2021/138 “Why US Rivalry with China Will Endure: Implications for Southeast Asia” by Robert Sutter
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Remarkably close cooperation begun in 2018 between the Executive Branch and the bipartisan majorities in Congress continues to drive strong American counter-measures against key Chinese challenges, including in Asia.
- Though preoccupied with domestic priorities, notably ambitious infrastructure legislation and wide-ranging legislation on economic equity, climate change, education, and immigration, President Biden has put aside past ambivalence in carrying out robust counter-moves to Chinese advances at US expense.
- In contrast to stronger support for US competition with China from allies and partners in Europe and key Asia-Pacific powers, Southeast Asian countries are wary of the Biden government’s policies antagonising Beijing.
- Despite the Biden government’s efforts to improve relations with Southeast Asia, considerable domestic constraints hinder Washington from joining multilateral economic groups or de-emphasising human rights concerns to compete more effectively with China in Southeast Asia.
- These American constraints, coupled with China’s effective use of positive and negative incentives towards Southeast Asian countries, forecast continued decline in US influence relative to China in the region.
*Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University, and was Visiting Fellow of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute between July and September 2021.
INTRODUCTION
The strong negative shift in American policy against China now dominates US policy in the Indo-Pacific region – one of two top policy arenas of acute US rivalry with China. The other is competition for dominance in the high technology industries that will determine which country will be the world’s economic and military leader. In both critical policy areas, the US seeks to counter Chinese challenges and prevent Chinese dominance and its negative impact on American security and well-being.[1]
This assessment demonstrates why this fundamental change in US policy will endure, and explains why the American policy change adds to reasons for US decline in competition with China in Southeast Asia.
FORGING DOMESTIC AND ALLIED CONSENSUS ON CHINA
American domestic politics drove the sharply negative turn against China. While continuing to take advantage of many benefits gained from interaction with the existing international order supported by the United States, China also continued to challenge a wide range of American interests through often coercive, intimidating, and covert security, economic and diplomatic practices. These practices eventually prompted a shift in China policy among leaders in Washington that emerged in public view with the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy in December 2017.[2]
The shift emerged erratically. Serious division within the Trump administration on economic counter-measures against China prevailed for a time. President Trump vacillated unpredictably between criticism of China’s practices and avowed friendship with China’s leader. Bipartisan majorities in Congress proved much steadier in establishing a “whole-of-government” US effort to counter China’s challenges. The Trump administration’s punitive tariffs and restrictions on high technology sales to China resulted in the so-called trade war until a truce in December 2018 led to talks resulting in a phase-one agreement in January 2020.[3]
The negative US shift against China ran up against US public opinion in 2019 which showed little support for a tough approach. And mainstream media focused on Trump’s antics, frequently neglecting the new policy. Democratic presidential candidates infrequently discussed China, with Biden prone to disparaging China’s capacities relative to the United States. Advisor Jake Sullivan judged that Democrats’ lack of attention to China as a danger was correctly in line with US public opinion.[4]
But a turning point came with strong American disapproval of the Chinese government’s behaviour as the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States with a vengeance in the midst of the presidential campaign of 2020. Both Trump and Biden emphasised toughness toward China.[5]
Biden Administration Developments
President Biden took office amid a crescendo of the Trump administration’s anti-China actions designed to constrain moderation by the new administration. Congress remained steadfast as it held over many of the 300 legislative proposals targeting China at the end of the 116th Congress.[6] President Biden strongly warned against major dangers posed by China’s challenges, while Beijing advanced practices challenging American interests and offering no compromises.[7] Methodical and well-coordinated statecraft resulted in sustained and sometimes advanced strictures involving trade, human rights and other disputes with China. Substantial change in US strategy toward China awaited policy reviews that remained incomplete or unannounced after nine months in office.[8]
President Biden’s priorities in his domestic agenda focused on countering the pandemic, reviving the stalled economy, reducing partisan government gridlock and mass protests undermining the democratic process, and protecting minority rights. His party had razor-thin majorities in Congress, placing a premium on gaining full support for the administration’s very ambitious domestic agenda from all Democrats, including those who strongly opposed multilateral trade agreements and condemned authoritarian regimes abusing human rights and squelching popular democracy.
Coming second, foreign policy involved close cooperation with allies and partners, seeking multilateral solutions on public health, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation, and a priority to US interests in Asia.[9] High-level interchanges with Chinese leaders came only after high-level US consultations with key allies and partners.
Competing with China in providing vaccinations abroad, the first summit meeting with the Quad dialogue leaders from Australia, India, Japan and the United States in March announced agreement to provide up to one billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and others by the end of 2022. The developed countries of the G-7 meetings in May and June gave priority to their differences with China. Top Australian, Indian and South Korean leaders participated as guests at the June summit. China figured prominently in high-level US discussions with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union, Japan, South Korea and Australia as the US leaders repeatedly asserted their intention to deal with China’s challenges from “a position of strength.”[10]
President Biden’s summits with the Japanese prime minister in April and the South Korean president in May resolved serious disputes over host nation support, dealt collaboratively with North Korean issues, and targeted China in referring to the South China Sea and Taiwan, the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Implicitly countering Chinese ambitions, the countries agreed to advance cooperation on new and emerging technologies in building more resilient supply chains.[11]
US reassurance by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan saw The Philippines carry out their most prominent rebuke of Chinese pressure tactics in many years. And President Biden sent his close friend and alter ego, former Senator Christopher Dodd, to show personal support for Taiwan’s president.[12]
Biden starkly warned that the main inflection point facing America is the fourth industrial revolution, with China confident that US democratic decision-making processes are less efficient and that its authoritarian system therefore will overtake America. He argued “we can’t let them win.”[13] In Congress, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer led multi-faceted bipartisan legislation in 2021 to improve US high technology industries and advance other measures to counter China. He advised, “we can either have a world where the Chinese Communist Party determines the rules of the road–or we can make sure the United States gets there first.”[14] Meanwhile, mainstream media and public opinion strongly supported tough policy while scattered opposition proved weak.
The controversy surrounding rushed US and allied withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 in the face of unexpected rapid collapse of the Afghan government’s resistance and Taliban’s sweeping take-over in the country undermined the United States’ position as a world leader and damaged President Biden’s political standing.[15] But the Biden government’s resolve against Beijing’s challenges was underlined by the surprise announcement on September 15 of a new and more rigorous US security relationship with Australia and Great Britain that involves the sale of tightly held US nuclear submarine technology and closer collaboration in dealing with China. In October, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai announced little change in existing trade policy, disclosing that the Trump government’s punitive tariffs would be continued. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait rose with unprecedented shows of force by large numbers of Chinese warplanes intruding into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone, providing the background for a meeting in Switzerland between Jake Sullivan and his Chinese counterpart Politburo Member Yang Jiechi announcing that plans were underway for a virtual summit meeting between the two presidents.[16]
CHINA-US RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA – AMERICA IS LOSING
Despite the Biden government garnering support in its competition with China from Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as well as European and NATO allies and partners, the competition is unwelcome or viewed warily in Southeast Asia. It adds to reasons explaining the recent US decline relative to China in Southeast Asia. China has distinct advantages with extensive borders with Southeast Asian neighbours and control of major rivers of utmost importance to neighbouring states. It is the largest trading partner and second largest source of financing for infrastructure in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian states are deeply invested in China while China’s investment in the region has grown impressively over the past decade. China ably controls and asserts its enormous claims to most of the South China Sea against much weaker capacities of Southeast Asian claimants.[17]
China is widely seen as the engine of economic growth for the region. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides much needed financing and construction capacity. The Chinese party-state’s overt and covert organs increased greater influence over the important ethnic Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, using this leverage to promote its objectives. Beijing exerts strong influence on governments increasingly dependent on Chinese transportation, communication and other infrastructure. As seen in scandals in The Philippines earlier and Malaysia more recently, and in Asia Society and other investigative reports about Myanmar, Cambodia and others, Beijing routinely accommodates corrupt practices by regional leaders in economic agreements under the BRI rubric that benefit those leaders and Chinese interests at the expense of the host country’s overall national interests. China also works to establish its leadership through penetrated local media, numerous Confucius Institutes and student exchanges. Chinese tourists dominate this industry in Southeast Asia.[18]
In competing with China, the US economic position in Southeast Asia has several strongpoints. US two-way trade with the region reached US$308 billion in 2020, and US investment in the region between 2015 and 2020 was US$111 billion, more than any other country. US close ally Japan is among ASEAN’s largest trading partners and between 2015 and 2020 Japan put $102 billion in FDI into ASEAN, more than China. Strategically, the United States sustains (albeit sometimes troubled) alliance relations with The Philippines and Thailand, a significant military presence in and cooperative security relationship with Singapore, and active military and other security exchanges with Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Regarding two Southeast Asian strategic centres of gravity, US forces guard against disruptive changes in the Indian Ocean approaches to the Malacca Strait and they challenge China’s illegal expansionism in the South China Sea. US allies Japan and Australia and close partner India in the Quad pursue complementary efforts to build strategic capacities among themselves and with Southeast Asian countries to defend their maritime rights and interests challenged by China.[19]
Nonetheless, American achievements fail to change prevailing media discourse in the region which views China ascendant and the United States in decline. In the recent past the United States was viewed as the region’s most important strategic power and a leading economic power, but now opinion overwhelmingly sees China as the most influential.[20]
Regional asymmetry shows in widespread criticism of US actions but silence on issues sensitive to Beijing. Chinese client states Cambodia and Laos block efforts by others to get ASEAN to defend Southeast Asian claimant states’ jurisdiction in their maritime zones against China’s nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea. The claim was deemed illegal by an international law of the sea tribunal five years ago, but Beijing’s pressure saw regional governments and ASEAN generally avoiding discussions on the ruling. A decade ago, US observers commonly judged that talks between China and ASEAN on a code of conduct in the South China Sea would stabilise the situation in line with the interests of the Southeast Asian claimants and the United States. Today, a common expectation is that China may so dominate the discussion that the code may well have provisions supported by China barring military activities by the United States.[21]
For its part, the United States struggles for relevance in contemporary regional discourse. US policy making is seen in Southeast Asia as devoting only episodic attention to the area. Serious US internal problems depict a nation poorly positioned to lead abroad. Among specific shortcomings, US domestic preoccupations slow the often halting pace of congressional approval of delayed administration appointments for ambassadors throughout Southeast Asia and senior State department and other policy makers. The US government does not have the funds to compete with the BRI. Progressive Democrats oppose multilateral trade agreements, yet their support is essential for President Biden’s domestic legislative priorities. As a result, it remains unlikely that the Biden government will join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP) which Beijing now seeks to join, even though US membership of this trade pact would provide an economic programme attractive to the region and competitive with China.[22] Similarly, progressive Democrats and others in Congress demand US foreign policy emphasis on democracy and human rights which is not well received by most regional states and especially limits US flexibility in dealing with the military junta in Myanmar. [23]
Against this background, recent US efforts to increase attention to Southeast Asia in order to counter Chinese challenges remain unattractive to Southeast Asian states seeking Chinese blandishments and wary of provoking Chinese punishment. Most regional states and commentary ignore the benefits for Southeast Asia provided by the US, including extensive investment noted above and foreign assistance – both much larger than comparable Chinese efforts.[24]
The Biden government’s early record of US actions in Southeast Asia did not reverse this perceived US decline. In Southeast Asia, senior US officials were attentive in support of The Philippines challenging Chinese security forces in the South China Sea, but their attention to Southeast Asian states and ASEAN overall remained low. In the first half of 2021, extensive high-level consultations with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, European leaders and even Taiwan stood in stark contrast with ASEAN and individual ASEAN states until a flurry of cabinet-level meetings with ASEAN counterparts in August 2021, capped with Vice President Kamala Harris visiting Singapore and Vietnam. But this high point was overshadowed by global controversy over the panic and distress seen during the concurrent US withdrawal from Afghanistan.[25] Biden’s continued determination to counter China in Asia was reinforced by the surprise announcement in September of an agreement on close US alignment with both Australia and Great Britain on a range of sensitive security matters targeting China, notably including a multi-billion dollars nuclear submarine sale. Yet, Southeast Asian governments reacted warily with only The Philippines openly supporting, Malaysia and Indonesia publicly criticising, and Vietnam and Singapore being ambivalent.[26]
The coup in Myanmar in February and resulting widespread civil turmoil and significant armed resistance on balance worked against US competition with China. Consistent with congressional preferences, the Biden government emphasised sanctions against abusive military leaders in Myanmar. ASEAN reportedly sought ways to engage both China and the United States to strengthen ASEAN centrality in dealing with the Myanmar crisis. Preserving good relations with the Myanmar junta, China was attentive in cooperating with ASEAN. A scheduled virtual ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting with Secretary Blinken in late May was cancelled because of last-minute technical difficulties. In contrast, China’s foreign minister hosted an in-person meeting with ASEAN counterparts in early June, one of many such meetings the minister has had with ASEAN counterparts in 2021. Blinken’s rescheduled virtual meeting with ASEAN counterparts over Myanmar in July avoided more direct US leadership in dealing with the problem.[27]
Secretary of Defence Austin’s visit to The Philippines in July came amid substantial US military and vaccine assistance, which led to mercurial President Rodrigo Duterte’s decision to restore the visiting forces agreement which he had threatened to end. Austin’s and Harris’s visits to Singapore and Vietnam highlighted important initiatives on providing COVID-19 vaccines, and closer US engagement on economic recovery, climate change, and maritime security. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of US activism in assisting the top US priority of countering China’s challenges remained limited, notably by Southeast Asian reluctance to offend Beijing. How far even Vietnam, the country with the most to lose if China dominates Southeast Asia, will go to avoid offending China seemed evident when Hanoi allowed the Chinese ambassador to publicly meet the Vietnamese prime minister with a donation of vaccines, upstaging Harris who hours later began her visit and offered vaccines.[28]
OUTLOOK
For now, the Biden administration seems determined to continue advancing relations with Southeast Asia in areas those governments believe will not seriously upset Beijing. Some specialists argue the US has no choice but to stay actively involved as Southeast Asia is perhaps the world’s most important channel of international trade and the region is on track to become the world’s fourth largest economy. This view holds that outside countries capable of expanding and deepening their economic relationships in Southeast Asia will write the rules and set the standards for future development, trade, and investment.[29]
How such an approach supports the high priority that Washington accords to countering China’s challenges is hard to demonstrate. Over time, such an approach may win over Southeast Asian governments which reportedly register keen anxiety in private over the region’s growing dependence on and deference to China’s overwhelming national interests, and over an increasingly China-dominated sphere of influence.[30] Indeed, China appears resolved in using a combination of blandishments and coercion in advancing control in regional affairs.[31] And the US government may come up with a strategy that meets the needs of the Southeast Asian states while also serving to counter Chinese challenges. However, in this time of acute US preoccupation with critically important domestic issues and blowback from the Afghanistan withdrawal, it is more likely that the Biden administration will focus on working with willing partners to counter Chinese challenges, notably the Quad powers. Meanwhile, allowing Southeast Asia and ASEAN to face more directly the risks of Chinese dominance may incentivise some important regional countries to take steps that will encourage the United States to sustain strong relations with them in the interest of preserving their autonomy and national rights.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/138, 26 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Robert Sutter, The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First Century Relations second edition (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 2020)1-2; Mark Warner, The China Challenge and Critical Next Steps for the United States, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, May 15, 2019); Timothy Heath, Derek Grossman and Asha Clark, China’s Quest for Global Dominance (Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2021); Evan Medeiros, Major Power Rivalry in East Asia,(Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations) April 2021.
[2] Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy of an Emerging Global Force (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021) 142-144 .
[3] Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations 144-148.
[4] Robert Sutter & Satu Limaye, A Hardening US-China Competition: Asia Policy in America’s 2020 Elections and Asian Responses, (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center 2020) 10-13.
[5] Ibid, 16-22; Robert Sutter, “Congress and America’s Negative Turn Against China: Strategic Ballast”, FULCRUM: Analysis on Southeast Asia, 27 July 202, https://fulcrum.sg/congress-and-americas-negative-turn-against-china-strategic-ballast/.
[6] “Bizarre bills against China stack up in US Congress”, Global Times, 18 June 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191994.shtml; Andrew Desiderio, “Senate advances a rare bi-partisan deal on countering China”, Politico, 17 May 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/17/senate-bipartisan-deal-countering-china-489152; Tony Romm, “Senate Approves $250 Billion to Trim China’s Ambitions”, The Washington Post, 9 June 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/06/08/senate-china-science-technology/.
[7] Ryan Hass, How China is Responding to Escalation Strategic Competition with the United States (Washington DC: Brookings Institution) 1 March 2021.
[8] Bonnie Glaser and Hannah Price, “Continuity Prevails in Biden’s First 100 Days”, Comparative Connections 23, 1 (May 2021) 29-37; Bonnie Glaser and Hannah Price, “The Decent Continues”, Comparative Connections 23, 2 (September 2021) 25-32.
[9] “Biden’s first 100 days: What he’s gotten done”, CNN, 28 April 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/28/politics/president-biden-first-100-days/index.html.
[10] Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Change in Style, Continuity in Asia Policy”, Comparative Connections 23, 1 (May 2021) 1-7.
[11] Sheila Smith, “Japan, the Quad and the Indo-Pacific” , The Asan Forum, 23 June 2021, https://theasanforum.org/japan-the-quad-and-the-indo-pacific/; Brad Glosserman, “What Was Unsaid Hovers Over the Biden-Moon Summit”, Japan Times, 25 May 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/05/25/commentary/world-commentary/biden-moon-summit/.
[12] Robert Sutter & Chin Hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asia Relations”, Comparative Connections 22,1 (May 2021) 70-72; Nick Aspinwall, “Biden delegation pledges US support for Taiwan self-defense”, The Diplomat, 17 April 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/biden-delegation-pledges-us-support-for-taiwan-self-defense/.
[13] US-China Policy Foundation Newsletter (2021) “US View of China Competition”, 21 May 2021, https://uscpf.org/v3/2021/05/21/us-china-competition/.
[14] David Sanger, Catie Edmondson, David McCabe and Thomas Kaplan, “In Rare Show of Unity, Senate Poised to Pass A Bill to Counter China”, The New York Times, 7 June 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/us/politics/senate-china-semiconductors.html.
[15] “Full Transcript of Biden’s Remarks on Afghanistan”, The New York Times,31 August 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/us/politics/transcript-biden-speech-afghanistan.html.
[16] The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS”, 15 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/; David Lynch, “White House calls for ‘new course’ on China trade ties”, The Washington Post, 5 October 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/10/04/tai-biden-china-trade/; David Sanger, “Biden and Xi agree to hold virtual talks”, The New York Times, 7 October 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/06/us/politics/biden-xi-jinping-china-summit.html.
[17] For a recent authoritative comparison of US and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, see David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021)179-246; other such authoritative assessments are Murray Hiebert, Under Beijing’s Shadow (Washington DC: CSIS, 2020) and Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2020).
[18] Shambaugh, op cit.; Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations 204-211. In particular, see Daniel Russel and Blake Berger, Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative (Washington, DC: Asia Society Policy Institute, June 2019) and David Shullman, ed., Chinese Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy (Washington, DC: International Republican Institute, 2019).
[19] Testimony of David B. Shear at “Strengthening Ties with Southeast Asia”, Hearing of US Congress, House Committee of Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 28 September 2021. The up-to-date figures in this paragraph are from Mr. Shear’s testimony as former US ambassador to Vietnam and senior advisor of McLarty Associates known for expert advice on Southeast Asian matters. https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2021/9/strengthening-the-u-s-ties-with-southeast-asia.
[20] ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, State of Southeast Asia 2019 Survey Report (Singapore 2020) /wp-content/uploads/pdfs/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2019.pdf; State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey Report (Singapore 2021). /wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf.
[21] John West, “Book Review: Where Great Powers Meet”, Australian Outlook, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 15 February 2021 https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/book-review-where-great-powers-meet-america-and-china-in-southeast-asia/; Viet Hoang, ‘The Code of Conduct for the South China Sea: A Long and Bumpy Road”, The Diplomat, 28 September 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/the-code-of-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea-a-long-and-bumpy-road/; Raissa Robles, “South China Sea: Beijing rushing code of conduct to undermine 2016 Hague ruling”, South China Morning Post, 24August 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3146535/south-china-sea-beijing-rushing-code-conduct-undermine-2016.
[22] Zack Cooper and Adam Liff, “America Still Needs to Rebalance to Asia, Foreign Affairs, 11 August 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-08-11/america-still-needs-rebalance-asia.
[23] Robert Sutter, “The United States and the Myanmar Crisis: Broad Interests, Constricted Responses”, FULCRUM: Analysis on Southeast Asia, 14 June 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/the-united-states-and-the-myanmar-crisis-broad-interests-constricted-responses/.
[24] Shambaugh op cit.; Sutter & Limaye, A Hardening US-China Competition 39-44, 67-70. Zach Cooper, “Mind the Gap: Biden’s Opportunity to Re-engage with Southeast Asia”, FULCRUM: Analysis on Southeast Asia, 25 November 2020, https://fulcrum.sg/mind-the-gap-bidens-opportunity-to-reengage-southeast-asia/; Sebastian Strangio, “ASEAN and China Minister Talk COVID-19, Myanmar Crisis”, The Diplomat, 8 June 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/asean-and-china-ministers-talk-covid-19-myanmar-crisis/.
[25] Huang Le Thu, “Biden Must Change the Narrative of Neglect for Southeast Asia, Foreign Policy, 9 July 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/southeast-asia-biden-asean-centrality/; Catharin Dalpino, “ASEAN Confronts Dual Crisis”, Comparative Connections 22, 1 (May 2021) 57-65; Robert Sutter & Chin Hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asia Relations”, Comparative Connections 22, 2 (September 2021) 64-65.
[26] Ristian Atriandi Suprianto, “Why Southeast Asia Should Welcome AUKUS”, The Diplomat, 28 September 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/28/southeast-asia-asean-australia-aukus-china-united-states/.
[27] Sutter, “The United States and the Myanmar Crisis: Broad Interests, Constricted Responses”; Sebastian Strangio, “US Focuses on Myanmar, South China Sea at Special ASEAN Meeting, The Diplomat, 15 July 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/us-focuses-on-myanmar-south-china-sea-at-special-asean-meeting/.
[28] Shibani Mahtani, “Harris in Vietnam Gets a dose of China’s challenge to the US”, The Washington Post, 25 August 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/kamala-harris-vietnam-china-coronavirus/2021/08/25/77e51efa-0564-11ec-b3c4-c462b1edcfc8_story.html.
[29] Shear testimony.
[30] Sebastian Strangio, “Report Shows Rising Southeast Asian Trust in US, Falling Trust in China”, The Diplomat, 12 February 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/report-shows-rising-southeast-asian-trust-in-us-falling-trust-in-china/.
[31] Sutter & Huang “China-Southeast Asia Relations”, (May 2021) 70-72.
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2021/137 “An Attempt to Lead Myanmar Back to the Future? Data on the State Administration Council Regime’s Union Ministers” by Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Constituted as a “provisional” government on 1 August, 28 Union ministers, holding a total of 29 portfolios, now serve Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) regime.
- Observers believe that the SAC’s ministerial appointments reflect an aspiration to achieve performance legitimacy for the regime that seized power in the 1 February coup.
- Five Union ministers are active-duty military officers, while 13 others have military backgrounds. Eight held senior posts under the 2011-2016 Union Solidarity and Development Party government, and six under the 2016-2021 National League for Democracy government.
- While two Union ministers are politicians, data on the backgrounds of the remaining 26 offer what amounts to a time-lapse photograph of Myanmar’s high-level government bureaucracy in recent decades, and thus make it possible to take stock of the human resources with which the SAC regime would administer the country.
- Unlike the civilian membership of the SAC, the junta’s roster of ministers appears intended to serve functional rather than political purposes.
- Scrutiny of the division of labour between the SAC junta and its Union ministers is vital to understanding the path on which Myanmar and its economy have embarked since the 1 February coup.
*Htet Myet Min Tun is an intern in, Moe Thuzar Co-Coordinator of, and Michael Montesano Coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
Seizing state power on 1 February, Myanmar’s armed forces or Tatmadaw detained not only President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi but also Union ministers in the National League for Democracy (NLD) government.[1] Coup leader and Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing swiftly replaced that government by signing an order appointing 11 Union ministers – three active-duty military officers and eight civilians.[2] These ministerial appointments thus predated the formation of the State Administration Council (SAC) junta itself, which occurred the day after the coup.[3] The newly appointed ministers were to serve under the nominal leadership of Acting President U Myint Swe — a retired lieutenant general who had been one of Myanmar’s two vice presidents during the period of NLD government in 2016-2020.[4]
The active-duty Tatmadaw officers among Min Aung Hlaing’s initial ministerial appointees hold the three portfolios that Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution allocates to the military: home affairs, defence, and border affairs.[5] Seven of the other initial appointees have military backgrounds, and only one a purely civilian background. The latter individual is Dr Thet Khaing Win, who heads the Ministry of Health. He served as permanent secretary in what was at the time the Ministry of Health and Sports under the ousted government.[6]
In the days, weeks and months following the coup, the SAC appointed additional Union ministers. These appointees were in the main civilians, some with military backgrounds.[7] The most recent ministerial appointment came on 30 August, with the reorganization of the Union Attorney-General’s Office into the new Ministry of Legal Affairs.[8]
The 2008 Constitution enshrines Myanmar’s “Union Government” — effectively, the country’s cabinet — as the state’s highest executive body.[9] However, the existence of the State Administration Council leaves the role of Union ministers in decision-making, and the extent of their authority, unclear. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)[10] — the junta composed entirely of military officers that ruled Myanmar from 1988 to 2011 — superseded Union ministers’ decision-making power. Prior to 1 August, the SAC appeared to follow that precedent, installing ministers with more of an implementational than executive role.
On that date six months after its coup, the SAC announced the formation of a “provisional government”, along with plans for elections in two years.[11] Additions to the roster of Union ministers, including the appointment of junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as prime minister, accompanied this announcement. Some observers in Yangon believe that the mission of this newly launched government and its ministers is to bring the SAC regime performance legitimacy.[12] Whatever the case, the 1 August announcement suggested the Tatmadaw’s determination both to give the SAC regime a more civilian image and to normalize its administration of the country.[13]
At the time of writing, 28 ministers hold 29 portfolios in the so-called “provisional government”. The SAC has retained some ministries from the 2016-2021 NLD era while also reviving some from the 1988-2011 SLORC/SPDC and 2011-2016 Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) eras.[14]
Table 1. Union Ministers Appointed after the 1 February Coup, and Their Portfolios, in Order of Date of Appointment.
| Portfolio | Romanized Name | Name in Burmese | Date of Appointment | Affiliation |
| Foreign Affairs | Wunna Maung Lwin | ဝဏ္ဏမောင်လွင် | 1 February 2021 | Union Solidarity and Development Party |
| Home Affairs | Lieutenant General Soe Htut | ဒုတိယဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး စိုးထွဋ် | 1 February 2021[15] | Tatmadaw |
| Defence | General Mya Htun Oo | ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး မြထွန်းဦး | 1 February 2021 | Tatmadaw |
| Border Affairs | Lieutenant General Htun Htun Naung | ဒုတိယဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး ထွန်းထွန်းနောင် | 1 February 2021 | Tatmadaw |
| Planning and Finance [and Industry][16] | Win Shein | ဝင်းရှိန် | 1 February 2021 | Union Solidarity and Development Party |
| Investment and Foreign Economic Relations | Aung Naing Oo | အောင်နိုင်ဦး | 1 February 2021 | civil servant[17] |
| International Cooperation | Ko Ko Hlaing | ကိုကိုလှိုင် | 1 February 2021 | independent |
| [Information] Union Government Office – 2 | Chit Naing | ချစ်နိုင် | [1 February -31 July 2021] 1 August 2021[18] | independent |
| Religious Affairs and Culture | Ko Ko | ကိုကို | 1 February 2021 | independent |
| Labour | Myint Kyaing[19] | မြင့်ကြိုင် | 1 February 2021 | civil servant |
| Health | Thet Khaing Win[20] | သက်ခိုင်ဝင်း | 1 February 2021 | civil servant |
| Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation | Khin Maung Yi | ခင်မောင်ရီ | 2 February 2021 | civil servant |
| I Construction | Shwe Lay | ရွှေလေး | 2 February 2021 | civil servant |
| Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation | Tin Htut Oo | တင်ထွဋ်ဦး | 3 February 2021 | independent |
| Transport and Communications | Admiral Tin Aung San | ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး တင်အောင်စန်း | 3 February 2021 | Tatmadaw |
| Commerce | Pwint San | ပွင့်ဆန်း | 3 February 2021 | Union Solidarity and Development Party |
| Ethnic Affairs | Saw Htun Aung Myint | စောထွန်းအောင်မြင့် | 3 February 2021 | Kayin People’s Party |
| Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement | Thet Thet Khine | သက်သက်ခိုင် | 4 February 2021 | People’s Pioneer Party |
| Hotels and Tourism, Information | Maung Maung Ohn | မောင်မောင်အုန်း | 7 February 2021, 1 August 2021[21] | Union Solidarity and Development Party |
| Electricity and Energy | Aung Than Oo | အောင်သန်းဦး | 8 February 2021 | Union Solidarity and Development Party |
| Education | Nyunt Pe | ညွန့်ဖေ | 16 February 2021 | independent |
| Union Government Office – 1 | Lieutenant General Yar Pyae | ဒုတိယဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး ရာပြည့် | 11 May 2021[22] | Tatmadaw |
| Industry | Charlie Than | ချာလီသန်း | 22 May 2021 | independent |
| Science and Technology | Myo Thein Kyaw | မျိုးသိန်းကျော် | 17 June 2021 | independent |
| Cooperatives and Rural Development | Hla Moe | လှမိုး | 24 June 2021 | independent |
| Immigration and Population | Khin Yi | ခင်ရီ | 1 August 2021 | Union Solidarity and Development Party |
| Sports and Youth Affairs[23] | Min Thein Zan | မင်းသိန်းဇံ | 1 August 2021 | independent |
| Legal Affairs | Thida Oo[24] | သီတာဦး | 30 August 2021 | civil servant |
Min Aung Hlaing and the deputy chairman of the SAC, Vice Senior General Soe Win, have assumed the posts of prime minister and deputy prime minister in the provisional government.[25] Three additional military officers on the junta are also members of that government: General Mya Htun Oo, Admiral Tin Aung San, and Lieutenant General Soe Htut. Both other active-duty military members of the SAC and its civilian members are absent from the ministerial line-up.[26]
Notwithstanding the subordination of the SAC regime’s Union ministers to the junta and the limited overlap in membership between the junta and the roster of ministers, the role of the latter in coordinating and administering a wide range of sectors makes its composition a matter of importance to those who would understand this regime. Those sectors are crucial to Myanmar’s economy, society and relations with the outside world. This article therefore presents preliminary data on the regime’s ministers — including their records of previous military and other government service, their career trajectories and educational backgrounds, and their party affiliations and history of involvement in electoral politics.[27]
SOLDIERS AND FORMER SOLDIERS
At first glance, civilians appear to dominate the roster of the SAC regime’s Union ministers. Only five active-duty military officers number among the 28 individuals holding ministerial portfolios. But 14 of the 23 “civilian” ministers are former Tatmadaw officers. The roster thus has a decided military flavour; only nine of its members are “true” civilians.
Table 2. Active-Duty Military Officers among Union Ministers.
| Name | Portfolio | Concurrent Position | Most Recent Military Post[28] |
| Lieutenant General Soe Htut | Home Affairs[29] | Member of State Administration Council | Chief of Military Security Affairs[30] |
| General Mya Htun Oo | Defence | Member of State Administration Council | Joint Chief of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force[31] |
| Lieutenant General Htun Htun Naung | Border Affairs | (none) | Chief of the Bureau of[32] Special Operations – 1 |
| Admiral Tin Aung San | Transport and Communications | Member of State Administration Council | Commander-in-Chief of the Navy[33] |
| Lieutenant General Yar Pyae | Union Government Office – 1 | Chair of the NUPRCC[34] | Chief of the Bureau of Special Operations – 2[35] |
Among active-duty military officers serving as Union ministers, General Mya Htun Oo, Admiral Tin Aung San, and Lieutenant General Soe Htut serve concurrently on the SAC. After the coup the first two officers gave up the posts of, respectively, Joint Chief of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy — the third and the fourth highest positions in the Tatmadaw hierarchy — for less prestigious and less powerful ministerial posts.[36]
Soe Htut became a SAC member in March 2021; he is the only military member of the SAC added to the junta after its formation.[37] Remaining on active duty in the Tatmadaw, he has retained the home affairs portfolio to which Min Aung Hlaing re-appointed him on the day of the coup.[38]
Many of the 14 notionally civilian Union ministers with military backgrounds left active duty to take up civil service posts during the SPDC era. Some, such as Chit Naing and Saw Htun Aung Myint, retired from those posts a decade or two later and rose to prominence in other fields of endeavour. Several were still serving as civil servants when Thein Sein assumed the presidency in 2011. Among these latter, Wunna Maung Lwin and Ko Ko Hlaing became, respectively, a minister under and the chief political advisor to the Thein Sein government. Others, such as Aung Naing Oo and Khin Maung Yi, continued working as civil servants even through the time of the NLD administration. Still other SAC ministerial appointees with military backgrounds — such as Win Shein, Maung Maung Ohn and Khin Yi — left active duty in the 2011-2106 period to serve as ministers or deputy ministers under Thein Sein. For his part, Myo Thein Kyaw, now holding the science and technology portfolio, only left the military sometime between 2018 and 2020.[39]
Table 3. Civilian Ministers with Some Military Background.
| Name | Current Portfolio | Year of Retirement from the Military | Post-Military Government Service | Years of Post-Military Government Service |
| Wunna Maung Lwin | Foreign Affairs | 1996[40] | Ministry of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs[41] | 1996 – 2016[42] |
| Win Shein | Planning and Finance | 2011[43] | Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Finance and Revenue[44] | 2011 – 2016[45] |
| Aung Naing Oo | Investment and Foreign Economic Relations | 2000[46] | Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations[47] | 2000 – 2021[48] |
| Myint Kyaing | Labour | (data not available) | Ministry of Labour[49] | (data not available) |
| Ko Ko Hlaing | International Cooperation | 2004[50] | Ministry of Information[51] | 2004 – 2011[52] |
| Chit Naing | Union Government Office – 2 | 1997[53] | Ministry of Information[54] | 1997 – 2008[55] |
| Ko Ko | Religious Affairs and Culture | 2006 or 2007[56] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Khin Maung Yi | Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation | 2003[57] | Ministry of Forestry – Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation[58] | 2003 – 2021[59] |
| Saw Htun Aung Myint | Ethnic Affairs | 1988[60] | Ministry of Transport[61] | 1988 – 2003[62] |
| Maung Maung Ohn | Hotels and Tourism, Information | 2014[63] | Rakhine State Government[64] | 2014 – 2016 |
| Myo Thein Kyaw | Science and Technology | 2019 or 2020[65] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Hla Moe | Cooperatives and Rural Development | (data not available) | Ministry of Cooperatives[66] | (data not available) |
| Khin Yi | Immigration and Population | 2011[67] | Ministry of Immigration and Population[68] | 2011 – 2015[69] |
| Min Thein Zan | Sports and Youth Affairs | (data not available) | Ministry of Foreign Affairs[70] | (data not available) |
CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF UNION MINISTERS
The majority of the nine Union ministers serving the SAC who are apparently “true” civilians with no military backgrounds are career civil servants. Some were serving as deputy ministers or permanent secretaries under the NLD government at the time of the 1 February coup. Several served as deputy ministers in or as advisors to Thein Sein’s government. The outstanding exception is Thet Thet Khine, the minister of social welfare, relief and resettlement, and the first of two women appointed minister under the SAC.[71] She is not a career civil servant, and she held no post in the Thein Sein government. Rather, she is a businesswoman-turned-politician who represented the NLD in Myanmar’s 2015 elections but broke with the party in 2019.[72]
Available data on the recent careers of the 23 civilian and quasi-civilian Union ministers permit sorting them into four broad categories: individuals who held ministerial, deputy ministerial, or advisory positions in the 2011-2016 USDP government; individuals who held deputy ministerial or permanent secretary positions in the 2016-2020 NLD government; other individuals, with or without military background, who previously held posts as civil servants; and still others whose appointments appear to reflect political considerations.
Several of the eight ministers in the first category hold portfolios related to international engagement or economic planning: foreign affairs, international cooperation, finance, tourism, information. Their appointment appears to reflect Min Aung Hlaing’s or the Tatmadaw’s belief that their performance in the Thein Sein administration prepared them to defend or promote Myanmar and SAC interests in the international arena. That five of eight are also former Tatmadaw officers can only increase SAC trust in these men.
Table 4. Union Ministers Members Who Held Ministerial, Sub-Ministerial or Advisory Positions in the 2011-2016 Thein Sein Government.
| Name | Current Portfolio | Position Held in the Thein Sein Government | Military Background | Previous Background Holding Civilian Posts in Government |
| Wunna Maung Lwin | Foreign Affairs | Minister of Foreign Affairs | yes | yes |
| Win Shein | Planning and Finance | Minister of Finance and Revenue[73] | yes | no |
| Ko Ko Hlaing | International Cooperation | Chief Political Advisor to the President[74] | yes | yes |
| Tin Htut Oo | Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation | Chairman of the National Economic and Social Advisory Council[75] | no | yes[76] |
| Pwint San | Commerce | Deputy Minister of Commerce[77] | no | no |
| Maung Maung Ohn | Hotels and Tourism, Information | Chief Minister of Rakhine State[78] | yes | no |
| Aung Than Oo | Electricity and Energy | Deputy Minister of Electric Power[79] | no | yes[80] |
| Khin Yi | Immigration and Population | Minister of Immigration and Population[81] | yes[82] | yes[83] |
Six SAC regime Union ministers served as deputy ministers or permanent secretaries under the ousted NLD government, only to find themselves promoted to ministerial positions soon after the 1 February coup. Relative to those of the ministers in the first category, their portfolios largely concern domestic matters: labour, health, construction, natural resources. In this regard, Aung Naing Oo’s appointment to the investment and foreign economic relations portfolio is an exception.
The likely explanation for the promotion of these NLD-era “holdovers” to ministerial positions lies in the SAC’s awareness of the need for some sense of continuity in governance while the military works to assert its control over the country. This consideration is particularly important in cases like those of the Ministry of Health during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and even the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations at a time when investors in Myanmar must decide how to adapt to post-coup conditions.
Table 5. Union Ministers Who Held Deputy Minister or Permanent Secretary Positions in the NLD Government.
| Name | Current Portfolio | Position Held under the NLD Government | Military Background |
| Aung Naing Oo | Investment and Foreign Economic Relations | Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations[84] | yes |
| Myint Kyaing | Labour | Deputy Minister of Labour, Immigration, and Population[85] | yes[86] |
| Thet Khaing Win | Health | Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health and Sports[87] | no |
| Khin Maung Yi | Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation | Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation[88] | yes |
| Shwe Lay | Construction | Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Construction[89] | no |
| Thida Oo | Legal Affairs | Permanent Secretary, Union Attorney-General’s Office[90] | no |
The third category of civilian and quasi-civilian Union ministers, comprising retired bureaucrats, includes five individuals. Three have military backgrounds. Following retirement from government service, several were active in private-sector concerns or associations. Chit Naing,[91] originally named information minister but later reassigned to the Union Government Office – 2 portfolio, served after retirement in the leadership of the Myanmar Writers and Journalists Association.[92] After stepping down as rector of the Myanmar Maritime University, Minister of Industry Charlie Than became the president of the Myanmar Engineering Council, directed some businesses, and advised government committees such as the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Management Committee.[93]
Table 6. Union Ministers Who are Retired Civil Servants.
| Name | Current Portfolio | Bureaucratic Position at the Time of Retirement | Year of Retirement | Military Background |
| Chit Naing | Union Government Office – 2 | Director General, Information and Public Relations Department, Ministry of Information[94] | 2009 | yes |
| Nyunt Pe | Education | Director General, Department of Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Education [95] | 2020[96] | no |
| Charlie Than | Industry | Rector, Myanmar Maritime University[97] | 2013[98] | no[99] |
| Hla Moe | Cooperatives and Rural Development | Managing Director for the Cooperative Import Export Enterprise, Ministry of Cooperatives[100] | 2016 or 2017 | yes |
| Min Thein Zan | Sports and Youth Affairs | Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs[101] | 2018[102] | yes[103] |
Finally, two ministers are politicians. Saw Htun Aung Myint serves as minister of ethnic Affairs and Thet Thet Khine as minister of social welfare, relief and resettlement. More than that of other ministers, but perhaps like that of some civilian members of the junta,[104] their appointment is likely to reflect the Tatmadaw’s political motivations. In the ethnic-affairs role, the junta needs someone with ethnic-nationality credentials with whom both the military and ethnic-nationality groups can work. Saw Htun Aung Myint held the Kayin affairs portfolio in the Yangon Region government during the Thein Sein administration and is now chairman of the Kayin People’s Party.[105]
Thet Thet Khine was an NLD member of the Pyithu Hluttaw, or Lower House of the Union Parliament, before breaking with the NLD to found the People’s Pioneer Party[106] and to contest the 2020 elections. She is known for her pronounced self-confidence and her criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership of the NLD and of that party’s poor performance in improving Myanmar’s economy.[107] Her appointment as a Union minister — arguably the subject of more comment among people in Myanmar than that of any other minister — appears to be due both to her strident anti-NLD stance and to a determination to send a signal to other politicians and their parties concerning the potential “rewards” of cooperation with the SAC.
Table 7. Union Ministers Who are Politicians.
| Name | Current Portfolio | Political Positions or Public Offices Previously Held | Military Background | Civil Service Background |
| Saw Htun Aung Myint | Ethnic Affairs | Minister for Kayin Affairs in the Yangon Region, Chairman of the Kayin People’s Party[108] | yes | yes |
| Thet Thet Khine | Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement | Member of Pyithu Hluttaw, Chairwoman of the People’s Pioneer Party[109] | no | no |
Two ministers do not fall into any of the categories discussed above. Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture Ko Ko, a retired Air Force colonel who writes under the pen name “Ko Ko (Defence Services Academy)”,[110] also served as chairman of the Yangon Region Election Commission.[111] Minister of Science and Technology Myo Thein Kyaw, another retired colonel, served as the rector of the Defence Services Technological Academy while still on active duty.[112]
ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS
Available data suggest that most of the SAC regime’s Union ministers are Bamar Buddhists. Notable exceptions are the Kayin Christian Saw Htun Aung Myint of the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs[113] and the Rakhine Buddhist Nyunt Pe of the Ministry of Education.[114] The contrast between the SAC regime’s ministers and the ethnically diverse civilian membership of the junta itself[115] suggests the managerial and administrative rather than representational and strategic role that the former are meant to play in the regime.
Data on the educational backgrounds of only 27 of the SAC regime’s 28 Union ministers are readily available, and not all of those data are complete. Nineteen ministers received some kind of military education; 13 are — like all but two of the military members of the SAC — Defence Services Academy (DSA) graduates. One studied at the Defence Services Technological Academy (DSTA), and four completed Officer Training School (OTS) and one the Officer Training Course (OTC). Civilian ministers received their undergraduate degrees from Myanmar institutions such as the Rangoon Institute of Technology, the Institutes of Medicine, Rangoon and Mandalay Arts and Sciences Universities, and Mandalay Agricultural University. Nine ministers hold postgraduate degrees, four from overseas institutions.
Table 8. Educational Backgrounds of the SAC Regime’s Union Ministers.
| Name | Current Portfolio | Undergraduate Education | Postgraduate Education | Other Military/ Professional Training |
| Wunna Maung Lwin | Foreign Affairs | Defence Services Academy – 16th Intake[116] | (data not available) | Diplomacy Course – 1st Intake[117] |
| Lieutenant General Soe Htut | Home Affairs | (data not available) | (data not available) | Officer Training School – 64th Intake[118] |
| General Mya Htun Oo | Defence | Defence Services Academy – 25th Intake[119] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Lieutenant General Htun Htun Naung | Border Affairs | Defence Services Academy – 25th Intake[120] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Win Shein | Planning and Finance | Defence Services Academy – 19th Intake[121] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Aung Naing Oo | Investment and Foreign Economic Relations | Mandalay Arts and Sceinces University, Officer Training Course – 11th Intake [122] | (data not available) | World Trade Organization training course,[123] English Language Training for Officials course at the Victoria University of Wellington[124] |
| Ko Ko Hlaing | International Cooperation | Defence Services Academy – 18th Intake[125] | M.A., institution unknown[126] | (data not available) |
| Ko Ko | Religious Affairs and Culture | Defence Services Academy – 10th Intake[127] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Myint Kyaing | Labour | (data not available) | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Thet Khaing Win | Health | M.B.B.S., Institute of Medicine – 1, Yangon[128] | master’s degree, internal medicine, Institute of Medicine -1, Yangon[129] | postgraduate training, internal medicine, United Kingdom[130] |
| Khin Maung Yi | Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation | (data not available) | (data not available) | Officer Training School (data on intake number unavailable)[131] |
| Shwe Lay | Construction | B. E., Rangoon Institute of Technology[132] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Tin Htut Oo | Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation | B.A., Mandalay Agricultural University[133] | M.S., Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University[134] | (data not available) |
| Admiral Tin Aung San | Transport and Communications | Defence Services Academy – 23rd Intake[135] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Pwint San | Commerce | M.B.B.S., Institute of Medicine – 2, Yangon[136] | M.B.A., Yangon Institute of Economics[137] | Yangon University of Foreign Languages (Diploma in Chinese)[138] |
| Saw Htun Aung Myint | Ethnic Affairs | Defence Services Academy – 6th Intake[139] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Thet Thet Khine | Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement | M.B.B.S., Institute of Medicine – 1, Yangon[140] | M.B.A., Yangon Institute of Economics;[141] M.B.A., Nanyang Technological University;[142] Ph.D., Public Management, Walden University[143] | (data not available) |
| Maung Maung Ohn | Hotels and Tourism, Information | Defence Services Academy – 22nd Intake[144] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Aung Than Oo | Electricity and Energy | B.E., Rangoon Institute of Technology[145] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Nyunt Pe | Education | (data not available) | Ph.D., Microbiology, Phytochemistry, Hokkaido University[146] | (data not available) |
| Lieutenant General Yar Pyae | Union Government Office – 1 | Defence Services Academy – 22nd Intake[147] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Chit Naing | Union Government Office – 2 | B.A., Mandalay Arts and Sciences University[148] | (data not available) | Officer Training School – 43rd Intake[149] |
| Charlie Than | Industry | B.E., Rangoon Institute of Technology[150] | M.E., Ph.D., Defence Services Technological Academy[151] | Certificate in Naval Architecture, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne[152] |
| Myo Thein Kyaw | Science and Technology | (data not available) | (data not available) | Officer Training School – 73th Intake[153] |
| Hla Moe | Cooperatives and Rural Development | Defence Services Academy – 19th Intake[154] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Khin Yi | Immigration and Population | Defence Services Academy – 17th Intake[155] | M.A., Defence Studies, National Defence College, Myanmar[156] | (data not available) |
| Min Thein Zan | Sports and Youth Affairs | Defence Services Academy – 23th Intake[157] | (data not available) | (data not available) |
| Thida Oo | Legal Affairs | LL.B., Rangoon Arts and Sciences University[158] | Ph.D., Law, Niigata University[159] | (data not available) |
POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATIONS
Eight of the 28 Union ministers are affiliated to political parties, six to the USDP alone.[160] That latter affiliation may say more about the sorts of people whom the Tatmadaw’s proxy party fields as candidates than about the identities of these ministers as politicians. In contrast, the other two ministers with political party ties are first and foremost politicians. One founded the People’s Pioneer Party (PPP), a break-off party from the NLD, and the other leads the Kayin People’s Party (KPP) — a prominent member of which serves on the SAC.[161] Each of these eight ministers contested the 2020 elections, save for Maung Maung Ohn of the USDP, and all lost to NLD candidates.
Table 9. Union Ministers’ Record of Participation in the 2010, 2015, and 2020 Elections.
| Name | 2010 Elections | 2015 Elections | 2020 Elections | |||
| Party | Result | Party | Result | Party | Result | |
| Wunna Maung Lwin | – | did not contest | – | did not contest | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[162] |
| Win Shein | – | did not contest | – | did not contest | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[163] |
| Pwint San | USDP | won[164] | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[165] | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[166] |
| Saw Htun Aung Myint | – | did not contest | KPP | lost to NLD candidate[167] | KPP | lost to NLD candidate[168] |
| Thet Thet Khine | – | did not contest | NLD | won[169] | PPP | lost to NLD candidate[170] |
| Maung Maung Ohn | – | did not contest | USDP | won[171] | – | did not contest |
| Aung Than Oo | – | did not contest | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[172] | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[173] |
| Khin Yi | – | did not contest | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[174] | USDP | lost to NLD candidate[175] |
Even though individuals now holding major portfolios such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Wunna Maung Lwin, Minister of Planning and Finance Win Shein, and Minister of Commerce Pwint San are members of the USDP, that affiliation appears to have been a less important factor in their appointments than several other factors. These include the Tatmadaw’s confidence in these individuals’ capability and loyalty and their relationships with the armed forces.
The decision of Saw Htun Aung Myint from the KPP and Thet Thet Khine from the PPP to serve the SAC regime as ministers appears to have had political costs.[176] However, each of these figures suffered resounding defeats at the hands of the NLD in the November 2020 elections, and they may well view working with the military as the way to regain relevance in the struggle for political survival after the coup. In this regard, they may differ from most of their fellow ministers.
CONCLUSION
Consideration of the line-up of the SAC regime’s Union ministers suggests two preliminary conclusions. First, the group has a fundamentally functional purpose: to administer the Myanmar state. Second, its composition is suggestive of the junta’s objectives for Myanmar. The membership of the SAC itself reflects, on the one hand, Tatmadaw domination and, on the other, the nature of the SAC as an essentially anti-NLD project.[177] In contrast to the negative goal of purging Myanmar’s politics of NLD influence, the SAC’s ministerial appointments appear to reveal a positive vision.[178]
In appointing as ministers former military men who were active in the USDP government and senior civil servants who served under the NLD, the Tatmadaw apparently seeks to recreate the Myanmar of the Thein Sein era. A business-friendly but military-controlled state and a moderately free and open society characterized that era. In his first speech after the 1 February coup, Min Aung Hlaing emphasized that the SAC was “different” from past military regimes, and that its foreign and economic policies would follow “the same path as before”. He also offered assurances that Myanmar’s economy would remain open to foreign investment.[179] At the time, the SAC’s chairman might aspire to preside over an economic performance better than that achieved under the NLD, which was widely criticized for economic mismanagement — not least by many of the “technocrats” now serving the junta as Union ministers.[180] With such people now on his team, the Senior General may have believed that improved economic performance would legitimize his seizure of power.[181]
SAC regime Union ministers such as Aung Naing Oo, Win Shein, Pwin San and Tin Htut Oo did in fact receive credit for achieving successful economic reforms during their previous government service, not least from foreign investors and other external actors. However, Min Aung Hlaing seems to have miscalculated. The political and economic landscapes of the period since his coup are not those of the recent USDP and NLD eras. Despite his contention that his junta is different from the previous such bodies, the Myanmar public could not help recalling the isolation, impoverishment and political oppression of the SLORC/SPDC era. This memory has led to unprecedented resistance to the SAC, starting in the days immediately after its coup. The Tatmadaw’s violent crackdown has only exacerbated matters, confirming the public’s fears concerning the return of military rule and provoking increasing domestic and international pressure on the junta. Under such circumstances, maintaining basic government functions and reviving Myanmar’s economy, let alone seeing that economy flourish, appear difficult if not impossible.[182]
Prior to 1 August, the extent of ministers’ freedom and authority was not evident. The SAC operated as the dominant body in the Myanmar state. A number of the regime’s Union ministers were former presidential advisors and permanent secretaries, whose primary function seemed to be offering advice to and following the directives of the Senior General and the junta, rather than making significant decisions. This was despite the fact that Myanmar faced simultaneous public-health and economic crises on a scale that it had never before encountered.
The formal inauguration of a “provisional” or “caretaker”[183] government six months after Min Aung Hlaing’s coup suggests that the Tatmadaw is now following, with the full participation of the ministers that it has installed, a path trodden by previous authoritarian and military regimes. This path may prove long. And following the recasting of the SAC regime as a so-called government, the respective roles of the junta — including its civilian members — and of the ministers that it has appointed merit and indeed demand scrutiny.[184] Myanmar’s short- and even medium-term future may hinge on that division of labour.[185] The data presented in this article on the SAC regime’s roster of Union ministers and in two previous articles on the membership of the junta itself seek to lay at least a partial foundation for that scrutiny.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/137, 22 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] The Tatmadaw put at least six Union ministers in the NLD government under house arrest on the day of the coup: Minister of Education Myo Thein Gyi; Minister of Transport and Communications Thant Sin Maung; Minister of Commerce Than Myint; Minister of Planning, Finance, and Industry Soe Win; Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation Aung Thu; and Minister of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement Win Myat Aye. See “Recent Arrest List”, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 4 February 2021 (https://aappb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Recent-Arrest-List-Last-Updated-on-Feb-4.pdf, downloaded 4 September 2021). On the same day, the Tatmadaw also terminated the appointments of all 24 deputy ministers serving in civilian-controlled ministries, and of the chairpersons and members of the Naypyitaw Council and the Union Civil Service Board (UCSB). Min Aung Hlaing appointed a new UCSB head while retaining the incumbent members of the judiciary at both the Union and region or state levels, as well as the members of the Myanmar National Commission on Human Rights and the Anti-Corruption Commission.
[2] “Office of Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services – Order No. (6/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Ministers”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 2 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-02-red.pdf, downloaded 27 July 2021). On subsequent ministerial appointments, please see note 7.
[3] For data on and analysis of the membership of the SAC, see Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/97, 23 July 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-97-min-aung-hlaing-and-his-generals-data-on-the-military-members-of-myanmars-state-administration-council-junta-by-htet-myet-min-tun-moe-thuzar-and-michael-montesano/, downloaded 27 July 2021), and “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/119, 8 September 2021 (/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-119-buttressing-the-anti-nld-project-data-on-the-civilian-members-of-myanmars-state-administration-council-junta-by-htet-myet-min-tun-moe-thuzar-and-michael-montesano/ , downloaded 13 September 2021).
[4] Myint Swe had served as chief minister of Yangon Region under the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government from 2011 to 2016. The Tatmadaw put him forward as its candidate for the Union presidency in the latter year. When the NLD-dominated Union parliament chose the party’s own candidate for that office, Myint Swe automatically became one of the country’s two vice presidents, following the provisions of Myanmar’s military-drafted 2008 Constitution. On 1 February 2021, after detaining President Win Myint, the Tatmadaw named Vice President Myint Swe acting president. Soon after being sworn in, Myint Swe declared a state of emergency and transferred state power to Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. See Elaine Kurtenbach and Victoria Milko, “A decade after junta’s end, Myanmar military back in control”, Associated Press, 2 February 2021 (https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-coup-aung-san-suu-kyi-a9843c6bf9c85b3944a606017e500162, downloaded 4 September 2021), and Victoria Milko, “Why is the military taking control in the Myanmar coup?”, Los Angeles Times, 1 February 2021 (https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-01/why-military-taking-control-coup-myanmar, downloaded 4 September 2021).
[5] According to the 2008 Constitution, three ministries – the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Border Affairs – are under Tatmadaw control; the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services nominates the ministers that lead them.
[6] In its final months, the 2011-2016 USDP government reintroduced the position of permanent secretary, which became the highest post for a civil servant in a ministry. Given that 23 of 33 permanent secretaries appointed at that time had military backgrounds, some observers believed that this move was intended to maintain the military’s control of ministries through the selection of Tatmadaw and USDP loyalists as for those positions. However, the NLD did not oppose the move at the time. See Kyaw Hsu Mon, “Govt Reintroduces Top Civil Servant Post”, The Irrawaddy, 21 April 2015 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-reintroduces-top-civil-servant-post.html, downloaded 30 July 2021), and David Steinberg, “Myanmar’s permanent secretaries reflect some permanent interests”, Nikkei Asia, 19 June 2015 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Myanmar-s-permanent-secretaries-reflect-some-permanent-interests, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[7] The Myanmar Legal Information System database provides the texts of all SAC announcements in Burmese; see https://www.mlis.gov.mm/lsSc.do?menuInfo=3_1_1&ordrType=06 (downloaed 17 October 2021). Entry 216 is the announcement of the formation of the junta’s management committee; see note 11 below. The announcement lists the ministerial line-up as at 19 February 2021. Entry 217 is SAC Order No. (6/2021), dated 1 February 2021, on the “Appointment of Union Ministers”, listing the initial ministerial line-up with 11 Union Ministers, and signed by Min Aung Hlaing in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. An English-language version of this order is cited in note 2 above. English-language versions of other orders concerning ministerial appointments appear in The Global New Light of Myanmar. On the appointment of Khin Maung Yi and Shwe Lay on 2 February, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (9/2021): Appointment and Assignment of Union Ministers”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 3 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-03-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Tin Htut Oo, Tin Aung San, Pwint San and Saw Htun Aung Myint on 3 February, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (15/2021): Appointment and Assignment of Union Ministers”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 4 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-04-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Thet Thet Khine on 4 February, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (25/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 5 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-05-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Maung Maung Ohn on 7 February, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (30/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 8 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-08-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Aung Than Oo on 8 February, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (37/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of
Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 9 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-09-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Nyunt Pe on 16 February, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (66/2021): Appointment of Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 17 February 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-02-17-red.pdf, downloaded 4 October 2021). On the appointment of Yar Pyae on 11 May, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (123/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of
Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 12 May 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-05-12-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Charlie Than on 22 May, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (133/ 2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 23 May 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-05-23-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Myo Thein Kyaw on 17 June, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (139/2021): Appointment and duty assignment of
Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 18 June 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-06-18-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Hla Moe on 24 June, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (142/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Minister”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 25 June 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-06-25-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Yar Pyae, Chit Naing, Maung Maung Ohn, Myint Kyaing, Khin Yi, Thet Khaing Win and Min Thein Zan on 1 August, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (154/2021): Appointment of Union Ministers”, “State Administration Council – Order No. (155/2021): Transfer and Appointment of Union
Minister”, “State Administration Council – Order No. (156/2021): Appointment of Union Ministers”, “State Administration Council – Order No. (157/2021): Appointment of Union Ministers”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 3 August 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-08-03-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021). On the appointment of Thida Oo on 30 August, see “State Administration Council – Order No. (177/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of
Union Minister for Legal Affairs and Union Attorney-General”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 31 August 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-08-31-red.pdf, downloaded 20 September 2021).
[8] “State Administration Council – Order No. (176/2021): Reformation of Union Ministry”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 31 August 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-08-31-red.pdf, downloaded 4 September 2021).
[9] In Burmese, this body is the ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့. See “Chapter V: Executive – The Union Government”, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) (https://www.myanmar-law-library.org/IMG/pdf/constitution_de_2008.pdf, downloaded 6 August 2021).
[10] The junta changed its name from SLORC to SPDC on 15 November 1997. See “Burma’s Last Mission?”, The Irrawaddy (Magazine), Vol. 5, No. 7, December 1997 (https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=944, downloaded 30 September 2021).
[11] “State Administration Council – Order No. (152/2021): Formation of Provisional Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 2 August 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-08-02-red.pdf, downloaded 3 August 2021). The Burmese term that the junta rendered as “provisional government” in English is အိမ်စောင့်အစိုးရ. Remarkably, this term is the same one that Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services General Ne Win used to refer to his military administration of 1958-1960, which took power after what was regarded as a constitutional coup and prefigured the decades of Tatmadaw domination of the state following the same officer’s coup of 1962. The SAC may have chosen to use the English word “provisional”, rather than “caretaker”, and to announce a timetable for elections in an effort to emphasize the temporary nature of the current regime. But the resurrection of the previously used term for “caretaker government”, various historical parallels with the government originally so labelled, accompanying changes and additions to ministerial portfolios, and the formal appointment of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing as prime minister have reinforced the image of the present “provisional government” as a body with a more than temporary role. Like Ne Win’s 1958-1960 government, the SAC has promised to re-establish law and order and then to convene elections. That earlier caretaker government also attempted to form a technocratic administration, with a determination to “impress foreign governments with the ‘can-do’ attitude of the Burma army”; see Robert H. Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2015), p. 228, and “Myanmar Junta’s Caretaker Government Follows in Footsteps of Former Dictator Ne Win”, The Irrawaddy, 3 August 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-juntas-caretaker-government-follows-in-footsteps-of-former-dictator-ne-win.html, downloaded 4 September 2021). For a recent, stimulating and ambitious study of the culture of the Myanmar Tatmadaw, see Andrew Selth, “Myanmar’s military mindset: An exploratory survey”, Griffith Asia Institute, 2021 (https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/1418333/Military-mindset-web.pdf, downloaded 28 September 2021). The authors are grateful to Dr. Selth for his constant encouragement for their work on this article and their two earlier articles on the SAC regime.
The inauguration of the new caretaker government has also suggested that the Tatmadaw seeks to give the SAC regime a more civilian image and role in the country’s daily administration. In fact, the announcement of that government was on one level a recasting of the SAC’s management committee (စီမံခန့်ခွဲရေး ကော်မတီ), formed on 19 February 2021. SAC Order No. (152/2021) of 1 August 2021 communicating the formation of a provisional government, notes that the SAC “constituted the Management Committee of the State Administration Council […] under Notification No. (9/2021) of the Council dated 19-2-2021”; Global New Light of Myanmar, 2 August 2021 (https://www.mlis.gov.mm/mLsView.do;jsessionid=A5B8D7BBC341CC2E1AF5A502894535BC?lawordSn=16091, downloaded 6 September 2021). The committee’s membership comprised the 22 Union ministers appointed by the time of its creation and the Union attorney-general. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing served as chairman and Vice Senior General Soe Win served as deputy chairman of this committee; of course, these two officers were also the top men on the SAC junta itself. Presumably, as the SAC appointed new ministers, they also joined the management committee, which served in effect as a cabinet replacing the role and functions of the ousted NLD-led government of Union ministers. Up until the time of its reincarnation as a provisional or caretaker government, the SAC Management Committee seemed to hold regular meetings; summaries of its seventh and eighth meetings, held in May and June, were published online on the Myanmar International Television news website; see “Management Comm. Meeting: SAC Management Committee Meeting (7/2021) Held”, MITV, 21 May 2021 (https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/management-comm-meeting-sac-management-committee-meeting-72021-held?__cf_chl_managed_tk__=pmd_eLGKdsHdaYU5StGgmtMswORb_P.o85hDaQNn7dh96io-1633010408-0-gqNtZGzNAxCjcnBszRSR, downloaded 7 September 2021), and “Management Meeting: SAC Management Committee Meeting (8/2021) Held”, MITV, 4 June 2021 (https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/management-meeting-sac-management-committee-meeting-82021-held?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_1ZOOmuOPL0PLOxFG7.Tdvcxw9xlxCZz0EEBDAzuPUwQ-1630947818-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQdR, downloaded 7 September 2021). Other sources refer to earlier meetings, held in March and April and illustrating a certain level of activity on the part of the SAC’s quasi-cabinet of Union ministers before the formal creation of the provisional or caretaker government in August.
[12] Personal Communication, veteran Myanmar political-economy scholar, 3 September 2021.
[13] The SAC’s move to cast itself as a government while prolonging the country’s state of emergency, along with its promise to hand power over by 2023 after “free and fair elections”, has historical parallels with Ne Win’s earlier caretaker government, which promised a similar trajectory of re-establishing law and order and then convening elections.
[14] When the NLD government took office in 2016, it reduced the number of Union ministries from 36 to 21 and eliminated deputy-minister positions. One of its stated reasons was to reduce government expenses. For example, the Ministry of Science and Technology was incorporated into the Ministry of Education, while the Ministry of Cooperatives was incorporated into the Ministry of Commerce. Further, the government merged the Ministry of Labour with the Ministry of Immigration and Population, and the Ministry of Health with the Ministry of Sports. The SAC has now reversed each of these mergers. The NLD’s term in office also saw the government gradually creating deputy-minister positions and introducing new ministries, such as the Ministry of International Cooperation and the Ministry of the Union Government Office in November 2017, and the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations in November 2018. The SAC has retained these three ministries. See Ei Ei Toe Lwin and Htoo Thant, “NLD reduces government ministries”, Myanmar Times, 18 March 2016 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/19532-nld-reduces-government-ministries.html, downloaded 27 July 2021); Nyan Hlaing Lynn, “Two new ministries established to ‘ease’ workload for govt”, Frontier Myanmar, 24 November 2017 (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/two-new-ministries-established-to-ease-workload-for-govt/, downloaded 30 September 2021); and “Parliament approves Formation of New Investment Ministry”, The Irrawaddy, 19 November 2018
(https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/parliament-approves-formation-new-investment-ministry.html, downloaded 30 September 2021).
[15] In the appointments made immediately after the coup, the Ministries of Home Affairs and of the Union Government Office were combined under the leadership of Lieutenant General Soe Htut. See “Office of Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services – Order No. (6/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Ministers”. In May, the SAC returned the powerful General Administration Department, which the NLD government had moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Union Government Office in 2018, to its original ministry. See “Republic of the Union of Myanmar State Administration Council Order No. (119/2021), 5 May 2021 Transfer and Reformation of Union Ministry”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 6 May 2021 (https://ww.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-05-06-red.pdf, downloaded 3 October 2021). The junta also later separated the two ministries once again, appointing Lieutenant General Yar Pyae to head the Ministry of the Union Government Office. See “State Administration Council – Order No. (123/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Minister” and “အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာနအား ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ရုံးဝန်ကြီးဌာန လက်အောက်မှ ပြည်ထဲရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန လက်အောက်သို့ ပြောင်းရွှေ့” [General Administration Department moved from the Ministry of Union Government Office to the Ministry of Home Affairs], Eleven, 5 May 2021 (https://news-eleven.com/article/207802, downloaded 30 July 2021). Confusingly, these May announcements mentioning the Union Government Office came despite the fact that the junta announced several days after Soe Htut’s appointment in February that it had renamed that office the Office of State Administration Council Officer, in an apparent reflection of its determination — in this case, abortive — to repudiate one more legacy of the NLD government. See “Republic of the Union of Myanmar State Administration Council Order No. (21/2021), 4 February 2021: Changing names of President’s Office and Union Government Office”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 6 February 2021 (https://cdn.myanmarseo.com/file/client-cdn/gnlm/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/6_Feb_21_gnlm.pdf, downloaded 3 October 2021). (In April, too, the official Global New Light of Myanmar still referred to Soe Htut as “Union Minister at the Government Office”. See Myanmar News Agency, “MoHA Union Minister meets service personnel at training schools in PyinOoLwin”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 12 April 2021 [https://www.gnlm.com.mm/moha-union-minister-meets-service-personnel-at-training-schools-in-pyinoolwin/, downloaded 4 October 2021].) Further, on 1 August — the same day that saw the formation of the “provisional” or “caretaker” government — the regime announced the “reconstitution” of the Union Government Office, despite Yar Pyae’s having been appointed Union minister of the Ministry of the Union Government Office nearly three months earlier. The ministry was now divided into two ministries, each bearing the name Ministry of the Union Government Office but designated as (1) and (2). See “Republic of the Union of Myanmar State Administration Council Order No. (149/2021), 1 August 2021: Reconstitution of Union Ministries”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 2 August 2021 (www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-08-02-red.pdf, downloaded 3 October 2021). At the time of writing, Yar Pyae and Chit Naing hold those two portfolios.
[16] In the appointments made directly after the coup, the military integrated the Ministry of Planning and Finance and the Ministry of Industry, with Win Shein in charge. In late May, it separated the two ministries again, and appointed Charlie Than on 22 May to head the Ministry of Industry.
[17] The designation “civil servant” applies here to those individuals who were serving in the civil service immediately before their appointment as ministers. Individuals who served in the civil service but had left it for some interval of time before their appointment as Union government minister, as in the case of retirees, are here designated as “independent”.
[18] On 1 February 2021, Chit Naing took charge of the Ministry of Information. Six months later, the SAC moved him to the Ministry of the Union Government Office – 2. In place of Chit Naing, it assigned Maung Maung Ohn to head the Ministry of Information while serving concurrently as minister of hotels and tourism.
[19] On 1 February, the Tatmadaw appointed Myint Kyaing to head the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population as consolidated by the NLD government. On 1 August 2021, however, the SAC divided the ministry into the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Immigration and Population. While the former is still headed by Myint Kyaing, the latter is now under the leadership of Khin Yi.
[20] On 1 February, the military appointed Thet Khaing Win to lead the Ministry of Health and Sports. On 1 August 2021, the SAC separated the ministry into the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs, perhaps in recognition of the urgency of addressing the pandemic. While Thet Khaing Win still heads the former ministry, the relatively unknown Min Thein Zan now heads the latter. In 1972, the Burma Socialist Programme Party government subsumed the country’s sports and physical education committee under the Ministry of Health. The SLORC/SPDC regime established a separate Ministry of Sports in 1996. Under the NLD government, President Htin Kyaw again subsumed the sports portfolio under the Ministry of Health. Youth affairs were under the purview of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement under the SLORC, SPDC, USDP and NLD governments.
[21] See note 18.
[22] “State Administration Council – Order No. (123/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of
Union Minister” and “အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဦးစီးဌာနအား ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ရုံးဝန်ကြီးဌာန လက်အောက်မှ ပြည်ထဲရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန လက်အောက်သို့ ပြောင်းရွှေ့”; also see note 15.
[23] See note 20.
[24] Thida Oo serves concurrently as Union Attorney-General, a post to which the SAC appointed her on 2 February. See “State Administration Council – Order No. (177/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Minister of Legal Affairs and Union Attorney-General”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 31 August 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-08-31-red.pdf, downloaded 5 September 2021); “List of Attorneys-General”, Ministry of Legal Affairs, Myanmar, n.d. (https://www.oag.gov.mm/?page_id=128, downloaded 1 October 2021); and note 90 below.
[25] “State Administration Council – Order No. (152/2021): Formation of Provisional Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar”.
[26] For discussion of members of the SAC junta, see Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta” and “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[27] For reasons that readers will appreciate, the collection of data presented in this article has presented numerous challenges, and some data remain incomplete. The authors thank three prominent students of developments in Myanmar for ensuring that those data are not even more incomplete, and for their valuable comments on a draft version of this article.
[28] Note that these Tatmadaw officers no longer hold the posts listed here.
[29] Minister of Home Affairs Soe Htut is the only Union minster held over from the term of the ousted NLD-led government. His predecessor as home minister, Lieutenant General Kyaw Swe, returned to military duty after his resignation from that post. Some observers believed that Kyaw Swe’s resignation was a consequence of his close association with Aung San Suu Kyi and of the Tatamaw’s dim view of that association. See “Myanmar Military Chief Expected to Appoint Loyalists as Reshuffle Looms”, The Irrawaddy, 13 February 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-military-chief-expected-appoint-loyalists-reshuffle-looms.html, 28 July 2021).
[30] Before being appointed home minister, Soe Htut served as the Chief of Military Security Affairs – the Tatmadaw’s top intelligence post – starting in 2016. Prior to that, he served briefly as the armed forces’ Judge Advocate General. He had earlier led the Central Command and the Eastern Central Command. See Htet Naing Zaw, “Who Is Myanmar’s New Home Affairs Minister?”, The Irrawaddy, 10 February 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-new-home-affairs-minister.html, downloaded 28 July 2021).
[31] Mya Htun Oo served as the Tatmadaw’s Joint Chief of Staff starting in 2016. However, following the coup, Lieutenant General Maung Maung Aye replaced Mya Htun Oo in that post when the latter officer became the minister of defence while remaining a member of the SAC. See “Lt-Gen Mya Tun Oo Appointed Burmese Military’s Chief of General Staff”, The Irrawaddy, 29 August 2016 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/lt-gen-mya-tun-oo-appointed-burmese-militarys-chief-of-general-staff.html, downloaded 28 July 2021), and Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[32] Before his appointment to head the Ministry of Border Affairs, Htun Htun Naung served as the chief of Bureau of Special Operations – 1 starting in 2015 and, prior to that, as commander of the Yangon Command, the Northern Command and the Eastern Central Command. Htun Htun Naung was previously involved in peace negotiations with ethnic armed organizations, including the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and was appointed to the five-member permanent Peace Talks Committee that Min Aung Hlaing formed in November 2020, just after the elections. See Nyein Nyein, “Myanmar Military Sets up New Committee for Peace Talks”, The Irrawaddy, 10 November 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-sets-new-committee-peace-talks.html, downloaded 28 July 2021); “ဒုတိယဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီးတချို့အငြိမ်းစားယူခွင့်ပြု ” [Some Lieutenant Generals Allowed to Resign], BBC News, 10 August 2015 (https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma/2015/08/150810_military_reshuffle, downloaded 28 July 2021); Seng Mai, “Government agrees to political talks with KIO”, Myanmar Times, 5 November 2012 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/2890-govt-agrees-to-political-talks-with-kio.html, downloaded 28 July 2021); and Lawi Weng, “Shan Army Agrees to Base Withdrawal”, The Irrawaddy, 5 July 2012 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/shan-army-agrees-base-withdrawal.html, downloaded 28 July 2021).
[33] Before his appointment to lead the Ministry of Transport and Communication, Tin Aung San had served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy since 2015. Moe Aung replaced Tin Aung San in that post following the latter officer’s post-coup selection as a minister. Tin Aung San remains a member of the junta, however. See “45 Senior Military Officers Retire to Contest Nov. 8 Poll”, The Irrawaddy, 11 August 2015 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/45-senior-military-officers-retire-to-contest-nov-8-poll.html, downloaded 28 July 2021), and Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[34] Yar Pyae serves as the chair of one of three peace talks committees formed by the SAC after the coup, the National Unity and Peace Restoration Coordination Committee (NUPRCC), which is composed of Union ministers and military commanders. Yar Pyae also served as the chair of the five-member Peace Talks Committee formed by the military in November 2020 and, before that, as the chair of the Union-level Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC). The latter committee was established in 2015, under the Thein Sein government, to support the National Ceasefire Agreement. See Joe Kumbun, “Do the Myanmar Junta’s New ‘Peace-Making Committees’ Stand Any Chance of Success?”, The Diplomat, 4 March 2021 (https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/do-the-myanmar-juntas-new-peace-making-committees-stand-any-chance-of-success/, downloaded 28 July 2021); and Nyein Nyein, “Myanmar Military Sets up New Committee for Peace Talks”; and Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[35] Before becoming an SAC regime Union minister, Yar Pyae had held such senior Tatmadaw posts as chief of Bureau of Special Operations – 2, chief of armed forces training, Judge Advocate General, commander of the Eastern Command, and rector of the Defence Services Medical Academy. In December 2020, he was briefly sent to the military reserves, in which Tatmadaw officers who are not promoted in timely fashion must serve. See “ဒုတိယ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး ရာပြည့် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့ ရုံး ဝန်ကြီး ဖြစ်လာ” [Lieutenant General Yar Pyae Becomes the Minister of the Union Government Office], The Irrawaddy, 12 May 2021 (https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2021/05/12/241729.html, downloaded 28 July 2021).
[36] See Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”. During the Burma Socialist Programme Party years, ministerial reassignments from military positions either signaled that the appointees in question had incurred Ne Win’s displeasure or served to create openings for more favoured officers. The relative irrelevance of the defence portfolio under the SAC junta also merits highlighting. Past junta leaders – from Ne Win to Saw Maung to Than Shwe – all held the defence portfolio concurrently with the post of Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief. However, it is also worth noting that, since the time of Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council, military regimes have used the “parachute policy” of appointing both active-duty and retired military officers to bureaucratic posts to entrench “the military’s presence in the machinery of government”. See Kyaw Zwa Moe, “From Top Brass to a Bureaucratic Class”, The Irrawaddy, 17 September 2015 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/election/opinion/from-top-brass-to-a-bureaucratic-class, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[37] “State Administration Council – Order No. (106/2021): Appointment of members of the State
Administration Council”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 31 March 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-31-red.pdf, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[38] Htet Naing Zaw, “Who is Myanmar’s New Home Affairs Minister”. Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution empowers the Tatmadaw to choose the ministers of home affairs, of defence and of border affairs. Rumoured to be close to and to enjoy the trust of the Senior General, Soe Htut served in Myanmar’s most senior military-intelligence post as head of the Office of Military Security Affairs prior to his appointment as minister, as noted above. See Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Myanmar spy chief named home affairs minister”, Myanmar Times, 6 Feburary 2020 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-spy-chief-named-home-affairs-minister.html, downloaded 2 August 2021). Until May, Soe Htut was also briefly responsible for the activities of a second ministerial portfolio, that of the Union Government Office while it was combined with the Ministry of Home Affairs. See “Office of Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services – Order No. (6/2021): Appointment and Duty Assignment of Union Ministers” and also note 15 above.
[39] As of October 2018, Myo Thein Kyaw remained in service as rector of the Defence Services Technological Academy; “Proceedings of Conference on Science and Technology Development-2018, 30-31 October 2018, Pyin Oo Lwin, Volume I” (Pyin Oo Lwin: Defence Services Academy, 2018) (https://www.cstd.com.mm/documents/CSTD2018E-Book-V1.pdf, downloaded 29 September 2021), front matter. Also see Yao Lide, Yang Minling, Yang Yuhui, Zeng Xinyuan and Liu Sumiao, 赴緬甸參加 2017 年臺灣高等教育展 [Myanmar joins the 2017 Taiwan Higher Education Exhibition], 1 September 2017 (106/9/1) (https://report.nat.gov.tw/ReportFront/PageSystem/reportFileDownload/C10602262/001, downloaded 30 September 2021), p. 61.
[40] Wai Moe, “Wunna Maung Lwin: Military Commander to Foreign Minister”, The Irrawaddy, 13 July 2011 (https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=21687, downloaded 28 July 2021).
[41] After leaving the military in 1996, Wunna Maung Lwin served as director general in the Ministry of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs before moving to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and serving as Myanmar’s ambassador to Israel (1999-2001) and to France (2001-2004) and as its permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva and ambassador to Switzerland (2005-2011). Some observers believe that his record of defending the previous military junta against criticisms over human-rights abuses during his service in Geneva led to Wunna Muang Lwin’s appointment as foreign affairs minister in 2011. See Wai Moe, “Wunna Maung Lwin: Military Commander to Foreign Minister”.
[42] Ibid.
[43] “Burma: Comparison of New Government Officials with the Council of the European Union List of Sanctioned Regime Members”, Global Justice Center, 1 June 2011 (https://www.globaljusticecenter.net/documents/Burma.SanctionsComparision.June2011.pdf, downloaded 28 July 2021); also see following note.
[44] After retiring as the commander of the Naval Training Headquarters, Win Shein briefly served as the deputy minister of transportation (2011-2012) in Thein Sein’s administration. In 2012, he became the minister of finance and revenue. He also chaired the Myanmar Investment Commission between 2013 and 2014. See Chan Mya Htwe, “Myanmar military appoints new captains of economy”, Myanmar Times, 4 February 2021 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-military-appoints-new-captains-economy.html, downloaded 28 July 2021), and “Burma: Comparison of New Government Officials with the Council of the European Union List of Sanctioned Regime Members”. Win Shein was a close associate of Soe Thane, a former Navy commander-in-chief and a leading figure in the 2011-2016 Thein Sein government; personal communication, Myanmar think-tank researcher, 22 September 2021.
[45] Chan Mya Htwe, “Myanmar military appoints new captains of economy”.
[46] “Aung Naing Oo”, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, n.d. (http://www.siiaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Aung-Naing-Oo-Bio.pdf, downloaded 28 July 2021).
[47] After leaving the military in 2000, Aung Naing Oo served in various positions in the Ministry of Commerce. In 2010, he became the deputy director general of its Department of Border Trade. In 2011, he assumed the same post in the Directorate of Investment and Company Registration (DICA). In 2012, he was promoted to DICA director general, a post that he held until 2019. Aung Naing Oo is also former secretary of the Myanmar Investment Commission (2014-2020), of which he has remained a member after the coup. In 2019, he became director general of the Office of the Union Investment and Foreign Economic Relations. In the same year, he was promoted to the post of permanent secretary of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations – a ministry newly formed by the NLD government. See ibid. and also Thompson Chau, “U Aung Naing Oo leaves DICA for a new role”, Myanmar Times, 3 April 2019 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/u-aung-naing-oo-leaves-dica-new-role.html, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[48] Ibid.
[49] See note 6, above.
[50] “ကိုကိုလှိုင် – ကိုယ်ရေးအကျဉ်း” [Ko Ko Hlaing – Curriculum Vitae], Free Burma, 21 October 2010
(https://archive.is/20130218005826/http://freeburma.info/index.php/Ko_Ko_Hlaing, downloaded 28 July 2021), and Li Chenyang, Chaw Chaw Sein, Zhu Xianghui, eds., Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community (Singapore: World Scientific, 2016) (https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789814759915_fmatter, downloaded 15 September 2021), p. xiv.
[51] After leaving his military post as first-class chief researcher in Research Department of the Ministry of Defence in 2004, Ko Ko Hlaing served in an advisory role in the Myanmar News and Periodicals Enterprise — and in particular in the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division, popularly known as the censorship board — under the Ministry of Information. He apparently remained in this position after his appointment in April 2011 to the post of chief political advisor to President Thein Sein. See Joseph Allchin, “Presidential ‘Advisors’ Raise Eyebrows”, DVB News, 28 April 2011 (http://www.dvb.no/news/presidential-%E2%80%98advisors%E2%80%99-raise-eyebrows/15438, downloaded 15 September 2021), and Li, Chaw Chaw Sein, and Zhu, Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community, p. xiv. Prior to becoming Thein Sein’s political advisor, and concurrent to his Ministry of Information advisory role, Ko Ko Hlaing served as the vice-chairman of the Myanmar Writers and Journalists Association. See “Myanmar forms advisory board to president”, People’s Daily Online (English), 3 May 2011 (http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90851/7367968.html, downloaded 15 September 2021). He continued in this role after his appointment as advisor to Thein Sein, as reported by the Myanmar Times in 2012. See Kyaw Hsu Mon, “MWJA plans press council as censorship eases”, Myanmar Times, 9 January 2012 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/1300-mwja-plans-press-council-as-censorship-eases.html, downloaded 15 September 2021); also see Li, Chaw Chaw Sein, and Zhu, Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community, p. xiv. In 2012, Ko Ko Hlaing became the head of the newly established Myanmar Development Resources Institute (MDRI)-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The MDRI was dissolved in 2016, when Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government left office. See Zeyar Khin Htun, Wint Thiri Than Aye, Sun Shin (Ivy), “The Importance of Think Tanks in Myanmar’s New Democratic Government and its Society”, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies, September 2016 (https://myanmarisis.org/publication_pdf/the-importance-of-thinktanks-in-a-democratic-government-and-its-society-ahz-H6SE9i.pdf, downloaded 15 September 2021). Nevertheless, MDRI-CSIS has continued to operate as an independent entity, offering degree programmes and serving as the Myanmar campus of the Aldersgate College Philippines. See MDRI-CSIS Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/Aldersgatecollegephilippinescsis/?ref=page_internal, accessed 15 September 2021). Ko Ko Hlaing writes under his own name as well as the pen names Sithu Aung and Hlaing Aung.
[52] Joseph Allchin, “Presidential ‘Advisors’ Raise Eyebrows”. The latter date given here refers to the year in which Ko Ko Hlaing became chief political advisor to Thein Sein.
[53] Chit Naing (Psychology), “ချစ်လို့ပြောတာမှတ်ပါ” [I am telling you because I love you], Facebook posting, 2017 (https://www.facebook.com/%E1%82%8F%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%B9%E1%80%85%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B1%E1%80%95-791458234329559/photos/pcb.909474655861249/909474639194584, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[54] After leaving the military, Chit Naing served as director general of the Information and Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Information starting in 1997; ibid.
[55] Personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 2 August 2021.
[56] Personal communication, Myanmar think-tank researcher, 22 September 2021. Ko Ko subsequently served on the Yangon Region Election Commission; personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 21 July 2021.
[57] “Myanmar junta’s environment minister is hit with tough new sanctions by the US Treasury”, Environmental Investigation Agency, 18 May 2021 (https://eia-international.org/news/myanmar-juntas-environment-minister-is-hit-with-tough-new-sanctions-by-the-us-treasury/, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[58] After leaving the military, Khin Maung Yi served as a special officer in the Forestry Department. In 2012, he became director general at the state-owned Myanmar Timber Enterprise before his promotion the following year to permanent secretary of the Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. (This ministry became the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation under the NLD government.) He has been a member of the Myanmar Investment Commission since 2016. See “Myanmar junta’s environment minister is hit with tough new sanctions by the US Treasury”, and Clare Hammond, “New Myanmar Investment Commission formed”, Myanmar Times, 9 June 2016 (https://www.mmtimes.com/business/20753-new-myanmar-investment-commission-formed.html, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[59] “Myanmar junta’s environment minister is hit with tough new sanctions by the US Treasury”.
[60] Saw Htun Lin, “KPP ဥက္ကဌ၏ဖြတ်သန်းမှုပုံရိပ်လွှာ” [Life of KPP’s Chair], Karen Information Center, 10 February 2020 (http://kicnews.org/2020/02/kpp-%E1%80%A5%E1%80%80%E1%81%A0%E1%82%92%E1%81%8F-%E1%80%BB%E1%80%96%E1%80%90%E1%80%B9%E1%80%9E%E1%80%94%E1%80%B9%E1%80%B8%E1%80%99%E1%82%88-%E1%80%95%E1%80%B6%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AD%E1%80%95/, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[61] After leaving the military in 1988, Saw Htun Aung Myint served in various positions in the Ministry of Transport, such as director of the Seaman Employment Control Division in 1988, director general of the Department of Marine Administration in 1990, and executive director of the Department of Inland Water Transport from 1997 until his retirement in 2003. See ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] In 2014, Maung Maung Ohn retired from the military and became the chief minister of Rakhine State. He had previously served as the deputy minister of border affairs. See “ဗိုလ်ချုပ် မောင်မောင်အုန်းအား ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် ဝန်ကြီးချုပ် အဖြစ် အတည်ပြု ခန့်အပ်” [General Maung Maung Ohn appointed as the chief minister of Rakine State], The Irrawaddy, 30 June 2014 (https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2014/06/30/61171.html, downloaded 29 July 2021); Lawi Weng, “General Appointed Arakan Chief Minister, Govt Tells Local MPs”, The Irrawaddy, 25 June 2014 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/general-appointed-arakan-chief-minister-govt-tells-local-mps.html, downloaded 29 July 2021); “New chief minister for Myanmar’s Rakhine state to serve for only a year”, UNHCR refworld, 27 June 2014 (https://www.refworld.org/docid/53c8d9a414.html, downloaded 28 September 2021); Ye Mon, Eyes on Rakhine State as chief minister enters election fray”, Myanmar Times, 29 July 2015 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/15724-eyes-on-rakhine-state-as-chief-minister-enters-election-fray.html, downloaded 17 October 2021); and “สาธารณรัฐแห่งสหภาพเมียนมาร์” [Republic of the Union of Myanmar], Neighboring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency (Thailand), March 2014 (https://www.neda.or.th/home/uploads%20-%20Copy/news/29201583436-W66wqq4Y.pdf, downloaded 28 September 2021), p. 9.
[64] Maung Maung Ohn’s appointment as chief minister of Rakhine State in 2014 brought critical reaction, as he was neither an ethnic Rakhine nor an elected official. However, some commenters approved of his appointment, believing that Rakhine State needed a strong figure who was not an ethnic Rakhine to restore stability and resolve racial conflicts without taking sides. His predecessor, the Rakhine Hla Maung Tin, resigned after not being able to resolve communal violence between Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims in the state. See Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “ရခိုင်က စိန်ခေါ်မှုတွေကို ၀န်ကြီးချုပ်သစ်ကျော်လွှားနိုင်မှာလား” [Will the new chief minister be able to overcome challenges in Rakhine State?], Myanmar Times, 3 July 2014 (https://myanmar.mmtimes.com/national-news/11000-2014-07-03-06-45-30.html, downloaded 29 July 2021), and Wa Lon, “New chief minister to face close scrutiny from MPs”, Myanmar Times, 4 July 2014 (https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/10897-new-chief-minister-to-face-close-scrutiny-from-rakhine-mps.html, downloaded 28 September 2021).
[65] See note 39 above.
[66] Hla Moe served as managing director of the Cooperative Import Export Enterprise, Ministry of Cooperatives, starting in the SPDC era and into the Thein Sein administration. See “List of enterprises owned or controlled by the Government of Burma/Myanmar or its members or persons associated with them, referred to in Article 15”, Annex III to “Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 383/2011 of 18 April 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008 renewing and strengthening the restrictive measures in respect of Burma/Myanmar”, United Kingdom (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2011/383/annex/III/division/ANNEX/adopted/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true, downloaded 29 September 2021). He retired from that post in 2016 or 2017; personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 21 July 2021.
[67] Kudo Toshihiro, “New Government in Myanmar: Profiles of Ministers”, Institute of Developing Economies – Japan External Trade Organization, 26 July 2011 (https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/20110726.html, downloaded 3 August 2021).
[68] Khin Yi served as the chief of the Myanmar Police Force starting ca. 2005. He retired from that post in 2011 with the rank of brigadier general, and then became the minister of immigration and population in Thein Sein’s administration. He held that latter post until 2016. See ibid. and “Council Common Position 2005/340/CFSP of 25 April 2005”, Official Journal of the European Union, 29 April 2005 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32005E0340, downloaded 3 August 2021).
[69] Kudo, “New Government in Myanmar: Profiles of Ministers”, and “Top ministers resign”, Eleven, 13 August 2015 (https://web.archive.org/web/20150924000234/http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/politics/top-ministers-resign, downloaded 18 October 2021).
[70] Min Thein Zan served as Myanmar’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, apparently between 2013 and 2018, and also as the country’s envoy to the Maldives starting in 2014. See “U Min Thein Zan presents Credentials to Sri Lankan President”, New Light of Myanmar, 24 October 2013 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs16/NLM-2013-10-24-red.pdf, downloaded 3 August 2021); “Appointment of Ambassador of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to Sri Lanka”, Foreign Ministry of Sri Lanka, 23 January 2018 (https://mfa.gov.lk/appointment-of-ambassador-of-the-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar-to-sri-lanka/, downloaded 3 August 2021); and “New Burmese Ambassador presents credentials to the President”, President’s Office, Republic of Maldives, 5 August 2014 (https://presidency.gov.mv/Press/Article/14638, downloaded 3 August 2021).
[71] The second is Thida Oo, the minister of legal affairs.
[72] Thet Thet Khine contested the 2015 general elections under the banner of the NLD and won a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Lower House of the Union Parliament. He served as a member of that body’s Banking and Monetary Development Committee. In 2018, she was dismissed from an NLD township-level executive committee for publicly criticizing the NLD government’s policies. She resigned from the NLD the following year to found the People’s Pioneer Party and became that new party’s chairwoman. See Htun Htun, “Two NLD Lawmakers Dismissed from Executive Committee”, The Irrawaddy, 3 September 2018 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/two-nld-lawmakers-dismissed-executive-committee.html, downloaded 30 July 2021); Nyan Lin Tun, “MP Dr Thet Thet Khaing [sic] resigns from NLD”, Eleven, 1 November 2019 (https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/mp-dr-thet-thet-khaing-resigns-from-nld, downloaded 29 July 2021); and Swe Lei Mon, “Influential ex-NLD legislator launches new party”, Myanmar Times, 2 December 2019 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/influential-ex-nld-legislator-launches-new-party.html, downloaded 5 September 2021). Reuters has recently reported that Ivan Htet, the son of Air Force Commander-in-Chief and SAC junta member General Maung Maung Kyaw, serves as an advisor to Thet Thet Khine’s People’s Pioneer Party. See “How a family of a Myanmar junta leader are trying to cash in”, Reuters, 7 September 2021 (https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-generals-families/, downloaded 13 September 2021).
[73] While serving as the minister of finance and revenue, Win Shein is reported to have been responsible for reforms in the areas of banking, public fiscal management, and taxation. In negotiations with the Paris Club in 2013, he managed to cancel the foreign debts that the country had assumed before 1988. He also chaired the Myanmar Investment Commission between 2013 and 2014. See Chan Mya Htwe, “Myanmar military appoints new captains of economy”.
[74] Ko Ko Hlaing reportedly stated that he advised the president only on international politics, and not on domestic politics. See Ba Kaung, “Thein Sein Appoints Presidential Advisors”, The Irrawaddy, 27 April 2011 (https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=21193, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[75] In 2012, Thein Sein appointed Tin Htut Oo chair of the National Economic and
Social Advisory Council. Prior to that appointment, the latter was senior advisor to the Special Unit on Countries with Special Needs, Office of the Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Bangkok (2009-2011). See “Chairman – U Tin Htut Oo”, Centre for Economic and Social Development (https://mdricesd.wordpress.com/about/our-people/, downloaded 29 July 2021). In his capacity as chairman of the board of the Centre for Economic and Social Development in Yangon, in May 2017 he was prominent among civil society attendees of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference organized under the NLD government. See “CESD Participates in the Union Peace Conference”, Centre for Economic and Social Development, 31 May 2017 (https://mdricesd.wordpress.com/2017/05/31/cesd-participates-in-the-union-peace-conference/, downloaded 22 September 2021).
[76] Starting in 1974, Tin Htut Oo held various positions in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. In 2001, he became director general of the Department of Agricultural Planning, serving in that post until he retired in 2009. See “Chairman – U Tin Htut Oo”.
[77] Pwint San served as the deputy minister of commerce in Thein Sein’s government from 2011 to 2016. He had previous been joint secretary general of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry starting in 2009 and secretary general of the Myanmar Industries Association starting in 2006. See “High-level Policy Dialogue on Reviving Multilateralism: ‘Road to Bali and Beyond’, 19 November 2013 – Know the Speakers”, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, November 2013 (https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/rmbali-bios.pdf, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[78] See note 63.
[79] Aung Than Oo served as the deputy minister of electric power (2), in what later became the Ministry of Electric Power, from 2011 to 2016. See “Burma: Comparison of New Government Officials with the Council of the European Union List of Sanctioned Regime Members”.
[80] Before becoming the deputy minister, Aung Than Oo apparently served in various positions in the Ministry of Electric Power (2), such as executive director, chief engineer and project engineer. See “Aung Than Oo”, Myanmar 2020 Revolution, n.d. (https://www.socialpunishment.com/aung-than-oo, downloaded 13 October 2021).
[81] Kudo, “New Government in Myanmar: Profiles of Ministers”, and “Top ministers resign”.
[82] According to available data, Khin Yi was the commander of 21st Military Operations Command (MOC – 21) in 2002. See Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948 (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), p. 229.
[83] That is, while serving as chief of the Myanmar Police Force; see Kudo, “New Government in Myanmar: Profiles of Ministers”.
[84] As DICA director general, Aung Naing Oo led the drafting of the Investment Law (2016) and the Company Law (2017), two laws important for the development of Myanmar’s private sector, under the NLD government. He was also involved in the drafting of the Special Economic Zone Law. Aung Naing Oo is said to have gained trust from foreign investors and the business community. See Chan Mya Htwe, “Myanmar military appoints new captains of economy”, and Chau, “U Aung Naing Oo leaves DICA for a new role”.
[85] Before his appointment as deputy minister in 2020, Myint Kyaing had served as permanent secretary in the Ministry of Immigration and Population since 2015, apparently appointed under the Thein Sein government. The ministry became the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population under the NLD government. Earlier, Myint Kyaing was the director general of the Department of Population. See “Myanmar appoints deputy ministers for 2 ministries”, Xinhua, 5 February 2020 (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138757451.htm, downloaded 29 July 2021); “Thailand wants meeting with Myanmar, Malaysia over human trafficking crisis”, Straits Times, 8 May 2015 (https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-wants-meeting-with-myanmar-malaysia-over-human-trafficking-crisis, downloaded 1 October 2021); and “UNFPA and Ministry of Immigration and Population Launch 2014 Population and Housing Census Project”, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs , 14 December 2012 (https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/unfpa-and-ministry-immigration-and-population-launch-2014-population-and-housing, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[86] Personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 21 July 2021.
[87] Thet Khaing Win served as permanent secretary in the Ministry of Health and Sports starting in 2015 or 2016. Prior to that, he was the rector of University of Medicine – 1 in Yangon during 2013-2015. See programme for “Asia-Pacific Conference in Fukuoka 2018: International Symposium on Oral Education and Research in Kitakyushu”, Kyushu Dental University, Kitakyushu, Japan, 11 May 2018 (https://apc-fukuoka.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2018.pdf, downloaded 17 October 2021), p. 6.
[88] Khin Maung Yi served in the Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, apparently starting in 2003; he seems to have become its permanent secretary with the creation of that post in 2015. As noted, the ministry became the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation under the NLD government. See “Myanmar junta’s environment minister is hit with tough new sanctions by the US treasury”.
[89] Shwe Lay was appointed as permanent secretary in the Ministry of Construction by the NLD government. In 2017, he had been appointed director general of the Department of Bridges. See “နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတရုံး အမိန့်ကြေငြာစာအမှတ် ၂၂/၂၀၁၇ – ဝန်ထမ်းအဖွဲ့အစည်းအကြီးအမှူးများခန့်ထားခြင်း” [Office of the President – Order No. 22/2017 – Appointment of Heads of Civil Servants], Myanmar Gazette, 9 February 2017 (https://data.opendevelopmentmekong.net/dataset/babb0c87-f3ee-472a-b7d2-c93078808a00/resource/83dbeefb-a57a-4583-b751-a350736d4fc6/download/70-10.pdf, downloaded 29 July 2021).
[90] Thida Oo served as the permanent secretary of the Union Attorney-General’s Office under the NLD government. She also headed the legal affairs assistance team for the Dawei Special Economic Zone in 2020. See “ထားဝယ် အထူးစီးပွားရေးဇုန် စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှု ကော်မတီ (၆/၂၀၂၀) လုပ်ငန်း ညှိနှိုင်း အစည်းအဝေးအား (၁၃-၇-၂၀၂၀) ရက်နေ့ တွင် Online Video Meeting ပြုလုပ် ကျင်းပခဲ့ပါသည်” [Online Coordination Meeting of Dawei SEZ Management Committee (6/2020) held on 13.7.2020], Dawei Special Economic Zone, 13 August 2020 (http://www.daweisez.gov.mm/my/news/thaawy-athuuciipaarejun-ciimnkhnkhaimu-keaamttii-62020-lupngn-nnyiniung-acnnyaweaaa-13-7-2020, downloaded 5 September 2021).
She had previously served as director general of the Legal Advisory Department of the Union Attorney-General’s Office, accompanying Aung San Suu Kyi when she travelled to defend Myanmar against charges of genocide before the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2019. See “Public sitting held on Thursday 12 December 2019, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Yusuf presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) – Verbatim Record”, International Court of Justice, 2019 (https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20191212-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf, downloaded 5 September 2021). As noted above, a day after seizing power, the SAC junta promoted Thida Oo to the post of Union Attorney-General. On 30 August, she was appointed minister of the newly created Ministry of Legal Affairs, a post that she holds while concurrently serving as Union Attorney-General. In that latter capacity, Thida Oo is also an ex officio member of the Myanmar Investment Commission. See “About the MIC”, Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, n.d. (https://www.dica.gov.mm/en/information-myanmar-investment-commission-mic, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[91] Some sources refer to him as “Chit Hlaing”, while the official announcement of this ministerial appointment uses “Chit Naing”. See “Myanmar information ministry warns some media and public not to spread rumours and incite unrest”, Myanmar Times, 3 February 2021 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/myanmar-information-ministry-warns-some-media-and-public-not-spread-rumours-and-incite-unrest, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[92] Chit Naing held the posts of vice chairman and joint secretary of the Myanmar Writers and Journalists Association after retiring from government service, and also served as a member of its central executive committee. See “MPs told to leave but Aung San Suu Kyi, Win Myint remain in custody”, Frontier Myanmar, 3 February 2021 (https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/mps-told-to-leave-but-aung-san-suu-kyi-win-myint-remain-in-custody/, downloaded 30 July 2021), and Chit Naing (Psychology), “အနှစ်သုံးဆယ်” [Thirty Years], 2001 (https://fliphtml5.com/pwsmw/kxgc/basic/101-150, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[93] Charlie Than was also a member of the experts group of the National Water Resources Committee and of the Yangon Region Urban Transport Authority. See “Engr. Prof. Dr. Charlie Than”, Myanmar Engineering Council (http://www.myanmarengc.org/sites/default/files/downloadpdf/Dr.%20Charlie%20Than%2C%20President%20of%20MEngC.pdf, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[94] Chit Naing (Pyschology), “ချစ်လို့ပြောတာမှတ်ပါ”.
[95] Nyunt Pe served as director general in the Department of Monitoring and Evaluation of the Ministry of Education from 2017 until his retirement in 2020. He was the rector of Pathein University from 2010 to 2017. He was accused of misusing university funds while serving in that post. See “Myanmar Military’s New Education Minister Faced Finance Probes”, The Irrawaddy, 18 February 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-militarys-new-education-minister-faced-finance-probes.html, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[96] Ibid.
[97] From 2008 through his retirement in 2013, Charlie Than served as the rector of the Myanmar Maritime University. He was pro-rector of the same institution during 2002-2008. He previously held various positions in the Ministry of Transport, such as assistant superintending engineer at the Dalla Ship Yard in Yangon (1990-1992), assistant superintending engineer at the Yadanarpon Ship Yard in Mandalay (1992-1999), and superintending engineer at the Dalla Ship Yard (1999-2002), chief engineer at Ahlone Dockyard in Yangon (1999-2003), and senior engineer of the flotilla, Department of Inland Water Transport (1999-2004). Charlie Than was also a visiting professor of naval architecture at the Defence Services Technological Academy (DSTA) during 1996-2010. See “Engr. Prof. Dr. Charlie Than”.
[98] Ibid.
[99] While Charlie Than has never been an officer in the armed forces, he has had exposure to the Tatmadaw, at least in the naval context and through teaching at the DSTA.
[100] See note 66 above.
[101] “U Min Thein Zan presents Credentials to Sri Lankan President”, “Appointment of Ambassador of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to Sri Lanka”, and “New Burmese Ambassador presents credentials to the President”.
[102] “Appointment of Ambassador of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to Sri Lanka”.
[103] Available data indicate that Min Thein Zan was commander of the 13th Military Operations Command (MOC – 13) in 2008. See Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw, p. 232.
[104] See Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[105] Note that SAC civilian member Mahn Nyein Maung ran on this party’s ticket in the November 2020 elections; ibid.
[106] That is, ပြည်သူ့ရှေ့ဆောင်ပါတီ.
[107] “Ousted and outspoken: The lady taking on Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar’s election”, Straits Times, 21 September 2020 (https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ousted-and-outspoken-the-lady-taking-on-aung-san-suu-kyi-in-myanmars-election, downloaded 30 July 2021), and Thompson Chau, John Liu, and Kyaw Soe Htet, “Thet Thet Khine slams Suu Kyi’s leadership on economy”, Myanmar Times, 19 October 2020 (https://www.mmtimes.com/news/thet-thet-khine-slams-suu-kyis-leadership-economy.html, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[108] After his retirement from government service as the executive director of the Department of Inland Water Transport in 2003, Saw Tun Aung Myint headed various Karen civil society and religious organizations. In 2010, he founded the Kayin People’s Party (KPP) and became its chairman. During 2011-2016, he served as the minister for Kayin ethnic affairs in the Yangon regional government and was also a member of Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) from 2016 until 2021. See Saw Htun Lin, “KPP ဥက္ကဌ၏ဖြတ်သန်းမှုပုံရိပ်လွှာ ” and “UPDJC ကော်မတီဝင်များ” [Committee members of UPDJC], ISP Peace Desk (https://ispmyanmarpeacedesk.com/function/updjc-%E1%80%80%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%90%E1%80%AE%E1%80%9D%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8/, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[109] See note 72 above.
[110] In Burmese, “ကိုကို (စစ်တက္ကသိုလ်)”.
[111] Personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 21 July 2021.
[112] “Proceedings of Conference on Science and Technology Development-2018, 30-31 October 2018, Pyin Oo Lwin, Volume I”, front matter.
[113] “ဦးထွန်းအောင်မြင့် (ခ) စောထွန်းအောင်မြင့်” [U Htun Aung Myint or Saw Htun Aung Myint], Eleven Media Group, 25 October 2020 (https://m.facebook.com/ElevenMediaGroup/photos/pcb.3533924413311823/3533921289978802/?type=3&source=48, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[114] “Myanmar Military’s New Education Minister Faced Finance Probes”.
[115] See Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[116] Wai Moe, “Wunna Maung Lwin: Military Commander to Foreign Minister”, and, on the DSA intake dates of military members of the SAC junta, see Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[117] Wai Moe, “Wunna Maung Lwin: Military Commander to Foreign Minister”. Formally the Basic Course in Diplomatic Skills, this is a short course on diplomacy and international relations that has been conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for interested members of the general public since 2000. See “MoFA opens Certificate Course in Basic Diplomatic Skills (43/2019)”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 1 October 2019 (https://www.gnlm.com.mm/mofa-opens-certificate-course-in-basic-diplomatic-skills-43-2019/, downloaded 16 September 2021).
[118] Htet Naing Zaw, “Who Is Myanmar’s New Home Affairs Minister?”
[119] “Lt-Gen Mya Tun Oo Appointed Burmese Military’s Chief of General Staff”.
[120] Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar Security Outlook: A Taxing Year for the Tatmadaw”, pp. 34-51 in Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector (Tokyo: NIDS Joint Research Series No. 14, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2016) (https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series14/pdf/chapter04.pdf, downloaded 29 September 2021), p. 47.
[121] Personal communication, veteran Myanmar journalist, 27 September 2021. As noted above, Win Shein spent his military career as a naval officer.
[122] Aung Naing Oo entered Mandalay Regional College in 1979, and then studied geology at Mandalay Arts and Sciences University during 1981-82. In 1982, he was selected for the OTC. Opting not to sit for his final-year university exams, he enrolled in that course; personal communication, university classmate of Aung Naing Oo’s, 24 October 2021. Mandalay Arts and Sciences University was the name by which Mandalay University went during the last decade of the Socialist Period. The OTC (အလုပ်သင်ဗိုလ်လောင်းသင်တန်း) is not to be confused with the OTS (ဗိုလ်သင်တန်း). The former accepts undergraduate recruits, while the latter enrols graduate recruits.
[123] “Aung Naing Oo”.
[124] “Myanmar daughter follows in father’s footsteps”, School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria University of Wellington, 12 January 2015 (https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/smib/about/news/news-archives/2015-news/myanmar-daughter-follows-in-fathers-footsteps, downloaded 21 September 2021.) Aung Naing Oo also received the ASEAN-New Zealand Award in 2015, upon the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of ASEAN-New Zealand dialogue relations.
[125] “Ko Ko Hlaing”.
[126] Ibid. This degree was in “TEFL”, or teaching English as a foreign language.
[127] Personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 21 July 2021.
[128] Programme for “Asia-Pacific Conference in Fukuoka 2018: International Symposium on Oral Education and Research in Kitakyushu”, p. 6. A decade and a half ago, the English-language names of the Institutes of Medicine were changed to Universities of Medicine. (In Burmese, they were already designated တက္ကသိုလ်.)
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid. Note that Thet Khaing Win is a member of the Royal College of Physicians of the United Kingdom and a fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh.
[131] “Myanmar junta’s environment minister is hit with tough new sanctions by the US treasury”.
[132] “ရွှေလေး B.E. (Civil)” [Shwe Lay, B.E. (Civil)], Yangon Technological University Students’ Union – YTUSU Facebook page, 5 August 2021 (https://www.facebook.com/YTUStudentsUnion/photos/pcb.2026705570812881/2026704974146274, downloaded 5 September 2021). The current name of this institution is “Yangon Technological University”.
[133] “Chairman – U Tin Htut Oo”.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 17 June 2021.
[136] “High-level Policy Dialogue on Reviving Multilateralism: ‘Road to Bali and Beyond’, 19 November 2013 – Know the Speakers”.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Saw Htun Lin, “KPP ဥက္ကဌ၏ဖြတ်သန်းမှုပုံရိပ်လွှာ”.
[140] “Thet Thet Khine”, USC Marshall Pacific Rim Business Forum, 2014 (http://www.marshallpacrimforum.org/thet-thet-khine/, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] “Building Process of Public-Private Dialogue during Major Reforms in Myanmar”, Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies, 2018 (https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/6051/, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[144] Renaud Egreteau, “The (Few) Generals That Don’t Exit in Myanmar”, The Diplomat, 20 November 2015 (https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/the-few-generals-that-dont-exit-in-myanmar/, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[145] “အောင်သန်းဦး B.E. (EP)” [Aung Than Oo, B.E. (EP)], Yangon Technological University Students’ Union – YTUSU Facebook page, 5 August 2021 (https://www.facebook.com/YTUStudentsUnion/photos/pcb.2026705570812881/2026704974146274, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[146] “Nyunt Phay”, LinkedIn, n.d. (https://mm.linkedin.com/in/nyunt-phay-a988665a, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[147] “ဒုတိယ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး ရာပြည့် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့ ရုံး ဝန်ကြီး ဖြစ်လာ”.
[148] Chit Naing (Psychology), “သေနင်္ဂဗျူဟာ အတတ်ပညာ” [Sun Tzu – The Art of War], 2003 (https://pt.slideshare.net/satsaluu/ss-27494862, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[149] Ibid. and personal communication, Myanmar think-tank researcher, 22 September 2021.
[150] “Engr. Prof. Dr. Charlie Than”.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Personal communication, former Tatmadaw officer and DSA graduate, 21 July 2021.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw, p. 229.
[156] That is, နိုင်ငံတော်ကာကွယ်ရေးတက္ကသိုလ်. See “Khin Yi” Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/ukhinyimyanmar, downloaded 15 September 2021), and “ဦးခင်ရီ၏ဘဝဇာတ်ကြောင်း – တပ်မတော်သားဘဝ” [Life Story of U Khin Yi – Life of a Soldier], Facebook page, 13 September 2020(https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=2731344260410369&set=pb.100044235049128.-2207520000, downloaded 29 September 2021).
[157] Ibid., p. 232.
[158] Personal Communication, retired Myanmar law professor, 1 October 2021. This source confirms that Thida Oo took her degree in 1986. This institution was the rump of the former Rangoon University that remained following the hiving off of programs in such areas as medicine and economics to form separate institutions during the Socialist Period.
[159] “Thida Oo”, LinkedIn, n.d. (https://www.linkedin.com/in/thida-oo-a6b51877/?originalSubdomain=mm, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[160] Khin Yi is the vice-chair of the USDP, and Wunna Maung Lwin and Pwint San members of its central executive committee. See Thiha Lwin, “Military Proxy USDP Adds Leaders Ahead of Myanmar’s Election”, The Irrawaddy, 24 February 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/military-proxy-usdp-adds-leaders-ahead-myanmars-election.html, downloaded 4 August 2021); San Yamin Aung, “Military-Backed USDP Leaders Defeated by NLD in Myanmar Election”, The Irrawaddy, 12 November 2020 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/military-backed-usdp-leaders-defeated-nld-myanmar-election.html, downloaded 4 August 2021); and “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်ယနေ့ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသောစီးပွားရေးအခြေအနေများနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးနှင့်ဖွံဖြိုးရေးပါတီ ဗဟိုအလုပ်အမှုဆောင် ဒေါက်တာပွင့်ဆန်း (စီးပွားရေးနှင့်ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေးဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးဟောင်း) အားတွေ့ဆုံမေးမြန်းမှု” [Interview with former Deputy Minister of Planning and Finance Dr. Pwint San, central executive committee member, on Myanmar’s current economic situation], Union Solidarity and Development Party, 20 August 2018 (http://www.usdp.org.mm/2018/08/20/%E1%80%BB%E1%80%99%E1%80%94%E1%80%B9%E1%80%99%E1%80%AC%E1%82%8F%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%B9%E1%80%84%E1%80%B6%E1%80%90%E1%80%BC%E1%80%84%E1%80%B9-%E1%80%9A%E1%80%B1%E1%80%94%E1%82%94%E1%80%BB/, downloaded 4 August 2021).
[161] See Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[162] Wunna Maung Lwin ran on the USDP ticket for a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Zabuthiri Township, Mandalay Region; he lost to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House), 2020 General Elections], Union Elections Commission, n.d. (https://uecdata.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/2020%20Election%20Result%20%28%20Percentage%20%29/1.%20Pyithu%20Result%20%28%20Percentage%20%29/Pyithu%20Each%20Candidate%20Result.pdf, downloaded 31 July 2021), p. 44.
[163] As a USDP candidate, Win Shein contested a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Oattara Thiri Township, Mandalay Region but lost to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 46.
[164] In 2010, running as a USDP candidate, Pwint San won a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Mayangone Township, Yangon Region. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၇-၁၁-၂၀၁၀)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) (7.11.2010)], Union Elections Commission, n.d. (https://www.uec.gov.mm/show_data_content.php?name=140.pdf&type=law&code=x&sno=4938&token=ee2edccb225aeeed8586de8451e67b701dd700d6cbcb681068901576e2c2faf84e6fa39bdc8c21e283e97a992ceab2e128839c653c53b7271a0e07f31497fa36, downloaded 30 July 2021), p. 58.
[165] In 2015, again as a USDP candidate, Pwint San ran for reelection to a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw Mayangone Township, Yangon Region, but lost this time to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House), 2015 General Elections], Union Elections Commission, n.d. (https://www.uec.gov.mm/show_data_content.php?name=01PyithuHluttaw1.pdf&type=page_multiple_photo&code=17&sno=3799&token=1bbff23522a45e97467bdd86f736fcb7e0617f1dc16a0ec49141f582277afc55f030c36948f4f631f4a207b59a7e301f60ec0574502dde4d2e02f7012ea3a7ad, downloaded 30 July 2021), p. 53.
[166] In November 2020, Pwint San contested a seat in the Yangon Region hluttaw representing Mayangone Township Constituency – 2 on the USDP ticket, but lost to an NLD candidate. See “တိုင်းဒေသကြီး သိုမဟုတ် ပြည်နယ်လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအ ခြေအ နေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for State and Region hluttaw, 2020 General Elections], Union Elections Commission, n.d.
(https://uecdata.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/2020%20Election%20Result%20%28%20Percentage%20%29/3.%20S%20%26%20R%20Result%20%28%20Percentage%20%29/S%26R%20Each%20Candidate%20Result.pdf, downloaded 30 July 2021), p. 123.
[167] Running as a KPP candidate in 2015, Saw Htun Aung Myint contested a seat in the Amyotha Hluttaw, or Upper House of the Union Parliament, representing Constituency – 7, Kayin State, but lost to an NLD candidate. See “အမျိုးသားလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House), 2015 General Elections], Union Elections Commission, n.d. (https://www.uec.gov.mm/show_data_content.php?name=02AmyotharHluttaw.pdf&type=page_multiple_photo&code=17&sno=9583&token=fd383d60132223462ab1397e79d03be04d694929d77d8f3f9eeb64b4bf5359e1f447b641c72e24a18d2b4e100896c87e384f28654c657876eab0a64cfdf3fdc9, downloaded 30 July 2021), p. 8
[168] In 2020, Saw Htun Aung Myint contested a seat in the Amyotha Hluttaw representing Constituency – 10, Kayin State, as a KPP candidate, but lost to the same NLD candidate who had beaten him five years earlier. See “အမျိုးသားလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House), 2020 General Elections], Union Elections Commission, n.d. (https://uecdata.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/2020 Election Result %28 Percentage %29/2. Amyotha Result %28 Percentage %29/Amyotha Each Candidate Result.pdf, downloaded 30 July 2021). p. 12.
[169] Thet Thet Khine won a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Dagon Township, Yangon Region on the NLD ticket in 2015. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 54.
[170] In November 2020, running on the ticket of the People’s Pioneer Party (PPP), Thet Thet Khine again contested for a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw, this time for one representing Mayangone Township, Yangon Region, but she lost to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 64.
[171] Running on the USDP ticket, Maung Maung Ohn won a seat in the Rakhine State hluttaw representing in Ann Constituency – 1. See “တိုင်းဒေသကြီး သိုမဟုတ် ပြည်နယ်လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)” [Election Results for Each Candidate for State and Region hluttaw, 2015 General Elections], Union Elections Commission, n.d.
(https://www.uec.gov.mm/show_data_content.php?name=03S_D.pdf&type=page_multiple_photo&code=17&sno=5789&token=2a840d7fdcf49becf13ac7636e5a61b04ae3a7e87747ed76b8a4fd5c8a03777981c19159c7dfb39e409533df0604dd7e692b4b7221b4e6eeb98475b8e623d134, downloaded 30 July 2021), p. 93.
[172] Running as a USDP candidate, a man named Aung Than Oo contested a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Thanphyu Zayat Township, Mon State, in 2015, but he lost to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 38. Please see following note, too.
[173] In 2020, a USDP candidate named Aung Than Oo contested a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Kawlin Township, Sagaing Region, but he lost to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 14. The authors have been unable definitively to confirm that the Aung Than Oo who contested a parliamentary seat in Mon State in 2015 is the same Aung Than Oo who contested a seat in Sagaing Region five years later and, if not, which of these men now serves the SAC regime as a Union minister. Their working assumption is, however, that the same Aung Than Oo who now serves in the latter capacity was in fact an unsuccessful USDP candidate in the two geographically distant constituencies in the successive elections in question.
[174] Running on the USDP ticket in 2015, Khin Yi contested a seat in the Amyotha Hluttaw representing Constituency – 6, Ayeyarwaddy Region, but lost to an NLD candidate. See “အမျိုးသားလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 35.
[175] In 2020, running again as a USDP candidate, Khin Yi contested a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw representing Seikgyi Kanaungto Township, Yangon Region, but lost once again to an NLD candidate. See “ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းတစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ မဲဆန္ဒရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ (၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ် အထွေထွေ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ)”, p. 61.
[176] See Emily Fishbein and Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, “Myanmar military tries ‘divide and rule’ in bid to cement power”, Al Jazeera, 15 February 2021 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/15/myanmar-military-tries-divide-and-rule-in-bid-to-cement-power, downloaded 5 September 2021), and “NLD ‘Turncoat’ Criticized After Being Named to Myanmar Military Regime’s Cabinet”, The Irrawaddy, 5 February 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nld-turncoat-criticized-named-myanmar-military-regimes-cabinet.html, downloaded 5 September 2021).
[177] See Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael Montesano, “Min Aung Hlaing and His Generals: Data on the Military Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta” and “Buttressing the Anti-NLD Project: Data on the Civilian Members of Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta”.
[178] See “Myanmar’s Junta Seen Moving to Dissolve NLD to Ensure Grip on Power”, Radio Free Asia, 16 August 2021 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/dissolve-08162021192931.html, downloaded 27 August 2021).
[179] Nitta Yuichi, “Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing says this coup is ‘different’”, Nikkei Asia, 8 February 2021 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-junta-chief-Min-Aung-Hlaing-says-this-coup-is-different, downloaded 30 July 2021).
[180] Personal communication, veteran Myanmar political-economy scholar, 3 September 2021.
[181] Thant Myint-U, “Myanmar’s Coming Revolution: What Will Emerge from Collapse?”, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2021) (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2021-06-11/myanmars-coming-revolution, downloaded 14 June 2021).
[182] For an incisive examination of Myanmar’s current plight and the inability of the SAC to alleviate it, see Lin Htet Myat, “Myanmar’s Junta Lacks the Tools Needed to Stabilize the Economy”, The Irrawaddy, 25 August 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmars-junta-lacks-the-tools-needed-to-stabilize-the-economy.html, downloaded 27 August 2021). Especially in the face of the third wave of the pandemic in July 2021, the SAC’s inability effectively to address COVID-19 became apparent. With the collapse of the public healthcare system, the country faces extreme shortages of both medical staff and medical supplies, while vaccination programmes are stalled. In July alone, the junta reported 6,000 deaths – about 58 per cent of total deaths counted by the Ministry of Health since the start of the pandemic – and 141,908 cases – about 46 per cent of total COVID-19 infections. However, the actual numbers of both deaths and cases of infection are likely to be much higher, as many people do not report to the ministry at all and the junta has very limited capacity in tallying numbers. See “Official Myanmar COVID-19 Deaths Exceed 10,000”, The Irrawaddy, 3 August 2021 (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/official-myanmar-covid-19-death-updates-exceed-10000.html, downloaded 4 August 2021).
[183] See note 11 above.
[184] The regime’s need to confront intensified resistance following the National Unity Government’s declaration of “D-Day” and the start of a “people’s defensive war” (ပြည်သူ့ခုခံစစ်) against the Tatmadaw and its SAC regime on 7 September 2021 may of course render this recasting utterly unfeasible. See Duwa Lashi La, အရေးပေါ် မိန့်ခွန်း [Emergency Speech], National Unity Government Facebook page, 7 September 2021 (https://www.facebook.com/NUGmyanmar/videos/605821454129982, downloaded 7 September 2020). Duwa Lashi La serves as Acting President of Myanmar’s National Unity Government; Sebastian Strangio, “Myanmar Shadow Government Declares ‘National Uprising’ Against Military Rule”, The Diplomat, 7 September 2021 (https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/myanmar-shadow-government-declares-national-uprising-against-military-rule/, downloaded 15 September 2021); and Shibani Mahtani, “Myanmar shadow government declares war on military junta, escalating crisis”, Washington Post, 7 September 2021 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/myanmar-military-war/2021/09/07/46c14ca2-0f93-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html, downloaded 15 September 2021).
[185] Speaking at an SAC meeting in late September, Min Aung Hlaing offered an apparent clarification of this division of labour, with comments to the effect that “The Tatmadaw does not directly concern with the State administration and assigns the relevant civilian administrative bodies” [sic]. See “All ethnic people need to unitedly live in the country with the same will and same rights: Senior General”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 25 September 2021 (https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-09-25-red.pdf, downloaded 28 September 2021).
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2021/136 “Climate Change: Can We Fix The Future Through Franchising?” by Michael T Schaper and Jason Gehrke
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Significantly reducing business-related greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) in Southeast Asia will require governments to work with the small-and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector, many of which trade as franchisees of major chains.
- There are now at least 4,300 franchise systems operating in the ASEAN region, with more than 150,000 franchisee SME firms. The real figure is likely to be much higher.
- The contractual power that franchisors have places them in a unique position to speedily transition many other businesses into low-emissions, more climate-friendly activity. They can potentially require their franchisees to move to climate-friendly products and processes; additionally, they can use their large-scale purchasing power to ensure the firms they source raw materials from also adopt low emissions practices.
- Little attention to greening the franchise sector has yet taken place in Southeast Asia, and is hampered by the absence of franchising regulators and comprehensive data on the sector in most ASEAN member states.
- Practical steps governments can undertake include identifying the franchise systems operating in their jurisdictions; engaging with master franchisors; ensuring that environment agencies become familiar with the sector; and working with national franchise industry associations.
* Michael T Schaper is Visiting Senior Fellow with the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and an Adjunct Professor with the John Curtin Institute of Public Policy, Curtin University, Western Australia. Email: michael.schaper@gmail.com. Jason Gehrke is Director of the Franchise Advisory Centre in Brisbane, Australia, and a Past Chairman of the World Franchise Council. Email: jason@franchiseadvice.com.au.
INTRODUCTION
Jollibee. Phuc Long Coffee and Tea. Café Amazon. Kebab Turki. Old Town White Coffee. These are the face of modern franchising in Southeast Asia, and they may just also be crucial in its attempts to minimise global warming.
How can Southeast Asian countries reduce their carbon emissions, and help be part of the global solution to climate change? Many different steps are required, and a central one will be bringing the region’s 70 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) along on the journey to a low-carbon economy.
SMEs are a highly diversified, fragmented group of businesses. Found in every country and in every industry, it has been difficult for policymakers to identify effective ways to bring large numbers of small firms into the emissions reduction and climate-adjustment process.
However, one particular group of SMEs – franchisees – are readily identifiable, easily reached, and have the potential to contribute significantly to regional efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Franchisees are, in effect, part of a local, regional or global supply chain. They are contractually bound to follow the production and procurement processes, logistical and transport arrangements established by their franchisor. As such, the possibility exists that changes in franchise arrangements can be remodelled in a way that results in significantly reduced carbon emissions.
THE FRANCHISING SECTOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
At its most basic, a franchise is a contractual relationship in which the rights holder of a piece of intellectual and commercial property (the franchisor) licenses another party (the franchisee, which is typically a small firm) to use or sell under that brand for a fixed period of time, on certain terms and conditions. It is an agreement between two different businesses to work together to make and sell goods or services, typically in a way prescribed by the franchisor (Schaper, Volery, Weber & Gibson 2014).
There are essentially two different types of franchise systems. In a product franchise arrangement, a franchisee is empowered to sell a particular good or commodity, such as clothing, cars, household goods, or petroleum. The franchisee has a wide degree of freedom in how they operate their business, and the franchisor’s role is largely focused on providing sufficient quantities of the requisite goods, monitoring product quality, and supervising the level of after-sales customer service.
In contrast, a business format franchise[1] is a far more comprehensive arrangement. The franchisor provides a small business franchisee with all the knowledge and ingredients necessary to start and run a business, including premises, the product/service, production and operating systems, management controls, staff training, IT support, raw materials input, advertising and marketing, and accounting. Usually the result of substantial prior experience and business development, the business system model is a complete package created by a franchisor which simply needs an operator franchisee to fund and manage. Many of the most recognisable international franchise chains are structured in this way, such as those in fast food, professional services, wellness and beauty care, retail and accommodation services.
Central to a business format franchise is the substantial (and, sometimes, almost total) control that the franchisor exerts over the franchisee. The franchisor can usually exercise discretion over the inputs, processes and outputs of the franchisees in its system, with which the franchisee is contractually required to comply.
First popularised in the United States in the late 1800s, over the last century franchising has grown substantially as a popular business model. In the Southeast Asian region, it became especially popular from the 1980s onwards, spearheaded by a number of fast food outlet groups operating as business system franchises, such as McDonald’s, Subway and KFC. This in turn also catalysed a number of local entrepreneurs into developing their own systems (Tomiyama 2015).
Today, franchising is a major phenomenon in Southeast Asia, with an estimated 4,310 chains in operation. As Table 1 below indicates, there are more than 152,000 individual franchisees across the region – and this is likely to be a major underestimate, given the paucity of data. Whilst many franchise systems remain relatively small, with perhaps 10-20 franchisee members, others have grown into large-scale ventures operating in multiple ASEAN member states, some of them with more than a thousand franchisee-owned outlets.
Franchise chains in the region now include a mix of both international systems that have originated elsewhere, as well as some highly visible, home-grown ones. Many of the former are US-based fast food chains, such as McDonald’s, Burger King, Wendy’s, Dunkin Donuts, KFC, Starbucks, Pizza Hut, and Dominos. Some local major chains have proven themselves to be highly entrepreneurial: Filipino chain Jollibee now has over 1,000 stores spread over not just The Philippines, but much of Southeast Asia as well. Its parent company also owns four other food chain systems – Greenwich, Red Ribbon Bakeshop, Chowking, and Mang Inasal (US Commercial Service 2018).
Policy oversight and the regulation of franchising varies across ASEAN. Malaysia has the most developed governmental framework, which includes a Franchising Act (1998), a statutory Registrar of Franchises, and a national franchise development agency, Pernas. Indonesia has a series of specific Franchise Regulations administered by the Ministry of Trade; Thailand also has a number of mandatory franchising regulations issued by the Office of Trade Competition Commission under the country’s Trade Competition Act[2]; and in Vietnam the sector is regulated by relevant clauses of the Commercial Law of Vietnam, compliance with which is overseen by the Ministry of Industry & Trade. However, in other Southeast Asian nations, there is no specific franchise legislation per se; instead, the general laws of contract, competition and related matters apply (Das, Dube & Loewinger 2019).
Table 1: Franchise Systems in Southeast Asia
| Estimated number of franchise systems | Estimated number of franchisees | |
| Brunei | 200** | Not known |
| Cambodia | 100** | Not known |
| Indonesia (2019) | 1,000 | Not known |
| Laos | 50** | Not known |
| Malaysia (2020) | 1,000 | Not known |
| Myanmar | 100** | Not known |
| Philippines (2018) | 500 | 100,000 |
| Singapore (2012) | 600 | 40,000 |
| Thailand (2018) | 500 | 12,000 |
| Vietnam | 260 | Not known |
| Total | 4,310 | 152,000 |
Sources: ASL Law (2021); Li & Chong (2021); Paul Hype Page & Co (2021); Pugnatorius Business Research (2020): Rose & Lee (2020); US Commercial Service (2018)
** Indicates no reliable published country data available; figures based on estimates by in-country franchising consultants.
FRANCHISING AND SUPPLY CHAINS
The power that franchisors have places them in a unique position to speedily transition many other businesses into low-emissions, more climate-friendly activity. They can, in effect, use their clout as a buyer and contractor to generate and implement eco-friendly changes that might not otherwise occur.
Franchise systems have the capacity to play a major role in two ways: firstly, by requiring their franchisees to move to new, climate-friendly products and processes; secondly, by requiring the firms they source raw materials from to also adopt climate-friendly, ecologically sustainable practices.
This is because modern franchise systems are also parts of significant supply chains, both horizontally and vertically. Large-scale franchises in the fast food sector, for example, typically purchase substantial quantities of agricultural and commercial inputs from other supplying business, which they then distribute to their franchisee restaurants for final end-use production and sale. Franchisors thus also have the capacity to require suppliers to their brands to move to low-emission, climate-friendly products and processes, or else risk losing the franchisors’ business.
This potential has already been recognised by some multilateral agencies. The OECD (2021), for example, has noted that significant potential exists to improve the environmental performance of smaller firms through the pressure exerted on them by the organisations that provide their raw materials. Requiring small firms to adopt certain low-emissions or green practices, technology and raw inputs are some of the ways in which this can occur.
Why would franchisors choose to do this? A first driver for such change is reputational. There is the risk of brand damage if members of the franchise system supply chain are seen to be guilty of poor environmental behaviour (OECD 2021). Conversely, a positive “green” or climate-friendly approach can also be treated as part of the strategic positioning and marketing of the franchise system, increase its unique selling proposition and enhance its public profile.
This is an important driver in the ASEAN region, where a growing educated middle class has become more exposed to sustainability issues internationally, and often come to expect this also in their home countries. These consumers are increasingly demanding climate-friendly products and services.
A second is risk management. Firms with international or major national supply chains and outsourcing strategies are often highly exposed to environmental risks posed by a changing climate, so mitigation or improvement programmes are one way in which to manage such threats.
A third, important impetus is economic self-interest. Many climate-friendly business practices and eco-friendly activities now clearly generate positive financial returns, even for the simplest of business franchise operations (OECD 2021). For example, the reduction of waste can lead to lower input costs and waste disposal fees; renewable energy is becoming cheaper; and changing heat and energy sources can reduce expenses.
Getting franchise systems to make these changes is not an easy task, though. Some international franchisors (such as US-based fast food chains) still source original products across extended distances, which contributes to the emissions generated by those goods. Complex supply chains can make it difficult for parent companies (franchisors) to successfully impose green practices, as production is dispersed across multiple companies and countries; many of them are autonomous or independent firms bound only to comply with these edicts on the basis of a commercial contract. Nor is it always easy for franchisors to monitor compliance with the terms of such legal agreements (OECD 2021: 16).
Another potential problem can be franchisee resistance. When changes are imposed without prior consultation, individual franchises may be reluctant to adopt new initiatives. This can often be the case if the reason for the changes is not clearly spelt out, or is perceived as providing no benefit to the franchisee. Cost is another issue. While there are many simple changes that can be made at low expense, other changes in product lines, manufacturing and production processes can come with significant outlays, most of which may be passed on to the franchisee. Ideally, franchisors need to help underwrite these expenses, and ensure that any financial benefits are shared with their franchisees (Matteson-Teig 2020).
SOME TENTATIVE STEPS SO FAR
Different franchise systems in the region have taken some steps towards a more climate-friendly approach. Toyota, for example, has publicly committed to moving to an ultimate zero-emissions business model and a “carbon free society.” McDonalds has adopted an emissions target, whilst Dunkin’ Donuts has a voluntary programme to encourage franchisees to take up more eco-friendly processes (Matteson-Teig 2020).
But few systems have committed substantially to specific emissions goals, to major reductions in their carbon footprint, or to a net-zero future. Likewise, it is difficult to find many public statements which show franchise chains helping franchisees prepare for a warmer global environment that is likely to have more extreme weather events.
Interestingly, there are now an emerging number of franchise systems promoting the sale of environmental services to the general public, as well as actively soliciting new franchisees for their chain. These include firms in the vegan foods, cleaning services, “green” technology, energy and recycling sectors (Franchise Direct 2019).
SOME PRACTICAL ISSUES TO BEAR IN MIND
Despite the overall size of the sector, the franchising community in Southeast Asia has not been targeted as a priority climate-action field by policymakers, environmental advocates or regulators. This is a substantial omission, as franchise systems collectively have the capacity to make a significant difference.
Moving the dial to more climate-friendly franchising requires a number of steps by governments in the region:
Understanding and engaging with the franchise sector. Franchising is, in many ways, quite different to the traditional concept of a “stand alone” business, since it involves a highly complex, ongoing and symbiotic relationship between two legally independent business operators. Government bodies attempting to work with this sector therefore need to spend time at the outset understanding how this model works, and engaging with both the formal and informal influencers within the sector. Whereas nations with a formal franchising regulatory system already in place (such as Malaysia and Indonesia) will have much of this knowledge, other countries will not. This engagement should include the various national franchising associations that exist in most (but not all) ASEAN member states (see Table 2 below), major influential franchisors, and the franchisee councils that many systems have set up to give their franchisee SMEs a representative forum.
Table 2: Franchise Industry Associations in Southeast Asia
| Principal Franchise Association | |
| Brunei | No apparent association |
| Cambodia | Cambodian Business & Franchise Association |
| Indonesia | Asosiasi Franchise Indonesia (Indonesian Franchise Association) |
| Laos | No apparent association |
| Malaysia | Persatuan Francais Malaysia (Malaysian Franchise Association) |
| Myanmar | Myanmar Franchise Association |
| Philippines | Philippine Franchise Association |
| Singapore | Franchising & Licensing Association (Singapore) |
| Thailand | Franchise & License Association (Thailand) |
| Vietnam | No apparent association |
| Regional | Asia-Pacific Franchise Confederation World Franchise council |
Tripartite involvement and co-ordination. There are two, and sometimes three, different arms of government that may potentially be involved in any greening of franchising supply chains – sustainability/environment ministries, SME agencies, and franchising regulators. They will need to work together to develop a common strategy and approach.
Working with master franchisors. Given the very hierarchical nature of most franchise arrangements, in which almost all substantial changes to procurement and products require the support and endorsement of a franchise system’s head office, it will be critical to get the support of the master franchisor in each region or country. Only once the franchisor is on board will franchisees also become actively involved. This may be easier to do with large, “home grown” systems that have originated in Southeast Asia, compared to those that are ultimately owned and controlled from outside the region.
Working with the “right” franchise systems. Not all franchise arrangements work in the same way, and some will be easier to green than others. Because of the ‘complete package’ they offer, business format franchises will have the potential to generate more significant changes than product franchise arrangements. And much will also depend upon the nature of the franchising contract that exists between the franchisor and its franchisees. Can the franchisor mandate changes to procurement and production processes, or does each franchisee have liberty to make their own decisions in these areas? Does the contract make it easy for parties to change their practices at short notice to be more climate-friendly, or not? Finally, some systems have already made a public commitment to climate-friendly activity, whereas others may have been silent on the issue.
CONCLUSION
Often overlooked, franchising provides a powerful avenue to generate climate-friendly changes in a large number of firms across Southeast Asia, and should be a priority for policymakers working on this issue. Franchising is different to many other business-to-business and business-to-consumer arrangements, so it can provide different solutions to this growing problem.
Will it require additional effort by climate bodies and governments? Yes. Will it require a different way of helping SMEs reduce emissions and adjust to a warmer future? Yes. Should we be doing this now? Yes. Global warming is an urgent problem, and governments should be acting promptly to work with the sector, rather than delaying until some indeterminate future date.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/136, 21 October 2021
REFERENCES
ASL Law (2021) Notes to Franchise in Vietnam, August [online] https://aslgate.com/franchise-in-vietnam/ (accessed 08 September 2021).
Das, Srijoy; Dube, Abhishek & Loewinger, Andrew (2019) “A Guided Tour of Franchising in the Asia-Pacific,” Paper presented to the 42nd Annual Forum on Franchising, American Bar Association, 16-18 October, Denver Colarado [online] w23.pdf (americanbar.org) (accessed 06 September 2021).
Rose, Farrah & Lee, Steven (2020) “Singapore: The Bridge Between East and West” Franchise News, 17 September [online]
Singapore: the bridge between East and West | Franchise News | Global Franchise (globalfranchisemagazine.com) (accessed 06 September 2021).
Franchise Direct (2019) Five Reasons You Should Consider A Green & Eco-Friendly Franchise, October 15 [online] Five Reasons You Should Consider A Green & Eco-Friendly Franchise | Franchise Direct (accessed 03 September 2021).
Li, Lee Lin & Chong, Kah Yee (2021) “Franchise Law Review: Malaysia,” The Law Reviews, 04 March, [online] The Law Reviews – The Franchise Law Review (accessed 06 September 2021).
Matteson-Teig, Beth (2020) “With Eco Initiatives, Franchises Aim To Reduce Carbon Footprint” Franchise Times, 05 November [online] With eco initiatives, franchises aim to reduce carbon footprint | Article Archive | franchisetimes.com (accessed 07 September 2021).
OECD/ASEAN (2021) Facilitating the Green Transition for ASEAN SMEs: A Toolkit for Policymakers, Paris: OECD [online]
https://asean.org/storage/Facilitating-Green-Transition-for-ASEAN-SMEs.pdf (accessed 30 August 2021).
Paul Hype Page & Co (2021) How To Start A Franchise Business in Indonesia, 11 June [online] How to start a franchise business in Indonesia – Paul Hype Page (accessed 07 September 2021).
Pugnatorius Business Research (2020) Foreign Franchise Businesses in Thailand, 17 July, [online] Foreign franchise businesses in Thailand (pugnatorius.com) (accessed 07 September 2021)
Schaper, Michael T.; Volery, Thierry; Weber, Paull & Gibson, Brian (2014)Entrepreneurship and Small Business: Asia Pacific (4th edition), Brisbane: John Wiley & Sons.
Tomiyama, Atsushi (2015) “Southeast Asia’s Burgeoning Restaurant and Coffee Chains” Nikkei Asia, October 29 [online] Southeast Asia’s burgeoning restaurant and coffee chains – Nikkei Asia (accessed 06 September 2021).
US Commercial Service (2018) Franchising Industry: A Reference for US Exporters, Washington DC: International Trade Administration, US Commercial Service [online]
USCS_Franchising_Resource_Guide_2018.pdf (accessed 03 September 2021).
ENDNOTES
[1] Also sometimes referred to as a “business system” franchise
[2] A specific franchising law has also been proposed for Thailand but not yet legislated.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/135 “Indonesia’s Economic Recovery Programmes: Progress and Challenges” by Siwage Dharma Negara and Muhammad Oktovan Tito
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Indonesia is struggling to deal with the economic and social impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has reversed its development achievements over the last two decades.
- In response to the current pandemic wave, the government has introduced new restrictions on public activities (Emergency PPKM) and added US$3 billion into its National Economic Recovery (PEN) budget. The new restrictions and longer-than-expected Covid-19 containment will stretch the country’s limited resources and further hinder its economic recovery.
- The government faces serious challenges in carrying out its economic recovery programme. The size of the stimulus package (at about 4% of GDP) is too small to address the magnitude of the crisis.
- Given its limited resources, the government will need to correctly prioritise the vulnerable sectors. Aiding the recovery of the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) should be a key focus, as they account for 60% of GDP and 97% of domestic employment. About half of the 64 million MSMEs have gone bankrupt since the pandemic started.
- The government will also have to overcome massive implementation difficulties. Disbursement of the budget for recovery has been painfully slow, due to bureaucratic red-tape and the decentralisation of government. Regional authorities are not always aligned with the central government’s priorities. Poor data gathering results in vulnerable groups missing out on sorely needed assistance. Finally, there is the perennial problem of funds leakage due to corruption.
* Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Muhammad Oktovan Tito is Research Intern at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is currently studying at King’s College London. The authors thank Cassey Lee, Lee Sue-Ann, and Manggi Habir for their helpful feedback on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
INTRODUCTION
At the start of 2021, Indonesia appeared to have passed the worst of the pandemic. Its quarterly GDP growth had been improving after suffering a contraction of 5.32% in Q2 2020: Indonesia’s economy contracted by 2.07% in 2020 and experienced a reduced contraction of 0.74% in Q1 2021. Real GDP rose 7.07% in the second quarter from a year earlier, and several early projections indicated that Indonesia was on track to achieve 4-5% growth in 2021.
However, a second wave hit the country in June 2021: Daily cases tripled from 4,800 in early June to almost 22,000 by the end of the month. The country has been struggling to overcome the prolonged impact of the pandemic, and this year’s economic recovery is expected to be slower than initial projections.
In July, the IMF revised downward its forecast for Indonesia’s 2021 economic growth from its April forecast of 4.3% to 3.9%. Slower growth means it will take longer for Indonesia to get back to where it was before Covid-19. The pandemic has reversed two decades of gains in poverty and employment. A study conducted by SMERU shows that the poverty rate had increased from 9.2% in 2019 to 10.2% in 2020, and it would have been higher without the massive social assistance programmes launched by the government.[1]
Furthermore, the pandemic has left Indonesia with a 5.8% shortfall of real GDP in Q2 2021 when compared to pre-pandemic levels. Open unemployment has increased from 5% in 2019 to 9.7% by 2021. As a result, the World Bank has downgraded Indonesia to lower-middle-income status on 1 July, with a gross national income per capita of US$3,870.[2] The government is facing tough challenges, and needs to overcome the pandemic and ensure effective implementation of economic recovery programmes.
This essay looks at the progress and challenges of the national economic recovery programmes (Program Pemulihan Ekonomi Nasional or PEN). We argue that given the protracted uncertainty about the pandemic and its impact on the economy, the most effective way of addressing the vulnerabilities in the short term is to increase the stimulus, improve its effectiveness through a targeted approach, and raise the speed of the disbursement of the stimulus measures. The following section gives an update on the Covid-19 situation in Indonesia. The subsequent section discusses the national economic recovery programmes and the challenges their implementation faces. The last section concludes with some thoughts on the way forward.
THE COVID-19 SITUATION: IMPROVING BUT STILL SOME WAY TO GO YET
Indonesia’s Covid-19 situation seems to be improving since the peak in July caused by the Delta variant. As shown in Figure 1, daily new confirmed cases passed 50,000 for the first time on 18 July, four times the previous peak on 1 February 2021. As of 20 September, the daily cases have declined to below 2,000 cases per day. Correspondingly, daily deaths hit 2,000 in July, five times higher than the previous peak reached on 31 January (Figure 1), but by the end of September, this has sharply declined to below 150. However, it is important to note that these official figures could underestimate the actual cases given the low test rates and problematic data collection.[3]
Figure 2 shows that just around 13% of Indonesia’s population is fully vaccinated so far. Considering the need for vaccinations to ‘break’ the link between infections and hospitalisations and deaths,[4] this rate is too low for a fast recovery. At this current rate, Moody’s Analytics has predicted that Indonesia can only reach herd immunity in 2023, while most Asia-Pacific countries are expected to manage that in 2022.[5]
Indonesia also has one of the lowest test rates in Southeast Asia, with just 150,000 tests per million population (tmp). This is significantly lower than its neighbours; for example, Malaysia has 560,759 tmp and The Philippines 151,000 tmp.[6]
Accelerating vaccination rollout, increasing testing rate, as well as ensuring public compliance on strict health protocols and safe distancing are necessary steps for Indonesia to take before it can reopen its economy safely.
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON COVID-19 PANDEMIC CRISIS
In response to the worsening Covid-19 situation, the Indonesian government implemented on 3 July a multi-tiered Emergency Restriction on Public Activities (PPKM) policy to reduce mobility.[7] There are four levels of PPKM designated for each area, based on the severity of infections, hospitalisations, and deaths in proportion to the area’s population. At the time of the writing, Bali and most of Java are classified under PPKM Level 3 or 4.[8]
Crucially, non-essential businesses are mandated to implement a 100% work-from-home (WFH) policy and non-crucial commercial activities are not allowed (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Essential businesses, meanwhile, are allowed to implement a 50% WFH policy and essential government services a 25% WFH policy. Educational institutions are also instructed to conduct online learning. Furthermore, domestic travellers via air, sea and railway must present a vaccine certificate and a negative PCR test. Places of worship are also temporarily closed. Food stalls, street vendors, and hawker stalls are currently allowed to open until 9 pm, limiting patrons’ mealtime to 30 minutes in Level 3 and 20 minutes in Level 4 areas.[9]
The PPKM measures will impact the economy significantly. Last year’s lockdown in April (PSBB) alone resulted in an estimated US$26.4 billion loss in GDP, with the services and industry sectors losing 29.7% and 23.4% of their sectoral GDP, respectively.[10] Figure 3 shows that transport/travel restrictions and wholesale/retail trade restrictions during PSBB accounted for one-third of the GDP losses. As PPKM measures also impose stringent travel restrictions and strict limits on retail trade operations, they will likely have detrimental impacts on the economic recovery.
To support PPKM implementation and rescue the economy, the government has increased the budget for its National Economic Recovery Programmes (PEN) by 6% from IDR 699.43 trillion to IDR 744.75 trillion on 18 July.[11] Table 1 shows that approximately half of the budget is directed towards healthcare and subsidies and aids, while the other half is for business incentives, financial assistance for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and corporations, and priority projects.
The following section looks at some of the challenges faced by the government in implementing the national economic recovery programmes.
CHALLENGES AHEAD AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
There are three major challenges faced by the government in managing the current situation. These are: (1) The size of the stimulus; (2) The target of the stimulus, and; (3) The distribution and realisation of the stimulus.
Firstly, the size of the stimulus, which is about 4% of GDP, is way too small to boost its economic recovery.[12] Understandably, this is because of limited fiscal space. Since the introduction of PEN 2021, the GDP growth has only increased by 2.3% (see Table 2 Appendix). Furthermore, household consumption and government expenditure have only grown by 6% and 7.6%, respectively, since 2Q20 (Ibid.). Given the recovery gap of approximately 7% to reach its pre-pandemic GDP, the growth in household consumption, the main component of GDP, and government expenditure require a more significant stimulus.
Secondly, given the limited fiscal space, setting the right target for the stimulus is critical. The government needs to place more emphasis on supporting MSMEs recovery. MSMEs comprise 99% of Indonesian businesses and contribute more than 60% of the GDP.[13] They also account for 97% of domestic employment and 56% of business investment as of 2018,[14] making them a significant cornerstone of Indonesia’s economy. Since the pandemic started, 30 out of 64 million MSMEs have gone bankrupt.[15] This has caused a substantial increase in unemployment rates, expectedly increasing to around 7.35% in August 2021, higher than the 7.07% figure in August 2020, and 5.23% in August 2019. Therefore, the government should focus on stimulating MSME recovery and transition to post-pandemic challenges.
Lastly, a serious challenge facing the implementation of the stimulus package is the low rate of disbursements, which will likely delay economic recovery. This needs to be speeded up.
As shown in Table 1, the realisation for PEN 2021 remains low at 43.8% as of 20 August 2021. There is a slow realisation for healthcare and social assistance, two critical components, at just one-third and half, respectively. Table 2 shows the comparison of the realised budget of PEN 2020 and PEN 2021. PEN 2021 is lagging in disbursement compared to PEN 2020, with 39.6 percentage points to catch up to the 2020 realisation of 83.5%. It will be even more challenging to meet the full disbursement target by the end of the year.
Figure 4 shows the breakdown of the unrealised budget by the components of PEN 2021. Strikingly, healthcare, aid for MSME and corporations, and social assistance comprise 80% of the unrealised spending in PEN 2021.
The low realisation rates are partly due to the highly bureaucratic process of disbursing the funds.[18] [19] [20] There is anecdotal evidence that unclear and complex bureaucratic processes across the implementing agencies have constrained the implementation of PEN.[21] These administrative barriers have been made worse by Indonesia’s vast decentralised system, which gives regional governments unique power to implement their respective policies/programs.
Another challenge for programme implementation is the lack of up-to-date and accurate data for better allocation of state resources. For example, the Social Affairs Ministry’s integrated social welfare data (DTKS) does not capture many vulnerable groups, such as those without employment social security records (BPJS). As a result, operators face difficulty in transferring funds to intended programme beneficiaries. Worse, data discrepancies have led to not only slow but also mistargeted distribution of Covid-19 relief. No doubt, there are variations between programmes. For example, the social protection programmes that were most effectively scaled up were those with well-established institutions and accountability and clearly identified beneficiaries.[22]
Finally, the government must improve monitoring of resource allocation to minimise leakages during the disbursement process. There are reports of widespread leakages in the disbursement of the social assistance programme, or bansos, which comprises 25% of PEN 2021. A former investigator of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)[23] claimed that as much as IDR 2 trillion (US$139.5 million) was lost through opaque contracts involving government-appointed suppliers of bansos packages. Given the critical importance of bansos to ensure the livelihood of vulnerable people, it is imperative that the government controls such corrupt practices. A more transparent tender process in awarding bansos suppliers is needed.
CONCLUSION
Compared to the huge economic impacts due to the pandemic, arguably, the size of the stimulus is too small to get the economy to recover quickly to pre-pandemic levels. Given the budget constraints, government spending needs to target vital sectors, particularly MSMEs, whose survival and robust recovery would benefit millions in the workforce. Effective and quick government spending is critical to support the recovery momentum. Yet, budget disbursement has been stubbornly slow, with only 43.8 per cent of the stimulus budget being disbursed as of late August 2021. The government must also improve the coverage and targeting mechanism of PEN this year. Without effective PEN disbursement, there is concern that the damaging effects of the pandemic will drag on, causing harm even in the long term.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/135, 20 October 2021
APPENDIX
ENDNOTES
[1] https://smeru.or.id/id/content/situasi-kemiskinan-selama-pandemi. Accessed 22/09/2021
[2] Indonesia graduated to upper-middle-income status with a GNI per capita of US$4,050 in 2020.
[4] https://news.sky.com/story/covid-19-data-shows-vaccines-reduce-risk-of-hospitalisation-and-death-but-you-need-to-read-it-with-a-clear-head-12365728. Accessed 29/7/2021.
[5] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/06/04/indonesia-wont-reach-herd-immunity-until-2023-moodys.html. Accessed 29/7/2021.
[6] https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/?zarsrc=130. Accessed 29/7/2021.
[7] https://indonesien.ahk.de/en/infocenter/news/news-details/covid-19-developments-in-indonesia
[8] https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2021/07/26/083000465/daftar-daerah-yang-kembali-menerapkan-ppkm-level-3-dan-4-hingga-2-agustus?page=all. Accessed 29/7/2021.
[9] https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/07/26/batas-waktu-makan-di-tempat-pada-daerah-dengan-ppkm-level-3-maksimal-30-menit-level-4-cuma-20-menit. Accessed 29/7/2021.
[10] https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/133789/filename/134002.pdf. Accessed 17/8/2021.
[11] https://money.kompas.com/read/2021/07/18/063000126/varian-delta-bikin-anggaran-pemulihan-ekonomi-naik-totalnya-rp-74475-triliun. Accessed 29/7/2021.
[12] https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Fiscal-Policies-Database-in-Response-to-COVID-19. Accessed 04/09/2021. There is no appropriate fiscal stimulus size given different fiscal capacity among countries. For comparison, US allocates 25%, Singapore and Australia 18%, Japan and Germany 16%, Korea and Sweden 4% of its GDP.
[13] https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/new-normal-digitalization-msmes-indonesia. Accessed 17/7/2021.
[14] https://www.oecd.org/publications/sme-and-entrepreneurship-policy-in-indonesia-2018-9789264306264-en.htm. Accessed 17/8/2021/
[15] https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20210326124010-92-622407/30-juta-umkm-bangkrut-7-juta-orang-kehilangan-kerja. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[16] https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20210721/10/1420229/realisasi-pen-per-16-juli-capai-372-persen-kesehatan-masih-kedodoran. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[17] https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2021/01/07/hingga-akhir-2020-realisasi-anggaran-penanganan-covid-19-dan-pen-cuma-834. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[18] https://radartegal.com/realisasi-pen-di-daerah-rendah-karena-birokrasi-sri-mulyani-ini-perlu-untuk-kita-atasi-bersama.7547.html. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[19] https://news.ddtc.co.id/penanganan-covid-19-terhambat-birokrasi-pp-23-2020-perlu-direvisi-22802. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[20] https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200803/9/1274195/serapan-anggaran-pen-birokrasi-dan-akurasi-data-masih-mengganjal. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[21] Robert Sparrow, Teguh Dartanto & Renate Hartwig (2020) Indonesia Under the New Normal: Challenges and the Way Ahead, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 56:3, 269-299.
[22] Ibid, p. 284. Accessed 30/7/2021.
[23] https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/07/07/eks-kasatgas-kpk-kerugian-negara-dalam-kasus-korupsi-bansos-covid-19-bisa-mencapai-rp-2-triliun. Accessed 1/8/2021.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/134 “Southeast Asian Responses to AUKUS: Arms Racing, Non-Proliferation and Regional Stability” by William Choong and Ian Storey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Southeast Asian responses to the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) technology-sharing agreement, which aims to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, have varied considerably.
- Malaysia and Indonesia have warned the agreement could trigger an arms race, undermine regional stability and weaken nuclear non-proliferation regimes.
- The Philippines’ national-security establishment has welcomed AUKUS though President Duterte shares the concerns of Malaysia and Indonesia.
- Singapore and Vietnam have been implicitly supportive of the tripartite pact while Thailand has remained silent.
- Concerns over arms racing and nuclear proliferation are overblown. AUKUS is a response to China’s rapid military modernisation and assertive behaviour in the maritime domain. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear submarines will not violate non-proliferation treaties.
- AUKUS is a wake-up call to ASEAN that it needs to be more proactive on security issues and cannot take its centrality for granted.
* William Choong and Ian Storey are Senior Fellows in the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
On 15 September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States announced a three-way technology-sharing agreement called AUKUS. The primary purpose of AUKUS is to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, but it also includes a commitment to jointly develop other technologies such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence and other undersea capabilities. According to a joint statement, the deal underscores the three countries’ commitment to deepen diplomatic, security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific so as to meet the “challenges of the twenty-first century”.[1]
China warned that AUKUS would “undermine regional peace and stability, aggravate arms race(s) and impair international nuclear non-proliferation efforts”.[2] Southeast Asian responses varied. Malaysia and Indonesia expressed concerns about the risks of arms racing, while Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines were generally more accepting of the arrangement.
AUKUS should be seen as an attempt to address the perceived imbalance in the regional balance of power stemming from China’s military buildup and assertiveness. More pertinently, the advent of AUKUS and other US-led initiatives such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Grouping (the Quad, linking the US, Australia, India and Japan), underscore the fact that extra-regional powers are seeking minilateral options outside the multilateral framework led by ASEAN.
This Perspective examines the responses to AUKUS of the six major maritime Southeast Asian countries – Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand -and assesses the validity of some of the concerns that have been expressed.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN RESPONSES
Malaysia
Malaysia’s reaction to AUKUS has been predictable and in accordance with its long-standing shibboleths on regional security. In a phone call with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and reiterated in a statement released the next day, Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob expressed concern that the new security arrangements could be a catalyst for a nuclear arms race in the region and might provoke some countries to act aggressively, especially in the South China Sea. In raising these concerns, he stressed Malaysia’s commitment to Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANFWZ), as well as Malaysia’s stance on not allowing nuclear-powered vessels to enter its territorial waters.[3] Subsequently, Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein and Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah issued statements of their own, echoing the Prime Minister’s disquiet.[4] In an extraordinary move, Hishammuddin announced he would pay a working visit to China for consultations.[5] Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad also weighed into the debate, warning that AUKUS increased the risk of Great Power conflict in Southeast Asia.[6]
Malaysia’s concerns are not without merit but are overblown. AUKUS is designed to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines – not nuclear-armed submarines. Australia has stated categorically that it does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons and remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation.[7] However, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines may set a precedent for Japan and South Korea if one day they decide to go on the same path.
In recent years, successive Malaysian governments have warned that the increased presence of foreign warships in the South China Sea is destabilizing and risks triggering a military confrontation.[8] Malaysia has stood its ground on its territorial claims and EEZ rights, rejected China’s nine-dash line claims and retained close defence links with the US, Australia and, through the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the UK.[9] Given China’s assertive behaviour in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it is doubtful the country’s national security establishment is as concerned about AUKUS as Malaysian politicians appear to be.
With regard to ZOPFAN and SEANFWZ, the former is a dead letter while the latter is not open for Australia to sign. A Malaysian initiative endorsed by ASEAN in 1971, ZOPFAN was meant to eliminate major power rivalry in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. Although the concept remained in the ASEAN lexicon post-Cold War, in practice, member states have established forums to engage external powers on regional security issues including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005 and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010. SEANFWZ, adopted by ASEAN in 1995, prohibits member states from possessing nuclear weapons. It includes a protocol that is open to accession by the five recognised nuclear-armed states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) but none of them have signed it.
Hishammuddin’s announcement that he would visit China to discuss AUKUS came under criticism from the opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition which, although sharing the Prime Minister’s concerns, felt that through this act, Malaysia could be perceived as taking sides.[10] He may have taken these criticisms on board, instead holding a video call with Chinese Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe. In a Tweet, Hishammuddin did not mention whether AUKUS had been discussed.[11]
Indonesia
In a statement on 17 September 2021, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry said it “cautiously” took note of AUKUS, and stressed that Jakarta was “deeply concerned” over the “continuing arms race and power projection in the region”. Indonesia called on Australia to continue meeting its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, and called on Canberra to maintain its commitment towards regional peace and security in accordance with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) to which Australia is also a High Contracting Party.[12] It should be noted though that Indonesia’s fears about “the continuing arms race and power projection” (italics added) – refers not only to the three AUKUS partners, but all regional states, including China.
A fuller assessment of AUKUS came from senior Indonesian diplomat Abdul Kadir Jailani. Writing in the Jakarta Post, he echoed his government’s assessment, but noted that no international norm appeared to have been violated. He added that “deeper conversations” about AUKUS would help build mutual trust, confidence and diplomacy.[13]
Concerns about arms racing and power projection need to be set in proper perspective. It should be noted that Indonesia’s fears about such developments – worded as “the continuing arms race and power projection” (italics added) – refers not only to the three AUKUS partners, but all regional states, including China. In addition, to argue that AUKUS would precipitate an arms race is an inversion of cause-effect logic. It is clear that AUKUS is a direct result of China’s “increasingly provocative actions”.[14] Australia’s Defence Strategic Update in 2020 noted that Canberra’s strategic environment had deteriorated more quickly than anticipated since its 2016 defence white paper. While there were few explicit references to China, it was clear that Beijing’s military buildup was the main focus of Canberra’s concerns.[15] The 6.4 per cent increase in China’s defence spending in 2020 (US$9 billion in real terms) is more than the combined real increase in Indo-Pacific regional states in that year.[16] China’s economic coercion of Australia – including the imposition of high tariffs on Australian products – after Canberra called for an inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus also played a part in Australia’s decision to strengthen its power projection capabilities.
On deeper examination, Indonesia’s response is less negative than originally perceived. One Indonesian analyst noted that Indonesia’s “tepid response” is “noticeable”.[17] He added that past US-backed initiatives to deter China – for instance, the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia – incited negative reactions from several ASEAN countries. Yet Indonesia’s reception to AUKUS has been more nuanced.[18]
The Philippines
The responses from the Philippines brought into sharp relief serious divisions within the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte over national security issues. Since Duterte took office in 2016, US-Philippines relations have been under strain due to his pledge to “divorce” America and seek closer relations with China and Russia. This has resulted in the scaling back of some bilateral defence engagements (compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic) and Duterte’s threat to terminate the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) – a threat that was only withdrawn in July during a visit to Manila by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[19] It was no surprise, therefore, that following the AUKUS announcement, presidential spokesman Harry Roque said that Duterte was worried the pact could trigger a “nuclear arms race”.[20]
Prior to Roque’s statement, however, two key members of Duterte’s cabinet had already come out in full support of AUKUS. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana stated it was Australia’s right to improve its defence capabilities as the Philippines was also doing to protect its territories.[21] Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin released an erudite statement which welcomed the establishment of AUKUS and made three key points.[22] First, ASEAN members, singly and collectively, lack the military capabilities to ensure peace and security in Southeast Asia. Second, with the region’s main balancer, the US, geographically distant, the strengthening of Australia’s power projection capabilities would help maintain the regional balance of power and enable Canberra to better respond to threats facing the region. Third, as Australia is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, AUKUS does not violate SEANFWZ nor Canberra’s commitments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or ASEAN centrality. Lorenzana’s and Locsin’s support for AUKUS reflects the Philippine national-security establishment’s support for the US alliance system and growing concerns about China’s assertive policy in the South China Sea.
Singapore
Singapore’s reaction to AUKUS has been relatively measured, and reflects the country’s support for the deployment of US military forces in the region. After being briefed on AUKUS by his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted the long-standing relations between Singapore and Australia. He expressed hope that AUKUS would contribute constructively to the peace and stability of the region as well as complement the regional architecture.[23]
Speaking to reporters subsequently, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakhrishnan expressed the same sentiments. He noted that Singapore had long-standing relationships with all three AUKUS members, and that such “large reservoirs of trust and alignment” were “very helpful”.[24] This meant that Singapore was not “unduly anxious” about the new developments.[25] The key point, the minister said, was that AUKUS was “part of a larger geo-strategic realignment”; Singapore had to take it in its stride and make sure it did not end up in an “unviable or dangerous” position.[26] From a wider perspective, AUKUS was not really the “centrepiece of concern”, and the bigger question was the management of US-China relations.[27]
Singapore’s position is not unexpected. The island republic has always sought to facilitate a balance of power where no major power dominates; it also seeks to involve major powers, in particular the US, in its security.[28] In this context, AUKUS, in the face of growing Chinese military power and assertiveness, would serve as another plank in maintaining and restoring the regional balance of power.
Vietnam
Vietnam’s approach to AUKUS largely mirrors Singapore’s, underscoring the two countries’ big-picture approach in appraising regional realities. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson noted that all countries should work towards the same goals of peace, stability, cooperation and development in the region. The spokesperson stressed that the nuclear energy used for Australia’s new submarine fleet must be used for peaceful purposes, serve socio-economic development, and ensure safety for humans and the environment.[29]
Vietnam’s reaction is not unexpected. Hanoi’s long-running dispute with China in the South China Sea has led it to pursue stronger relations with the US, as well as other Quad countries. While Hanoi has not expressed open and public support for the FOIP strategy that is shared by the Quad countries, it has expressed support for FOIP principles, such as the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law.[30] In essence, Vietnam indirectly supports the Quad and FOIP as they provide Hanoi with a carapace against growing Chinese assertiveness. It has also sought to improve relations and defence cooperation with individual Quad members. In September, Hanoi signed an agreement with Japan for the transfer of defence equipment and technology. As a former Vietnamese ambassador put it, US-led groupings such as the Quad are playing an “important role” in countering China’s assertiveness. AUKUS, he added, should bring “new confidence” to countries contesting China’s excessive maritime claims.[31]
Thailand
As a treaty ally of the US, but also a close partner of China, Thailand responded to AUKUS with characteristic circumspection. Thailand wants to preserve cordial ties with both parties and does not wish to take a position on the trilateral arrangement and risk offending either Washington or Beijing. In any case, the Thai government is preoccupied with domestic political issues and has little bandwidth for regional security issues
Accordingly, there has been no official response from the prime minister’s office or the ministries of foreign affairs or defence. Ten days after AUKUS was announced, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha delivered a pre-recorded speech at the United Nations in which he pledged Thailand’s support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (of which Australia is not a signatory) and the NPT.[32] His references to these two treaties could be a sign that Thailand has reservations about AUKUS.
In the absence of a response from the government, the void has been filled by prominent Thai observers who offered contrasting views on this matter. Hyperbolically, journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn has accused the three countries of fuelling an arms race in the Indo-Pacific, provoking tensions with China and forcing regional states to choose sides in the escalating US-China competition.[33] Former Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya stated that no country wanted to be dominated by China and that therefore the US military presence is necessary, and presumably by extension, those of its allies and partners.[34]
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA
Kasit’s point is apposite as it applies to Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and underscores the Singaporean and Vietnamese underlying approach to AUKUS: in the face of growing Chinese power, any line of effort that can lead to regional stability is a net positive. Some Chinese commentators recognise that Australia plays a “critical role” in the region; they also view the three-way deal as a sign that countries are willing to come together to push back against Beijing.[35]
With regard to non-proliferation, there are clearly concerns about what AUKUS portends for nuclear non-proliferation in terms of setting a precedent for future proliferation by utilising naval reactor programmes to develop nuclear weapons “by the back door”.[36] These concerns are largely misplaced. Although a final decision has yet to be made, the most likely outcome after the 18-month consultation process among the AUKUS members is that Australia will join a UK-led project to design a successor to the Royal Navy’s Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The British-designed submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) would be constructed in Adelaide, but the nuclear reactors would be built in the UK and installed in Australia as a “black box”. British reactors have a lifespan of around 30 years which means Australia would not have to enrich uranium nor refuel the submarines, thus eliminating the risk of nuclear proliferation. The submarines will be armed with US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and, probably, US-made torpedoes. Given the limited numbers of both US and UK nuclear-powered submarines, it is unlikely that Australia will lease any from either country, though US nuclear attack submarines could be forward deployed to Australia. Australian submariners would probably train on British submarines. Starting from the mid-2020s, the operational life of the RAN’s current fleet of Collins-class submarines will be extended for 10 years while the nuclear-powered boats are under construction.[37] The plan would be for the RAN to receive its first nuclear-propelled submarine in the late 2030s or early 2040s.
Concerns about AUKUS stem less from the trilateral deal per se, but more the attendant fears of a loss of regional stability with the projection of US and allied forces into the region amid intensified Sino-US competition. A case in point was the deployment of US naval forces – including the small carrier USS America – off the coast of Borneo in April 2020. This was in response to a Chinese survey ship, and accompanying coast guard and maritime militia ships, which were shadowing the West Capella, a drillship chartered by Petronas near the outer edge of Malaysia’s EEZ.[38] While the US effort has been noted as a decisive effort to confront China and reassure regional states,[39] it has also been argued that America’s lack of staying power in the area (the warships left after five days) escalated the situation for Malaysia and only served to “make things worse”.[40] In recent years, US freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea have raised the risk of accidental escalation.[41]
Lastly, AUKUS reflects ASEAN’s lack of ability to cope with China’s increasing assertiveness in the maritime domain, particularly in the South China Sea.[42] ASEAN’s concept of inclusive and cooperative security has proved to be inadequate; like the Quad, AUKUS as a balance-of-power entrenchment is a “natural response” to coping with China’s maritime expansionism in the region.[43] The establishment of the EAS in 2011 and the ADMM-Plus in 2010 led to optimism that the region’s security architecture would reduce the risks of flare-ups. But more recently, hopes for an effective Asian security architecture has started to dissipate.[44] As Nguyen Hung Son, the vice-president of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, has noted, ASEAN needs to question why AUKUS has happened without its knowledge; one has to ask whether the “centrality” that ASEAN and its partners talk about is “merely lip service”.[45]
CONCLUSION
The AUKUS deal, and the Quad and FOIP strategy that precede it, underscore the fact that while ASEAN Dialogue Partners such as Australia, the UK and the US consistently echo the mantra of ASEAN centrality, they do not see the concept as inviolate or sacrosanct amid a fast-changing geopolitical environment. As former Indonesia foreign minister Marty Natalegawa notes, AUKUS is a reminder to ASEAN of the cost of “dithering and indecision” in a fluid strategic environment.[46] In fact, it has become increasingly apparent that China and the US, while reiterating the importance of ASEAN centrality, have sought to use such reiterations to woo the 10-member grouping to their respective sides, whether it be to the China-centric Belt and Road Initiative or FOIP.[47]
What AUKUS illustrates is that in the face of ASEAN’s apparent inability to respond effectively to changes in the geopolitical environment, the three-way deal, as well as the Quad, represent an evolving new Asian security architecture where minilateralism runs parallel to multilateral institutions centred on ASEAN. Given that AUKUS and the Quad are essentially responses to China’s military modernisation and belligerence, ASEAN would need to manage two challenges simultaneously: harnessing the power of such extra-regional initiatives to maintain a balance of power while simultaneously ensuring ASEAN cohesion and relevance in the fraught regional security environment.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/134, 14 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS”, 15 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on 22 September 2021”, 22 September 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1908814.shtml
[3] Ravil Shirodkar,“Malaysia Says AUKUS Alliance May Lead to Arms Race, Provocation”, Bloomberg, 18 September 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-18/malaysia-says-aukus-alliance-may-lead-to-arms-race-provocation
[4] “Enhanced Security Trilateral Partnership Between Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS)”, Press Statement, Senior Minister of Defence, YB Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, 19 September 2021; “Announcement by Australia, United Kingdom and the United States on Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership – AUKUS”, Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dato’ Saifuddin Abdullah, 19 September 2021, https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/announcement-by-australia-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-on-enhanced-trilateral-security-partnership-aukus
[5] Hadi Azmi, “Aukus fallout: Malaysia plans China consultations as anxiety simmers over defence pact”, South China Morning Post, 22 September 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3149713/malaysia-plans-china-consultations-anxiety-simmers-over-aukus
[6] Ibid.
[7] “Australia to pursue nuclear-powered submarines through new trilateral enhanced security partnership”, Media Statement, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2021, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security
[8] “Warships in South China Sea will invite conflict, says Dr M”, Malay Mail, 21 October 2019, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/10/21/warships-in-south-china-sea-will-invite-conflict-says-dr-m/1802234
[9] See Ian Storey, “Malaysia and the South China Sea Dispute: Policy Continuity amid Domestic Political Change”, ISEAS Perspective #18/2020, 20 March 2020, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/malaysia-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute-policy-continuity-amid-domestic-political-change-by-ian-storey
[10] “Hisham’s China visit plan on Aukus is ‘off the mark’, says PH”, Free Malaysia Today, 25 September 2021, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2021/09/25/hishams-china-visit-plan-on-aukus-is-off-the-mark-says-ph
[11] Hishammuddin Hussein, Twitter, 27 September 2021, https://twitter.com/HishammuddinH2O/status/1442467191262040072
[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, “Statement on Australia’s Nuclear-powered Submarines Program”, 17 September 2021, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2937/siaran_pers/statement-on-australias-nuclear-powered-submarines-program
[13] Ibid.
[14] Charles Edel, “China Has Only Itself to Blame for AUKUS”, Foreign Policy, 24 September 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-aukus-submarines-defense
[15] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS), p. 226
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “Why Southeast Asia Should Welcome AUKUS”, Foreign Policy 28 September 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/28/southeast-asia-asean-australia-aukus-china-united-states
[18] Ibid.
[19] See Ian Storey, “After Seventy Years, It’s Time to Modernise the US-Philippines Alliance”, Fulcrum, 23 September 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/after-70-years-its-time-to-modernise-the-us-philippines-alliance
[20] Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos , “Duterte ‘concerned’ over AUKUS nuclear submarine deal”, Philippine News Agency, 28 September 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1154907
[21] “Australia has right to improve sub defense capability: Lorenzana”, Philippine News Agency, 17 September 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1153864
[22] “Statement of Foreign Affairs Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr. On the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership”, 19 September, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements-and-advisoriesupdate/29484-statement-of-foreign-affairs-teodoro-l-locsin-jr-on-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-aukus-enhanced-trilateral-security-partnership
[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Singapore), “Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Telephone Call with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison”, 16 September 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/09/20210916-PM-Call-With-Scott-Morrison
[24] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Singapore), “Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Doorstop with Singapore Media via Zoom at the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”, 25 September 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/09/20210926-76th-UNGA-doorstop
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] William Choong, “China-US Relations: Singapore’s Elusive Sweet Spot”, ISEAS Perspective no. 80, 23 July 2020, /wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_80.pdf
[29] Tu Anh, “Vietnam Spells Out Stance on AUKUS”, Hanoi Times, 23 September 2021, https://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-spells-out-stance-on-aukus-318802.html
[30] Mateusz Chatys, “Vietnam and Japan: Partners Amid Superpower Rivalry”, Fulcrum, 1 October 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/vietnam-and-japan-partners-amid-suVietnperpower-rivalry
[31] Radio Free Asia, “Southeast Asian Nations Cautious Over New AUKUS Defense Pact”, Radio Free Asia, 17 September 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/aukus-southeastasia-09172021164007.html
[32] “Prime Minister Delivered Statement at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA76)”, 25 September 2021, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/pmunga76-2?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683e
[33] Kavi Chongkittavorn, “ Thai view on the new AUKUS alliance”, Thai PBS World, 27 September 2021, https://www.thaipbsworld.com/op-ed-thai-view-on-the-new-aukus-alliance
[34] “Philippines Throws Support Behind AUKUS Pact”, Radio Free Asia, 21 September 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/pact-09212021152655.html
[35] Oriana Skylar Mastro and Zack Cooper, “In Defence of AUKUS”, Lowy Interpreter, 5 October 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/aukus-and-australia-s-nuclear-submarines
[36] James Acton, “Why the AUKUS Submarine Deal is Bad for Nonproliferation – And What to Do About It”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 September 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/21/why-aukus-submarine-deal-is-bad-for-nonproliferation-and-what-to-do-about-it-pub-85399
[37] “Australia Confirms Life-Of-Type Extension For Collins-Class Submarines”, Naval News, 19 September 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/australia-confirms-life-of-type-extension-for-collins-class-submarines
[38] Euan Graham, “U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies”, Foreign Policy, 4 May 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/04/malaysia-south-china-sea-us-navy-drillship-standoff
[39] Blake Herzinger, “Learning in the South China Sea: the U.S. Response to the West Capella Standoff”, War on the Rocks, 18 May 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/learning-in-the-south-china-sea-the-u-s-response-to-the-west-capella-standoff
[40] Graham, “U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies”,
[41] Karen Leigh, Peter Martin and Adrian Leung, “Troubled Waters: Where the U.S. and China Could Clash in the South China Sea”, Bloomberg, 17 December 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-south-china-sea-miscalculation
[42] William Choong, “Why the Quad Will Endure”, 9DashLine, 13 April 2021, https://www.9dashline.com/article/why-the-quad-will-endure?rq=choong; Ian Storey, “Will 2022 see signing of a South China Sea Code of Conduct?”, Straits Times, 2 October 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/will-2022-see-signing-of-a-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct
[43] Hoang Thi Ha, “The AUKUS Challenge to ASEAN”, Straits Times, 25 September 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-aukus-challenge-to-asean
[44] Desmond Ball, Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, Tim Huxley, C. Raja Mohan and Brendan Taylor, “Asia’s New Geopolitics: Military Power and Regional Order”, IISS Adelphi no. 478-480,
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge for the IISS, 2021), pp. 12-13, https://www.routledge.com/Asias-New-Geopolitics-Military-Power-and-Regional-Order/Ball-Beraud-Sudreau-Huxley-Mohan-Taylor/p/book/9781032187365
[45] Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (Livestream), “AUKUS: Responses from Southeast Asia”, 1 October 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDpeZcsPoCQ&t=2140s [16:17-17:30]
[46] Dian Septiari, “Oz Seeks to Reassurre ASEAN After AUKUS Gambit”, Jakarta Post, 21 September 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2021/09/21/oz-seeks-to-reassure-asean-after-aukus-gambit.html
[47] Tan See Seng, “Southeast Asia’s Struggle for Autonomy Amid US-China Rivalry”, in International Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS), p. 72.
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“The Democratic Action Party in Johor: Assailing the Barisan Nasional Fortress” by Kevin Zhang, John Choo and Fong Sok Eng
2021/133 “Peril or Opportunity? The Case of Malaysia’s First Non-party Leader Prime Minister” by Ooi Kok Hin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Ismail Sabri Yaakob, Malaysia’s ninth Prime Minister, is the first who is not a party leader. He is only the third highest-ranked leader in UMNO. He is Malaysia’s third premier in 39 months.
- In his first Prime Ministerial address, Ismail Sabri articulated a new vision called “Keluarga Malaysia” (Malaysian Family), affirming inclusiveness and urging all parliamentarians to work towards common ground. However, his commitment to this is uncertain given his track record of stoking ethnic sentiments for political gain.
- Ismail Sabri’s grip over UMNO is tenuous and he faces a party election that must be held by late 2022. The current top two leaders in UMNO are hostile to Bersatu, which is part of Ismail Sabri’s coalition. If Ismail Sabri is defeated in the party election, his position as Prime Minister will become untenable.
- The Islamist party PAS holds significant leverage in the current government. Ismail Sabri is the first PM to give PAS complete control over the religious affairs ministry. He walks a tightrope as he needs PAS to offset his weakness in UMNO, but he must also retain the support of East Malaysian parties wary of PAS’s legislative agenda.
- To circumvent the uncertainties surrounding his fragile coalition and the anticipated leadership tussle within UMNO, Ismail Sabri has reached out to the Pakatan Harapan opposition coalition. An imminent test of his government’s ability to forge multi-party consensus on policies to lift the country out of the health and economic crises will be seen in whether the opposition’s inputs are incorporated into the annual budget to be presented in October. Progress in achieving this would augur well for the evolution of Malaysia’s democracy away from the divisive and “winner takes all” politics of the past.
- However, the impending state and party elections indicate that Malaysia will undergo a period of political uncertainty, which is not atypical following the ending of strongman rule and one-party dominance.
* Ooi Kok Hin is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. The author would like to thank Dr Lee Hwok Aun, Dr Meredith Weiss, Dr Nicholas Chan, and Daniel Teoh for their thoughtful comments and feedback.
INTRODUCTION
The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) has retaken the Prime Minister’s office just 39 months after losing the general election, but not all is well within the party. Although newly minted Malaysian Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, is from UMNO, he is not the top party leader and is politically dependent on its coalitional ally-cum-electoral rivals, the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). Ismail Sabri’s “weak” position presents opportunities – and potential perils – for Malaysia as he seeks to foster a new political equilibrium and steer Malaysia toward recovery.
Ismail Sabri announced a bloated cabinet of 70 ministers and deputy ministers, almost a third of the total Members of Parliament.[1] As political scientist Wong Chin Huat observed, this “payroll vote” is necessary to sustain the prime minister’s slim majority in Malaysia’s parliamentary democracy.[2] He maintained continuity with Muhyiddin Yassin’s cabinet – all but four ministers are retained in the cabinet. Under Ismail Sabri’s cabinet, UMNO has a net gain of two ministers and crucially, has wrested the rural development ministry and the housing and local government ministry – both rich in resources and patronage – back from Bersatu. UMNO also now completely controls the Communications ministry, whose messaging channels and personnel hiring will be useful in the general election which has to be held within two years. Given his position as non-party leader with untested majority in Parliament (as of the time of writing), his premiership in the coming months will require him to consolidate his power internally (within UMNO as well as within his coalition) and externally (through a confidence and supply agreement with the opposition).
Ismail Sabri is the first Malaysian Prime Minister who is not a party leader. In parliamentary democracies, the positions of Prime Minister or Opposition Leader often belong to the leader of a political party. But Ismail Sabri is only the third highest-ranked leader in UMNO (Table 1). He is one of three Vice Presidents of the party (he received the highest votes among the three winners in the 2018 party election, and hence became the most senior among them). He was appointed to the premiership out of the force of circumstance: UMNO president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi faces 47 charges for misuse of funds,[3] and another 33 charges for corruption,[4] while UMNO deputy president Mohamad Hasan is not eligible because he is not a Member of Parliament.[5] Being the highest ranked UMNO leader in the previous cabinet under Muhyiddin, Ismail Sabri was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister on 7 July 2021. Slightly more than a month later, Muhyiddin resigned, on 16 August, after a faction of UMNO parliamentarians aligned to the party president withdrew their support and Muhyiddin failed to reach a confidence-and-supply agreement with the opposition to remain in power.[6] Five days of political uncertainty ensued, and it was Ismail Sabri who cobbled a sufficient majority to be sworn in as the ninth Prime Minister on 21 August.
Table 1: Top five UMNO leaders for the term 2018-2021
ISMAIL SABRI’S PREMIERSHIP ON ETHNIC RELATIONS: A HISTORY AND AN OUTLOOK
In his first address to the nation as Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri articulated a new vision called “Keluarga Malaysia” (Malaysian Family).[7] He pleaded for Parliamentarians to put aside differences and forge consensus, and affirmed the inclusive diversity of “the Malaysian Family.”
However, is “Keluarga Malaysia” a credible commitment on his part? In the past, Ismail Sabri had often demonstrated a willingness to stoke ethnic sentiments for political gains. For example, in 2015, a quick spiral of events turned violent in Kuala Lumpur: a theft incident in Lowyat Mall was followed by ethnically charged incitements and misinformation, which led to confrontations between Malay and Chinese groups. Ismail Sabri, who was then minister in charge of rural development, jumped the gun before police investigations concluded. He expressed sympathy for one group and called upon Malay customers to boycott Chinese businesses.[8] Not only that, he ended the Facebook post by lamenting that the Chinese will continue to “oppress the Malays” if they do not change.[9] He later clarified that his intention was to urge consumers to organize against price increases, but his emphasis on ethnicity was unmistakable.[10] He also seized the occasion to launch MARA Digital Mall, a knee-jerk reaction to the riot, to promote Bumiputra entrepreneurs.[11] The initiative proved to be a policy failure[12] and cost losses to the ministry.[13]
On another occasion, a mere three years ago, Ismail Sabri opposed the government’s plan to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). In a public rally, he riled up the predominantly Malay Muslim crowd by grumbling about the erosion of Malay rights, lamenting the expansion of equal opportunities for other ethnic groups and falsely claiming that Bibles were being publicly distributed to Muslims.[14] As opposition leader in 2019, he challenged the government to ban the Chinese educationist group, the United Chinese School Committees’ Association (Dong Zong).[15]
Far from revisiting Ismail Sabri’s personal history, these instances point to a reckless proclivity in jeopardizing ethnic relations. He had no qualms speaking[16] and writing[17] the words “Bangsa DAP”, a derogatory term with racist undertones. In a divided society such as Malaysia, Ismail Sabri’s previous actions in public office do not inspire confidence.
Table 2: Key events in Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s political career
That said, historical precedents provide clues that Ismail Sabri will at least tone down his ethnic appeal when he governs as Prime Minister. Before he became the country’s first premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman was distrustful of non-Malay loyalty to the polity, stating that “It is not fair for the Malays to throw in their lot with others when others refused to be naturalized, refused to study the language, and refused to adopt the customs of the country.”[18] However, he went on to govern liberally as Prime Minister and even appointed a Chinese as finance minister. Similarly, Mahathir Mohamad was seen as the firebrand author of “The Malay Dilemma” prior to his premiership but it was he who promoted Bangsa Malaysia as Prime Minister. Former Prime Minister Najib Razak also started the 1Malaysia campaign immediately after becoming the premier. To an extent, Ismail Sabri has already moved in this direction with his “Keluarga Malaysia” vision, but a credible measure of his sincerity would be the extent to which he refrains from the ethnic appeals he had frequently invoked in the past.
Yet the logical reason underpinning this shift to the centre – to appeal to the broader electorate beyond one’s own party base – does not always reap the intended rewards. Najib’s 1Malaysia campaign failed to attract Chinese voters in the 2013 general election. Najib subsequently abandoned the 1Malaysia campaign and pivoted to the right in the run-up to the 2018 general election.[19] He openly flirted with PAS to enable the Islamist party’s president, Abdul Hadi Awang, to table a private member’s bill on the empowerment of Shariah courts.[20]
Ismail Sabri is in a unique position because while he is from UMNO, he initially did not have unanimous support from the party to remain in Muhyiddin’s cabinet.[21] He broke ranks with the top two party chiefs and led a group of UMNO Members of Parliament to side with the Perikatan Nasional government.[22] In doing so, he was rewarded and made Deputy Prime Minister with support from PAS and Bersatu.
Without full backing from his own party, Ismail Sabri is politically dependent on both PAS and Bersatu. As a matter of fact, a dark horse in Ismail’s cabinet is PAS. The party has been quiet since forming the Perikatan Nasional government with Muhyiddin (and now Ismail Sabri). If they become assertive and press for their ideologically-driven goals – for instance, a legislation empowering Shariah courts and paving the way for Hudud implementation – they could reinvigorate ethnic and religious polarization in the country. It is noteworthy that under Ismail Sabri’s new cabinet, PAS now completely helms the ministry of religious affairs for the first time.[23] PAS’s increasing leverage can be observed in a recent announcement of several bills being proposed to strengthen Shariah laws.[24] Will Ismail Sabri’s dependency on PAS’s loyalty lead to concessions in religious conservatism, or will he contain their ambition out of fear that PAS’s agenda will cost him support from East Malaysian parties? Already, the Sabah chief minister has publicly objected to the proposed bills on Control and Restrictions on the Expansion of non-Islam Religions, which is one of the four new Shariah bills.[25] Regardless, Ismail Sabri would be wise to avoid Shariah-related issues till at least after the Sarawak state election.[26] PAS’s ideological demands may strike a chord among Malay Muslim voters in the peninsula but they are a liability in Borneo, which is more diverse and wary of Islamization.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
As Professor Abdul Rahman Embong concluded in a recent webinar organized by ISEAS –Yusof Ishak Institute, there may not be a clear winner in GE15.[27] If that turns out to be the case, political fragmentation will remain for a while. What is perceived as instability, however, is not necessarily a liability for Malaysia’s long-term democratic development. In Japan and Indonesia,[28] for example, there were a series of rapidly changing governments in the initial period following the fall of a strongman rule or dominant party rule before a new (and hopefully democratic) equilibrium was found.
The political order under Ismail Sabri is shaky. Within his party, Ismail Sabri must face the UMNO party election, which must be held by the end of 2022.[29] The timing for this will depend on the timing of the general election. Will Ismail Sabri contest the presidency? It is unprecedented enough that a non-party leader was appointed Prime Minister, but it is more bizarre if he does not consolidate power within his party. Marshalling the incumbency advantage as Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri could make a bid for the party presidency by assembling a team with UMNO ministers in his cabinet, such as Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein.[30] The party election will probably take place first before the general election so that whoever emerges party president will get to pick election candidates and lead the party into the general election.
An important detail in Ismail Sabri’s cabinet lies not just in who is in, but who is excluded: Ahmad Zahid (current UMNO president), Mohamad Hassan (deputy president), and Khaled Nordin (vice president and former Menteri Besar of Johor). The UMNO president has the power to sign the candidate nomination form, which means he has the final say in determining the party’s election candidates. Without becoming party president, Ismail Sabri cannot pick his slate of candidates (presumably loyal to him) and in fact, cannot unilaterally settle seat negotiations with other parties in his coalition, such as Bersatu. This could be a test of two incumbent advantages: does the incumbency advantage of the Prime Minister outweigh the incumbency advantage of the party president? In the event that Ismail Sabri is defeated in the party election, however, his position as Prime Minister will become untenable.
In preparing for UMNO’s party election, Ismail Sabri will have to strike a delicate balance between campaigning to be a party leader who prioritizes UMNO’s interest, without antagonizing or yielding to Bersatu. Between UMNO and Bersatu, ties are rocky and Ismail Sabri’s government is at risk if factions within the two parties fall out again. As it is, they are unable to even agree on the name of the new government: one faction still calls it the Perikatan Nasional government, while another faction rejects any association with Perikatan Nasional.[31] For as long as Bersatu exists, UMNO cannot be returned as the sole dominant party because of their overlapping constituencies. Thus, the current top two UMNO leaders have rejected cooperation with Muhyiddin’s Bersatu, to which Ismail Sabri’s faction is less hostile. They will need to wrestle for the UMNO leadership if they wish to form an electoral agreement and negotiate seats with Bersatu and Perikatan Nasional for the general election. Though ousted as prime minister, Muhyiddin does not plan to retire from politics. He has in fact already been appointed chairman of the National Recovery Council,[32] and recently vowed to lead Bersatu and Perikatan Nasional into the general election.[33]
This could well be the reason PAS sided with Bersatu under Perikatan Nasional and deprioritized their pre-existing partnership with UMNO under Muafakat Nasional. UMNO president was so slighted at PAS’s “loyalty” to Bersatu that he virtually claimed that the Muafakat Nasional partnership is as good as dead.[34] With Bersatu’s weak presence on the east coast, PAS are virtually assured of retaining their rule in their coveted bases, Kelantan, Terengganu and perhaps Kedah. On the other hand, a partnership with UMNO would entail a more equal sharing of power. Why would PAS settle for equal partnership when they can be the Big Brother on the east coast? Since UMNO is the traditional electoral opponent for PAS prior to the 2018 alignment, a consolidated UMNO would threaten PAS’s political interests. In addition, PAS has always been the political beneficiary of an UMNO split. This happened in the 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2018 elections, and it would therefore be in their interest to draw out the UMNO-Bersatu rivalry for as long as possible.
Given the context of his fragile coalition and uncertainty surrounding UMNO leadership, Ismail Sabri has sought to forge a temporary stabilizing order by reaching out to the opposition for support. He met with top opposition leaders prior to the cabinet announcement[35] and in September, leaders from the ruling and the opposition coalitions signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Transformation and Political Stability.[36] This could well be a rare opportunity for substantive reforms and democratization, though it is not clear whether the MoU has any legally binding obligations.[37]
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Ismail Sabri has been catapulted to Malaysia’s highest office under the most unusual circumstances. For the first time, the prime minister is not the president, chairman, or de facto leader of a political party. Compared to his predecessors, Ismail Sabri’s relatively “weak” position – within his party and the fragile coalition – presents unique challenges to his premiership.
The MoU signed by the ruling and opposition coalitions helps to set the tone for a new political culture that is less fixated on a winner-takes-all rationale.
The spirit of cooperation will be tested in late October when the government tables the budget. Will the government incorporate the opposition’s inputs into the budget and meet public expectations? If they do, will the opposition honour their word and pass the budget?
ISEAS Perspective 2021/133, 12 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] “Ismail Sabri’s govt: Who’s in, who’s out and what it means”, Malaysiakini, 27 August 2021. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/588927
[2] Wong Chin Huat, “Parliament as Prime Minister’s electoral college: the defection game in Malaysia’s democratic backsliding”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Volume 109, Issue 5, 2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1819631
[3] “Zahid’s trial over 47 charges involving foundation’s funds to start Monday”, The Star Online, 17 November 2019. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/11/17/zahid039s-trial-over-47-charges-involving-foundation039s-funds-to-start-monday-nov-18
[4] “Zahid slapped with 33 more charges for receiving RM42.7m bribes”, The Edge, 27 June 2019. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/zahid-slapped-33-more-charges-0
[5] Mohamad Hasan, popularly known as Tok Mat, was former Menteri Besar of Negeri Sembilan from 2004 to 2018 and is now leader of the opposition in the Negeri Sembilan state assembly. In the 2018 party election, he defeated Annuar Musa, the current Minister of Communications and Multimedia, to be elected the 11th UMNO deputy president.
[6] “Malaysia’s opposition, key ally reject PM’s offer for bipartisan support”, Reuters, 13 August 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysias-opposition-key-ally-reject-pms-offer-bipartisan-support-2021-08-14/
[7] “In first-ever speech, new PM asks MPs to save ‘Keluarga Malaysia’ together, offers Opposition leaders a chance to join Covid-19 fight”, Malay Mail, 22 August 2021. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/08/22/in-first-ever-speech-new-pm-asks-mps-to-save-keluarga-malaysia-together-off/1999603
[8] “Malaysia minister asks Malays to boycott Chinese businesses to reduce prices”, TODAY Online, 2 February 2015. https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/malaysia-minister-asks-malays-boycott-chinese-businesses-reduce-prices
[9] “Boycott Chinese businesses to lower price of goods, minister tells Malays”, Malay Mail, 2 February 2015. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2015/02/02/boycott-chinese-businesses-to-lower-price-of-goods-minister-tells-malays/832557
[10] “Ismail Sabri explains Facebook posting”, New Straits Times, 2 February 2015. https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/ismail-sabri-explains-facebook-posting
[11] “Ismail Sabri: Medan Mara digital mall not a racist venture”, the Star Online, 8 December 2015. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/12/08/ismail-sabri-yaakob-mara-digital-mall-not-racist-venture
[12] “Malaysia’s bumiputera-only digital malls struggle to stay open”, Straits Times, 22 January 2020. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-bumiputera-only-digital-malls-struggle-to-stay-open
[13] “Mara digital malls in two states closed due to low sales”, the Star Online, 17 October 2019. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/10/17/mara-digital-malls-in-two-states-closed-due-to-low-sales
[14] The video clip, shared in a Facebook group called “Penyatuan Ummah” by a user, is titled “ICERD & Agenda DAP: Luahan Rasa DS Ismail Sabri Yaakob, Naib Presiden UMNO #Benteng153.” https://www.facebook.com/groups/PenyatuanUmmah/posts/924931844725949
[15] “Haramkan Dong Zong, Pertubuhan Rasis Sempit: Ismail Sabri”, UMNO Online, 14 August 2019. https://umno-online.my/2019/08/14/haramkan-dong-zong-pertubuhan-rasis-sempit-ismail-sabri/
[16] “Ismail Sabri: Malaysia currently ruled by ‘bangsa DAP’”, KiniTV, 2019. Video available at: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x75351o
[17] Ismail Sabri, “Tahap mana lagi kita Bangsa Melayu dan Islam Malaysia harus bersabar apabila satu demi satu cubaan Bangsa DAP untuk mempersoalkan hak dan keistimewaan Orang Melayu Islam di Malaysia.,” Twitter.com. 4 August 2019. https://twitter.com/ismailsabri60/status/1158015391836172288?lang=en
[18] The Straits Times, 18 September 1951.
[19] A “Made for Television” moment was captured in December 2016 when Najib and Hadi, then party presidents of UMNO and PAS respectively, jointly appeared in a rally to support Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims. The bitter irony was that it was the Perikatan Nasional government, of which UMNO and PAS were part of, which launched a harsh crackdown on Rohingya refugees in 2020.
[20] Helen Ting, “UMNO’s hand in Malaysian Islamic law,” East Asia Forum. 6 June 2017. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/06/umnos-hand-in-malaysian-islamic-law/
[21] “Ismail Sabri to face ‘consequences’ for standing with Muhyiddin,” Malaysiakini, 4 August 2021. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/585926
[22] “MPs from Umno-led BN break ranks to support Malaysia PM Muhyiddin Yassin”, Straits Times, 18 August 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/31-mps-from-umno-led-bn-reiterate-support-for-malaysia-pm-muhyiddin-yassin
[23] The Minister of Religious Affairs, Idris Ahmad, and the deputy minister, Ahmad Marzuk Shaary, are both from PAS. It is the only ministry over which PAS has complete control.
[24] “Four new shariah laws in the works, says deputy minister”, Free Malaysia Today, 6 September 2021. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2021/09/06/four-new-shariah-laws-in-the-works-says-deputy-minister/
[25] “Sabah opposes proposed Shariah Bill to control non-Muslim religions – CM”, Borneo Post, 9 September 2021. https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/09/09/sabah-opposes-proposed-shariah-bill-to-control-non-muslim-religions-cm/
[26] A state of emergency has been extended in Sarawak until February 2022 to suspend the state election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. An extension is possible after the date.
[27] Abdul Rahman Embong, “Malaysian Political Dynamics: The Making and Remaking of Political Alignments and Social Cohesion”, ISEAS Malaysia Studies Programme Webinar, 25 August 2021.
[28] It was Ross Tapsell from the Australian National University who first drew the parallel between contemporary Malaysia and Indonesia in the immediate aftermath of the Suharto regime’s collapse. https://twitter.com/RossTapsell/status/1427418272874438656. Although the context differs because the Suharto’s regime collapsed while Barisan Nasional lost the election to the opposition coalition, there is some parallel in the rapid and fluid regrouping of political elites before a new political equilibrium stabilizes.
[29] “Postponement of Umno elections in order – Ahmad Maslan”, New Straits Times, 30 August 2021. https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2021/08/722916/postponement-umno-elections-order-ahmad-maslan
[30] “According to UMNO’s party constitution, clause 8.2 states that the annual general assembly (AGM) must be held annually at a time decided by the Supreme Council so long as it does not exceed 18 months after the previous AGM. The 2020 AGM was held on March 2021 (It was also postponed due to the pandemic). The 2021 AGM, the one that is currently being postponed, must be held within the subsequent 18 months, which is by August 2022.”
[31] “Cracks emerge between Umno and Bersatu day after Ismail named PM”, Malaysiakini, 21 August 2021. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/588144
[32] “Malaysia appoints former PM to lead coronavirus recovery council,” Reuters, 4 September 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-appoints-former-pm-lead-coronavirus-recovery-council-2021-09-04/
[33] “Bersatu to make comeback at next polls, says Muhyiddin,” The Malaysian Insight, 10 September 2021. https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/338562
[34] “Zahid hints Muafakat Nasional is dead,” The Malaysian Insight, 30 Sept 2021 https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/342460
[35] “Malaysia’s new PM Ismail Sabri Yaakob and opposition leaders agree to find common ground”, South China Morning Post, 25 August 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3146370/malaysias-new-pm-ismail-sabri-yaakob-and-opposition
[36] “ Malaysian govt, PH opposition sign historic bipartisan deal; polls not expected before Aug 2022”, Straits Times, 14 September 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-govt-and-opposition-ink-deal-on-historic-bipartisan-cooperation
[37] “A legal view of the MOU between the government of Malaysia and Pakatan Harapan — Philip TN Koh”, Malay Mail, 17 September 2021. https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-think/2021/09/17/a-legal-view-of-the-mou-between-the-government-of-malaysia-and-pakatan-hara/2006370
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2021/132 “Reform of Parliament: Lessons from 2020-2021” by Shad Saleem Faruqi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- An elected and representative legislature is the central pillar of a democratic polity. One third of the Articles of the Constitution of Malaysia require Parliament to perform a number of essential functions, such as the making of laws, scrutiny of executive policy, supervision of national finance, and control of emergency powers.
- The House of Representatives gives legitimacy to the government, represents electoral constituencies, and approves electoral boundaries. Individual MPs help to redress the grievances of their constituents. The Senate represents the 13 States, the Federal Territories and minorities.
- Despite its key role in Malaysia’s governance, Parliament has been in abeyance for much of 2020 and 2021. It played no role in restoring political stability to the nation after the fall of the Pakatan Harapan Government in February 2020, and has been an unwilling bystander in the devastating health and economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.
- Reform of the law and practice of Parliament are necessary to give effect to the constitutional provisions on Parliament’s functions and to enhance Parliament’s institutional efficacy.
- This essay highlights those issues that surfaced in 2020 and 2021 when the institution of Parliament was at its ebb.
* Shad Saleem Faruqi is Emeritus Professor at UiTM; and holder of the Tunku Abdul Rahman Foundation Chair at the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya. He is also Senior Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
When the Constitution of Malaya was drafted in 1957, fifty-seven out of 181 Articles of the basic charter were devoted to the role and function of an elected and representative Parliament, created to be the heartbeat of Malaya’s constitutional and political system.
Regrettably, a wide gap has developed between the Westminster theory that the government is answerable, accountable and responsible to Parliament, and the reality of an omnipotent executive. This is not peculiar to Malaysia and is a challenge in almost all of the 33 or so “Westminster” democracies operating in the world today.[1] The factors that have contributed to the shift of power from the legislature to the political executive vary from society to society and require separate treatment.
This essay outlines the constitutional functions of the Malaysian Parliament but takes note of the reality of pervasive executive dominance. A comprehensive list of reforms to reverse this trend is not possible in this essay[2] but lessons from the last two years are noted because Parliament was in abeyance for most of the time between January 2020 and September 2021.[3] It played no role in restoring political stability after the fall of the Pakatan Harapan Government in February 2020 and was an unwilling bystander in the devastating health and economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.
ROLE AND FUNCTION OF PARLIAMENT
In Malaysia’s Westminster system of “parliamentary government”, the legislature is supposed to perform the following constitutional functions:
Giving democratic legitimacy to the government: Under Article 43(2)(a), the Monarch appoints a person to be the Prime Minister who in his judgement is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives (the Dewan Rakyat).[4] If this majority is lost,[5] the PM has only two choices: advise a dissolution of the House or submit the resignation of the Cabinet.[6]
Legislative function: This includes the enactment, amendment, and repeal of ordinary laws,[7] emergency laws[8] and amendments to the Constitution.[9] Ideally, the legislative role should also include the scrutiny of delegated legislation[10] and a leadership role in law reform.[11]
Oversight of executive policy and performance: The foundational principle of a parliamentary democracy is that Parliament should enforce accountability, answerability, and responsibility of the political executive to the Houses of Parliament or their committees. Article 43(3) sums it up well: “The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament”.
Control of national finance: This should include oversight of the government’s long and short term financial and economic policies; examination of the use of financial resources optimally; allocation of the annual budget and supplementary budgets.[12] The Dewan Rakyat’s Public Accounts Committee reviews the reports of the Auditor-General to examine how the allocations were utilised.[13]
The constituency function: In Malaysia’s electoral system of single-member constituencies, the 222 MPs represent the voters of one constituency each. It is part of each MP’s function to redress his/her constituents’ grievances and engage with them to obtain feedback on government policies and programmes. Many MPs run Service Centres to serve their constituents.[14]
Functions during an emergency: During an emergency, Parliament is not automatically dissolved or suspended (though it may be). Instead, Article 150 gives to Parliament three major functions during an emergency: (i) To scrutinise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s (King’s) Emergency Proclamation and, if need be, to annul it;[15] (ii) To scrutinise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s Emergency Ordinances and, if need be, to annul them;[16] and (iii) To enact Emergency Acts of Parliament.[17]
Electoral boundaries: It is part of the Dewan Rakyat’s function to approve or reject the Election Commission’s proposals for new electoral boundaries.[18]
Malay Reserves Lands: Any de-reservation of a Malay Reserve requires legislation in the State Assembly along with a special majority resolution in both Houses of Parliament.[19]
Parliamentary privileges: Each House is empowered to exercise parliamentary privileges to protect the House, its members and officers and to ensure compliance with its decisions and orders.
Dewan Negara/Senate: Two Senators from each State represent the 13 States. In addition, 44 appointed Senators are supposed to give voice to the Federal Territories, minorities and marginalised groups.
Regrettably, except for the constituency function, Parliament fails to perform the other functions satisfactorily. There are many structural, legal and procedural impediments in the way of its independence and efficacy. The years 2020-2021 exposed some of these impediments dramatically.
LESSONS FROM 2020-2021
If Parliament is to perform any of the above constitutional functions, it must be allowed to assemble frequently enough! It must have some say over whether it can convene, and when. It must decide or at least be consulted over issues of adjournment and prorogation.[20] It must have the power to determine its agenda, to debate and discuss matters of national and public importance and to introduce motions. The Speaker[21] and the Secretary of Parliament[22] must not be subordinate to the political executive. Regrettably, the last two years have taught Malaysians that the political executive has near-total control over all aspects of the Parliament’s life.[23]
Constitutional principles and PM’s discretion over parliamentary calendar: The summoning, adjournment and prorogation[24] of Parliament, are not a royal discretion but a prime ministerial power.[25] The number of parliamentary sittings per year is quite low.[26] The Dewan Rakyat meets 50-80 days a year. In 2020 it met for only 55 days; in 2021, (till 26 Sept) for only nine days. Due to the emergency in 2021, Parliament was convened for the first time only on July 26 but prorogued two days later. Our parliamentary calendar compares unfavourably with the UK where Parliament meets for about 170-180 days per year on average.[27]
On 1 March 2020, when Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin was sworn in as PM, he postponed the scheduled parliamentary sitting from 9 March to 18 May in order to consolidate his position ahead of an anticipated vote of no-confidence. In subsequent weeks when the Palace advised PM Muhyiddin to summon Parliament as soon as may be, the Palace’s press releases were largely ignored by the PM’s office on the ground that the decision to summon Parliament rests with the Cabinet and not the King.[28]
There is also the problem of the distinction between a ‘Session’ and a ‘Meeting’.[29] Article 55(1) forbids no more than “six months to elapse between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for (the) first meeting in the next session”. The Constitution is silent about the interval between one meeting and the next meeting in the same session![30]
Increasing the number of sittings will assist Parliament to perform its roles more thoroughly. Reformers suggest that given the very lengthy periods when Parliament does not sit, parliamentary committees should be allowed to function both during an adjournment and a prorogation. It is in committee work that Parliament blossoms into “the grand inquest of the nation”.
Parliamentary agenda: Though Parliament is supposed to be a separate pillar of our Constitution, it has no independence to determine its agenda! Under the Standing Orders of the House, the executive, and not the Speaker, determines or dominates the parliamentary agenda.[31] Government business takes precedence over private members’ business.[32] The Standing Orders have a constitutional basis[33] and are probably unchallengeable in a court due to Article 63(1).[34]
The dominance of the executive over Parliament was dramatically illustrated in several recent events.
In March 2020, after Tan Sri Muhyiddin was appointed Prime Minister, he postponed Parliament from 9 March to 18 May. But come 18 May, the Dewan Rakyat was allowed to sit for a mere half day to listen to the King’s speech at the beginning of the new session. No debates or motions were allowed!
On 13 July 2020, the Speaker, Tan Sri Dato’ Mohamad Ariff Md Yusof, a retired and respected former Court of Appeal judge, known for his independence and integrity, was summarily removed from his post in mid-term because, according to the PM “there is a new candidate for the post”.[35] The Deputy Speaker only allowed two individuals from each side to debate for 10 minutes each.
In July 2021, the Dewan Rakyat met for the first time on 26 July 2021 for two days only and was then adjourned due to the Covid threat. During the two days, a motion of no-confidence was not allowed by the Speaker! The Emergency Ordinances required to be laid before the Houses under Article 150(3) were not allowed to be debated on the unconstitutional claim that the Cabinet had already annulled them.
Again in 2021, when Parliament returned to session on 13 September under the new PM Ismail Sabri, neither a motion of confidence in favour of the PM nor a motion against the Speaker were allowed on the Daily Order Paper.[36]
Motion of no-confidence: It is a fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy that the PM and Cabinet are subject to votes of confidence in the elected House. Articles 43(3) and 43(4) indirectly recognise this principle.[37] A House of Commons Briefing Paper refers to the “core convention” that the government must be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons.[38]
Despite this core convention, the Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat, framed during the days of Barisan Nasional’s monolithic power, do not have any specific provision for a motion of no-confidence. Since 2015, scores of such motions have been denied admission or placed at the bottom of the Order of Business. Most incredulously, several Dewan Rakyat Speakers have ruled that to give a Motion of no-confidence priority will require the Motion to be moved by a Minister under S.O. 14(1)(n) to alter the Order of Business![39]
The legality and propriety of a vote of confidence on the floor is under serious questioning in Malaysia. The feeling of some is that the judgment about who commands confidence is the exclusive function of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Article 43(2)(a) without recourse to Parliament. It is noteworthy that after the “Sheraton move”, when Tun Mahathir, the “Interim Prime Minister”, sought to convene the House to prove his majority, his request was turned down by the Speaker on the ground that “the appointing authority resides in the Head of State, not in the legislature”.[40] In the appointment of Muhyiddin Yassin in 2020 and Ismail Sabri in 2021, the King chose to interview MPs in person and consult his brother Rulers rather than convene the House to test the claimant’s majority on the floor.
To question the claim that Parliament is the best forum for testing the PM’s majority, the Attorney-General issued a Press Release on 4 September 2021 that as PM Ismail Sabri had been duly appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a vote of confidence was unnecessary and would undermine the King’s powers.[41] The AG went on to say that the power of the King to appoint a PM was absolute and could not be questioned. The AG’s views are out of sync with Articles 43(2)(a) and 43(4). Article 43(2)(a) links the Monarch’s discretion to the likelihood of someone commanding the confidence of the majority of the members of the House. Article 43(4) foresees the possibility that someone duly appointed by the King may cease to command this confidence. The AG’s views also contradict the explicit royal direction from the King when PM Ismail Sabri was appointed that the new PM must seek a vote of confidence in Parliament.[42] The AG also sidesteps clear precedents of votes of confidence when Tun Hussein Onn and Tun Abdullah Badawi assumed the premiership.[43] At the State level, there are eleven examples of successful votes of no-confidence between 1962-2020, the most recent being December 2020 in Perak.[44]
Role of Malay Rulers: Since the Sultan of Pahang ascended to the federal throne on 31 January 2019, he has for many critical decisions sought the advice of his brother Rulers. Some of these occasions were the appointment of the PM in 2020 and again in 2021. This spirit of consultation is entirely commendable and is in line with the Conference’s power under Article 38(2) to deliberate on “any other matter that it thinks fit”. However, what is constitutionally significant is that only the Malay Rulers and not the Governors were invited for the consultation.[45]
Number of cabinet ministers: Unlike all State Constitutions which prescribe the maximum number of Executive Council members, the Federal Constitution imposes no limit on how large the Cabinet can be. If a PM has unlimited power to choose the size of his Cabinet under Article 43(2)(b), that, along with his extensive power of patronage, makes it almost impossible for a vote of no-confidence to ever be successful. Also, the economic implications of a 70-strong Cabinet are staggering.
Covid-19 and hybrid sittings: Under Article 62(5), “members absent from a House shall not be allowed to vote”. This law was cited as a hindrance to “hybrid sittings”. Actually, all that is needed is an amendment to the Standing Orders to redefine “a House” to include any place permitted or required by the Speaker in or outside the main block of Parliament.
Control over emergency powers: Despite the command in Article 150(3) that a proclamation of Emergency and all Emergency Ordinances shall be laid before the Houses, no time frame has been provided for such laying.[46] If Parliament is not summoned before the emergency ends or if the government controls the agenda in such a way as to disallow any debate or motion on emergency laws (as was the case on 26 July 2021), then the constitutional requirement of Article 150(3) is frustrated.
Power to delay enforcement of Bills passed by Parliament: The last few years have brought to light a most undemocratic reality. Bills including constitutional amendments duly passed by the Houses and signed by the King are often left hanging because the executive had inserted a clause empowering it to choose the date of enforcement. If the executive fails to act, the will of Parliament remains unenforced. The Undi-18 Act passed and gazetted in September 2019 has suffered this ignominy.
MPs convicted of crimes: Under Article 48(4) MPs convicted of crimes are not disqualified from membership till their appeal is dismissed in the courts and their application for Royal Pardon is rejected.[47] Article 48(4) brings a bad name to Parliament. Additionally, MPs under the stigma of conviction may resort to pressures on the government to drop or modify the charges. In a situation of a hung Parliament or a slim majority, these pressures may destabilise a government.
Party-hopping: Malaysia needs an anti-hopping law to regulate the nefarious activity of defections.[48] Defections have caused the fall of many elected governments at the State level. At the federal level since 2020, two PMs have had to resign. However, one must be mindful that an anti-hopping law may be unhelpful in some circumstances.[49] For this reason, instead of an anti-hopping law, Malaysia could legislate a “recall law”, whereby any MP who crosses the floor could be required, if there is a Petition by 20 percent of the electorate, to return to the electorate in his constituency at a by-election for renewal of his electoral mandate.
CONCLUSION
The last 18 months have not been good for the Malaysian Parliament. One is reminded of the British Queen’s 1992 annus horribilis speech of 1992. Only once in earlier history has the Malaysian Parliament been so marginalized. That was during the dark days of the racial riots of May 1969 when Parliament was suspended for about 21 months.
One can think of some silver linings, though. An important constitutional development in early 2021 was that the emergency proclamation on 12 January carried a first-ever “sunset clause” to end the emergency on August 1, 2021. This could be a precedent for future Emergency Proclamations.
There is broad outrage at the way the political executive pulverized the nation’s legislative organ in 2020-21. An elected institution, meant to oversee the executive, is under the total control of those it is supposed to scrutinize!
During the Muhyiddin Yassin tenure, the Conference of Rulers and the King spoke repeatedly but in vain of the need to bring Parliament back to session to perform its constitutional functions. The monarchy earned praise for its role.
The new Law Minister, Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar, has promised parliamentary transformation through wide ranging reforms.[50] On 13 September 2021, PM Ismail Sabri’s government signed a historic bipartisan deal with the opposition.[51] One has to wait and see how things work out but in the area of parliamentary reform it appears that there will be many concessions to the parliamentary opposition. A balance of representation between opposition and government MPs in parliamentary Select Committees is proposed. Opposition members will have a place on the National Recovery Council. Opposition members will be permitted to contribute to the contents of Budget 2022. There will be equal allocations for constituency development funds.[52] The PM’s term will be limited to 10 years. Undi-18 and automatic voter registration will be implemented. The Parliamentary Services Act will be reintroduced.
While the above piecemeal reforms are welcome, one notes with concern that nothing is said about reform of Standing Orders and other laws that deal with the parliamentary calendar, parliamentary agenda, question time, motions, and private members’ business. These enable the executive to dominate the legislature and silence dissent. There are other structural, legal and administrative reforms that are needed to restore Parliament’s dignity and efficacy. Foremost should be the putting in place of a system of legislation committees and departmental committees, better scrutiny of the law-making process, a Law Reform Commission reporting to Parliament, better scrutiny of national finance, reform of the Senate, improvement of the electoral process, better representation for Sabah and Sarawak in Parliament, an Institute of Parliamentary Affairs, a law on Fixed Term Parliaments, regulation of party hopping, and rules about caretaker governments.
One hopes that the ripples being created will go far. Perhaps the marginalization suffered in 2020-2021 will inspire thorough reform.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/132, 7 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] In the UK, Lord Hewart of Bury’s book The New Despotism (1929) and G W Keeton’s The Passing of Parliament (1952) recorded their alarm over the increasing ascendency of the executive over Parliament and the courts.
[2] Shad Saleem Faruqi, “The Malaysian Parliament: Problems, Prospects and Proposals for Reform” in Mohamad Ariff Md Yusof, Roosme Hamzah and Shad Saleem Faruqi (editors), Law, Principles and Practice in the Dewan Rakyat, Sweet & Maxwell, 2020, pp. 495-524.
[3] In 2020, the Dewan Rakyat met for a total of 55 days. In 2021 (till 26 September) it met for a mere 9 days.
[4] Articles 40(2)(a), 43(2)(a).
[5] There are two ways in which the loss of confidence can be measured: first by a vote on the floor of the House of Representatives. Second, by the King taking note of relevant facts outside the House: Dato’ Dr Zambry Abd Kadir v Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar [2009] 5 MLJ 464.
[6] Article 43(4). In 2020 Tun Mahathir and in 2021 Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin resigned from the PM’s post due to the loss of support of several defectors from their coalition. The British convention that with the fall of the PM, the doctrine of collective responsibility requires that the entire cabinet must resign, is explicitly incorporated into the Malaysian Constitution by Article 43(4). In Datuk (Datu) Amir Kahar Tun bin Datu Haji Mustapha v Tun Mohd Said Keruak [1995] 4 CLJ 184 the then Chief Minister of Sabah, Datuk Seri Joseph Pairin Kitingan of the ruling Parti Bersatu Sabah lost his majority to the Barisan Nasional due to defections. Pairin tendered his resignation. Amir Kahar, a member of Pairin’s Cabinet brought an action that he was still a minister because only the Chief Minister had resigned. The Court held that when the Chief Minister resigns, the Cabinet resigns with it; whether or not there was a letter of resignation.
[7] Articles 66, 73-79.
[8] Article 150(5), (6) and (6A).
[9] Articles 2(b), 159 and 161E.
[10] In Malaysia, delegated legislation is referred to as ‘subsidiary legislation’. Under the Interpretation Acts 1948/1967 “Subsidiary legislation means any proclamation, rule, regulation, order, notification, by-law or other instrument made under any Act, Enactment, Ordinance or other lawful authority and having legislative effect”. Subsidiary legislation outnumbers parliamentary legislation by a ratio of 1:20. The stark reality is that in the legislative sphere, the executive is more important than Parliament. With the centre of gravity of the legislative process having shifted from Parliament to Putra Jaya, the Dewan Rakyat and Dewan Negara could in order to combat this situation by setting up a Joint Select Committee on Subsidiary Legislation in line with the British Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. The UK committee has seven members from each House and alerts Parliament to any exceptional use or misuse of delegated power. See M P Jain, Administrative Law of Malaysia, 2020, pp. 131-150, esp. 145-150.
[11] The last two functions are not mentioned in the Constitution.
[12] Articles 96-112D.
[13] Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat, S.O. 77.
[14] How representative the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) is will requires a separate study of the constituency delineation process, the rules of electoral financing, the presence or absence of multi-member constituencies, the presence or absence of reserved seats, and how far the system allows minorities, women, the youth, orang asli, the professions and sectoral groups to eke out an electoral triumph. Under-represented groups may also acquire a voice by being nominated to the Senate (Dewan Negara) under Article 45(1)(2).
[15] Article 150(3). However, the annulment by the Houses of a Proclamation does not exclude the possibility of (i) a new Proclamation by the King under Article 150(1) and (ii) the prorogation (the formal ending of a session until the next session is summoned by the King) under Article 55(2). A prorogation will give to the executive a free hand to handle the emergency without parliamentary oversight.
[16] Article 150(3).
[17] Articles 150(5), 150(6) but subject to 150(6A).
[18] Thirteenth Schedule Part II.
[19] Article 89(1)(b).
[20] There is a difference between ‘adjournment’ and ‘prorogation’. The former is a temporary break with or without a date fixed for the next sitting. A prorogation is a royal notification to end a ‘session’. A session normally lasts one year. Once it is prorogued, only a royal summon can bring it back. Between one session and the next, Article 55(1) mandates that no more than 6 months may elapse.
[21] The tradition of an impartial, non-partisan Speaker has not taken hold in Malaysia. This contrasts with the UK where the impartiality of the Speaker is a key feature of the office. See footnote 36 below.
[22] The Clerk of the Senate and the House of Representatives are members of the general public service and are transferrable to another office in the general public service: Article 65(2).
[23] This was not the intention of the Constitution. The spirit of the Constitution is that the elected Parliament should not be kept in abeyance for too long. No more than six months may elapse between one session and the next [Article 55(1)]. The King has a discretion to grant or refuse the PM’s request for a premature dissolution [Article 40(2)(b)]. If Parliament is dissolved, an election shall be held within 60 days and the new Parliament shall be summoned to meet within 120 days of the dissolution [Article 55(4)].
[24] Prorogation refers to the formal end of the session as opposed to the temporary adjournment.
[25] Under S.O. 11(2), the Leader of the House the Prime Minister) shall determine at least 28 days before the commencement of each Session, the dates on which the House shall meet in the Session. Though under Article 55(1) and S.O. 11(1), the power to summon Parliament belongs to the King, this must be read in the light of Article 40(1) which requires the King to act on advice.
[26] Whether this reflects lack of reverence for Parliament in our system of democracy, or the need to make quick decisions unencumbered by lengthy debates and filibusters in Parliament is a matter of opinion. “Discussion before decision” may be the sine qua non of a democratic set up. However, in many Asian governments the practice is to “decide first, discuss and rectify afterwards”. A number of other factors have contributed to the marginalization of Parliament, among them: the continuous state of emergency from 1948-1960; 1964-2011; and 11 January to 1 August 2021. The Alliance/Barisan Nasional enjoyed a massive, 2/3 majority from 1955 to 2008 and this made it possible to treat Parliament as a legitimating and not as a check and balance institution.
[27] House of Commons Library, Number of Sitting Days by Session Since 1945. Briefing paper 04653, 23 May 2016.
[28]Malaysia in Transition. “Malaysian King Presses Muhyiddin to Reopen Parliament Immediately”, asia.nikkei.com, June 16, 2021.
[29] The parliamentary calendar is divided into ‘sessions’ (which last approximately one year), ‘meetings’ (which are 3 to 4 per session) and ‘sittings’ within each meeting.
[30] This flaw in the law means that the government of the day can keep Parliament in abeyance for as long as it likes between two meetings of the same session by not proroguing but adjourning sine die (without a fixed date for the next meeting).
[31] Standing Orders of the Dewan Rakyat; O.14(1)(n), O. 14(2). However, the Speaker does have latitude over such matters as Question and Answer sessions, Debates, Motions, ‘Adjournment on a Definite Matter of Urgent Public Importance’, order and discipline within the House and matters of privilege. See Mohammad Ariff Md Yusof, “The Speaker’s Position and Functions”, in Ariff Md Yusof, Roosme Hamzah and Shad Saleem Faruqi in Law, Principles and Practice in the Dewan Rakyat, pp. 151-236.
[32] Standing Orders, O. 15.
[33] Under Article 62(1), “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of federal law, each House shall regulate its own procedure”. The position is similar in other developed democracies like the UK and Australia. However, there the moderating influence of constitutional conventions is very strong. This is lacking in Malaysia and one indication is that the Standing Orders show no deference to the needs of private MPs who may wish to introduce Private Bills. Constituency allocations are withheld, in disregard of Article 8(1), from opposition MPs. Membership or Chairmanship of Committees was till 2018 generally monopolized by the ruling party members. However, PM Ismail Sabri’s recent MoU promises some positive transformation in this area.
[34] Article 63(1) ordains that proceedings in Parliament shall not be questioned in any court. The courts may refuse to intervene even if the Standing Orders disregard the spirit of the Constitution as in relation to a vote of no-confidence. Such a vote is implicit in Art 43(4) but is not provided for in the Standing Orders.
[35] theedgemarkets.com, July 13, 2020; The New Straits Times, July 13, 2020.
[36] The Constitution, in Article 57(1A) sought to promote the tradition of a non-partisan Speaker by providing that the Speaker may either be a member of the House or from outside the House. In either case, he/she must be elected or may be removed by the House. However, the tradition of an impartial Speaker has not taken hold in Malaysia. Subject to some honourable exceptions, the position of the Speaker in Malaysia is a little bit akin to the USA where the Speaker is a partisan figure and openly sides with his/her party. This contrasts with the UK and Ireland where the impartiality of the Speaker is a key feature of the office since the middle of the 19th century. The Speaker in the UK severs all ties with his/her party once elected. He/she answers to no monarch or party leader. If at the next general election, the Speaker wishes to contest, his seat is not contested by the main parties.
[37] Art 43(3) ordains that the Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament. Art 43(4) requires that if the PM loses the confidence of the majority in the House, he must either advise dissolution or submit the resignation of the Cabinet.
[38] R Kelly, “Confidence Motions”, Briefing Paper No 02873, March 14, 2019 (House of Commons Library), p. 3. In the UK’s House of Commons, there have been 4 confidence defeats since 1895: in 1895, Jan 1924, Oct 1924 and 1979. Since 1945 there have been 33 confidence motions that were debated. All but one (in 1979) were defeated.
[39] The UK tradition is that if there is a motion of no-confidence, the Speaker allows it to be debated as soon as is practicable.
[40] Mohamad Ariff Md Yusof, Roosme Hamzah and Shad Saleem Faruqi (editors), Law, Principles and Practice in the Dewan Rakyat, Sweet & Maxwell, 2020, pp. 533-535.
[41] https://www.malaysiakini.com, 4 Sept 2021.
[42] https://www.thesundaily.my 18 August 2021.
[43] Philip Koh, “Confidence Motion on PM will not erode King’s authority”, www.freemalaysia today.com, Sept 5, 2021. “Does the Agong’s appointment of PM preclude the appointment from being questioned or be subject to a vote of confidence in Dewan Rakyat?” https://ceomorning brief.the edgemalaysia.com/article/2021/0244/Home/15/584022.
[44] “Perak MB Loses Confidence Vote”, Daily Express, Dec 5, 2020.
[45] Except for matters enumerated in Section 7 of the Fifth Schedule, (election of the King and Deputy King), the Conference includes the four Governors of States not having a Ruler. Perhaps the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was mindful of Article 40(2)(c) under which his discretion to requisition the Conference is confined to matters relating to the privileges, honours and dignities of the Rulers. The appointment of the PM is, however, not covered by Article 40(2)(c).
[46] Such a time frame existed prior to the constitutional amendment in 1960. A Proclamation expired two months after issuance and an Ordinance came to an end 15 days after the first sitting of both Houses unless approved by both Houses.
[47] A learned survey of several countries is found in the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Report on Exclusion of Offenders From Parliament, Strasbourg, 23 Nov 2018, Opinion No. 807/2015.
In Canada, Section 750 of the Criminal Code, which applies to both members of the Senate and the House, provides:
(1) Where a person is convicted of an indictable offence for which the person is sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more and holds, at the time that person is convicted, an office under the Crown or other public employment, the office or employment forthwith becomes vacant.
(2) A person to whom subsection (1) applies is, until undergoing the punishment imposed on the person or the punishment substituted therefore by competent authority or receives a free pardon from Her Majesty, incapable of holding any office under the Crown or other public employment, or of being elected or sitting or voting as a member of Parliament or of a legislature or of exercising any right of suffrage. See James R Robertson, Parliamentary Research Branch, “Criminal Charges & Parliamentarians”, 21 July 1994, Publications, gc.ca.
[48] In the past, defections caused the fall of governments in Terengganu (1962), Sarawak (1966), Kelantan (1977), Sabah (1994, 2018, 2020), Perak (2009, 2020), Johor, Malacca, Kedah (2020). At the federal level, party-hopping caused the downfall of the Mahathir government in 2020 and the Muhyiddin government in 2021. For a world survey of anti-defection laws, see Kenneth Janda, “Law Against Party-Switching, Defecting, or Floor-Crossing in National Parliaments”, The Legal Regulation of Political Parties, Working Paper 2, August 2009, Northwestern University. K-janda@northwestern.edu. The learned author finds that out of 193 countries, 41 (or 21.2%) had anti-defection laws. According to his analysis, 14 per cent of 36 older democracies, 24 per cent of 54 newer democracies, 33 per cent of 58 semi-democracies and nine per cent of 45 non-democratic countries had anti-defection laws. See also, Csaba Nikolenyi & Shaul R Shenhav, The Constitutionalisation of Party Unity: The Origins of Anti-Defection Laws in India and Israel”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol 21, 2015 – Issue 3, pp. 390-407.
[49] First, if after an election, there is a hung Parliament and a political stalemate, a government cannot be formed if MPs from the opposition are forbidden from crossing the aisle to enable the formation of a government. Second, if due to the death, resignation or disqualification of a member, the government in power loses its majority, it needs a few cross-overs to remain in the saddle. Third, if an MP who falls out of favour with his party boss is expelled by the party on personal or malicious grounds, then in countries like India, this will trigger the penalties of the Anti-Defection Law. It is submitted that such expulsion should not amount to hopping. The MP should retain his seat as an Independent. Fourth, there is another evil tradition that is widespread in Malaysia’s electoral politics. Most parties have a practice that any candidate who is nominated to contest an election in the name of the party must sign an undated resignation letter at the time of nomination. Courts have condemned this practice as not binding (Datuk Ong Kee Hui v Sinyium anak Mutit (1982)) but it remains widespread. Fifth,an MP may cross the floor for reasons of moral and conscientious objections to his party’s direction or policies. Therefore, an anti-hopping law, if ever passed, has to be crafted with care and with necessary exceptions. Sixth, in the Nordin Salleh (1992) decision, the Federal Court held that under Article 10(1)(c) the freedom to associate includes the freedom to disassociate. This means that an anti-hopping law in Malaysia will require a constitutional amendment to Article 10(2). Seventh, though Article 10(2)(c) imposes three restrictions on the right to associate – national security, public order and morality – the judges in Nordin Salleh held – most amazingly – that the term ‘morality’ refers merely to ‘sexual morality’ and not to ‘political morality’. This decision needs to be overturned by a constitutional amendment. Eighth, those who suggest that an anti-hopping law should be passed to (i) mandate a forced resignation; (ii) require a by-election, and (iii) permit the previous holder to go back to the voters to renew his mandate, fail to note Article 48(6) which prevents an MP who resigns from re-contesting for 5 years! If an MP hops and is required to resign by an anti-defection law, he cannot go back to the electorate to renew his mandate because of Article 48(6). This Article has to be repealed if an anti-hopping law or a “recall” law is to be passed.
[50] The Star, 03 Sept 2021.
[51] Commentators are describing it as “Memorandum of Understanding on Transformation and Political Stability between Government and Opposition” and as “Malaysia’s first federal-level Confidence and Supply Agreement”. See ideas.org.my, Sept 14, 2021; Wong Chin Huat, “M’sia’s First Federal Level CSA – 8 Questions to Answer”, Malaysiakini, Sept 13, 2021, https://m.malaysiakini.com/columns/591119; “Malaysian govt, PH opposition sign historic bipartisan deal; polls not expected before Aug 2022”, The Straits Times, Sept 14, 2021; ideas
[52] This will end the unconstitutional discrimination and violation of the Constitution’s Article 8 on equality before the law.
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2021/131 “Getting On Board with Climate Change: A New Challenge for Company Directors in Southeast Asia” by Michael T Schaper
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Legal, regulatory, strategic and external pressure is growing on company directors and boards to address climate change, reduce emissions and adapt to a warmer world.
- However, the level of activity and focus in Southeast Asia on this matter is lower than in many other jurisdictions.
- Only one country in ASEAN – Malaysia – is currently a member of the Climate Governance Initiative, which works with the World Economic Forum to upskill directors on climate abatement and adjustment. A Singapore chapter and an ASEAN hub are currently being considered.
- Governance scrutiny and board independence in the region are often held back by high levels of ownership concentration, family-based business control and stock holdings by government-linked entities. Professional director associations are often new and small.
- More ASEAN member states should consider forming a Climate Governance Initiative (CGI) chapter; assisting national director bodies to upskill their climate knowledge; broaden the pool of qualified independent director candidates; and encourage consideration of climate issues by the boards of non-profit, SME and statutory organisations.
* Michael T Schaper is Visiting Senior Fellow with the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, an Adjunct Professor at the John Curtin Institute of Public Policy, Curtin University, and a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Company Directors. Email: michael.schaper@gmail.com. These are his personal views.
INTRODUCTION: A SHIFTING GLOBAL CLIMATE – AND ECONOMY
An increasing range of scientists, governments, multilateral agencies, large corporations, investment bodies, public interest bodies and advocacy groups have acknowledged the need to limit global warming to no more than 1.5℃ to 2℃ by 2030, and ultimately move to a zero-net-emission economy. To do so, substantial changes will be needed which can have an impact on all firms in Southeast Asia.
This transformation will affect many different aspects of how companies operate, including production processes, finance, management, supply chains, transportation, energy consumption, stakeholder relationships, marketing and human resources.
Ultimate responsibility for this activity will rest with the boards of corporations, as they – and the individual directors who constitute them – are accountable in law for the oversight and control of the business entities they direct.
These governance changes are already well underway in many other parts of the world, but have been markedly slow in Southeast Asia to date.
CLIMATE CHANGE AS A CORPORATE RISK
Company boards around the world are increasingly being asked how they are addressing a range of issues related to climate change. Dealing with this problem is not simply a matter of emissions reduction. Risks which are increasingly becoming important to companies, shareholders and senior management now include:
- Extreme weather events. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in July this year noted that temperatures have already begun to increase, and are being accompanied by noticeable changes in weather patterns around the world. These are increasing the number and severity of business disruptions, hampering transportation and supply systems, increasing insurance premiums for firms, and creating more damage to people and property (IPCC 2021).
- Regulatory and legal risk. Whilst businesses have usually been encouraged to reduce emissions on a voluntary basis, there is an increasing risk of more formal regulation, mandatory emissions trading systems and limits on output being imposed by governments. At the same time, an increasing number of corporations are being sued by external groups for allegedly breaching their duties of care by failing to adequately deal with emissions reductions: by May 2020, more than 1,500 cases of climate change litigation had been filed globally against various companies (Yap, Seow & Tan 2021)[1].
- Financial impacts. An increasing number of financial institutions (including banks, venture capital funds, managed investment funds, and retirement/annuity funds) are critically examining where they place their money, and disinvesting from companies with poor environmental, sustainability and emissions records. This can curtail a firm’s ability to borrow capital, and lead to the withdrawal of investor funds. The growth and mainstreaming of sustainability principles across pension funds, mutual funds and lending requirements represent a very powerful reason for directors to assiduously manage climate risks.
- Consumer and stakeholder expectations. Firms are increasingly subject to pressure from shareholders, consumers, suppliers, NGOs, advocacy groups, labour unions and other external stakeholders in regards to climate change. These bodies are seeking more commitment by public corporations to promptly move to net-zero (or, in some cases, negative) emissions outputs. In many cases, advocacy bodies and consumer groups are increasingly willing to support boycott campaigns against firms seen as high carbon emitters.
- There has also been increased shareholder activism at company general meetings and in voting for director elections.
- Supply chain risks. Many Southeast Asian firms are closely integrated into various international supply chains, and so are also indirectly vulnerable to global warming impacts on other firms they trade with. For example, they may experience adverse ripple effects if another corporation in the same system is damaged by extreme weather events. As ASEAN seeks to build a stronger cross-border regional economy, more firms will be exposed to an increasingly complex suite of environmental impacts on supply chains.
CHALLENGES FOR DIRECTORS
Given that many directors have had no prior experience in managing climate-related matters, it can often be quite difficult for individual directors, and boards collectively, to decide how they should rise to the challenge. Whilst companies in high-emitting industries (such as aviation, transportation, chemicals, energy and manufacturing) are relatively familiar with the phenomena, the risks posed by climate change can often be hard to identify in other commercial sectors. Nevertheless, as many professional company director associations have noted (MinterEllison/AICD 2021), there are questions that directors in all companies need to consider:
Initial assessment. The first issue is to understand the company’s current exposure to climate-related issues. This can include its current “carbon footprint” (emissions impact); the legal obligations imposed by governments; understanding the sentiments of the firm’s major stakeholders; and the level of preparation for future extreme weather events. What risks does the company face, and what is the overall fiduciary, legal and practical responsibility of the firm with regards to climate change?
What emissions target should the firm aim for? There are several different targets currently being bandied around in public debate, with many leading firms now moving to a net-zero emission goals by 2030 or 2050. Other corporations have committed themselves to becoming negative emitters.
How should the company operationalise and oversee the governance of climate risks? Having identified the firm’s risks and the changes that need to be made, implementation and oversight becomes important. Who is operationally responsible? What metrics should be reported to the board? Should it become part of the purview of the board’s audit and risk committee?
Cost. What will the overall expenses of carbon abatement be in the next few years, and of longer-term adjustment to a warmer world? These figures can often be substantial, and difficult for firms to accurately forecast in advance. In addition to new operating and capital costs, there is an increasing risk of stranded assets if plant and equipment can only operate when producing a high level of emissions. Insurance premiums are also likely to increase for firms exposed to extreme weather vulnerabilities, and it may be difficult to obtain suitable policies going forward. Finally, directors will also need to determine if their firm is likely to face a carbon tax, which already exists in jurisdictions such as the European Union and in Singapore, and is likely to become more common and more expensive over time.
What is the likely future regulatory and reporting environment? The clear trend over time has been for various governments to demand increasingly higher levels of environmental performance. Does the firm have a clear understanding of what these might be? New sustainability reporting and climate-related disclosures may also be required for some particular firms, such as those listed on a stock exchange or operating under an industry code of practice.
Corporate skills base. What skills and knowledge do the firm’s employees have in order to deal with this issue? Is additional training and development needed? Do specialist staff need to be recruited?
Personal knowledge. Many directors do not know a great deal about global warming, emissions and associated issues, making it difficult to exercise due diligence and consideration when dealing with these issues across the board table. Although directors are not generally expected to be a subject matter expert in every area they oversee, a general baseline level of knowledge is still needed.
Controversy. Whilst the need to deal with climate change is a given in many communities, in other jurisdictions it can remain a highly contested area with a significant body of sceptics and critics. For large corporations with a significant market or international presence, this can lead to high profile – and sometimes very negative – publicity and criticism. Board directors need to develop a clear sense of their risk appetite with regards to this issue.
AN EMERGING GLOBAL TREND
A director-specific focus on climate change is a relatively new phenomenon, and perhaps indicative of the speed with which global warming is increasingly becoming a core issue for much of the business community.
Much of it has been generated by the work of the World Economic Forum and a number of other initiatives, such as the International Corporate Governance Network’s (ICGN) Global Governance Principles. Boards have also been spurred on by the accounting and reporting requirements of the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), and enhanced disclosure regimes on many bourses.
Many CEOs and directors have now recognised the need for more attention on the issue. Between 2014 and 2019, for example, respondents to the WEF’s annual Global Risks Report consistently cited climate change and extreme weather events as the leading future macro-economic risk they were likely to face. In response, that year the WEF and PwC jointly set out a series of guiding principles for company boards on the issue, the major elements of which are shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1: WEF Principles for Effective Climate Governance
| 1 | Climate accountability | Boards should be accountable for the company’s long-term resilience relating to climate change. |
| 2 | Command of the (climate) subject | Boards should include directors with knowledge, skills, and background in climate-related issues. |
| 3 | Board structure | Climate considerations should be integrated into the board structure and committees. |
| 4 | Material risk and opportunity assessment | Regularly assess short-, medium- and long-term materiality of climate-related risks and opportunities. |
| 5 | Strategic and organisational integration | Climate issues should be part of strategic investment planning, decision-making processes and risk management. |
| 6 | Incentivisation | Consider including climate-related targets and indicators in executive incentive schemes. |
| 7 | Reporting and disclosure | Ensure material climate-related risks, opportunities and strategic decisions are consistently and transparently disclosed to stakeholders. |
| 8 | Exchange | Stay informed about latest climate-relevant risks and regulations; regularly exchange ideas with peers, policy makers, investors and other stakeholders. |
Source: WEF/PwC (2019: 11-17)
One of the leading global forums for climate change and company directors today is the Climate Governance Initiative, a network of director organisations across more than 20 different countries. The CGI exists to promote the WEF’s Principles for boards, focusing on non-executive directors. It aims to raise climate awareness within director communities and their professional bodies; embed climate issues into board responsibilities and decision-making; provide practical suggestions to directors; and help them develop the skills needed to deal with a changing climate (Climate Governance Initiative 2021).
CGI chapters now exist in over twenty countries, including Canada, Brazil, Chile, France, Russia, Iceland, the USA and the UK, with the greatest concentration being in Europe. In and around Southeast Asia, however, only four jurisdictions are members, or in the process of joining: Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia.
The emergence of CGI comes at a time when there is also a growing number of other international business networks, organisations and coalitions that are working to raise awareness and generate meaningful action on climate change. These include the International Chamber of Commerce, the We Mean Business Coalition, Business Ambition for 1.5℃, SME Climate Hub, and the UNFCCC’s Race to Zero. What makes the CGI unique, however, is its singular focus on the role of company directors.
THE DIRECTOR LANDSCAPE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
As much as it is anywhere else, climate change is an emerging challenge for companies and their directors across Southeast Asia. The IPCC has forecast that, under current trends, climatic patterns in Southeast Asia will see temperatures in the region continuing to rise. Rainfall trends will not be consistent, but are likely to increase in some parts of the region and decrease in other areas. There will be fewer but more extreme tropical cyclones, especially affecting countries around the Pacific Ocean. The combined impact of climate change, land subsidence, and local human activities will lead to more extensive flooding in the Mekong Delta. Finally, sea level rises are also “virtually certain” (IPCC 2021).
These changes will have a major impact on the commerce and consumer populations of ASEAN member states, a region which has more than 70 million trading businesses (Schaper 2020). For example, higher sea levels will threaten the viability of major metropolitan regions such as Manila, Bangkok and Jakarta. There may be greater flooding in littoral zones, where much of the region’s population lives. Greater cyclonic activity may cause more losses of infrastructure, buildings, agricultural crops and human lives. Weather variation could also lead to potential substantial declines in rice yields. Other parts of the agricultural sector, which is still a major part of many Southeast Asian economies, are also likely to be adversely affected (ASEAN 2021).
To date, however, the amount of director activity in climate governance appears to be quite limited. Only one country – Malaysia – is a full signatory to the Climate Governance Initiative. It was an early starter in work on this topic: Climate Governance Malaysia was launched in May 2019, and claims to have been only the second country in the world – and the first in Asia – to advocate for the CGI. Overseen by a group of non-executive directors, it is largely run on a voluntary basis (Climate Governance Malaysia 2021).
A second chapter, that of CGI Singapore, is in the process of being formed, and an ASEAN hub is being launched in the near future.
Several hundred firms in SE Asia are also signatories to the Global Reporting Initiative, which allows firms to report on their sustainability performance using a common set of international metrics, including carbon emissions. An ASEAN office has been based in Singapore since 2019 (GRI 2021).
In April 2021, company directors in SE Asia’s most sophisticated and valuable bourse – the Singapore Stock Exchange – were effectively put on notice by the publication of a legal opinion commissioned by the Commonwealth Climate and Law Institute. It concluded that directors of corporations were obliged to consider climate change risks as part of their commitment to the best interests of the company, and (building upon the 2016 sustainability reporting requirements imposed by the SGX) had a clear duty to disclose any material impacts of climate change risks. It also pointed out the personal liabilities of directors who breach these requirements (Yap, Seowl & Tan 2021). Singapore is amongst the most active countries in the region addressing climate issues, with strategies that include a sophisticated whole-of-government approach to the issue, as well as an existing carbon tax.
Malaysian regulators have also recently stepped up their activities in this area, with both Bank Negara and Bursa Malaysia issuing corporate and director guidance this year (Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative 2021).
However, overall the level of director activity in climate change issues appears to be low.
Many ASEAN businesses seem to be generally aware of climate change, and some have developed strategies relating to energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions reduction. But few of them have looked more strategically at, and integrated climate change into their overall business planning (Amran, Ooi, Wong & Hashim 2016).
There are a number of reasons for this.
As the OECD has noted, a fundamental issue across the region is the high level of ownership concentration, and the predominant role of family ownership in many businesses. Both of these factors tend to lead to a “business as usual” approach to governance due to the lack of new, external board members with different ideas. Its recent examination of board structures and processes across Asia found that many corporations are effectively controlled by a small number of families, especially in The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. In addition, government-linked entities also hold considerable stock in firms in Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam (OECD 2017).
The role of independent directors[2] and independent board chairs is often weak in many Asian jurisdictions. For example, only Indonesia requires the chair of a board to be separate to that of the CEO, whereas in many cases firms in The Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand can permit the same person to hold both positions. The number of independent, professional directors on most corporate boards is also limited to a minority position, typically sitting at only a third of all positions (OECD 2017). These structures can make it difficult to successfully bring new ideas and change to board deliberations.
Professional director associations are still somewhat nascent. As Table 2 below shows, not all countries in ASEAN have a national professional body representing directors (Laos and Brunei do not appear to have any publicly-visible association). Moreover, many of those that exist are relatively new: whilst a handful date back to the 1990s (Singapore, Thailand), several others (Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam) are only one or two years old. In some cases, membership numbers are also quite low (for example, the Philippines’ Institute of Corporate Directors states on its website that it has about 300 members, a very small figure for a country with more than a million businesses in existence).
Table 2: Director Institutes/Associations in Southeast Asia
| Brunei | No apparent organisation. |
| Cambodia | Institute of Directors, Cambodia Formed 2020 |
| Indonesia | Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship Formation date not stated |
| Laos | No apparent organisation. |
| Malaysia | Institute of Corporate Directors Formed 2018 Malaysian Alliance of Corporate Directors Formation date not stated |
| Myanmar | Myanmar Institute of Directors Formed 2018 |
| Philippines | Institute of Corporate Directors Formation date not stated |
| Singapore | Singapore Institute of Directors Formed 1998 |
| Thailand | Thai Institute of Directors Formed 1999 |
| Vietnam | Vietnam Institute of Directors Formed 2018 |
WHAT NEXT?
Clearly, there is more that can be done in the region to facilitate greater director focus on climate change adaptation. Change in this field is coming for company directors in Southeast Asia – along with a range of new responsibilities and expectations.
A first step for many ASEAN jurisdictions may be to form a local CGI chapter, or some other similar director-focused climate initiative. This will allow local directors to access some of the global networks of other firms who have already begun the decarbonisation journey. Understanding a firm’s risks, examining case studies showing how other companies have made the adjustment, and building relationships with other directors is a useful way to expedite the change process. Given that so few firms in Southeast Asia have become involved in the CGI, there is plenty of scope to encourage much greater participation.
Increasing the direct involvement of director organisations is another step forward. Institutes and director professional bodies can play a leadership role in proactively putting a focus on emissions abatement and developing client resilience. Just like the CGI at the cross-border level, there is a need for national associations to provide governance guidance, ideas and information directly to their members.
Moreover, education and information about this issue should be offered to all directors, not just those on stock exchange-listed corporations. Unlisted private sector firms, small businesses, non-profit organisations and statutory corporations also face a climate challenge, and their boards need to understand how they can deal with this issue.
Finally, boards in the region should look carefully at their recruitment of new directors. Non-executive director positions, especially, are ideal points in which to secure candidates with a knowledge of climate issues, and can potentially help firms not only to develop resilience, but also to identify some of the many new business opportunities emerging as nations decarbonise. To do so, though, firms will increasingly need to rely on more formal, open and genuinely competitive recruitment processes for NEDs, rather than the traditional “old boys network.”
ISEAS Perspective 2021/131, 6 October 2021
REFERENCES
Amran, Azlan; Ooi, Say Keat; Wong, Cheng Yew & Hashim, Fathyah (2016) “Business Strategy for Climate Change: An ASEAN Perspective” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol.23 No.4, pp.213-227.
Climate Governance Initiative (2021) Charter of the Climate Governance Initiative (CGI) [online] – Climate Governance (climate-governance.org) (accessed 26 August 2021).
Climate Governance Malaysia (2021) About [online] https://www.cgmalaysia.com/founding-members (accessed 30 August 2021).
Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative (2021) Primer on Climate Change: Directors’ Duties and Disclosure Obligations In Support Of The Principles for Effective Climate Governance, June, Oxford: University of Oxford.
Global Reporting Initiative (2021) GRI in ASEAN [online] GRI – GRI in ASEAN (globalreporting.org) (accessed 31 August 2021).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations (2021) Regional Factsheet – Asia: Sixth Assessment Report. Geneva: IPCC.
MinterEllison/AICD (2021) Climate Risk Governance Guide: An Introductory Resource For Directors, August, Sydney: Australian Institute of Company Directors.
OECD (2017) OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in Asia, Paris: OECD.
Schaper, Michael T. (2020) “The Missing (Small) Businesses of Southeast Asia” ISEAS Perspective, No.79, 22nd July, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies-Yusof Ishak Institute.
World Economic Forum/PwC (2019) How to Set Up Effective Climate Governance on Corporate Boards: Guiding Principles and Questions, Geneva: WEF.
Yap, Wai Ming; Seow, Joel & Tan, Claudi (2021) “Company Directors in Singapore Urged to Consider Climate Change Risks,” Lawflash – Morgan Lewis, 22 April, Singapore: Morgan Lewis [online] Company Directors in Singapore Urged to Consider Climate Change Risks – Publications | Morgan Lewis (accessed 30 August 2021).
[1] The most noticeable is the May 2021 Shell case, where the District Court in The Hague, The Netherlands found that Shell must reduce its global net carbon emissions by 45% by 2030 compared to 2019 levels.
[2] Directors who are not also full-time employees of a company are generally referred to here as “non-executive directors,” although numerous other broadly synonymous terms are also used in different countries in Southeast Asia, such as “supervisory board members”, “outside directors”, “independent directors”, or “corporate directors,” amongst others.
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2021/130 “‘Global Britain’ and Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospects” by Ian Storey and Hoang Thi Ha
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Southeast Asia is crucial to the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific. By mid-2021 it had achieved notable progress in strengthening its diplomatic, economic and security engagement with the region.
- Becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner provides an anchor for the UK to deepen its engagement with the region, but does not automatically lead to British membership of ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asian Summit (EAS).
- Rather than pursuing a regional free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN or joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the UK prioritises bilateral trade deals with key Southeast Asian partners, and focuses on facilitation and standard harmonisation with ASEAN in a number of core sectors.
- A Royal Navy (RN) aircraft carrier strike group is currently in Asian waters and, together with announcements of future naval deployments, sends a strong signal that the UK intends to establish a permanent military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
- The UK’s positive agenda for its engagement with the region should include, among others, emergency COVID-19 vaccine support for Southeast Asian countries in need.
*Ian Storey is Senior Fellow and Co-editor of Contemporary Southeast Asia, and Hoang Thi Ha is Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2021 – nearly five years after the Brexit referendum, and 15 months after the UK formally left the European Union (EU) – the British government published a landmark policy paper aimed at resetting the country’s foreign and defence posture: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review (IR) of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.[1]
While the IR acknowledged the continued primacy of the Euro-Atlantic region for the UK – and its alliance with the United States and NATO – it emphasised that the country’s future prosperity and security increasingly depended on developments in the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, the IR announced a ‘tilt’ to the region with the ambitious goal of establishing a “greater and more persistent presence than any other European country” by 2030.[2]
Southeast Asia plays a critical role in realising Britain’s ambitions. The region is at the confluence of the salient trends identified in the IR: the shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity to the Indo-Pacific; the rise of China and the opportunities and “systemic challenges” it poses; the escalation of Great Power competition, especially between the United States and China; the fragmentation of the rules-based international order; rising maritime insecurity; rapid technological change; and the existential threat posed by climate change.
By mid-2021, the UK had made good progress towards achieving some of the goals outlined in the IR: it became ASEAN’s 11th Dialogue Partner in August; its application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was successful; and in July a British aircraft carrier strike group transited through the South China Sea and conducted maneouvers with several Southeast Asian navies. The announcement on 15 September of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) security arrangement in which Washington and London will help Canberra acquire nuclear-powered submarines also strengthens Britain’s defence credentials in the Indo-Pacific.
This Perspective reviews the progress the UK has made in deepening its engagement with Southeast Asia and assesses the prospects for its participation in the region’s multilateral forums and future trading arrangements, and of it establishing a more permanent military presence.
ASEAN-UK DIALOGUE RELATIONS: WHAT LIES AHEAD?
A formal relationship with ASEAN is seen as key to the UK’s ambitions in Southeast Asia. London applied for ASEAN Dialogue Partner status in June 2020, and ASEAN-UK dialogue relations were formalised at the 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) in August 2021.[3] Becoming the 11th ASEAN Dialogue Partner despite the grouping’s 25-year moratorium on new dialogue partnership is arguably one of the UK’s most important post-Brexit diplomatic achievements. It provides multiple avenues of regional cooperation for the UK to anchor its presence and deepen its engagement with Southeast Asia and beyond.
The UK’s current priority is to give form and content to dialogue relations.[4] This will entail: (i) setting up ASEAN-UK regular consultations at the ambassadorial, senior officials and ministerial levels, first in the diplomatic and economic-trade sectors to later be expanded to other select sectors across the three ASEAN community pillars; (ii) developing a comprehensive framework/plan of action with a focus on several priority areas of mutual interests; and (iii) implementing concrete projects, preferably with commitment of UK funding support.
As a Dialogue Partner, Britain can engage ASEAN leaders at the summit level, although the frequency of ASEAN-UK summits will be decided by mutual agreement. Among the current ASEAN Dialogue Partners, only China, Japan, South Korea, India, the United States and most recently Australia, have annual summit meetings with ASEAN. The leaders of Russia, New Zealand, Canada and the EU meet their ASEAN counterparts only on an ad hoc basis at special or commemorative summits.
Moreover, ASEAN Dialogue Partner status does not automatically guarantee UK membership of ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ADMM-Plus and EAS. Being a Dialogue Partner is merely one criterion for admission to the ADMM-Plus and EAS, and membership applications will be subject to approval by all ASEAN member states (see Table 1). Moreover, these mechanisms continue their long-held moratorium on new members as ASEAN’s focus remains on their consolidation instead of expansion. The organisation learned the hard way from the ARF’s rapid enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s, well beyond its original geographical footprint－East Asia and Oceania－which then diluted its focus and effectiveness.
Table 1: Criteria for Membership at ASEAN-led Mechanisms
In 2018, well before becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the UK had applied for observer status to several of the ADMM-Plus Experts Working Groups (EWGs). Its application, together with those of Canada, France and the EU, was met with opposition from Russia and China, who exercised the veto power bestowed on them by the concept paper on observership at the ADMM-Plus EWGs’ activities.[9] Acknowledging that this situation had undermined the principle of ASEAN Centrality, in June 2021 the ADMM adopted a comprehensive concept paper in which ASEAN exercises control over the ADMM’s external engagements.[10] The prerogative to decide on new ADMM-Plus members or observers to the ADMM-Plus EWGs now rests solely with the ADMM. As such, the obstruction by some Plus countries no longer stands in the way of the UK’s pursuit of formal defence relations with ASEAN.
The question going forward is whether London will upgrade its application from observership at ADMM-Plus EWGs’ activities to ADMM-Plus membership. Having a front seat at the table is much more attractive than just observing from the sidelines, especially given that defence cooperation has been a key pillar of the UK’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ and its outreach to ASEAN following the Brexit referendum. Now that it has become a Dialogue Partner, the UK holds clear advantages compared to the EU and Canada’s pending applications in terms of having “significant interactions and relations with ASEAN defence establishments” and “being able to work with the ADMM to build capacity to enhance regional security” – the two other criteria of ADMM-Plus membership. The EU is not considered a full-fledged security actor and does not possess military personnel and assets within its jurisdiction to participate in many of the ADMM-Plus’ practical activities. Meanwhile, Canada’s defence engagement with Southeast Asian countries is very limited compared to the UK.
However, ASEAN’s consideration of the UK’s potential applications for admission into the ADMM-Plus—and the EAS—will not be guided only by the UK’s own merits. Another key consideration is how to position the UK in the overall context of ASEAN’s relations with other powers. First, ASEAN tries to maintain pretensions of balanced and equal treatment of all of its Dialogue Partners. Some member states who are reluctant to see the UK engage too far and too fast in ASEAN-led mechanisms may use this as an excuse to link the UK with the pending applications by the more longstanding Dialogue Partners, Canada and the EU. Second, as the US-China contest increasingly manifests itself in ASEAN-led platforms, the admission of the UK is seen as tipping the balance in favour of the US and its allies and partners within these mechanisms. At this, the establishment of AUKUS will further complicate ASEAN member states’ consideration. Given their different concerns and perspectives on AUKUS, reaching consensus on admitting the UK to ASEAN-led mechanisms would not be easy or straightforward.
So far, the UK has not expressed its intention to apply for membership of any ASEAN-led mechanisms. It has exercised caution, saying that it would like to focus on building up the foundations of the relationship first.[11] London, however, needs to start strategising its future participation in the ASEAN-led multilateral architecture, and laying the groundwork towards achieving its goals.
EXPANDING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE LINKS
Strengthening the UK’s “prosperity links” with countries around the world through bilateral and regional FTAs is central to Britain’s post-Brexit ambitions.[12] Progress in this respect with various Indo-Pacific partners has been encouraging (see Table 2). FTAs with the US and China, however, are not forthcoming as the Biden administration is wary about trade deals and because Sino-British relations have deteriorated sharply over human rights issues in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.
Table 2: The UK’s FTA Negotiations/Conclusion with Indo-Pacific Partners
In February 2021, the UK applied for membership of the CPTPP and, in June, its 11 members agreed to induct Britain. Negotiations are currently underway with each of the CPTPP parties and the UK is likely to formally join the CPTPP in the first half of 2022.[15] The trade pact accounts for 13 per cent of global GDP and the UK’s trade with CPTPP members accounts for 9 per cent of its total trade, far lower than trade with the EU at 43 per cent. However, Britain’s trade with CPTPP members is growing more quickly than with the EU.[16] Beyond trade numbers, joining the CPTPP would enable the UK’s participation in shaping the region’s economic architecture based on high-standard, rules-based, free and fair trade.[17]
Four Southeast Asian countries—Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam—are members of the CPTPP, and Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have expressed an interest in joining. Although these latter countries may currently be reluctant to enact significant economic reforms to qualify for CPTPP membership, their accession to the trade pact in the future cannot be ruled out. It is also assessed that the UK’s prospective CPTPP membership, as well as its FTAs with Japan and Australia and the forthcoming one with India, will drive further Southeast Asia-UK trade integration since these economies are closely networked with Southeast Asian countries.[18]
In contrast, there is little to suggest the UK’s interest in joining the RCEP agreement which was concluded last year between ten ASEAN countries, Australia, China, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand. London’s disinterest is mainly attributed to the RCEP’s limited scope and low ambition in labour and environmental standards, state-owned enterprise reforms and government procurement. The RCEP is also considered “too regional and not deep enough to accommodate the UK’s strength in the services sector”.[19] Furthermore, London’s condemnation of the February 2021 coup in Myanmar and criticism of the junta’s human rights abuses make it politically challenging for the UK to be in trade talks with any grouping that includes Myanmar.
The UK will likely follow in the EU’s footsteps by prioritising bilateral FTAs with key Southeast Asian partners. After concluding FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, a trade deal with Indonesia – the region’s largest economy – was high on the agenda during UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab’s visit to Jakarta in April 2021.[20] Instead of pursuing a wide-ranging FTA with ASEAN as a group, the UK is taking a pragmatic, building-block approach, focusing on facilitation and standard harmonisation in its core sectors such as digital economy, financial services, green technologies, regulatory excellence, skills and education. These priority areas are reflected in the Joint Declaration on Future Economic Cooperation adopted at the first ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM)-UK Consultations on 15 September 2021.[21] The UK’s development assistance to Southeast Asia has also centred around these target sectors, including the ASEAN Economic Reform Programme, ASEAN-UK Digital Innovation Partnership, ASEAN-UK Cooperation on COP26, and UK support for the ASEAN Low Carbon Energy Programme.[22]
TOWARDS A PERSISTENT UK MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
According to the IR—and the defence command plan published a few weeks later[23]—Britain’s armed forces are being modernised and restructured to allow for deployment overseas more often and for longer periods of time. Britain’s refocused military strategy brings to a close its two-decade involvement in land wars in the Middle East and Central Asia, and places a strong emphasis on it playing a more proactive role in the maritime domain, including maintaining freedom of navigation, upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and protecting shipping lanes.
In Southeast Asia, the UK plans to enhance its security ties with regional states. This includes increased participation in military exercises undertaken by the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA)－a defence grouping linking Britain with Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand－as well as upgrading its defence garrison in Brunei and a naval logistics facility in Singapore that the UK maintains in support of the FPDA. However, the UK is conscious of the sensitivities surrounding its colonial legacy, and the need to avoid giving the appearance of inflaming regional tensions. Accordingly, its presence will be mainly focused on helping regional armed forces improve their ability to counter non-state threats at sea.
Carrier Strike Group-21
The deployment of Carrier Strike Group-21 (CSG-21) to Asia has sent a strong message to the region that the UK is serious about increasing its defence diplomacy engagements in the Indo-Pacific. CSG-21 is the UK’s largest operational naval deployment since the 1982 Falklands War and its biggest to Asia since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong. The strike group comprises ten warships (including a US destroyer and Dutch frigate) led by the 65,000-tonne aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth (embarking both UK and US F-35B joint strike fighters). During its 28-week deployment, CSG-21 will sail 26,000 nautical miles (nm), visit 40 countries and take part in over 70 defence diplomacy activities including training exercises and port visits.
Having departed the UK in early May, the strike group arrived in Asia in late July. It held separate exercises with warships from India and Japan in the Indian Ocean before entering Southeast Asia through the Straits of Malacca. In Southeast Asian waters, ships belonging to CSG-21 conducted maneouvers with naval vessels from Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei.
In recent years, the UK has taken a stronger stand on the South China Sea dispute. Five Royal Navy (RN) warships conducted presence missions in the South China Sea between 2018 and 2020, and in August 2018 one of them conducted a US-style freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) by sailing within 12 nm of the disputed Paracel Islands. In 2020, the UK endorsed the 2016 arbitral tribunal award which ruled that China’s nine-dash line claims in the South China Sea are incompatible with UNCLOS.[24]
Prior to CSG-21’s arrival in the region, there was speculation – as well as warnings in China’s state-controlled media[25] – over whether any of its warships would conduct a FONOP in the disputed Spratly Islands, as one of the fleet’s warships had done in the Black Sea en route to Asia.[26] However, prior to CSG-21’s departure from Britain, Defence Secretary Wallace stressed that “We are not going to go to the other side of the world to be provocative. We will be confident, but not confrontational.”[27] Accordingly, no CSG-21 warships conducted a FONOP in the South China Sea, traversed through the Taiwan Straits en route to Japan, or participated in the Malabar naval exercises undertaken by the Quad (America, Japan, India and Australia) off Guam in late August. However, on 27 September, the frigate HMS Richmond passed through the Taiwan Straits on its way to Vietnam, resulting in condemnation from China.[28] Moreover, a FONOP by one of the other CSG-21 warships cannot be ruled out as the strike group re-enters the South China Sea in October on its way back to the UK.
Forthcoming and Future Naval Deployments
The UK is likely to deploy a CSG—led either by HMS Queen Elizabeth or her sister ship HMS Prince of Wales—to the Indo-Pacific periodically, perhaps every few years. To establish a more permanent presence, the RN plans to deploy a variety of other vessels to the region out to the end of decade. This mix of vessels will enable the UK to increase its defence engagement with regional states across a spectrum of activities: from training and capacity-building exercises, to constabulary duties such as fishery protection to Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations and, if need be, power projection.
First to be deployed will be two 2,000-tonne River-class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), HMS Tamar and HMS Spey. The two OPVs are expected to arrive in the region in October, and will be deployed for at least five years in an area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the west coast of the United States.[29] Relatively small and lightly armed, the OPVs will be less controversial than larger warships and can assist regional states to improve their capacity to address persistent non-state maritime security threats, including people, drugs and arms smuggling, piracy and illegal fishing. The OPVs are also better suited for working with the navies of Southeast Asia which mostly operate similar-sized vessels or frigates. Their small size will enable them to visit a larger number of regional ports. Crucially, Tamar and Spey will be forward-deployed but not forward-based: they will undergo maintenance, resupply and crew rotations at various ports around the region (a model the RN currently uses in the Caribbean and Mediterranean).[30] In an era of great power competition, this arrangement avoids the political sensitivities associated with permanently hosting foreign warships.
In 2023, the RN plans to deploy one of two Littoral Response Groups (LRGs) to the Indo-Pacific, probably based at Duqm, Oman. LRGs consist of an amphibious landing ship, a supply vessel and a destroyer or frigate. The LRGs can undertake a range of maritime tasks including HADR operations, training exercises and other defence diplomacy activities.[31] Future plans call for the permanent deployment of a RN frigate to the Indo-Pacific by 2030. Whether this vessel will replace the OPVs, and operate without a nominated base or be home-ported in the region, has yet to be decided.
OUTLOOK
2021 has been a high-water mark for ‘Global Britain’ in Southeast Asia. London has made efforts to integrate diplomacy, development and defence in its outreach to the region. On their part, ASEAN and its member countries have been generally welcoming of the UK’s overtures and initiatives.
The UK’s ‘tilt’ to the region, however, cannot escape the geopolitics of US-China competition and may even compound it further. This has and will deepen the existing internal incoherence among Southeast Asian countries, as demonstrated in their very different reactions to AUKUS. While some of them welcome the UK’s forward-deployed presence in the Indo-Pacific, others may look at it warily, which is not helped by the narrative that invokes the region’s colonial past with the UK’s increased presence. Going forward, the region will watch carefully the nexus between the UK, US, EU and Australia in dealing with China’s “systemic challenge”, and how it will play out in Southeast Asia and ASEAN. ISEAS’ State of Southeast Asia 2021 survey findings[32] suggest that Southeast Asians’ trust in the UK to champion the global free trade agenda, to maintain the rules-based order, and to hedge against US-China rivalry, trails far behind key Dialogue Partners such as Japan, the EU, China and the US.
The UK nevertheless holds strong appeal as a destination for tertiary education, ranking second after the US. Another area where the UK’s “soft power” can immediately make positive impact is COVID-19 vaccine support. The UK is the third largest donor to the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) in terms of doses (80 million) and financing (US$733 million), after the US and Team Europe.[33] With the UK government’s support, the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine has also been supplied to the world on a not-for-profit basis.[34] However, outside of the COVAX facility, the UK’s bilateral vaccine donations have been underwhelming,[35] and no priority is given to Southeast Asia compared to other parts of the world. In June, Foreign Secretary Raab criticised China and Russia for using vaccines as a geopolitical tool.[36] Geopolitics, however, is not the overriding concern of most Southeast Asian countries at this moment as they are scrambling for vaccine supplies to cope with the spread of the deadlier Delta variant. Vaccine support as part of the UK’s positive agenda for the region would go a long way towards winning hearts and minds in Southeast Asia.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/130, 1 October 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review (IR) of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (London: HM Government, March 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf.
[2] Ibid, p. 62.
[3] Joint Communiqué of the 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 2 August 2021, https://asean.org/joint-communique-54-th-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting/.
[4] Dian Septiari, “Discourse: UK seeks to deepen cooperation with ASEAN following dialogue partner status: Envoy”, Jakarta Post, 24 August 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2021/08/24/discourse-uk-seeks-to-deepen-cooperation-with-asean-following-dialogue-partner-status-envoy.html.
[5] Criteria for participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, adopted in July 1996, ASEAN Regional Forum website, https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/.
[6] Concept Paper on ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) External Engagements, June 2021, https://admm.asean.org/index.php/2012-12-05-19-05-19/admm1/concept-papers.html.
[7] Although no formal decision on moratorium has been made, the ADMM is technically imposing moratorium on admission of ADMM-Plus new members since it has agreed to focus on consolidating the ADMM-Plus first and hold in abeyance any application for membership.
[8] Report 68 Treaties tabled on 7 December 2004 (5) and 9 August 2005, on Chapter 3 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, website of the Parliament of Australia, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jsct/9august2005/chapter3.
[9] Hoang Thi Ha, “Repositioning the ADMM-Plus in a Contested Region”, ISEAS Perspective 2021/13, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/iseas-2021-13-repositioning-the-admm-plus-in-a-contested-region-hoang-by-thi-ha/.
[10] Concept Paper on ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) External Engagements.
[11] Dian Septiari, “Discourse”.
[12] Global Britain in a competitive age, p. 5.
[13] Department of International Trade, UK-Australia FTA negotiations: agreement in principle, GOV.UK, 17 June 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-australia-free-trade-agreement-negotiations-agreement-in-principle/uk-australia-fta-negotiations-agreement-in-principle.
[14] Kanishka Singh, “UK aims to start trade talks with India this year”, Reuters, 18 August 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-aims-start-trade-talks-with-india-this-year-2021-08-17/.
[15] Stefan Boscia, “Liz Truss aims for UK to join CPTPP trading bloc in the next 12 months”, City A.M., 25 April 2021, https://www.cityam.com/liz-truss-aims-for-uk-to-join-cptpp-trading-bloc-in-the-next-12-months/.
[16] Vikram Khanna, “Britain’s entry into the CPTPP spells win-win all around”, Straits Times, 9 June 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/britains-entry-into-the-cptpp-spells-win-win-all-around.
[17] Department for International Trade, “UK Accession to CPTPP: The UK’s Strategic Approach”, June 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-approach-to-joining-the-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-cptpp.
[18] Anita Prakash, Alicia Garcia Herrero and David Martínez Turégano, “UK–ASEAN Trade: Strengthening the Supply Chain Linkages”, ERIA, July 2021, https://www.eria.org/publications/uk-asean-trade-strengthening-the-supply-chain-linkages/.
[19] Prakash, Herrero and Turégano, “UK–ASEAN Trade”.
[20] Resty Woro Yuniar, “Indonesia, Britain agree to deepen security, trade partnership ahead of warship’s visit to Indo-Pacific”, South China Morning Post, 7 April 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3128662/indonesia-britain-agree-deepen-security-trade-partnership-ahead.
[21] Joint Declaration on Future Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), 15 September 2021.
[22] Policy paper: ASEAN Economic Reform Programme, GOV.UK,21 June 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asean-economic-reform-programme; Official Launch: ASEAN-UK Digital Innovation Partnership, Website of the UK-ASEAN Business Council, 01 September 2021, https://ukabc.org.uk/event/official-launch-asean-uk-digital-innovation-partnership/; “UK convenes ASEAN-COP26 Climate Dialogue”, GOV.UK, 01 October 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-convenes-asean-cop26-climate-dialogue.
[23] Defence in a competitive age (London: Ministry of Defence, March 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974661/CP411_-Defence_Command_Plan.pdf.
[24] “South China Sea: Freedom of Navigation, UK Parliament”, House of Commons Hansard, 3 September 2020, Vol. 679, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-09-03/debates/99D50BD9-8C8A-4835-9C70-6E9A38585BC4/SouthChinaSeaFreedomOfNavigation
[25] See, for example, “UK shouldn’t tempt own fate in South China Sea: Global Times editorial”, Global Times, 29 July 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1230053.shtml.
[26] Ian Storey, “Royal Navy Freedom of Navigation Operation in South China Sea: After Events in the Black Sea it’s Quite Possible”, Fulcrum, 2 July 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/after-black-sea-encounter-british-fonop-in-the-south-china-sea-quite-possible/.
[27] David Sabbagh and Helen Davidson, “UK says it has no plans for South China Sea confrontation after Beijing warning”, The Guardian, 30 July 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/30/china-royal-navy-south-china-sea-warning-beijing.
[28] “China condemns Britain for Taiwan Strait warship mission”, Reuters, 27 September 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/british-frigate-sails-through-taiwan-strait-2021-09-27/.
[29] “U.K. navy to station new vessels in Indo-Pacific for 5 years”, Nikkei Asia, 16 September 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/U.K.-navy-to-station-new-vessels-in-Indo-Pacific-for-5-years#.
[30] “Royal Navy warships sail for permanent basing in the Indo-Pacific region”, Navy Outlook, 6 September 2021, https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navy-warships-sail-for-permanent-basing-in-the-indo-pacific-region/.
[31] Nick Childs, “UK Littoral Response Group: the shape of things to come”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance Blog, 25 June 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/06/uk-littoral-response-group.
[32] Seah, S. et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021), /wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf.
[33] Dose Donations to COVAX, Announced for 2021-2022, as of 10 September 2021; Assured Resources for the Gavi COVAX AMC, as of 06 August 2021, https://www.gavi.org/covax-facility.
[34] “UK to donate 100 million coronavirus vaccine doses”, GOV.UK, 11 June 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-donate-100-million-coronavirus-vaccine-doses.
[35] Clint Witchalls, “COVID-19: why it’s time for the UK to start sharing its vaccine doses”, The Conversation, 1 September 2021, https://theconversation.com/covid-19-why-its-time-for-the-uk-to-start-sharing-its-vaccine-doses-164303.
[36] William James, “EXCLUSIVE UK’s Raab: Some countries are using vaccines as a geopolitical tool”, Reuters, 11 June 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/exclusive-uks-raab-we-dont-condone-vaccine-diplomacy-no-doubt-some-are-using-it-2021-06-11/.
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