources and powers of the state, the group immediately found legitimacy not only in the fact that its members, contrary to those of the military junta, had been elected, but also in the tens of thousands of posters and banners carried by many protesters, asking for the release of all political prisoners, the return to democracy, and specifically supporting the CRPH. I spent February and March 2021 (and many years before that) in Yangon and was witness to this support granted by an entire people to the CRPH, as well as to detained leaders, starting with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint.

[5]  The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is Myanmar’s bicameral parliament.

[6] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar’s Shadow Government Vows a New Constitution and End to Dictatorship”, 1 April 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-shadow-government-vows-new-constitution-end-dictatorship.html, downloaded 25 October 2021). The text of the federal democracy charter is available on the CRPH’s website (https://crphmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Federal-Democracy-Charter-English.pdf, downloaded on 25 October 2021). A final draft of the Federal Constitution is apparently going to be published in December 2021; Saw Thonya, “Draft Federal Union Constitution to be finalized in December”, Burma News International, 24 May 2021 (https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/draft-federal-union-constitution-be-finalized-december, downloaded 25 October 2021).

[7] Tinzar Htun and Mael Raynaud, “Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution – Avenues for reform and decentralization and steps towards a federal system” (Yangon: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2018).

[8] Indeed, the issue is the cause of what is often referred to as “the longest civil war in the world”. See for instance Bertil Lintner, “Why Burma’s Peace Efforts Have Failed to End its Internal Wars” (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, Peace Works n°169, 2020).

[9] Michael Siegner, “In Search of the Panglong Spirit: The Role of Federalism in Myanmar’s Peace Discourse” (Yangon: Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2019).

[10] Matthew J.  Walton, “Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong”, Asian Survey 48:6 (2008), pp. 889-910.

[11] Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee, The New Panglong Initiative, Rebuilding the Union of Burma, edited by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe and Lian H. Sakhong (Chiang Mai: UNLD Press, 2003).

[12] As shown with the branding as “21st century Panglong” of the cycle of peace conferences organized by the NLD governments in 2016, 2017, 2019 and 2020, and discussed in Mael Raynaud, “Panglong Spirit Under the 2008 Constitution”, Tea Circle, 22 July 2016 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2016/07/22/panglong-spirit-under-the-2008-constitution/, downloaded on 25 October 2021).

[13] The CRPH/NUG federal democracy charter, published on 31 March 2021, states that “it is essential to implement once again the Panglong Agreement, Panglong Commitment and Panglong Principle which are the original convention of the Union in order to build peaceful and prosperous Federal Union.”

[14] This is my interpretation, based on two decades working with political activists from Myanmar, and in particular those representing ethnic nationalities.

[15] For the full text of the Panglong Agreement and additional related documents, see Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 239–245.

[16] Frontier Myanmar, “The Constitution is Invalid Now: NLD patron fires back at Military” (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-constitution-is-invalid-now-nld-patron-fires-back-at-military/, downloaded 25 October 2021).

[17] Bertil Lintner, “Finding a Federal Model that Fits”, The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2014 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/finding-federal-model-fits.html, downloaded 25 October 2021).

[18] Mael Raynaud, “Educating for Peace, the Rule of Law and Development in a New Myanmar”, Journal of Human Rights and Peace Studies 2:2 (2016): 35-74.

[19] See Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar (London: Hurst, 2009).

[20] The author refers to the country as “Burma” prior to 1989, and “Myanmar” since, as is now common practice in Myanmar studies.

[21] This is also true in countries that were never formally colonized, such as neighbouring Thailand. See Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, third edition 2014).

[22] Nicolas Salem-Gervais and Mael Raynaud, “Teaching ethnic minority languages in government schools and developing the local curriculum: elements of decentralization in language-in education policy” (Yangon: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2020).

[23] While the concept of a federal army, supported by a number of ethnic organizations as well as the National Unity Government, would require an article of its own to discuss, it might be the clearest example of a demand reminiscent of the mandala system, and arguably in direct contradiction with the definition and the practice of Weberian states, in the sense that no centralized security forces would be able to control the entire territory.

[24] The irony of ethnic nationalities referring to the rather modern and European concepts of “nation” or “sovereignty’ has been noted by many scholars, among them Mandy Sadan, Being and Becoming Kachin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[25] It is thus difficult to describe the geographic area known as Myanmar, before colonization in any other way than as “pre-colonial Burma”. 

[26] Author’s field notes, Thailand and Myanmar, 2002-2008.

[27] Such as the Kachin Independence Organization, the United Wa State Organization, the Restauration Council for Shan State, the Karen National Union or more recently the Arakan Army. The most detailed description of one of these forms of governance can be found in Kim Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: the Karen National Union in Times of Change” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016). Jolliffe has also co-authored a series of reports for the Asia Foundation on topics such as the provision of education, health, or justice services by EAOs or organizations closely associated with them.

[28] There is no negative undertone to this phrase. It simply reflects the fact that the objective is indeed to build a form of governance that shares many of the attributes of a state, even as these forms of governance do not fit internationally accepted definitions of a state that could, for instance, join the United Nations. Whether these proto-states are based in camps literally in the jungle, or in some of the most developed cities in Myanmar, on the Chinese border, or across the border with Thailand, they remain out of the reach of the Myanmar state, and, for that matter, of most citizens of Myanmar.

[29] Nicolas Salem-Gervais and Rosalie Metro, “A textbook case of nation-building: The Evolution of History Curricula in Myanmar”, Journal of Burma Studies, Volume 16 n°1 (2012): 27-78.

[30] Nilar Khaing and Mael Raynaud, “Covid-19, Decentralization and the 2020 Elections in Myanmar”, ISEAS Perspective, 20 October 2020 (https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2020-120-covid-19-decentralization-and-the-2020-elections-in-myanmar-by-nilar-khaing-and-mael-raynaud/, downloaded 2 November 2021).

[31] James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed (New Haven: Yale University Press 2009), p. ix.

[32] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso 1983) p. 6.

[33]  Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964) p. 169.

[34] The peace process was initiated by then President U Thein Sein in August 2011, and continued under the NLD administration as “the 21st century Panglong”. For a sober analysis of the state of the peace process, see David Mathieson, “Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is Dead”, The Irrawaddy, 15 October 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmars-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-is-dead.html, downloaded 25 October 20210).

[35] The 2008 Constitution divides the national territory into seven (supposedly) Bamar majority “regions” and seven “ethnic” states. Within Sagaing Region and Shan State, it grants ”self-administered zones” to six ethnic nationalities that were not given “their own states”: the Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Palaung, Kokang, and Wa. The latter groups territory is distinguished from that of the others, under the name of the Wa Self-Administered Division.

[36] Mael Raynaud, “Towards a Normalization of the Political Sociology of the Elites in Myanmar”, Tea Circle, 30 January 2017 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/01/30/towards-a-normalization-of-the-political-sociology-of-the-elites-in-myanmar-part-one/, downloaded on 25 October 2021).

[37] W.O. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982) pp. 27-28.

[38] Aurore Candier, La réforme politique en Birmanie pendant le premier moment colonial (1819-1878) (Paris: EFEO, 2020).

[39] Baker and Pasuk, p. 9.

[40] Mael Raynaud, “Towards a Normalization of the Political Sociology of the Elites in Myanmar”, Tea Circle, 30 January 2017 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/01/30/towards-a-normalization-of-the-political-sociology-of-the-elites-in-myanmar-part-one/, downloaded on 25 October 2021).

[41] Michael Aung-Thwin, “Hierarchy and Order in Pre-Colonial Burma”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume 15, n°2 (September 1984): 224-232.

[42] William J. Koenig, The Burmese Polity, 1752-1819 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), p. 37.

[43] Arakan was invaded by the Burmese in 1784.

[44] William J. Koenig, p. 99.

[45] Oliver B. Pollak, “Crisis of Kingship: Dynasticism and Revolt in Burma, 1837-1852”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume 7, n°2 (September 1976): 187-196.

[46] “Article 195: Reserved Territories” of the second draft of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma, adopted on 12 February 2008, states that: “(A) An area or part of an area, belonging traditionally to a particular indigenous minority group in a Member State of the Federal Union, may be reserved as a territory for that group.”

[47] G.E. Harvey, The History of Burma, from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the English Conquest (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1925), p. 361.

[48] Thein Than Win and Mael Raynaud, “Decentralization: Bamars Care About Governing Their Own Regions, Too”, Tea Circle, 8 April 2019 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2019/04/08/decentralization-bamars-care-about-governing-their-own-regions-too/, downloaded 25 October 2021).

[49] Nicolas Salem-Gervais and Mael Raynaud, “Teaching ethnic minority languages”.

[50] Tinzar Htun and Mael Raynaud, “Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution”.

[51] Jangai Jap, “Understanding Recent Survey Data on Kachin’s Heterogeneous Attitudes Toward Myanmar”, Tea Circle, 2 July 2020 (https://teacircleoxford.com/2020/07/02/understanding-recent-survey-data-on-kachins-heterogeneous-attitudes-toward-myanmar/, downloaded 25 October 2021)

[52] I have addressed the issue of the “8 States solution”, i.e. the idea developed by a number of politicians and scholars representing ethnic nationalities to organize Myanmar around eight or nine ethnic states, and one large Bamar region, in the second part of the article “Panglong Spirit Under the 2008 Constitution”, cited above.

[53] Adam Burke, Nicola Williams, Patrick Barron, Kim Jolliffe, Thomas Carr, “The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2017).

[54] Ashley South, “Hybrid Governance and the Politics of Legitimacy in Myanmar’s Peace Process”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2017) (DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2017.1387280).

[55] David C. Williams, “Asymmetrical Federalism in Burma”, in Social Difference and Constitutionalism in Pan-Asia, edited by Susan H. Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press 2014) pp. 137-164. The concept is also used in Tinzar Htun and Mael Raynaud, “Schedule Two of the 2008 constitution”.

[56] This article considers what a federal system may look like if adopted, while recognizing that democracy has been suspended until a time that remains unknown. It is, for instance, highly doubtful that any party enjoying any real degree of popular support would participate in future elections, if these were organized by the current military regime.

[57] Mael Raynaud, “Asymmetric Constitutional Arrangements and Federalism in Myanmar”, ISEAS Perspective, forthcoming.

[58] Melbourne Forum on Constitution-building in Asia and the Pacific, “Asymmetric Constitutional Arrangements in Decentralized Systems”, Melbourne Forum Constitutional Insights n°3 (October 2018).

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