Articles & Commentaries

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• President Joko Widodo’s son-in-law, businessman Bobby Nasution, won Medan’s 2020 mayoral election on 9 December 2020. Meanwhile, the President’s son Gibran Rakabuming Raka won Solo’s mayoral election in Central Java. In South Tangerang, Banten, all three mayoral candidates have family ties with established elites. Many observers have therefore deemed these local elections as a perpetuation of “dynastic politics”.

• Bobby’s victory in Medan is especially interesting since President Jokowi did not win here in the 2019 presidential election. A key factor could be the rapprochement between Jokowi and Prabowo after the 2019 election, resulting in Bobby’s candidacy being backed by parties in the governing coalition at the national level, while his rival was aligned with the weaker and fragmented opposition parties. Voters who previously supported Prabowo’s cause became less averse to voting for Bobby.

• Bobby’s campaign clearly benefited from his personal link to the President’s family. The higher voter turnout in Medan in 2020 reflected the prestige arising from this link, considering that he was an outsider. Moreover, Bobby’s camp encouraged the perception that Bobby would have easier access to resources and policy attention from the central government. 

• Furthermore, voters in Medan have lost faith in the incumbent mayor who represented an underperforming and corrupt bureaucracy, and are thus less concerned about contributing to “dynastic politics” in Indonesia.

* The author is Associate Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Visiting Associate Fellow at the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS), Academia Sinica.

INTRODUCTION

On 9 December 2020, Medan, the capital city of North Sumatra, held its mayoral election. It was one of the country’s 270 simultaneously held regional elections, comprising 9 gubernatorial, 224 district heads’ and 36 mayoral, elections. Some voters demanded the postponement of these elections due to the ever-exacerbating Covid-19 pandemic,[1] deeming that health considerations must be prioritised over elite political interests. However, the government went ahead with the elections, stating the “cruciality of upholding people’s rights to vote and be voted for” and that “nobody knows when the pandemic would be over.”[2]

The grave pandemic aside, the 2020 Medan mayoral election exhibited an interesting feature shared with a few other high-profile elections, such as in Solo and South Tangerang, namely “dynastic politics”.[3] A political dynasty can be defined as a network of family politicians who come to power in an election-based regime.[4] Kanchan Chandra writes that dynastic politics involve family members who are “active in politics”, referring to those who hold office in an elected body, whether directly or indirectly elected, or is a candidate for an election, whether direct or indirect, or holding any office in a political party.[5]

The Medan election was won by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, a newly recruited PDIP cadre and Muslim-Batak young entrepreneur. Bobby Nasution and his running-mate Aulia Rachman won 53% of the total votes, while the incumbent pair Akhyar Nasution and Salman Alfarisi gained 46.5%. Bobby-Aulia’s ticket won 393,533 votes (15 districts) while Akhyar-Salman’s won only 342,380 (6 districts).

Bobby-Aulia’s ticket was supported by eight political parties, namely his father-in-law’s party Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP); the former opposition party, Prabowo’s Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra); National Mandate Party (PAN); Golkar Party; National Democrat Party (Nasdem); People’s Conscience Party (Hanura); United Development Party (PPP) and Indonesian Solidary Party (PSI). The incumbent Akhyar Nasution and his running-mate Salman Alfarisi were supported by the Islamist-oriented Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s party Democrat Party (PD).

This was Medan’s fourth direct mayoral election since the implementation of direct elections in Indonesia in 2005. That year, Medan and other North Sumatra’s districts such as Karo and Toba-Samosir were among the first cities to hold direct elections. In 2020, Medan had 1,601,000 registered voters scattered across its 21 sub-districts and 4,303 voting booths. Muslims comprise 61.21% of Medan’s population, Christians 29.99%, Buddhists 8.02%, Confucianists 0.41% and Hindus 0.34%. Medan is a multi-ethnic city, with Batak groups comprising 35.2% of the population, Javanese 33%, Chinese 9.7%, Malays 6.9% and others 15.2%. Medan’s main political parties are PDIP with 10 seats in the city parliament, Gerindra with 10 seats, PKS with 7 seats, PAN with 6 seats, Golkar with 4 seats, Nasdem with 4 seats, PD with 4 seats, Hanura with 2 seats, PSI with 2 seats and PPP with 1 seat.

During the 2019 Presidential election, Medan was among the cities where Prabowo Subianto, President Joko Widodo’s former rival, won. Prabowo was backed by the coalition of the Islamist-inspired PKS and the nationalist Gerindra parties. Back then, the presidential election exhibited a religion-based voter polarisation, with predominantly Muslim regions in the East Coast voting overwhelmingly for Prabowo, while the Christian regions in the West Coast supported Jokowi, who was backed by PDIP.[6]

Similarly, in the North Sumatra gubernatorial election in 2018, Medan was among the regions where the candidate backed by the PKS-Gerindra coalition won. This gubernatorial election also exhibited religion-based polarisation, with predominantly Muslim regions voting overwhelmingly for the all-Muslim ticket supported by PKS-Gerindra, and the Christian regions voting for the religiously mixed ticket supported by PDIP.[7] This means, in addition to being inclined towards candidates possessing Islamist credentials, Medan also tended to support the Gerindra-PKS coalition.

Therefore, the fact that Bobby Nasution, a PDIP cadre with family ties to President Jokowi – who was not popular among Medan voters – could in 2020 win the city’s election, is interesting. How have his family ties with the President helped him in mobilising votes? How did the elements of “dynastic politics” play a role in Medan? What are the key takeaways of this election and what is the outlook for “dynastic politics” vis-à-vis the more familiar religious politics, in the future of Indonesia’s mainstream politics?

CANDIDATES AND CAMPAIGNS

The backgrounds of both contenders in the Medan election are worthy of note, partly because they also reflect the political contestation on the national level. The incumbent Mayor, Akhyar Nasution, a 54-year-old Batak-Muslim, was Vice Mayor under Dzulmi Eldin who won the election in 2015, but who is now in jail for corruption. Akhyar was a PDIP cadre before, yet was dismissed by the party’s Chairman Megawati Sukarnoputri for several reasons: first, it was reported that Akhyar was “upset” with her decision to not endorse his candidacy in Medan’s 2020 election and to support Jokowi’s son-in-law Bobby Nasution instead;[8] second, due to his disgruntlement with PDIP, Akhyar decided to approach Democrat Party, which in the end supported his candidacy together with PKS, whose cadre Salman Alfarisi became Akhyar’s running-mate.[9] Because Akhyar became a member of the Democrat party, PDIP then considered him “disloyal” and decided to dismiss him. It is also important to note that on the national level, the Democrat party and PKS were the only opposition left, since Gerindra had joined the government. The competition between Bobby and Akhyar thus reflects the national level contest between the ruling coalition and the opposition.

Akhyar’s “disloyalty” to PDIP aside, it is worthy of note that the Democrat Party, due to its founding history, is considered by many as PDIP’s long-time rival. The party was established as a vehicle for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who was then-President Megawati’s Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs, to run for the presidency in 2004. This alliance turned rivalry between SBY and Megawati became deep-seated and was extended into a long-term contention between these political parties.[10]

Although for other regions, being incumbent may at times boost a candidate’s popularity, being incumbent in Medan impacted negatively on Akhyar’s popularity. It is worth mentioning the “special” trait of Medan’s local politics: all elected mayors since 2005 have been convicted for corruption. The first directly elected mayor, Abdillah, who took office in 2005, was convicted in 2008. The second mayor, Rahudman Harahap, was Abdillah’s former Vice Mayor; he was elected Mayor in 2010, and was convicted in 2014. The third mayor, Dzulmi Eldin, Rahudman’s former Vice Mayor, who was himself elected as mayor in 2015, was convicted in 2020. The fact that all Medan’s mayors have been involved with corruption had played a role in the city voters’ political apathy, resulting in a low turnout of 25-35% in the 2010 and 2015 elections. In the 2020 election, most likely due to the candidacy of newcomer Bobby Nasution, who is not connected to the presumably corrupt bureaucracy and who is instead connected to the central government in Jakarta, Medan’s voter turnout reached 55%, almost doubling those of the previous two elections.

Bobby’s business accomplishments were not unknown to his potential voters. The fact that he is a successful young entrepreneur might have appealed to millennial voters. Like all election candidates across the country, Bobby reported his wealth to the Electoral Commission. His total wealth amounted to IDR 54.8 billion (USD 3.82 million);[11] his property assets are worth IDR 34.2 billion (USD 2.38 million) and consist of 3 plots of land in Medan, 1 plot in Solo, Central Java, 3 houses in Jakarta, and 1 house in Deli Serdang, North Sumatra. As the President Commissioner of a company called PT Wirasena Cipta Reswara, Bobby’s main business is in the property sector although he also ventured into agriculture and mining. In the rice sector, Wirasena’s daughter company, PT Pilar Wirasena Sinergi, is connected to the son of the district head of Binjai, North Sumatra, Muhammad Adri Alfisah, whose mother ran in the Binjai 2020 mayoral election but lost. Another affiliated company was PT Sambas Mineral Mining, headquartered in Southeast Sulawesi. Since 2016, Bobby has been also the marketing director of Takke Group, a property business owning various properties in Jakarta. He admitted that he got to know the founder of Takke through his father, who was the director of the state-owned enterprise, PT Perkebunan IV in North Sumatra.[12] As such, Bobby and his family were not unknown in the said province.

The fact that Bobby did not reside in Medan prior to his candidacy[13] – thus making him not a “real” Medan resident – was at first considered not helpful for his campaign.[14] However, the fact that all past mayors of Medan, all real residents of the city, had turned out to be involved in corruption, enabled him, as an outsider, to offer himself as a fresh alternative to the presumably corrupt city bureaucracy. Bobby-Aulia’s official cues thus included “change”, referring to the need for bureaucratic reforms towards clean governance.[15] In addition, they also promised a revitalisation of education institutions, strengthened rule-of-law, promotion of creative economy and small-scale businesses as well as religious harmony and tolerance.[16] Meanwhile, in line with the ideological platform of the PKS party which backed him, some of Akhyar’s promises focused on the interests of Muslim voters, for example, the establishment of an Islamic Centre within three years and a budget for fardhu kifayah, or the Islamic regulations for the preparation for the dead body for funeral, for poor people.[17]

In addition to the above official cues, there were several “unofficial” cues. In some of his speeches, emphasising his ties with the central government, Bobby portrayed himself as a sort of “mediator” between Medan and the government in Jakarta. Seemingly promising easy access to the central government, he said “I dare to make phone calls to Ministers in Jakarta, in order to take care of Medan”.[18] Hearing this, the Akhyar camp sneered, saying that the Indonesian government has structures and regulations in place, and that local governments cannot “just make phone calls to ministers” to get the central government’s attention. Moreover, Bobby’s statement seemed to imply that if Akhyar won the election, the central government would be reluctant to pay attention to Medan. This, according to them, could be considered as unethical campaigning.[19]

Bobby’s campaign did seem to be more “prestigious”. He took his wife, Jokowi’s daughter Kahiyang Ayu, on a number of campaign activities, emphasising in public his family ties with the President. In addition, many well-known national-level political figures supported him by coming to North Sumatra. Among these were Gandjar Pranowo, Central Java’s governor who is a PDIP cadre, and Sandiaga Uno, a Gerindra cadre who was Prabowo Subianto’s vice-presidential candidate in the 2019 election. President Joko Widodo’s own visit to North Sumatra’s Tapanuli region, though not to Medan and not for supporting Bobby, but yet so close to his son-in-law’s Pilkada contestation no doubt helped Bobby’s campaign, since it showed that the President was paying more attention to North Sumatra. 

Akhyar’s camp’s “unofficial” cues included the prioritising of Islamic voters’ interest. Akhyar-Salman pledged a “pact” with the popular Islamist preacher Abdul Somad to prioritise Islamic interests and values. Promises made include involving Islamic religious leaders (ulama), local intellectuals and cultural figures in policy-making, supporting Qur’an recitation activities and to include these in the regional laws, encouraging Islamic alms-giving to finance non-permanent teachers, Qur’an recitation teachers, grave-diggers, mortuary, and other Islamic-related activities and to include these in the regional laws.[20] Denoting that these would be included in the regional laws meant that the incumbent was willing to make Medan officially more “Islamic”. In addition to the pledge, getting the preacher Abdul Somad to support them was itself a supportive signal to the conservative Islamic voters in Medan. This strategy was successful in North Sumatra’s 2018 gubernatorial election, where the pair supported by Abdul Somad won.

DYNASTIC POLITICS AND THE RELATIVE INCONSEQUENCE OF RELIGIOUS MOBILISATION

The fact that Bobby is a wealthy young entrepreneur attracted voters, especially millennials who aspire to learn from his business success. It was also reported that his campaign team used this to emphasize that although he was wealthy and had lucrative businesses and “networks”, he still chose to turn to politics to “dedicate himself” to developing Medan instead.[21]

Medan’s 2020 mayoral election thus exhibited interesting aspects. Firstly, Bobby’s camp benefitted from the fact that he is the son-in-law of the President and that there might be an assumption among voters that Bobby can offer easy access to central resources.

Secondly, unlike during the 2010 Medan election when ethno-religious identities were voters’ political preference,[22] ethnic politics did not take place in 2020 as both candidates were Bataks, and were even from the same Batak clan, Nasution. Similarly, religious identity-politics did not matter as much because both tickets were all-Muslim – although the Akhyar camp tried to promote programmes which directly focused on Islamic interests. This was different from the 2018 gubernatorial election, where one candidate pair was an all-Muslim ticket and the other was a mixed-ticket, and this made religious-based mobilisation more effective.

Thirdly, the fact that Prabowo Subianto, the chairman of Gerindra, has now joined the Jokowi government seemed to have made Medan voters – who voted overwhelmingly for Prabowo in 2019 – less averse to Jokowi’s government. Bobby-Aulia’s (PDIP-Gerindra) pairing also reflected the current closeness between Jokowi and Prabowo at the national level as well as epitomized the reconciliation of the two major nationalist parties which had been political rivals. In contrast, Akhyar-Salman was backed by the Islamist PKS and Democratic Party, which at the national level represented the weak and fragmented opposition camp.

Fourthly, the pandemic significantly reduced the chances of mass mobilisation. This also meant that Abdul Somad, the young firebrand Islamic preacher who is popular in Medan and who was supporting Akhyar-Salman, could not mobilize the masses, which had been his political strength. The figure of Abdul Somad did not therefore influence voters as much as it had during the 2018 gubernatorial election, when the young preacher intensively campaigned for the Gerindra-PKS candidate who eventually won.

Fifthly, in relation to the reduced opportunity for Islamic mobilisation, the Islamist party PKS’ strength has been divided with the birth of PKS’s splinter party Gelora. PKS used to have a very strong party machinery in North Sumatra. In the Medan election, while PKS supported Akhyar-Salman, the splinter party Gelora supported Bobby-Aulia. Gelora national leader Fahri Hamzah even campaigned for the “proximity” of Medan to the central government.[23]

Lastly, the massive flooding which ruined many residential areas in Medan several days before the election became the “nail in the coffin” for Akhyar’s camp, as it accentuated the incumbent local government’s incapacity to deal with this municipal problem.[24]

KEY TAKEAWAYS AND RELATIONS TO THE NATIONAL POLITICS

Bobby Nasution’s electoral triumph in Medan might have been surprising for some, especially considering that President Jokowi, his father-in-law, was not popular with Medan residents in 2019 and did not win the 2019 presidential election in the city. Two factors may explain Bobby’s popularity among Medan’s residents: firstly, there has been a reconciliation between President Jokowi and Prabowo at the national level, which also meant that the Gerindra party had joined the government camp. This might have rendered Medan’s residents less averse to Jokowi’s government, and by proxy, to the candidacy of his family member. Secondly, there might indeed be an assumption that Bobby can provide easier access to central resources. This logic of “patronage” is certainly not unfamiliar to Medan, where clientelism and corruption are known to be rampant.

Aside from factors pertaining to Bobby’s popularity, the 2020 Medan election portrays several interesting features that reflect a general trend in Indonesia’s current politics. Firstly, “dynastic politics” is considered “not unethical” with the excuse that every citizen has the political right to run in elections. This is not a good sign for Indonesia’s democracy, as family-run political machineries perpetuate patronage politics and clientelism which in turn impedes good governance. Moreover, dynastic politics actually shrinks the space for non-dynastic aspiring individuals running in the election, creating an unlevel playing field that undermines democracy. Nevertheless, dynastic politics is also inevitable in Indonesia where decades of authoritarian governance had consolidated power among a few old entrenched (oligarch) elite groups and influenced the rise of new groups. Unfortunately, not many Indonesians would flinch when prominent families assume a hereditary political role.

Secondly, while “dynastic politics” may perpetuate binary politics and polarisation in Indonesia, it does not do that between hardline vs moderate Islam, but between local elites with local roots and new local elites with connection to the central government. The congruence of interests between local elites and central government elites might foster patronage networks and therefore extend the political (and business) clout of the central-based oligarchs to the local level.

Thirdly, the Medan mayoral election portrays national-level political contestation as both camps represented polarisation at the national level. Bobby-Aulia’s candidacy represented the consolidation of PDIP and Gerindra, which was also evident at the national level. Meanwhile,  Akhyar-Salman’s candidacy, which was backed by PKS and Democratic Party, reflected the weak and divided opposition camp at the national level.

Fourthly, in this election, voters seemed to have “penalised” the incumbent for “under-performing”. Voters had witnessed how three mayors who were related to the local bureaucracy had been involved in corruption, therefore a newcomer not connected to the local government was a welcomed change. Moreover, Bobby is also Jokowi’s son-in-law, the fact which made him more popular than the incumbent. Excitement pertaining to Bobby’s candidacy might partly explain the unusually high voter turnout in 2020 compared to past elections. It is noteworthy that non-incumbent contenders who were not as popular as Bobby in the past had not attracted as large a turnout. Lastly, with Bobby’s triumph, Medan residents might be anticipating a more proximate relationship with the central government and easier access to central resources and public goods. Whether this will bring welfare to the people, as Bobby has promised, remains to be seen.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/48, 20 April 2021

ENDNOTES

[1] Indonesia has the worst pandemic situation across Southeast Asia, with more than 1.3 million total cases, more than 32,000 deaths and numbers of daily new cases which could reach up to more than 14,000.

[2] “Ini alasan Pilkada tetap dilaksanakan” (“These are the reasons why Regional Elections would still be held”), Republika, 24 September 2020, https://republika.co.id/berita/qh5ssl467/ini-alasan-pilkada-tetap-dilaksanakan (accessed 25/02/2021).

[3] President Joko Widodo’s son Gibran Rakabuming Raka won the mayoral election in Solo, Central Java. In South Tangerang, Banten province, all three mayoral candidates have political ties with established elites; one was a family member of Prabowo Subiyanto’s, the current Minister of Defence and Jokowi’s former presidential rival, one was a family member of Ma’ruf Amin, the current Vice President of Indonesia, and the last one was a member of a local political family who holds power in almost all districts and cities of Banten. See A. Harimurti and Made Supriatma, “The Solo 2020 Election: Jokowi’s Dynasty begins?”, ISEAS Perspective 18, 2021,  /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-18-the-solo-2020-election-jokowis-dynasty-begins-by-a-harimurti-and-made-supriatma/ and Syafiq Hasyim, “Dynastic politics in Indonesia’s Tangerang Selatan Triumphs,” ISEAS Perspective 16, 2021, /articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/iseas-perspective-2021-16-dynastic-politics-in-indonesias-tangerang-selatan-triumphs-by-syafiq-hasyim/

[4] Ayesha Ali, “Do political dynasties hinder development?” in International Growth Centre, 3 July 2017, https://www.theigc.org/project/do-political-dynasties-hinder-development/ (accessed 8/3/2021).

[5] Chandra, Kanchan. “Hardly the end of dynastic rule.” Economic and Political Weekly (2014): 25-28.

[6] Deasy Simandjuntak, “Jokowi’s defeat in Sumatra and the future of religiously charged binary politics”, ISEAS Perspective 70, 2019, /wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_70.pdf

[7] Deasy Simandjuntak, “North Sumatra 2018 election: Identity politics ruled the day”, ISEAS Perspective 60, 2018,

/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_60@50.pdf

[8] “Ngamuk tak diberi rekomendasi, Akhyar Nasution dipecat Megawati sebagai kader PDIP” (“Upset for not getting a recommendation, Akhyar Nasution was dismissed by Megawati from being PDIP cadre”), Kompas TV, 27 August 2020, https://www.kompas.tv/article/104392/ngamuk-tak-diberi-rekomendasi-akhyar-nasution-dipecat-megawati-sebagai-kader-pdip (accessed 3/3/2021).

[9] “PDI Perjuangan pecat Akhyar Nasution” (“The Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle dismissed Akhyar Nasution”), CNN Indonesia, 9 August 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200809210723-32-533847/pdi-perjuangan-pecat-akhyar-nasution (accessed 3/3/2021).

[10] “Luka lama Mega-SBY dibongkar picu ketegangan Democrat & PDIP” (“Mega-SBY’s old wounds are opened  triggering tension between Democrat and PDIP”), CNN Indonesia, 18 February 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210218081407-32-607679/luka-lama-mega-sby-dibongkar-picu-ketegangan-demokrat-pdip (accessed 3/3/2021).

[11] “Menilik kekayaan Bobby Nasution, mantu Jokowi dan cawalkot Medan” (“Looking at Bobby’s wealth, son-in-law of Jokowi’s and Medan’s mayoral candidate”), Kompas, 27 September, https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/09/27/071200126/menilik-kekayaan-bobby-nasution-mantu-jokowi-dan-cawalkot-medan?page=all (accessed 5/3/2021).

[12] Aulia Adam, “Jejak bisnis Bobby Nasution, menantu President Jokowi” (“The business traces of Bobby Nasution, President Jokowi’s son-in-law”) Tirto,  8 December 2020, https://tirto.id/jejak-bisnis-bobby-nasution-menantu-presiden-jokowi-f7So (accessed 5/3/2021).

[13] Bobby’s family had lived in several cities. Bobby went to the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB) for his bachelor’s and master’s education. He has a house in Jakarta, as well as properties in Medan and Deli Serdang (North Sumatra).

[14] “Bobby Nasution: banyak yang bilang Bobby bukan orang Medan, tidak pernah tinggal di Medan” (“Bobby Nasution: many people say that Bobby is not a real Medan resident because I never reside in Medan”), Kompas, 16 February 2020, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/02/16/08034431/bobby-nasution-banyak-yang-bilang-bobby-bukan-orang-medan-tidak-pernah?page=all#page2 (accessed 4/3/2021).

[15] “Bobby Nasution – Aulia Rachman tawarkan reformasi birokrasi di kota Medan” (“Bobby Nasution – Aulia Rachman offer bureaucratic reforms in Medan city”) Sumutnews 22 November 2020, https://kumparan.com/sumutnews/bobby-nasution-aulia-rachman-tawarkan-reformasi-birokrasi-di-kota-medan-1udgy4vmid6/full (accessed 4/3/2021).

[16] Janji Akhyar vs Bobby di pilkada: sekolah gratis hingga Medan bebas korupsi” (“Akhyar’s vs Bobby’s promises in the mayoral election: free education to corruption-free Medan”) Detik, 21 October 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5222278/janji-akhyar-vs-bobby-di-pilkada-sekolah-gratis-hingga-medan-bebas-korupsi (accessed 4/3/2021).

[17] “Akhyar siapkan jurus menangkan pilkada Medan, ada pembiayaan Fardhu Kifayah” (“Akhyar prepares strategies to win the Medan election, there is budget for Fardhu Kifayah”) Tribunnews, 6 November 2020,  https://www.tribunnews.com/pilkada-2020/2020/11/06/akhyar-siapkan-jurus-menangkan-pilkada-medan-ada-pembiayaan-fardhu-kifayah?page=2 (accessed 4/3/2021).

[18] “Bobby: saya nggak bakal malu telpon menteri untuk masyarakat Medan” (“Bobby: I will not be shy to call Ministers for Medan residents”) Detik, 29 September 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5193305/bobby-saya-nggak-bakal-malu-telepon-menteri-untuk-masyarakat-medan (accessed 4/3/2021).

[19] Ibid.

[20] “Aman buat 9 komitment dengan Ustaz Somad di atas materai, begini isinya” (“Akhyar-Salman pledged 9 commitments with Preacher Somad on sealed document, this is the content” Sindonews, 7 December 2020, https://daerah.sindonews.com/read/259264/717/aman-buat-9-komitmen-dengan-ustaz-somad-di-atas-materai-begini-isinya-1607321535 (accessed 8/3/2021).

[21] “Bobby tak malu telepon Menteri dibalas kubu Akhyar baru belajar” (“Bobby is not shy to call ministers, Akhyar’s camp’s response: he’s still learning [to become politician]”) Detik, 1 October 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5196532/bobby-tak-malu-telepon-menteri-dibalas-kubu-akhyar-baru-belajar (accessed 5/3/2021)

[22] In the Medan election’s second round in 2010, the two pairs of contenders represented different ethno-religious identities. The first pair, Rahudman Harahap and Dzulmi Eldin, represented an all-Muslim ticket (Harahap is Muslim-Batak while Eldin is Muslim-Malay). Meanwhile, their contenders, Sofyan Tan and Nelly Armayanti, represented a mixed-ticket; Tan is a Chinese-Buddhist and Armayanti is Muslim. Identity-politics unsurprisingly ruled the day, with Muslim voters being mobilized to vote for candidates “of the same faith”.

[23] “Fahri Hamzah yakin mantu Jokowi bawa Medan ke level dunia” (“Fahri Hamzah is convinced Jokowi’s son-in-law brings Medan to the world level”) CNN Indonesia, 31 October 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201030235741-32-564299/fahri-hamzah-yakin-mantu-jokowi-bawa-medan-ke-level-dunia (accessed 9/3/2021).

[24] “Debat pilkada Medan, bencana banjir jadi amunisi menyerang” (“Medan mayoral election debate, flooding became ammunition to attack”) Bisnis Sumatra, 5 December 2021,  https://sumatra.bisnis.com/read/20201205/533/1326878/debat-pilkada-medan-bencana-banjir-jadi-amunisi-menyerang (accessed 5/3/2021).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Tasikmalaya previously gained national and international repute as an intolerant district where discrimination towards religious minorities had occurred sporadically, including during the pandemic.

• Although sectarian issues and identity politics surfaced in the early days of the 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya, they proved remarkably irrelevant in influencing voters.

• A key factor which dissipated the impact of identity politics in the Tasikmalaya election was the fact that all the four candidate teams claimed affiliation with the Nahdatul Ulama and/or other Muslim entities. Furthermore, religious leaders in Tasikmalaya urged contestants to refrain from provoking conflict on the basis of ethnicity or religion.

• Polarisation along sectarian lines was also mitigated by the broader context of the 2020 regional elections being contested by diverse political coalitions which were formed on the basis of local interests and pragmatic considerations instead of strict alignment with the political parties at the national level. This greatly helped to alleviate the Islamist-nationalist divide so often seen in Indonesian politics.

* Amin Mudzakkir is Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta. Ahmad Najib Burhani is Senior Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.

INTRODUCTION

Politics of identity and the politicisation of religion were dominant features in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, and also in the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta. Discussions on the potential use and abuse of religion as well as the polarization of Indonesian society in the 2020 simultaneous regional election have been common.

In Tasikmalaya, for example, sectarianism was lurking during the early days of the slotted campaign time. A big banner quoting the joint-ministerial decree on Ahmadiyya from 2008 was erected at the gate of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Badakpaeh, Cipakat, Singaparna, Tasikmalaya. The Ahmadiyya community owns the mosque. Rumours distributed through WhatsApp messages and social media said that Azies Rismaya Mahfud, the mayoral candidate from the Gerindra Party and Democrat Party coalition, was a Shi’a devotee, a member of a religious group considered deviant by some people in Indonesia.[1] The intention was unequivocal: it was to denigrate Azies and undermine his electability.

This attempt at identity politics, and the playing up of sectarian issues did not work in the Tasikmalaya election, however. How did that happen? And what does it imply for Indonesian democracy?

ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND SECTARIANISM IN TASIKMALAYA

Tasikmalaya is often associated with “Kota Santri” (Santri City or City of Pious People).[2] The idea to construct Tasikmalaya as a Santri City began at the end of the New Order when santri became a powerful force and santri-ness a strong identity for the district.[3] This designation is based on the religiosity of its population, the huge number of pesantren (Islamic boarding school) located there, and the strength of political Islam in that district. A majority of the population in Tasikmalaya are Muslims. Tasikmalaya is also famous for the number of big and old pesantren in that district,[4] i.e. at Cipasung, Sukahideng, Suryalaya, Riyadlul Ulum Wadda’wah Condong, Bahrul Ulum Awipari, Sukamanah, Baitul Hikmah Haur Kuning, and Cintawana.[5]

Tasikmalaya was the stronghold of the Masyumi Party, one of the strongest political parties under the Sukarno regime (1945-1965). When Kartosuwiryo led the rebellion, commonly known as DI/TII (Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia) under the banner of Islam between 1949 and 1962, Tasikmalaya was the bastion for his group.

After the Reformasi period in 1998, Tasikmalaya implemented various “sharia” regulations which were considered discriminatory towards minorities.[6] One of them was regulation No. 13/2001 on the strategic plan for Tasikmalaya Regency, “which is religious / Islamic”. Following this regulation, the local government issued circular No. 451/SE/Sos/2001 on “the effort to improve the quality of belief and piety” and Decree No 13/2003 451/Se/04/Sos/2001 on the requirement for enrolling elementary and middle schools to reflect the vision of the regency, which also focused on being “religious / Islamic”. Besides this regulation, Tasikmalaya witnessed several attacks against religious minorities by Muslim groups, especially towards the Ahmadiyya. In 2014, the Ahmadis were forced to sign a declaration that stated that they have to leave the Ahmadiyya if they wanted their marriage to be registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs.[7] Even during the pandemic, which was first announced by President Joko Widodo on 2 March 2020, discriminations towards minorities in this district did not show any sign of slowing down. A case to note is the effort of the local government to seal off Al-Aqso Mosque, which is owned by the Ahmadiyya community, in Badakpaeh, Cipakat, Singaparna on 6 April 2020.[8] The discriminatory regulations and attacks to religious minorities brought repute to the district, nationally and internationally, as an intolerant district.[9]

NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND THE 2020 REGIONAL ELECTION

The 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya saw four pairs of candidates running against each other: 1) Azies Rismaya Mahpud-Haris Sanjaya, 2) Ade Sugianto-Cecep Nurul Yakin, 3) Cep Zamzam Dzulfikar Nur-Padil Karsoma, and 4) Iwan Saputra-Iip Miftahul Faoz. Interestingly, all of them claimed to be representing the santri element of the Tasikmalaya population. More specifically, they claimed to represent the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).[10] Although direct election of heads of the Tasikmalaya regency government has been held since 2006, the 2020 election was the first to see all candidates claiming to represent NU.[11]

Although NU has a strong influence on society, its role in local politics had not been very visible and it had even seemed neglected in politics.[12] National developments after the 2019 presidential election appeared to have changed this situation. With the inclusion of several NU leaders in Joko Widodo’s administration, such as Ma’ruf Amin as the Vice President, many, including politicians in Tasikmalaya, identified or affiliated themselves with NU, expecting to win more support and more votes through it.

It is worth noting that the government’s decision to divide Tasikmalaya into Tasikmalaya City (Kota Tasikmalaya) and Tasikmalaya Regency (Kabupaten Tasikmalaya) in 2001 provided a platform for the NU to gain more influence in the government. In urban areas, the influence of the NU is limited or obscure. Modernist religious organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and the Islamic Union (Persis) are stronger and more dominant than the NU in urban areas. These two organizations have several schools and pesantren in the city. In the regency areas, NU is indeed more dominant.

Large Islamic boarding schools located in the district are commonly affiliated with the NU. Among them are Cipasung, Sukahideung, Sukamanah and Haurkuning. Even Miftahul Huda pesantren, which was initially somewhat distant to NU because of the connection between its founder, Choer Affandi, and the Darul Islam (DI) movement, is now moving closer to NU.[13] Moreover, after the banning of Hizbut Tahrir (HTI) and the Front of Islamic Defenders (FPI), the role of the NU as the holder of religious authority in Tasikmalaya Regency seems definite, with almost no contender to challenge its position.

Below is stated the background of the four pairs of candidates and how they affiliate themselves with the NU. Azies Rismaya Mahfud is a son of Haji Mahfud – better known as Haji Engkud – (died 2010), the founder of the Mayasari group, a company that originally focused on public transportation in Jakarta (Mayasari, Primajasa, Doa Ibu) but has now expanded into other fields including property and retail.[14] Together with his four siblings – Agus Mahfud, Ade Ruhyana Mahfud, Amir Mahfud, and Rahmi Mahfud – Azies controls the businesses of their parents.[15] In addition, they also manage the Al-Muttaqin educational institution, an elite school in the city of Tasikmalaya. Haji Mahfud, as a native of Tasikmalaya, tried his luck in Jakarta since the era of Governor Ali Sadikin in the 1960s. He has since become a successful businessman.

Apart from doing business, Haji Mahfud and his children, including Azies, were active in the Islamic movement, and in political parties. In the past, Haji Mahfud was a member of the Islamic Ummah Association (PUI), but his children, while becoming activists in Islamic Students Associations (HMI), became close to a Shi’ite group (IJABI).[16] In terms of political parties, Haji Mahfud’s family is very dynamic. Initially, they supported the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), then the National Mandate Party (PAN), then the Islamic Union Party (PPP) and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) to an extent, but lately, they have been seen to be actively associately with Gerindra Party. In the 2020 Tasikmalaya election, Azies was formally registered as the candidate for Gerindra Party and the Democrat Party.

Azies’ running mate, Haris Sanjaya, is an NU activist, and was in fact the chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Student Association (IPNU) in Tasikmalaya Regency. In addition to the IPNU, he was also active in Ansor, NU’s Youth wing, and a member of the National Awakening Party (PKB). He was general chairman of PKB Tasikmalaya Regency for two periods and a member of parliament for Tasikmalaya. But since his party, the PKB, decided to support other candidates in the elections, Sanjaya moved to join Azies. One of the significant meanings of this partnership between Azies and Sanjaya was that it relieved Azies of the sectarian issue. Azies, who was associated with the Shi’a denomination, was no longer attacked on that issue after his appointment of Sanjaya as his running mate.[17]

The second candidate, Ade Sugianto is a politician from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). At 23, he served as chairman for the parliament in Tasikmalaya Regency (1999-2004). He then became deputy regent and subsequently replaced Uu Ruzhanul Ulum as the regent of Tasikmalaya. That happened after Ulum became deputy governor of West Java. Ade studied Archeology at Gadjah Mada University but did not finish his undergraduate programme.

Knowing that Tasikmalaya is “Kota Santri”, Ade asked Cecep Nurul Yakin to be his running mate in the 2020 election.[18] Cecep is the chairman of PPP for Tasikmalaya Regency. He is a son of the late Adang Mukarom, a prominent ulama, and a grandson of the late Abdulloh Muslim of Khoirul Huda Islamic Boarding School, Pancatengah. His father and grandfather were well-known as students of Mama Ruhiyat Bantargedang, a sufi guru, who died in Mecca in the early 20^th century. Cecep is also active in the NU as the chairman of Pagar Nusa, a martial art group, of Tasikmalaya.

The third candidate, Cep Zamzam Zulfikar Nur, was running as an individual candidate and did not use any political party as his vehicle. Before that, he was a civil servant in the Local Government Office of Tasikmalaya. He is a son of the late Asep Moch. Saefullah of pesantren Nurul Wafa, Sukarame, Tasikamalaya, who is a teacher of Tatang Farhanul Hakim (former Regent of Tasikmalaya). Tatang was the man behind Cep Zamzam’s candidacy. It was also Tatang who mobilized community support for Cep Zamzam, and helped Cep Zamzam to complete the administrative requirement of having a certain number of ID cards in order to pass the process of individual candidacy. Besides Tatang, Cep Zamzam also received much show of support from the alliance of young ulama of the NU, named the Alliance of Ajengan Anom (Asparanom).[19]

To accompany Cep Zamzam in the election, Tatang asked Padil Karsona, a senior bureaucrat from Cikalong, Tasikmalaya, who had had a long career in Purwakarta, to become his running mate. Padil’s last appointment in the government’s office was as Regional Secretary of Purwakarta Regency. He actually ran for the regency in Purwakarta in 2018, but failed. Cep Zamzam and Padil were the first pair running independently, without political party, in Tasikmalaya.

The fourth candidate, Iwan Saputra, is a bureaucrat and son of Lieutenant Colonel Basuni (former military commander in the district of Tasikmalaya, Chairman of the Tasikmalaya parliament, and Chairman of the Golkar Party).[20] Iwan’s last bureaucratic appointment was as Head of Bappeda (Agency for Regional Development) of Tasikmalaya Regency. Iwan’s main supporters, therefore, came from Golkar circles, army children (FKPPI), and certain pesantrens, such as Pesantren Suryalaya and Pesantren Idrisiyah, the two largest tarekat pesantrens in Tasikmalaya. These two pesantren were affiliated with Golkar Party during the New Order.

Being aware that he was not closely affiliated with the NU and did not have a strong religious background, Iwan took Iip Miftah Faoz as his running mate. Iip is a son of the late Saefuddin Zuhri of Haurkuning Islamic Boarding School, one of the largest NU Islamic boarding schools in southern ​​Tasikmalaya. Iip himself is also an alumnus of the Sukahideng Islamic boarding school and was active in various pesantren-based NGOs, as well as in the Ansor of Tasikmalaya Regency. In addition, he was also coordinator of village assistants for the Ministry of Villages in West Java for several years. This pair was registered as a candidate from PKB, Golkar, PKS, PAN and Nasdem.

Since all candidates claimed to be associated with NU, sectarian issues did not arise during the campaigning period.[21] What happened instead was mutual-claim and internal competition within the NU, and they did not attack each other with sectarian issues. The three candidates for deputy regents, namely Cecep, Haris, and Iip, even showed their friendly relationship in a photo taken during their participation in the Madrasah Kader NU, 7 November 2020. During a debate held by the Tasikmalaya Election Commission, a vice regent candidate, Iip Miftahul Faoz, said loudly that using the term “Islamic” was not really important in public statements.[22] This was put forward in response to another candidate for vice regent, Cecep Nurul Yakin, who asked him why he did not include the words “religious / Islamic”, referring to the Sharia By-Law No 13/2001, in their vision and mission statements.

During the campaign, the candidates avoided specific and distinctive issues. The incumbent promised to continue with the existing development, while the challengers contested that development in Tasikmalaya Regency was lagging behind. It was only Iwan-Iip who raised an alternative policy. If elected, they promised to issue a card, named Peduli Umat Melayani Rakyat (PUMR) or “Caring (Muslim) Community and Serving People”, to be used to strengthen the welfare of people, especially Muslims.[23] Paying special attention to the Muslim community was seen as an important factor; the 2020 regional election in Tasikmalaya Regency was basically a struggle to win the vote of santri (pious Muslims).[24]

The regional elections was held on 9 December 2020. Nothing unique happened except when the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI), led by Denny JA, announced in the afternoon, the result of their quick count. The quick count showed that Iwan-Iip had won with 33.99% of the votes, followed by the incumbent Ade-Cecep with 31.29%, Azis-Haris with 23.14%, and finally Cep Zamzam-Padil with 11.58%. The LSI itself is a political consultant for the Ade-Cecep pair. After the quick count was released, Iwan-Iip immediately claimed victory.[25]

However, on 16 December 2020, the Indonesian Commission of Election of Tasikmalaya Regency (KPUD) announced a different result from the LSI quick count.[26] Ade-Cecep won over Iwan-Iip. Ade-Cecep had received 32.18% of the votes, while Iwan-Iip had won only 31.47%. This decision of the KPUD generated controversy, and Iwan Saputra and his deputy filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court for alleging systematic fraud committed by Ade Sugianto.

Until today, the Constitutional Court has as yet not issued any decision regarding the winner(s) of the election in Tasikmalaya.

CONCLUSION

The rise in NU’s role in Tasikmalaya has resulted in them having strong influence in the local political contest. The question why identity politics failed to determine the 2020 Tasikmalaya election can be answered from this point of view. The fact that all four pairs of candidates claimed to represent NU aided in promoting pluralism, making identity-based attacks arguably less successful. Azies Rismaya, who was initially accused as a member of a deviant religious group, was no longer attacked for it after he decided to partner with Haris Sanjaya, an NU leader. The accusation disappeared by itself.

What happened during the election was mainly competition among NU people. Fortunately, NU leaders in Tasikmalaya were well-prepared and responded wisely to the potential use of identity politics among NU candidates. Atam Rustam, the local chairman of the NU, announced that the board of the NU did not provide any recommendation to vote for a certain candidate. More important than that, Atam asked voters not to be provoked by the issue of SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group). This announcement was not only written in a circular letter, but also video-recorded and widely circulated to the public. This announcement was very effective in mitigating the use or the abuse of sectarian issues and identity politics.[27]

In other words, the role of Islamic organizations, in this case; NU of Tasikmalaya Regency, was to ensure that the issue of identity politics was not used and abused during the elections. The role of civil Islam in balancing democracy cannot be underestimated. The absence of identity politics in the 2020 Tasikmalaya election evidently reflected this aspect.

Besides the role of NU local leaders in limiting the use of sectarian issues, the context behind the 2020 regional elections could have also contributed to the absence of identity politics. Simultaneous elections took place in many parts of Indonesia. There were 270 regions across the country covering nine provinces, 224 regencies and 37 municipalities which held election that same day, 9 December 2020. The division between Islamist party and nationalist party collapsed in this election. PKS and the PDIP, previously seen as water and oil, were allied in 13 regional elections.[28] In Tasikmalaya, PKB, PKS, PAN, Golkar and Nasdem were allied in support of Iwan-Iip.

The blurring division, coalition, and alliance among political parties made it difficult to have a single national issue to define them and contrast them from other parties. They could not orchestrate a single theme in all the regions. Therefore, it was not surprising that there was no polarisation during this election.

The last factor that contributed to the absence of identity politics was the banning of the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir (HTI).[29] This organisation had been the brain behind the rise of identity politics and the implementation of Islamic Sharia in several districts, and was the mastermind behind various demonstrations and rallies, including the 212 movement that demanded the government to give a dominant role to Islam and to discriminate against non-Muslims. With the banning of the HTI in 2017, no other organization has appeared which is active, capable and systematic enough to promote identity politics in elections. There was, of course, the Front of Islamic Defenders (FPI), a loyal partner of the HTI. The supreme leader of the FPI, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, returned from self-exile in Saudi Arabia on 10 November 2020. However, without the help of the HTI, Shihab seemed unable to consolidate his supporters to activate identity politics during the regional elections. The government had continuously tried to restrict the activities of the FPI and finally banned it not long after the regional elections, on 30 December 2020.[30]

ISEAS Perspective 2021/45, 16 April 2021

ENDNOTES

[1]  “Azies Klarifikasi Tuduhan Dirinya Syiah, di Masjid As-Siraj wal Arsyad”, kapol.id, 14 June 2020, https://kapol.id/azies-klarifikasi-tuduhan-dirinya-syiah-di-masjid-as-siraj-wal-arsyad (accessed 4 March 2021).

[2] For a discussion on the concept of santri, see: Burhani, Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Geertz’s Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi: Controversy and Continuity”, Journal of Indonesian Islam, 11 (2/2017): 329-50. For Tasikmalaya as “Kota Santri”, see: Amin Mudzakkir, “Perseteruan Memori Kolektif: Kontestasi Islam dan Politik di Tasikmalayaa Pasca-Orde Baru”, Dinika: Academic Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 4 (3/2019): 399-412.

[3] It began after the 1996 riot, when some people vandalized the properties of Chinese and attacked houses of worship of non-Muslim minorities. See Mudzakkir (2019).

[4] Of the 1.8 million in Tasikmalaya Regency, only 593 were non-Muslims. See Kabupaten Tasikmalaya dalam Angka 2021. Tasikmalaya: BPS – Statistics of Tasikmalaya Regency, 2021, p. 152.

[5] “10 Pondok Pesantren Besar Di Tasikmalaya”, nu-kotatasikmalaya.id, 25 Sep 2020. https://nu-kotatasikmalaya.id/10-pondok-pesantren-besar-di-tasikmalaya (accessed 4 March 2021)

[6] For more detail, see Amin Mudzakkir, “Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmaya”, Harmoni, Vol. 16 (1/2017): 57-74; Also, Amin Mudzakkir, “Dilema Kota Santri: Politik kewarganegaraan di Tasikmalaya Pasca-Soeharto”, Presented at the 7^th International Symposium of Journal Antropologi Indonesia, 23-26 July 2019. https://simposiumjai.ui.ac.id/download/9-10-kota-santri-dillema-the-politics-of-citizenship-in-post-soeharto-tasikmalaya

[7] Laporan Kebebasan Beragama / Berkeyakinan dan Intoleransi 2014 (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2014), p. 53.

[8] “Upaya Penyegelan Masjid Ahmadiyah di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya Tuai Penolakan”, pikiranrakyat.com, 7 April 2020. https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/jawa-barat/pr-01362265/upaya-penyegelan-masjid-ahmadiyah-di-kabupaten-tasikmalaya-tuai-penolakan (accessed 4 March 2021).

[9] Jessica Soedirgo, (2018) “Informal networks and religious intolerance: how clientelism incentivizes the discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, Citizenship Studies, 22 (2/2018): 191-207.

[10] For Haris Sanjaya, Cecep Nurul Yakin, and Iip Miftahul Faoz, see “3 Kader NU Bertarung di Pilkada Tasikmalaya, Ini Sikap PCNU”, jabar.nu.or.id, 24 Sep 2020, https://jabar.nu.or.id/detail/3-kader-nu-bertarung-di-pilkada-tasikmalaya–ini-sikap-pcnu (accessed 12 March 2020); For Cep Zamzam Dzulfikar Nur, see “Kiai Muda Siap Dukung Cep Zamzam,” radartasikmalaya.com, 23 Sep 2019, https://www.radartasikmalaya.com/kiai-muda-siap-dukung-cep-zamzam (accessed 12 March 2021)

[11] Since 2006, the Regency of Tasikmalaya had held local elections three times. In 2006, Tatang Farhanul Hakim was elected regent. In 2011, Uu Ruzhanul Ulum was elected to succeed Tatang Farhanul Hakim. In 2016, Uu Ruzhanul Ulum was elected for the second time as regent. Candidate’s association with the NU, although weakly, appeared in all those three elections. In 2020, being part of the NU was believed to be a key to success and, therefore, all the candidates claimed to be part of the NU. For 2006 election, see “Tasikmalaya Gelar Pilkada, 4 Pasangan Bertarung”, detik.com, 7 Jan 2006, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-514433/tasikmalaya-gelar-pilkada-4-pasangan-bertarung; For 2011 election, see “KPU Tetapkan Pasangan ‘Huda’ Menangkan Pilkada Tasikmalaya’, antara.com, 15 Jan 2011, https://jabar.antaranews.com/berita/29844/kpu-tetapkan-pasangan-huda-menang-pilkada-tasikmalaya; For 2016 election, see “Molor Sebulan, Calon Tunggal Bupati Tasikmalaya Ditetapkan”, tempo.co, 11 Jan 2016, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/737591/molor-sebulan-calon-tunggal-bupati-tasikmalaya-ditetapkan (accessed 13 March 2021)

[12] On the political maps in Tasikmalaya, between the city of Tasikmalaya and the Regency of Tasikmalaya, see Amin Mudzakkir, “Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmaya”, Harmoni, Vol. 16 (1/2017): 57-74.

[13] Choer Affandi is the founder of the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school, one of the largest Islamic boarding schools in Tasikmalaya and even West Java. Before founding the pesantren in 1967, he was well known as a Darul Islam influential figure. See Amin Mudzakkir, “Konservatisme Islam dan Intoleransi Keagamaan di Tasikmaya”, Harmoni, Vol. 16 (1/2017): 57-74; Amin Mudzakkir, “Mobilisasi Islam dan Politik di Jawa Barat: Sebelum dan Sesudah Rangkaian Aksi 212” in Cahyo Pamungkas and Yogi Setya Permana (eds.), Intoleransi dan Politik Identitas Kontemporer di Indonesia (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2020), pp. 173-196.

[14] “Sekilas Tentang Sosok Seorang H. Azies Rismaya Mahpud”, rakyatmerdekanews.com, n.d., https://rakyatmerdekanews.com/2020/07/12/sekilas-tentang-sosok-seorang-h-azies-rismaya-mahpud (accessed 4 March 2021)

[15] “Azies Rismaya Jadi Cabup Tasikmalaya Paling Tajir”, detik.news.com, 25 Sep 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-barat/d-5188076/azies-rismaya-jadi-cabup-tasikmalaya-paling-tajir (accessed 4 March 2021)

[16] Interview with Nurjani, a local journalist, in Tasikmalaya, 26 Nov 2019.

[17] “Azis Minta Restu NU untuk Maju sebagai Cabup Tasikmalaya”, koropak.co.id, 8 Feb 2020. https://news.koropak.co.id/11548/azis-minta-restu-nu-untuk-maju-sebagai-cabup-tasikmalaya (accessed 4 March 2021)

[18] “Berangkat dari Keluarga Pondok Pesantren, Berikut Profil H Cecep Nurul Yakin, Calon Wakil Bupati Nomor Urut 2”, kamarang.com, 9 october 2020. https://www.kamarang.com/berangkat-dari-keluarga-pondok-pesantren-berikut-profil-h-cecep-nurul-yakin-calon-wakil-bupati-nomor-urut-2 (accessed 4 March 2021)

[19] “Kiai Muda Siap Dukung Cep Zamzam”, radartasikmalaya.com, 23 Sep 2019. https://www.radartasikmalaya.com/kiai-muda-siap-dukung-cep-zamzam (accessed 4 March 2021)

[20] “Mengenal Sosok Bakal Calon Bupati Tasikmalaya Iwan Saputra”, sakata.id, 21 Sep 2020. https://sakata.id/sosok/mengenal-sosok-bakal-calon-bupati-tasikmalaya-iwan-saputra (accessed 4 March 2021)

[21] Yang muncul justru adalah politik uang sebagaimana dikemukakan oleh badan pengawas pemilihan umum (bawaslu) setempat. Lihat, https://tirto.id/pilkada-tasikmalaya-2020-bawaslu-temukan-dugaan-politik-uang-f7W5 (accesed 16 Maret 2021)

[22] See “Pilkada Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, Debat dengan Cecep, Iip: Jargon Islami Tidak Terlalu Penting”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrTaVSs_90M (accessed 13/3/2021)

[23] “Inilah Janji Politik Cawabup Iip untuk Masyarakat Kabupaten Tasikmalaya”,  https://literasinews.pikiran-rakyat.com/politik/pr-92860870/inilah-janji-politik-cawabup-iip-untuk-masyarakat-kabupaten-tasikmalaya (accesed 19/03/2020)

[24] “Ceruk Suara Santri di Pilkada Tasikmalaya”, https://koran.tempo.co/read/nasional/459855/ceruk-suara-santri-di-pemilihan-bupati-tasikmalaya

[25] “Iwan-Iip Menang di Pilbup Tasikmalaya Versi QC LSI Denny JA”, detik.com, 9 Dec 2020. https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-barat/d-5288777/iwan-iip-menang-di-pilbup-tasikmalaya-versi-qc-lsi-denny-ja (accessed 4 March 2021)

[26] “Quick Count LSI Denny JA di Pilkada Tasikmalaya Meleset, Akademisi: LSI Harus Jelaskan ke Publik”, kompas.com, 17 Dec 2020. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/17/13223551/quick-count-lsi-denny-ja-di-pilkada-tasikmalaya-meleset-akademisi-lsi-harus (accessed 4 March 2021)

[27] “Maklumat PCNU Kab. Tasikmalaya Terkait Pilkada Kabupaten Tasikmalaya”, 20 Oct 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTeOwdmsCcs (accessed 4 March 2020)

[28] “Bersatu di 13 Pilkada PDIP-PKS Ternyata Bukan Minyak dan Air”, rm.id, 30 August 2020. https://rm.id/baca-berita/pilkada/45854/bersatu-di-13-pilkada-pdippks-ternyata-bukan-minyak-dan-air (accessed 4 March 2021)

[29] Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The Banning of Hizbut Tahrir and the Consolidation of Democracy in Indonesia”, ISEAS Perspective, 19 September 2017. /images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_71.pdf

[30] Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Will the Banning of the FPI Thwart Radicalism?”, ISEAS Commentary, 5 January 2021. https://fulcrum.sg/will-the-banning-of-the-fpi-thwart-radicalism