2021/145 “Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy in The Philippines and Its Impacts” by Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Improved bilateral relations paved the way for China’s vaccine diplomacy in The Philippines. Manila gained early access to critical jabs while Beijing received another endorsement for its global dose drive.
- President Duterte taking a Sinopharm shot and huge orders of Sinovac doses were votes of confidence for China. But reliance on Chinese jabs and continued tensions in the maritime flashpoint have stirred domestic unease.
- As the vaccination drive continues into next year, China is well placed to appeal to Filipino leaders and voters as a pandemic-tested partner. Incidents at sea, however, may undercut this aspiration.
- As new virus variants emerge and more international partners step up, China’s early mover advantage increasingly comes under challenge.
* Guest writer, Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, is Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/145, 15 November 2021
INTRODUCTION
Improved bilateral relations in recent years made The Philippines a key beneficiary of China’s global health outreach. Beijing’s pioneering medical assistance was critical in the early months of Manila’s fight against Covid-19. When China switched gears and embarked on a massive vaccine diplomacy, The Philippines once again became a recipient. Rapid mass production, proximity, less stringent logistical requirements, steady supply, and technology licensing for overseas production made Chinese vaccine overtures attractive to its neighbours, including The Philippines. China’s vaccine exports also drew other major country donors to compete in vaccine provision. Worries that Beijing may leverage its dose donations to deepen its influence among recipients compelled rivals to step up sooner. China’s health outreach gave it a platform to project the image of a benign and responsible neighbouring power in the lead-up to the May 2022 Philippine elections. Whether its gambit pays off remains to be seen.
Yet, despite the inroads made by China’s vaccine diplomacy, unease about growing reliance on Chinese vaccine supplies and possible strings attached persists. Opposition figures cite a possible linkage between the South China Sea disputes and Chinese jab shipments.[1] Concerns were raised that Beijing may capitalize on Manila’s focus on pandemic response and growing demand for Chinese doses to consolidate and expand its position in the maritime flashpoint. To this end, the drive to diversify sources and the entry of more donors converge to offer The Philippines much legroom and avoid becoming too beholden to its big neighbour for its vaccination programme. It also tempers the influence that may come from Beijing’s health outreach and gives Manila ample space to push back on other contentious aspects of the relations.
A PIONEER PANDEMIC PARTNER THAT FORCED RIVALS TO STEP UP
China plays a crucial role in the Philippine pandemic response. It was the first to donate test kits and personal protective equipment and dispatch a team of medical experts to share its accumulated experience in dealing with the pandemic.[2] It also donated cash, millions of face masks and other medical equipment and supplies.[3] It was also the first to give Philippine military aircraft and vessels a special permit to fetch medical supplies from China.[4] Aside from its national government, Chinese tycoons,[5] enterprises,[6] and local governments, especially those with twinning arrangements (sister cities, provinces)[7] with their Filipino counterparts, stepped up to lend a hand. The timing of this intervention was critical as the country faced a dearth of local and international supplies, its health capacity stretched thin and with few foreign partners forthcoming.
China was also first to donate and sell government-procured vaccines to The Philippines. The arrival of 600,000 doses of Sinovac’s Coronavac began The Philippines’ national vaccine rollout in early March.[8] A second batch of 400,000 jabs arrived later in the month.[9] Amid rising Covid-19 cases, limited global vaccine supply and hurdles in procuring Western vaccines in the early months of the campaign against the unprecedented health crisis, China’s timely input enabled the country to inoculate its medical and security frontliners and priority at-risk groups. This was not lost to Manila, especially to President Rodrigo Duterte who bared plans to make a final trip to China before stepping down from office just to convey his personal gratitude to his country’s big neighbour.[10]
Indemnity and advance payments have been sticking points in the country’s negotiations with foreign vaccine developers, delaying procurement[11] and raising the salience of Chinese alternatives. Unlike Pfizer and AstraZeneca, Sinovac did not require an indemnification clause before delivering supplies.[12] The highly politicized Dengvaxia controversy sent a chilling effect to many foreign pharmaceutical companies and complicated Manila’s efforts to purchase from big Western firms. The latter demanded immunity from suits and liabilities and for the host government to indemnify patients suffering adverse effects after getting inoculated.[13] In 2017, French drug company Sanofi Pasteur faced lawsuits and public backlash, and its officials were threatened with arrests due to harmful effects from its anti-dengue vaccine Dengvaxia, the administration of which was halted. Duterte also criticized Western drug firms for prioritizing profit even during a global health crisis by asking for advance payments from buyers.[14] These, and curbs on vaccine exports by developed countries, opened the doors for Sinovac to have the first crack in The Philippines’ Covid-19 vaccine market. This is despite being the third supplier to receive emergency use authorization.
Furthermore, unlike Pfizer and Moderna, Sinovac also has less demanding storage requirements[15] This contributed to reduced handling and transport costs. Chinese deliveries also arrived regularly, picking up the volume from 600,000 donated jabs in late February to as high as 11 million in August, with an average of 5 million doses per month. Openness towards technology licensing has been another upshot in working with Chinese vaccine makers. Sinovac, for instance, inked partnerships with Indonesian state-owned BioFarma[16] and Malaysia’s Pharmaniaga[17] to co-produce Covid-19 vaccines to supply domestic needs and serve the Southeast Asian market. A similar arrangement for The Philippines was discussed in a telephone call last August between Presidents Duterte and Xi Jinping.[18] Duterte is supportive of the idea, describing it as an “answered prayer.”[19] But without genuine technology transfer, local production is still a distant prospect and the country will still be dependent on bulk supplies of Chinese doses.
China’s vaccine diplomacy appeals to strong global undercurrents for vaccine access equity. It enhances the country’s international profile as a major power that keeps its commitment and bears sacrifices to help less privileged countries. Beijing’s vaccine deliveries implement President Xi’s pledge during the May 2020 World Health Summit that Chinese jabs will be made global public goods.[20] Beijing permitted exports then, despite having low vaccination rates at home compared to other developed and emerging economies. In contrast, other donors only came into the fray much later after achieving substantial progress in their domestic vaccination programmes. In the Philippine case, the first non-Chinese bilateral vaccine donation from Japan would not come until early July, over four months after the initial donated Sinovac doses had arrived.
Moreover, many of the donations from advanced countries were part of their unused or surplus inventory as many had oversubscribed orders, a phenomenon decried by many countries from the global South as hoarding. Duterte railed against this in his address before the virtual 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly. The firebrand leader said that:
“There is a man-made drought of vaccines ravaging poor countries. Rich countries hoard life-saving vaccines, while poor nations wait for trickles. They now talk of booster shots, while developing countries consider half-doses just to get by. This is shocking beyond belief and must be condemned for what it is – a selfish act that can neither be justified rationally nor morally.”[21]
Against this bleak outlook, China’s dose outreach won support from The Philippines.
China’s vaccine diplomacy was seen as a vindication of friendly bilateral relations pursued by the Duterte administration. The vaccine donations and commercial shipments enhanced China’s image and appealed to a neighbour with which it has longstanding territorial and maritime disputes with. This is despite concerns about the efficacy of Chinese jabs and worries about the influence that comes with them. But initial hesitation against taking Chinese shots soon dissipated as more people were immunized without experiencing adverse effects. Sinovac eventually became one of the most preferred vaccine makers among adult Filipinos, according to a survey.[22] Meanwhile, to allay suspicions about alleged Chinese ulterior motives, Duterte also reassured his constituents that Chinese shots do not come with strings attached.[23] That its other neighbours, including fellow South China Sea littoral states, likewise procured Chinese vaccines, even producing under license, without necessarily eroding their defense posture in contested waters, also helped alleviate reservations by some domestic quarters.
In a show of confidence in Chinese vaccines, Duterte received Sinopharm jabs under a compassionate use permit.[24] His security escorts had received the same shots much earlier.[25] The country also made huge orders of Sinovac doses. At 43.5 million doses as of October 24, it holds the largest share in the country’s vaccine inventory, almost twice as much as the next supplier, Pfizer.[26] However, the threat of new virus variants and the advent of other donors, notably the United States, Japan and countries in Europe, will expectedly challenge Beijing’s early lead.
China’s vaccine diplomacy also forced other major donors to compete sooner for fear of ceding more ground to Beijing. This, in turn, is a boon to Manila’s desire to spread out its portfolio of providers. Outside COVAX, bilateral partners upped their game beginning July. Japan fired the opening salvo, donating 1.1 million AstraZeneca doses on July 8. The United States followed suit, giving 3.2 million single-shot Janssen doses on July 16-17, barely two weeks before the visit of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to Manila. Four days after Austin’s departure, Washington donated 3 million more Moderna doses. The day after China announced another donation of 1 million Sinovac jabs, Japan, on October 15, pledged to give another 1.96 million AstraZeneca doses, while Germany gave 844,800 AstraZeneca shots via COVAX on the same day.
WILL THE EARLY BIRD CATCH THE WORM?
While China’s vaccine diplomacy did break some ground in The Philippines, doubts linger. Despite having Beijing at its back, the country was still a laggard in Southeast Asia in commencing vaccination, suggesting internal fissures within the government on which vaccines to use for the debut rollout. The purported botched handling of the initial order for Pfizer jabs gave rise to rumours that the administration was giving way to Sinovac despite its lower efficacy.[27] It did not help that Chinese vaccine makers failed to secure emergency use authorization (EUA) earlier from The Philippines’ Food and Drug Administration due to inadequate documents submitted, including vital clinical trials.[28] Notwithstanding the urgency of securing vaccines and Duterte’s preference, Chinese vaccine developers have not been exempted from going through the appropriate processes, which regrettably remained cumbersome despite the exigency of the times. Had Sinopharm got its EUA sooner, the vaccination of members of the Presidential Security Guard and Duterte himself would not have courted much controversy. Chinese dose donations could have also come sooner. The impression that Chinese vaccine producers could cut corners because of presidential imprimatur would have been counterproductive to both China’s vaccine outreach and the Philippine government’s vaccination plan.
The lack of transparency about the prices of Chinese vaccines fueled allegations of overpricing, if not perception of failure on the government’s part to negotiate better rates with producers. Varying figures cited and wide discrepancies in quoted prices from other countries added to the speculation.[29] Government officials doubling down on non-disclosure agreements when asked during Senate hearings only heightened suspicions.[30] This reveals the tightrope in balancing commitment to commercial contracts and demands for public scrutiny.
Furthermore, despite the hype, China’s vaccine donations to The Philippines still pales in comparison to some of its neighbours where Beijing’s clout is arguably stronger. Cambodia, for instance, bagged 9 million pledged donated doses, Myanmar got six million, and Laos got five million.[31] Vietnam, despite more contentious relations with China, likewise obtained 3 million promised jabs, equal to that for The Philippines.[32] Against its huge orders, Chinese vaccine grants seem minuscule. With sales of 48 million doses, Manila is among the world’s biggest buyers of Chinese vaccines[33] and a 3 million jab gratis seems too small a consolation. The US, which just sold 24.4 million doses thus far, even gave more – 11.4 million jabs. To this end, news of Beijing’s pledge to donate two million more doses was warmly welcomed.[34]
China’s early mover advantage is also being eroded by the fact that more international supplies have become available. After reaching its all-time peak thus far of 11 million doses last August, Chinese vaccine shipments ebbed, while the share of non-Chinese vaccine arrivals gathered pace and outstripped Chinese imports by a wide margin even before the end of October.
Finally, despite repeated reassurances, fears continue to grow that China’s vaccine diplomacy may either divert attention away from its activities in the South China Sea or dither Manila’s resolve in defending its maritime interests. This is especially so as Beijing continues to undertake steps to cement its position in the disputed strategic waterway. These include fortifying its artificial island bases, challenging routine patrols, resource activities and efforts by other claimants to upgrade facilities in features they occupy, and enforcing new regulations such as an expansive unilateral fishing ban and a coast guard law that greenlights the use of force against foreign vessels. Such actions only reinforce the notion that while Beijing extends goodwill, it also engages in disaster opportunism. Lawmakers argue that while the country should acknowledge Chinese dose donations, it should continue to protest against Chinese intrusions into Philippine waters.[35]
The backlash from China’s ill-conceived attempt to foster pandemic-era solidarity through a controversial music video sponsored by its mission in Manila reveals the Filipino public’s wariness about Chinese benevolence. Notwithstanding its intention, the poorly titled “Iisang Dagat” (One Sea), stirred domestic sensitivities about the two countries’ competing sea claims and inadvertently gave a political colour to China’s humanitarian assistance to its neighbour.[36]
Duterte quickly brushed off worries that the country was wavering in its stance. He said that while China had not asked for anything in return for its vaccine supplies, Chinese ships remained present in the West Philippine Sea. As such, he vowed to likewise maintain vessels in the area and would not order them back.[37] The country’s continuing naval, coast guard and air force modernization, unprecedented construction upgrades in Pag-Asa (Thitu), its largest administered feature in the flashpoint, and filing of numerous diplomatic protests attest that, rhetoric and optics aside, pandemic cooperation has not diluted the country’s determination to safeguard its maritime interests.
China’s vaccine diplomacy benefited The Philippines, and friendly ties undoubtedly played a key part in facilitating it. But Manila’s endorsement also boosted Beijing’s global dose drive, adding another feather to its cap. Both sides thus reaped mutual gains.
With vaccination likely to go on next year, the stage is set for China to appeal among Filipino candidates and voters as a pandemic-tested partner.[38] However, its activities in the West Philippine Sea and untoward sea incidents can quickly spoil that aspiration. This shows how tenuous China’s influence is on The Philippines despite over five years of enhanced political and economic relations and timely relief in trying times. In extending critical medical assistance and vaccines to its neighbour, China was the early bird. Whether it catches the worm, only later events will tell.
ENDNOTES
[1] Patricia Lourdes Viray. China’s vaccine donations ‘soften blow’ while maritime militia swarms Julian Felipe Reef — Carpio. Philippine Star, March 24, 2021. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2021/03/24/2086648/chinas-vaccine-donations-soften-blow-while-maritime-militia-swarms-julian-felipe-reef-carpio; CNN Philippines Staff. Lawmakers raise concerns about China’s vaccine donations amid new tensions in West Philippine Sea. CNN Philippines, March 24, 2021. https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/3/24/China-s-vaccine-donation-West-Philippine-Sea-incursion.html?%3F%3F%3F%3F
[2] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines. Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian says China is supplying nearly 10 million doses of vaccines to the Philippines in August, August 20, 2021. http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/sgdt/t1900680.htm
[3] CNN Philippines Staff. China donates ₱1-million cash aid, PPEs to Filipino medical frontliners. CNN Philippines, August 15, 2020. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/8/15/China-donates–1-million-cash-aid–PPEs-to-Filipino-medical-frontliners–.html
[4] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines.
[5] Christia Marie Ramos. Jack Ma donating 50,000 more COVID-19 testing kits to PH – Pacquiao. Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2020. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1271264/jack-ma-to-donate-50000-more-covid-19-testing-kits-to-ph-pacquiao
[6] Chinese companies stand behind Philippines in fight against COVID-19: ambassador. Xinhua, May 19, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/19/c_139070108.htm; NGCP investor donates 500,000 masks to Red Cross. Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2020. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1273281/ngcp-investor-donates-500000-masks-to-red-cross
[7] Sofia Tomacruz. Guangzhou donates masks, thermometers to sister city Manila. Rappler, March 25, 2020. https://www.rappler.com/nation/guangzhou-china-donates-masks-thermometers-manila; Che Palicte. Davao’s sister cities in China extend Covid aid. Philippine News Agency, January 25, 2021. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1128445; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Chinese Consulate in Laoag Turns Over Donated Goods from Shandong Province to Ilocos Norte. April 7, 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1767233.shtml
[8] Department of Health. DOH, NTF grateful to hospitals and vaccinees as PH inoculates 756 on first day of Covid-19 vaccine rollout. Press release, March 2, 2021. https://doh.gov.ph/doh-press-release/DOH-NTF-GRATEFUL-TO-HOSPITALS-AND-VACCINEES-AS-PH-INOCULATES-756-ON-FIRST-DAY-OF-COVID-19-VACCINE-ROLLOUT
[9] Dwight de Leon. Philippines receives 400,000 more Sinovac doses from China. Rappler, March 24, 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/philippines-receives-more-china-sinovac-vaccines-march-24-2021
[10] Azer Parrocha. Duterte eyes another China visit before his term ends: Palace. Philippine News Agency, March 3, 2021. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1132390
[11] Senate of the Philippines 18th Congress. Drilon blames PAO mishandling of Dengvaxia case, govt mismanagement for delays in arrival of COVID-19 vaccines. Press Release, February 22, 2021. http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2021/0222_drilon3.asp
[12] CNN Philippines Staff. No indemnification deal with Sinovac for COVID-19 vaccines, Palace says. CNN Philippines, February 22, 2021. https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/2/22/China-Sinovac-COVID-19-vaccines-indemnification-agreement.html
[13] Jocelyn Montemayor. COVID vaccine makers, fearing Dengvaxia mess, want indemnity pacts. Malaya Business Insight, February 18, 2021. https://malayaph.com/news_news/covid-vaccine-makers-fearing-dengvaxia-mess-want-indemnity-pacts/
[14] CNN Philippines Staff. Duterte slams pharma firms seeking advance payment for COVID-19 vaccine. CNN Philippines, September 14, 2020. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/9/14/Duterte-slams-pharma-firms-seeking-advance-payment-for-COVID-19-vaccine.html
[15] Department of Health. Know your vaccines (Vaccine matrix: current evidence), Updated August 16, 2021. https://doh.gov.ph/vaccines/know-your-vaccines
[16] Prime Sarmiento. Indonesia vaccine deal with China viewed as vital for region. China Daily, June 22, 2021. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202106/22/WS60d15797a31024ad0bacaa7b.html
[17] Pharmaniaga aims to supply Sinovac vaccine to markets in Southeast Asia, Africa. The Star, August 26, 2021. https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2021/08/26/pharmaniaga-aims-to-supply-sinovac-vaccine-to-markets-in-southeast-asia-africa
[18] Ellson Quismorio. Find out what Duterte, Xi discussed in 45-min long phone call, Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2021. https://mb.com.ph/2021/08/27/find-out-what-duterte-xi-discussed-in-45-min-long-phone-call/
[19] Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos. Duterte backs local Covid-19 vax production. Philippine News Agency, April 15, 2021. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1136957
[20] Pan Zhaoyi. Chinese vaccines will be made global public good, says Xi. CGTN, May 19, 2020. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-19/Chinese-vaccines-will-be-made-global-public-good-says-Xi-QCpFSGlL2g/index.html
[21] Statement of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte at the High-Level General Debate, 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, 2021. https://pcoo.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/1632277138258067.pdf
[22] Sofia Tomacruz. Sinovac, Pfizer top COVID-19 vaccines preferred by adult Filipinos. Rappler, May 24, 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/top-covid-19-vaccines-preferred-by-adult-filipinos-sws-survey-may-2021
[23] Raymund Antonio. ‘No strings attached’ to China’s donated COVID-19 vaccines — Duterte. Manila Bulletin, August 17, 2021. https://mb.com.ph/2021/08/17/no-strings-attached-to-chinas-donated-covid-19-vaccines-duterte/
[24] Catherine Valente. Duterte did not violate law in Sinopharm jab – Palace. Manila Times, May 5, 2021. https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/05/05/news/national/duterte-did-not-violate-law-in-sinopharm-jab-palace/869961
[25] Pia Ranada. FDA grants PSG compassionate permit for 10,000 doses of Sinopharm vaccine. Rappler, February 11, 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/fda-issues-compassionate-permit-presidential-security-group-sinopharm-vaccines
[26] TRACKER: The Philippines’ COVID-19 vaccine distribution. Rappler, April 1, 2021 (70th update). Accessed October 26, 20201. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/data-documents/tracker-covid-19-vaccines-distribution-philippines
[27] Consuelo Marquez. Did they ‘drop the ball’ on Pfizer deal because of Sinovac vaccine? Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 24, 2020. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1375635/did-they-drop-the-ball-on-pfizer-deal-because-of-sinovac-vaccine
[28] Gaea Katreena Cabico. Lacking submission to FDA delays review of Sinopharm COVID-19 jab. Philippine Star, March 3, 2021. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2021/03/03/2081704/lacking-submission-fda-delays-review-sinopharm-covid-19-jab; CNN Philippines Staff. China’s Sinovac applies in PH for COVID-19 vaccine’s emergency use. CNN Philippines, January 14, 2021. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/1/14/China-Sinovac-COVID-19-vaccines-emergency-use-Philippines-EUA.html
[29] Senate of the Philippines 18th Congress. Lacson: Differences in Sinovac Prices Smack of Corruption. Press Release, January 17, 2021. http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2021/0117_lacson1.asp; DJ Yap. Varying prices of Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine raise alarm. Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 18, 2021. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1384867/sinovac-jabs-varying-prices-raise-alarm
[30] Christia Marie Ramos. Covid-19 vaccine deals may be jeopardized if prices are publicized, vaccine czar warns. Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 18, 2021. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1384910/galvez-on-revealing-sinovac-price-during-senate-hearing
[31] Bridge Consulting. China COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker. Accessed October 26, 2021. https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/
[32] Bridge Consulting.
[33] Bridge Consulting.
[34] Joyce Ann L. Rocamora. PH to get 2M more China-donated Sinovac doses. Philipine News Agency, November 4, 2021. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1158764
[35] CNN Philippines Staff. Lawmakers raise concerns about China’s vaccine donations amid new tensions in West Philippine Sea. CNN Philippines, March 24, 2021.
[36] Mong Palatino. China’s COVID-19 Diplomacy Backfires in the Philippines. The Diplomat, May 9, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/chinas-covid-19-diplomacy-backfires-in-the-philippines/
[37] Neil Arwin Mercado. ‘No strings attached’ to China’s jabs donation, ‘except their boats are there’ – Duterte. Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 17, 2021. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1474547/no-strings-attached-in-chinas-jabs-donation-except-their-boats-are-there
[38] Dakila Kim P. Yee. A Trojan Horse: China’s Vaccine Diplomacy and the internal dynamics of the COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout in the Philippines. Criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, May 5, 2021. https://doi.org/10.52698/JJLT2807
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2021/144 “Recurring Themes in the Politics of Parti Keadilan Rakyat” by Khoo Boo Teik
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The origin and evolution of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, or People’s Justice Party) were tied to crises that befell successive regimes from 1998 to 2018. The present crisis is qualitatively different because the Covid-19 pandemic pre-empted former modes of political mobilization. Today, PKR will have to negotiate between inhibited activism and profitless quietude to establish solidarity with latent dissent.
- From its inception, PKR’s politics has been little if not coalition politics. On record, PKR stayed with every one of its coalitions. This apparent accommodation of inter-party difference is an important quality in the existing two-coalition system since a strong opposition will demand a democratic, pluralist political framework no matter who rules.
- The PKR has been amply rewarded for its demonstrated commitment to multiethnic politics and principled opposition to ethnic discrimination. Massive non-Malay support enabled the opposition coalitions to advance at every general election from 2008 to 2018. It is improbable that PKR will turn its back on the non-Malay voters. Nor will the latter back the ‘Malay-Muslim front’ of the ruling Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance).
- Anwar Ibrahim characterised the PKR’s ‘reform agenda’ as a ‘humane economy’ which combines a critique of ‘the way things are’ with a vision of ‘how things should be’. New discourses and civil society initiatives to respond to the present public health disaster, economic disruption and social misery have a moral and social tenor that can resonate with the spirit of the humane economy.
- In a limited sense, ‘PKR was Anwar, and Anwar was PKR’. The advantageous side of this tight bond benefitted PKR at crucial moments before the 2008 and 2013 general elections. But the bond created complications for party unity and integrity when the leadership mishandled the vulnerable side of the bond. Whether PKR can restore a healing ‘just unity’ depends on whether its leaders’ conduct can internalize the principles of their conception of democratic and institutional reform.
* Khoo Boo Teik is Professor Emeritus, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, and Research Fellow Emeritus, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan; and was Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore (April to September 2021).
ISEAS Perspective 2021/144, 11 November 2021
INTRODUCTION
In Malaysian history, some political parties had risen unexpectedly on swells of public discontent at critical moments – Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, or Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party) in 1959, Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, or Malaysian People’s Movement) in 1969, and Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS, or Sabah United Party) in 1985. But as part of the Pakatan Harapan (Harapan, or Pact of Hope) coalition, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, or People’s Justice Party), surpassed those parties by defeating the 61-year-old regime three years ago.[1] The political situation has since been unsettled by the collapse of the Harapan government, the Covid-19 pandemic, and economic contraction. Even so, PKR is a rallying-point of opposition to the Perikatan Nasional (PN, or National Alliance) regime.
All this makes it compelling to examine PKR’s importance to Malaysian politics. To do so, this essay discusses five themes of PKR’s politics, namely, its origin and evolution in crises; stress on coalition-building; commitment to multiethnic politics; ‘humane economy’ as reform agenda; and unique bond with Anwar. Not written in the mould of ‘SWOT analysis’,[2] this essay suggests that those five themes may resonate with current conditions.
THEME 1: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION IN CRISES
There are reasons to cry out with irony that, ‘Crisis is PKR’s middle name!’
The obvious one is that PKR’s origin lay in Anwar’s fall, itself an outcome of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Anwar’s sacking brought two traumas – one for the Malay community which rebelled against Mahathir’s regime, and another for UMNO and the government whose leadership transition has been troubled ever since.
The deeper reason is PKR’s evolution in parallel with several disasters that befell the post-Mahathir regimes.[3] Those events provoked surges of popular outrage and organized dissent that bore narratives of defiance – ‘Enough is enough’, Lawan tetap lawan! (Fight, resolutely fight!), and the ubiquitous Re-for-ma-si!
The present crisis is qualitatively different. Harapan’s collapse was followed by unstable PN regimes, and deteriorating Covid-19 and economic conditions. There is public disaffection with the regime’s crisis management. But the post-March 2020 suspension of Parliament, the declaration of a state of emergency, and prolonged movement control orders denied the opposition recourse to its former modes of mass mobilization. Besides, there is public weariness with ‘politicking’ (on all sides) construed as elite manipulations remote from the suffering of ordinary people. Current dissent, avoiding grand discourses of structural reform, is generally expressed in small-scale, direct, community, self- and mutual-help projects to alleviate immediate health and economic pains found in the lacunae left by #kerajaangagal (‘failed government’). Today, with PN and Harapan agreed on a ‘truce’ that should last until the next general election, PKR will have to negotiate nimbly between inhibited activism and profitless quietude if it wishes to establish meaningful solidarity with latent dissent.
THEME 2: STRESS ON COALITION-BUILDING
The PKR’s birth was attended by a range of Reformasi allies.[4] The opposition formed a coalition, Barisan Alternatif (BA, or Alternative Front) to draw synergistically on the appeal of Anwar’s cause and the interventions of opposition parties and civil society organizations.[5] But PKR’s result was modest at the 10th General Election (GE10) of 1999 and disastrous at the 11th General Election (GE11) of 2004. By then BA had fallen into disuse. To contest the 12th General Election (GE12) of 2008, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and PAS renewed their cooperation with Anwar’s mediation. An electoral alliance of DAP, PKR and PAS was formed just as public sentiment turned against the Barisan National (BN, or National Front) regimes headed by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). At GE12 the opposition achieved an electoral breakthrough by winning more than a third of parliamentary seats and five state governments.
That historic election made two things clear. First, only a cohesive opposition could successfully challenge BN’s domination. In 2008 the DAP-PAS-PKR trio was only an electoral alliance.[6] Having realized its long desired ‘two-coalition system’, however, the opposition established a formal coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR, or People’s Pact). Later elections proved that the opposition correctly banked its future on an institutionalized coalition that could resolve inter-party differences, overcome external obstacles, and jointly govern where it had won power.[7i] Second, PKR ceased to be the opposition’s weak link when its parliamentary representation leapt from a single seat in 2004 to 30 in 2008. Remarkably, PKR won seats long held by BN that neither DAP nor PAS expected to win. As it were, PKR repaid its debt to its partners, and enjoying the advantage of Anwar’s leadership of PR, PKR could even stiffen PR’s spine.[8]
From its inception, PKR’s politics has been little if not coalition politics.[9] On record, PKR stayed with every one of its coalitions – BA, PR, and Harapan – unlike some of its partners.[10] Hence PKR has been more accommodating of inter-party difference, which is important in two ways. First, PKR’s stance is consistent with its support for democracy and pluralism. Second, the days of one hegemonic party lording over a multi-party coalition that utterly dominates Parliament are over.[11]
The existing two-coalition system emerged from three consecutive general elections from 2008 to 2018 and has survived five regimes. Whatever its terms, the PN-Harapan truce reflects a basic truth: no matter who rules, there will be a strong opposition to demand a democratic, pluralist political framework. Today, Harapan forms the single largest bloc in Parliament – and, arguably, a more cohesive one than PN despite the latter’s advantages of incumbency. Still, one of Harapan and PKR’s toughest tasks is to secure more allies but reliable ones who temper self-interested calculations with observance of basic principles.[12]
THEME 3: COMMITMENT TO MULTIETHNIC POLITICS
With its origin in Reformasi, PKR was bound to have a predominantly Malay membership. But PKR’s leadership has been a multiethnic mix of the original Anwaristas,[13] veterans of Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM, or Malaysian People’s Party), civil society activists, and politicians from Sabah and Sarawak. As such, one of the most heartening aspects of PKR’s politics is its demonstrated commitment to multiethnic politics and principled opposition to ethnic discrimination.[14]
There are notable points about PKR’s multiethnic commitment. First, Anwar repudiated UMNO’s ethnic politics and policies as fully as anyone with his background could.[15] Second, while his rejection of ethnic discrimination is tied to his promotion of multiculturalism in the 1990s, its antecedent was his ABIM-era advocacy of the universalism of Islam in a plural society.[16] Third, PKR’s multiethnic spirit thrived in PR’s heyday when PAS under Nik Aziz Nik Mat’s guidance lived its most tolerant period of the early 21st century,[17] and DAP-PAS cooperation gained strong grassroots support. Fourth, Anwar and PKR never took a ‘pro-Malay’ turn despite being spurned by non-Malay voters at GE10 and GE11.
The patient audacity of its multiethnic politics brought PKR ample reward. Non-Malay voters only swung from BN after being snubbed by UMNO between 2005 and 2007. But their unrelenting swings enabled PR to create the ‘tsunami’ of GE12 and gain the popular vote at the 13th General Election (GE13) of 2013, and Harapan to win the 14th General Election (GE14) of 2018.
It is improbable that PKR will turn its back on the non-Malay voters.[18] Nor will the latter support PN’s avowed ‘Malay-Muslim front’. There is a simple but stark illustration of the difference between PKR and PN. When he was deputy prime minister, Anwar used to say in Mandarin, wo men dou shi yi jia ren (We are one family). To some he sounded gimmicky. But as PKR leader, he vowed to end ethnic discrimination. The PN Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, raised a Keluarga Malaysia (Malaysian Family) slogan. He quickly hollowed it by setting a ’51 per cent bumiputera equity’ for the logistics sector,[19] which have rekindled the controversies over ethnic quotas of the 1970s and 1980s.
The desertion by Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu, or United Pribumi Party of Malaysia) and a big PKR faction exposed Harapan to ‘anti-Malay’ charges.[20] For years Anwar, PKR, and DAP had faced such accusations (from UMNO). They are now vulnerable because they lack an ally who can deflect a racist demonisation of the coalition. Until it broke with PR, PAS was such an ally. The Harapan partner, Amanah, has stayed above ethno-religious gamesmanship but Amanah’s influence cannot match PAS’s.
One of the brighter notes of life under the pandemic is a low-level awareness of shared suffering and mutual help that transcends ethnic boundaries. Activists of the ‘young generation’ find common ‘interethnic’ ground, as did their counterparts of the Reformasi era, in opposing injustice and discovering the validity of Bangsa Malaysia in practice.[21]
THEME 4: ‘HUMANE ECONOMY’ AS REFORM AGENDA
Anwar’s original call for Reformasi had an anti-oligarchic, anti-corruption and anti-authoritarian message.[22] He did not have the time to elaborate then but he was not narrowly ‘pro-democracy’ and ‘pro-market’. When he emerged from prison his ideas of PKR’s ‘reform agenda’ showed more depth, breadth and force than he had intimated before. He still denounced oligarchy, corruption and authoritarianism. He would dismantle monopolies, stop mismanaged privatisation, strengthen transparent and accountable control of public assets. He would even replace a much-abused New Economic Policy with needs-based affirmative action for the poor and deserving regardless of ethnicity.
Anwar presented his vision of a ‘humane economy’ in two PKR documents, Malaysian Economic Agenda, and KeADILan Manifesto 2008 – A New Dawn For Malaysia.[23] To realize his vision, he needed democracy, independent judiciary, free press, civil service professionalism, quality education for the masses, and just administration of welfare. He even wanted to ennoble money-making with moral responsibility and cultural refinement. It was to this cohesive ‘reform agenda’ that Nurul Izzah Anwar, Anwar’s daughter, alluded when she declared at the BERSIH 5 rally in 2016 that, ‘We do not want just to replace the prime minister. We want to replace the damned system.’[24]
The PKR’s reform agenda found empathy with the party’s ideologically diverse leadership.[25] The humane economy appealed to a social base of urban subaltern classes who rebelled against the regime beginning with Reformasi. Among the subalterns was a class fraction of new Malay urban professionals. Whereas Mahathir’s Melayu Baru (New Malay) capitalists would not wean themselves from state sponsorship, these New Malay professionals were repelled by UMNO-style patronage. The latter could confidently leave the ‘existing New Economic Policy’ behind, not cling to it indefinitely. Finally, many young non-Malay activists of the ‘Vision 2020 generation’ saw the reform agenda as an important means to replace ethnic politics with ‘Malaysian’ politics.[26]
At the present juncture the public health disaster of Covid-19 converges with the metaphorical sickness of the body politick. Has Anwar’s ‘humane economy’ a place here? For PKR there is a hopeful answer. The humane economy was not a top-down blueprint but a critique of ‘the way things are’ and a vision of ‘how things should be’. The critique targets stalled economic progress, maladministration, corruption, oligarchic excesses, social inequality, and poor public services. The vision aims to complement economic growth with redistribution, efficiency with welfare, and development with compassion. To tackle the social divide, it is essential to replace mismanagement which unjustly enriches the elites with reforms that fairly benefit commoners regardless of ethnicity.[27]
Recently, as the Covid-19 pandemic, economic disruption, and social misery worsened, groups and individuals acted to ease deprivation and despair with self-reliance, social solidarity, mutual help, ‘colour blind’ compassion, protection of vulnerable communities, migrant labour and refugees, and so on. New discourses and civil society initiatives have arisen around notions of double (elite-plebeian) standards (dua darjat),[28] failed government (#kerajaangagal),[29] protest (#Lawan), self-reliance and mutual assistance (#KitaJagaKita),[30] response to appeals (#BenderaPutih, or White Flag movement), combatting corruption (#RasuahBusters),[31] monitoring political conduct (Solidaritas),[32] and so on. These initiatives do not come close to the scale of Reformasi mobilization. Yet the moral and social tenor of their criticisms of state incompetence, elite indifference, double standards, rising poverty, widening inequality, and social neglect evokes the spirit of the humane economy. To the extent that the regime has no vision of a reformed post-pandemic society, PKR has a chance to reassert the meaning and urgency of the humane economy.[33]
THEME 5: UNIQUE BOND WITH ANWAR
The PKR’s formation and progress received crucial impetus from Anwar’s plight and fight. His persecution sparked revulsion, his defiance inspired rebellion, and his demands defined a reformist platform. Conversely, Anwar’s life after September 1998 depended on PKR: the party’s existence was his relevance, its progress his hope, and its triumph his vindication. In this limited sense of the one’s fortune being the other’s fate, ‘PKR was Anwar, and Anwar was PKR’, as it was sometimes said.
So intertwined a leader-party bond brought benefit. On his return to active politics, for instance, Anwar had a keener feel for the restive popular mood than most. While he received reliable information from the extensive contacts that he had cultivated during his years in UMNO and government, he attracted sizeable audiences wherever he spoke. And his stature made him an effective mediator between PKR’s allies. He has been universally credited with the opposition’s 2008 breakthrough.
But the bond created complications. For all his charisma, Anwar is faulted for being domineering and divisive, making arbitrary decisions and showing poor judgement (of people). Without accurate insider information, a detached view might generally detect three types of complications tied to the direction of the party, the apportionment of high office, and leadership transition.
Over Anwar’s first six years in prison,[34] PKR struggled to stabilize its organisational structure. Who should receive, transmit, interpret, and implement the instructions and decisions that passed between the party and its absent leader? Of those who administered the party, some were wont to defer to Anwar’s wishes. Others did not want Anwar to ‘run the party from prison’. Such differences of opinion turned fractious during PKR’s early days.[35]
When PKR could fill high office appointments after GE12 and GE13, the second type of complication arose. The Selangor Menteri Besar’s post was key and ill-fated. In 2008, Anwar’s choice of Khalid Ibrahim for the post disappointed Azmin Ali. In 2013, Azmin was appointed by the Sultan of Selangor over PKR’s preferred nominee, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. Quite possibly the Anwar-Azmin rift began in 2008 and was aggravated in 2013.
Leadership transition formed the third type of complication. Anwar’s imprisonment from February 2015 and May 2018 was the time of his rapprochement with Mahathir and Harapan’s formation. All along, PR had maintained Anwar as its leader. At high-level Harapan discussions, however, Azmin campaigned to have a ‘Muhyiddin Yassin-Azmin Ali pair’ nominated as Harapan’s candidate prime minister and his deputy.[36] Eventually Harapan decided on a Mahathir-Anwar ticket. The mistrust between Anwar and Azmin must have turned irreconcilable from there, before the PKR’s bitterly divisive 2019 election, and the defection of Azmin’s faction in February 2020.[37]
These scenarios were not disputes of ideology- or policy-driven factionalism. Suffice it to note that the disputants had respectively to tread a fine line between loyalty to a strong leader and autonomy from domineering control; between rightful reward and presumptuous claim; and between justifiable ambition and makan towkay.[38] As it was, the party mishandled those complications on the vulnerable side of its bond with Anwar. Can PKR restore a healing ‘just unity’ within itself? That depends on whether its leaders’ conduct can internalize rules of governance, transparency and accountability – the principles of their conception of democratic and institutional reform.
A final point might be made about the Anwar-PKR bond. The era from September 1998 to May 2018 was a turbulent conjuncture at which opposition politics and social dissent converged to give life to bold narratives of the future. At the heart of all that was Anwar Ibrahim. The era did not belong to him. That would be a wrong way of looking at it given the immensity of its popular struggles and creative energies. But Anwar cut an epic figure who led PKR, PR and even Harapan very far along a rough path of political transformation.[39] As the late DAP MP, Sim Kwang Yang, perceptively observed, it was immaterial ‘whether Anwar [was] a “knight in shining armour”’; in the ‘larger historical backdrop’, he was ‘a powerful instrument [who brought] meaningful change to the moribund democracy prior to March 8 [2008]’.[40] It will not do to reduce Anwar’s historical significance to a mere issue of the premiership that has eluded him. He was 51 years old when he fell. He turned 74 last August. He is unlikely to bestride a new milieu as he did the old. Still, it is one of PKR’s unfinished tasks to define Anwar’s role in a post-pandemic environment. What it decides might determine if his moment has passed, or is yet to come.
Acknowledgement
I wish to thank ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute for my Visiting Senior Fellowship which gave me a very good chance to write on contemporary Malaysian politics. In this regard, I very much appreciate the kind assistance of Francis Hutchinson, Lee Hwok Aun, and the staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Francis, Hwok Aun, and Fong Chin Wei gave critical suggestions that helped me to revise a draft of this essay. I am grateful to Hamdan Mohd Salleh, Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail, Tricia Yeoh, and Zulkarnain Abdul Rahman for generously making valuable sources available to me. My knowledge of PKR and the present political juncture was much improved by conversations with Ibrahim Sani, Ong Jing Cheng, Nathaniel Tan, and Zaharom Nain.
ENDNOTES
[1] When the regime refused to register Harapan as a coalition, all its candidates contested on the PKR ticket.
[2] A rigorous sample of which is given by Tricia Yeoh, Will Harapan’s Hold on Selangor Hold? Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue 3, 2021.
[3] Those included the murder of Altantuya Shaaribu, the ‘Lingam-gate’ corruption of the judiciary, and the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) ‘heist of the century’.
[4] On the origins of Parti Keadilan Nasional (Keadilan, or National Justice Party), and its merger with PRM to form PKR, see Hamdan Mohd Salleh, ‘Parti Keadilan Rakyat sebagai Parti Oposisi dalam Amalan Demokrasi di Malaysia’ (Parti Keadilan Rakyat as an Opposition Party in the Practice of Democracy in Malaysia), in Merentasi Sempadan yang Melewati Zaman: Kumpulan Esei Sempena Persaraan Profesor Mohammad Redzuan Othman (Crossing Boundaries of the Time: Essays in Honour of the Retirement of Professor Mohammad Redzuan Othman), edited by Amer Saifude Ghazali, Zulkarnain Abdul Rahman and Rosmadi Fauzi, Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, 2018, pp. 301-324; see especially pp. 309-314.
[5] At GE10, PAS advanced but DAP faltered. At GE11, PAS shed its previous gains while DAP did no better.
[6] The trio had an important but often overlooked ally, Makkhal Sakhti, which mobilised a huge erstwhile regime-friendly Indian vote for the opposition. The BA experience left DAP and PAS with doubts that their respective supporters would back a coalition of their ‘ideologically incompatible’ parties.
[7] Ong Kian Ming, ‘The April “Tri-elections” in Retrospect’, Aliran Monthly, 29 (3), 2009, pp. 9-14. Also see Kian Ming Ong, ‘Pakatan Rakyat: What is Different This Time?’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 99:407, 141-152; on latent DAP-PAS differences, see pp. 145-147.
[8] See ibid., p. 147 for Ong’s view of PKR’s early weaknesses, such as poor candidate selection.
[9] Anwar said of his political plan in 2007 that ‘the vehicle of support is Keadilan, working hard, in collaboration and understanding with both PAS and DAP [and] more progressive civil society groups’ (‘I am committed and determined,’, Aliran Monthly, 27, 1, 2007, p. 8).
[10] DAP withdrew from BA, PAS from PR, and Bersatu from Harapan.
[11] Liew Chin Tong, ‘How Long Can Ismail Sabri Survive as PM?’ Citizen Tong, Part 1, 27 September 2021, https://chintong.substack.com/p/part-1-can-ismail-sabri-survive-his, and Part 2, 28 September 2021, https://chintong.substack.com/p/can-ismail-sabri-survive-his-governments (accessed on 29 September 2021).
[12] And not a ‘kingmaker’ partner, say, who holds a coalition hostage.
[13] Anwar loyalists who followed him out of UMNO.
[14] Analysts of GE10 were cautious in discussing the ‘end of ethnicity’ in Malaysian politics. Maznah Mohamad, ‘Malaysia – democracy and the end of ethnic politics?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62, 2, 2008, pp. 441-459; and Thomas B Pepinsky, ‘The 2008 Malaysian Elections: An End to Ethnic Politics?’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 9, 2009, pp. 87-120.
[15] ‘Anwar eschewed playing the race card to attack Umno for not doing enough for the Malays. Instead, he focused on better governance, stopping corruption of the BN elite, so that government aid could get to the poor who needed it. He also repeatedly emphasised the importance of expanding affirmative action to include poor non-Malays and he linked this with Islamic principles of justice and fair play. He also vowed to stop the looting of national wealth by the self-serving Umno elite’ (Jeyakumar Devaraj, ‘Pakatan Harapan debacle: A clash of narratives?’, Aliran, 12 July 2020, https://aliran.com/aliran-csi/pakatan-harapan-debacle-a-clash-of-narratives, accessed on 25 July 2021).
[16] ‘Islam regards discrimination as a criminal conduct because it is completely opposed to its advocacy of uniting all nationalities and encouraging tolerance, friendship and consideration among humans’ (Anwar Ibrahim, ‘Islam – Penyelesaian Kepada Masalah Masyarakat Majmuk’ [Islam – Solution to the Problems of a Plural Society], Speech at the Eighth ABIM General Assembly, 1979.
[17] Nik Aziz resolutely refused to cooperate with UMNO. Led by Hadi Awang, PAS took on a ‘Malay-Muslim first’ position which Hadi once denounced as asabiyah (narrow communalism).
[18] ‘Non-discrimination is central to the position that my party takes in promoting justice’, said Anwar, pledging ‘to demonstrate that affirmative-action policies can be premised on need … poverty and lack of opportunity, not race or religion’ (Anwar Ibrahim, ‘Confronting Authoritarianism’, Fifteenth Annual Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture, Journal of Democracy, 30, 2 [2019]: 8-9).
[19] Sitpah Selvaratnam, ‘Piracy ashore: Unlawful 51pct equity policy for forwarding companies’, Malaysiakini, 4 October 2021, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/593929, accessed on 4 October 2021; ‘Bumiputera policy and the 12th Malaysia Plan: Discrepancies between the plan and the speech – Lee Hwok Aun’, Malay Mail, 2 October 2021, https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-think/2021/10/02/bumiputera-policy-and-the-12th-malaysia-plan-discrepancies-between-the-plan/2010201, accessed on 3 October 2021.
[20] For the next general election, Azmin’s faction might have to fight other Malay parties within PN for seat allocation, and against Harapan in ethnically mixed seats which most of the ex-PKR MPs won at GE15.
[21] ABIM has adopted an ‘Islamic cosmopolitanism’ to reinterpret Bangsa Malaysia as fostering shared ethnic values in fighting for justice. See Muhammad Faizal Abdul Aziz, Kosmopolitan Islam & Pembinaan Bangsa Malaysia (Cosmopolitan Islam and the Forging of Bangsa Malaysia), Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 2020.
[22] Permatang Pauh Declaration, 12 September 1998.
[23] Khoo Boo Teik, The Making of Anwar Ibrahim’s ‘Humane Economy’, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue 18, 2020, pp. 19-21.
[24] Pantaitube ‘BERSIH 5 – Nurul Izzah @ KLCC’, YouTube, 20 November 2016, at 06:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1o7QPtzYtNc (accessed on 15 September 2017).
[25] There is an interesting suggestion that Anwar crafted a pragmatic, centrist, PKR platform, synthesizing ideas from ‘left’ and ‘right’, with PKR influenced by the Malay left, social democracy and liberalism; see Mohd Azizi Jaeh, ‘Pengaruh Sosialisme Demokratik dalam Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR): Reformasi dan Cabaran kepada Ideologi Alternatif di Malaysia’ (The Influences of Democratic Socialism in Parti Keadilan Rakyat [PKR]: Reformasi and Challenges to Alternative Ideology in Malaysia), Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, 44, 2 (2017): 27-50, especially pp. 31-35. As part of PKR’s intellectual milieu, Khalid Jafar led a project of political education centred on Enlightenment ideas and policies of liberal democracy and (loosely) reformist capitalism; see Mohd Azizi Jaeh and Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail, ‘Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) dan Intelektual Liberal: Kelahiran dan Evolusi Idea’ (Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Liberal Intellectuals: The Birth and Evolution of Ideas), Akademika 90, 1 (2020): 165-179, especially pp. 169-174.
[26] Several (graduated) Chinese student activists were drawn to PKR because it was young, non-communal and offered more political space for new members; they contested successfully as PKR candidates in GE12. Thock Ker Pong, ‘Aktivisme Mahasiswa Cina Era Reformasi dan Pasca Reformasi di Malaysia: Kajian Impak Politik dalam Pilihan Raya Umum ke-12’ (Chinese Student Activism in the Reformasi Era and Post-Reformasi in Malaysia: A Study of Political Impact at the 12th General Election), Akademika 82, 1 (2012): 91-102, especially pp. 99-101.
[27] Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman, the youngest member of the fallen Harapan government, criticized the PN regime’s proposed ‘bumiputera equity safety net framework’, which would require ‘bumiputera shares to be sold to bumiputeras only’, for only benefitting the cronies and the rich (Malaysiakini, ‘Saddiq questions why M’sian equity holders punished for not being born Malay’, 28 September, 2021, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/593115, accessed on 4 October 2021).
[28] ‘But now, the Malays can see and feel – for themselves – the suffering caused by those who preach racial politics. The injustice of dua darjat has also made it clear that there are different rules for the powerful, and for ordinary Malays’ (Andrew Sia, ‘Aiya, this country no hope la’, Malaysiakini, 29 August 2021, https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/589084 accessed on 30 August 2021).
[29] For example, Lim Kit Siang, ‘#kerajaangagal193 – Parliament next week should be given a report as to what measures have been taken to reduce the shocking Covid-19 fatality rate, which had increased more than 22 times from the daily casualty of nine deaths before the emergency to 199 deaths yesterday’, 21 July 2021, https://blog.limkitsiang.com/2021/07/21/kerajaangagal193-parliament-next-week-should-be-given-a-report-as-to-what-measures-have-been-taken-to-reduce-the-shocking-covid-19-fatality-rate-which-had-increased-more-than-22-times-fr (accessed on 31 July 2021).
[30] https://www.facebook.com/kitajagakita2020/. Also see Clarissa Ai Ling Lee, ‘Malaysia’s #Kitajagakita Invigorates Activism and Tackles Apathy’, Fulcrum, 14 September 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/malaysias-kitajagakita-invigorates-political-activism-and-tackles-apathy (accessed on 22 September 2021).
[31] https://www.facebook.com/rasuahbusters
[32] https://www.facebook.com/solidaritas.my
[33] ‘Rather than ethnic “others”, the more prominent narrative is one of “haves versus have nots”. Rich influencers repeatedly flouting rules and business figures callously calling the suffering lazy join politicians in being pilloried on social media.’ Bridget Welsh, ‘Pandemic failures will transform Malaysian politics’, East Asia Forum, 18 July 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/07/18/pandemic-failures-will-transform-malaysian-politics (accessed 21 July 2021)
[34] Several PKR leaders were detained without trial during that period. Johan Saravanamuttu, ‘Reformasi Activists Under Detention’, Aliran Monthly, 21, 3 (2001): 2-6.
[35] Khoo Boo Teik, ‘Die Hard: The new, the old and the ugly in keADILan Nasional’s turmoil’, Aliran Monthly, 20 (5), 2000, pp. 2-6.
[36] Liew Chin Tong, Lim Kit Siang: Patriot, Leader, Fighter, Kuala Lumpur, REFSA, 2021, pp. 221-223.
[37] Adam Aziz, ‘Azmin leads exodus of 11 MPs from PKR and PH’, theedgemarkets.com, 24 February 2020, https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/azmin-leads-exodus-11-mps-pkr-and-ph; accessed on 1 March 2020.
[38] Literally ‘to eat the boss’ in Malay political jargon.
[39] Khoo Boo Teik, ‘The ever-present Anwar Ibrahim’, Malaysiakini, 20 March 2018, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/416333.
[40] Sim Kwang Yang, ‘Whom should we trust?’ Malaysiakini, 12 April 2008, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/81274, accessed on 20 April 2008.
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2021/143 “Debunking Five Myths on Energy Transition in Southeast Asia” by Ryan Wong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Southeast Asia Climate Outlook Survey 2021 has provided novel data on professional positions on reducing coal reliance, enduring short economic pain, and investing in renewables. These observations, some of which debunk myths on the issues, include the following:
- Young people lose their enthusiasm for climate advocacy and rapid energy transition as they mature.
- Consumers of social media are not significantly less supportive of rapid energy transition than those who use traditional sources (i.e., newspapers, radio, and television).
- Professionals from the business and academic sectors are more likely to hang onto coal for longer and avoid short-term economic pain from severing reliance on fossil fuels.
- More advanced economies in Southeast Asia are not necessarily more accepting of a rapid energy transition.
- Southeast Asian professionals who look up to Japan as a climate leader are less likely to support early diversion from coal.
* Ryan Wong is Lead Researcher (Climate Policy) at the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
Energy security has been a controversial issue in Southeast Asia, at the heart of which lie the questions of how fast and by how much developing economies should divert from fossil fuels.
Some are adamant that developing countries have every right to keep burning fossil fuels, including the dirtiest coal; and the economic train should not slow down for the green crusades of the developed nations. Others know that an energy transition is inevitable as the price of solar energy generation drops and the prospect of coal-fired power plants becoming stranded assets increases.
EXPLAINING ENERGY TRANSITION
At this crossroad, we remain clueless about the extent of Southeast Asians’ support for the diversion from fossil fuels and the adoption of renewables. The Southeast Asian Climate Outlook Survey 2021 (Seah, Martinus, and Qiu 2021) recently asked 463 professionals from the public, private, academic, civil society and media sectors to find out.[1] The analysis specifically examines attitudes towards the following three positions on energy transition:
- ASEAN countries should cut their reliance on coal as soon as possible.
- Reduction of dependence on fossil fuels will be painful in the short term but beneficial to ASEAN economies in the long run.
- There is potential for ASEAN to tap into the renewable energy sector.
Cutting coal reliance
Southeast Asia has a difficult relationship with coal. The Philippines and Malaysia bit the bullet and declared a moratorium on coal, while Thailand and Vietnam on the other hand took the middle approach of embracing all energy sources – building renewable energy infrastructure faster than other Southeast Asian countries while keeping their coal capacity. Indonesia is holding on to its coal energy and coal exporting industry tightly.
China has cancelled several coal-fired plants in Vietnam and Indonesia and pledged no more new builds in Belt and Road signatories. Japan offers clean coal technology[2] to ASEAN as a strategy for cutting emissions. In the past decade, coal consumption in Indonesia and The Philippines has more than doubled. It is almost four times in Vietnam, while the reduction in Thailand is less than 12% (IEA 2020). There is certainly a shift in attitude this year as fewer new coal-fired power plants are being funded in these fast-growing and energy-hungry nations (Board 2021).
Long-term economic gain
Towards the end of the last century, Southeast Asia was blessed by an abundance of fossil fuel. The mining and exporting of oil and gas has brought wealth to countries like Malaysia and Brunei. However, as the international energy market moves toward diversification of energy sources and diversion from fossil fuel, Southeast Asia may sink into an economic dilemma. Do we continue to pursue the carbon-heavy energy path because we do not want the short-term economic pain? Or do we endure the short pain, divert from fossil fuel, and reap the long-term gain?
Investment in renewables
Strong sun and wind resources make Southeast Asia particularly suitable for developing renewable energy capability. Despite strong support from the governments, 70% of the energy market still relies on fossil fuels while the other 30% are renewables such as biomass and hydropower. From a very low base, the renewables have grown rapidly and solar may soon dominate the market (Khuong, McKenna, and Fichtner 2019).
Thailand spearheaded policies for implementing renewable energy infrastructure, but weak institutions and politicized regulation have brought the whole ambition to its knees (Sirasoontorn and Koomsup 2018). Targets were not achieved and projects abandoned. A more encouraging case is Vietnam, which has pulled almost every policy lever for scaling up its renewable capability (Thang and Burke 2021).
As rich as the context on policy milestones may be, we need to understand who the laggards of energy transition are. Based on the Southeast Asia Climate Outlook Survey 2021, the following analysis assesses the truthfulness of five beliefs in relation to youths, social media users, professionals, advanced economies, and climate leaders.
BELIEF 1: YOUTHS ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF RAPID ENERGY TRANSITION.
Whenever the policy community is frustrated by the incremental progress of climate action, it is not unusual that hope will be placed on the younger generation. The belief is that the young are more educated about climate change and not tied to the old ways of powering the economy. They also come with a level of moral legitimacy in the face of systemic inactions (Han and Ahn 2020). Their communication is not limited to the Armageddon narrative or the intractable political process, and measured solutions were proposed (Zummo, Gargroetzi, and Garcia 2020). However, younger professionals (aged 21-35) who took part in the survey were not starkly more pro-environment than their older counterparts. In the Survey, younger professionals are almost as likely to demonstrate pro-environment attitude towards transformational energy transition as the older professionals, especially those from the 36-45 and 46-60 age groups. Younger professionals were more enthused about reducing fossil fuel dependence for long-term economic interests and leveraging the potential of renewables. The surprise is that the younger professionals were less supportive of cutting coal reliance as soon as possible. By contrast, professionals over 60 years old are especially accepting of cutting coal and investing in renewables.
The younger professionals may have a more realistic sense of economic transition. They are less radical about ditching coal, which is the dominant energy source in the region. Almost all the younger professionals who did not agree with the statement on cutting coal were unsure rather than in disagreement. The hesitancy needs to be addressed firstly, through research studies that demonstrate that the divergence from coal will not fundamentally hurt Southeast Asian economies, and secondly, through strategic communication with young professionals of this. The popular belief that young people are more supportive of climate actions is only true among the pre-adolescents aged 7-13. Despite being more scientifically equipped to understand climate issues, 14-18 year old youths are less likely to support climate actions (Lee et al. 2020). This downward trend may extend into the 21- to 35-year-old professionals.
BELIEF 2: SOCIAL MEDIA USERS ARE LESS SUPPORTIVE OF RAPID ENERGY TRANSITION.
Professionals who rely on social media are less likely to support positions for cutting coal reliance, enduring short-term pain, and tapping into renewables. Another common belief is that users of media platforms managed by journalists and climate experts are more pro-environment. Conversely, social media has been criticized for offering a mixed bag of simplified messages, fake news and light entertainment. Climate-related topics are predominantly framed in negative ways on social media platforms, especially on Twitter (Dahal, Kumar, and Li 2019). Without professional curation, social media users have to differentiate evidence-based claims from untrustworthy information. The analysis in Figure 2 confirms this belief. However, the differences between users of social media and traditional news are not large for the first two positions on energy transition.
Youths in Southeast Asia have found social media to be an alternative space for acquiring and expressing diverse opinions while respecting the predominantly conservative and collectivistic societies in the region (Yue, Nekmat, and Beta 2019). For all ages, social media provides a mechanism for sharing information, generating discussion, and mobilising actions (Tandoc and Eng 2017). Media consumers use multiple sources that complement each other, especially on energy issues as controversial as the use of nuclear power in Southeast Asia (Ho et al. 2019).
BELIEF 3: PROFESSIONALS FROM DIFFERENT FIELDS SHOW SIMILAR SUPPORT FOR RAPID ENERGY TRANSITION.
Professionals are assumed to be more highly educated and therefore more exposed to and receptive of scientific knowledge. The common understanding of climate change and energy transition should be shared among professionals from any field. It is unsurprising to see that the most climate-progressive professional group is civil society. At least 90% of the civil society respondents indicated their support for the three positions on energy transition. Different professional groups showed fairly similar levels of support for the positions on renewables and short-term pain but not on cutting coal reliance. It is important to acknowledge that all the professionals in this analysis did not deny the relevance of climate change in their work. However, professionals from the business sector are the least likely to support tough decisions on cutting coal even though they felt that it would be good for the economy in the long term. It is somewhat disconcerting to see that academics and researchers have not been more enthusiastic about cutting coal and reaping the long-term economic gains than the government and media professionals.
BELIEF 4: MORE ADVANCED ECONOMIES ARE MORE READY FOR ENERGY TRANSITION
The presumption is that more economically advanced countries are more ready for energy transition. The analysis here shows that this linear relationship does not apply to countries with a relatively higher GDP per capita, which are Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. The Kurznet curve could partially explain that individual countries will need to achieve sufficient economic success before they start considering environmental issues such as pollution and waste management. For example, Vietnam is two times wealthier than Cambodia. The Vietnamese respondents have greater desires to cut coal reliance, accept that diversion from fossil fuel is economically sensible, and embrace renewable energy. However, as Vietnam and Indonesia grow more, they may not enjoy proportionately greater support on issues related to fossil fuels. They would hit a pro-environment ceiling. In fact, they are already much more optimistic about energy transition than their richer neighbours – Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. This is perhaps less surprising for the last two countries that run its economy on oil. Thailand on the other hand is a disappointment. Only 72% of the Thai professionals felt that cutting coal soon is necessary. And 80% indicated that moving away from fossil fuel is largely good for the economy long-term. Were the Thai professionals more pessimistic or perhaps realistic about the impact of energy transition? Given the high support for renewable energy development, it is also possible that the Thai professionals held a preference for exploiting every type of energy sources to maximise energy security.
BELIEF 5 : CLIMATE LEADERS WILL LEAD BY EXAMPLE.
Climate leadership can be demonstrated by countries in various ways. Countries could be good at international negotiations of climate treaties and their absence in later summits would be palpable (Parker and Karlsson 2018). They may be critical in setting up the international institutions necessary for these negotiations to take place (Kopra 2020), and may lead by example when committing to ambitious climate goals and targets, which could be made easier if the process were primarily state-led and top down (Engels 2018). They can provide climate finance and support the development of appropriately ambitious climate policies in developing countries (Torney 2019). Southeast Asian countries should in theory be more influenced by their immediate neighbours (Glasgow, Zhao, and Rai 2021) in the Asia Pacific such as China, Australia, Japan and South Korea than other climate leaders such as the EU, UK and US. Beyond the states, similarly important is the climate leadership of some corporations that have thrived under supportive regulatory frameworks (Dupuis and Schweizer 2019).
It is unsurprising that professionals saw Japan and the EU as primary climate leaders. What is less known is whether the professionals who have confidence towards their preferred climate leaders are more likely to support rapid energy transition in their region. The Survey shows that supporters of climate leadership from China and Japan are less likely to buy into the need for cutting coal reliance as soon as possible. Only subscribers of EU leadership are enthusiastic about diverting from fossil fuel as a long-term economic strategy. The supporters of US leadership are not particularly keen on cutting coal and thinking long term, and the reverse is true for supporters of the Australian leadership. This contradicts with a track record of severe climate inaction from the Australian government.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This analysis about laggards of energy transition is far from conclusive. More research is needed to understand ways of sustaining climate advocacy as the younger generation matures. It remains a puzzle if users of social media and traditional news are open to diversifying their sources of information on climate change.
The relatively lower support for rapid energy transition from the business and academic sectors warrants reflection on whether the effort in persuading them is better spent somewhere else.
It is also critical to identify the factors that drive effective climate leadership, as national wealth, economic power and geographical proximity do not seem to consistently matter.
REFERENCES
Board, Jack. 2021. “Funding for New Coal Projects Drying u Fast in Southeast Asia as Climate Pressures Mount.” CNA, 2021.
Dahal, Biraj, Sathish A.P. Kumar, and Zhenlong Li. 2019. “Topic Modeling and Sentiment Analysis of Global Climate Change Tweets.” Social Network Analysis and Mining 9 (1): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-019-0568-8.
Dupuis, Johann, and Remi Schweizer. 2019. “Climate Pushers or Symbolic Leaders? The Limits to Corporate Climate Leadership by Food Retailers.” Environmental Politics 28 (1): 64–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1521947.
Engels, Anita. 2018. “Understanding How China Is Championing Climate Change Mitigation.” Palgrave Communications 4 (1): 101. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0150-4.
Glasgow, Derek, Shuang Zhao, and Saatvika Rai. 2021. “Rethinking Climate Change Leadership: An Analysis of the Ambitiousness of State GHG Targets.” Review of Policy Research 38 (4): 398–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12428.
Han, Heejin, and Sang Wuk Ahn. 2020. “Youth Mobilization to Stop Global Climate Change: Narratives and Impact.” Sustainability 12 (10): 4127. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12104127.
Ho, Shirley S., Alisius D. Leong, Jiemin Looi, and Agnes S.F. Chuah. 2019. “Online, Offline, or Word-of-Mouth? Complementary Media Usage Patterns and Credibility Perceptions of Nuclear Energy Information in Southeast Asia.” Energy Research & Social Science 48 (February): 46–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.09.012.
IEA. 2020. “Southeast Asia Coal Consumption by Country, 2010 and 2019.” 2020.
Khuong, Phuong M., Russell McKenna, and Wolf Fichtner. 2019. “Analyzing Drivers of Renewable Energy Development in Southeast Asia Countries with Correlation and Decomposition Methods.” Journal of Cleaner Production 213: 710–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.192.
Kopra, Sanna. 2020. “Leadership in Global Environmental Politics.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.537.
Lee, Katharine, Nathalia Gjersoe, Saffron O’Neill, and Julie Barnett. 2020. “Youth Perceptions of Climate Change: A Narrative Synthesis.” WIREs Climate Change 11 (3). https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.641.
Parker, Charles F., and Christer Karlsson. 2018. “The UN Climate Change Negotiations and the Role of the United States: Assessing American Leadership from Copenhagen to Paris.” Environmental Politics 27 (3): 519–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1442388.
Seah, Sharon, Melinda Martinus, and Jiahui Qiu. 2021. “Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2021 Survey Report.” Singapore.
Sirasoontorn, Puree, and Praipol Koomsup. 2018. “Energy Transition in Thailand : Challenges and Opportunities.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 42.
Tandoc, Edson C., and Nicholas Eng. 2017. “Climate Change Communication on Facebook, Twitter, Sina Weibo, and Other Social Media Platforms.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.361.
Thang, Nam Do, and Paul Burke. 2021. “Vietnam’s Solar Power Boom: Policy Implications for Other ASEAN Member States.” Perspective, 2021.
Torney, Diarmuid. 2019. “Follow the Leader? Conceptualising the Relationship between Leaders and Followers in Polycentric Climate Governance.” Environmental Politics 28 (1): 167–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1522029.
Yue, Audrey, Elmie Nekmat, and Annisa R. Beta. 2019. “Digital Literacy Through Digital Citizenship: Online Civic Participation and Public Opinion Evaluation of Youth Minorities in Southeast Asia.” Media and Communication 7 (2): 100–114. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v7i2.1899.
Zummo, Lynne, Emma Gargroetzi, and Antero Garcia. 2020. “Youth Voice on Climate Change: Using Factor Analysis to Understand the Intersection of Science, Politics, and Emotion.” Environmental Education Research 26 (8): 1207–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2020.1771288.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/143, 10 November 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] The full methodology can be found on page 2 of the report. My targeted analysis focuses on survey respondents who identify themselves as belonging to a professional sector. Therefore, I have excluded responses of students (n=87), individuals without an affiliation (n=77) and, professionals with strong climate scepticism (n=7).
[2] The technology enhances the efficiency and environmental acceptability of coal extraction, preparation, and use. Coal is considered cleaner because less emissions are produced with these advanced techniques in place.
[3] The number of respondents that nominated South Korea as a climate leader is vastly lower than for the other countries. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with caution. To a lesser extent, this applies to the UK and the US too.
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2021/142 “Uncertainties Surrounding the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election” by Max Lane
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Even though the next presidential and parliamentary elections are three years away, open discussion and manoeuvring have already begun, including calls for a date to be set immediately.
- This is partly motivated by the uncertainty arising from the requirement for presidential candidates to be nominated by political parties or coalitions having 20% of parliamentary seats or 25% of the votes. As only the PDIP has 20% of the seats in the parliament (and with none having 25% of votes), aspiring contenders will face growing pressure to seek out feasible coalition partners.
- The uncertainty is aggravated by the absence of any candidate from any party with a clearly high electability (popularity) level, and compounded by the many possible permutations for coalition-building, because there are no ‘natural’ ideological or policy differences among the parties.
- Being the only party with 20% of parliamentary seats, the PDIP’s choice of candidate is therefore an important question. So far, Puan Maharani is favoured by Megawati and the party machinery, but she polls significantly behind Ganjar Pranowo. Given this potential impasse, Joko Widodo has even surfaced as a possibility, but this would require constitutional amendment to allow Widodo’s eligibility for a third term.
- Prabowo Subianto and Anies Baswedan are the two most discussed non-PDIP candidates, with each facing their own specific uncertainties.
* Max Lane is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is the author of several books on Indonesia including Decentralization and Its Discontents: An Essay on Class, Political Agency and National Perspective in Indonesian Politics (ISEAS 2014) and An Introduction to the Politics of the Indonesian Union Movement (ISEAS 2019) and the editor of Continuity and Change after Indonesia’s Reforms: Contributions to an Ongoing Assessment (ISEAS 2019).
INTRODUCTION
On 24 September, the Jakarta Post Editorial Board published a special statement demanding that the Indonesian government set a date for the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections.[1] It was a very strong editorial statement ending with the words: “Now set the dates!” What is behind one of Indonesia’s major dailies making such a strong demand more than two years away from the election year? The Jakarta Post editorial is just one manifestation of what appears to be an early start to election manoeuvring by everybody involved.[2] There are several factors to consider in explaining this. One issue that the Jakarta Post raised has a real basis, namely that the KPU needs as much time as possible to prepare for the elections in such a huge country which will be carrying out simultaneous elections for the national parliament and the President and Vice-President and in the same year as a round of regional elections. This is a huge task. Tens of millions of people will be voting.
There are, however, deeper reasons for the early start to politicking; these flow from the interaction between the formal requirements of the election process and the situation and character of Indonesia’s political parties.
THE PRESIDENCY AND THE PARTIES
Prior to 2004, the President and Vice-President were elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which comprised members of the House of Representatives alongside other, initially appointed and later elected, individuals. During the New Order period, this facilitated the easy management of the continued re-election of President Suharto as a sole candidate whose state apparatus effectively controlled the three political parties that were allowed to operate, of which GOLKAR, Suharto’s own party, always had a large majority in the DPR. After Suharto’s fall, the state apparatus lost its capacity to effectively intervene, and considerable power was transferred to the political parties with seats in the parliament. From 1998 until 2004, Presidents were chosen and replaced through changing deal-making within the MPR/DPR among the various parties. In 2002, there was a change in the Constitution so that in 2004, the President and Vice-President were directly elected.
Initially, it was only necessary for a political party that wanted to nominate a presidential candidate to have achieved a ‘presidential threshold’ of 3% of seats in the parliament at a general election. This was changed by parliament to 20% in 2009.[3] The establishment of this presidential threshold(PT) reinforced the role of negotiations between political parties in the process of nominating candidates, with an important advantage going to any political party that could win 20% of the seats in parliament or get close to that figure.[4] Only such parties or coalitions, already represented in parliament, can nominate a President and Vice-President.
It is crucial to note today that only the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) has the PT by itself.[5] Puan Maharani, speaker of the parliament and daughter of the Chairperson of the PDIP, Megawati Sukarnoputri, is the most influential person in the PDIP faction in parliament. The current President, Joko Widodo, was nominated by and is a member of the PDIP – although he was not a lifelong member of the party, joining only when he decided to make his run for the Presidency, standing first as Mayor of Solo. Every other party will need coalition partners to nominate a President and Vice-President.
In the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, two coalitions emerged behind two sets of candidates for President and Vice-President. In 2021, three years before the next scheduled elections, discussion has already begun as to whether having only two sets of candidates is ideal or not.[6] Theoretically it is possible to have up to 5 candidates. Under the Indonesian system, there would be a run-off between the two top scoring candidates if nobody scored over 50% in the first round, as occurred in 2004 when there were 5 sets of candidates. In 2009, there were three sets. The debate about this issue reflects the tension created by the constraints necessitated by this rule and manifested in the need for coalitions.
The Democrat Party, has called for the abolition of the PT altogether. Meanwhile, the PDIP has raised the idea of raising the PT even higher and also called for there to be only two sets of candidates nominated by two coalitions, as has been the case since 2014. In the 2019 elections, the PDIP was part of a 10-party coalition that supported Joko Widodo and Maruf Amin. Other parties are open to a first round of 3 or 4 sets of candidates. The political reality underpinning these different positions on the PT and on the number of candidates is ‘simply’ that there is no party even getting close to winning 50% of the vote. The PDIP with 22.26% of the DPR seats is the largest, which it won with just 19% of the vote! All the other parties have less than 15%, some even at just 10% or lower. The Indonesian political reality does not provide the basis for a two-party system. In fact, even this spread of percentages of seats in the DPR has been moderated by the imposition of a national threshold of votes (4%) for parties to be awarded seats in the parliament.[7] Seven other parties, with a total of around 17% of the national vote, were denied seats in the parliament. All the current parties in the DPR have a greater proportion of seats than of votes because of the elimination of these seven parties from the DPR.
Apart from needing to be nominated by a party or parties with at least 20% of the seats in parliament, a presidential candidate needs to win more than 50% of the vote in a face-off contest with a rival candidate. Given that the votes for the 14 main parties have remained stable for more than ten years, a successful coalition is likely to comprise parties that combined have won at least 50% in the previous elections.
All these factors underpin a system where any President needs to be supported by a substantial coalition of the existing parties to have a chance of winning. As President, he or she then needs a majority in parliament to pass budgets and legislation.
UNCERTAINTIES FOR 2024
There are no substantial ideological or programmatic differences among these parties. At the moment there are only two parties represented in parliament – Democrat and PKS – that are outside the government. Many of the parties in the current government were members of the government when the Democrat President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was in power. At the provincial and kabupaten[8] level, every possible combination of parties can be found in coalitions. There are no policy issues that seriously divide the political elite and their parties. The fact that there are almost no “natural” divisions among the parties means that almost any combination of parties is possible. At this stage, the only combination that can perhaps be ruled out is one that contains the PDIP alongside the Democrat Party, but this reflects the personal animosities between Megawati and Yudhoyono[9] rather than any deeper differences.
In 2014 and 2019, the largest coalition was drawn together because of the highly palpable elektabilitas[10] of Joko Widodo after his perceived successes as Mayor of Solo. In 2021, the situation is being defined by two facts: first, almost any combination of parties is possible and, second, there is no candidate with the same elektabilitas popularity that Joko Widodo enjoyed in 2013 to draw together such an opportunistic coalition. At the moment, both possible candidates and likely coalitions remain uncertain. It is this uncertainty that is driving the flurry of early manoeuvres and discussions of both new policies and of competing scenarios.
This uncertainty, however, is one experienced primarily among the ‘political class’ itself. It is not accompanied by additional uncertainty around future policy directions which might destabilise society in general. There are also no signs, at the moment, that this situation is creating the rhetorical polarisation that mobilised sectarian identity politics in 2014 and 2019. In 2014 and 2019, Prabowo Subianto, who did appear to have substantial electability, allied with sectarian Islamic politics, such as that represented by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and others. In 2021, having achieved a reproachment with Joko Widodo, he is no longer engaging in that flirtation. Rather, he has moved closer to the PDIP and its chairperson, awarding her an honorary doctorate from the Defence University, which as Defence Minister he maintains oversight, and appearing with her at other significant events.[11] Therefore, this uncertainty is not having significant destabilising impact among the broader society or at the grassroots. This, of course, can change, but there are no such signs now.
PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES AS OF 2021
The situation described above underlines the centrality of the different party’s assessment of the elektabilitas of candidates, and not policy outlooks, as the dynamic factor shaping prospective coalitions. In this process, the PDIP does not formally require a coalition to nominate a candidate, although it would be strengthened politically if it does so. If it can put forward a popular figure as a candidate, as it did with Joko Widodo, it becomes the leading player in the game. The prospects of the PDIP in this respect need to be reviewed first.
PDIP’s candidates
At the moment, public discussion about whom the PDIP could nominate focuses on three figures. These are Puan Maharani, Ganjar Pranowo, the Governor of Central Java and President Joko Widodo. This is a complicated situation. Puan Maharani has extremely low poll ratings – sometimes below 4%[12] – and thus almost no elektablitas,[13] but she has the support of the party machine under the direction of her mother, Megawati, who is the chairperson. On the other hand, Ganjar Pranowo, scores relatively well in elektabilitas polls, many times that of Puan. Ganjar has high social media presence based on a positive image of his tenure as Governor.[14] He is surrounded by a team that includes experienced activists from the anti-Suharto movement period. Recent events, however, show that he does not have the support of Megawati and the party machine, which has instead allocated considerable resources to Puan’s billboard profile campaign. Ganjar was even excluded from a party machine cadre preparation event that was organised by Puan.
Ganjar’s further advantage is that the position of governor – like mayor or head of district – is a better launching pad than either being a Minister, which Puan was in Widodo’s first presidential term or Speaker of the Parliament. Incumbent political figures at the local level can more easily claim association with any successful policy implementation that is palpable locally. This was the precedent set by Widodo’s own rise from Mayor of Solo to Governor of Jakarta to the Presidency. On the other hand, the Ministers as well as the Parliament have become the focus of popular discontent. Four ministers have recently been arrested for corruption.[15] In early October, two senior ministers have been implicated in the Pandora Papers scandal.[16] Although Puan has not been convicted of any corruption charges, her name was linked to a corruption scandal that had to do with welfare funds in the media in late 2020 and early 2021.[17] Shifting from a Ministry to the position of Speaker of the Parliament may provide her with a major political platform, but that also highlights her involvement in the almost unanimous support of parliament for unpopular laws that shrank the competency of the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Job Creation (Omnibus) Law weakened protection for workers.
In many ways, Ganjar fits the profile of a younger PDIP leader with an image of success at the gubernatorial level while Puan is tainted by being part of a corrupt national elite and an unpopular parliament.[18] However, to date, the party machine under Megawati, appears to be committed to advancing Puan’s profile.[19] It is possible that this is preparation to nominate Puan as a Vice-Presidential candidate, but this would most likely be with a presidential candidate from another party, not Ganjar. Thus the PDIP is now constrained by the contradiction between having a candidate popular in the polls but not popular with the party hierarchy.
Another possible PDIP candidate is President Joko Widodo, although for Widodo to stand for a third term, the parliament would need to amend the Constitution. Puan Maharani was one of the first to mention this possibility back in November, 2019.[20] In June, 2021, Tempo magazine published reports of meetings being held by Ministers and the heads of various polling groups planning for either Widodo to stand again or for emergency regulation to extend his presidency because of the Covid pandemic.[21] However, in September, Widodo issued a statement that he had “no intention” of either standing again or extending his presidential term.[22] However, given the apparent lack of support for Ganjar from the party hierarchy and the very low popularity of Puan, the spectre of a manoeuvre to secure a third period for Widodo cannot be ruled out.
This contradiction inside the party that holds the most strategic position for coalition creation adds to the general uncertainty. It also forms the terrain for the potentiality of candidates from smaller parties or of those not tied to parties.
Non-PDIP Candidates.
The two non-PDIP candidates that have significant poll ratings are Prabowo Subianto, current Minister of Defence and Chairperson of the GERINDRA Party, and Anies Baswedan, current Governor of Jakarta. Prabowo’s GERINDRA continues to state that Prabowo will be their Presidential Candidate in 2024. GERINDRA has just under 14% of the seats in the DPR and would need one other party to join in nominating Prabowo. To date, there have been no clear signs of GERINDRA’s stance on this. However, as mentioned above, since Prabowo’s reproachment with Widodo, he has cultivated a close relationship with Megawati. Prabowo had stood as Megawati’s Vice-Presidential running mate in 2009. With this reproachment, there is considerable speculation that there may be a chance of a Prabowo-Puan candidacy and many polls[23] put forward this candidacy as one option.[24] Indeed there has even been speculation in the media of a Megawati-Prabowo candidacy, although most commentators consider this to be very unlikely.[25] In some polls, a Prabowo-Ganjar pairing obtained better results than a Prabowo-Puan ticket.
One set of candidates outside of a PDIP or PDIP-Gerindra that does well in polls is that of Anies Baswedan together with the son of Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), from the Democrat Party.[26] Baswedan now stands out as the contrasting candidate to the Widodo-PDIP axis, especially after the achievement of high vaccination coverage in Jakarta, thanks to which Baswedan’s popularity has improved.
Baswedan is in a unique figure in a very opportune position. Although nominated by a coalition of PKS and GERINDRA to stand as Jakarta Governor, he is not tied to any party. He began his quest for the Presidency by intending to step forward as a candidate at a planned 2012 Democrat Party convention. When that Convention did not happen, he became one of the most prominent campaigners for Joko Widodo in 2013-4. Widodo appointed him Minister of Education only to remove him later. He became an opponent and critic of Widodo and stood for the governorship of Jakarta with PKS and GERINDRA support against candidates supported by the PDIP. He is strangely in a similar position as Widodo. Widodo is acceptable to all parties, except the Democrat Party, while Baswedan is acceptable to all parties except the PDIP. While AHY scores low in the polls, the Baswedan-AHY pairing scores well and ahead of a Prabowo-Puan combination – approximately 36% to 22%.[27]
CONCLUSION
The lack of policy-based natural divisions between the parties means that almost any combination of parties to nominate presidential candidates is possible. The primary obstacle to some combinations is personal rivalry. There is also no candidate with popularity as high as what Joko Widodo had enjoyed in 2014 and 2019. These two facts have given rise to considerable speculation on how things might develop, which parties may make up the next government and who will be President. As a result, manoeuvring has started early.
The preeminent strategic position of the PDIP as the only party that has no formal need of a partner, and the fact of its incumbency, have given rise to an initial wave of speculation of a PDIP-GERINDRA axis competing with a Baswedan-Democrat axis.[28] However, the absence of any consolidated divisions among the parties, apart from personal rivalries, means the situation will remain fluid and uncertain for some time yet.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/142, 9 November 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2021/09/23/set-the-election-dates.html
[3] https://tirto.id/mengapa-presidential-threshold-terus-bermasalah-setiap-lima-tahun-fMh8
[4] The legislation also allows for a party than won 25% of the vote to nominate a candidate, but no party has ever achieved that since the legislation was passed.
[5] See Table.
[6] https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2021/06/11/utak-atik-calon-presiden-2024/
[8] Kabupaten is an administrative unit within a province, sometimes called a district.
[9] https://www.merdeka.com/politik/kisah-perseteruan-megawati-dan-sby-berawal-dari-pilpres-2014.html
[10] For an early discussion of how “elektabilitas” became a central idea in contemporary politics, see Max Lane, Indonesia’s 2014 Legislative Elections: The Dilemmas of “Elektabilitas” Politics at /wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2014_25.pdf
[11] https://www.suara.com/news/2021/05/27/121845/harmonis-dengan-megawati-gerindra-berpeluang-duetkan-prabowo-puan-di-pilpres-2024; https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210929180730-20-701204/megawati-kenang-bung-karno-masa-orde-baru-sejarah-dibelokkan; https://www.kompas.com/edu/read/2021/06/10/090034971/megawati-raih-gelar-profesor-kehormatan-dari-unhan-ini-alasannya
[12] In the poll reported here, Puan scored below 1% https://en.tempo.co/read/1466162/ganjar-pranowo-outshines-puan-maharani-in-latest-electability-survey
[13] See note 12.
[14] https://www.merdeka.com/politik/ganjar-pranowo-saya-bermedsos-sudah-sejak-jadi-dpr.html; https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/10/30/19294771/gaya-bermedia-sosial-ganjar-pranowo-sosialisasi-kebijakan-hingga-menerima?
[16] https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/10/05/12572651/luhut-pandjaitan-disebut-dalam-pandora-papers-ini-penjelasan-jubir; https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2021/10/05/coordinating-ministers-named-in-pandora-papers.html
[18] It should be noted that Ganjar has also been affected in reports on a corruption affair from when he was a member of parliament in an earlier period: https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1203978/kpk-akan-periksa-lagi-ganjar-pranowo-dalam-kasus-korupsi-e-ktp
[19] https://fulcrum.sg/politicians-billboard-war-underscores-absence-of-policy-contestation/
[20] https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4798084/puan-minta-wacana-jabatan-presiden-3-periode-dikaji
[23] https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20210908/15/1439909/akankah-prabowo-puan-maju-di-pilpres-2024
[24] https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2203078/duet-prabowo-puan-paling-mungkin-diwujudkan-di-pilpres-2024; https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5667858/survei-pasangan-capres-2024-anies-ahy-tertinggi-disusul-prabowo-puan
[27] https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5667858/survei-pasangan-capres-2024-anies-ahy-tertinggi-disusul-prabowo-puan; https://www.merdeka.com/politik/simulasi-head-to-head-capres-2024-prabowo-puan-kalah-dari-anies-ahy.html,
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“The WTO’s 2020 Trade Policy Review for Indonesia and Thailand: A Comparative Assessment” by Hal Hill and Jayant Menon
“Public Perceptions of the Election Commission, Election Management and Democracy in Malaysia” by Helen Ting M.H. and Andrew Kam Jia Yi
2021/141 “Indonesia’s Budget Stretched to Control a Pandemic and to Revive a Struggling Economy” by Manggi Habir and Siwage Dharma Negara
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The second major Covid-19 surge driven by the Delta variant in the second half of 2021 has led to another round of social restrictions, thereby slowing down the economy’s fragile recovery. This complicates budget implementation for the remaining part of the year as well as the planning for 2022.
- This year’s improved budget disbursement has helped to fund the expansion of the government’s critical health and social assistance programmes, while material and capital expenditures have declined.
- Expecting state revenues to be squeezed, the government has introduced a new tax law, which parliament has just passed. This tax law consists of a rise in value-added tax (VAT) and income tax rates next year, a second tax amnesty programme and a new carbon tax, among others. However, the desired outcomes are not assured, as the pandemic is still evolving.
- Policymakers have to calibrate a delicate balance in catering for public health requirements while ensuring that growth objectives remain intact. While funds are sorely needed for social spending and economic programmes, fiscal prudence is critical to avoid any downgrading of Indonesia’s risk and debt ratings.
* Guest writer, Manggi Habir, is an independent commissioner for three companies, PT ABM-Investama Tbk, PT Berdayakan Usaha Indonesia, and PT Adira Dinamika Multi Finance Tbk. Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
This year, the Indonesian economy had been showing signs of recovery from last year’s pandemic-driven slump. The 2Q 2021 grew at a promising 7.07% year-on-year rate. But in August, this recovery was disrupted by a massive second wave of delta-variant infections, once again overstretching health facilities and forcing the government to reimpose social restrictions. As a result, earlier 5% growth targets have been downgraded to around 3.5%. This has a complicated budget implementation for the remainder of 2021 and raises questions about next year’s plan.
In this second pandemic year, the government’s fiscal options are understandably quite limited. Revenues are down from a slowdown brought about by social restrictions, while expenditures are up, driven by extensive health and social assistance spending. This inevitably creates a widening budget deficit. The challenge is to find a balance between raising enough debt to cover the deficit while ensuring it does not overwhelm fiscal capacity, hurt debt ratings and ultimately damage market confidence.
Fiscal flexibility is badly required as the government rushes to impose social restrictions, hurting growth and government revenue during an infectious surge, and subsequently lifts restrictions and boosts spending when the positive-infected numbers drop to a manageable level. The parliament has just passed a new tax law to enhance fiscal flexibility and help reduce the budget deficit to meet the government’s fiscal consolidation target in 2023.[1]
This brief will discuss some critical issues concerning the fiscal situation in Indonesia, focusing on government revenue and spending patterns before and during the pandemic. It will look at the ability of the government to fund the spending and the challenges it faces to maintain a budget deficit and a debt level that does not hurt its “investment grade” rating.
SPENDING FOR GROWTH
To deal with the impact of the pandemic, the Indonesian government has relied on an expansive fiscal policy to support the health sector and provide a lifeline for the economy. This government spending has kept the economy from further deterioration after the implementation of large-scale social restrictions, or PSBB, in April-June 2020. In the second half of 2020, while all GDP components experienced deep contractions, government consumption grew positively (Table 1), thanks to the massive stimulus package (PEN or Program Pemulihan Ekonomi National), amounting to Rp 695.2 trillion (US$ 48.8 billion).[2]
From Q2 to Q4 last year, government spending had grown at a two-digit level, indicating an aggressive counter-cyclical fiscal policy in response to the economic recession (Table 1). Still, the economy contracted by 2.07% last year.
Traditionally, personnel expenditure takes the largest share of government spending, amounting to 22-23% (Table 2). The second-largest component is material expenditures, accounting for about 21% of total outlays before the pandemic. During the pandemic, the allocation for material expenditure[3] has declined dramatically by -21%. Likewise, capital expenditure had also declined by -27% in 2020. Meanwhile, spending for social assistance has jumped significantly by 71%, from Rp 102 trillion in 2019 to Rp 175 trillion in 2020. Moreover, interest payments jumped by 23%, from Rp 276 trillion in 2019 to Rp 339 trillion in 2020.
As growth is expected to recover, the government has projected to reduce social assistance allocation from this year onward (Table 2). While understandable, given the risk of a prolonged pandemic, reducing government support too early can be risky for economic recovery.
Government spending has faced disbursement challenges. In 2019, the realisation of central government spending was around 91.7%. In 2020, the government slightly improved the spending realisation rate to 92.5% (Table 3). The low realisation rates are partly due to the highly bureaucratic process of disbursing the budget.[4]
There is encouraging disbursement improvement this year. Table 3 shows that as of August 31, the realisation rate has reached 55%, higher than for the same period of last year or the year before the pandemic. Material spending (incl. vaccine and medical equipment), in particular, has seen the fastest realisation rate, followed by subsidies and social assistance. Nevertheless, capital expenditure remains sluggish, reaching only 42% as of August 31. Based on the 2020 experience, capital spending[5] accelerated at year-end. Last year, health and business sector disbursements only started to pick up in August.
This year, the government has raised the National Economic Recovery Program (PEN) by 7% to Rp 744.8trn (US$52.3 billion). This programme supports the health sector, maintains people’s purchasing power through social assistance programmes, and prevents further deterioration for MSMEs and the business world through subsidies and tax relief.
The realisation of the PEN programme in 2020 only reached 82.83% of the budget ceiling or Rp 575.8 trillion.[6] The government could only spend 64% of the budget for health support and 47% of the budget for business incentives by late 2020.[7] It did, however, manage to spend 96% of the household support budget, the most significant component of PEN. This higher disbursement performance was made possible by scaling up existing programmes, such as the Hopeful Families Program (PKH), food assistance programmes, and the village fund programme.
A medium and long-term implication of the pandemic relates to increased debt burden. In 2020, interest payments increased significantly, reaching Rp 338.8 trillion from Rp 275.9 trillion pre-pandemic. This year, interest payments are projected to increase further by 10%. By 2022, about 20% of central govt expenditure will be spent on paying interest. This means that only 80% of the spending can be used to support the economy.
Given the shrinking fiscal space, improved revenue collection is imperative for ensuring fiscal sustainability. The following section will discuss the issues surrounding revenue collection during the pandemic.
REVENUE COLLECTION
State revenue trends: When the pandemic first spread in 2020, state revenue of Rp 1,648 trillion dropped by 16% from the pre-pandemic year of 2019. Tax revenue accounted for Rp 1,285 trillion, followed by non-tax revenue at Rp 344 trillion. [8]
For January-July 2020, a more detailed breakdown of state revenue sources shows income tax as the largest contributor (40% of state revenue), shrinking by the same 16%, reaching Rp 370 trillion (see Table 4). All other state revenue sources declined, except for excise tax, largely from resilient tobacco sales and custom charges. It is interesting to note that Value-added Tax (VAT), the second-largest contributor to state revenue (24% of state revenue), showed a lower drop than income tax due to the ongoing production and consumption of essential goods.
With the recovery picking up in early 2021, state revenue for the January-July period rose by 11.8%, reaching Rp 1,032 trillion. Still, this remains below pre-pandemic levels.
Tax revenue, including customs and excise tax, amounted to Rp 789 trillion, with non-tax revenue reaching Rp 242 trillion. Once again, VAT revenue growth far exceeded growth in income tax, as consumption grew early this year.
The adverse impact from the resumption of social restrictions during August-September 2021, however, is a concern. Bank Indonesia has already adjusted downward its forecasts for the country’s 2021 growth to a 3.5-4.3% range, which is much lower than the 2021 state budget’s 5% growth target (see Table 1 in Appendix). As a result, this year’s last quarter recovery will be critical to cover lost ground from the August-September social restrictions.
As noted in Table 5, the 16.0% decline in 2020 state revenue and the 12.4% rise in state spending, resulted in a budget deficit of 6.1%. The projected recovery in 2021 and 2022—i.e. a subsequent increase in state revenue and a more subdued rise in state spending—would reduce the budget deficit to 4.85% by 2022. The goal is to bring this further back under its earlier limit of 3.0% in 2023.[9]
Financing a widening deficit: As of July 30, 2021, the total government debt outstanding, consisting of Rupiah, foreign-denominated and Sharia Sukuk bonds, reached Rp 839.4 trillion. Last year, to ensure the take-up of these bonds, the government and Bank Indonesia (BI) came up with their Burden Sharing programme, where BI would purchase government bonds in the primary market. This was met with some trepidation by market observers who questioned BI’s independence and voiced concern about potential inflationary pressures.
BI’s government bond purchase, as of August 16, 2021, amounted to Rp 131.96 trillion, comprising roughly 16% of total government bond ownership. Foreign ownership, which at 39%, was the largest holder of bonds during pre-pandemic times, has now been overtaken by Indonesian banks with 33% bond ownership holdings. Banks facing limited lending opportunities and holding considerable liquidity have become active buyers of government bonds. Meanwhile, inflation has dropped to an all-time low of 1.6% for 2021, with overall demand still weak.
The country’s total debt level, as a percentage of GDP, is at 37.5% for 2Q 2021, slightly below its peak of 39.3% late last year. So far, Indonesia’s debt rating remains at BBB with Fitch and S&P, while Moody’s is at a similar Baa2 level. The difference is that Moody’s and Fitch ratings come with a ‘Stable’ outlook, while S&P is keeping its ‘Negative’ outlook. Indonesia is just two notches above the investment-grade benchmark, and so it must cautiously manage its debt capacity as it has limited room to maintain its financial market access.
Some market players are already factoring in a lower rating in their valuation and pricing of Indonesia’s government bond, given S&P’s negative outlook. This explains the relatively rich 6.337% yield on its 10-year bond. The lowered portion of foreign-owned government bonds from 39% in the past to 23% also reduces the bonds’ pricing volatility. However, with concerns about inflation and the potential rise in US interest rates, there could be upward pressure on government bond rates.
This is one reason behind recent plans to pass new tax legislation through parliament before year-end. This new tax law, which will become effective next year and is already factored into the government’s 2022 forecast, is designed to boost government tax revenue to meet its 2022 and 2023 budget commitments.
One of the tax changes is to raise VAT rates from 10% to 11% starting April 2022, and further to 12% in 2025. In addition, VAT will further extend to basic goods and services (food, education, health and financial services), which is currently still exempted. VAT is becoming an increasingly important contributor to state revenue, given its acceptance, compliance, and implementation are much easier than income tax. And, during the pandemic, VAT has been shown to be more resistant to downward swings and more responsive to upswings than income tax.
Another, is a new income tax bracket of 35% for individuals with an annual income above Rp 5 billion (SGD 500,000). For lower income levels, the first income bracket of 5%, which currently applies for income up to Rp 50 million, will be extended further to cover income up to Rp 60 million. For corporates, the current corporate tax rate will be kept at 22% and not lowered to 20% as planned. For 2020 and 2021, the current tax rates still apply and the government has not issued any tax moratorium for these two years. There will also be a new carbon tax of Rp 30 for every kg equivalent of carbon dioxide emitted. Coal plants will be the first to be impacted next year.
The last change is a plan to have a second tax amnesty, which will closely follow the 2016 amnesty programme, but now with higher final income tax rates. This time, taxpayers will be allowed to declare assets not yet reported and pay a final income tax rate ranging between 12-18%. The earlier tax amnesty programme carried a 6-11% final income tax range. The rates applied would depend on the location of the assets, whether it would be brought back or kept abroad, and whether or not it would be invested in a designated investment area or type of government security.[10]
It is doubtful that this new amnesty programme will attract a similar level of participants, which in 2016 saw around 970,000 taxpayers declaring undisclosed assets of Rp 4,881 trillion (40% of GDP), and generate similar results, which comprised Rp 135 trillion in additional tax income in 2016. Surprisingly, most of the assets declared then were domestic assets, amounting to Rp 3,698 trillion, while foreign assets, which amounted to Rp 1,036 trillion, fell far short of the government’s target.[11]
This time, the government’s objective appears to focus more on registering and repatriating more undeclared offshore assets. A few months earlier, the Ministry of Finance established a specific task force to seek the repayment of still outstanding government liquidity credits (Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support or BLBI) totalling Rp 110.45 trillion from major borrowers, most of which were issued to bail out the banking sector during the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis.[12] This new amnesty programme would help these borrowers settle their government obligations. However, this might be a long drawn-out process.
The Ministry of Finance is projecting that the new tax laws will generate IDR 139 trillion in additional government revenue and reduce the government’s budget deficit further by -0.37% to -4.43% next year.[13]
CONCLUSION
In a pandemic environment, the ability to successfully implement a country’s budget will not just rely on political-economic factors as with previous budgets. There are also public health issues to address at this time, owing to the deadly virus that continues to mutate and evolve. Getting people vaccinated and ensuring that health protocols are adhered to remain challenges worldwide. Closely monitoring a relatively new set of public health metrics and responding with effective social policy and guidelines are becoming critical to ensure that the fragile recovery continues to gain strength.
Appendix:
ISEAS Perspective 2021/141, 5 November 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2021/10/04/key-points-from-impending-new-tax-law.html. Accessed 7 October 2021.
[2] https://money.kompas.com/read/2021/07/15/155819626/sepanjang-2020-realisasi-program-pen-hanya-8283-persen. Accessed 27 September 2021.
[3] Material expenditures consist of spending on office equipment, replacement of office equipment and supplies as well as consumable goods and services, including vaccines and medical equipment.
[4] Robert Sparrow, Teguh Dartanto & Renate Hartwig (2020) Indonesia Under the New Normal: Challenges and the Way Ahead, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 56:3, 269-299.
[5] Capital expenditures are used for procuring land, equipment and machinery, building, road, irrigation and network infrastructure, and other capital expenditures.
[6] https://money.kompas.com/read/2021/07/15/155819626/sepanjang-2020-realisasi-program-pen-hanya-8283-persen. Accessed 27 September 2021.
[7] Della Temenggung, Adhi Saputro, Rullan Rinaldi & Deasy Pane (2021) Managing Recovery and Seizing Reform Opportunities, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 57:1, 1-28.
[8] APBN Kita, Kinerja dan Fakta Agustus 2021
[9] APBN Kita, Kinerja dan Fakta Agustus 2021
[10] Arys Aditya, Grace Sihombing and Claire Jiao, “Indonesia Eyes Top Income Tax Bracket”, Raises VAT in New Bill, Bloomberg News, October 1, 2021
[11] “Trillions declared through Indonesia’s tax amnesty programme”, Oxford Business Group, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/taxing-questions-amnesty-programme-trigger-step-change-tax-compliance
[12] Sorta Tobing, “Daftar Pengutang BLBI, Ada 7 Debitur Masuk Prioritas Satgas”, 19 September 2021, katadata.co.id, https://katadata.co.id/sortatobing/berita/614711c59ffd3/daftar-pengutang-blbi-ada-7-debitur-masuk-prioritas-satgas
[13] Ministry of Finance, Undang-Undang Harmonisasi Peraturan Perpajakan, Membangun Sistem Perpajakan Yang Adil, Sehat, Efektif dan Akuntabel, Jakarta, Oktober 2021
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/140 “The ESG Practices of Chinese State-owned Enterprises in Cambodia” by Chheang Vannarith
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting has gained policy traction over the years, and some Chinese companies have started implementing ESG procedures following their government’s announcement to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.
- Although there are attempts to improve sustainability and responsible business, Chinese state-owned enterprises in Cambodia, however, do not have ESG policy guidelines and reporting yet.
- The four state-owned enterprises discussed in this paper have not fully implemented ESG reporting. Therefore, there is a need to introduce and enforce ESG to enhance the quality and image of Chinese investments.
- The local government plays a pivotal role in promoting ESG reporting. Currently, Cambodia lacks a cohesive regulatory framework on ESG, and does not effectively exercise strict and transparent enforcement of existing environmental and social safeguards.
- Other key barriers to ESG development in Cambodia are the lack of understanding of the issues among the policymakers and the lack of access to detailed data on environmental and social safeguards for investment projects.
- The Cambodian regulator should introduce policy guidelines on ESG integration and reporting so that the quality and sustainability of investment projects can be enhanced.
*The author is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and President of the Asian Vision Institute (AVI), an independent think tank based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
INTRODUCTION
The state of Chinese companies’ Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting gained some momentum after China announced its ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The key indicators of ESG include those concerning (1) The environment: Climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, waste and pollution, resource depletion, land use and biodiversity; (2) Social conditions: labour standards, diversity and inclusion, health and safety, data privacy, product safety and responsibility, learning and development, and; (3) Governance: Board diversity, bribery and corruption, executive compensation, shareholder rights and business ethics. The strategy suggested by Chinese corporations includes reviewing industry megatrends and peer performance, identifying opportunities created by the ESG movement, and embedding ESG into the company’s vision and growth strategies.[1]
However, policy implementation remains an issue. Based on official policy, China’s economy is transitioning from “brute-force economic expansion” to a growth model that focuses more on “inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth”, in which ESG adoption by Chinese companies is instrumental.[2] ESG can be another source of China’s soft power projection as China’s implementation of ESG presents “a serious shift towards meeting global standards and domestic-level sustainable development objectives”.[3] However, there are loopholes and gaps in implementing ESG standards, especially among Chinese investors overseas. This paper aims to shed light on the practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises regarding ESG application in Cambodia.
CAMBODIA’S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK RELATING TO ESG
In Cambodia, there is no law or regulation on ESG per se. Still, some regulatory frameworks support ESG standards and practices, namely regulatory framework on environmental protection, social securities, and employment and labour relations. Overall, there is a lack of coherent information and understanding on ESG among local policy makers. Different government agencies have different roles regarding ESG and the outstanding challenge is policy and institutional coordination between agencies. The Ministry of Environment oversees ecological protection while the Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training oversees labour relations and social securities
The environmental protection framework includes: The Law on Environment Protection and Natural Resource Management adopted in 1996, Sub-Decree on Management of Solid Waste adopted in 1999, Sub-Decree on the Water Pollution Control adopted in 1999, and Sub-Decree on the Control of Air Pollution and Noise Disturbance adopted in 2000. National Policy on Green Growth adopted in 2013 provides a comprehensive policy framework to develop a balance of economic development with environment, society, culture, and sustainable use of national resources.
Specifically, concerning investment projects in Cambodia, the Sub-Decree on the Implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Process that was adopted in 1999 provides certain EIA guidelines. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environment is responsible for scrutinising and reviewing EIA reports in collaboration with other concerned ministries. It also has to follow up, monitor and take appropriate measures to ensure that project owners conform to the Environmental Management Plan while project construction is underway, and accede to their EIA report’s approval. The investors or project owners have to pay the EIA examination service fee and monitor the project implementation. In practice, most EIAs are outsourced to private sector consultants due to the lack of human resources at the Ministry of Environment. The Ministry will approve the assessment result subject to payment of the service fee.[4]
Concerning labour rights and standards, the regulatory framework on employment and labour relations includes the Labour Law adopted in 1997, which provides comprehensive protection of labour rights and working conditions. In 2003, the Labour Arbitration Council was established with the support of the International Labour Organisation to resolve labour disputes. Under the Labour Law, the wage must be equal to the guaranteed minimum wage that ensures every worker a decent standard of living compatible with human dignity. Minimum wages in the garment and footwear sector have been negotiated among the trade unions, corporations and government agencies. The minimum wage in the garment and footwear sector has increased from US$100 in 2014 to US$192 in 2021. The minimum wage of workers in this sector is normally used as a reference for negotiation and determination of wages and other working conditions in other sectors.
The Law on Social Security Schemes for Persons Defined by the Provisions of the Labour Law was promulgated in 2002 to establish a social security scheme composed of a pension system. The pension system’s objectives include providing old-age benefit, invalidity benefit and survivors’ benefit; and occupational risk insurance to cover employment injury and provide occupational disease benefits. The National Social Security Fund launched in 2007 manages national social insurance schemes covering work injury and health insurance.
CHINESE COMPANIES IN CAMBODIA
Chinese companies must comply with EIA to get their investment projects approved, just like other domestic and foreign companies. Getting access to the EIA reports remains an obstacle as the project owners treat these reports with great confidentiality. However, Article 16 of the Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management (1996) stipulates that the Ministry of Environment, upon request from the public, needs to provide any information about the activities and encourage public participation for environmental protection and natural resource management. The lack of transparency, public participation and disclosure of EIA reports are issues that need to be addressed and improved.
According to the Asian Vision Institute survey in 2020, Chinese state-owned companies have varying standards regarding sustainability practices and ESG reports. These companies do not have any clear strategy to integrate environmental and social sustainability into corporate governance, and they do not have any ESG disclosure plans as yet. However, when Cambodian authorities set rules and regulations on ESG disclosure, they comply with local regulations by developing and disclosing ESG standard reports. Concerning environmental and social safeguards, four Chinese state-owned enterprises are briefly discussed below. The information is based on the survey conducted by the research team from the Asian Vision Institute (AVI) in September 2020.
Table 1: Background Information of the Companies
| China Huaneng (Lower Sesan II) | China Road and Bridge Corporation | Yunnan Construction Investment Group | Bank of China | |
| Year of establishment (in Cambodia) | 2014 | 2001 | 2007 | 2010 |
| Type of project(s) | Hydropower | Civil engineering and construction | Infrastructure investment | Financial services Banking services |
| Investment value (USD) | 800 Million | NA | NA | 1.1 Billion (As of 2019) |
| Location | Stung Treng Province | Phnom Penh | Phnom Penh | Phnom Penh |
| No of employee | 210 (110 are Cambodians) | Around 100 | Around 100 | 173 |
| ESG-related policy | Sustainability Report (2020) | Social Responsibility Management | Corporate Social Responsibility Policy |
China Huaneng
China Huaneng is one of the leading state-owned enterprises in China. Its operation portfolio includes development, investment, construction, operation and management of power sources; production and sale of power and heat; development, investment, construction, production and sale of businesses and products related to finance, coal, transportation, renewable energy and environmental protection, and; industrial investment, operation and management. In 2020, the company published its sustainability report highlighting its contributions to socio-economic development and environmental protection.
Its Lower Sesan II Hydropower project in Cambodia is one of the most controversial, given contradictory reports concerning environmental and social safeguard issues. The company conducted a feasibility study and fulfilled the EIA in 2011, before the project started in 2014. The project started its entire operation in 2018. Per the requirements of the “EIA Report”, the Lower Sesan II Hydropower plant has allocated funds and expenses for fish protection and environmental protection to fulfil its social responsibilities and to protect biodiversity.[5]
The feasibility study and EIA report show that six villages with a total population of about 900 households were affected by the project. The local villagers consist of Khmer and other indigenous ethnic groups. Their livelihoods, including traditional crop rotation cultivation, non-timber forest products collection, livestock raising, and fishing, are affected. The river plays an essential role in generating income, supporting subsistence, and protecting local livelihoods. Villagers from two villages (Srae Sronouk and Kbal Romeas Chas) refused to resettle to designated places.
Resettlement is indeed the most controversial issue. According to the company’s report, the compensation regime was fair, and the company provided opportunities to the local people and contributed to the local socio-economic development. Concerning the resettlement issue, the survey findings by the Asian Vision Institute show that 7 per cent of the respondents are very satisfied, 18 per cent are somewhat satisfied, 4 per cent are very unsatisfied, and 18 per cent are slightly unsatisfied. The rest are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. Various studies and reports illustrate the side effects of the project, resettlement issues and inadequate compensation.[6]
This 400 MW hydropower project is one of the most significant energy investment projects in Cambodia. It is a joint venture between China Huaneng—a Chinese state-owned enterprise—and Royal Group of Cambodia, a Cambodian conglomerate. The project costs about US$800 million, covers a land area of 9,854 ha of government concession land. The project takes the form of BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), with a cooperative operation period of 40 years before it transfers the ownership and operation to the Cambodian government. With a length of 6.5 kilometres, the dam is the largest in Cambodia. It can reserve 2.72 thousand million cubic meters of water, and the hydropower station generates and provides about 2 TWh of renewable energy annually, contributing about 20% of Cambodia’s total energy supply capacity. Based on CDC’s report in 2018, electric supply by hydropower shares approximates 34.5%. To meet fast-rising energy demand. By 2040, it is estimated that hydropower would reach 55%, compared to coal (30%), and renewable energy (10%).[7]
By commissioning a local think tank to conduct a field survey on the sustainability issue, Huaneng Group at least showed its willingness to improve its responsible business performance. While acknowledging the economic benefits of the project, the study by Asian Vision Institute has proposed to the company to further develop programmes to build necessary skills for the affected local community, preserve community forests for villagers to continue to get access to non-timber products, improve and develop community-based clean water supply, and develop the two villages that refused to resettle, without discrimination.[8]
China Road and Bridge Corporation
China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) is under the umbrella of China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), a China state-owned company focusing on civil engineering and construction and operation of infrastructure projects, especially those under the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to the design and construction of infrastructure, CRBC is engaged in infrastructure equity investment, real estate development and management, and industrial park equity investment and development.
The company has been working closely with the Ministry of Economy and Finance to resolve acute problems before, during and after construction. CRBC submits a monthly report on the project’s progress to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and conducts meetings with other line ministries every three months. When conflicts happen at the sites, laws and regulations of Cambodia are to be applied. In every project implementation, EIA and Social Safeguard Process have been included by the company.[9] The main infrastructure projects include Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, National Road No.6, Bassac River Koh Thom Bridge, and National Road No.44. The Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway is a BOT project with a total investment of US$2 billion, and is due to be completed in 2023.[10]
CRBC mainly purchases construction materials from a domestic company, except for the materials that are not available locally. To have a proper construction technique suitable to Cambodia’s geography, climate, soil and other relevant supported facilities and techniques, CRBC started a Construction Laboratory in Sihanoukville province to conduct testing and training. With this laboratory, the company can reduce risks during construction.
Environmental and social safeguards have also been implemented following Cambodia’s rules and regulations. However, the company does not have an ESG disclosure, and therefore, a detailed report on environmental and social safeguards is not available. The company has been involved in certain corporate responsibility activities such as helping construct small roads and providing training opportunities to local staff. The company’s social responsibility management policy focuses on protecting local ecology, fulfilling social responsibility, promoting culture and education, and protecting employees’ interests.[11]
Yunnan Construction Investment Group
The Yunnan Construction Investment Group is a key state-owned company from Yunnan Province. The Group received an AAA credit rating domestically and BBB+ credit rating internationally – the best credit level among state-owned companies in Yunnan. It runs a wide range of businesses, including infrastructure investment and construction, investment and development in urban construction, real estate development, international investment and construction, commercial concrete production, building research, prospective design, vocational education and construction labour.[12]
Its representative office in Cambodia was opened in 2006. The main infrastructure projects constructed by the Group include the office building of the Council of Ministers of Cambodia completed in 2008, the new Siem Reap International Airport to be completed by 2023 with the capacity to annually receive 10 million passengers by 2030 and 20 million by 2050.[13] The Group is also involved in developing rural roads funded by Chinese aid under Cambodia’s Ministry of Rural Development.
Information on social and environmental safeguard measures is not available, however. The company neither has an environmental impact assessment report nor an ESG policy and disclosure guidelines. The company settles construction-related issues on a case-by-case basis.[14] Since infrastructure projects constructed by the Group are mainly funded by Chinese aid, we can assume that the Group complies with the development cooperation agreement between China and Cambodia, and related local rules and regulations on environmental and social safeguards.
In terms of staffing, about 60% of the staff are local, mainly labour and technical staff. Engineers and professional staff come from China, and training for local staff is provided. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the company offered accommodation to reduce the risk of infection among staff members by reducing their interactions with outsiders.[15] Notably, the main issue in the construction sector in Cambodia is the lack of local human capital. Hence, the company has needed to recruit engineers and professional staff from China.
Bank of China
The Bank of China (Phnom Penh Branch) was established in 2010, and was the first Chinese commercial bank in Cambodia. It mainly engages in corporate banking, personal banking, international settlement, trade financing and financial services. The company also facilitates commercial and investment activities between Chinese and Cambodian enterprises. One interesting project launched by the bank is a global SME cross-border matchmaking service to connect enterprises.
To improve the well-being of the people and assume more social responsibility, the company has set up an SME services department, and an inclusive finance service system. It has innovated the product system and service mode to realise sustainable development, focusing on inclusive financing and entrepreneurship development. Moreover, to assuage the hardships caused by the pandemic, the company has reduced the interest rate to SMEs and self-employed businesses.[16]
Concerning environmental protection, the bank has introduced policies to minimise potential risks and environmental impacts arising from its business development by reducing resources utilisation, improving resources efficiency and promoting environmentally responsible business practices. It has also implemented green procurement and encourages stakeholder engagement on sustainability issues. The Group has constructed a Sustainable Procurement Policy and Supply Chain Code of Conduct. In addition, it has developed green finance to promote green operation practice, environmental risk assessment projects, environmental performance disclosure and green public welfare activity.[17]
The company’s corporate social responsivity activities focus on charity works such as donating masks and medical supplies to Cambodia’s Ministry of Health to combat the Covid-19 pandemic, supporting the organisation of the annual conference of the Cambodia-China Friendship Association and donating to the Cambodia Red Cross. The company also offers a staff development programme, which as of 2019, had trained more than 210 staff members.[18]
CONCLUSION
Although ESG standards have been promoted in China in recent times, Chinese state-owned enterprises functioning overseas have not fully integrated environmental and social frameworks into their corporate governance philosophy and practices. Due to the lack of local rules and regulations on ESG of the host country, Chinese companies are not obligated to have ESG integration and disclosure in their operations.
Noticeably, Cambodia’s investment law does not contain explicit and comprehensive social and environmental safeguards. Other key barriers to ESG development in Cambodia are the lack of understanding of ESG especially among policymakers, limited data, and lack of transparency in Chinese investment projects’ environmental and social safeguards measures.
The host country plays an enormous role in the implementation of regulatory social and environmental safeguards. The Cambodian government should introduce policy guidelines on ESG integration and reporting so that the quality and sustainability of investment projects can be enhanced. Moreover, Chinese regulators should also enforce ESG guidelines on their state-owned enterprises investing overseas. It will also serve foreign policy objectives and promote the sustainability and growth of the companies. The enhancement of the quality of Chinese investments overseas will significantly contribute to the soft power of China.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/140, 3 November 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] World Economic Forum. 2021. A leapfrog moment for China in ESG reporting, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_China_ESG_Champions_2021.pdf
[2] Arisaig Partners. 2021. Navigating ESG in China, https://arisaig.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Arisaig-Partners-Navigating-ESG-in-China-June-2021.pdf
[3] Hasmath, Reza. 2020. “New ESG practices in China and its implications for foreign actors” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.
[4] Council for Development of Cambodia, http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/investors-information/environment-protection.html
[5] Khmer Times, Lower Sesan II hydropower plant protects the environment and provides clean energy in Cambodia, 18 August 2021, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50918128/lower-sesan-ii-hydropower-plant-protects-the-environment-and-provides-clean-energy-in-cambodia/
[6] Human Rights Watch, “Under Water: Human Rights Impacts of a China Belt and Road Project in Cambodia”, 10 August 2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/08/10/underwater/human-rights-impacts-china-belt-and-road-project-cambodia
[7] Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (2019), “Cambodia Basic Energy Plan”, Jakarta: ERIA.
[8] Asian Vision Institute, Sustainability report of Huaneng’s Lower Sesan II, https://www.asianvision.org/archives/publications/csr-report-china-huaneng
[9] Field interview by the research team from the Asian Vision Institute on 15 September 2020.
[10] Chheang, Vannarith (2021) BRI projects in Cambodia and Laos roll on despite Covid-19. ISEAS Perspective 2021/99, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-99-bri-projects-in-cambodia-and-laos-roll-on-despite-covid-19-by-vannarith-chheang/
[11] China Road and Bridge Corporation, https://www.crbc.com/site/crbcEN/ResponsibilityManagement/index.html?id=629efe42-9861-45ae-ac93-11951d80ae22
[12] China Daily, “Yunnan Construction and Investment Holding Group”, 21 June 2019, https://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201906/21/WS5d0c3d23498e12256565e4ed/yunnan-construction-and-investment-holding-group.html
[13] Chheang, Vannarith (2021) BRI projects in Cambodia and Laos roll on despite Covid-19. ISEAS Perspective 2021/99, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-99-bri-projects-in-cambodia-and-laos-roll-on-despite-covid-19-by-vannarith-chheang/
[14] Field interview by the research team from the Asian Vision Institute, 22 September 2021.
[15] Field interview by the research team from the Asian Vision Institute, 22 September 2021.
[16] Field interview by the research team from the Asian Vision Institute, 8 September 2022.
[17] Bank of China, BOC Hong Kong (Holdings Limited Corporate Social Responsibility Policy).
[18] Field interview by the research team from the Asian Vision Institute, 8 September 2022.
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“The National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN): A New Arrangement for Research in Indonesia” by Ahmad Najib Burhani, Lilis Mulyani and Cahyo Pamungkas
2021/139 “How Much Longer can Thailand’s Prime Minister Rule Before Reaching the Eight-year Limit?” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- A dispute has emerged over when Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha’s premiership will reach the constitutional limit.
- Thailand’s 2017 Constitution limits to eight years the total duration of time that a person can hold the premiership, whether those years are consecutive or not.
- Opposition parties contend that General Prayut’s premiership will reach the limit by next August since he was first appointed prime minister in August 2014, after he led the country’s May 2014 coup.
- Legal experts say the constitutional limit is applicable only to the period since the constitution entered into force in April 2017; hence, General Prayut can continue to lead the government until April 2025.
- Some supporters further insist that General Prayut can stay much longer if he so wishes, since he became prime minister under the current constitution only in June 2019, after the March 2019 general election.
- General Prayut is asking for five more years in office “to make things better” for Thailand, creating new confusion in Thai politics.
*Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Previously he had been a researcher on ASEAN political and security cooperation at the Institute’s ASEAN Studies Centre.
INTRODUCTION
A huge political storm is brewing in Thailand. It centres on a seemingly simple but highly controversial question: When will Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha’s premiership reach the eight-year constitutional limit? The question is directly tied to another intriguing question: When did his premiership actually start?
Section 158, Paragraph 4, of the 2017 Constitution stipulates: “The Prime Minister shall not hold office for more than eight years in total, whether or not consecutively …”[1] The drafters of the constitution recorded their rationale for setting the eight-year limit, and it was to serve as a precaution against lengthy monopolisation of power, which could be the source of political crisis.[2]
Opposition politicians now contend that General Prayut’s premiership started on 25 August 2014, when the previous monarch, King Bhumibol, appointed him prime minister following a unanimous decision of the National Assembly on 21 August 2014 to select him for the premiership. Therefore, they say, General Prayut’s premiership must end by 24 August 2022. Beyond that date, his rule becomes unconstitutional. The opposition intends to take its case to the Constitutional Court if General Prayut ignores the constitutional limit.
However, constitutional lawyers generally agree that Section 158 of the 2017 Constitution has no (adverse) retroactive effect. They believe that it is applicable only to the period after the constitution entered into force, i.e. on 6 April 2017. Therefore, General Prayut’s premiership will reach the eight-year limit only on 5 April 2025.
On the other hand, supporters of General Prayut argue that he has much longer than that to serve as prime minister, because his premiership under the current constitution actually began only on 9 June 2019 — after the March 2019 general election. Assuming that he completes his first four-year term in March 2023,[3] General Prayut can thus constitutionally serve another four-year term until mid-2027.
In a recent public opinion survey, 40.73 per cent of respondents thought that General Prayut’s premiership would reach its constitutional limit in August 2022. At the same time, 38.3 per cent suggested that he seek clarification on the matter from the Constitutional Court, and 15.03 per cent believed that General Prayut need not do anything for now.[4]
General Prayut seems to agree that he has until mid-2027 to remain in office. Nevertheless, he has assigned Deputy Prime Minister Dr Wissanu Krea-ngarm, the government’s chief jurist, to examine all pertinent issues concerning Section 158 of the 2017 Constitution.
In the meantime, General Prayut is asking the Thai people to give him five more years “to make many things better”.[5] In recent weeks, the prime minister has been conducting frequent field trips in the provinces, assuring the hard-pressed populace that the COVID-19 pandemic is being tackled effectively, and that economic recovery is just around the corner.[6] He is in fact acting and speaking very much like a politician canvassing for votes.
General Prayut seems to have regained his self-confidence, after narrowly surviving potential political assassination in the House of Representatives in early September.[7] Apparently, he has made up his mind: He is determined to complete his four-year term in March 2023. After that, he would welcome renomination from the Phalang Pracharat Party (PPP) to return to the premiership after the next general election.[8] Hence he is asking the Thai people to give him five more years.
STILL THE ONE TO BEAT
General Prayut’s popularity had been in decline this year; his favourability rating fell from 28.79 per cent in March to 17.54 per cent in September.[9] But he is still the strongest contender for the premiership following Thailand’s next elections – if he really wants to go for it.[10]
By throwing his hat into the ring this early, General Prayut is practically undermining the ongoing search by the chief opposition party, Phuea Thai (PT), for a viable nominee for the premiership. While most other parties will nominate their party leaders to succeed Gen Prayut in the premiership, PT is an exception. Its current leader Sompong Amornvivat, a veteran MP from Chiang Mai, is too low-key, inarticulate and uninspiring to be viable candidate. Despite being the formal Opposition Leader, Sompong has seldom taken the floor in the House to say anything extemporaneously; he generally reads from prepared texts.
PT has intensified its search for potential nominees for premier, in anticipation of a possible dissolution of the House and an election in the first half of 2022. Those being considered included, not so surprisingly, members of the family of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.[11] After his downfall in the 2006 coup, Thaksin managed to install both his brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat, and then his younger sister, Yingluck, in the premiership in the periods 17 September – 2 December 2008 and 10 August 2011 – 7 May 2014, respectively.
PT is however yet to announce potential nominees for the premiership. In the 2019 general election, it nominated three individuals.[12]
THE PPP NEEDS GENERAL PRAYUT
Like PT, the PPP also does not intend to nominate its party leader, General Prawit Wongsuwan, for the premiership. Its existing plan is to renominate General Prayut, as it did in the 2019 general election.
Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit, who is 76 years old and not in good health, has repeatedly insisted that he does not wish to replace General Prayut as prime minister. “The party leader can hardly walk, … I don’t feel any disappointment … I am the one who nominates Prayut to continue for another term”, he recently told reporters wishing to know if he had changed his mind.[13]
One impediment to General Prayut’s smooth return to office is the continuing presence of Captain Thammanat Prompao, who holds the influential post of secretary-general of the PPP. The flamboyant former Army officer was the mastermind behind the failed conspiracy to bring government MPs together with opposition MPs to vote against General Prayut in a parliamentary no-confidence motion in early September.
General Prayut counter-attacked forcefully and managed to foil the conspiracy. And he survived the no-confidence vote. Then, without informing General Prawit in advance, General Prayut took revenge by having Captain Thammanat dismissed from the cabinet through a sudden command from the king, issued before Captain Thammanat could tender a formal resignation.
At first, a disappointed Captain Thammanat announced his intention to return to his northern home province of Payao. But General Prawit has asked him to stay on in the PPP.
Moreover, General Prawit has appointed a new party strategist, namely General Wit Thephassadin, a former deputy Army chief who was edged out by General Prayut in 2010 for the force’s top job. General Wit’s arrival in the PPP could be seen as deterrence against attempts to wrestle control of the PPP from General Prawit and to hand it over to General Prayut.
Without a party of his own, General Prayut remains vulnerable in the House. The PPP can easily force him to resign by withholding support for a bill proposed by the government, especially one involving fiscal matters. A prime minister is supposed to accept political responsibility if his government’s draft law is rejected in the House.
Alternatively, a prime minister can choose to dissolve the House and call an early general election when a bill is rejected. This power is General Prayut’s trump card vis-à-vis government MPs. Few of the latter want to face the hardship of an early general election, when they still have nearly 18 months of their four-year term left in which to enjoy their privileged parliamentary status.
THE TRIO’S LOVE-HATE TRIANGLE
At times, General Prayut has been bold enough to do things in his own way – even though this might displease General Prawit, his mentor and beloved “big brother”. Dropping Captain Thammanat from his cabinet was one such daring move. Another was to cancel in early October General Prawit’s reassignment to supervise four key departments[14] for which Captain Thammanat was responsible when he was deputy minister in the Ministry of Agriculture.
At first, General Prawit was given the role of supervising the four departments, which included the Agricultural Land Reform Office — a crucial mechanism for tackling landlessness in rural areas, and thus a potent means for winning the hearts and minds of rural voters. The Democrat Party, whose secretary-general, Chalermchai Sri-on, is the agriculture minister, openly opposed the move, fearing that it would undermine Chalermchai’s his authority as head of the ministry.
Democrat party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Jurin Laksanavisit cautioned the prime minister against creating a new problem between the PPP and the Democrat Party for the sake of making up with General Prawit to help settle internal problems in the PPP. A week after this warning, General Prayut changed his mind and cancelled the reassignment. The four departments in question are now back under the supervision of Chalermchai, who reports to the cabinet through Jurin.
The Democrats are happy with this solution, and Captain Thammanat is once again frustrated.
How General Prawit will resolve the conflict between Captain Thammanat and General Prayut remains both a puzzle and a matter of intrigue. Publicly, Captain Thammanat has vowed to serve General Prawit, and to make the PPP the top party in the next general election. But he has not declared support for a second term for General Prayut.
A PARTY OF HIS OWN
If the worse comes to worst, and if General Prayut sees he can no longer rely on the PPP, he has another option: heading a party of his own.
At least two political parties have been set up by supporters of General Prayut, the Ruamthai Sangchart Party and the Thai Economic Party. The latter has often been associated with Chatchai Phromlert,[15] who retired at the end of September after serving four years as the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Interior. Chatchai was a trusted top aide to Interior Minister General Anupong Paochinda.
General Anupong is a close ally of General Prayut; he was often seen alongside the Prime Minister during the political crisis in early September. General Anupong needs to strengthen his control of the Interior Ministry in order to fend off efforts by Captain Thammanat and the PPP to make inroads there. One possibility in this regard is to appoint Chatchai as deputy interior minister in the next cabinet reshuffle.
The Interior Ministry controls all the 76 provincial governors and administers the second largest budget allocation of all Thai ministries — larger than the defence budget and second only to the education budget. Whichever party controls the Interior Ministry enjoys enormous advantage in dispensing political patronage nationwide.
If the appointment of Chatchai happens, it will reveal a clear game plan on the part of General Prayut and General Anupong to compete for power against their “elder brother” General Prawit and his PPP.
New and small parties will face an uphill battle in the next general election, when the election system is expected to revert to the use of two ballots, one for a candidate in each constituency and another for a party. The number of electoral constituencies will be increased from 350 to 400, while the number of party-list House seats will drop from 150 to 100. Constitutional amendments to bring about the changes were adopted in parliament on 10 September and submitted to the king for his endorsement on 4 October.
The changes will benefit large parties, particularly PT and the PPP, which have the resources to field strong candidates in all 400 parliamentary constituencies. To ensure a decisive victory over PT, the PPP wants control of the Interior Ministry.
If and when General Prayut heads a party of his own, one quick way to build it up for the next general election will be to co-opt experienced politicians from other parties. He can count on defectors from the PPP joining his party, especially those in the “Sam Mit” or “Three Friends” faction of Justice Minister Somsak Thepsuthin, Energy Minister Suriya Juangroongruangkit, and Deputy Finance Minister Santi Promphat.[16] Another group of defectors might be 14 MPs from southern provinces, who have long complained about lack of recognition from the PPP’s leadership. The group is demanding a cabinet post for one of its MPs.
Seemingly to placate the “Sam Mit” faction of his party, General Prawit has appointed Somsak as one of his new advisors. Somsak had earlier been suddenly replaced as chief party strategist by General Prawit’s ally, General Wit. Another new advisor to Prawit is Pirapan Salirathvipak, who has advised Prime Minister Prayut on constitutional affairs at Government House. Pirapan, a former justice minister in the Democrat Party-led coalition government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, is an influential “fixer” with good connections in high places. He has clear potential to thrive in the PPP.
When he was asked who he is actually serving, General Prayut or General Prawit, Pirapan avoided the trap and responded that he was “serving the Thai people”.[17]
RESTORING TRANSPARENCY
One quick way to reduce political uncertainty and to restore transparency in Thai politics is to clarify once and for all how much longer General Prayut can constitutionally lead a government.
His chief legal counsel Dr Wissanu is understandably unenthusiastic about tackling the controversy now. In fact, he has appeared annoyed when several opposition leaders kicked up a fuzz over what he considers a hypothetical issue.[18]
Dr Wissanu has pointed out that General Prayut would not yet have exceeded the eight-year limit on service as premier, even if his premiership were to be considered as starting in August 2014. This being the case, Dr Wissanu believes that the Constitutional Court will not accept for further consideration any complaint that General Prayut is violating the constitutional limit simply because he has stated his wish to go for a second four-year term.
Nevertheless, one possible solution — now being looked into — is for the Election Commission to request a ruling by the Constitutional Court on when General Prayut’s premiership will reach the eight-year limit. This is provided for under Section 170, Paragraph 3, of the 2017 Constitution. The thinking behind this idea is that the Election Commission needs to know when the term of a prime minister ends, because it has to plan for a possible snap general election.
Opposition leaders are demanding that General Prayut respect the “democratic spirit” of the eight-year limit on the premiership. They are challenging him to step down before August 2022. This will refute their long-standing accusation concerning General Prayut’s “monopolisation of power” since the time he, as Army chief, toppled the PT-led coalition government on 22 May 2014.
So far, the prime minister’s only response has been to say that he is “playing by the rules” for the common good of the Thai nation.
Whether or not Thai voters are willing to give General Prayut five more years to rule remains to be seen. If they have had enough of him, they can vote for candidates and parties in the opposition. If these latter collectively win at least 376 seats in the House – the minimum simple majority of the combined memberships of the House’s 500 MPs and the Senate’s 250 members — they can vote for someone else to be the next prime minister.
CONCLUSION
With General Prayut still in the race for the premiership, PT has little chance of regaining power in the next general election. Thailand’s main opposition party cannot even find anyone willing to compete against the incumbent prime minister for his job.
However, if General Prayut can be kept out of the race by the constitutional limit restricting prime ministers to eight years in the post, then the field will be thrown wide open. And even the PPP will have to scramble to find another nominee for the premiership.
For now, General Prayut looks confident about retaining the premiership if he is renominated by the PPP. He can still count on the strong support of senators, just as he did in June 2019 when 249 out of the 250 senators voted for him.
However, if he chooses to lead a party of his own, and that party nominates him for the premiership, his political future will be less certain. He and his party will face tough competition from the PPP, which has enormous “fire power” and experienced politicians, in the next general election. The PPP is certainly capable of attracting strong candidates for Thailand’s premiership.
Political uncertainty and confusion will diminish only after a satisfactory resolution of the question concerning when General Prayut’s premiership will reach the eight-year limit. The sooner this is done, the better for Thailand.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/139, 27 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] See the Council of State’s English translation of the 2017 Constitution at krisdika.go.th/documents/67673/181643/837163_0001.pdf, accessed 8 October 2021. Section 171 of Thailand’s earlier 2007 Constitution limited the premiership to eight consecutive years.
[2] “ความมุ่งหมาย และคำอธิบาย ประกอบรายมาตราของรัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พุทธศักราช 2560” [Objectives and explanations of each section of the Kingdom of Thailand’s Constitution of 2017], published by the Secretariat of the House of Representatives in May 2019 and revised in October 2019, www.parliament.go.th/ewtcommittee/ewt/draftconstitution2/download, accessed on 9 October 2021. The rationale of setting the eight-year limit for the premiership was “เพื่อมิให้เกิดการผูกขาดอำนาจในทางการเมืองยาวเกินไปอันจะเป็นต้นเหตุเกิดวิกฤติทางการเมืองไทย”.
[3] General Prayut’s four-year term as prime minister ends when the four-year term of members of parliament ends on 23 March 2023. He will become caretaker premier while awaiting the outcome of a new general election. The time in transition shall not be counted as part of the eight-year duration. Therefore, if his premiership is deemed to have started on 9 June 2019, he can actually serve another four-year term and still stay within the eight-year limit ending in mid-2027.
[4] NIDA Poll published on 10 October 2021, https://nidapoll.nida.ac.th/survey_detail, accessed 10 October 2021.
[5] “‘บิ๊กตู่’ ขอเวลา5 ปีหลายอย่างต้องดีขึ้น” [ ‘Big Tu’ asks for five more years; many things must be better], Daily News, 7 October 2021, www.dailynews.co.th/news/352606, accessed 8 October 2021. ‘Big Tu’ is the nickname of General Prayut.
[6] “‘บิ๊กตู่’ โพสต์ขอทุกคนเชื่อมั่นพลังสามัคคีผสานต้นทุนทางวัฒนธรรมจะพลิกโฉมสู่ประเทศที่มีรายได้สูง” [‘Big Tu’ posts (in his Facebook page) to call for confidence, saying that the power of unity combined with the rich cultural capital will transform (Thailand) into a high-income country], Thai Post, 8 October 2021, https://www.thaipost.net/main/detail/119174, accessed 9 October 2021.
[7] Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “Thai PM Remains Vulnerable Without a Party of His Own”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/127, 28 September 2021, at /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-127, accessed 8 October 2021.
[8] “‘ประยุทธ’ เผยยินดีและขอบคุณ พรรคพลังประชารัฐที่ให้ความไว้วางใจ จะเสนอชื่อชิงนายกฯ อีกครั้ง” [ Prayut welcomes and thanks the Phalang Pracharat Party for its confidence in him and its intention to renominate him for the premiership again], Post Today, 5 October 2021, www.posttoday.com/politic/news/664881, accessed 8 October 2021.
[9] Based on the NIDA Poll of the National Institute for Development Administration (NIDA). See details of the quarterly surveys at www.nidapoll.nida.ac.th/survey_detail, accessed 8 October 2021.
Popularity of Key Thai Political Figures in 2021
| Ranking | Name | September | June | March |
| 1 | No favourite | 32.61% | 37.65% | 30.10% |
| 2 | General Prayut | 17.54 | 19.32 | 28.79 |
| 3 | Khunying Sudarat Keyuraphan (a) | 11.15 | 13.64 | 12.09 |
| 4 | Pita Limjaroenrat (b) | 11.05 | 5.45 | 6.26 |
| 5 | Pol Gen (ret.) Seripisuth Temeeyaves (c) | 9.07 | 8.71 | 8.72 |
| 6 | Not interested | 7.48 | 2.15 | 3.25 |
| 7 | Korn Jatikavanij (d) | 2.58 | 3.62 | 2.70 |
| 8 | Sompong Amornvivat (e) | 2.33 | 0.87 | 1.90 |
| 9 | Jurin Laksanavisit (f) | 1.54 | 1.47 | 0.99 |
| 10 | Anutin Charnvirakul (g) | 1.24 | 2.35 | 2.02 |
| Others (h) | 3.41 | 4.77 | 3.18 |
(a) Khunying Sudarat is now leader of the Thai Sang Thai Party. In November 2020, she left the chief opposition party, Phuea Thai, whose lead nominee for the premiership she had been in the March 2019 general election. Her new party has yet to enter a general election.
(b) Pita is leader of the Move Forward Party, the second largest opposition party in parliament.
(c) Police General (retired) Seripisuth, a former National Police chief, is leader of the Thai Liberal Party, which is currently in the opposition.
(d)Korn is leader of the Kla or Courageous Party, another new party. He was a finance minister in the Democrat-led coalition government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, December 2008 – August 2011.
(e) Sompong, a veteran MP for Chiang Mai, is leader of the Phuea Thai Party.
(f) Jurin is leader of the Democrat Party, the third largest in the ruling coalition, and a member of that party’s prominent but fading southern wing.
(g) Anutin is leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, the second largest in the ruling coalition after the lead party Phalang Pracharat.
(h) Other names mentioned in the surveys included Abhisit Vejjajiva, Ming-khwan Saengsuwan (leader of New Economics, an opposition party), Dr Varong Dejkitvikrom (leader of the new royalist Thai Pakdee Party), Wan Muhammad Nor Matha (leader of Prachachart, an opposition party), Kanchana Silapa-archa (leader of the Chatthai Pattana, a government party), and Chadchart Sitthipan (the Phuea Thai Party’s second-ranked nominee for the premiership in the 2019 general election who left the party soon after the general election to pursue the Bangkok governorship as an independent and has been the strong front-runner for the post in recent surveys).
[10] See the table in note 9 above.
[11] One of Thaksin’s family members reportedly being approached by the Phuea Thai Party is Nuttaphong Kunakornwong, who in November 2011 married Thaksin’s daughter Pintongta. Nuttaphong is now the CEO of S.C. Assets, a real estate firm founded by the Shinawatra family. Another one is Thaksin’s younger sister Monthatip, who is slightly older than Yingluck.
[12] Its lead nominee was Khunying Sudarat Keyuraphan, who left the Phuea Thai Party to head a new party called Thai Sang Thai. Its second-ranked nominee was Chadchart Sitthipan, who has also left the party to pursue the Bangkok governorship as an independent. He has turned down offers to return to head the party. The third-ranked nominee was Chaikasem Nitisiri, who is the party’s chief legal advisor. Eventually, in the parliamentary vote on premiership on 5 June 2019, the party supported Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, leader of the Future Forward Party, against General Prayut, a nominee of the Phalang Pracharat Party. Thanathorn was beaten by General Prayut, by 244 votes to 500. General Prayut received 251 votes from government MPs and 249 votes from senators; one of the 250 senators, Senate President Dr Pornpetch Wichitcholchai abstained. All of Thanathorn’s 244 votes came from opposition MPs, and none from the senators.
[13] “‘บิ๊กป้อม’ ลั่นเอง ชู ‘ประยุทธ’ นั่งนายกฯ อีกสมัย แจง ‘เดินไม่ไหว’ เลยไม่เป็นเอง” [‘Big Pom’ declares his intention to support ‘Prayut’ for another term in the premiership, citing that he himself can hardly walk and thus he doesn’t want it (the premiership) for himself], the Khaosod Online, 6 October 2021, www.khaosod.co.th/politics/news_6661423, accessed 9 October 2021. ‘Big Pom’ is the nickname of General Prawit Wongsuwan, leader of the PPP.
[14] In addition to the Agricultural Land Reform Office, the three other departments in question are the Land Development Department, the Royal Rain-Making and Agricultural Aviation Department, and the Marketing Organisation for Farmers.
[15] “Chatchai Phromlert — the ‘man behind PM Prayut’s new power push’”, Thai PBS News, 6 October 2021, www.thaipbsworld.com/chatchai-phromlert-the-man-behind-pm-prayuts-new-power-push, accessed 9 October 2021.
[16] Santi was reportedly the one who betrayed Captain Thammanat and alerted General Prayut of the conspiracy.
[17] Interview with Danai Akmahasawas, Youtube, 10 October 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1TieN7jn94, accessed 10 October 2021.
[18] “‘วิษณุ’ ข้องใจฝ่ายค้านเปิดประเด็นนายกฯ 8 ปี อยู่ตั้งนานเพิ่งจะมาพูดให้ยุ่งทำไม” [Wissanu wonders why the opposition is raising the issue of the eight-year term of the PM, (the PM) has been in power for this long, why kick up a fuzz now] the Thai Post, 5 October 2021, www.thaipost.net/main/detail/118873, accessed 9 October 2021.
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