2021/95 “The Hashtag Battle over Indonesia’s Omnibus Law: From Digital Resistance to Cyber-Control” by Yatun Sastramidjaja and Pradipa P. Rasidi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since its announcement in February 2020, the controversy over the Omnibus Law on Job Creation has polarized the digital public sphere, as proponents and opponents exploit social media to propagate their stances, often with the use of “pro” and “contra” hashtags. The issue quickly turned into a proxy for pro- and anti-government positions.
- The passing of the Omnibus Law in Parliament, on 5 October 2020, prompted mass protests and a massive upsurge in online agitation. Opposition to the Omnibus Law initially dominated the social media landscape, but by mid-October, the government’s narrative that the Omnibus Law served the nation’s interests had prevailed in cyberspace.
- The government achieved control of the narrative through a concerted strategy of cyber-surveillance and deployment of cyber-troops against opponents of the Omnibus Law. This went hand in hand with the delegitimization of the protest in mainstream news coverage, which helped to quickly marginalize and suppress the anti-Omnibus Law movement.
- The degree of concerted effort by which the government deployed its power and resources in cyberspace to clamp down on opposition to the Omnibus Law was unprecedented. This indicates that the implementation of the Omnibus Law was of key strategic interest to Joko Widodo’s current administration. Furthermore, it indicates growing sophistication in the government’s capacity to neutralize its opponents in cyberspace.
* Yatun Sastramidjaja is Assistant Professor in Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam, and is currently an Associate Fellow with the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Pradipa R. Rasidi holds an MA in Anthropology from the University of Indonesia and currently works as Research Assistant in the Dutch-Indonesian project on “Cyber Troops and Public Opinion Manipulation in Indonesia”.
INTRODUCTION
On 17 June 2021, the Constitutional Court started its judicial review of Indonesia’s Omnibus Law on Job Creation, which was filed seven months earlier by labour unions and civil society groups following mass protests over this sweeping piece of legislation. In the days prior to the Court’s session, activists called for combined “field action” and “virtual action” to pressure the Constitutional Court to annul the Omnibus Law. Netizens were urged to use the hashtag #CabutOmnibusLaw (“revoke Omnibus Law”) and to “like, mention and spread” the message widely, because: “Your fingertips can change the world”. Such calls for action alluded to a repeat of the protests in October 2020, which saw a turnout of tens of thousands on the streets and more than one million on social media. This time, however, the streets remained quiet; on social media, too, anti-Omnibus Law hashtags garnered little engagement. Instead, on the day of the judicial review’s opening, the mass media highlighted the news that Indonesia had climbed three places in a global competitiveness ranking, owing to “improvements in business efficiency”.[1] This seemed to validate the government’s claim that pro-business legislation was needed to lift Indonesia’s economy and global standing, thus naysaying critics of the Omnibus Law.
Figure 1: Social network analysis of messages on Twitter taking “pro” and “contra” stances on Indonesia’s Omnibus Law, 16 October 2020. Picture: Ismail Fahmi, “Tren Penolakan Terhadap Omnibus Law Semakin Menurun”, Drone Emprit, 18 October 2020, https://pers.droneemprit.id/tren-penolakan-terhadap-omnibus-law-semakin-turun/.
The government’s narrative that the Omnibus Law served the nation’s interests was long contested by activists, whose counter-narrative on the detrimental effects of the Omnibus Law strongly influenced public opinion. Following the vociferous protests in October 2020, however, efforts to organize protests on the same scale, whether on the streets or on social media, invariably failed. The government’s heavy-handed repression of the protest in October 2020, along with the delegitimization of the protest in the mass media, had effectively deterred the majority of protesters. Moreover, online criticism of the Omnibus Law was stifled through a concerted strategy of cyber-surveillance and the deployment of cyber-troops, which proved to have long-lasting effects on activists’ capabilities for online agitation.
In this article, we trace how the narrative battle over the Omnibus Law developed in the interplay between street action and virtual action, between mainstream media and social media, and between physical repression and cyber-control. We show, first, how the opponents initially dominated the social media landscape, and thereby garnered public support; and, second, how the government’s strategy for winning the battle indicates growing sophistication in its capacity to neutralize opponents in the cybersphere.
#TOLAKOMNIBUSLAW: TRENDING RESISTANCE
While grassroots resistance to the Omnibus Law can be traced to long-established struggles in the fields of labour, environmentalism and indigenous rights, the popular online and offline protests that climaxed in October 2020 was the offspring of the student and youth-led #ReformasiDikorupsi (“reform corrupted”) protest that erupted in September 2019.[2] The Reform Corrupted protest was the first social media-driven movement in Indonesia, and, as such, it continued unabated online after heavy-handed repression brought an end to the mass demonstrations. On social media, activists continued to engage netizens through a clever play with protest hashtags, memes and information-sharing, indicating that their struggle against corruption and repressive governance had just begun.
When President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), during his inaugural speech on 20 October 2019 for his second presidential term announced his plans to revise “dozens of laws that inhibit job creation” into an efficient Omnibus Law,[3] this immediately became the new target for protest. As Jokowi’s plans unfolded in the following months, labour unions, student activists and civil society groups repeatedly voiced their objections to the Omnibus Bill, which they considered a clear manifestation of the government’s harmful pro-business policy, entailing the corrosion of labour rights and posing a threat to indigenous land rights and the environment by lifting restrictions on corporate exploitation of forest land. By 12 February 2020, when the bill was submitted to Parliament, the hashtag #TolakOmnibuslaw, “reject the Omnibus Law”, had become a common sight on social media, and preparations for mass strikes and protests were well underway.
Figure 2: Hashtag-framed logo of the resistance to the Omnibus Law, presented as the offspring of the #ReformCorrupted movement.
All protest plans were interrupted, however, by the Covid-19 pandemic. This was a setback to the movement’s momentum, but activists adapted to the situation by accelerating the protest online. Small demonstrations were still held—using creative tactics to accommodate social distancing regulations; for example, installing mannequins at the Parliament’s entrance with the message “Reject the Omnibus Law!”, or putting up placards stating the building had been “infected by the oligarchy virus”[4]—but it was the online protest that spurred unprecedented mass participation. Twitter actions became especially popular, as Twitter’s trending topics offered a useful platform to demonstrate mass support.[5] For example, on 23 March 2020, student activists and other groups coordinated a Twitter action, urging netizens to catapult the hashtag #TolakOmnibuslaw into Twitter’s top trending position. The action succeeded, engaging tens of thousands of netizens, who were especially charmed by the paired hashtags #LockdownDPR (“lockdown Parliament”) and #dirumahaja (“just stay home”, connoting “protest from home”). Other Twitter actions also cleverly played on the pandemic, with such slogans as “Omnibus Law and Covid-19 = Common Enemy: #CancelOmnibusLaw and #FocusOnHandlingThePandemic”. The online resistance kept expanding in the following months, producing a growing lexicon of oppositional hashtags such as #GagalkanOmnibusLaw or #JegalOmnibusLaw (“foil” or “halt” the Omnibus Law), and most prominently #MosiTidakPercaya (“vote of no confidence”). The increasing visibility of these hashtags not only popularised the activist message among netizens. Mainstream media also picked up on the growing online resistance, and they began using Twitter trends as an indicator for public opinion on the Omnibus Law.
In addition, social media became a vital information channel for public understanding of the Omnibus bill. As official communication on the bill remained sparse and fragmented, fake news about the bill proliferated online, spreading public confusion.[6] For activists, then, raising public awareness by providing clear and accurate information on the implications of the Omnibus Law became a key concern. Thus, beyond mere agitation, they engaged in thorough fact-checking to fill the gaps in information, as well as to expose the political and economic interests behind the government’s push for the Omnibus Law. In presenting their findings, they used the idiom and logic of social media, creating shareable memes and infographics that were easy to digest and disseminate.[7] Again, such information quickly spilled over to mainstream media, providing fodder for public debate.
Meanwhile, the government attempted to sway public opinion by accelerating its online campaign. Initially, they used official government accounts and the hashtag #RUUCiptakerLindungiPekerja, “the Job Creation Bill protects workers”. But as this too overtly propagated government policy, it had little public resonance, and the hashtag was abandoned. Instead, in August 2020, prominent influencers were used to promote the bill through the hashtag #IndonesiaButuhKerja, “Indonesia needs jobs”. Without mentioning the bill, this hashtag was linked to moving stories about hardships suffered during the pandemic. On 10 August, #IndonesiaButuhKerja suddenly became top trending on Twitter and especially on the celebrity-focused platform Instagram, as celebrities tagged their posts with the hashtag, including popular dangdut singer Inul Daratista, rising musician Ardhito Pramono, Millennial entrepreneur Gofar Hilman, two national football players and several actors and actresses. The campaign backfired, however, when on 13 August it was revealed that at least 21 of these influencers had been paid five to fifteen million rupiah for promoting the hashtag. The backlash on social media—where netizens mocked the influencers’ ignorance and publicly shamed them for “pocketing the people’s money”—led most of them to remove posts of their which carried this hashtag. Some issued a public apology, claiming they did not know the hashtag was connected to the controversial bill, or who ordered the campaign.[8] The presidential office was quick to deny government involvement. The hashtag disappeared as quickly as it skyrocketed.
This social media blunder made resistance to the Omnibus Law all the more popular. By late September 2020, the narrative on Twitter was overwhelmingly dominated by those rejecting the bill (Figure 3). The immense volume of the online opposition could largely be attributed to the participation of tens of thousands of young “K-poppers” or Korean pop fans (Figure 4), many of whom had previously also joined the Reform Corrupted protest.[9] Alongside student activists and civil society actors, the active participation of K-Poppers and other young netizens epitomized the organic nature of the social media-driven resistance.[10] While helping to expand the ecology of the online resistance, these young participants also gained valuable political knowledge on the issues being raised in the posts they “liked” and shared.[11] This prepared many to continue the protest on the streets. However, it did not prepare them for the harsh cyber-attacks that followed.
Figure 3: Social network analysis, by data scientist Ismail Fahmi, of Omnibus Law-related hashtags on Twitter from 28 September to 5 October 2020 shows netizens’ overwhelming rejection of the bill. Picture: Ismail Fahmi, “Omnibus Law Peta Aspirasi Publik di Media Sosial,” Drone Emprit, 5 October 2020, https://pers.droneemprit.id/omnibus-lawpeta-aspirasi-publik-di-media-sosial/.
Figure 4: Ismail Fahmi’s analysis shows the prominence of K-poppers in the online protest. “Top Avatars for the hashtag #VoteOfNoConfidence; This and other hashtags on the Omnibus Law that became trending topics are widely circulated by accounts with Korean avatars—K-Poppers Strike Back!”, https://twitter.com/ismailfahmi/status/1313179270299086848.
CYBER-POLICING THE NARRATIVE
By September 2020, labour unions, students and other activists were preparing for mass protests and a three-day national strike to start on 6 October—one day ahead of the parliamentary vote on the Omnibus Bill. Without warning, however, Parliament expedited its vote on 5 October, and the bill passed by a large majority, prompting an outcry across civil society.[12] In the following days, university and high-school students, alongside labour unions and other groups, staged angry demonstrations throughout the country, which occasionally turned violent.[13] As during the Reform Corrupted protest one year earlier, the demonstrations were fuelled by online action, with over one million netizens pushing anti-Omnibus Law hashtags into Twitter’s top trending lists—both on Indonesian Twitter and globally—while footage of the protest shared on TikTok garnered up to 8.6 million views.[14]
This time, however, the authorities came prepared to offset the public impact of the protest.
The government’s response was revealed in a leaked telegram, dated 2 October, in which the National Police Chief, General Idham Azis, issued two types of instruction to his personnel:[15] First, to heighten vigilance and intelligence at “strategic risk areas”—including factories, universities and city squares—in order to nip “anarchistic action” in the bud, stressing the need to disperse disorderly gatherings amidst the Covid-19 pandemic; second, to cyber-patrol social media and conduct cyber-surveillance on activists to detect online agitation, and furthermore to actively “operate counter-narratives against issues that discredit the government”, that is, to counter activists’ counter-narratives against the Omnibus Law. The telegram further recommended “media management” as an effective method to influence public opinion to make it “disagree with protest actions”. Thus, the police received the green light for the violent dispersal of the protest, and instructions to help delegitimize it on social media and mainstream media. For that purpose, the “anarchy” discourse, a legacy of the New Order, proved its efficacy.
On 8 October, three days into the protest, an incident occurred in Jakarta that discredited the entire movement; several TransJakarta bus stops were vandalized and some set on fire. This incident, which reporters blamed on “anarchistic elements” among the protesters, instantly overshadowed all other news on the protest; throughout the day, television stations broadcasted footage of the burning bus stops and ransacking crowds (Figure 5). On social media, it prompted widespread disapproval from netizens, who had thus far overwhelmingly supported the protest. One netizen, who was among the first to tweet images of the destruction, commented, “I would fight for your cause but this is beyond outrageous ?♂️?♂️?♂️”. The tweet went viral, garnering thousands of retweets and likes (Figure 6).
Figure 5: Images of burning bus stops were broadcast on national television throughout the day. CNN Indonesia captioned, “Video: Impact of Action: TransJakarta HI-Sarinah Stop Burned Down”, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/tv/20201008195833-409-556218/video-dampak-aksi-halte-transj-hi-sarinah-dibakar-massa.
Figure 6: A netizen expresses disapproval of the ransacking of TransJakarta bus stops during the protest, alleging it was done by the demonstrators who thereby fell from grace.
An investigation by the independent media channel NarasiTV found that the vandalism had been coordinated by unidentified people, who were seen to manoeuvre erratically amongst the mass of protesters.[16] Given the track record of government-linked actors mobilizing incognito military men or militia for inciting riots in the past, speculations about the government’s role in the incident ran wild.[17] But the damage was done. The incident marked the culmination of concerted efforts to delegitimize the protest on two fronts: news coverage and online attacks by political buzzers.
After the incident, two types of coverage dominated news on the protest. The first focused on its “anarchic” nature. About 37% of the coverage highlighted vandalism during the protest, with stories abounding of violent protesters destroying public facilities and provoking clashes with security forces.[18] These stories evoked a narrative about the protest as uncivil and destructive, contrary to media depictions of the Reform Corrupted protest in September 2019, which was celebrated as the rebirth of the Indonesian student movement. Within the new narrative, a group emerged as the “mastermind”: anarcho-syndicalists. News outlets thus facilitated the authorities’ story of anarcho-syndicalists as provocateurs, which first appeared in police statements during an earlier Omnibus Law protest in Jakarta in March 2020.[19] Soon after that protest, television stations broadcasted a supposed confession from a person dubbed as “the chairman of anarcho-syndicalism”. It was told that a vast network of anarcho-syndicalists was conspiring to vandalize Indonesia. In actuality, as later revealed, this “chairman” was merely a motorcycle thief forced to “confess” by the police. While activists have since mocked this fabricated story, it deterred law-abiding citizens from identifying with the protest.
The second type of coverage portrayed the protesters as ignorant. In the course of the protest, the draft for the Omnibus Law was revised three times, each draft counting up to 1,052 pages. Activists struggled to keep up with the changes, which authorities exploited to depict the protesters as uninformed. As President Jokowi claimed, in a headline-statement on 9 October, criticism of the Omnibus Law was merely based on “disinformation and hoaxes spread through social media”.[20] Besides the anarcho-syndicalism story, the story of “gullible kids duped by online hoaxes” became a repetitive narrative in media commentary. Thus, as one critic asserted, news outlets increasingly “served as a public relations agency for the government”.[21]
Online operations by pro-government cyber-troops or political “buzzers” was the other front where government supporters attempted to control the narrative.[22] Besides flooding social media with pro-Omnibus Law hashtags—often using automated bot accounts to exponentially multiply tweets—pro-government buzzers mimicked and magnified negative stories of the protest by news outlets, thus accusing the protesters of being “anarchic” and lacking proper information. One pro-government buzzer, for example, tweeted a video of Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo admonishing two young protesters; he patronisingly asked them whether they had read the draft. The caption read, “Demonstrating is permissible as a democratic right, but you have to know what you’re fighting for, don’t just play along and let yourself be exploited. How many [protesters] were like these?” (Figure 7). As this caption alluded, accusing the protest of being orchestrated by opposition parties seeking to exploit the situation for their own political gain, was another common tactic. Though less explicitly, this was also insinuated in mainstream media.
Figure 7: A video of the Central Java Governor admonishing young protesters for their ignorance, which went viral.
What distinguished the buzzer operations from mainstream news coverage was the harsh, and often personal, attacks on activists. Pro-government buzzers scorned the protesters as “hoax-spreaders” for posting tweets based on older drafts—or for exposing government officials’ collusion and corruption. Some buzzers also instructed their followers, and coordinated with other cyber-troops, to harass specific activists. Targeting the coordinator of environmentalist group JATAM, one buzzer wrote, “This is the account guys @Merah_Johansyah let’s beat this SLANDERER up.” Soon after the call to action, the activist’s posts were filled with comments such as “shoot the filthy pig to death!!!!” Online hostility was also frequently targeted at activist women, who had to contend with misogynistic slurs, leading some to lock their account.
Finally, buzzers tapped into existing unsympathetic public sentiment towards the protesters as well. From the outset, not all netizens supported the protest. Unsympathetic netizens often attributed the protesters with the derogatory label “SJW” (social justice warrior), caricatured as hysterical, self-righteous hypocrites. Buzzers replicated this label and made graphics ridiculing protesters as SJW clowns, further contributing to the delegitimization of the protest. Through these various tactics, buzzer operations effectively turned the online public sentiment around. By mid-October, the hashtags dominating social media were those propagating the Omnibus Law; for example, #OmnibusLawBawaBerkah (“Omnibus Law brings blessing”) and #OmnibusLawBasmiKorupsi (“Omnibus Law eradicates corruption”).[23]
Figure 8: A buzzer post ridiculing the “Social Justice Warriors” of the Omnibus Law protest, describing them as persons who claim to defend freedom of speech, but who refuse to listen to the opinions of others.
CONCLUSION
The strategy of concerted delegitimization had a swift impact on the protest. Activists struggled to respond to the hostile situation both offline and online. The protest was challenging enough on the ground due to the police brutality, but now online, activists had to navigate through hostilities and derision, leaving them few opportunities to argue against the charge that their protest was illegitimate. In addition, the police stepped up cyber-surveillance as instructed, and many activists and netizens were prosecuted for violating the Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) Law with its notorious “rubber articles”. Some were arrested due to buzzers framing their tweets as hoax-spreading.
Thus, during the Omnibus Law controversy, social media turned from an activist playground into an unsafe space for activists. This had a chilling effect on political criticism generally. One survey conducted on 24-30 September 2020 already indicated that some 70% of the respondents felt that citizens had become more afraid to publicly express their opinions.[24] Since then, this trend appears to have deepened. The lukewarm response on social media to calls for action around the judicial review in June 2021 clearly indicated the changed political climate.
The scale at which the government deployed its power and resources in cyberspace to clamp down on opposition to the Omnibus Law—as indicated by the National Police Chief’s telegram—was unprecedented. Clearly, the implementation of the Omnibus Law was of such key strategic interest to Jokowi’s current administration that no disruptions could be tolerated. Furthermore, the methodical manner in which the government succeeded in winning the narrative battle soon after the protest erupted in October 2020—despite earlier social media blunders—indicates increasing sophistication in its capacity to neutralize opponents in the cybersphere. It is likely the government will build on this success to shore up its resources and capabilities to counter online dissent.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/95, 21 July 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Anonymous, “Indonesia Improves in World Competitiveness Ranking”, Jakarta Globe, 17 June 2021, https://jakartaglobe.id/business/indonesia-improves-in-world-competitiveness-ranking/.
[2] Yatun Sastramidjaja, “Indonesia: Digital Communications Energising New Political Generation’s Campaign for Democracy”, ISEAS Perspective, No. 2020/16, 17 March 2020, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/indonesia-digital-communications-energising-new-political-generations-campaign-for-democracy-by-yatun-sastramidjaja/.
[3] Riza Roidila Mufti and Kharishar Kahfi, “Jokowi Pushes for Passage of Omnibus Laws: What Are They?”, The Jakarta Post, 25 October 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/25/jokowi-pushes-passage-omnibus-laws-what-are-they.html.
[4] Lukman Nurhadi Arunanta, “Aksi Tolak Omnibus Law, Puluhan Manekin ‘Demo’ di Depan DPR”, Detik.com, 29 June 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5072315/aksi-tolak-omnibus-law-puluhan-manekin-demo-di-depan-dpr; Ari Saptura, “Gedung DPR Disemprot ‘Vaksin Oligarki’ untuk Tolak Omnibus Law”, Detik.com, 9 July 2020, https://news.detik.com/foto-news/d-5086269/gedung-dpr-disemprot-vaksin-oligarki-untuk-tolak-omnibus-law.
[5] Although Twitter ranked only fifth among the leading social media platforms in Indonesia (behind YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook; see “Penetration of Leading Social Networks in Indonesia as of Q3 2020”, https://www.statista.com/statistics/284437/indonesia-social-network-penetration/), it has been particularly popular among younger generations for public expression of their opinions.
[6] Anonymous, “Be Careful, Your Draft of the Omnibus Bill Might be a Hoax: Government”, The Jakarta Post, 21 January 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/01/21/be-careful-your-draft-of-the-omnibus-bill-might-be-a-hoax-government.html.
[7] The environmentalist group JATAM published a scathing report exposing the business ties of 12 high-ranked government officials who supported the bill, in which information on each of them was summarised in meme-ified form; posted on Twitter with the text “Who are the actors behind #Omnibus Law”. The report and the separate memes went viral (see https://twitter.com/jatamnas/status/1314562990360813569?s=03). Another popular post (garnering 19.000 likes and retweeted 10.000 times) was created in February 2020 by one of the authors of this article, Pradipa R. Rasidi; titled “Ringkasan 10 Menit: Segala tentang Omnibus Law” (10-minute summary: all about the Omnibus Law), it consisted of 12 shareable memes summarising key implications of the Omnibus Law, compiled from Esther Samboh, “Guide to Omnibus Bill on Job Creation: 1,028 Pages in 10 Minutes”, The Jakarta Post, 24 February 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/21/guide-to-omnibus-bill-on-job-creation-1028-pages-in-8-minutes.html.
[8] Dyaning Pangestika, “Influencers Apologize for Supporting Job Creation Bill after Furore among Followers”, The Jakarta Post, 16 August 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/15/influencers-apologize-for-supporting-job-creation-bill-after-furor-among-followers.html; Anonymous, “Polemik Buzzer Omnibus Law: Influencer Tak Kompeten dan Netizen Mudah Lupa”, Kumparan, 19 August 2020, https://kumparan.com/kumparantech/polemik-buzzer-omnibus-law-influencer-tak-kompeten-dan-netizen-mudah-lupa-1u1uiLqhkPc/full.
[9] Rosa Folia, “Fans K-Pop Aktif di Garis Depan Protes Pengesahan UU Cipta Kerja”, VICE, 6 October 2020, https://www.vice.com/id/article/qj47ad/fans-k-pop-aktif-memrotes-pengesahan-uu-cipta-kerja-omnibus-law-di-medsos; Ismail Fahmi, “RUU Omnibus Law Disahkan: K-Popers Strike Back”, Drone Emprit, 6 October 2020, https://pers.droneemprit.id/ruu-omnibus-law-disahkan-k-popers-strike-back/.
[10] Yatun Sastramidjaja, “Digital Youth and Rhizomatic Protest Movements”, IIAS The Newsletter, No. 89 (Summer 2021), https://www.iias.asia/the-newsletter/newsletter-89-summer-2021.
[11] Ismail Fahmi discovered a remarkable trend in K-poppers’ retweets during this period, namely the widespread sharing of the poem “Resist” by leftist poet Wija Thukul, prompting many K-poppers to look up and learn about this poet and the political conditions during the New Order that led to his disappearance in 1997 (allegedly abducted and killed by the military). Ismail Fahmi, “Wiji Thukul di tengah Ava K-poppers”, Twitter, 6 October 2020, https://twitter.com/ismailfahmi/status/1313534757427273728.
[12] Besides labour unionists and student activists, the passing of the bill was strongly condemned by Indonesia’s two largest religious organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, by academics and deans from 67 universities, and by NGOs from various sectors, including human rights, women’s, environmentalist and indigenous peoples’ organisations. Syafiq Hasyim, “Indonesian Muslim Groups Oppose Omnibus Law”, Fulcrum, 16 October 2020, https://fulcrum.sg/indonesian-muslim-groups-oppose-omnibus-law/; Max Lane, “Protests Against the Omnibus Law and the Evolution of Indonesia’s Social Opposition”, ISEAS Perspective, No. 2020/128, 9 November 2020, /wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_128.pdf.
[13] Aisyah Llewellyn and Tonggo Simangunsong, “Demonstrations Sweep Indonesia over Controversial Labour Law”, AlJazeera, 9 October 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/9/demonstrations-sweep-indonesia-over-controversial-omnibus-law.
[14] Ismail Fahmi, “Omnibus Law Peta Aspirasi Publik di Media Sosial”, Drone Emprit, 5 October 2020, https://pers.droneemprit.id/omnibus-lawpeta-aspirasi-publik-di-media-sosial/; Nuurrianti Jalli, “How TikTok Can Be the New Platform for Political Activism: Lessons from Southeast Asia”, The Conversation, 24 February 2021, https://theconversation.com/how-tiktok-can-be-the-new-platform-for-political-activism-lessons-from-southeast-asia-155556.
[15] The telegram was exposed on 5 October by the independent news site Tirto.id, after which it circulated widely on social media. Adi Briantika, “Perintah Kapolri: Intai, Larang & Lawan Narasi Penolak UU Ciptaker”, Tirto.id, 5 October 2020, https://tirto.id/perintah-kapolri-intai-larang-lawan-narasi-penolak-uu-ciptaker-f5As.
[16] Aqwam Fiazmi Hanifan and Arbi Sumandoyo, “62 Menit Operasi Pembakaran Halte Sarinah”, Buka Mata (NarasiTV), 28 October 2020, https://www.narasi.tv/buka-mata/62-menit-operasi-pembakaran-halte-sarinah.
[17] This “tradition” dates back to the Malari riots of 1974 which quelled the 1974 student movement, and the May 1998 riots which according to human rights organizations were orchestrated by General Prabowo Subianto—Jokowi’s erstwhile rival but who has become Minister of Defense in Jokowi’s second-term cabinet. Yatun Sastramidjaja, Playing Politics: Power, Memory and Agency in the Making of the Indonesian Student Movement, PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, April 2016.
[18] Muhammad Heychael and Purnama Ayu Rizky, “Lumpuh Dalam Cengkeraman Cukong: Televisi Dan Pemberitaan UU Cipta Kerja”, Remotivi, 30 October 2020, https://remotivi.or.id/pantau/643/lumpuh-dalam-cengkeraman-cukong-televisi-dan-pemberitaan-uu-cipta-kerja.
[19] Purnama Ayu Rizky, “Bagaimana Media Memfasilitasi Cerita Polisi Soal Anarko?”, Remotivi, 30 April 2020, https://remotivi.or.id/pantau/588/bagaimana-media-memfasilitasi-cerita-polisi-soal-anarko.
[20] Ivany Atina Arby, “Jokowi Dismisses Criticism of Omnibus Jobs Law as Hoax News”, The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/09/jokowi-dismisses-criticism-of-omnibus-jobs-law-as-hoax-news.html.
[21] Roy Thaniago et al., “Omnibus Law: Media Menjadi Humas Pemerintah”, Remotivi, 30 March 2020, https://remotivi.or.id/pantau/576/omnibus-law-media-menjadi-humas-pemerintah.
[22] See Yatun Sastramidjaja’s forthcoming Perspective, “The Business of Buzzers and Bots: Online Political Manipulation in Indonesian Cyberspace”.
[23] Ismail Fahmi, “Tren Penolakan terhadap Omnibus Law Menurun”, Drone Emprit, 17 October 2020, https://www.slideshare.net/IsmailFahmi3/tren-penolakan-terhadap-omnibus-law-menurun.
[24] Eva Safitri, “Survei Indikator: Mayoritas Responden Takut Nyatakan Pendapat Saat Ini”, DetikNews, 25 October 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5228103/survei-indikator-mayoritas-responden-takut-nyatakan-pendapat-saat-ini.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“The Unrealized Mahathir-Anwar Transitions: Social Divides and Political Consequences” by Khoo Boo Teik
“30 Years On: A Reflection on Southeast Asia’s Fight Against Communism During the Cold War Years” by Daljit Singh and Lye Liang Fook
2021/94 “Feminism and the Pro-Democracy Cause in Thailand” by Wichuta Teeratanabodee
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The pro-democracy protests in Thailand, while often characterised by observers as a youth movement, draw in actual fact on participation from many social groups.
- One of the most prominent of these groups has been young women calling not only for democracy but also for gender equality.
- Ruptures have occurred between feminist and non-feminist pro-democracy demonstrators over their priorities and over patriarchal norms in the mobilisation of protests.
- Feminists have felt stuck, seeing democracy as more achievable in Thailand than gender equality.
- Both sides need empathy and education to maintain solidarity in fighting against their common enemy – Thai authoritarianism.
*Wichuta Teeratanabodee holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and an MSc in Development Studies, from Lund University, Sweden. In June 2021, she served as an intern in ISEAS’s Thailand Studies Programme.
INTRODUCTION
Since early 2020, Thailand has witnessed a remarkable wave of political protests, initially triggered by the dissolution of the progressive Future Forward Party[1] and the kidnapping in Cambodia of pro-democracy activist Wanchalerm Satsaksit.[2] Throughout the past year, demonstrations have taken place in many parts of the country, though primarily in Bangkok.
The demonstrators, often gathered as a coalition calling itself the Khana Ratsadon or People’s Party in homage to the group that replaced absolute monarchy with constitutional rule in 1932, had made three core demands. These include the resignation of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and his cabinet, the reform of the monarchy, and the amendment of the military-drafted 2017 Constitution.[3] Having the courage to discuss and criticise royalism – one of the most tabu-ed topics in Thai society – has set this group of protestors apart from its predecessors.
Beyond noting its bold demands, observers have often characterised this wave of protests as a youth movement. High school and university students have indeed been the main actors.[4] However, the protests are more complicated than they appear. The new Khana Ratsadon is a network of many groups — including feminists, LGBTQ+ people, people with disabilities, and environmental activists in addition to students. The conversation among protestors about the state of Thailand thus often goes much beyond democracy and reforming the monarchy. It includes other progressive agendas such as gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights and environmental concerns. The focus of this paper is on the first of those concerns.
THE FEMINISTS
The conspicuous roles of young women in this ongoing wave of protests have put them in the spotlight.[5] Unlike in previous rallies, which were often led by males, women are now taking on leadership roles to call for democracy. Simultaneously, they have shared stories of women’s struggles in Thai society, focusing particularly on women’s status in politics — which has worsened markedly since the 2014 coup. In 2013, Thailand was ranked among the top 65 per cent in Political Empowerment by the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report.[6] By 2021, it had dropped dramatically to the bottom 14 per cent.[7] While the number of women in Parliament rose from 5.3 per cent to 16.2 per cent after the 2019 national elections, both fellow politicians and public attention often target female representatives’ appearances or attire, instead of their performance or capability.[8]
Beyond Parliament, women participating in pro-democracy protests have highlighted policies that are products of patriarchy. They have called for an amendment to the new abortion law,[9] increased accessibility to women’s sanitary products and an end to sexual harassment in Thai institutions.
While these issues seem to align with a broader call for democracy, feminists in the pro-democracy protests see themselves fighting a two-front war. On one front they demand democracy and an end to the current authoritarian regime, and on another, they fight for gender equality against fellow pro-democracy protestors who do not support feminist objectives.
This piece seeks to capture the perspectives of feminist protestors from the ground. It draws on interviews with two self-identified feminists who actively attended political rallies throughout the past year[10] and seeks to put their experience and concerns into a broader context. The first interviewee, “Fern”,[11] is a 27-year-old graduate of one of the country’s most prestigious law faculties. She is currently a legal officer at a state-owned enterprise in Bangkok. The second interviewee, Sai,[12] is a 25-year-old recent graduate of one of the oldest faculties at a well-known Thai university, where she majored in English Literature. She is now working as the manager of a photography school in Bangkok.
Both interviewees participated in their first political protests in 2020. Resentment of and disappointment with the system, triggered mainly by the dissolution of the Future Forward Party in February 2020, motivated them. Sai, who has long been politically active on her Twitter account, said that the Constitutional Court’s decision to disband the party was like pouring oil into what was an already heated discussion on the powerlessness of civil society in the online world. “It made us realise that we needed to be louder and turn something into a more concrete form, more tangible than merely complaining on the Internet,” said Sai.[13]
As a former law student, Fern was certain that legal principles did not justify the dissolution of Future Forward. Therefore, she was “very disappointed in the legal processes. As a law student, I know the principles. I knew how the result was supposed to be. Thus, I was very saddened and angry when I saw the actual results”.[14]
Fern has not had to think twice before joining the on-street protests since then. Seeing herself as both a Thai and a global citizen, she wants to contribute her time and energy to make Thailand and the world a better place. “I call for democracy and systematic changes not only for myself but also for those who don’t have the resources of time, energy and money like me. Thus, I have to be as loud as possible,” Fern explained.[15]
Similarly, Sai has become a frequent participant in the pro-democracy movement. She sees herself as a contributor to making the crowds larger and stronger. “I felt that just being there was already a significant contribution,” said Sai.[16]
PROTESTS OF DIVERSITY
While political objectives like democracy were the reasons that Fern and Sai initially joined the street protests, both women quickly realised that people in the movement had diverse backgrounds and were expressing their agendas loudly – whether on the streets, on the stage or in the online world. The movement offered “space where people from different groups could join. They came to speak up about their agendas”, said Sai.[17]
People who stepped up onto the stage to talk to the crowd did not only talk about democracy or critique the monarchy. They also each represented their own social group. At the Sanam Luang protest on 18 September 2020, for example, the pool of speakers was diverse, including LGBTQ+ activist Chumaporn “Waddao” Taengkliang, environmental activist Prasitchai Noonuan, Bad Students Network leader Lapanapat “Min” Wangpaisit, and Chatchai “Champ” Pumpuang of the Designers Labour Union Network.[18]
On the streets, an iconic feature of this wave of protests was an event called “Mob Fest”, where different social groups came together and set up booths to promote certain agendas through presentations, discussion and performances.[19] This arrangement made the demonstrations look like a festival.[20] Protestors could drop by to participate in campaigns and learn more about various social issues at Mob Fest.
One of the most prominent campaigns was the #AnonymousMeetingPoint (#นิรนามMeetingPoint), organised as a collaboration among several feminist and LGBTQ+ groups. The campaign designated several locations where women, LGBTQ+ people and youths who attended the protest alone could meet up and find company. The locations helped ensure that these protestors would be safe while attending the demonstrations,[21] while simultaneously signalling that women, LGBTQ+ people and young people did not feel safe when alone.
Other campaigns represented at Mob Fest often focused on collecting signatures to introduce or amend laws, with goals such as legalising prostitution,[22] amending abortion laws, proposing the Clean Air Act,[23] and even legalising craft beer in Thailand.[24]
At a glance, the active participation of feminists and the promotion of many social issues at protest venues seemed almost out of context with protestors’ core demands for Prayut’s resignation and reform of the monarchy.
To explain this phenomenon, Cornell University Professor Tamara Loos points out that “In effect, the demonstrations have become avenues for young people not just to refuse royalism but also to demand the right to nonconformity”.[25]
Loos argues that nonconformity in the context of Thailand and specifically in that of ongoing protests offers “critiques to the status quo hierarchy and refusal to conform to traditions on all levels”.[26] In other words, apart from just the military and the monarchy, the demonstrators challenge all institutions they perceive as authoritarian. In her view, “every aspect of these protests is something broader than explicitly political; their message is to refuse to conform to existing cultural norms, which only reinforce the status quo hierarchy”.[27]
Fern’s and Sai’s thinking corroborates Loos’s views. The two Thai feminists believe that the protests are not just a fight against individual institutions. Instead, they are a battle against authoritarian, hierarchical traditions that define many institutions in Thailand. Fern notes that, apart from the authoritarian government, she is also fighting against the “gender hierarchy and male supremacy” that have long been part of Thai society.[28]
Despite the vibrant diversity of protestors, participants in the demonstrations have not accepted all agendas equally. Feminists find themselves being challenged – often by their fellow pro-democracy protestors.
“MANY PROTESTORS SUPPORT DEMOCRACY BUT DO NOT AGREE WITH FEMINISTS!”
As with any massive social movement, clashes have arisen among pro-democracy protestors. On many occasions, they have pitted feminists against non-feminists.
Fern shared that “sometimes, male leaders on the stage would use words that connote female inferiority… something like ’a pussy face’, as insulting phrases”.[29] Many of the people in attendance, especially feminists, felt offended and would reply, “do NOT insult a pussy!” She explained that “while it is quite common in our culture to use phrases involving genitalia as insulting or curse words, we have to understand that, in a certain context, it’s oppressing women”.[30]
Speakers at protests have made these concerns explicit. At a protest at Chiang Mai University on 18 October 2020, for example, Kornkanok “Pup” Kamta, a representative of the Feminist Liberation Front,[31] called for a new protest culture by encouraging people to stop using terms such as ‘pussy face’ or ‘prostitute’ as insults.[32] Pup said that “a pussy is not something to insult, and prostitution is a legitimate profession”.[33]
Apart from agendas related to women, feminists also support the campaign for LGBTQ+ rights. That is because, “for feminists, the term feminism is not about ‘women being the best or better than men’. Instead, it means ‘all genders are equal on all matters’,” said Fern.[34]
Thus, when John Winyu Wongsurawat, a popular and charismatic pro-democracy TV host, discussed the legalisation of same-sex marriage on his programme Daily Topics and remarked that “If the rights of the common people are not here yet, LGBTQ+ rights are unlikely to come”, his comments sparked anger from both LGBTQ+ people and feminists.[35] Many have pointed out that his words suggested a hierarchy of concerns. This stance contradicts his pro-democracy principles.
John Winyu is an example of what feminist pro-democracy protestors call ‘Leftist Thai men’.[36] Emerging from discussions on Twitter, the term refers to men who support democracy but “do not seem to understand and support gender equality”, explains Fern. “And when we raise some points that, to us, are clearly the product of patriarchy, they think that ‘feminists are so annoying and never happy about anything’”.[37]
Sai notes that “feminists are portrayed or painted as the demanding folks. So, many times, people don’t even pay attention to what we have to say”. She goes further to compare the image of feminists to that of ‘sa-lim’, a term referring to people who are against pro-democracy protestors. “If sa-lim are seen as those who would always yell their lungs out for whatever they think was right and not bother to listen, they [leftist Thai men] probably see us [feminists] in that way as well”.[38]
DEMOCRACY AND GENDER EQUALITY
John Winyu’s opinion is not rare. In fact, some pro-democracy protestors share his thinking. They hold that democracy should be the priority, and gender equality can come later. Fern and Sai disagree and ask in effect, “why can’t we drive for multiple agendas at the same time?”
“Democracy is not about just raising hands and voting, but it comes with rights, freedom, equality, and solidarity,” said Fern, who sees that gender equality clearly falls under the democracy umbrella.[39]
Feminists’ biggest enemy, they argue, is patriarchy, which exists as the core of many institutions in Thailand – from family, school and the military to the royal institution.[40] It is the invisible element that affects everyone’s lives in one way or another, including those of men. In an interview with a Thai online news media outlet, The MATTER, LGBTQ+ activist Waddao said that “First of all, we have to understand that patriarchy does not, in any way, stand for men”.[41] Men can also be victims of patriarchy through “toxic masculinity”.[42] Thus, Waddao suggested, an end to patriarchy would also benefit men.
Feminist pro-democracy activists often bring up the example of King Vajiralongkorn’s polygamous practice. In July 2019, the monarch officially appointed Sineenat “Koi” Wongvajirapakdi as his “noble consort”.[43] He thus revived a tradition that had not been witnessed in Thailand since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932.[44] The king later used his power to demote and then reappoint Koi with just the snap of his fingers.[45] These events exemplified not only the king’s power but also the status of the Thai monarchy as a patriarchal institution.
Examples like this one explain why, to feminists, patriarchy is an unavoidable topic in the fight to reform the monarchy.
PATHS FORWARD
Despite the clear link between gender equality and democracy, feminists still feel stuck in relation to their fellow pro-democracy protestors. Fern and Sai share the opinion that democracy seems to be more easily achievable than gender equality because patriarchy and gender inequality are deeply rooted in human history.[46]
The struggle for democracy in Thailand often involves physical confrontations with authorities. They have cost many people their lives or their freedom. Democracy is undoubtedly not an easy thing to attain. Thus, “democracy is more achievable than gender equality” is indeed a noteworthy message, revealing the multi-layered struggles that feminists are facing.
Nevertheless, Fern and Sai try to remain understanding. Sai admits that the fracture over feminism among protestors is a tough issue but not an unexpected one. “Of course, there must be conflicts. There is no way that everyone, even among those who want democracy, would agree 100 per cent on everything”.[47] Fern adds that “It is impossible to make everyone think the way I do. If I say that I want everyone to think like me, then I’m a dictator. Wouldn’t it be ironic then?”[48]
Fern and Sai also understand that, as patriarchy has long been part of society, the patriarchal mindset can be difficult to alter. Fern says that “the more we [feminists] push back, the more likely changes would happen. I cannot say that they [leftist Thai men] would understand, but at least they would know the consequences of their words and actions”.[49] Revisiting John Winyu’s case, she says that, “after the incident, John Winyu might not immediately understand the complicated gender issues, but, at least, he is now more aware of how his comments on LGBTQ+ people can cause a backlash”.[50]
Sai shares a similar thought. “We just have to keep talking out loud”. She sees democracy in two forms – one in the system and the other one in the mindset. “A democratic system can be achieved through reformation, but that doesn’t mean that everyone will automatically have the true ideas of democracy – equality, listening to one another, and empathy – installed in their mindset. The democratic mindset can happen if we keep educating one another, so we shouldn’t be tired of raising awareness on gender issues and pushing against patriarchy; this is going to be a long journey,” she says.[51]
Feminist and non-feminist protestors in today’s Thailand have a common enemy – the authoritarian regime, which — one prominent activist scholar contends — has shown “no signs of …willingness to negotiate with democracy”.[52] Consequently, Tamara Loos notes, maintaining a kind of strategic uniformity from within will help them achieve their common goal.[53] Disagreements are likely to always happen and criticism to be voiced, and the protestors will have to remain empathetic, to keep raising awareness, and to educate one another.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/94, 16 July 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] BBC, “Thai protests: How pro-democracy movement gained momentum”, 15 October 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54542252, accessed 18 June 2021). The newly established Future Forward Party took third place in the national elections of March 2019. Its progressive agenda, which included legalising abortion and same-sex marriage, attracted many younger Thais. Less than a year after the election, the Constitutional Court disbanded the party, reasoning that it had benefitted from improper funding from Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, the party’s leader.
[2] Ibid. In June 2020, Wanchalerm Satsaksit, a pro-democracy activist living in exile since 2014, was reported kidnapped on a street in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Suspicion fell on the Thai government, which neglected to respond. Wanchalerm remains missing until today.
[3] Thai PBS, “Reincarnated Khana Rasadorn to press three demands in October 14th protest”, 8 October 2020 (https://www.thaipbsworld.com/reincarnated-khana-rasadorn-to-press-three-demands-in-october-14th-protest, accessed 18 June 2021).
[4] See, for example, BBC, “Thai protests: How pro-democracy movement gained momentum”; John Reed, “Inside Thailand’s youth revolution”, Financial Times, 6 November 2020 (https://www.ft.com/content/c2a530ba-a343-4007-a324-c2d276b95883, accessed 18 June 2021); Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, “The white ribbon movement: high school students in the 2020 Thai youth protests”, Critical Asian Studies 53, 2 (2021):206-218 (https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.1883452); and Tamara Loos, “A Revolutionary Change in Thailand Protests Against the Monarchy Signal a Break With the Past”, Foreign Affairs, 7 December 2020 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/thailand/2020-12-07/revolutionary-change-thailand, accessed 17 June 2021).
[5] Sebastian Strangio, “Report Shines Light on Thailand’s Women Protest Leaders”, The Diplomat, 4 February 2021 (https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/report-shines-light-on-thailands-women-protest-leaders, accessed 16 June 2021).
[6] World Economic Forum, “The Global Gender Gap Report 2013”, 20 October 2013 (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf, accessed 24 June 2021), p. 357.
[7] World Economic Forum, “The Global Gender Gap Report 2021”, 30 March 2021 (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf, accessed 24 June 2021), p. 367.
[8] Waraporn Chamsanit, “ความเท่าเทียมทางเพศ: คำถามที่สังคมไทยต้องขบคิด” [Gender equality: the question that Thai society has to ponder], 4 January 2020 (https://ngthai.com/cultures/26986/sexual-equality-in-thai-society, accessed 25 June 2021).
[9] In January 2021, the Thai parliament amended the penal code to loosen restrictions on abortion. The amended law allows women to have an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. It is still a criminal act to terminate a pregnancy after 12 weeks. Protestors are pushing for the extension of the right to abortion beyond 12 weeks. See “Thailand: Abortion in First Trimester Legalized”, Global Legal Monitory, United States Library of Congress, 1 March 2021 (https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/thailand-abortion-in-first-trimester-legalized, accessed 23 June 2021).
[10] The interviews were conducted online as part of the author’s broader project on “Identities among Pro-Democracy Protestors in Thailand”. The project explores different social groups and identities among participants in ongoing pro-democracy protests, including feminists, LGBTQ+ people, students, people with disabilities, and people from rural Thailand. It seeks to understand the identities that they share, potential conflicts among them, and how they manage those conflicts. The interview with “Fern” was conducted on 29 April 2021, and the interview with “Sai” was conducted on 26 May 2021. Both interviews were conducted via Zoom with the permission of the interviewees to record and to quote their statements.
[11] The name is a pseudonym, chosen by the interviewee.
[12] The name is a pseudonym, chosen by the interviewee.
[13] Author’s interview with Sai, 26 May 2021.
[14] Author’s interview with Fern, 29 April 2021.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Author’s interview with Sai, 26 May 2021. [17] Ibid.
[18] Prachachat, “เปิดโผรายชื่อ ดาวเด่นม็อบนักศึกษา ขึ้นปราศรัย 19-20 กันยายนนี้” [Revealing the list of names of stars in university students’ protest on the stage this 19-20 September], 18 September 2020 (https://www.prachachat.net/politics/news-523999, accessed 17 June 2021).
[19] Bangkok Biz News, “เปิดไอเดีย แอดมินเพจ ‘Mob Fest’ รู้ก่อนไป ‘ม็อบ 14 พ.ย.’” [Revealing an idea with administrator of the page ‘Mob Fest’ things to know before attending Mob 14 November], 14 November 2020 (https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/907761, accessed 25 June 2021).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Twitter @femliberateth, “แฟมินิสต์ปลดแอก (ผู้หญิงปลดแอก)” [Feminist’s Liberation Front (Women’s Liberation Front)], 18 September 2020 (https://twitter.com/femliberateth/status/1306877365780467722, accessed 19 June 2021).
[22] Twitter @JiPaTaBook, “#ม็อบ7มีนา #เดินทะลุฟ้า แล้วมาลงชื่อแก้กฎหมายกัน!” [#Mob7March #WalkThroughTheSky come sign your name to call to amend the law!], 7 March 2021 (https://twitter.com/JiPaTaBook/status/1368568154201280518/photo/1, accessed 19 June 2021).
[23] Twitter @whathappeninmob, “จุดลงชื่อ #พรบอากาศสะอาด” [Locations for #CleanAirAct], 21 March 2021 (https://twitter.com/whathappeninmob/status/1373619788023361536, accessed 19 June 2021).
[24] Twitter @nefj94, “มีแคมเปญจากกลุ่มแนวร่วมคราฟเบียร์มาฝากครับ” [Here is a campaign from the Craft Beer Group], 16 September 2020 (https://twitter.com/nefj94/status/1306164770467241985, accessed 19 June 2021).
[25] Tamara Loos, “A Revolutionary Change”.
[26] Author’s interview with Tamara Loos, conducted online, 17 June 2021.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Author’s interview with Fern, 29 April 2021.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] The group was then called the Women’s Liberation Front. In an effort to become more inclusive, it changed its name to the Feminist Liberation Front in November 2020. See Prachatai, “ผู้หญิงปลดแอกเปลี่ยนชื่อเป็น ‘เฟมินิสต์ปลดแอก’ เพื่อเปิดกว้าง มุ่งเท่าเทียมทางเพศ” [Women’s Liberation Front changes name to “Feminist Liberation Front” to broaden itself, aiming for gender equality], 15 November 2020 (https://prachatai.com/journal/2020/11/90426, accessed 25 June 2021).
[32] Prachatai, “นัดปุ๊บมาปั๊บ ประมวล #ม็อบ18ตุลา แน่นอนุสาวรีย์ชัยฯ กลางสายฝน ที่นี่และที่อื่นๆ” [As soon as appointment is made, they come, #Mob18Oct filling up the Victory Monument under the rain, here and elsewhere], 18 October 2020 (https://prachatai.com/journal/2020/10/90021, accessed 18 June 2021).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Author’s interview with Fern, 29 April 2021.
[35] Daranee Thongsiri, “Feminista Perspective: ประชาธิปไตยคือความหลากหลายและ LGBTIQไม่ได้มีแค่กลุ่มเดียว” [Feminista Perspective: democracy is diversity and LGBTIQ are not just one group], Feminista, 14 July 2020 (http://www.feminista.in.th/post/feminista-perspective-democracy-lgbt-rights-intersectional, accessed 18 June 2021).
[36] That is, ซ้ายชายไทย.
[37] Author’s interview with Fern, 29 April 2021.
[38] Author’s interview with Sai, 26 May 2021.
[39] Author’s interview with Fern, 29 April 2021.
[40] Hannah Beech and Muktita Suhartono, “Young Women Take a Frontline Role in Thailand’s Protests”, New York Times, 24 September 2020 (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/world/asia/thailand-protests-women.html, accessed 14 June 2021).
[41] Jiratchaya Chaichumkhun, “ประชาธิปไตยที่ไม่ทิ้งใครไว้ข้างหลัง ต้องมีความเป็นธรรมทางเพศ คุยกับ ชุมาพร แต่งเกลี้ยง” [Democracy that leave no one behind must have gender fairness. A talk with Chumaporn Taengklinag], The MATTER, 27 October 2020 (https://thematter.co/social/gender/interview-waaddao-gender/127058, accessed 20 June 2021).
[42] Ibid.
[43] Hannah Beech, “‘Extremely Evil Misconduct’: Thailand’s Palace Intrigue Spills Into View”, New York Times, 6 November 2019 (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/world/asia/thailand-king-consort-wives.html, accessed 19 June 2021).
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Author’s interview with Sai and Fern, 29 April and 26 May 2021.
[47] Author’s interview with Sai, 26 May 2021.
[48] Author’s interview with Fern, 29 April 2021.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Author’s interview with Sai, 26 May 2021.
[52] Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “‘Good Coup’ Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall”, pp. 3-16 in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ed., “Good Coup” Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2014), p. 8.
[53] Author’s interview with Tamara Loos, 17 June 2021.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/93 “Unpacking China’s Merchandise Trade with ASEAN during the Global Pandemic” by Xiaojun Li
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- While the global merchandise trade shrank by 5.3% as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN increased in the meantime by 6.7%, thanks not only to a steady increase in bilateral trade but also to the relative decline of trade between China with its other major trading partners. Since January 2020, cumulative trade between China and ASEAN has maintained positive year-on-year growth, while cumulative trade between China and the European Union, the United States and Japan contracted for the first three quarters of last year.
- The increase in bilateral trade was largely driven by the ASEAN-6 countries, which accounted for the lion’s share of both imports and exports with China. The negative impacts of pandemic-induced measures on bilateral trade were temporary. Countries relatively unscathed by the pandemic such as Thailand and Vietnam recorded positive year-to-date changes in trade with China for nearly every month of the year. Most other ASEAN member states saw either imports or exports with China dip in the first half of 2020 but rebound in the second half. Laos was the only country whose imports and exports with China both shrank.
- The pandemic expanded the extensive margins of China’s exports (i.e., the range of traded goods) to ASEAN with substantial increases in products related to medical supplies and ‘work-from-home’ as well as capital goods. In the meantime, intra-industry trade between China and ASEAN declined due to the disruption of global production networks and lower demand, while China’s exports with high foreign value added decreased.
* Xiaojun Li is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. He was a Wang Gungwu Visiting Scholar at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute from 1 March 2021 to 30 June 2021.
INTRODUCTION
The Covid-19 pandemic since early 2019 has drastically disrupted economic activities throughout the world. According to the World Trade Organization, global merchandise trade flows decreased by 5.3% in 2020.[1] Against this backdrop, however, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN bucked the trend and reached $684.6 billion, a 6.7 percent increase from 2019. This propelled ASEAN to dethrone the European Union as China’s largest trading partner for the first time, while making China ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 12 years in a row.[2]
But there is more going on beneath the surface. The purpose of this Perspective is to move beyond the aggregate trade measures to uncover additional patterns in China’s trade with ASEAN countries during the global pandemic. Using monthly export and import data disaggregated by country and commodity, released by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China,[3] this Perspective seeks answers to the following questions: (a) What factors contributed to ASEAN becoming China’s number one trading partner? (b) How did the pandemic and related measures imposed by governments affect bilateral trade between China and ASEAN member countries? (c) What has or has not changed in the trade pattern between China and ASEAN as a result of the global pandemic?
CHINA’S TRADE WITH ASEAN VERSUS OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIES
We start by looking at overall trade between China and its top four trading partners—the European Union (EU), ASEAN, the United States and Japan.[4] The EU took the honour of being China’s top trading partner in 2019 with $707 billion in total imports and exports, narrowly edging out ASEAN at $644 billion. That same year, ASEAN also overtook the United States for the first time, after being China’s third trading partner for the previous eight years.
In 2020, ASEAN passed the EU to take the number one spot right off the bat. As can be seen in the top panel in Figure 1, in eleven of twelve months, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN was higher than that between China and the EU. The only exception was in May when EU logged about $2.5 billion more trade with China than ASEAN.
Figure 1: China’s Overall Trade with Top 4 Partners in 2020
Note: The top panel plots overall trade in billion USD and the bottom panel plots the year-to-date percent change in percentage points, which are calculated using cumulative trade from January up to that month. The data for the first two months are customarily combined due to the Chinese New Year. Source: GAC of China.
From the top panel in Figure 1, it appears that the pandemic did not hugely impact China’s trade as situations in the country were quickly contained. After a big dip in March, trade rebounded for the EU and the United States and later for ASEAN and Japan as well. However, if we look at year-on-year change in the bottom panel in Figure 1, it is apparent that ASEAN is the only one that has maintained a positive year-to-date change every month. In contrast, EU’s trade with China in the first eight months decreased from a year ago. The United States and Japan took even longer to post a year-to-date increase. In other words, ASEAN’s emergence as China’s top trading partner is a combination of the steady increase in bilateral trade and the relative rather than absolute decline of other major trading partners.
Figure 2: China’s Import and Export with Top 4 Partners in 2020
Note: This figure plots China’s monthly exports and imports in billion USD with its top four trading partners in 2020. The data for the first two months are customarily combined due to the Chinese New Year. Source: GAC of China.
Additional patterns emerge when total trade is broken down into exports and imports in Figure 2. China’s imports follow a similar, slightly increasing trend and the ranking remains the same—ASEAN, the EU, Japan and the United States. This is in contrast to exports where the ranking of the top three trading partners changes from month to month, with the U.S. taking the overall top spot of the year with $452 billion, followed by the EU ($392 billion) and ASEAN ($385 billion).
Using data from Figure 2, we can additionally calculate the differences between imports and exports (see data appendix A), which show that China ran a trade surplus against its top three trading partners (i.e., ASEAN, EU, and US), though the sizes of the surplus varied over time. Strikingly, China’s surplus with the United States remained large despite ongoing economic and political tensions between the two countries.
CHINA’S TRADE WITH ASEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES
While ASEAN as a whole became China’s top trading partner during the pandemic, there is a wide range of variations across ASEAN member countries. Figure 3 ranks the ten ASEAN member countries according to their imports, exports, and total trade with China in 2020. The ASEAN-6 countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and The Philippines) accounted for the lion’s share (94.8%) of ASEAN’s total trade with China. In particular, Vietnam surpassed Australia for the first time to become China’s seventh largest trading partner. On the other hand, the trade volumes between China and the four smaller ASEAN economies—Brunei, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar—were substantially smaller.
Figure 3: China’s Trade with ASEAN Countries in 2020
Note: Export and import values (in billion USD) may not add up to total trade values due to rounding. Source: GAC of China.
The rankings of countries are similar when we look at imports and exports separately. One notable exception is Singapore, which ranked second for exports and fifth for imports. This resulted in a trade deficit of $26.4 billion with China, second to Vietnam’s deficit of $35.3 billion. Only three out of the ten ASEAN member countries’ exports to China exceeded their imports from China—Brunei, Laos, and Malaysia. While trade surpluses were small for Brunei ($1 billion) and Laos ($0.6 billion), Malaysia’s trade surplus with China reached $17.8 billion, mostly driven by exports in electrical and electronics products, rubber products, and palm oil and palm oil-based agriculture products, all of which were important raw materials and intermediate goods that saw a surge in demand as production capacities returned to pre-pandemic levels in China.[5]
Comparing trade figures in 2020 with just a year ago reveals that the pandemic has had divergent impacts on ASEAN member countries. Figure 4 displays cumulative year-on-year changes in both exports and imports and shows how pandemic-induced government measures such as lockdowns and circuit breaks affected trade negatively. In particular, China’s exports to almost all ASEAN countries were negatively affected in the beginning of 2020 when China entered into lockdown. Despite the pandemic, China’s imports from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam grew stronger (driven mostly by integrated circuits), which likely contributed to the overall positive growth observed in Figure 1.
Figure 4: Monthly Year-to-Date Percentage Change in China’s Exports and Imports with ASEAN Member Countries
Note: This figure plots the monthly YTD percent changes in China’s exports (top panel) and imports (bottom panel) with ASEAN countries. Underlying data for the figure can be found in Data Appendix B. Source: GAC of China.
In the second quarter of the year, many ASEAN member countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, The Philippines, and Singapore implemented lockdown measures of varying intensity, and coincidently, their trade with China suffered consequently (as represented by the “V” shape in Figure 4). When such measures were gradually eased in the second half of the year, bilateral trade rebounded for most ASEAN member countries, with positive year-on-year changes in both imports and exports being recorded for Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam by the end of the year. Not all countries were able to fully recover though. China’s exports to Brunei, Indonesia and Laos and its imports from Laos, The Philippines and Singapore contracted from a year ago. Laos was the only country that saw both its imports and exports with China shrink by 4.3% and 15.2%, respectively.
SHIFTING TRADE STRUCTURE IN THE PANDEMIC
Did the global pandemic affect what was being traded between China and ASEAN? Table 1 shows China’s top 20 export and import products in terms of value (in billion USD) and percentages (of total imports and exports) with ASEAN in 2020 and 2019 (see Data Appendix C for the descriptions for all product chapters).[6]
On the import side, there are remarkable similarities before and after the pandemic. Only one product category (HS code 3) in the top 20 list of 2019 failed to make it to the same list of 2020. In addition, the value and percentage of these imports are comparable between the two years, resulting in a similar ranking with just a few exceptions (HS code 71, 72, and 98).[7] On the whole, the pandemic did not affect China’s imports from ASEAN in terms of both the type (i.e. extensive margin) and value (i.e. intensive margin) of goods—the top 20 product categories accounted for 91.7% and 91.1% of total imports in 2019 and 2020, respectively.
The picture is dramatically different on the export side with significant reshuffling of the top 20 list.[8] Half of the product categories in the 2019 list were replaced by new ones in 2020. Not surprisingly, these included products related to medical supplies (e.g. surgical masks and protective gears under HS 62 and 63), products with a higher ‘work-from-home’ share such as “furniture; bedding; stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings” (HS 94), and capital goods such as “iron and steel articles” (HS 73), for which long-term planning implies a different reaction to the temporary shock due to the pandemic.[9]
Furthermore, unlike the imports where the top 20 list before and after the pandemic added up to roughly the same level, China’s top 20 exports to ASEAN in 2020 accounted for 78.3% of all exports, compared to 91.8% in 2019. In other words, China exported a wider range of products to ASEAN, suggesting that the negative effects of the pandemic were concentrated on the “intensive margin”, i.e. the value of traded goods; a pattern that mirrors what happened during the “great trade collapse” following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.[10]
Examining imports and exports in the same year exhibits another major change between the two years. Over the last few decades, bilateral trade between China and A $SEAN saw steady increase in intra-industry trade through which China and ASEAN are linked to the larger global production networks.[11] One prime example of this is electronic integrated circuits under HS code 85 (“electrical machinery and parts”), the top product category whose combined imports and exports make up over half of the bilateral trade in both years. In 2019, the top 20 import list largely mirrors the top 20 export list, suggesting a high degree of intra-industry trade. In 2020, as the pandemic disrupted global supply chains, intra-industry trade between China and ASEAN declined substantially, which is indicated by the divergence of the top 20 lists for imports and exports.
The impact of the global pandemic on the structure of bilateral trade is also evident in the changes of foreign value added in China’s exports to ASEAN.[121] Foreign value added (FVA) is the foreign content such as raw materials and intermediate goods imported from other countries that is embodied in exports. As such, FVA is a measure of vertical specialization as it captures the extent to which a country is integrated into global production networks through the use of imported intermediates.[13]
Figure 5 plots the foreign value added embodied in China’s exports to ASEAN for 97 HS-2 digit product categories against the export value on the logarithmic scale.[14] Each dot in the figure represents one product category. The dashed lines are the locally weighted regression smoothing curves. In 2019, FVA values were positively correlated with exports, suggesting that China’s exports to ASEAN were highly integrated in the global production networks. In 2020, when global supply chains were disrupted and demands were suppressed in countries heavily hit by the pandemic, there was virtually no relationship between FVA and export values for products with higher foreign value added (> 20%). As a matter of fact, exports in 2020 decreased from 2019 for eight of the ten product categories with the highest FVA in 2020.
Figure 5: Foreign Value Added in China’s Exports to ASEAN in 2020 and 2019
Source: GAC of China.
CONCLUSION
A deeper dive into the disaggregated bilateral trade data between China and ASEAN countries in 2020 reveals a number of new patterns. They suggest that the repercussions of the pandemic on other trading partners of a country, and on its own demand for imports from a specific country, will depend not only on pandemic-related measures in the respective countries, but also on the demand and supply of third countries in the global production networks.
In the first quarter of 2021, ASEAN remained China’s top trading partner,[15] but the gap has been narrowing, and may soon be edged out by the EU again, as many ASEAN countries are now struggling with new waves of Covid-19 variants.[16] What’s more interesting and potentially will be of greater significance is the shifting trade structure and the drop in intra-industry trade. Some of these changes certainly can be attributed to the pandemic, but it remains to be seen whether or not these new patterns will persist as firms reorganize and relocate their supply chains in the post-pandemic world.
Note: Trade values in billion USD. A positive trade difference indicates China running a surplus with the partner. All changes are year-to-date percent changes ending at the specific month. Source: GAC of China.
Note: Trade values in billion USD. A positive trade difference indicates China running a surplus with the partner. All changes are year-to-date percent changes ending at the specific month. Source: GAC of China.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/93, 15 July 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres21_e/pr876_e.htm.
[2] http://asean2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinanews/202101/20210103031104.shtml.
[3] The advantage of using the GAC data is that they are available for all ASEAN member countries at the product and month levels. Such disaggregate data are not available for Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam in commonly used databases such as the International Trade Centre (ITC). It should be noted that trade data reported by China may not align with those reported by its partner countries. Such statistical discrepancies are well documented and difficult to overcome. See, for example, Javorsek, Marko. Asymmetries in international merchandise trade statistics: A case study of selected countries in Asia and the Pacific. No. 156. ARTNeT Working Paper Series, 2016. Thus, results reported in this Perspective should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
[4] All data on trade in merchandise goods used in this paper are obtained from the GAC. http://english.customs.gov.cn/statics/report/preliminary.html.
[5] As mentioned above, these results are based on China’s trade data and the conclusion may be different if we use data from the trading partner. For example, according to data from the ITC, Malaysia has a trade deficit of about $3 billion with China in 2020 (down from $8.7 billion in 2019).
[6] Exports in 2019 only cover the first eleven months of the year due to errors in the data released by the GAC. The product codes are based on the Harmonized System (HS), a standardized numerical method of classifying traded products arranged in 99 2-digit product categories. See UN Trade Statistics, “Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems”. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/50018/Harmonized-Commodity-Description-and-Coding-Systems-HS.
[7] Notably, China’s imports of “iron and steel” (HS code 72) more than doubled in 2020, from $4 billion to $10.6 billion.
[8] Products related to vaccines (e.g. freezing equipment) likely contributed to the substantial increase in exports of HS 84.
[9] https://voxeu.org/article/2020-trade-impact-covid-19-pandemic
[10] Behrens, Kristian, Gregory Corcos, and Giordano Mion. “Trade crisis? What trade crisis?.” Review of economics and statistics 95, no. 2 (2013): 702-709.
[11] Tan, Day-Yin, and Mui-Yin Chin. “ASEAN-China trade flow: a study on intra-industry trade in manufacturing sector.” Advanced Science Letters 23, no. 4 (2017): 2691-2694.
[12] These measures are constructed using the input-output tables of both China and its eight top trading partners (EU, US, ASEAN, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand) from 2010-2017.
[13] Hummels, David, Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi. “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade.” Journal of International Economics 54, no. 1 (2001): 75–96.
[14] Data for product-level exports are not available for Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia. Foreign value added for the products are drawn from Ministry of Commerce’s 2017 Report on Global Value Chains and China’s Value Added Trade, available at http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/www/201811/20181130164119212.pdf.
[15] http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/13/c_139877286.htm.
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2021/92 “ASEAN’s COVID-19 Recovery Measures: Missing Opportunities for a Green Future” by Melinda Martinus and Sharon Seah
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- As of 28 May 2021, ASEAN countries had authorised a total of US$ 730 billion, equivalent to 7.8% of its total GDP in stimulus dollars. This amount is nearly double from July 2020 when lockdowns started to ease.
- Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, The Philippines and Thailand have borrowed and received a total of US$15.6 billion Covid-19-related assistance from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
- ASEAN governments have prioritised the disbursement of stimulus packages to ramp up economic recovery, namely, (1) disbursement of cash assistance to retrenched workers and vulnerable groups, (2) supporting micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) operations, (3) providing financial assistance and incentives to the heavily-hit critical economic sectors, namely aviation and tourism, and most importantly (4) strengthening emergency health responses such as testing capacity and vaccination programmes.
- Few ASEAN countries and development partners have tied green components to their Covid-19 stimulus packages, and in effect, environmentally harmful measures are also embedded in the present stimulus packages.
* Melinda Martinus is Lead Researcher (Socio-Cultural) at the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, while Sharon Seah is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre and the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The authors thank Qiu Jiahui for providing data assistance and Siwage Dharma Negara for comments and suggestions.
INTRODUCTION
More than one year after the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a public health emergency on 12 March 2020, ASEAN, a region with a combined GDP of US$9.34 trillion* and a population of more than 650 million has not recovered from the global economic tumult resulting from the pandemic. The past 18 months have seen different countries in the region battling subsequent waves of infections at different junctures, relegating even intra-regional plans to reopen travel and tourism to the backburner. The ASEAN-5 countries’ GDP growth, namely The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia shrank by respectively -9.5%, -6.1%, -5.6%, -2.1%, and 2.0% in 2020.[1] Meanwhile, Vietnam’s GDP grew by 2.9%, putting it among a few better-performing economies in the world, alongside China.[2]
The pandemic recession was unavoidable, yet experts have suggested that economic growth would bounce back in 2021. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) predicts that Southeast Asia would see a 4.4% GDP growth in 2021 with a projection of 5.1% growth in 2022. It also foresees the region’s top three best-performing economies in 2021 to be Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia, respectively, showing a growth rate of 6.70%, 6% and 6%.[3] Meanwhile, Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar would see relatively lower GDP growth in 2021 with Thailand and Cambodia growing at only 4%, and Myanmar’s economy, due to Covid-19 and the country’s political instability, shrinking by -9.8%.[4]
While some economies in the region do appear to be recovering, ASEAN governments are still prioritising the disbursement of stimulus measures for short-term economic relief. As of April 2021, these governments have authorised approximately US$642 billion or the equivalent of 6.88% of its GDP (see Appendix, Table 1). This stimulus amount is nearly double from almost a year ago, in July 2020 when lockdowns started to ease.[5] Six ASEAN countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, The Philippines and Thailand have borrowed a total of US$15.6 billion Covid-19-related assistance from the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the ADB, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see Appendix Table 2).
The majority of ASEAN’s stimulus packages are utilised for immediate, short-term fiscal and monetary measures to accelerate economic recovery through (1) disbursement of cash assistance to retrenched workers and vulnerable groups, (2) supporting micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) operations, (3) providing financial assistance and incentives to the heavily-hit critical economic sectors, namely aviation and tourism, and most importantly (4) strengthening emergency health responses such as testing capacity and vaccine.[6]
A few ASEAN countries have leveraged the Covid-19 crisis to strengthen social and economic resilience. Indonesia and The Philippines, with assistance from development partners, advanced their flagship social assistance programmes; Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) and Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). The stimulus packages included expanding coverage of the assistance, enhancing delivery, and building more robust data transparency so that these aids can reach targeted recipients. Likewise, Singapore and Malaysia have utilised stimulus dollars to future-proof workforce skills and encourage digitalisation across various industries.[7]
While ASEAN governments have indeed demonstrated willingness to strengthen socio-economic resilience during the ongoing crisis, the higher-order challenge is to what extent ASEAN governments can leverage this crisis to equip themselves against climate change, a slow-on-set crisis of the same or even bigger magnitude as the COVID-19 crisis. Many development institutions have introduced the green recovery approach as a regulatory and fiscal pancake focusing on environment protection to accelerate economic growth after Covid-19.[8] However, a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) highlights that only 17% of global stimulus packages have been allocated to green recovery.[9] Another recent report by the United Nations Environment Programme that tracks recovery spending by 50 of the world’s largest economies reported 18% green spending, similar to the OECD’s study.[10] The study found a 17-fold differential in recovery spending between advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies.[11]
Concerns that global efforts to keep global warming well below 2 degrees Celsius are insufficient are not unfounded. As countries apply CPR to their economies through infrastructural new builds and eventually with resumption of travel, it is expected that national carbon emissions will rebound with a vengeance. International Energy Agency (IEA) data show that countries are already seeing a rebound to pre-pandemic levels at the end of 2020.[12] Planning for a transition to a low-carbon economy requires the creation of enabling environments using the right policy tools to encourage investors and businesses to make the right decisions and provide adequate time for education and training for the workforce to transition to green jobs.[13] Green recovery policies and strategies can equally help to put a country on the path to economic recovery while bringing environmental and sustainability benefits.
WHAT IS GREEN RECOVERY?
Economists and development experts introduced the concept of green recovery measures to encourage governments to decarbonise the economy and enhance resilience in facing future health and climate shocks. The Institute for European Environmental policy suggests that governments introduce sustainable economic policies to tackle the Covid-19 crisis.[14] These include:
- Fiscal measures with a long-term vision
Industry bailouts must be conditional in order to ensure that the private sector does not return to business as usual after Covid-19 and to enhance fairness, transparency, and positive environmental impacts.
- Fossil fuel subsidy reform
The dramatic drop in oil prices and decreased consumption as countries tighten their lockdown measures provides an opportunity for governments to cut fossil fuel subsidies and reallocate spending to more sustainable projects.
- Environmental taxation
Introducing and increasing carbon taxation is an important tool to push industries to implement green practices. When green stimulus measures are difficult to implement, sustainable activities can be achieved by adjusting market expectations to align with a future context of higher carbon prices.
- Natural capital investment
Providing capital investment to protect water, biodiversity, and other natural resource activities will not only bring a more sustainable economic multiplier effect with positive climate impacts but also ensure ecosystem resilience as global crises caused by animal-human viral transmission, climate change and biodiversity loss are increasingly interlinked.
- Increasing research and innovation to advance decarbonisation
Research and innovation are increasingly important to ensure policymakers and business players can leverage technologies and tools available to make their economies more competitive while transforming and scaling up sustainable practices.
Countries can invest in decarbonisation pathways in critical economic sectors, which significantly contribute to carbon emissions such as energy efficiency and renewable energy adoption, clean transportation, and green construction.[15] For countries that are vulnerable to climate risks such as extreme weather and drought, building up institutional capacities for resilience, for example, agriculture and food security, nature and biodiversity protection, and disaster risk reduction and preparedness will ensure that communities are equipped to face climate crises of the future.
As a region, ASEAN’s collective efforts for green recovery are articulated in the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework adopted at the 37th ASEAN Summit.[16] Under the framework, green recovery – including green growth, green jobs, and green infrastructure, and decarbonisation pathways – is one of the suggested measures at the country level. In particular, the framework highlights the need for member states to accelerate renewable energy transition and decarbonisation pathways by:
- Establishing cross-sectoral coordination to frame and sustain an ASEAN energy transition;
- Designing economic stimulus packages at the national levels which consider green measures such as having clean electricity sources, expanding and modernising power grids, improving the energy efficiency of appliances, and increasing the spread of cleaner transport;
- Enhancing collaboration and partnerships to ensure ASEAN’s capacity to access innovations and deploy emerging technologies and strengthen the energy supply chain through diversification to enhance resilience from future disruptions.
WHAT ARE THE GREEN COMPONENTS IN ASEAN GOVERNMENTS’ STIMULUS PACKAGES?
In the first year of the pandemic, ASEAN governments were mainly focused on delivering short-term fiscal and monetary relief measures (1) to ensure adequate mass healthcare provisions e.g. masks, PPE, testing, diagnostics; (2) to provide cash flow and liquidity for businesses e.g. soft loans, tax exemptions, rental waivers etc; (3) to protect livelihoods, e.g. wage compensation, cash assistance for vulnerable households and utilities subsidies.
Moving into the medium and long term, governments are prioritising national vaccination programmes to ease economic reopening. Some ASEAN governments are beginning to build green components into their Covid-19 stimulus packages to future-proof their economies according to domestic challenges and priorities (See Table 3). Some development partners have also provided loans and assistance for those initiatives.
Singapore’s 2020 Unity Budget complemented by supplementary Covid-19 stimulus packages (Resilience, Solidarity, and Fortitude Budgets) with a total amount of S$93 billion, was largely directed towards supporting households and businesses, and preserving and enhancing workforce development. Although there were some ecological protection measures in the stimulus packages, such as a S$5 billion coastal and flood protection fund to protect against rising sea levels and with support to the SG Eco-fund for community partnerships on sustainability initiatives built in, we note these may be pre-existing measures[17] not necessarily in direct response to the pandemic. Other programmes[18] such as the HDB Green Town Programme, incentives for low-income households to buy energy-efficient household appliances, and building up electric vehicle (EV) charging stations including rebates on EV registration fees were also introduced in Singapore’s 2020 Unity budget to help the country transition to clean energy.[19] In 2021, the government introduced even more green components in their yearly budget and Covid-19 stimulus packages. The Singapore Green Plan 2030 was launched to enhance sustainable practices across industries. The plan includes S$60 million for the Agri-Food Cluster Transformation Fund, S$30 million for accelerating electric vehicle adoption, and the issuance of S$19 billion of green bonds.[20]
Malaysia introduced similar stimulus packages to encourage energy efficiency and renewable energy transition as part of their Covid-19 recovery measures. Measures such as improving LED street lighting, rooftop solar panels and transmission lines were introduced as part of a RM$13 billion stimulus for infrastructure upgrade.[21] Measures to help the country to roll out solar energy generation projects were also included. Likewise, Myanmar’s Covid-19 Economic Relief Plan has a component for renewable energy infrastructure, and the government there has introduced a tender of 30 solar projects, totalling 1,060 MW in capacity.[22]
In defining green components in their respective stimulus packages, Indonesia and The Philippines target community adaptation and resilience instead of direct measures to reduce carbon emission or energy transition. Indonesia, with the assistance from ADB, will utilise a US$500 million loan to enhance the Disaster Resilience Improvement programme aimed at reforming the country’s risk management and health emergency programmes.[23] Similarly, the government of The Philippines, through the Duterte Administration’s 4-Pillar Socioeconomic Strategy Against Covid-19 rolled out support for food-security and agri-fishery programmes for enhancing the most vulnerable sectors against health and climate crisis in the future. The Philippine government also received a US$1 million loan from the World Bank and the ADB for disaster management which includes strengthening the country’s policy and institutional framework and the community’s capacity to recover from environmental disasters.[24]
ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL STIMULUS MEASURES EXIST TOO
While ASEAN governments have been increasingly integrating a small proportion of green components in their respective Covid-19 stimulus packages, they have not avoided measures that are environmentally harmful.
In the case of Indonesia, while the government did not increase subsidies on fossil fuels during the pandemic, they did provide tax incentives to oil and gas companies to save employment in this industry.[25] Unfortunately, the government’s incentives did not come with a conditional clause that those oil and gas companies receiving tax incentives must demonstrate sustainability practices, or at least, invest in improving their capacity to decarbonise in the long term. Experts fear that this move will undermine the government’s vision to decrease the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels and will only further lock Indonesia into a high-carbon future.[26]
Indonesia recently announced a plan to temporarily remove a luxury tax on cars to help the automotive industry recover.[27] The country has seen the sale of cars plunged by up to 48.5% in 2020 from the previous year.[28] In implementing this plan, the government may have inadvertently missed the chance to decarbonise private transportation. Instead of simply reducing taxation, the government could have started small initiatives to incentivise the adoption of electric vehicles (EV). This is cleaner and creates new job opportunities, even though the domestic EV industry is still at a nascent stage. Some countries such as Singapore and the United States have explored this opportunity. President Biden recently announced a US$2 trillion plan to overhaul the country’s transportation infrastructure, which includes tax breaks on EV and the installation of EV-charging stations.
Indonesia’s counter-green measures culminated in the passing of the Omnibus Law, aimed at simplifying business licensing procedures and changing the existing manpower law in October last year. The Omnibus law, which was planned long before the Covid-19 pandemic, is expected to create friendly conditions for investment, thus accelerating an economic rebound. However, experts have concerns about how this could affect the country’s environment and long-term sustainability visions. The operational regulations for the omnibus law have not been finalised, but some environmental experts are worried that the law could potentially drive deforestation and restrict public consultation or its ability to challenge projects damaging to the environment.[29]
In the same way, Vietnam seemed to have made a strategic move towards decarbonisation with potentially harmful outcomes in the long run. The government introduced a 30% reduction in the environmental protection tax on jet fuel. This approach helps offset losses and keep the aviation industry afloat,[30] but in the long term, may undermine national efforts to decarbonise. Countries such as France and Germany have also been compelled to help their national airlines. But instead of giving free money to the aviation industry to continue boosting dirty energy consumption, their governments attached “green strings” to the bailout. In exchange for that assistance, airlines were required to invest in low-emission aircraft, powered by electricity, hydrogen, and other forms of renewable energy.[31]
Some ASEAN countries used the Covid-19 momentum to bring forward public infrastructure plans. However, this approach could trigger unintended consequences. Malaysia, for instance, used part of its stimulus package to accelerate the construction of the Pan Borneo Highway.[32] This project was launched in 2015 and was expected to be completed in 2021. While it may play a critical role in opening up new economic corridors and opportunities, environmental experts are concerned about the forest destruction to make way for the highway. [33]
A report from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) indicates that the environmental costs from deforestation, potential flood damage, biodiversity-related service loss, and carbon dioxide emissions from the construction could reach tens of millions US dollars annually.[34] It also suggests that the project consider reforestation of the area cleared for the highway projects, installations of wildlife crossings, and carbon emission offsetting by utilising energy from solar energy generation.
CONCLUSION
Covid-19 stimulus measures launched by ASEAN countries are more focused on saving lives and livelihoods than on building climate resilience or environmental protection. Some ASEAN countries have introduced some green components in their stimulus packages, but some environmentally harmful measures are there too. There is no evidence that countries have aligned their stimulus packages and recovery plans with their updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Overall, this trend shows that ASEAN countries are still trailing behind in its decarbonisation plan and climate ambitions. There remains much need and opportunity for long-term economic development levers like national budgeting, regulatory framework, and investments to prioritise the opportunities that green economies offer.
While there exists a region-wide recovery framework, the guidelines in the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework are only hortatory and left to the national governments to decide on their own country-level measures. It is not clear whether ASEAN as an organisation will take on a more proactive role to push its member states towards a coherent decarbonisation strategy.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/92, 9 July 2021
* Authors would like to acknowledge that the combined GDP figures of ASEAN countries vary from source to source and that the most accurate numbers are US 3.2 trillion (ASEAN Secretariat, ASEANStats Database 2019).
ENDNOTES
[1] Various resources: the Philippine Statistics Authority, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council of Thailand, the Central Bank of Malaysia, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore, the Ministry of Finance of Republic of Indonesia
[2] Yen Nee Lee, “This Is Asia’s Top-Performing Economy in the Covid Pandemic — It’s Not China,” CNBC, January 28, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/vietnam-is-asias-top-performing-economy-in-2020-amid-covid-pandemic.html.
[3] Asian Development Bank, “Economic Forecasts: April 2021,”, Asian Development Bank (Asian Development Bank, April 2021), https://www.adb.org/outlook.
[4] Asian Development Bank, “GDP Growth, Asian Development Outlook Update 2021 – April 2021,” April 2021, https://data.adb.org/dataset/gdp-growth-asia-and-pacific-asian-development-outlook.
[5] Melinda Martinus and Sharon Seah, “Are ASEAN Stimulus Dollars Going towards Sustainability?,” ISEAS Perspective 87, 2020 , /wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_87.pdf.
[6] Martinus and Seah.
[7] Martinus and Seah.
[8] “Boosting the EU’s Green Recovery,” July 3, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1250.
[9] OECD, “Spotlight on Green Recovery Measures,” OECD, December 11, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/themes/green-recovery.
[10] Brian J. O’Callaghan and Em Murdock, “Are We Building Back Better? Evidence from 2020 and Pathways for Inclusive Green Recovery Spending,” UNEP – UN Environment Programme, March 8, 2021, http://www.unep.org/resources/publication/are-we-building-back-better-evidence-2020-and-pathways-inclusive-green.
[11] O’Callaghan and Murdock.
[12] CNBC, “Global Carbon Emissions Exceed Pre-Pandemic Lockdown Level as Economies Rebound without Clean Energy,” March 2, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/global-carbon-emissions-over-pre-pandemic-level-economic-rebound-clean-energy/.
[13] Partnership for Action on Green Economy, “PAGE Analytical Tools for Supporting Green Economic Recovery,” https://www.un-page.org/files/public/page_4_tools_material_final.pdf.
[14] Gauthier Schefer, Cara Maeztu, and Eloise Bodin, “What Constitutes a European Green Recovery?,” July 28, 2020, https://ieep.eu/publications/what-constitutes-a-european-green-recovery.
[15] Yamide Dagnet and Joel Jaeger, “Not Enough Climate Action in Stimulus Plans,” September 15, 2020, https://www.wri.org/insights/not-enough-climate-action-stimulus-plans.
[16] ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework and Its Implementation Plan,” November 12, 2020.
[17] Press release, “PUB to lead Singapore’s coastal protection efforts”, 4 March 2020. https://www.pub.gov.sg/news/pressreleases/PUBtoleadSingaporescoastalprotectionefforts
[18] The authors note that some of these green measures may not have been direct responses to the pandemic but are part of Singapore’s long-term climate action plans.
[19] “Singapore Budget 2020,” http://www.gov.sg/features/budget2020.
[20] Ministry of Finance Singapore, “Singapore Budget,” The Budget Booklet summarises key Budget 2021 measures, https://www.mof.gov.sg/singaporebudget.
[21] Robert Carnell Patterson Prakash Sakpal, Iris Pang , Nicholas Mapa, Warren, “Asia’s Lamentable Green Covid-19 Response,” August 11, 2020, /reports/asia-pacifics-lamentable-green-covid-19-response/.
[22] GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, “Overcoming as One: COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan” (April 27, 2020).
[23] Asian Development Bank, “$500 Million ADB Loan to Help Boost Indonesia’s Disaster Resilience,” Text, Asian Development Bank, September 23, 2020, Indonesia, https://www.adb.org/news/500-million-adb-loan-help-boost-indonesia-s-disaster-resilience.
[24] The World Bank, “Development Projects : Philippines Third Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Loan – P171440,” https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P171440.and Asian Development Bank, “$500 Million ADB Loan to Boost the Philippines’ Disaster Resilience,” Text, Asian Development Bank (blog), September 10, 2020, Philippines, https://www.adb.org/news/500-million-adb-loan-boost-philippines-disaster-resilience.
[25] DDTCNews, “Selain Manufaktur, Ini 11 Sektor Usaha yang Bakal Dapat Insentif Pajak,” April 17, 2020, https://news.ddtc.co.id/selain-manufaktur-ini-11-sektor-usaha-yang-bakal-dapat-insentif-pajak-20345.
[26] Anissa Suharsono, “Indonesia’s COVID Recovery: Supporting a Green Transition?,” June 22, 2020, https://www.iisd.org/gsi/subsidy-watch-blog/indonesia-covid-recovery-green.
[27] The Business Times, “Indonesia to Give Tax Incentives for Sales of Some Cars, Transport,” n.d., https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/transport/indonesia-to-give-tax-incentives-for-sales-of-some-cars.
[28] MarkLines Automotive Industry Portal, “Indonesia Flash Report, Sales Volume, 2020,” https://www.marklines.com/en/statistics/flash_sales/automotive-sales-in-indonesia-by-month-2020.
[29] Jong, “Indonesia’s Omnibus Law a ‘Major Problem’ for Environmental Protection,” Mongabay Environmental News, November 4, 2020, https://news.mongabay.com/2020/11/indonesia-omnibus-law-global-investor-letter/.
[30] Saigon Giai Phong, “Environmental Protection Tax Reduction on Aviation Fuel to Extend through 2021,” December 11, 2020, https://sggpnews.org.vn/national/environmental-protection-tax-reduction-on-aviation-fuel-to-extend-through-2021-89721.html.
[31] Liz Alderman, “France’s Aerospace Industry to Get $17 Billion in Government Support,” The New York Times, June 9, 2020, sec. Business, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/business/France-aerospace-industry.html.
[32] Adib Povera, “Good Performance despite Pandemic,” NST Online, March 5, 2021, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/03/671160/good-performance-despite-pandemic.
[33] D Kanyakumari, “Game Changer? Pan-Borneo Highway in East Malaysia Offers Hope for Development, but Locals Sceptical,” CNA, November 22, 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-borneo-highway-development-12086656.
[34] IISD, “Are Investments in Road Infrastucture on Borneo A Sustainable Recovery for Malaysia?,” October, 2020.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/91 “Biden’s ‘China Challenge’ and Domestic Politics: Implications for Southeast Asia” by Shaun Narine
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- There is bipartisan support under the Biden administration to compete with and confront China, reflecting the American desire to maintain its dominant position in the international system.
- The US’s ability to act as a reliable security partner is heavily constrained by its domestic political paralysis caused by ideological divisions as well as social and economic upheavals.
- US foreign policy commitments and approaches may vary in the future, depending on the political party in the White House, given that Trump remains a dominant figure in the increasingly radicalised Republican Party.
- While Southeast Asian countries want the US to remain militarily and economically engaged in the region to act as a counterweight to China, they do not want to take sides between the two superpowers.
- It will be increasingly difficult for Southeast Asian countries to remain neutral if Washington and Beijing continue to entrench their competitive and adversarial positions.
*Shaun Narine is Professor of International Relations at St. Thomas University in Canada.
INTRODUCTION
Joe Biden assumed the presidency at a crucial time for the US. The country is deeply divided along racial, economic, and political lines. Furthermore, this growing domestic polarisation presents profound challenges to the Biden administration’s foreign policy. Although the US has been a major security actor in the Asia-Pacific for decades, it is not clear whether Washington will continue to be a reliable partner going forward for two distinct but interconnected reasons: (1) Biden may be distracted from foreign policy by domestic problems; and (2) Political polarisation in the US may cause its foreign policy to vary significantly in the future, depending on the political party in control. These two factors are further confounded by Washington’s competitive and confrontational approach towards China.
Southeast Asian countries want the US to remain engaged in the region as a major security and economic actor, and seek an equilibrium between American and Chinese presence. However, they are also adamantly opposed to choosing sides between the two superpowers. Yet, as this paper argues, these countries make their decisions based on several factors, including the US’ ability to compete with China, US long-term commitment to the region, and their assessment of their own national interests.
BIDEN’S FOREIGN POLICY: CONFRONTING THE ‘CHINA CHALLENGE’
The Biden administration has made clear that its major foreign policy priority is to meet the ‘China challenge’. Many Americans believe that Donald Trump was correct to initiate a trade and technological war with China, and the Biden administration has thus far maintained Trump’s policy to respond robustly to China’s technological development and “decouple” the two countries’ economies in strategic sectors, including 5G network and semiconductors.[1] There is a bipartisan consensus, and across different sectors of American society, that the US must compete with, confront and constrain China.[2] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that US policy towards China will be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be and adversarial when it must be”.[3] So far, the Biden administration has focused more on the adversarial and competitive elements although it recognises the need for China’s cooperation in matters pertaining to climate change.
Domestically, the Biden administration is using the ‘China challenge’ – “the one last bastion of bipartisan policy”[4] – to justify its plans for governmental expansion and spending, including in areas of science and research[5] and to continue massive military expenditures. Externally, the administration’s decision to withdraw all remaining US troops from Afghanistan reflects its desire to remove other strategic distractions so that it can focus on competition with China.[6]
Democrats and Republicans both appear committed to maintaining American power and privilege in the global system. However, unlike Trump, the Biden administration is actively engaging with its allies and partners to confront China. In its early foreign policy acts, the Biden administration sought to reassure American allies that “America is back” and to reverse the damage done to American diplomacy by the Trump presidency.[7] The Democrats recognise the advantages of US soft power and are inclined to pursue multilateral approaches. Washington has encouraged NATO to reorient its focus towards the Pacific and NATO has declared that China presents “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security”.[8] The Biden administration is also seeking to create a coalition of “like-minded states” to balance China, including through the Group of Seven (G7), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India, Japan and Australia, and the Five Eyes.[9] However, whether the US can achieve its objectives remains to be seen, given the uncertainty among American allies, along with their own complex relationships with China.
Recently, the US and China resumed trade talks and indicated that areas of common interest and economic exchanges remain potential areas of compromise and cooperation. But this progress can easily be overturned by tensions in the political and security domains.[10] The Biden administration still maintains Trump’s tariffs and other economic measures against China, but even if the administration started out dealing with China in a restrained manner, the dynamics of the highly polarised US domestic politics may make it difficult to maintain this restraint.
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON BIDEN’S FOREIGN POLICY
Biden has made it clear that domestic policy drives US foreign policy. If the US is to “win” the 21st century against other states, it must first be strong at home.[11] The new administration is seeking to pass massive spending bills designed to revitalise the country’s infrastructure, alleviate the economic suffering of its citizens, and implement a long-overdue expansion of the US welfare state.[12] If successful, these measures may alleviate many of the forces fueling Trumpism. However, Biden’s arduous task is to get his reforms through the Congress amid deeply entrenched bipartisan politics.
Donald Trump’s influence over the Republican Party has further hammered in ideological and racial wedges in American society, and undermined democratic norms in the US body politic.[13] The Trump administration’s mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic laid bare the deep divisions within American society, and the Republican Party’s institutional failures. Even now, large segments of the population continue to resist public health measures.[14] These failures raise profound questions about the ability of American society and its political system to function collectively. While these domestic challenges may not directly impact executive competence or the soundness of US foreign policy, they do serve as a distraction for American leaders and raise serious concerns for American allies who depend on the US government to act with competence.
The immediate challenge for the Biden administration is to re-establish US credibility as a reliable global leader and guarantor of international security. However, a Trump-like Republican President who disparages alliances and multilateralism may be only one election away. A symbiotic right-wing media complex dominates the thinking of millions of Americans, while a substantial majority of Republican voters do not believe that Joe Biden won the 2020 election.[15] These considerations create profound tensions within the US that can absorb President Biden’s time, attention and energy and push foreign policy to the side.
The world has experienced how US foreign policy can radically shift as administrations change. George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Accord. Trump abandoned the Paris Accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Biden may make promises about US leadership on climate change or security policy today, but what the next Republican president will do is not predictable. The Cold War which kept US foreign policy consistent across political parties is gone, and US foreign policy will continue to shift between Republican and Democrat values for the foreseeable future where the challenge of China is the only area of agreement. But for Southeast Asia, this is not an entirely desirable development.[16]
Furthermore, although a majority of Americans still support US military engagement in alliances and as a deterrent, there is far less support for US involvement in many of the apparently never-ending wars the US embarked upon in recent decades, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. US public support appears contingent on the level of commitment and the likely outcome of the war in question, putting it on an unstable foundation.[17] US security commitments have little credibility if the American public is reluctant in backing them up, and public distrust of Washington’s crusading and interventionist foreign policy is higher than ever.[18] Ultimately, why should Americans risk possible nuclear confrontation with China over rocks in the South China Sea (SCS)?[19] However, public opinion may change if the public can be sufficiently angered and frightened by a real or imagined enemy.[20] Circumstances may appear, either by accident or by design, that force the issue.
SOUTHEAST ASIA: CAUGHT BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA
It is still too early to tell exactly what course of action Biden will pursue with respect to China. However, it seems likely that the two countries are embarking on an increasingly rocky relationship. The Biden administration will need to understand that its success with Southeast Asia is dependent on several factors, including the US’s ability to compete with China, US long-term commitment to the region, and Southeast Asian governments’ assessment of their own national interests.
In the economic domain, the Biden administration has yet to show any intention of returning to the TPP or reversing Trump’s economic nationalism,[21] in effect gradually reducing American economic leverage over Southeast Asia. In contrast, China is an economic powerhouse whose growth is fundamentally important to the region’s development and whose importance is likely to increase. Southeast Asian economies are deeply intertwined with China in the global supply chains, and will become even more so upon the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) concluded in November last year among ASEAN member countries, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. China. The RCEP signifies China’s common ground with Southeast Asia in promoting a multilateral open trading system.[22]
Preference in the region for the Trump or Biden administration may not be as clear-cut as one might imagine. On one hand, Southeast Asian countries are committed to multilateralism, especially through ASEAN mechanisms, to address various regional challenges. Trump was, unfortunately, hostile to multilateralism, failing to attend most of the ASEAN summits during his term and withdrawing from the TPP on the first day of his presidency. His incessant attacks on trade and security arrangements with US allies in East Asia will not be fast forgotten.
On the other hand, many Southeast Asian states appreciated Trump’s strong positions against Chinese overreach in the SCS and elsewhere. Furthermore, some Southeast Asian governments operate on the spectrum of authoritarianism, and therefore had no qualms about the Trump administration’s neglect of human rights and democracy. However, the Biden administration desires to project itself once again as a model of democracy. Biden has set his sights on winning the ideological competition with China, noting that “this is a battle between the utility of democracies in the 21st century and autocracies”.[23] He is working at organising a coalition of “democracies” to arrest the rising trend of authoritarianism which has been enthused and abetted by the success of China’s model of state capitalism.
According to Stephen Walt, that battle between US and China is really over the appeal of different approaches to the international system.[24] The US offers a vision of a liberal democratic order, where only other liberal democracies are fully legitimate. China in turn offers a Westphalian version of the international system where states respect the concept of “sovereignty” and leave each other alone to govern their internal affairs. Both countries adhere to their visions imperfectly and both are open to criticisms of hypocrisy in implementation. The US’ record of championing liberal democracy is contingent on its security, ideological and political interests and preferences. China’s principle of adherence to national sovereignty rings hollow especially in the SCS context where its belligerence has rattled the Southeast Asian littoral states. While being optimistic about liberal democracy’s long-term appeal, Walt notes that many states may prefer China’s vision over that of the US. This is true for Southeast Asian states who indeed promote non-interference as one of ASEAN’s basic principles. As such, most Southeast Asian states may not join Biden’s coalition of democracies, and his democracy agenda will find it hard to gain traction in Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asian states want the US and China to continue functioning as active participants in the Asia-Pacific region. They support the US’s military presence and American efforts to counterbalance China and its maritime claims in the SCS. However, they do not want the region to become locked in a conflict that endangers economic growth and provokes political instability at the national or regional level.[25] This has always been a difficult expectation, requiring the US to act in a calibrated way to limit and reject China’s excessive claims without taking measures that could lead to outright conflict. If the US rivalry with China becomes as critical to its self-identity as its rivalry with the Soviet Union, then Southeast Asian states will be under enormous pressure to “pick a side.” To date, regional states have been successful in walking the line between the two superpowers. Doing so may be much more difficult in the near future.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/91, 8 July 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Jill Disis and Kyle Blaine, CNN Business, “Biden expands Trump’s list of Chinese companies banned from US investment”, CNN, 4 June 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/03/economy/biden-china-executive-order/index.html.
[2] Benjy Sarlin and Sahil Kapur, “Why China May Be the Last Bipartisan Issue Left in Washington”, NBC News, 21 March 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/why-china-may-be-last-bipartisan-issue-left-washington-n1261407.
[3] Simon Lewis, Humeyra Pamuk, “Biden administration singles out China as ‘biggest geopolitical test’ for U.S”, Reuters, 4 March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-blinken-idUSKBN2AV28C.
[4] Benjy Sarlin and Sahil Kapur, op. cit.
[5] David Sanger, “Biden Calls for US to Enter New Superpower Struggle”, The New York Times, 29 April 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/29/us/politics/biden-china-russia-cold-war.html.
[6] Ryo Nakamura, “US Exit From Afghanistan Underscores Pivot from Terror to China”, Nikkei Asia Review, April 16, 2021: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/US-exit-from-Afghanistan-underscores-pivot-from-terror-to-China.
[7] Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world. Some examples of Biden’s attempt to undo the damage caused by Trump include negotiations with Iran for the US to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), US return to the Paris Climate Change Accord, and support to the global multilateral vaccine facility COVAX.
[8] Sabine Siebold, Steve Holland, Robin Emmot, “NATO Adopts Tough Line on China at Biden’s Debut Summit with Alliance”, Reuters, 14 June 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-welcomes-biden-pivotal-post-trump-summit-2021-06-14; Andrew Salmon, “UK, NATO in a Hard Pivot to Asia”, The Asia Times, 2 June 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2021/06/uk-nato-in-a-hard-pivot-in-east.
[9] “Biden’s Grand Tour”, Project Syndicate, 3 June 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/bigpicture/biden-s-grand-tour. The “Quad” consists of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The exact intentions and purposes of the Quad states are not completely convergent, at least at the moment. See: Brad Lendon, “Quad Alliance of US, Japan, India and Australia is Part of Biden’s Plan to Contain China. But Some Experts Aren’t So Sure”, CNN, 11 March 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/11/asia/quad-us-india-japan-australia-intl-hnk/index.html.
[10] Wendy Wu and Frank Tang, “China-US Relations: Economic Chief Liu He, Janet Yellen in Virtual Talks”, South China Morning Post, 2 June 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3135691/china-us-relations-economic-chiefs-liu-he-janet-yellen-virtual-talks.
[11] “Biden Addresses Joint Session of Congress”, Politico, 28 April 2021, https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/joe-biden-speech-to-congress-2021-live-analysis-transcript-highlights-4-28-21.
[12] Jim Tankersley, “Biden’s $6 Trillion Budget Aims for Path to Middle Class, Financed by the Rich”, The New York Times, 28 May 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/business/biden-plan.html.
[13] Julian Borger, “Republican Closely Resemble Autocratic Parties in Hungary and Turkey-Study”, The Guardian, 26 October 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/26/republican-party-autocratic-hungary-turkey-study-trump.
[14] David Brooks, “Our Pathetic Herd Immunity Failure”, The New York Times, May 6, 2021: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/06/opinion/herd-immunity-us.html
[15] Harry Enten, “Polls Show A Majority of Republicans Mistakenly Think the 2020 Election Wasn’t Legitimate,” CNN, 11 April 2021: https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/11/politics/voting-restrictions-analysis/index.html.
[16] Joschka Fischer, Germany’s former foreign minister, argues that this uncertainty is the major reason for Europe to build its own defensive capability and learn to stop subordinating itself to “US leadership.” See: “Biden’s Grand Tour: It’s Europe’s Turn to Reject Trump”, Project Syndicate, 28 December 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/bigpicture/biden-s-grand-tour.
[17] Kevin Baron, “Do Americans Really Want to End ‘Forever Wars’? Survey Says…” Defense One, 10 September 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2019/09/do-americans-really-want-end-forever-wars-survey-says/159760.
[18] Stephen Walt, “America’s Forever Wars Have Come Back Home”, Foreign Policy, 3 March 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/03/americas-forever-wars-have-come-back-home.
[19] Hugh White, ”Without America: Australia in the New Era”, Quarterly Essay, No. 68, https://www.quarterlyessay.com/au/essay/2017/11/without-america. White argues that no rational American President would risk a war with China over the South China Sea.
[20] There are precedents of the US government seizing real or imagined crises to manipulate the public into full-throated support for American wars and military actions. A few examples: the destruction of the battleship Maine, docked in Cuba, as an excuse for the Spanish-American War (1898); the supposed attack in the Gulf of Tonkin (1964) that provided the US with the excuse to get more deeply involved in Vietnam; the “threat” of Iraq’s non-existent “weapons of mass destruction” that provided cover for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. For an overview of American foreign policy and these incidents, see George C. Herring, The American Century and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2017.
[21] Pierre Lemieux, “Joe Biden’s Economic Agenda: An Early Appraisal”, CATO Institute, Spring 2021, https://www.cato.org/regulation/spring-2021/joe-bidens-economic-agenda-early-appraisal.
[22] For a description and analysis of Xi’s speech at the virtual 2021 Davos meeting, see: Stephen Walt, “Xi Tells the World What He Really Wants”, Foreign Policy, 29 January 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/29/xi-tells-the-world-what-he-really-wants.
[23] The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference”, 25 March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/25/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference.
[24] Stephen Walt, op. cit.
[25] Dino Patti Djlalal, “Can Biden Keep the Peace in Southeast Asia?”, Foreign Policy, 30 May 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/30/biden-asean-southeast-asia-china-us-rivalry-geopolitics.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/90 “Assessing Challenges Facing the ECRL’s Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs)” by Tham Siew Yean and Kevin Zhang
A general view of the Dungun Tunnel is pictured during a ceremony at the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project in Dungun, Terengganu, on 25 July 2019. On this day, Malaysia restarted a $10-billion, China-backed rail project. Photo: Rushdi Samsudin, AFP.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) launched in 2017 to enhance connectivity between the west and east coast of Peninsular Malaysia was renegotiated and rebooted in 2019. It is currently proceeding on track, towards completion by 2027.
- The Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) launched Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) in 2019 to drive up demand for freight and passenger services by increasing economic activities along the ECRL routes, by means of industrial parks, and logistic hubs and Transit-Oriented Developments (TODs).
- If industrial parks are to be used to attract investments to the less developed states in Peninsular Malaysia, reforms to local institutions and upgrading of the investment environment there will be needed.
- Having inter-modal transportation centres such as dry ports and TODs along the ECRL route are promising; however, the location of these centres should be determined according to technical criteria, rather than by changes in administration.
- Successful implementation of intermodal transportation centres, be it dry ports or TODs, requires cooperation and collaboration among all relevant stakeholders, including local governments, key transportation players and local communities.
- The government continues to have an important role to play in the establishment of these intermodal centres, especially in planning and ensuring last-mile connectivity.
* Tham Siew Yean is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor Emeritus, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Kevin Zhang is Research Officer of the Malaysia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. The authors would like to thank Rebecca Neo for creating the GIS maps.
INTRODUCTION
The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), upon completion, will provide a rail link between the more developed west coast and the less developed east coast of Peninsular Malaysia. The project agreement was signed in November 2016 between the owner Malaysia Rail Link Sdn Bhd (MRL)[1] – an entity wholly-owned by the Malaysian Ministry of Finance – and the general contractor China Communications Construction Company Ltd (CCCC), in the presence of then-Prime Minister Najib Razak.[2] The project cost was an estimated RM46 billion when the agreement was first inked, but that escalated to RM 65.5 billion by 2018 due to an expansion of its scope, among other reasons. When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration took over from Barisan Nasional (BN) after the 2018 General Election, the future of ECRL became uncertain. It was, however, relaunched in 2019 after some renegotiations.
The renegotiated project shaved off RM21.5 billion from its price tag, down to RM44 billion, with Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China financing 85 percent through a loan. Debt servicing costs were estimated at RM24 billion.[3] The ECRL was rerouted to achieve the cost reduction.[4] Instead of travelling along the coastal area of Kelantan and Terengganu, the line was amended to serve localities further inland.[5] The main change was for the rail line to be rerouted southwards to go through Negeri Sembilan before heading north to Port Klang, thus skipping Bentong and central Selangor (see Map 1)
However, the PH government that did the renegotiations collapsed in February 2020 and was replaced by a government led by Perikatan Nasional (PN). Malaysia’s current Transport Minister Dr Wee Ka Siong announced on 5 April 2021 that the PN government was reverting the ECRL back to the northern alignment. Specifically, the change involves Section C of the line, running between Port Klang in Selangor and Temerloh in Pahang (see Map 2).
Despite the many changes in route, in costing and with the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, the construction of the ECRL is ahead of schedule.[6] In 2019, after the relaunch of the ECRL, an additional agreement was signed between the Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) and CCCC to develop the corridors along the ECRL with industrial parks, infrastructure, logistics hubs and Transit-Oriented Developments (TODs).[7] These EAP projects were placed under the jurisdiction of MIDA, as attracting private domestic and foreign investments was deemed the key for implementing the EAPs. MIDA subsequently launched a dedicated ECRL unit to facilitate the promotion and development of Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs) along the ECRL corridor, primarily as investment projects.[8] This paper assesses challenges facing the EAPs in driving demand for ECRL’s freight and passenger services.
THE ECRL: PROJECTIONS AND EAPS
Freight Cargo and Ridership Projections
Revenue for ECRL is to come from freight and passenger transport, at an estimated ratio of 7:3 respectively. Although the estimated revenue amount is not revealed, the 2017 and 2020 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) does provide estimates on the freight and passenger volume.[9]
The projected freight cargo for the ECRL has been brought down substantially in the 2020 EIA report, [10] when compared to the 2017 EIA report (see Table 1).[11] The bulk of freight goods ferried within the first year of operation, based on the 2020 EIA, are expected to be Export/Import containers and Iron Ore. Other goods, including palm oil, steel and coal only constitute a small share of overall goods transported.
Table 1. Estimated ECRL freight volume and passenger ridership, based on 2017 and 2020 EIA
| Estimated freight, volume in million tonnes | 2027 | 2030 | 2032 | 2040 |
| 2017 EIA | NA | 37.28 | NA | 44.08 |
| 2020 EIA | 9.0 | NA | 15.8 | NA |
| Estimated ridership, numbers in millions | 2027 | 2030 | 2032 | 2040 |
| 2017 EIA | 4.8 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 8.1 |
| 2020 EIA | 4.1 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 7.9 |
Note: NA – not available
Source: EIA reports 2017 and 2020
The passenger forecast was similarly revised downwards in the 2020 EIA report, compared to the 2017 EIA (see Table 1).
Despite the revised estimates, the projected freight and passenger figures for ECRL remain rather optimistic, if Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM)’s annual figures are to serve as a reference point. Comparing these projections with the total freight freight traffic for KTM Cargo for Peninsular Malaysia, which includes the landbridge right up to Songkla in Thailand, the total freight traffic for KTM Cargo peaked in 2014 at 7.83 million tonnes of carried cargo. And since then, the numbers have declined to just under six million tonnes for 2017 and 2018 (Table 2).
Table 2. KTM freight volume between 2014 and 2018
| 2014 | 2017 | 2018 | |
| Freight volume by KTM in million tonnes | 7.1 | 5.6 | 5.8 |
Source: Ministry of Transport Malaysia [12]
The forecasted number for ECRL in 2027 according to the 2020 plan – at nine million tonnes, is 50 percent higher than the total cargo freight carried by KTM for the whole of Peninsular Malaysia. This appears optimistic. Likewise, the forecasted ECRL ridership number for 2027 in the 2020 report – at 4.1 million – also appears unlikely since the KTM passenger ridership on long-distance trains (for both intercity and ETS) was just under 8 million in 2019.[13] Most of these trips were made along the Peninsula’s West Coast, with the existing rail line between Kelantan and Negri Sembilan (through Pahang) only recording a fraction of the total ridership. As the population density in Kelantan, Terengganu and Pahang are much lower than in the West Coast, the ECRL will have to provide reliable and affordable pricing to attract passengers.
Clearly, driving up the demand for freight cargo and passenger traffic by rail is critical for achieving the aspired targeted freight cargo. But the current preferred mode of freight transportation in Malaysia is via road haulage while rail freight service is unattractive due to service issues such as the time factor, frequency, and flexibility in fulfilling customer needs. Passenger rail traffic also needs to compete with alternative modes of transport such as buses, private vehicles and low-cost air carriers. Pahang and Terengganu (excluding northern Terengganu) are well served by the East Coast Expressway which provides direct and fast access to Kuala Lumpur. Each of the three state capitals on the east coast (Kota Bahru, Kuantan and Kuala Terengganu) are also well served by low-cost carriers. This provides invaluable lessons on the critical importance of operational efficiency for the ECRL. Even if the ECRL can attain the required operational efficiency, demand-generating effects that are to be derived from the EAPs are badly needed.
Economic Accelerator Projects (EAPs)
Economic Accelerator Projects (EAP) in the form of industrial parks, transit-oriented development (TODs) and logistics hubs are currently planned along the ECRL route to increase both passenger and freight volumes.[14] Two industrial parks are planned, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, but each with a different focus. The planned industrial park on the east coast, in Terengganu, will focus on downstream metal and minerals processing, manufacturing, e-commerce, construction, and petrochemical industry (except the mining of oil, gas and minerals). The industrial park on the west coast is to be located in Negeri Sembilan, and it will focus on hi-technology industries and energy sector (possibly including a high technology park). The three logistics hubs are to be located at Kuantan Port City, Temerloh and Port Klang while seven TODs are earmarked based on the 2020 route configuration. The stations listed for TODs are Kota Bharu, Kuala Terengganu, Kota SAS, Temerloh, Nilai, Putrajaya Sentral and Jenjarom.[15]
While the goal of designating specific projects to raise demand and investment along the ECRL corridor is commendable and appropriate, the identified projects face serious challenges.
CHALLENGES FACING THE EAP
Building Industrial Parks in the less developed states of Malaysia
Industrial parks are not new in Malaysia. In fact, there are, listed in MIDA’s directory, a total of 63 industrial parks in the country (Table 3).
Table 3. Industrial parks in ECRL states
| Selangor | 16 |
| N. Sembilan | 15 |
| Kelantan | 8 |
| Terengganu | 13 |
| Pahang | 11 |
Source: MIDA (https://www.fmm.org.my/images/articles/publication/Malaysia%20Industrial%20Park%20Directory.pdf)
Given that there are already existing industrial parks in the states traversed by the ECRL, the priority should not be building another one, especially in states where the record of approved and implemented FDI and DDI are low (Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Kelantan, and Terengganu) (see Figure 1 and Figure 2) relative to Selangor, Johor and Penang, the top three states for both types of investments.
The approved investments for the east coast states of Pahang, Terengganu and Kelantan (Figure1) continued to remain substantially smaller relative to the more developed states on the west coast despite the launch of the East Coast Development Region (ECDR) as one of the development corridors in 2008. This reflects the relatively poorer investment climate there, despite dedicated promotion efforts.[16]
The figures for approved FDI do not reveal whether these projects took off or will take off or not. A more accurate picture would be one that shows realized investments in the form of implemented projects (Figure 2).
Table 4 shows that the ratio of implemented to approved investments for Pahang, Terengganu and Kelantan are much lower than of those for the top three states for hosting investments, namely Johor, Selangor and Penang, which have a ratio at around 0.6. Although Negeri Sembilan performs just as well, its approved investments are much less than the top three states (Figure 1).
Table 4. Ratio of Implemented to Approved Investments, 2013-2020
| Ratio of Implemented/Approved | Domestic Investments | Foreign Investments | Total Investments |
| Johor | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.62 |
| Selangor | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.64 |
| Penang | 0.66 | 0.67 | 0.66 |
| Sarawak | 0.74 | 0.36 | 0.51 |
| Sabah | 0.49 | 0.04 | 0.40 |
| Kedah | 0.49 | 0.70 | 0.63 |
| Pahang | 0.43 | 0.36 | 0.37 |
| Perak | 0.62 | 0.55 | 0.59 |
| Melaka | 0.39 | 0.82 | 0.56 |
| Negeri Sembilan | 0.64 | 0.62 | 0.63 |
| Terengganu | 0.49 | 0.34 | 0.37 |
| Kelantan | 0.28 | 0.59 | 0.33 |
| W.P. – Kuala Lumpur | 0.72 | 0.05 | 0.37 |
| Perlis | 0.06 | 1.00 | 0.10 |
| W.P. – Labuan | 0.24 | 1.00 | 0.32 |
| Total | 0.59 | 0.57 | 0.58 |
Source: MIDA
Given the above data, it appears far more important to address the gaps in investors’ expectations which are causing the discrepancies in approved investments between the states, especially between the west coast and the east coast, as well as the much lower implementation in Pahang, Terengganu and Kelantan. In this regard, local institutions play an important part, especially in implementation, since investors have to deal with local authorities over business licenses, real estate issues, access to public utilities, tax incentives, and other administrative matters where building and operating a factory are concerned. It is the respective state’s institutions such as the land and local authorities that affect the implementation of projects.[17] A poorer implementation record also contributes towards a less favourable investment climate.
Enhancing Intermodal Connectivity: Dry Ports
MIDA’s EAPs focus on the establishment of logistics hubs around Kuantan, Temerloh and Port Klang. However, such hubs will not necessarily shift current freight transport preferences from road to rail, due to door-to-door delivery, cost-effectiveness in terms of timeliness, and the flexibility and reliability of road haulage as compared to rail freight. Road haulage permits direct point-to-point transport between sender and receiver, while rail haulage requires the freight to be first transported by road to the rail station or intermodal terminal before being loaded onto a cargo train. The process is repeated at the destination; this increases the time required to transport goods. The current imbalance between road and rail freight has been noted in numerous Malaysian Plans, such as the Logistics and Trade Facilitation Master Plan (2015-2020),[18] with rail haulage comprising only a very small fraction of the total freight transported despite the extensive KTM network. The National Transportation Plan that was launched in 2019 is aimed at increasing rail freight.[19] What appears needed is enhanced road-rail intermodal connectivity in order to promote the much-needed modal shift from road to rail freight, improve the modal balance between road and rail in freight transport as well as reduce the negative environmental impact of road haulage.[20] Improving intermodal connectivity will also help Malaysia utilise the ECRL and its ports to compete against ASEAN neighbours who are performing better in multimodal transport, such as Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand.[21]
Intermodal transportation for KTM was facilitated by the development of dry ports along especially the north-south bound of KTM.[22] Hence, establishing dry ports or intermodal terminals along the ECRL route is important for facilitating the intermodal shift from road to rail. There is only one dry port along the 2020 proposed route; this is at Nilai. This may not hold though if the ECRL is again rerouted, as announced in the 2021 plan.
Location is one of the critical factors in determining dry ports’ success. Unfortunately, as seen in the KTM case, not all Malaysian dry ports are strategically located to assist stakeholders, including seaports. Some of the existing inland ports in Malaysia are not located close to seaports, and due to a lack of adequate connecting infrastructure are unable to meet the demands of firms.[23] The example of Segamat Inland Port (SIP) is illustrative. Established by the Transport Ministry and as a fully state-owned intermodal terminal, the port ceased operations seven years after it began operations; this was due to limited road infrastructure for accessing SIP, and to high container charges.[24]
Other dry ports along KTM’s intermodal routes were developed under joint investment schemes between the private sector and the government.[25] Malaysia has dry ports in Padang Besar, Ipoh, Tanjung Pelapas, Nilai and Segamat. For the last 10 years, only two important intermodal corridors have been in operation, namely (i) Port Klang-Ipoh corridor and (ii)) Penang Port-Padang Besar corridor.[26]
Dry ports should be located strategically near manufacturing activities such as industrial parks, include land for future expansion, and promote functional cooperation with seaports rather than pose as external competition against them. Last-mile connectivity is also important, as highlighted by National Logistics Plan, as are good infrastructure connections linking dry ports to the hinterlands and railway. The key stakeholders to invest in need to include strategic players such as the ports, and logistics players such as freight forwarders. Engaging sea ports operators, especially in terms of investments will facilitate cooperation and the regionalisation of these ports by extending their hinterland, in turn further enhancing the use of these dry ports along the ECRL route.[27]
Promoting Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) projects
TOD are projects developed and centred around transportation hubs with the goal of creating an urban environment that is pedestrian friendly. This is meant to encourage the use of public transport and decrease the need for private transport.[28] Typically, TOD projects cater for intermodal public transport—with the inclusion of rail networks—to facilitate connectivity. Through optimal land usage, the immediate vicinity of transport hubs caters to the residents’ various needs, including facilitating commercial and recreational facilities being interspersed among residential buildings.[29] TOD projects tend to support a population density that is moderate to high, while simultaneously serving as an economic catalyst within the area.[30]
Presently there are seven proposed TOD projects along ECRL. The criteria used for the identification of these TOD stations are not made known. Nevertheless, as in the case of the location of dry ports, the location of TODs is important. They have to be chosen based on a host of scientific criteria in order to ensure successful implementation. Although no specific development and planning guidelines relating to TOD have been gazetted at the federal level in Malaysia, there are nevertheless some available for the state of Selangor.[31] These include mixed-land use development, high-density and connectivity which are in line with principles used in other countries. Other typical planning guidelines for TODs include frequent and regular public transport services (particularly rail), and access to employment centres. This is aimed at creating compact development so as to provide the highest benefit to the public and to ensure success for the planned TOD transit station.
In applying population as one of the criteria for determining the viability of TOD stations, as seen in Maps 1 and 2, the more viable stretch on the east coast is from Cukai to Kota SAS, rather than around Kota Bharu and Kuala Terengganu. [32] Chukai and Kota SAS are located not far from Kuantan, and the region has numerous existing (and upcoming) industrial parks and port facilities. While population can increase if investments increase in these two states, these are subject to an upgrading in local institutions, as explained earlier.
For section C on the ECRL, which is still being considered for changes, the northern alignment that passes through central Selangor before heading to Port Klang covers an area with a significantly higher population compared to the southern route through Negri Sembilan and Putrajaya. In particular, Gombak and Serendah Baru have the highest population along the entire ECRL; Puncak Alam and Kapar also serve an area with a moderately high population. In contrast, Klawang and (to a lesser extent) Nilai serves an area that is relatively sparse, even if Putrajaya and Jenjarom in Selangor have a moderately high population.
It is important to note that successful implementation of TODs cannot be left to the investor alone. The government has to provide the overall planning, policy framework and connecting infrastructure.[33] The private sector is a collaborator and partner but will not have the macro planning perspective that a government should have in developing TODs. In particular, last-mile connectivity requires public provisions such as making connecting roads pedestrian friendly and with shelter in view of Malaysia’s climate. The TOD design also needs to involve local authorities and stakeholders, especially as land use and land rights fall under state government jurisdiction, and cater to the needs of the local community.
CONCLUSION
The EAPs are being launched to drive up the demand for rail cargo and rail passenger services for the ECRL. MIDA therefore aims to increase private investments and accelerate economic activities along the ECRL route through the provision of industrial parks, logistics hubs and TODs. Although industrial parks can serve as a tool for drawing in new investments, it may be more important to address sub-locational issues such as improving local institutions and investment environment to improve the attractiveness of these locations relative to the more popular states for hosting investment such as Selangor, Penang and Johor.
While the establishment of inter-modal transportation centres such as dry ports and TODs along the ECRL route are appropriate strategies to facilitate intermodal shifts in the use of transportation, the locations of these centres have to be determined based on technical criteria, rather than on changes in administration. In the near term, another change of administration cannot be ruled out considering the razor-thin majority of the PN coalition in parliament, and the possibility of a snap election soon. With Malaysia facing protracted political uncertainty, it is paramount that technical criteria, instead of changing political fortunes, determine the development plans of the ECRL.
Successful implementation of intermodal transportation centres, be it dry ports or TODs, requires cooperation and collaboration among all relevant stakeholders, including local government, key transportation players and local communities. The government must continue to play an important role in the establishment of these intermodal centres through planning and execution of last-mile connectivity; this is an important determinant in the usage of different transportation modes.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/90, 6 July 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Malaysia Rail Link Sdn Bhd (MRL) is the project and asset owner of the ECRL project.
[2] The contract was awarded without any open tender, and initially involved a sum of RM46 billion. Under the bilateral agreement, the Chinese side would provide RM55 billion for the project, of which 85 percent was to be borrowed from Exim Bank of China at a low interest rate of 3.35 per cent, with an amortization period of 20 years with the first seven years being free of repayments, including interest and with the Malaysian government as guarantor. The difference in the two amounts was explained by a Minister in https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/362231 <Accessed 13 June 2021>.
[3] The Business Times, 26 July 2019, “Malaysia restarts rail project with China after cost cut”, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/transport/malaysia-restarts-rail-project-with-china-after-cost-cut <Accessed 23 June 2021>.
[4] The length of the railway lines was shaved by 40 km. See https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/04/13/ecrl-is-up-and-running-again/ <Accessed 24 June 2021>.
[5] According to former Minister of Transportation Anthony Loke in https://www.thesundaily.my/local/no-downsizing-of-ecrl-project-scope-anthony-loke-YX1088221 <Accessed 13 June 2021>.
[6] See The Star, 10 April 2021, “ECRL records first tunnel breakthrough in Paka ahead of schedule”, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/04/10/ecrl-records-first-tunnel-breakthrough-in-paka-ahead-of-schedule <Accessed 8 June 2021>; The Star, 02 June April 2021, “ECRL says Dungun tunnel breakthrough 6 months ahead of schedule”, https://www.thestar.com.my/business/2021/06/02/ecrl-says-dungun-tunnel-breakthrough-6-months-ahead-of-schedule <Accessed 13 June 2021>.
[7] See https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-see-more-chinese-investments-along-ecrl-anthony-loke-11482594 <Accessed 23 June 2021>.
[8] See https://www.mida.gov.my/media-release/mida-urges-domestic-companies-to-join-the-economic-accelerator-projects/ <Accessed 23 June 2021>.
[9] There is so far only one independent study of the quality of EIA assessments. According to Rahman, et al;, 2021, the quality is dependent on cost of EIA preparation, sufficient time to conduct EIA study, skills and expertise and adequate training of consultants and Department of Environment (DOE) officers. The study also suggests three ways for improving EIA assessments, in terms of training of the officers, enhancement of EIA database and the understanding of the project developer. See https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349677174_Faktor_mempengaruhi_kualiti_Laporan_Penilaian_Kesan_Alam_Sekitar_di_Malaysia <Accessed 25 June 2021>.
[10] See https://enviro2.doe.gov.my/ekmc/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ECRL-Section-C-Volume-1-ES-RE-Part-1.pdf <Accessed 11 June 2021>.
[11] See Malaysian Government document archives at https://govdocs.sinarproject.org/documents/ministry-of-natural-resources-and-environment/eia-reports/362980465-ecrl-volume-1-executive-summary.pdf/view <Accessed 11 June 2021>. It should be noted that the method and models used for projections are not made known to the public and therefore the differences in projections are not explained nor made transparent.
[12] Ministry of Transport Malaysia. Quarterly statistics of rail transport. https://www.mot.gov.my/en/land/reports/quarterly-statistics-of-rail-transport <Accessed 13 June 2021>.
[13] Ibid.
[14] See MIDA 2020. https://www.mida.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200304180553_01_MIDA.pdf <Accessed 8 June 2021>.
[15] Ibid.
[16] For further details on the ECER, see https://acde.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/acde_crawford_anu_edu_au/2018-01/2017-14_2_athukoralapc_acde_wp_economic_corridor_malaysia.pdf <Accessed 24 June 2021>.
[17] See for example, Nielsen, Bo & Asmussen, Christian & Weatherall, Cecilie, 2017. “The location choice of foreign direct investments: Empirical evidence and methodological challenges”. Journal of World Business. 52: 62-82. 10.1016/j.jwb.2016.10.006. and Meyer, K. E., & Nguyen, H. V., 2005. Foreign Investment Strategies and Sub-national Institutions in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Vietnam*. Journal of Management Studies, 42(1), 63–93. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00489.x.
[18] See https://www.mot.gov.my/en/Penerbitan%20Rasmi/Executive%20Summary%20Logistics%20and%20Trade%20Facilitation%20Masterplan.pdf <Accessed 8 June 2021>.
[19] See https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/ntp-2019-optimising-full-potential-rail-connectivity <Accessed 8 June 2021>.
[20] The carbon footprint of rail is generally lower than that of flight and road transportation.
[21] Smith, Michael & Wimalasuriya, Rukman & Gunasekera & Voak, Adam, 2019. “Better transport connectivity in ASEAN: Impacts on commodity trade,” 2019 Conference (63rd), February 12-15, 2019, Melbourne, Australia 285090, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society (AARES).
[22] Jeevan, J., NHM.Salleh, K.B. Loke and A.H.Saharuddin, 2017. “Preparation of dry ports for a competitive environment in the container seaport system: A process benchmarking”, International Journal of e-Navigation and Maritime Economy, Volume 7, June 2017: 19-33; Othman, M.R., Jeeva, J. and Rizal, S., 2016. “The Malaysian Intermodal Terminal System: The Implication on the Malaysian Maritime Cluster”, International Journal of e-Navigation and Maritime Economy, Vol. 4, June 2016: 40-61.
[23] Zainuddin, Nizamuddin & Mohd Saifudin, Adam & Zalazilah, Mohd & Bahaudin, Ahmad & Khalid, Ruzelan. (2019). “Inland Port Logistical Issues In Northern Region Of Peninsular Malaysia”, Journal of Humanities, Language, Culture and Business, Volume 3, No. 12. May 2019: 51-65.
[24] The Star, 18 December 2015, “RM 245 mil. revival of Segamat Inland Port”, https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2015/12/18/rm245mil-revival-of-segamat-inland-port <Accessed 13 June 2021>.
[25] Jeevan, Jagan & Chen, Shu-Ling & Lee, Eon-Seong. (2015). The Challenges of Malaysian Dry Ports Development. The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics. 7. 10.1016/j.ajsl.2015.03.005.
[26] Shahrin Nasir 2014. Intermodal container transport logistics to and from Malaysian ports Evaluation of Customer requirements and environmental effects. Doctoral thesis in transport science, Sweden. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:781452/FULLTEXT02.pdf <Accessed 8 June 2021>.
[27] Op. cit. Shahrin Nasir 2014.
[28] Gomez, Christy & Omar, Masitah & Nallusamy, Rameson, 2019. “A Study on the Benefits of Transit Oriented Development in Malaysia And Incorporation of Those Benefits in Planning,” MATEC Web of Conferences. https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201926606016.
[29] See optimal usage in World Bank, 2014. Formulating an Urban Transport Policy: Choosing between Options.. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20950.
[30] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2004. “Transit-Oriented Development in the United States: Experiences, Challenges, and Prospects.” Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/23360.
[31] See Azmi, N.A. et al., 2021. “A comparative analysis of transit oriented development guidelines between Malaysia and other countries, PLANNING MALAYSIA: Journal of the Malaysian Institute of Planners,VOLUME 19 ISSUE 1 (2021), Page 186 – 199. file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/935-1736-1-SM.pdf .
[32] Ridership for public transport, including train services, is typically positively correlated to the population size around the train station. DOS Malaysia only provides population data at district level rather than for township. Hence, we have had to estimate population data for the ECRL stations based on the number of registered electorates within the DUN seat (state constituency) in which the ECRL station is located. DUN seats which, though not served by the ECRL station, lie within a one-kilometre distance from the stations are also included (shaded as pink). Since foreigners are not captured in the registered electorate data, and due to the absence of automatic voter registration in Malaysia, the population numbers provided should be seen as conservative estimates.
[33] Rowe, W. undated. “Is Transit-Oriented Development the Answer?” http://eps.mbpj.gov.my/SlideTOD/Is%20Transit%20Oriented%20Development.pdf <Accessed 10 June 2021>.
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2021/89 “Lancang-Mekong Cooperation: Overcoming the Trust Deficit on the Mekong” by Richard Grünwald
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) underwent a stress test in April 2020 when the Eyes on Earth (EoE) raised concerns over the connection between Chinese mainstream dams and the alteration of the Mekong’s water flow.
- Despite the politicisation of its findings in the context of the US-China strategic rivalry, the EoE Study presents a window of opportunity for deepening water cooperation in the Mekong.
- The launch of the China-led Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Platform (LMWRC) and the US-led Mekong Dam Monitor (MDM) in late 2020 help enhance transparency on the Mekong’s hydrological data.
- However, the LMWRC’s failure to explain the prolonged water fluctuation after China’s upstream maintenance in January 2021 has undermined trust in the LMC.
- To overcome the trust deficit on the Mekong, it is important to depoliticise hydrological science by ensuring accountable dialogue on research findings among relevant stakeholders, compliance with standard research procedures, and collaboration among relevant institutions.
*Richard Grünwald is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Institute of International Rivers and Eco-Security, Yunnan University, China. His research interest is in Mekong hydropolitics and transboundary water governance in Southeast Asia.
INTRODUCTION
The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) is one of the most recent cooperation mechanisms established in the Mekong sub-region. Unlike other mechanisms[1] backed by non-riparian states, such as the Mekong-US Partnership (MUP), the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), the Mekong-Republic of Korea Cooperation (MROK) or the Mekong-Japan Cooperation (MJC), the LMC was established by all riparian states[2] to deal with multifarious regional challenges. [3]
The genesis of the LMC was the Initiative of Sustainable Development of the Lancang-Mekong Subregion (ISDL) introduced by the Thai government in 2012. This was to facilitate cross-border tourism, water safety, agriculture and fishery.[4] In November 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the 17th ASEAN-China Summit, building upon the ISLD model, proposed the LMC as a new mechanism for comprehensive development in the Mekong.[5]
Table 1: The LMC-related Events (Nov 2014 – Aug 2020)
| Event | Outcome |
| 17th ASEAN-China Summit, Nov. 2014 | The LMC idea introduced by Li Keqiang |
| 1st LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Nov. 2015 | Introducing 3+5 cooperation model (i) political and security issues, (ii) economic and sustainable development, and (iii) cultural and people-to-people exchanges in five priority areas Committing to cooperation with existing water cooperation mechanisms Adopting early harvest projects |
| Jinghong hydropower dam in China released water, Mar. 2016 | Jinghong hydropower dam released water to alleviate severe droughts upon Vietnam’s request China committed to share more hydrological dataDebate about geopolitical implications |
| 1st LMC Leaders’ Meeting, Mar. 2016 | Adopting the Sanya Declaration Plan to establish 7 thematic joint working groups to coordinate the LMC agenda LMC Special Fund established |
| 2nd LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Dec. 2016 | Reviewing LMC progress Discussing LMC early harvest projects Planning to establish LMC cooperation centers Introducing the Green-Lancang Mekong Initiative |
| LMC Secretariat and water center established, Mar. 2017 | Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Secretariat Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center Promoting further collaboration and information sharing |
| Yunnan-based LMC institutions established, Jun. 2017 | Yunnan Liaison Office of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Yunnan Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Center Yunnan Lancang-Mekong Research Institute Promoting collaboration and information sharing |
| LMC environmental center established, Nov. 2017 | Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center Promoting further collaboration and information sharing |
| 3rd LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Dec. 2017 | Reviewing LMC progress Discussing reforming of the 3+5 cooperation model |
| 2nd LMC Leaders’ Meeting, Jan. 2018 | Adopting the Phnom Penh Declaration and the Five-Year Plan of Action Launching the 3+5+X cooperation model Establishing closer collaboration between BRI and LMCApproving 132 new LMC joint projects |
| 4th LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Dec. 2018 | Reviewing LMC progress Committing to collaboration with other cooperation mechanisms |
| Jinghong dam planned maintenance, Jul. 2019 | Public outcry after the announcement of the Jinghong hydropower dam maintenance that could prolong severe droughts |
| Low water flow changed the colour of the Mekong River, Dec. 2019 | Public outcry over the river colour’s change to aquamarine hue Debate about the upstream dam impact |
| 1st Ministerial Meeting on Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation, Dec. 2019 | Facilitating transboundary water governance Reviewing progress in transboundary water resources management Introducing principles and framework for strengthening existing cooperation |
| 5th LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Feb. 2020 | Promoting connection between LMC and BRI Advancing health security cooperation (COVID-19) Deepening water cooperation and hydrological data sharing Closer collaboration with other mechanisms (MRC, GMS and ASEAN) China’s commitment to release more water to alleviate the negative effects of seasonal droughts |
| 3rd LMC Leader’s Meeting, Aug. 2020 | Commitment to fund the LMC projects during COVID-19Establishing the LMC Special Fund for Public Health Strengthening cooperation with other mechanisms (ASEAN, ACMECS and MRC) Deepening collaboration with BRI, particularly the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor China’s commitment to share year-round hydrological data |
Source: Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and Conflict Database (LMCCD), compiled by author
The 1st LMC Foreign Minister’s Meeting in November 2015 unveiled the 3+5 cooperation model[6] which involved not only economic cooperation but also environmental protection and transboundary water governance. The LMC activities were under the radar until March 2016 when the Chinese government released water from the Jinghong hydropower dam to mitigate the prolonged drought.[7] Some observers interpreted the emergency water release as a token of China’s goodwill.[8] Others saw it as China’s geopolitical move to exert greater influence over downstream countries and a symbolic gesture to gain diplomatic mileage before the 1st LMC Leader’s Meeting in March 2016.[9]
The LMC has since been institutionalised with the establishment of various LMC centres to coordinate its expanding agenda. It has committed to pursue closer cooperation with other Mekong-related mechanisms, particularly the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). The LMC has undertaken various projects on urban water management,[10] health security[11] and food safety standards[12] in the Mekong countries. However, these were largely overshadowed by other infrastructure projects such as the China-Laos highway, the Boten-Vientiane railway, the Kyaukphyu deep sea port in Myanmar and the Navigation Channel Improvement Project, among others. Either way, LMC projects heavily rely on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funds. While some observers consider the synergy between the LMC and the BRI as part of China’s strategy to reconfigure the balance of power in the Mekong sub-region,[13] this connection allows the LMC to push forward its all-round development agenda with considerable financial support.[14]
A big stress test for the LMC came after severe droughts in June 2019[15] and rising concerns about the impact of upstream hydropower dams on the water flows.[16] At that time, many experts suspected that Chinese and Laotian dam projects could be the main cause for the deteriorating Mekong flows.[17] In response, the Chinese government committed to speed up a joint research collaboration with the MRC[18] and share year-round hydrological data through planned the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Sharing Platform (LMWRC).[19] However, the LMC effort in transboundary water governance was negatively affected by the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020. Since then, the LMC has re-focused its priority on securing funding for its ongoing and planned projects and meeting the growing demand for medical supplies in the Mekong countries. [20]
EYES ON EARTH STUDY
The attitude towards the LMC changed sharply after April 2020 when the Eyes on Earth (EoE) Study raised concerns about the connection between Chinese upstream dams and negative water flow changes.[21] While the correlation between mainstream water projects and severe droughts in recent years has been extensively discussed,[22] researchers have not found robust evidence for supporting such claims. Compared to other mainstream hydrological studies[23], the EoE Study attracted significant media attention and different reactions over its new scientific evidence.
The EoE Study estimated the actual water flow based on satellite images and concluded that there is a connection between upstream dams and the alteration of natural river flow.[24] According to the authors, the current predictive model has 89 per cent accuracy and provides a relatively easy guide for measuring hydrological changes within the basin. To increase research credibility, the EoE Study compared its predictive models with the MRC hydrological data and demonstrated the negative effects of the upstream dams on the “missing” water at Chiang Saen gauge where the water flow changes are most visible.
Although the EoE Study presents an important step in advancing regional discussion on this issue, many scientists are concerned about the misinterpretation of its findings.[25] Furthermore, the study lacks a rigorous peer-review process, shows a limited literature review of contemporary sources and inadequate consideration of the cumulative effects from the climate change and left-bank tributaries.
In addition, since the EoE Study was funded by the US-led Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), the objectivity of the research is in question.[26] Building upon the EoE Study, the US-based Stimson Center published a commentary on its website, criticising China’s “lack of transparency” and its water policy choices that “consider water a sovereign resource rather than a shared resource”.[27] According to the review by the Australia-Mekong Partnership for Environmental Resources and Energy Systems (AMPERES), such strong conclusions regarding China’s role and motivation in the 2019 flood were not substantiated, given “the limitations in the background research on the context, simplicity of the method, and lack of comparison with existing studies”.[28] Furthermore, the EoE Study findings were also used in American officials’ speeches to increase political pressure on the Chinese government.[29]
On the other hand, despite this escalation of political rhetoric and the marginalisation of scientific responses,[30] the EoE Study provides a window of opportunity to enhance existing water cooperation. Such potentially positive outcomes can be observed in the following events. First, at the 3rd LMC Leader’s Meeting in August 2020, China promised to fulfill its commitments on sharing year-round hydrological data and establishing the LMWRC[31] as well as addressing the prevalent concerns related to COVID-19, regional economic recovery and water resources management. The LMWRC was launched in November 2020; this helped promote the transparency of hydrological data.
Second, the launch of the MUP in September 2020 signals the US government’s greater focus on supporting sustainable river basin development.[32] The MUP draws on the success of the LMI and continues addressing non-traditional security issues that had received positive feedback from downstream countries since 2009. The MUP, however, also demonstrates Washington’s redefined agenda towards Southeast Asia as part of its overall strategic rivalry with China.[33] Other related geopolitical moves include boosting US military and defence budget on regional security, strengthening the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad),[34] and increasing the military assistance component in US foreign aid budget.[35] The heightened attention from Washington creates both pressure and incentive for the LMC to improve its water cooperation agenda.
Third, the MUP in collaboration with the Stimson Center and other stakeholders launched the Mekong Dam Monitor (MDM) in December 2020 to improve the transparency of hydrological data and operationalise the EoE Study findings.[36] The MDM visualises water flow changes in real-time and provides a detailed methodology and other useful statistics related to the Mekong sub-region.[37] The MDM also raises public awareness about transboundary water management and complements the existing MRC mechanism for hydrological data sharing.
The MDM spotted several water fluctuations in early 2021.[38] While some commentators interpret this sudden water change as another Chinese attempt of “manipulating the water flow”[39] and a proof of LMWRC incompetence,[40] it turned out that it was the regular hydropower maintenance that had been previously announced on the LMWRC website.[41] In response, China’s Ministry of Water Resources notified the MRC about the scheduled water fluctuation and committed to provide more information with downstream countries if needed.[42] On the other hand, the LMWRC did not mention how much water would be restored after the maintenance.[43]
Since end-January 2021, the LMWRC experienced some communication shortcomings and failed to explain the prolonged water fluctuation that continued until early February 2021.[44] After February 2021, the water levels slowly rose again. Apart from concerns about the abnormally low water levels, the MRC indicated that the discrepancy in outflow estimates by the MRC and China’s Ministry of Water Resources was probably due to different calculation methods.[45] China has committed to share water levels data rather than operational and water discharge data.[46] The LMWRC should consider building more hydrological stations in the upper Lancang River, activate the Lancang-Mekong Multi-stakeholders Platform (LMMP)[47] and revise the notification guidelines at their websites to advance water cooperation.
The MUP continues to be active in alerting dramatic water flow changes,[48] facilitating multi-stakeholder meetings[49] and encouraging journalists to monitor the situation.[50] Meanwhile, the LMWRC continues to advance cooperation with the MRC, including at the LMWRC-MRC online meeting in March 2021[51] and during the 3rd International Forum on Water Security and Sustainability in late April 2021.[52] However, it is unclear what substantive outcomes can be achieved at the next LMC Foreign Ministers Meeting, and how the LMC will regain trust in the LMWRC. At the press reference in March 2021, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hua Chunying, only emphasised the LMC’s economic benefits and did not reflect the concerns about the LMWRC.[53] Similarly, during a tour of some Mekong countries by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in early 2021, the agenda was predominantly focused on COVID-19 cooperation and economic relations through the LMC rather than on water cooperation.[54]
As for the MDM, it has gained traction for sharing Mekong water-related information, especially its hydrological developments and trends, on social media on a weekly basis. However, a number of MDM posts are of a speculative nature due to the lack of adequate data, for example on the connection between the Buyuan cascade and the potential impact on fishery[55] or the scope of negative impact of hydropeaking on migratory bird nests and their eggs.[56] Other challenges for the MDM include a bias in the datasets[57] and the issue of whether and how it should collaborate with the LMWRC.
Table 2: EoE Study-related Events (April 2020-December 2020)[58]
| Event | Outcome |
| Eyes on Earth Study, Apr 2020 | Concerned about Mekong hydrological changes Emphasised the impact of Chinese water reservoirs |
| Stimson Center commentary, Apr. 2020 | Concerned about Chinese mainstream dams Commented on China’s water policy choices and motivation Emphasised the need for further hydrological data |
| MRC commentary, Apr. 2020 | Provided feedback on the EoE Study’s limitations Recommended more joint research and data sharing |
| AMPERES commentary, Apr. 2020 | Provided feedback on the EoE Study’s limitations Encouraged LMC countries to collaborate |
| Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Shuang Geng’s press statement, Apr. 2020 | Quoted the New York Times instead of the EoE Study Said the EoE Study is a “groundless report” Highlighted that China suffered from droughts too |
| US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s statement, Apr. 2020 | Raised concerns about the EoE Study findings Demanded further information about upstream dams |
| US Ambassador to Thailand Michael DeSombre’s statement, Apr. 2020 | Highlighted US achievements in the Mekong basin Asked “why more water did not flow from China” |
| Aalto University’s commentary, Apr. 2020 | Provided recommendations to address existing shortcomings of the EoE Study |
| Michael DeSombre’s statement, May 2020 | Noted that “China’s actions are contributing to droughts” |
| US Assistant Secretary of State David R. Stilwell’s statement, Jun. 2020 | Said that Beijing used dams to hoard the water and that Chinese dams contributed to droughts |
| Tsinghua University Study, Jul. 2020 | Noted that the Chinese dams did not cause the droughts Highlighted positive effects of Chinese dams |
| Dialogue Forum for the Mekong, Jul. 2020 | Discussed the geopolitical impact of the EoE Study Discussed the hydrological changes since 2014 |
| MRC commentary, Aug. 2020 | Noted that the Chinese dams did not cause the droughts Recommended to share more hydrological data |
| Li Keqiang’s statement, Aug. 2020 | Committed to provide year-round hydrological data and advance existing water cooperation |
| David R. Stilwell’s statements, Sep. 2020 | Said that “China manipulates the water flow for its profit” and asked for better transparency of hydrological data Emphasized that “transparency is more important than the accuracy of the EoE Study” |
| Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lijian Zhao’s statement, Sep. 2020 | Asked to “stop politicizing water resources” and “stick to the facts” and “quote the EoE Study findings with caution” |
| MUP launched, Sep. 2020 | Committed to enhance good water governance and autonomy of Mekong states |
| Michael Pompeo’s statements, Sep. 2020 | Reaffirmed to “halt China’s aggressive and destabilizing policies in the Mekong sub-region” Committed to ensure autonomy and economic independence of Mekong partners Emphasised that China threatened the Mekong’s natural environment and economic autonomy |
| Michael Pompeo’s statement, Oct. 2020 | Concerned about China’s lack of transparency and stressed that China’s “malign and destabilizing activities in the Mekong, including manipulation of Mekong River water flow” negatively affected downstream countries |
| David R. Stilwell’s statement, Oct. 2020 | Noted China’s unilateral manipulation of the water flow and asked China to share hydrological data with the MRC |
| Stimson Center commentary, Oct. 2020 | Encouraged the US government to “find avenues for collaboration with China if possible” |
| Hydrological data sharing, Oct. 2020 | China agreed to share year-round hydrological data with the MRC |
| LMWRC launched, Nov. 2020 | Shared more hydrological data, improved collaboration with the MRC, and provided notification about upstream water plans |
| Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Luo Zhaohui’s statement, Nov. 2020 | Committed to deepen water cooperation and to eliminate “external interruptions” that “sabotage sub-regional cooperation” Stressed that “the Mekong sub-region is an arena of common development, rather than a battlefield of geopolitics” |
| Hua Chunying’s statement, Dec. 2020 | Highlighted the LMWRC achievementsCommitted to promote water cooperation |
| MDM launched, Dec. 2020 | Provided complementary hydrological monitoring Paid special attention to upstream dams |
| Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wenbin Wang’s statement, Dec. 2020 | Welcomed the MDM as a constructive action Committed to fight against “malicious moves” of the external interference that can “drive a wedge” between Mekong countries Emphasised the need to advance LMC cooperation on the basis where “facts speak louder than words” |
Source: Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and Conflict Database (LMCCD), compiled by author.
THE LMC’S FUTURE PATHWAYS
There are several pathways to promote the viability of the LMC.
First, instead of putting all responsibility for sustainable river development on the Chinese government and relying on BRI financing, other Mekong countries should be more active in proposing LMC reforms and diversifying financial sources for LMC activities. However, the ongoing crisis in Myanmar caused by the military coup in February 2021 could be a complicating factor since Myanmar is the co-chair of the LMC this year and also the current country-coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations.[59]
Second, the LMWRC and the MDM should find some common ground towards greater synergy. So far, both mechanisms work in silos. Except for their mutual cooperation with the MRC, there is limited hydrological data sharing and dialogue between China and the US. The future pathways for the Mekong sub-region are being discussed through various “isolated” platforms led by different stakeholders.[60] Without constructive and meaningful engagement, especially with Chinese stakeholders, solutions to effectively promote Mekong water cooperation remain elusive.
Third, the persisting misinterpretation of hydrological studies that undermine trust in scientific institutions must be addressed. This problem includes over-simplification of research findings[61]and double-standards towards other hydrological studies.[62] Without systematic de-politicisation of science, substantial scientific investigations within the official research channels, and consensus on complying with the basic research standards, there is a high risk that solutions will remain in the realm of hopes and false expectations.
Another related issue is moving the scientific discussion into public media space, which can generate mixed impact. Although public media helps raise public awareness of the problems on the ground, it is simultaneously an easy target for simplification and misinterpretation of the hydrological data. Unlike the standard peer-review process in high-impact research journals or structured dialogue in research conferences that try to delimit the over-statements, scientists in public media space may develop their research arguments and tailor the content to justify their prior beliefs. Therefore, instead of seeking “research shortcuts” and “media sensations”, it may be more reasonable to establish wider consensus among the inter-disciplinary scientific community and verify research findings through peer-review. Going forward, future research should be consulted with the MRC and go through standard research procedures to prevent “information trench wars”. Other remedies include fact-checking mechanisms and closer collaboration between relevant institutions such as the LMWRC, MRC and MDM. It should be noted that any joint research in this regard will be time-consuming and still may not result in conclusive findings.
CONCLUSION
To regain trust in the LMC and depoliticise the water issues, the multiple stakeholders should follow standard research procedures and observe the objectivity of science. Hence, further joint investigations and coordinated action among relevant institutions are necessary to overcome the looming water crisis and build mutual trust among Mekong countries.
The LMC remains a promising intergovernmental platform to promote development and water management in the Mekong region. Thanks to its synergy with the BRI, there are available resources for the LMC to promote all-round cooperation in the Mekong countries. However, the LMC has not yet developed coherent normative frameworks for transboundary water governance.[63] On the other hand, if China delivers on its commitment to secure funding for LMC projects during the COVID-19 pandemic, deepen regional water cooperation particularly with the MRC and promote mutual understanding among LMC members through collective leadership,[64] the LMC will stand a good chance of overcoming current scepticism about its credibility.
In the long term, the LMC requires structural changes, especially in advancing transparency over its projects[65] and addressing the current water problems.[66] While the LMC may possess sufficient capacity to address these challenges, it is not easy to change the existing mindset, especially the limited willingness on the part of some member countries to take more responsibility in transboundary water management. That being said, the political pressure to change this mindset must come from the Mekong countries themselves rather than from foreign actors.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/89, 1 July 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Since the 1990s, most cooperation mechanisms were designated to improve cultural exchanges and economic ties among Asian countries. However, there is a distinction of priority and focus between Southeast Asian maritime and mainland countries. Whereas the maritime countries emphasise the importance of the South China Sea, security of the Malacca Strait and other Asia-Pacific issues, the Mekong countries are more focused on joint basin development, cross-border trade and trans-Asian connectivity to reduce poverty. For more information, see Thomas Parks, Larry Maramis, Apichai Sunchindah and Weranuch Wongwatanakul, “ASEAN as the architect for regional development cooperation”, The Asia Foundation, 2018, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ASEAN-as-the-Architect-for-Regional-Development-Cooperation.pdf
[2] Richard Grünwald, “Lancang-Mekong Cooperation: Present and Future of the Mekong River Basin”, Politické vedy, 2020, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 69-97.
[3] Thomas Parks, Larry Maramis, Apichai Sunchindah and Weranuch Wongwatanakul, op. cit.
[4] Pou Sovachana and Bradley J. Murg, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism: Confronting New realities in Cambodia and the Greater Mekong Sub-region”, Regional Security Outlook, ed. John Huisken, 48-51 (Canberra: CSCAP Press, 2019).
[5] “Remarks by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Summit”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 13 November 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1212266.shtml
[6] “Joint Press Communiqué of the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, 12 November 2015, http://www.lmcchina.org/2015-11/12/content_41449862.htm
[7] “China releasing water to Mekong River countries”, China.org, 15 March 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2016-03/15/content_38033620.htm
[8] Xing Wei, “Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation and Trans-Boundary Water Governance. A Chinese Perspective”, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 2017, Vol. 3, No.3, p. 377-393.
[9] Richard Grünwald, op. cit.
[10] “Water quality assessment of Mekong River in Shan State to begin soon”, The Global New Light of Myanmar, 21 September 2019, https://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/water-quality-assessment-of-mekong-river-in-shan-state-to-begin-soon/; Ekaphone Phouthonesy, “Laos, China ink US$4.5. million deal on cooperation projects”, Vientiane Times, 18 February 2019, https://www.vientianetimes.org.la/freeContent/FreeConten_Laos_China_ink_41.php
[11] ““Mekong Bright Action” brings brightness to poor cataract patients in Laos”, China Development Brief, 20 October 2016, https://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/reports/mekong-bright-action-brings-brightness-to-poor-cataract-patients-in-laos/
[12] “China and Thailand Sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Cooperation on Project of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Special Fund”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 7 December 2019, http://www.chinaembassy.or.th/eng/dszl/t1722853.htm
[13] Sebastian Biba, “China’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ Mekong River politics: the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective”, Water International, 2018, Vol 43, Iss. 5, p. 622-641.
[14] Richard Grünwald, op. cit.
[15] “Water flow from China’s Jinghong station to fluctuate, but no major impact is expected”, Mekong River Commission, 3 July 2019, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/water-flow-from-chinas-jinghong-station-to-fluctuate-but-no-major-impact-is-expected
[16] “Chinese Embassy Spokesperson’s Remarks on Mekong-related Media Report Targeting China”, Embassy of the People’ Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 5 July 2019, http://www.chinaembassy.or.th/eng/sgxw/t1678896.htm
[17] Richard Grünwald, Yan Feng, Wenling Wang, “Modified Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS): Xayaburi Dam Case Study”, Water Vol. 12, Iss. 3, p. 710-727.
[18] “MRC and China renew pact on water data provision and other cooperation initiatives”, Mekong River Commission, 19 July 2019, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-and-china-renew-pact-on-water-data-provision-and-other-cooperation-initiatives
[19] Mekong River Commission, “MRC Secretariat, LMC Water Center ink first MOU for better upper-lower Mekong management”, 18 December 2019, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-secretariat-lmc-water-center-ink-first-mou-for-better-upper-lower-mekong-management
[20] “Joint Press Communiqué of the Fifth Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, 20 February 2020, http://www.lmcwater.org.cn/cooperative_achievements/important_documents/files/202008/t20200825_162714.html
[21] Brian Eyler and Courtney Weatherby, “New Evidence: How China Turned off the Tap on the Mekong River”, Stimson Center, 13 April 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/new-evidence-how-china-turned-off-the-mekong-tap/#4-the-2019-drought
[22] Sebastian Biba, “China’s Continuous Dam-building on the Mekong River”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2012, Vol. 42, Iss. 4, p. 603-628; Vu Nguyen Hoa Hong, “Water Security in the Mekong River Basin Challenges, Causes and Solutions”, ASRJETS, 2020, Vol. 64, No. 1., p. 187-199.
[23] “Strategic Environment Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream”, ICEM, 2010. http://icem.com.au/documents/envassessment/mrc_sea_hp/SEA_Final_Report_Oct_2010.pdf; The Council Study. The Study on the Sustainable Management and Development of the Mekong River Basin including Impacts of Mainstream Hydropower Projects (Vientiane: Mekong River Commission, 2017).
[24] Alan Basist and Claude Williams, Monitoring the Quantity of Water Flowing Through the Upper Mekong Basin Under Natural (Unimpeded) Conditions (Bangkok: Sustainable Infrastructure partnership, 2020).
[25] Tarek Ketelsen, John Sawdon and Timo Räsärenen, “Monitoring the Quantity of water flowing through the Upper Mekong Basin under natural (unimpeded) conditions”, AMPERES, 19 April 2020, https://www.amperes.com.au/library/2020/4/amperes-commentary-eyes-on-earth; Understanding the Mekong River’s hydrological conditions: A brief commentary note on the “Monitoring the Quantity of Water Flowing Through the Upper Mekong Basin Under Natural (Unimpeded) Conditions” study by Alan Basist and Claude Williams (2020) (Vientiane: MRC Secretariat, 2020); Mark Kallio and Amy Fallon, “CRITICAL NATURE: Are China’s dams on the Mekong causing downstream drought? The importance of scientific debate”, CSDS, 28 April 2020, https://www.csds-chula.org/publications/2020/4/28/critical-nature-are-chinas-dams-on-the-mekong-causing-downstream-drought-the-importance-of-scientific-debate
[26] There are multiple connections between the EoE Study authors and US government-funded projects and US-driven initiatives seeking to justify concerns about Chinese mainstream dams before April 2020. See for example: “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on August 3, 2018”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 3 August 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1583054.shtml; “Meeting Report: Improving Data for Water Resources Management. Mekong Water Data Expert Group”, IBM Center for Cognitive Government, 4 April 2019, https://mekonguspartnership.org/wp-content/files/Report%20-%20Mekong%20Water%20Data%20Experts%20Meeting%20%20(Washington%20DC%202019).pdf; “Lower Mekong Iniative Implementers Workshop 2019”, Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership, 19 December 2019, https://mekongsip.org/download/2019-lmi-implementers-workshop_report
[27] For further details see Brian Eyler and Courtney Weatherby, “New Evidence: How China Turned off the Tap on the Mekong River”, Stimson Center, 13 April 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/new-evidence-how-china-turned-off-the-mekong-tap/#4-the-2019-drought
[28] Tarek Ketelsen, John Sawdon and Timo Räsärenen, op.cit.
[29] See “The United States and ASEAN Are Partnering to Defeat COVID-19, Build Long-Term Resilience, and Support Economic Recovery”. U.S. Mission to ASEAN, 22 April 2020, https://asean.usmission.gov/the-united-states-and-asean-are-partnering-to-defeat-covid-19-build-long-term-resilience-and-support-economic-recovery
[30] See for example “Special Briefing with David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs”, U.S. Department of State, 15 September, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/special-briefing-with-david-r-stilwell-assistant-secretary-of-state-for-the-bureau-of-east-asian-and-pacific-affairs/index.html; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on December 14, 2020”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 14 December 2020 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1837496.shtml; “The Mekong River, Mekong Sovereignty, and the Future of Southeast Asia”, U.S. Embassy & Consultate in Thailand, 15 October 2020, https://th.usembassy.gov/remarks-david-stilwell-assistant-secretary-at-indo-pacific-conference-on-strengthening-transboundary-river-governance
[31] “Full text of Vientiane Declaration of the Third Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting”, Xinhua, 24 August 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/24/c_139314536.htm
[32] Mekong-U.S. Partnership website at https://mekonguspartnership.org/about
[33] Sebastian Strangio, “How Meaningful is the New US-Mekong Partnership?”, The Diplomat, 14 September 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/how-meaningful-is-the-new-us-mekong-partnership/
[34] “Secretary Pompeo to Participate in Virtual U.S.-ASEAN, EAS, ARF, Mekong-U.S. Partnership Foreign Ministers Meeting September 9-11”, U.S. Mission to ASEAN, 2 September 2020, https://asean.usmission.gov/secretary-pompeo-to-participate-in-virtual-u-s-asean-eas-arf-mekong-u-s-partnership-foreign-ministers-meetings-september-9-11
[35] See USAID Foreign Aid Explorer before and after 2019, “U.S. Foreign Aid Explorer”, USAID, accessed on 25 February 2021, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd
[36] “Launch of the Mekong Dam Monitor”, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in China, 16 December 2020, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/launch-of-the-mekong-dam-monitor
[37] Alan Basist, Allison Carr, Brian Eyler, Courtney Weatherby and Claude Williams, op. cit. [38] Alan Basist, Allison Carr, Brian Eyler, Courtney Weatherby and Claude Williams, op. cit.
[39] Panu Wongcha-um and Kay Johnson, “China notifies Mekong River neighbours it is holding back waters”. Reuters, 6 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river-idUSKBN29B17C
[40] Brian Eyler. “Mekong Mainstream at Chiang Saen, Thailand (Golden Triangle) drops >1 meter in 48 hours as Jinghong Dam upstream fills”. Planet, 5 January 2021, https://www.planet.com/stories/mekong-mainstream-at-chiang-saen-thailand-golden-t-XlhhVOaGg
[41] “Notification of Hydrological Information on Lancang River（December 27, 2019”, Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Sharing Platform, 27 December 2019, www.lmcwater.org.cn/water_information/regulation_information/202008/t20200824_162706.html
[42] “Notification of Hydrological Information on Lancang River（January 5, 2021”, Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Sharing Platform, 5 January 2021, www.lmcwater.org.cn/water_information/regulation_information/202101/t20210105_163831.html
[43] “Mekong water levels to drop due to power grid maintenance in China”, Mekong River Commission, 6 January 2021, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/pr001-06102021
[44] “Mekong River drops to “worrying” levels, some sections turning blue-green”, Mekong River Commission, 12 February 2021, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/pr002-12022021/
[45] “Mekong River levels see slight increase, monsoon rains to begin earlier”. Mekong River Commission, 22 February 2021, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/pr003-22022021/
[46] This data is provided from two stations located on the Upper Mekong mainstream, one at Jinghong and one on a tributary at Manan in China’s south-western Yunnan province, see “Mekong River levels see slight increase, monsoon rains to begin earlier”, Mekong River Commission, 22 February 2021, https://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/pr003-22022021
[47] “Multiple-stakeholder Platform for the Lancang-Mekong Water Sharing”, Global Water Partnership, 23 December 2018, https://www.gwp.org/en/GWP-China/about-gwp-china/news-list/2018/lmc-workshop-in-dali
[48] Alan Basist, Allison Carr, Brian Eyler, Courtney Weatherby and Claude Williams. “Mekong Dam Monitor”. Stimson Center, 10 December 2020, https://monitor.mekongwater.org
[49] “Mekong-U.S. Partnership Track 1.5. Policy Dialogue Opening Plenary”. Stimson Center, 18 March 2021. https://www.stimson.org/event/mekong-u-s-partnership-track-1-5-policy-dialogue.
[50] “Mekong Data Journalism Fellowship”. Earth Journalism Network, 16 February 2021. https://earthjournalism.net/opportunities/expired-opportunities/Mekong-Data-Journalism-Fellowship-2021-
[51] “Discussion on Hydrological Conditions Held with Consensus of Strengthening Lancang-Mekong Water Cooperation”, LMC Water Center, 16 March 2021, http://www.lmcwater.org.cn/dynamic_news/202103/t20210316_164074.html
[52] “3rd International Forum on Water Security & Sustainability”, Water Security & Sustainability, 24 April 2021, https://estds.yicode.ac/assets/doc/handbook-updated-0420-bl-compressed.pdf
[53] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on March 23, 2021”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 24 March 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1863508.shtml
[54] Lye Liang Fook, “Wang Yi’s Southeast Asia Tour: Significance and Challenges”. ISEAS Perspectives, 2021/10. /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/iseas-perspective-2021-10-wang-yis-southeast-asia-tour-significance-and-challenges-by-lye-liang-fook
[55] “Mekong Dam Monitor”, Facebook, 30 December 2020, https://www.facebook.com/mekongdammonitor/posts/111754390816021
[56] “Mekong Dam Monitor”, Facebook, 29-30 March 2021, https://www.facebook.com/mekongdammonitor/posts/157212269603566 ; https://www.facebook.com/mekongdammonitor/posts/157966442861482
[57] On 28 April 2021, the MDM announced “bias in the input SSMI data that was making the wetness values higher than the actual wetness”. The authors said that “a more detailed explanation is forthcoming in a major update to the Mekong Dam Monitor”, but no further information has been provided thus far. See “Mekong Dam Monitor”, Facebook, 28 April 2021, https://www.facebook.com/mekongdammonitor/posts/174623914529068.
[58] The list of events only refers to major milestones. For a full list of events and other information before and after April 2020 related to the EoE Study – please contact the author.
[59] “China, Myanmar reach consensuses on ties, fight against COVID-19”, Xinhua, 12 January 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/12/c_139661989.htm
[60] “Mekong-U.S. Partnership Track 1.5. Policy Dialogue Opening Plenary”, Stimson Center, 18 March 2021. https://www.stimson.org/event/mekong-u-s-partnership-track-1-5-policy-dialogue; Center for Social Development Studies (CSDS) (2021). The Mekong, China, & SE Asian Transitions Series-Mekong Dams: Debates and the Politics of Evidence [Online, 29 April 2021], https://www.csds-chula.org/activityandevents/2021/4/29/event-resources-the-mekong-china-amp-se-asian-transitions-series-mekong-dams-debates-and-the-politics-of-evidence-online-29-april-2021
[61] Brian Eyler and Courtney Weatherby, “New Evidence: How China Turned off the Tap on the Mekong River”, Stimson Center, 13 April 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/new-evidence-how-china-turned-off-the-mekong-tap/#4-the-2019-drought
[62] Fuqiang Tian, Hui Liu, Shiyu Hou, Kunbiao Li, Hui Lu, Guangheng Ni, Xiangpeng Mu and Baiyinbaoligao, “Drought Characteristics of Lancang-Mekong River Basin and the Impacts of Reservoir Regulation on Streamflow”, Tsinghua University, 15 July 2020, http://www.civil.tsinghua.edu.cn//upload/file/20200715/1594791768224016662.pdf
[63] Richard Grünwald, op. cit.
[64] Vannarith Chheang, “Lancang-Mekong Cooperation: A Cambodian Perspective”, ISEAS Perspective, 2018, No. 70, p. 1-9.
[65] Richard Grünwald, op. cit.
[66] Sebastian Biba, “China’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ Mekong River politics: the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation from a comparative benefit-sharing perspective”, op. cit.
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Temasek Working Paper No. 2: 2021 – Dharmakīrti of Kedah: His Life, Work and Troubled Times by Iain Sinclair
