ISEAS Perspective 2021/12 “Populations, Precarity and Pandemics: The Demographics of Inequality and Covid-19 in Southeast Asia” by Kevin S.Y. Tan and Grace Lim
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The recent resurgence of Covid-19 infections in Thailand and Malaysia among low-income migrant communities suggests a connection between the spread of the disease and the harsher conditions experienced by those living in relative poverty and who are socially marginal.
- Unfortunately, labour migrants are often scapegoated as the cause of growing Covid-19 infections.
- Southeast Asia is highly interconnected through complex and large-scale migration between and within countries. This has contributed to the emergence of the “precariat”, such as low-income migrant workers, a growing class of disadvantaged persons who are underemployed and are highly vulnerable during socio-economic and health crises.
- Efforts to combat the ongoing pandemic need to recognize the relationship between socio-economic inequality within populations and the resurgence and resilience of Covid-19 infection rates.
- The relationship between socio-economic inequality and the rate of infection is suggested when Indonesia and the Philippines, two countries with the greatest numbers of those living in poverty, also have the highest numbers of Covid-19 infections in Southeast Asia.
- Such linkages are further reflected when comparisons are made between the Gini Coefficient scores of countries in Southeast Asia and their accumulated Covid-19 infection numbers.
- Proactive policies should be formulated to combat the Covid-19 pandemic on top of ongoing reactive policies involving lockdowns, quarantine, testing, social distancing, contact tracing and vaccinations. Other than those in poverty, low-income migrant workers should be given priority access to voluntary free vaccination and subsidized healthcare; improved living conditions and greater social support in minimizing their marginality.
* Kevin S.Y. Tan is Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Adjunct Faculty at the School of Global Studies, Thammasat University; and Grace Lim is Intern with the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Cluster at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
After more than half a year of apparent success at controlling Covid-19 infections, Thailand registered a shocking spike in numbers in the second half of December 2020. The first batch of infections emerged in the province of Samut Sakhon, just southwest of Bangkok, at a major shrimp market when up to 1,300 persons[1] were detected with the feared coronavirus in a matter of days. And after barely two weeks, infections were seen in up to 33 provinces throughout Thailand. Although four provinces[2] including Samut Sakhon were placed on regional lockdown, this was unable to slow the spread of Covid-19. By the first week of 2021, 28 provinces throughout the country were declared ‘red zones’[3] and subjected to lockdown measures in varying degrees of severity. Going into the second half of January 2021, daily infections were numbering more than 200.[4] The Thai government, however, has resisted calls to impose blanket lockdowns nationwide, so far placing only 6 provinces under provincial lockdown.[5] By the start of February 2021, the 7-day average of infections number was more than 850, with the majority of cases found in Samut Sakhon through what the authorities have referred to as ‘active testing’.[6]
Seeking possible explanations behind the new wave of infections since December 2020, the Thai government has directed responsibility for the outbreaks on illegal immigration,[7] since a high proportion of the initially infected in Samut Sakhon were low-income migrant workers from Myanmar.[8] Such statements, unfortunately, have oversimplified the situation and fueled local hostility and suspicion[9] against the Myanmarese migrant worker community in Thailand. The outbreak in Samut Sakhon further served to exacerbate earlier fears regarding a resurgence of infections when several Thai women illegally traversed the border[10] between Myanmar and Thailand just a few weeks earlier. Ironically, these developments came in the wake of increasing global accolades[11] about how successful Thailand had been able to hold off the pandemic for most of 2020. Unfortunately, anticipation towards a year-end recovery of the local economy has been dashed, crushing faint hopes of tourism reviving in the coming months.
The sudden resurgence of Covid-19 infections in recent months has not been restricted to Thailand. The situation in neighbouring Malaysia, for example, has spiraled towards an ever more serious level. Although Malaysia had been similarly congratulated[12] for keeping the spread of Covid-19 infections to less than 10 persons in August 2020, the situation unfortunately turned for the worse when state elections in Sabah were held on 26 September, just barely a month later. Political campaigning had already occurred for two weeks prior and by the time the elections were over, a noticeable surge in Covid-19 infections[13] was apparent because of large-scale intermingling during rallies and other public events. This eventually led to more than 86,000 infections by mid-December,[14] where daily infections reached more than 1,000 a day. At the time of writing, infections in Malaysia have not abated for more than four months, surging at higher rates than before. In fact, the country recorded an all-time daily high of more than 2,500 cases[15] on 31 December 2020, New Year’s Eve. On 12 January, the Malaysian King declared a nationwide State of Emergency[16] after daily cases exceeded more than 3,000[17] just a few days earlier. This would be the first time in more than 50 years that an emergency has been declared in the country, leading to concerns about Malaysia’s political future[18]. In spite of such efforts, daily infections by the end January 2021 have gone beyond 5000[19].
The ongoing pandemic scenarios in Thailand and Malaysia reflect the numerous difficulties that many countries around the world face, including those in Southeast Asia. Probably the most frustrating aspect of dealing with Covid-19 is its ability to return in far greater numbers compared to earlier waves. Such fears appear to have been validated in several countries[20] in conjunction with year-end seasonal changes in 2020. For policy-makers and researchers, this certainly begs the question: Why has this been the case? Naturally, the answer to such a complex problem is multifaceted and many explanations have been proposed, but a key component to understanding and perhaps preventing future recurring waves lies in adopting a demographic perspective.
Just how bad has the pandemic been for the region? As of 29 January 2021, recorded Covid-19 cases within Southeast Asia were nearing 2 million,[21] and rising daily (Figure 1). Although the pandemic has been better contained in Southeast Asia in comparison with societies such as the United States or the United Kingdom, it has highlighted the potential vulnerabilities in the region. The economic fallout from the lockdowns has been felt throughout all countries in Southeast Asia, with its combined total population of around 650 million. This is reflected in an overall GDP contraction of 4.2% for 2020 for the region.[22] Consequently, the informal sector that involves 75.2% of Southeast Asia’s population[23] in manufacturing, construction and tourism, has been the hardest hit, driving millions of workers to face the bleak prospect of losing their jobs amid rising inflation.
Figure 1. Breakdown of Covid-19 coronavirus infections (as of 29 January 2021)
(Source: https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0)
This article’s fundamental argument is that inherent social-economic inequalities within and between countries are key factors in contributing to recurring waves of Covid-19 coronavirus infections.[24] These factors are as equally important as other considerations, such as the role of governance and the management of pandemics within populations. This is because the capacity for countries to either eradicate or minimize infections depends on them adopting proactive policies alongside ongoing reactive policies that involve all the familiar strategies of repetitive lockdowns, quarantine protocols, widespread testing, social distancing, contact tracing and finally, the search for medical cures and vaccines. One way to do so is to recognize that a recurring theme with Covid-19 is that cases tend to originate among socially and economically marginal communities[25] in their respective countries. This is a crucial observation, as it will enable governments to enact proactive policies for these communities in three broad and intersecting dimensions—the economic, the social and the environmental. The economic involves voluntary access to free vaccines before outbreaks and subsidized healthcare; the social aims at minimizing communal marginalization of the disadvantaged; and the environmental involves improving living conditions and slowing the spread of disease.
While ongoing narratives and observations regarding Covid-19’s devastation have rightfully highlighted the negative consequences of the pandemic, greater demographic awareness regarding continuing social, economic and environmental conditions that contribute to the pandemic’s apparent resilience is equally necessary. In other words, understanding the current pandemic though demographic lenses should not be simply restricted to examining statistical fluctuations of fertility, mortality and life expectancy, fundamental as they are to the discipline. They can and should be augmented by a nuanced and interdisciplinary analysis of ongoing inequalities and diversities,[26] which often run within and between populations in the form of transnational and internal migration. More specifically, labour migration within ASEAN countries accounts for at least 7 million documented persons, and they are an integral part of the region’s economic development, where a majority are low-skilled and low-income migrants who often lack sufficient labour rights protection or legal status.[27] It follows intuitively, then, that demographic attempts to address the pandemic should also adopt a regional perspective[28] that views Southeast Asia as a single complex geopolitical entity.
In the case of Malaysia, one of the major sites of resurgent infections were in dormitories that housed low-income migrant workers of Top Glove,[29] a major manufacturer of up to a quarter of the world’s medical latex gloves. A vast majority of the Covid-19 cases emerged amidst crowded living spaces that were judged to be deplorable.[30] Nevertheless, the Top Glove case is only one example out of a broader category of what the Malaysian authorities have labeled euphemistically as ‘workplace clusters’,[31 sidetracking how such clusters are also sites of low-income employment involving a high percentage of migrant workers, who are often scapegoated[32] for the rise in infections. Concurrently, it is also interesting to recall that the new wave of infections from December 2020 in Thailand first emerged in Samut Sakhon, a province well known for its high concentration of low-income migrant workers from Myanmar, now numbering approximately 400,000 persons, with many locals even referring to the province as ‘Little Myanmar’.[33] Interestingly, such scenarios mirror what Singapore had previously struggled with for most of the previous year, when a high percentage of its Covid-19 infections[34] were also located among its foreign worker dormitories. It is important to realize that such parallels are not simply coincidences, but also revealing of a demographic reality with real consequences.[35]
These cases in different countries suggest a close relationship between low-income migrant communities and the spread of disease. They are a reflection of how social and economic inequality within societies, along with environmental constraints, often translates into a sense of precarity, giving rise to a class of persons that scholars have described as the ‘precariat’.[36] The term is a portmanteau of the words ‘precarious’ and ‘proletariat’, referring to a social class of persons who are often ‘underemployed’ as opposed to being ‘unemployed’. Apart from low-income migrant workers resulting from “low-end globalization” and involved in “3D” (Dirty, Dangerous and Demeaning) occupations, they are part of a larger population of persons who live in relative poverty, often housed under crowded conditions that have poorer standards of sanitation. This further suggests that it may not have been entirely unexpected that the Malaysian resurgence of Covid-19 infections first emerged in Sabah, which also happened to be the country’s poorest state with a poverty rate of 19.5 percent[37] along with significant numbers of undocumented low-income migrant workers.
Thailand and Malaysia are also the two most popular destinations[38] for low-income migrant workers within Southeast Asia. Drawing from statistics in the ASEAN International Labour Migration Statistics (ILMS) data-base,[39] both countries now have at least more than two and a half million employed migrants from the ASEAN region or beyond; and this is only taking into account the number of documented migrants. In reality, the combined numbers are likely far greater, as noted within reports on both countries regarding illegal and unskilled migrant workers.[40] It has also been estimated that Thailand alone has up to 5 million[41] migrant workers.
The close relationship between precarity and pandemics is further reflected when the two countries in Southeast Asia with the greatest number of Covod-19 infections as of 29 January 2021 – Indonesia (1,051,795 cases) and the Philippines (521,413 cases) – are concurrently the same countries with the numerically largest populations living under their respective poverty lines (Figure 2). Reports prior to the current pandemic had already observed that up to 90% of Southeast Asia’s poorest are living in Indonesia or the Philippines.[42] Despite the fact that extreme poverty has fallen across the region[43] in recent years, the situation is just as severe when their combined total of Covid-19 infections, to date, make up more than three-quarters of the accumulated total for the region.
FIGURE 2. Comparisons of population in poverty with cases of Covid-19 coronavirus
Source: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poverty-rate-by-country
The association between precarity and Covid-19 is also supported when we examine the relationship between the accumulated number of Covid-19 cases to date, and the countries’ respective Gini coefficient scores according to the World Bank. Based on Figure 3, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines have the highest number of accumulated infections in the region along with their relatively higher Gini scores. The exceptions to this association appear to be Cambodia and Laos. One possible demographic explanation is that both Laos and Cambodia have the two youngest populations in Southeast Asia.[44] At the same time, insufficient testing in Cambodia[45] and Laos[46] may have obscured their real rates of infection.
Although these interpretations are limited by differences in how various countries calculate their Gini coefficient scores, the apparent correlation cannot be ignored. This is once more suggestive of how inequality within countries may be a partial indicator of their vulnerability to pandemics. The close relationship between precarity within populations and pandemics is even more marked when recent research[47] in the area of Vitamin D deficiency suggests that it can affect the severity of Covid-19 infections. This is not a unique revelation, as researchers have noted for some time an association between social-economic precarity and the relative deficiency of Vitamin D.[48]
FIGURE 3. Approximate comparison of Covid-19 cumulative cases with Gini coefficient scores of ASEAN countries given by World Bank using Tableau software (Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI). Note: Information on Singapore and Brunei are not available from source
Admittedly, studying the relationship between the demographic characteristics of populations and pandemics[49] is not particularly new. This overlaps with the broader intellectual legacy of Malthusian concerns regarding overpopulation. Similar to the dangers of climate change, warnings from demographers, epidemiologists and other population scholars have always noted the close relationship between rapid population growth and disease,[50] particularly under crowded and impoverished conditions. Nevertheless, over the years, such insights have not always been given the proper consideration that they deserve from policymakers. On hindsight, and perhaps unfortunately, this reflects the often-one-sided relationship between scholars and governments,[51] where the former’s work is subject to the agendas and political contingencies of the latter.
Perhaps an incentive for policymakers to pay more attention to those in precarity within their respective societies lies in the additional observations of how the current pandemic tends to exacerbate pre-existing demographic trends. This is where ageing societies appear to age even faster,[52] and how less developed societies may be delayed from progressing along the stages of demographic transition because of accelerated fertility rates due to the current pandemic. The latter trend has been observed in the cases of Indonesia[53] and the Philippines,[54] where the pandemic has further raised birth rates partly due to poorer access to birth control measures. On the other hand, societies that have been ageing fastest in the region such as Singapore,[55] Vietnam[56] and Thailand[57] appear to be ageing at unprecedented rates. The potential economic challenges resulting from these demographic shifts should provide more impetus to stem the disease among precariat communities.
So, what next? The first important step is to translate such insights into action. With the advent of several vaccines that are already being employed in various stages throughout the world, there is now a cautious but renewed sense of hope that perhaps the “old normal” may return. The policies surrounding the implementation of the vaccines often take into account what they deem as “priority groups”, and they rightfully refer to front-line medical staff who have been instrumental in combating and containing the spread of infections. This is often followed by prioritization based on age-group and health-status, suggesting that the elderly and those with compromised or pre-existing health conditions should be next in line.
Such strategies are not necessarily universal. Taking a different approach, Indonesia[58] has prioritized working adults within the age range of 18-59, which partly reflects an economy-centric rationale, and this is seemingly justified by their use of a Chinese-made vaccine where clinical trials had focused on this age group. However, it is unfortunate that low-income migrant communities and those in poverty are not intuitively considered vulnerable. Perhaps policymakers should at least begin categorizing them as a “priority group”. This is because better control of future outbreaks can be ensured if these groups are given adequate attention and support. Economy-centric strategies are, at best, short to mid-term measures that sidestep the crux of the issue. Combating pandemics should be understood in terms of the “long-game”, not unlike efforts addressing the problems of climate change. Ignoring efforts at administering vaccinations among populations in precarity and rejecting a dedicated approach to improve their living conditions would only stagnate ground-up proactive efforts at containing or minimizing future pandemics.
This preliminary examination of the relationship between demographic inequality and the apparent resilience of the Covid-19 coronavirus suggests that policymakers need to work on reducing the social and economic gap within their populations in order to minimize the conditions that can lead to resurgences in infections. Combating pandemics should take into consideration not only the citizenry or long-term residents, but also marginalized low-income migrant communities that actively participate within the local economy. A crucial and useful mindset change is to avoid conveniently separating infection counts into spurious categories of “locals” and “foreigners”, because the Covid-19 coronavirus will not discriminate between nationality or ethnicity. It is one thing to say that the poor and disadvantaged will be the most affected in times of a pandemic, but it is even more important to eradicate poverty and lower social inequality to combat the dreaded resurgence of pandemics. We should remind ourselves that those who live precariously within our societies are more than often, not just the worst victims of a pandemic, but also likely its earliest victims.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/12, 9 February 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] “Thailand mulls lockdown as coronavirus surge blamed on Myanmar workers” – https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3115130/thailand-mulls-lockdown-coronavirus-surge-blamed. South China Morning Post, 23 December 2020.
[2] “Lockdowns now in four provinces” – https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30400078. The Nation Thailand, 23 December 2020
[3] “Thai PM imposes lockdown restrictions in 28 “Red Zone” provinces from Monday” – https://www.thaipbsworld.com/thai-pm-imposes-lockdown-restrictions-in-28-red-zone-provinces-from-monday. Thai PBS World, 3 January 2021
[4] “Thailand logs 287 new Covid cases Tuesday” – https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2049707/thailand-logs-287-new-covid-cases-tuesday. Bangkok Post, 12 January 2021
[5] “Thai government’s reluctance to impose Covid-19 lockdown stirs unease” – https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/softly-does-it-bangkoks-covid-19-containment-strategy-stirs-unease. Bangkok Post, 11 January 2021
[6] “Thailand logs 836 new Covid cases, 793 from active testing” – https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2060639/thailand-logs-836-new-covid-cases-793-from-active-testing. Bangkok Post, 1 Feb 2021
[7] “Thai PM blames COVID-19 surge on illegal migration, hints at new curbs” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/thailand-covid-19-surge-prayut-chan-o-cha-illegal-immigration-13825052. Channel News Asia, 22 December 2020
[8] “‘Little Myanmar’ COVID-19 cluster a ‘big lesson’ for Thailand” – https://www.thaipbsworld.com/little-myanmar-covid-19-cluster-a-big-lesson-for-thailand. Thai PBS World, 22 December 2020
[9] “Anti-Myanmar hate speech flares over virus” – https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2040767/anti-myanmar-hate-speech-flares-over-virus. Bangkok Post, 25 December 2020
[10] “Fourth woman who sneaked back from Myanmar found infected” – https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2028355/fourth-woman-who-sneaked-back-from-myanmar-found-infected. Bangkok Post, 1 December 2020
[11] “WHO hails Thailand’s success in fighting Covid-19” – https://www.thaipbsworld.com/who-hails-thailands-success-in-fighting-covid-19. Thai PBS World, 14 November 2020
[12] “Malaysia’s Success Story in Curbing the COVID-19 Pandemic” – https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/malaysias-success-story-curbing-covid-19-pandemic. Istituto Affari Internazionali, 6 November 2020
[13] “Malaysia’s PM Muhyiddin admits Sabah state polls in Sept caused current Covid-19 wave”- https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-pm-muhyiddin-admits-sabah-state-polls-in-sept-caused-current-covid-19-wave. The Straits Times, 18 November 2020
[14] “Malaysia invokes emergency to stop by-elections as COVID-19 cases rise” – http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14025493. Asahi Shimbun, 16 December 2020
[15] “Malaysia reports record 2,525 new COVID-19 cases on New Year’s Eve” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-covid-19-new-cases-dec-31-record-high-8-deaths-13872280. Channel News Asia, 31 December 2020
[16] “Malaysia’s king declares state of emergency to curb spread of COVID-19” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-king-declares-state-emergency-curb-spread-covid-19-13941968. Channel News Asia, 12 January 2021
[17] “Covid-19: Highest-ever daily total recorded as new cases breach 3,000” – https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/01/07/covid-19-3027-new-cases-eight-deaths. The Star, 7 January 2021
[18]Commentators have suggested that this was partially politically motivated, as Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin had just lost his majority in parliament. Declaring a state of emergency would suspend parliament for the first time in 50 years, enabling Muhyiddin to remain in power. Further details can be found here: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-coronavirus-malaysia-emerg/explainer-why-a-state-of-emergency-raises-concerns-in-malaysia-idUSKBN29H1HE.
[19] “Malaysia records new high as daily cases exceed 5,000” – https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-reports-record-daily-increase-of-5725-coronavirus-cases-taking-total. The Straits Times, 30 January 2021
[20] “COVID-19: Lockdowns, curfews, alcohol bans as nations around the world fight resurgent virus” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/covid-19-lockdowns-curfews-alcohol-bans-battle-resurgence-13884138. Channel News Asia, 3 January 2021
[21] “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker” – https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0. CSIS: Centre Strategic and International Studies
[22] “ICAEW: South-East Asia’s GDP growth to contract by 4.2% in 2020” https://www.digitalnewsasia.com/business/icaew-south-east-asias-gdp-growth-contract-42-2020. Digital News Asia, September 21 2020
[23] “State of employment in informal sectors of Southeast Asia” – https://www.peoplemattersglobal.com/article/recruitment/state-of-employment-in-informal-sectors-of-southeast-asia-20968. People Matters, 20 March 2019
[24] “Covid 19 – Epidemic ‘Waves’” – https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/covid-19-epidemic-waves. The Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, 30 April 2020
[25] “Diseases and the Links to Poverty” – https://en.reset.org/knowledge/diseases-and-links-poverty. Reset: Digital for Good
[26] “Demography and Inequality” – https://www.eapn.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/eaf_policy_brief_-_demography_and_inequality_post_copy_edit_15.10.13.pdf. European Commission, April 2013
[27] “Labour Migration in the ASEAN Region: Assessing the Social and Economic Outcomes for Migrant Workers – http://www.migratingoutofpoverty.org/files/file.php?name=harkins-labour-migration-in-asean-update.pdf&site=354. Migrating Out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium, Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom
[28] “Asean unity in the age of coronavirus” – https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1943180/asean-unity-in-the-age-of-coronavirus. Bangkok Post, 30 June 2020
[29] “Migrant worker at Malaysian medical glove manufacturer dies of Covid-19” – https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/14/worker-in-malaysian-medical-glove-factory-dies-of-covid-19-top-glove. The Guardian, 14 December 2020
[30] “Malaysia’s COVID Woes Spotlight ’Terrible’ Migrant Worker Housing” – https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/malaysias-covid-woes-spotlight-terrible-migrant-worker-housing. VOA News, 6 December 2020
[31] “Health Ministry: Over a third of all Covid-19 clusters are linked to workplaces” – https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/11/24/health-ministry-over-a-third-of-all-covid-19-clusters-are-linked-to-workplaces. The Star, 24 November 2020
[32] “Malaysia’s Coronavirus Scapegoats” – https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/malaysias-coronavirus-scapegoats. Foreign Policy, 19 June 2020
[33] “The Lives of Migrant Workers in Thailand’s ‘Little Burma’” – https://globalvoices.org/2016/07/19/the-lives-of-migrant-workers-in-thailands-little-burma. Global Voices, 19 July 2016
[34] “Covid-19: Singapore migrant workers infections were three times higher” – https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55314862. BBC News, 16 December 2020
[35] “Southeast Asia’s migrant workers face Covid-19 tragedy” – https://www.ucanews.com/news/southeast-asias-migrant-workers-face-covid-19-tragedy/87842. UCA News, 28 April 2020
[36] “Meet the precariat, the new global class fuelling the rise of populism” – https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/precariat-global-class-rise-of-populism. World Economic Forum, 9 November 2016
[37] “Poverty, Sickness, And Death: Why Sabah’s Covid-19 Patients Are Ill” – https://codeblue.galencentre.org/2020/10/20/poverty-sickness-and-death-why-sabahs-covid-19-patients-are-ill. Cod Blue, 20 October 2020
[38] “Thailand and Malaysia top countries for ASEAN labour migration” – https://theaseanpost.com/article/thailand-and-malaysia-top-countries-asean-labour-migration. The ASEAN Post, 27 December 2017
[39] The International Labour Migration Statistics (ILMS) Database for ASEAN – http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/ilms-database-for-asean-asean-at-a-glance/at_download/file1. (Rev)2013
[40] “Thai authorities detain illegal Myanmar migrant workers” – https://www.ucanews.com/news/thai-authorities-detain-illegal-myanmar-migrant-workers/89336. UCA News, 31 August 2020
[41] “United Nations Launches Thailand Migration Report 2019” – https://www.iom.int/news/united-nations-launches-thailand-migration-report-2019. IOM, UN Migration
[42] “Southeast Asia’s poorest mostly Filipinos, Indonesians – ASEAN report”- https://www.rappler.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-report-poverty-philippines-indonesia. The Rappler, 19 November 2017
[43] “Will COVID-19 erase ASEAN’s progress on poverty in recent years?” – https://www.aseantoday.com/2020/04/will-covid-19-erase-aseans-progress-on-poverty-in-recent-years. ASEAN Today, 7 April 2020
[44] “How Asia’s Population is Ageing, 2015-2030 scenario – https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/02/14/how-asias-population-is-aging-2015-2030-scenario.html. Jakarta Post. 14 February 2018
[45] “In Cambodia, coronavirus ‘scarecrows’ deployed by farmers to ward off infection” – https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3105049/cambodia-coronavirus-scarecrows-deployed-farmers-ward. South China Morning Post, 11 October 2020
[46] “Secretive Laos reports very few Covid-19 cases” – https://www.ucanews.com/news/secretive-laos-reports-very-few-covid-19-cases/87907. UCA News, 5 May 2020
[47] “Over 200 Scientists & Doctors Call For Increased Vitamin D Use To Combat COVID-19” – https://vitamindforall.org/letter.pdf. #VitaminDforAll, 7 December 2020
[48] “Vitamin D and the social aspects of disease” – https://academic.oup.com/qjmed/article/104/12/1065/1545355. D.S. Grimes. QJM: International Journal of Medicine, Volume 104, Issue 12, December 2011, Pages 1065–1074
[49] “How Demographic Changes Make Us More Vulnerable to Pandemics Like the Coronavirus” – https://www.prb.org/how-demographic-changes-make-us-more-vulnerable-to-pandemics-like-the-coronavirus. 13 April 2020
[50] “What 11 Billion People Mean for Disease Outbreaks” – https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-11-billion-people-mean-disease-outbreaks. Scientific American, 26 November 2013
[51] “Scientists must rise above politics — and restate their value to society” – https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02379-w. Nature, 7 August 2019
[52] “Here Comes the COVID-19 Baby Bust” – https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/11/covid-19-pandemic-births-baby-bust/617149. The Atlantic, 24 November 2020
[53] “Pandemic-fuelled baby boom has many Indonesians worries – https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/07/01/pandemic-fuelled-baby-boom-has-many-indonesians-worried.html. Jakarta Post, 1 July 2020
[54] “Covid-19: The Philippines and its lockdown baby boom – https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55299912. BBC News, 23 December 2020
[55] “Singapore and rest of aging Asia scurry to avoid COVID baby bust” – https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Singapore-and-rest-of-aging-Asia-scurry-to-avoid-COVID-baby-bust. Nikkei Asia, 21 October 2020
[56] “Aging in Vietnam: The elderly to account for 20.4% by 2050” – http://hanoitimes.vn/ageing-in-vietnam-older-persons-to-account-for-204-by-2050-314914.html. Hanoi Times, 21 November 2020
[57] “Ageing population in Thailand” – https://ageingasia.org/ageing-population-thailand. HelpAge Global Network.
[58] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-indonesia-explaine/why-indonesia-is-vaccinating-its-working-population-first-not-elderly-idUSKBN2990MX – https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-indonesia-explaine/why-indonesia-is-vaccinating-its-working-population-first-not-elderly-idUSKBN2990MX. Reuters, 4 January 2021
“Using Regionalism for Globalisation: The ASEAN Way” by Jayant Menon
ISEAS Perspective 2021/11 “Shaping Tomorrow’s International Order: Germany’s Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific” by Jan Kliem
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Indo-Pacific that Germany envisions is neither unipolar nor bipolar. Instead, multilateralism is the key principle in and thread throughout its Indo-Pacific policy guidelines and each policy area, from climate cooperation to security.
- The guidelines underline the importance of reliable strategic partnerships and dialogue. They do not signal that Germany will undertake significant military deployments to the region or ‘get tough on China’.
- While implicitly repudiating much of China’s behaviour regarding the international rules-based order, the guidelines do not directly criticise, or shut the door on China.
- Germany’s guidelines are good news for Southeast Asia and ASEAN. They foreshadow increasing cooperation and support by both Germany and the EU for ASEAN’s multilateral (security) architecture.
* Jan Kliem is Senior Research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG), Faculty of Law, Thammasat University.
INTRODUCTION
In early September 2020, the German government published its “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”.[1] With it, Germany joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, France, India, Japan and the United States, in publicly laying out an Indo-Pacific vision. Even more recently, the Netherlands came out with its own version while an Indo-Pacific commission has made suggestions as a precursor to a strategy in the UK. At this stage, it is only a matter of time before the EU too will publish a policy paper on the Indo-Pacific.
In Germany’s case, the effort marks a shift in its policy towards the Indo-Pacific, reflecting a new focus on a hence underappreciated region and a recognition that “[i]t is already foreseeable today that, more than anywhere else, the shape of tomorrow’s international order will be decided in the Indo-Pacific”. It also reflects a reaction to external pressures and an implicit reassessment of Germany’s relations with China, its third largest trading partner. At the same time, once the decision to go ahead with the guidelines was made, Germans could hardly have proceeded with more caution – or diplomatic finesse: Those looking principally for a robust, military-focussed contribution to an American-led Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision will be disappointed, while those, who take a nuanced look, factoring in Germany’s domestic and international situation have much to be hopeful about.
AN EVOLVING APPROACH TO A LONG-NEGLECTED REGION
As opposed to other regions in the world, Germany has long fared without a coherent regional approach to Asia. Instead, much of its approach to the region was dominated by its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Germany has been reluctant to push back against Chinese assertiveness and has often been seen to prioritise trade relations with the PRC over normative or security concerns. Cognisant of changing priorities and power shifts in the international system however, the German government started to adjust this stance several years ago.
In May 2017, a new Directorate-General for Asia and the Pacific was created in the German Foreign Ministry.[2] Its sub-directorates address large parts of Asia, with a dedicated China department and others focussing on organisations and countries of East, South and Southeast Asia, including ASEAN. The move intended to improve the coherence of Germany’s Asia approach, and already put the Indian and the Pacific Ocean regions under one more narrowly defined roof. In addition, the restructuring came on the heels of a 2015 Indian Ocean Conference in which then-Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier invited representatives from the region to discuss its growing importance. At the conference opening, Steinmeier left no doubt that it was “high time that Germany and Europe paid more attention to the era of the Indian Ocean”.[3] Three years later, then as President of the Federal Republic of Germany, he stated while visiting the region that considering trade flows, Germany has a growing interest in a safe and open Indian Ocean.[4]
The publication of the guidelines in 2020 is a concretisation of these efforts and provide a first comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. The guidelines signal German intent to take the region seriously and are entirely novel in terms of the focus and attention paid to the region. In addition to the region’s economic and political importance, the guidelines are also an expression of the sense Germany now has that it can no longer rely exclusively on the United States to provide public goods and to defend the rules-based international order on which Germany so heavily depends upon. It further reflects Germany’s appreciation of the need to re-balance its China approach. In that regard, it is in line with the 2019 EU Commission’s publication “EU-China – A strategic outlook”, in which China was labelled a “strategic partner”, a “competitor”, as well as a “systemic rival”, and contended that “there is a growing appreciation in Europe that the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted.”[5]
At the same time, Germany’s guidelines, as the government is keen on stressing, do not target any one particular nation, but are for anyone who supports a rules-based, multilateral order. Reaching out to partners, new and old, implies a recognition that Germany needs diversification away from one single country. China accounts by far for the largest share of Germany’s trading relations with Asia, including crucial parts of Germany’s supply chains. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted this unhealthy situation and made clear that diversified supply chains are much more reliable in a crisis.[6]
While the prevalence of multilateralism in German foreign policy is by no means new – it is in fact a foundational principle – the guidelines signal a shift and a realisation that Germany has to shoulder more responsibility internationally, and that its security interests lie beyond Europe. Its vital interests of peace and security, a rules-based order, open sea lines of communication (SLOCs), free trade, and multi- instead of uni- or bipolarity require active involvement on its part to be properly upheld. Despite the fact that the military aspect of this involvement is small, its inclusion in the document, and even more so the domestic reactions to it, is remarkable. Equally as deep-seated as multilateralism is in German foreign policy is a strong reluctance to use military means to achieve foreign policy goals.
For historic reasons, Germany sees itself as a civilian power and maintains both a strict legal framework on the use of force and a significant general public scepticism towards the use of its armed forces. Even though there are precedents for German participation in multilaterally organised operations to defend open and free SLOCs (for example the EU’s anti-piracy ATALANTA mission), the domestic response is often reserved. Both former Federal Minister of Defence Peter Struck and former Federal President Horst Köhler had to face a backlash when they suggested, respectively, that German forces be used to defend Germany’s interests in far flung regions such as Afghanistan, or that Germany must consider using its military to defend open SLOCs.[7] Arguably, a maritime mission with a more abstract possibility of kinetic exchange is still easier to sell than boots on the ground in a warzone, but even Köhler’s remarks elicited heated reactions only ten years ago. Incidentally, showcasing this deep scepticism today, a recent discussion over merely having soldiers help out in understaffed and strained public health offices within Germany during the pandemic sparked controversy, and in extreme cases opposition and fears of “militarisation”.[8]
The mild public reactions to the military parts of the guidelines thus far suggest that a cautious and limited inclusion of armed forces in multilateral foreign policy efforts and increasing German responsibility are slowly becoming more widely accepted. To be sure though, military aspects will remain limited. Regardless, accepting international responsibility and strategic interests beyond Europe, and a sober assessment that Germany has to safeguard its interests are a welcome change. Current Minister of Defence, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, has been vocal in sharing this message at home and abroad for over a year now and the guidelines are a logical extension of that.[9] More recently, in November 2020, she engaged in virtual diplomacy in the region, speaking for example in a joint event with Singapore’s defence minister where she elaborated on the guidelines and on increasing German involvement in the region.[10]
DIVERSIFICATION, COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP
The German paper on the Indo-Pacific is by far the longest and most comprehensive of all the Indo-Pacific policy papers thus far. This reflects the whole-of-government approach as well the diversity of the paper and the many policy issues within. First of all, however, it is noticeable that it is called guidelines (Leitlinien) and not, as some commentators continue to call it, strategy. A strategy, the argument goes, on the one hand elicits too much of a militaristic connotation and on the other, does not reflect the modesty of the approach in the eyes of German officials. As officials are happy to concede, it is a first for Germany to publish such comprehensive policy guidelines for the region, and secondly, were Germany to put forward a robust military position, it would not have the necessary hardware available to back it up. Hence, the guidelines are modest in tone, have few military components, do not target countries directly, but are an invitation for diverse regional partnerships with anyone who favours a multilateral rules-based order.
Without spelling it out, the guidelines mark a repudiation of aggressive behaviours displayed by China in particular, and with that, continues the notion of China as a “systemic rival”. At no point however, do the guidelines close the door on Chinese cooperation and partnerships, thus achieving a skilful diplomatic nuance that in recent times has been sorely missed in great power politics. More likely than not, cooperation with China will only become more important, not only in obvious global challenges such as climate change but also in post-pandemic economic recovery and potentially in operationalising a global push for comprehensive vaccination.
Under the overarching banner of multilateralism and cooperation, the main policy areas of the document include climate change; peace, security and stability; human rights and the rule of law; rules-based free trade; digital transformation; as well as culture, education and science. The broad mix can be read as a standing invitation to all actors in the region of starting, deepening or diversifying partnerships with Germany. In more sensitive areas, such as security and defence diplomacy, it is worth pointing out that the guidelines are in some aspects somewhat ‘after the fact’ and do not provide new, ground-breaking proposals.
The guidelines speak for instance of forms of German maritime presence in the region, when in fact the decision to send a frigate to the region had already been made prior to the guidelines and was only put on hold due to the Covid-19 pandemic.[11] German officers have also already been onboard French ships present in the region. It also mentions the government’s intention to further the network of liaison officers and military attachés, referring for instance to Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC) to which a German officer had already been seconded before the guidelines’ publication. Nevertheless, there is of course much room for increasing efforts, including more participation in training exercises or conceivably even in French or British operations in the area, not only with personnel but hardware, too. There is a clear appetite for increased defence diplomacy and for safeguarding the rules-based order in general and, as is pointed out, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in particular.
In each of the policy areas, Germany mentions both concrete actions as well as a variety of initiatives that it will support or continue to support. On climate change and environmental protection, where the guidelines look to further partnerships with many countries of the Indo-Pacific and make a point of singling out China as a “key player”[12], Germany for instance pledges 2.25 billion Euros to the Green Climate Fund.[13] To strengthen human rights and the rule of law, Berlin will set up a Regional German Information Centre in Singapore in support of fact-based information and resilience against disinformation. In order to strengthen rules-based, fair and sustainable free trade, it plans on building a network of free and comprehensive trade agreements, continuing in the spirit of the trade agreement between the EU and Singapore and the EU and Vietnam. Germany also reiterates its commitment to support the EU in its attempt to conclude a comprehensive investment agreement with China. In the entire Indo-Pacific region, the Federal Government wants to support German companies and business, including support for more cooperation in vocational training and facilitation of students’, specialists’ and skilled workers’ abilities to come to Germany for education, training or work. Germany also pledges to continue its support for academic exchange and to expand funding measures for joint research projects with regional partners with shared values.
SUPPORTING ASEAN-LED MULTILATERALISM
Throughout the guidelines, Germany takes a non-binary view of great power competition and sees neither uni- nor bipolarity as a desirable outcome for the region. Its approach is decidedly multilateral, reflecting its own preferences and support for the existing multilateral architecture led by ASEAN. The German paper resonates well with ASEAN’s own outlook on the Indo-Pacific and all of Southeast Asia can reasonably expect opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. In addition to economic benefits, Germany provides a boost to ASEAN and its core principles such as ASEAN centrality and its intra- and extra-regional dialogue structures. In fact, in November 2019, Germany acceded to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and with that reaffirmed its belief in ASEAN’s core principles of regional cooperation, multilateralism, and the desire to settle conflicts peacefully and on the basis of common rules. The guidelines follow this logic. In terms of great power competition, ASEAN’s preference of ‘not choosing sides’ is reflected by the rather nuanced approach Germany has chosen with regards to committing to the rules-based order and in a way joining the ‘Indo-Pacific narrative’, but clearly keeping a door open for China. This too, is supportive of ASEAN’s approach. Less subtle, but clearly spelt out is that “[n]o country should […] be forced to choose between two sides or fall into the state of unilateral dependency”, echoing ASEAN’s and all Southeast Asian countries’ preference. Furthermore, Germany is already the largest bilateral donor to ASEAN within the EU and as a leading EU country, Germany’s support foreshadows greater EU support, too. Indeed, one of the stated goals of German support for an upgrade of EU-ASEAN relationship to a strategic partnership has already been achieved.[14] For ASEAN, the guidelines clearly indicate continued and growing support from Germany and the EU, also going beyond financial support. Germany, the EU and ASEAN are in a sense joined in their efforts to put the interest of all before the interest of one.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/11, 5 February 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] The Federal Foreign Office, Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien–1–data.pdf (accessed 5 December 2020).
[2] The Federal Foreign Office, Directorates-General, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/abteilungen (accessed 5 December 2020).
[3] The Federal Foreign Office, Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the opening of the Indian Ocean Conference at the Federal Foreign Office, 9 June 2015, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/150609-indianoceankonferenz/272306.
[4] Bagchi, I. (2018): Must bring India-EU trade pact rapidly to conclusion, The Times of India, 22 March 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/must-bring-india-eu-trade-pact-rapidly-to-conclusion/articleshow/63406025.cms (accessed 5 December 2020).
[5] The European Commission, Joint Communication To The European Parliament, The European Council And The Council, EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, 12 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf (accessed 5 December 2020).
[6] See also: Kliem, F. (2020): Why German industry is looking past China to the rest of Asia, Nikkei Asian Review, 1 December 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Why-German-industry-is-looking-past-China-to-the-rest-of-Asia? (accessed 5 December 2020).
[7] Fischer, S; Medick, V.; Weiland, S. (2010): Umstrittene Bundeswehr-Äußerungen. Köhler geht in Deckung, Der Spiegel, 27 May 2010, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umstrittene-bundeswehr-aeusserungen-koehler-geht-in-deckung-a-697144.html (accessed 5 December 2020). Köhler, as part of his quote cited in the article, said: […]we are on our way to understand that a country of our size […] and export-dependence […] has to know that […] in certain emergencies military operations are necessary to safeguard our interests, such as open trade routes or avoiding regional instabilities […]. (Source in German, quote is author’s translation). For Minister of Federal Defence Peter Struck’s comments see: Eckert, D. (2002): Die Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt, Heise Online, 13 December 2002, https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Die-Sicherheit-Deutschlands-wird-auch-am-Hindukusch-verteidigt-3427679.html (accessed 5 December 2020).
[8] Mayntz, G. (2020): Abgelehnte Corona-Hilfe macht Ministerin fassungslos, Rheinische Post, 1 October 2020, https://rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/kramp-karrenbauer-fassungslos-ueber-abgelehnte-hilfe-bei-corona-bekaempfung_aid-53692829 (accessed 5 December 2020).
[9] See for example: The Federal Ministry of Defence, Speech by Federal Minister of Defence at the Bundeswehr University Munich, 7 November 2019, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/speech-federal-minister-of-defence-security-policy-147072 (accessed 5 December 2020).
[10] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, KAS Ministerial Forum: The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Challenges and Opportunities for Germany and Singapore, 13 November 2020, https://www.kas.de/en/web/politikdialog-asien/veranstaltungen/detail/-/content/kas-rsis-ministerial-forum (accessed 5 December 2020).
[11] Gain, N.: Germany Anticipates Growing Role in Indo-Pacific Region, Naval News, 4 September 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/09/germany-anticipates-growing-role-in-indo-pacific-region/ (accessed 5 December 2020).
[12] The Federal Foreign Office, Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, p.30, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien–1–data.pdf.
[13] The Green Climate Fund, set up by the United Nations in 2010 supporting the goal of keeping average global temperature rise well below 2 degrees C. https://www.greenclimate.fund.
[14] European Union External Action Service, EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, 1 December 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89626/eu-asean-strategic-partnership_en (accessed 5 December 2020).
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ISEAS Perspective 2021/10 “Wang Yi’s Southeast Asia Tour: Significance and Challenges” by Lye Liang Fook
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- China kicked off 2021 by according importance to Southeast Asia and ASEAN with Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s January visit to Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar and The Philippines.
- In 2020, Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, Politburo Member Yang Jiechi, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Wang Yi visited nine ASEAN countries in pursuit of its objective of wooing Southeast Asia.
- Myanmar will be the country coordinator for China-ASEAN relations this year and is the current co-chair of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, a China-led initiative. Brunei is the chair of ASEAN this year.
- China regards Indonesia as the most important and influential country in ASEAN, and has expressed support for Indonesia to become a regional vaccine production hub so as to raise its profile in developing and Muslim countries.
- There are a number of thrusts in China’s relations with Southeast Asia, including collaboration for economic recovery, pushing ahead with key projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and providing access to Chinese vaccines.
- At the same time, Beijing’s passage of the coastguard law has undermined Wang Yi’s outreach efforts to Southeast Asia. China also needs to address issues related to its vaccine diplomacy.
* Lye Liang Fook is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme and Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
Although China has stuck to its more than three-decade long tradition of having its foreign minister visit Africa in his first foreign trip of the year, Southeast Asia has especially in recent years featured prominently in China’s foreign policy. Last year, soon after State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the African countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea and Zimbabwe on 7-13 January 2020, he accompanied Chinese President Xi Jinping on a state visit to Myanmar the following week, on 17-18 January.[1]
This year, Southeast Asia has featured prominently as well where such high-level visits from Beijing are concerned. Very soon after his five-nation African tour of Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Seychelles and Tanzania on 4-9 January 2021, Wang Yi embarked on his Southeast Asian visit to Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar and The Philippines lasting from 11 to 16 January 2021.[2]
CHINA’S FOCUS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
Wang Yi’s January 2021 Southeast Asia visit is part of the continuous efforts China has been making to engage the region. This engagement seems to have assumed more importance in the past two years, beginning with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in early 2020. Xi’s visit was significant for a number of reasons. First, this was Xi’s first overseas visit in 2020 which indicated China’s intention that year to focus on strengthening its ties with Southeast Asia in general and with Myanmar in particular. In the event, due to the Covid-19 outbreak, Xi’s Myanmar visit turned out to be the only foreign trip he took in 2020. Second, it was the first state visit to Myanmar by a Chinese president in 19 years.[3] Third, the trip was a single-country visit, which departed from the usual Chinese practice of combining a few countries in one trip (see Table 1 below).
Table 1: List of Visits by Chinese Leader/Ministers to Southeast Asia (2020-2021)
| Date | Chinese Leader/Ministers | Southeast Asian Countries Visited (arranged in order of the countries visited) | Remarks |
| 17-18 January 2020 | Xi Jinping (Chinese President) | Myanmar | Single-country state visit |
| 19-20 August | Yang Jiechi (Politburo member) | Singapore | After Singapore, Yang Jiechi visited Busan, South Korea, on 21-22 August |
| 1-4 September 2020 | Yang Jiechi (Politburo member) | Myanmar | Apart from Myanmar, Yang also travelled to Spain and Greece |
| 7-11 September 2020 | Wei Fenghe (State Councilor and Defense Minister) | Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines | Wei’s visit coincided with remarks by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo for Southeast Asia to take action against China’s bullying in the South China Sea |
| 11-15 October 2020 | Wang Yi (State Councilor and Foreign Minister) | Cambodia, Malaysia, Laos and Thailand | Wang Yi’s trip included a transit stop in Singapore on 13 October 2020 where he met Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan at Changi Airport |
| 11-16 January 2021 | Wang Yi (State Councilor and Foreign Minister) | Myanmar, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines | Wang Yi embarks on his Southeast Asian tour a day after his return from Africa |
Myanmar has continued to receive much attention from China throughout 2020 and 2021, and was the country most visited by Chinese dignitaries. In September 2020, Politburo member and former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Myanmar. This was Yang’s second visit to Myanmar; he had accompanied Chinese President Xi Jinping to Naypyitaw in January 2020. In 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi again accorded importance to Myanmar when he made the country his first stop in his first trip to Southeast Asia. Chinese media highlighted that Wang Yi was the first foreign minister to visit Myanmar since national elections were held there in November 2020.[4]
There are a number of reasons behind China’s focus on Myanmar. One is that Myanmar will be the country coordinator for China-ASEAN relations in July 2021 for a three-year term. Another reason is that Myanmar is the current co-chair of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, an initiative of China involving five other ASEAN riparian member states.[5] A longer standing reason is that China continues to lend its support to the NLD-led government and especially Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been criticized by the West and Malaysia over her handling of the Rohingya issue.[6]
Wang Yi’s January visit should also be viewed in conjunction with earlier visits by himself and other Chinese dignitaries to Southeast Asia. Taken together, they have covered nine out of the 10 ASEAN member states.[7] The ninth country, Singapore, was covered twice in 2020, once as a transit stop in October while the other was during Yang Jiechi’s visit in August for the 30th anniversary of China-Singapore relations.
That leaves Vietnam as the only country ostensibly left out in previous visits. However, this does not mean that Hanoi is any less important to China. There is a view that Vietnam was not included in Wang Yi’s January visit as Hanoi was preoccupied with preparations for its all-important 13th National Congress.[8] If so, we can expect senior level exchanges to resume after the conclusion of the congress.
Furthermore, although there were no senior level visits from China to Vietnam in 2020, high-level interactions between the two countries have continued unabated. Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on the phone with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Phu Trong in September 2020;[9] following on a conversation they had had in January 2020.[10] Chinese Premier Li Keqiang spoke with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc in April 2020 and they met online for the 3rd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting in August 2020. Wang Yi and his Vietnamese counterpart Pham Binh Minh met physically in Vientiane, Laos in February 2020[11] and again in Dongxing, Guangxi in August 2020.[12]
China has accorded more attention to Brunei since 2020 to lay the groundwork for better ties, given Brunei’s role as chair of ASEAN in 2021. 2021 also marks the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations and the 30th anniversary of China-Brunei diplomatic relations. Furthermore, Brunei is a Southeast Asian claimant state in the South China Sea, and China would like it to maintain a low profile on the issue especially when the United States is urging Southeast Asian claimant states to stand up to China’s bullying in this area.[13]
During China’s Defense Minister Wei Fenghevisit to Brunei in September 2020, he called on Brunei and China to continue to “strengthen bilateral communication and consultation, and promote maritime cooperation so as to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in the South China Sea”.[14] China’s preference is for differences on the South China Sea issue to be addressed bilaterally between Beijing and the relevant Southeast Asian claimant states, including Brunei. Wang Yi included Brunei in his January 2021 Southeast Asian tour, in another signal that China would like to work with Brunei to strengthen bilateral ties and promote China-ASEAN relations.
As for Indonesia, China regards the country as the most important Southeast Asian state given its size and its weight in the Muslim world. President Xi Jinping spoke three times with his Indonesian counterpart in 2020, on a noticeably more frequent basis than with any other Southeast Asian leader in that year.[15] Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also included Indonesia in their Southeast Asian tours in September 2020 and January 2021 respectively. Indonesia can be expected to continue featuring prominently in China’s relations with Southeast Asia.
KEY THRUSTS
There are a number of key thrusts in Wang Yi’s latest visit to Southeast Asia. Foremost among them is to show that there is much potential for China and Southeast Asia to work together to promote economic recovery amid the Covid-19 pandemic. Before Wang Yi’s visit, Chinese media highlighted that “history was made” when ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner in 2020.[16] Echoing this message, Premier Li Keqiang told his ASEAN counterparts at the ASEAN-China Summit in November 2020 that China-ASEAN trade had bucked the global trend of shrinking world trade, economic recession and constraints on people-to-people exchanges. Based on Chinese statistics, China-ASEAN trade reached $481.8 billion, up 5 percent year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2020, making ASEAN China’s largest trading partner.[17]
Economic cooperation for recovery and growth was a key theme during Wang Yi’s visit to Southeast Asia. For instance, his first stop in Indonesia was Lake Toba in North Sumatra, where he was welcomed by the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Pandjaitan. Apart from being Indonesia’s point man on promoting economic cooperation with China, the Lake Toba itinerary underscored the message that Indonesia welcomes Chinese tourists as well as investments from China.[18]
During Wang Yi’s visit to Brunei, Myanmar and The Philippines, it was announced that China and these countries have agreed to establish some form of “fast track” arrangement for the flow of people and “green lanes” for the flow of goods to promote economic recovery.[19] In addition, while Wang Yi was in The Philippines, it was announced that The Bank of China Manila would be the RMB Clearing Bank in The Philippines to support the growing local RMB market.[20]
Another thrust, related to economic cooperation, is China’s continued emphasis on pushing ahead with its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia. This is evident in the instances listed below:
- In Myanmar, Wang Yi reiterated during his call on Aung San Suu Kyi that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is a flagship project under the BRI.[21]
- In Indonesia, Wang Yi indicated to President Jokowi during their meeting that China was willing to work with Indonesia to promote “high quality” BRI cooperation including speeding up the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail project.[22]
- In Brunei, Wang Yi made a call for both sides to speed up the Hengyi petrochemical[23] as well as the Guangxi–Brunei Economic Corridor projects during his meeting with Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah.[24]
- When Wang Yi was in The Philippines, it was announced that the two countries had signed a commercial contract to build a railway connecting Subic Bay to Clark Air Base. This is apparently the highest-funded government-to-government project between the two countries, valued around US$940 million, and is a flagship project under President Duterte’s “Build, Build, Build” programme.[25]
Yet another thrust of Wang Yi’s visit is China’s effort to position itself as a key provider of Covid vaccines to Southeast Asia. Going beyond earlier professions of making China’s Covid vaccines a global public good, Wang Yi pledged to donate 300,000 doses of coronavirus vaccines to Myanmar[26] and 500,000 similar doses to the Philippines.[27] In Brunei, the response to China’s vaccines was considerably muted with Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah reportedly expressing a general interest on Brunei’s part to cooperate with China in the field of vaccines when he met Wang Yi for talks.[28]
In contrast, the most high-profile attention and vote of confidence accorded to China’s vaccines was in Indonesia. Most notably, during Wang Yi’s visit to Indonesia, President Jokowi launched Indonesia’s vaccination drive by going live on national television to receive Sinovac’s CoronaVac at the presidential palace in Jakarta on 13 January 2021.[29] Jokowi had explained in an earlier social media post that he would be first in line for the jab to show that the vaccine was safe and halal.[30]
Indonesia appeared to have pulled out all the stops to launch CoronaVac for use during Wang Yi’s visit. A day before Wang Yi’s arrival in Indonesia, i.e., on 11 January 2021, the Indonesian Food and Drug Monitoring Agency (BPOM) approved CoronaVac for emergency use, citing interim data showing a 65.3 percent efficacy rate, above the World Health Organisation threshold of 50 per cent.[31] In doing so, Indonesia became the first country outside China to green light the use of the vaccine.[32]
Among the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia is the most engaged in terms of Covid-19 collaboration with China. Since August 2020, Sinovac and its local Indonesian partner, Bio Farma, launched Phase 3 clinical trials in Bandung. In addition, Indonesia has inked a deal to procure at least 125 million doses of Sinovac vaccine to be produced jointly with Bio Farma.[33] Under this arrangement, Sinovac will supply not only the bulk of vaccines but also extend the technology licensing to enable Bio Farma to produce the vaccine locally. While in Indonesia, Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s commitment to continue vaccine production cooperation with Indonesia and support the latter to become a regional vaccine production hub.[34] The idea of making Indonesia a vaccine production hub was apparently first mentioned during Luhut’s visit to China in October 2020.[35]
A final thrust of Wang Yi’s visit was to downplay China’s differences with Southeast Asia especially on the South China Sea issue. In particular, while commenting on his Philippine visit at the end of his Southeast tour, Wang Yi said that the South China Sea issue is only partial to the entirety of China-Philippine relations, and that the two countries should not allow their one percent difference on this issue affect the 99 percent of their overall relations.[36] He reiterated the call for China and The Philippines to push ahead with oil and gas exploration, as a means of exploring a breakthrough to this problem left over from history. Separately, during Wang Yi’s Brunei visit, China and Brunei agreed to set up a working group on energy cooperation and work towards establishing a working group on maritime cooperation.[37]
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Through Wang Yi’s latest Southeast Asia tour, one may note that China is trying to set its relations with the region on a correct footing that it hopes will last through the year. At one level, China seeks to strengthen its ties with individual Southeast Asian countries as well as with ASEAN as a whole. At another level, China’s efforts to reach out to Southeast Asia is driven by the dynamics of the US-China relationship. By visiting Southeast Asia before Joe Biden’s presidential inauguration, China is seeking to either draw Southeast Asia closer to Beijing or cajole Southeast Asian countries to remain neutral in its ongoing competition with the United States. Beijing is concerned that the United States will work closer with its allies and partners, some of which are in Southeast Asia, to counteract a more assertive China.
However, as had happened before, Beijing’s positive moves in one particular area is sometimes undermined by its own actions in other areas. For example, barely a week after Wang Yi’s Southeast Asia tour, China adopted a law that empowers its coastguard to take necessary action including firing on foreign vessels to safeguard China’s sovereignty at sea.[38] Although the state media positioned the passage of the law as directed at upholding China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (or Senkaku Islands in Japanese),[39] the same law does not preclude its coastguard from enforcing China’s claims in the South China Sea. This law is likely to raise concern among Southeast Asian claimant states over how China intends to enforce its claims in the South China Sea, and complicate efforts by China and ASEAN to conclude the Code of Conduct (CoC) by end 2021.[40] Discussions on the CoC had already been put on the backburner last year due to Covid-19.
China may further need to tread carefully in terms of its signature initiatives in Southeast Asia. In reviving their economies from the negative impact of Covid-19, Southeast Asian countries are likely to scrutinize more closely projects under the BRI, especially in terms of their commercial viability. Likewise, on China’s part, Covid-19 presents an opportunity for Beijing to re-assess its BRI projects to emphasize quality and the sharing of benefits with recipient countries. The mere fact that Wang Yi has to make a call for such projects to be speeded up is already telling. A few successful projects will likely be more effective in projecting a positive image of China than the unsuccessful ones that are the subject of constant media attention.
China’s provision of Covid vaccines will likely be welcomed in Southeast Asia especially when vaccines from other suppliers are in short supply. However, Beijing can do more to ensure the transparency of its vaccine data. In addition, it may need to accord more consideration on how it intends to roll out its vaccines in Southeast Asia. Its promise to make Indonesia a regional vaccine production hub may backfire if other Southeast Asian countries regard this as implying that they are less important in gaining access to vaccines from China. Beijing will also need to be mindful of domestic political and ethnic sensitivities if Jakarta is seen as being over-reliant on Chinese vaccines. Furthermore, it may be prudent for Beijing not to over-commit in terms of how much vaccine it can deliver and over its efficacy so as not to raise undue expectations.[41] China has the opportunity to draw useful experiences from the backlash against the BRI and apply them in the rolling out of its vaccines in Southeast Asia. A more transparent and science-based approach based on data is likely to receive a more receptive response from recipient countries than a resort to chest-thumping nationalism over how Chinese vaccines are as good if not better than those produced by other suppliers.[42]
ISEAS Perspective 2021/10, 4 February 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] Xi Jinping Returns to China after a State Visit to Myanmar, China’s foreign ministry, 18 January 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdmdgsfw/t1825014.shtml.
[2] There was only a one-day interval between Wang Yi’s return from his African trip and his trip to Southeast Asia.
[3] The last state visit to Myanmar was by Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 2001.
[4] 2021 nian 1 yue 13 ri waijiao bu fayan ren Zhao Lijian zhuchi lixing jizhe hui (2021 January 13 Foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian chairs a regular press briefing, China’s foreign ministry, 13 January 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1846158.shtml.
[5] Myanmar took over from Laos as co-chair of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation in August 2020.
[6] “Chinese Ambassador Says Beijing Stands with Myanmar on Rohingya Issue”, The Irrawaddy, 22 August 2019, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/chinese-ambassador-says-beijing-stands-myanmar-rohingya-issue.html#.
[7] Apart from the four countries of Myanmar, Indonesia, Brunei and The Philippines covered in the January visit, Wang Yi had visited four other Southeast Asian countries in October 2020, namely Cambodia, Malaysia, Laos and Thailand.
[8] Vietnam’s 13th National Congress took place from 25 January to 2 February 2021.
[9] “Xi Jinping Has a Phone Call with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and President Nguyen Phu Trong”, China’s foreign ministry, 29 September 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1820610.shtml.
[10] “Chinese, Vietnamese leaders agree to further promote bilateral ties”, Xinhuanet, 16 January 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/16/c_138710637.htm.
[11] Wang Yi and Pham Binh Minh met on the sidelines of the special China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane, Laos in February 2020.
[12] Wang Yi and Pham Binh Minh met again to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the delimitation of the China-Vietnam land boundary and the 10th anniversary of the erection of pillars to demarcate the land border between the two countries. The meeting took place in Dongxing, Guangxi Autonomous Region of China in August 2020.
[13] Apart from extending Covid-19 assistance to Brunei through governmental and enterprise channels, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army also got into the act with donations of medical masks, goggles, protective clothing and waterproof isolation suits. See “Brunei receives anti-COVID-19 medical donations from Chinese military”, Xinhuanet, 15 May 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/15/c_139058401.htm.
[14] “Brunei’s Sultan meets Chinese defense minister on ties, cooperation”, Xinhuanet, 9 September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/09/c_139356298.htm.
[15] On 12 February 2020, Xi thanked President Widodo for a phone call and expressed confidence that China will win fight against Covid-19. On 2 April 2020, Xi expressed China’s readiness to provide support and assistance to Indonesia to fight Covid-19. On 1 September 2020, Xi and Jokowi spoke about Covid-19 cooperation, and the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail.
[16] Chuangzao lishi! Dong meng chengwei Zhong guo di yi da maoyi huoban (History is created! ASEAN becomes China’s largest trading partner), Xinhuanet, 27 September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2020-09/27/c_1126548246.htm.
[17] “Premier Li: ASEAN now China’s largest trading partner”, CGTN, 13 November 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-11-12/Premier-Li-ASEAN-becomes-China-s-largest-trading-partner–VmpM9aYZgc/index.html#:~:text=According%20to%20Li%2C%20in%20the,ASEAN%20China’s%20largest%20trading%20partner.&text=By%20the%20end%20of%202019,year%2C%20only%20after%20the%20EU.
[18] “Luhut welcomes China’s Wang Yi for investment talks”, The Jakarta Post, 13 January 2021.
[19] While visiting Myanmar earlier, it was also announced that China and Myanmar agreed to establish the “fast lane” for personnel movement and the “green channel” for goods. China’s announcement of fast track arrangements with Myanmar and the Philippines are not the first China has with Southeast Asia. The first of such fast-lane arrangements was with Singapore, established in June 2020. See “China confirms launch of fast lane arrangement with Singapore to facilitate travel”, Xinhuanet, 10 June 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/10/c_139127134.htm.
[20] “RMB clearing bank launched in the Philippines”, CGTN, 17 January 2021, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-01-17/RMB-clearing-bank-launched-in-the-Philippines-X7qjlqEZEs/index.html.
[21] Wang yi tong miandian guowu zizheng jian waizhang ang shan su ji juxing huitan (Wang Yi holds talks with Myanmar’s State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi), China’s foreign ministry, 11 January 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1845673.shtml. Under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, there are key projects like the Kyaukphyu Deep Water Port, the China-Myanmar Economic Cooperation Zone and the New Yangon City Project.
[22] Yìnni zongtong zuo ke huijian wang yiì (Indonesian President Joko Widodo meets with Wang Yi), Xinhuanet, 13 January 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-01/13/c_1126979769.htm.
[23] The Hengyi Industries Sdn Bhd is a joint venture between China’s Zhejiang Hengyi Group (70%) and Damai Holdings (30%), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Brunei government’s Strategic Development Capital Fund. The JV aims to build an integrated refining and petrochemical complex on Pulau Muara Besar island in Brunei. There are two phases to the project with the first put into operation in November 2019. See “Hengyi Industries lets contract for new alkylation unit at Brunei refinery”, Oil and Gas Journal, 25 August 2020, https://www.ogj.com/refining-processing/refining/construction/article/14182301/hengyi-industries-lets-contract-for-new-alkylation-unit-at-brunei-refinery.
[24] In 2014, Guangxi and Brunei signed a memorandum to build an economic corridor. Under this corridor, the two countries envisioned a number of projects that included the co-development of Brunei’s Muara port. See “Economic corridor with Guangxi expected to spur growth in Brunei”, CGTN, 19 November 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514e78417a4e30457a6333566d54/share_p.html; and Wen lai sudan ha sang na r huijian wang yi (Brunei Sultan Hassanal meets with Wang Yi), China’s foreign ministry, 14 January 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1846434.shtml.
[25] Chinese Ambassador to The Philippines Huang Xilian’s Facebook post, 16 January 2021, https://www.facebook.com/AmbHuangXilian/posts/118154730161040. According to the Chinese ambassador, the 71-km single-track railway will be located in south-central Luzon, connecting Subic Bay Freeport Zone and Clark International Airport and linking to the Philippine Department of Transport’s North Railway Project. The construction period is estimated to last 42 months. Once completed, the railway will promote connectivity between commercial zones along the Subic-Clark corridor.
[26] China pledged to provide 300,000 doses of Covid-19 vaccine and three million yuan worth of Covid-19 medical assistance to Myanmar. See “China to provide COVID-19 aid to Myanmar”, Myanmar Times, 12 January 2021, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/china-provide-covid-19-aid-myanmar.html.
[27] Chinese Ambassador to The Philippines Huang Xilian’s Facebook post, 19 January 2021, https://www.facebook.com/AmbHuangXilian/photos/a.106650864644760/119970053312841/?type=3&theater.
[28] “China, Brunei vow to push bilateral cooperation to new high”, Xinhuanet, 15 January 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/15/c_139668533.htm.
[29] “Indonesian President receives Chinese vaccine as rollout begins”, CGTN, 13 January 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sf-yLxNbanw.
[30] “Indonesia green-lights emergency use of Chinese vaccine”, AP, 11 January 2021, https://apnews.com/article/international-news-indonesia-coronavirus-pandemic-joko-widodo-china-02ef76d07280abe393c876407d224adb.
[31] “BPOM approves Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine for emergency use: Chairwoman”, antaranews, 11 January 2021, https://en.antaranews.com/news/165512/bpom-approves-sinovac-covid-19-vaccine-for-emergency-use-chairwoman.
[32] “Indonesia green lights China’s Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine”, Biopharma, 11 January 2021, https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Article/2021/01/11/Indonesia-green-lights-China-s-Sinovac-COVID-19-vaccine.
[33] As of 12 January 2021, 18 million doses of the bulk vaccines from Sinovac have been delivered. See “Indonesia Receives 15 Million Doses of Half-Finished Sinovac Vaccine”, Jakarta Globe, 12 January 2021, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-receives-15-million-doses-of-halffinished-sinovac-vaccine.
[34] “Wang yi tan zhongguo tong yinni dacheng de wu dian gongshi” (Wang Yi talks about the five-point consensus reached between China and Indonesia), Xinhuanet, 14 January 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-01/14/c_1126979826.htm; and, “China pledges to make Indonesia a regional Covid-19 vaccine production hub”, The Straits Times, 13 January 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/china-pledges-to-make-indonesia-a-regional-vaccine-production-hub-says-closer-ties-will.
[35] The idea of making Indonesia a regional vaccine production hub was mentioned in Indonesian papers. See “Indonesia can be manufacturing hub for COVID-19 vaccine, says Chinese foreign minister”, The Jakarta Post, 13 October 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/12/indonesia-can-be-manufacturing-hub-for-covid-19-vaccine-says-chinese-foreign-minister.html. At that time, the Chinese media was more circumspect and did not use the term “hub”, merely quoting Wang Yi as saying that China is “willing to work with Indonesia to comprehensively promote the research and development, production and use of the vaccine, and jointly contribute to the availability and affordability of vaccines in the region and the world”. See “China, Indonesia to enhance COVID-19 vaccine cooperation”, CGTN, 10 October 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-10-10/China-Indonesia-to-enhance-COVID-19-vaccine-cooperation–Ut0xAmXLSE/index.html
[36] Wang yi: Nanhai wenti shi zhong fei zhijian rao bukai de yiti, dan jue bushi jie bu kai de sijie (Wang Yi: The South China Sea is an issue that cannot be skirted around by China and The Philippines, but it is by no means a knot that cannot be untied), Chinanews, 18 January 2021, https://www.chinanews.com/gn/2021/01-18/9390038.shtml.
[37] Details on these working groups are scanty at the moment. What is clear is that these working groups will fall under the framework of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) that oversees cooperation between the two countries. The second meeting of the JSC was held during Wang Yi’s visit to Brunei and was co-chaired by Wang Yi and Brunei’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dato Seri Setia Haji Erywan bin Pehin Haji Mohammad Yusof. See “JOINT PRESS RELEASE ON THE SECOND MEETING OF THE JOINT STEERING COMMITTEE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND BRUNEI DARUSSALAM”, China’s foreign ministry, 16 January 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1846764.shtml.
[38] The coastguard law was adopted by the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress on 22 January 2021, almost a week after Wang Yi’s Southeast Asian tour concluded on 16 January 2021.
[39] “China adopts coastguard law, safeguarding sovereignty in Diaoyu Islands”, Global Times, 23 January 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213649.shtml. The Global Times article suggests that China’s adoption of the coastguard law is a direct response to US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s re-affirmation that Washington’s defense treaty with Tokyo applies to the Senkaku Islands in a phone call he had with his Japanese counterpart Shigeru Kitamura.
[40] China’s Premier Li Keqiang made a call for a CoC to be concluded in three years’ time when he visited Singapore in November 2018.
[41] “China Wanted to Show Off Its Vaccines. It’s Backfiring”, New York Times, 25 January 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/business/china-covid-19-vaccine-backlash.html.
[42] “Hard to beat COVID-19 without China’s vaccine: Global Times editorial”, Global Times, 24 December 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1210863.shtml; and, “Chinese media criticise Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine, tout local shots”, Reuters, 20 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-vaccine-china/chinese-media-criticise-pfizer-covid-19-vaccine-tout-local-shots-idUSKBN29P1HT.
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ISEAS Perspective 2021/9 “Batam’s 2020 Mayoral Election: Populism, Economic Recovery and Covid – 19” by Ady Muzwardi and Siwage Dharma Negara
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Batam’s mayoral election on 9 December 2019 was a lopsided contest between a popular incumbent pair, Muhammad Rudi-Amsakar Achmad, and a newcomer pair, Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo-Abdul Basyid Has.
- The incumbents convincingly won the election with 73 per cent of the votes. Their success can be attributed to support from the political parties that dominate the local parliament and their track record in overseeing developmental progress in Batam.
- Covid – 19 also contributed to the incumbents’ success as various social assistance programmes were distributed to the grassroots community in the run – up to the election campaign.
- The challenger failed to offer a differentiated and attractive campaign programme to challenge the incumbent’s popularity. His strategy to boost his appeal through social media paled in comparison to the incumbent’s popularity with the grassroots community.
* Ady Muzwardi is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji and a Doctoral Student, Department of International Relations, Padjajaran University. Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
Batam is the economic powerhouse of the Riau Islands (Kepulauan Riau or Kepri in short) Province, accounting for 65 – 70 per cent of Kepri’s total GDP. Its population has increased from around 455,000 in 2000 to around 1.4 million in 2019, many of them young people moving into the industrial and service trade sectors from other parts of Indonesia. These internal migrants play an important role in the economy and in the process increase their political stakes in Batam. Nevertheless, Batam’s politics is heavily influenced by the local ethnic Malay community (Carruthers 2018).[1]
What is interesting for the 2020 elections is the fact that both Batam and its mother – province, Kepri conducted simultaneous elections for mayoral and gubernatorial positions, respectively. Moreover, like other parts of the country, the city’s social and economic situation has been adversely affected by the Covid – 19 pandemic. One day before election day, Batam remained a “red zone” with total accumulated infection cases of 4,432, and an average increase of 40 cases per day.[2]
Figure 1: Numbers of registered voters and turnout rate in Batam’s mayoral election, 2015 and 2020
Source: General Elections Commission (KPU)
Interestingly, concerns about the health risk did not reduce the enthusiasm of voters to go to the ballot box. Data from the General Elections Commission (KPU) indicates a 12% increase in turnout rate in 2020 compared to the 2015 mayoral election (Figure 1). In 2020, the number of voters who participated in the election reached 377,350,[3] compared to 319,623 voters for the previous election.[4]
This short essay examines the processes and outcomes of Batam’s mayoral election. The next section discusses the candidates and their campaign programme, while the subsequent section discusses the factors behind the triumph of the incumbent. The last section concludes with some projections of Batam’s leadership going forward.
THE CANDIDATES
In September 2020, the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU) announced two candidate pairs who would be competing in the 9 December elections in Batam. The incumbent mayor, and current ex – officio Head of Batam Indonesia Free Trade Zone Authority (BP Batam), Muhammad Rudi, would compete against the former head of BP Batam, Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo. The incumbent is an ethnic Malay politician from Tanjung Pinang. His candidacy is supported by eight political parties; Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem), Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura), Partai Demokrat, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) serta Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI). His challenger, Lukita, in turn, is supported by three political parties; Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI – P), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra).
It is noteworthy that although Nasdem and PDI – P are allies on the national political stage, they have become opponents in the Batam and Kepri elections. Moreover, PDI – P even joined Gerindra, its opposition on the 2019 presidential election, in contesting against Nasdem and Golkar. This interesting display indicates a key difference between local and national politics. For local elections, Indonesia’s political parties tend to put less priority on the ideological dimension. This has in turn led to transactional politics, developing based purely on mere interests for power (Nugroho, Kenawas, Syarief 2020).[5]
An early survey by the Research Center Media Group, conducted in January – March, pointed to Haris Lambey as the likely candidate (26% of total respondents) to become Mayor of Batam. The popularity of Haris, who is an ethnic Bugis police officer stationed in the provincial police headquarter (POLDA Kepri), however, did not earn him any support from the main political parties, i.e., Golkar and PDI – P, which had their respective candidates. In this early survey, Muhammad Rudi was in second place with 18%. Lukita was in fourth with 10%.
Meanwhile, a survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) conducted in the same period, showed Muhammad Rudi’s electability to be very high, reaching close to 80% while his partner, Amsakar, reached 54%. In mid – November, a survey conducted through social media (Facebook) also reflected similar trends where the popularity of Rudi – Amsakar far surpassed the Lukita – Basyid pair, evidently shown in the percentage differences of 69% versus 31% (Table 1).
Table 1: Candidates’ electability based on early polling
Source: Authors compilation, 2020
Lukita is not originally from Batam or Riau Islands, but is a Sundanese professional bureaucrat turn politician. He had spent time in Batam since 2017 when he served as Head of Batam Indonesia Free Trade Zone Authority (BP Batam). He is a PDI-P cadre and a former member of the Research and Development Agency within PDI-P. He joined the party in 2019, just before the elections. PDI-P decided to support Lukita based on several considerations. First, he had served as Head of BP Batam from October 2017 to January 2019. Second, Lukita has a long track record in the government. He was Deputy Minister at the Ministry of National Development Planning (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/BAPPENAS) (January 2010-October 2014) and served as Secretary of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy (December 2014- October 2017). Third, Lukita is also seen as a reformist, being previously assigned by the central government to revitalise Batam’s economy.[6]
Lukita is paired with Abdul Basyid Has, a local politician. Basyid is the Head of the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) of the PKB Party, Kepri Province. Apart from having political influence within PKB, Basyid also has quite a strong business background. He is the president director of a shipping company, PT Takang Emas Samudra and owner of Hang Nadim Malay School Batam. Basyid is the richest candidate in terms of assets value compared to the other three candidates (Table 2).
Table 2: Wealth value of Batam’s regional head candidates
Apart from PDI-P and PKB, Lukita-Basyid also received political support from two other parties, namely the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) and the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). In terms of electoral support in the 2019 elections, the four-party coalition has 34% of the votes in the regional legislative council (Table 3).
Table 3: Partisan Support for the Lukita-Basyid coalition
Muhammad Rudi is the current Mayor of Batam (2016-2021). Moreover, he also served as the ex-officio Head of the Batam Indonesia Free Trade Zone Authority (BP Batam). This is a consequence of the Government Regulations No 62/2019 concerning the new management of Batam FTZ. The regulation was passed by the central government to end the problem of leadership dualism in Batam.[8] In the past, Batam city mayor and Head of BP Batam were held by two different persons.
Rudi, who is a party cadre and Head of the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) of the Nasdem Party, Kepri Province, partnered with Amsakar Achmad, a former career official in the municipal administration. Amsakar is a Nasdem cadre and Head of Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the party in Batam.[9] Rudi and Amsakar also contested and won in the 2015 Batam mayoral election.
Having candidate pairs coming from the same party in a Pilkada election is quite rare in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Rudi-Amsakar was also supported by the Golkar Party, PKS, PAN, Hanura, Democratic Party, PPP, and PSI. The coalition controls 66% of the seats in the Batam legislature (Table 4).
Table 4: Partisan Support for the Rudi-Amsakar Partnership
Wilson and Hui (2020) have observed that dynastic politics is a persistent feature of Indonesian politics.[11] Indeed, Batam and the Riau Islands Province did showcase dynastic politics at work. Rudi’s wife, Marlin Agustina, also contested in the regional election and won as Vice-governor of Kepri Province, accompanying the elected governor, Ansar Ahmad.[12] Both Rudi and his wife were supported by Nasdem and Golkar party.
Campaign Programme
In the campaign, Lukita-Basyid offered to overcome various problems in Batam and make Batam an international city. Their campaign theme was “Batam Bahagia Mendunia” or “Batam Prosperous and Globalized”. The word “bahagia” is commonly associated with prosperity. To achieve prosperity, they promised economic growth of 7% at the end of their leadership (2024). The word “mendunia” or “globalized” reflected their vision to transform Batam into a world city, with international standard in services, security, and environmental quality.[13]
Rudi-Amsakar offered quite a similar campaign theme, which was “Terwujudnya Batam sebagai bandar dunia madani yang modern, berkeadilan, dan sejahtera”, translated as “the realization of Batam as a modern, just, and prosperous global port city”. This vision was more or less similar to their 2015 campaign theme.[14]
Moreover, Rudi-Amsakar proposed six priority programmes, including acceleration of economic recovery, more equitable distribution of economic development, improvement of human resources, promoting investment, developing hinterland areas, and reforming the bureaucracy (see Appendix).
Role of campaign team
Both candidate pairs each had their respective campaign team or “tim sukses”. Lukita-Basyid’s consisted of active members of the regional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD), political party members, members of NGOs (Organisasi Masyarakat or Ormas), and private groups (Figure 2). Rudi-Amsakar’s team had almost the same composition, involving many elements of political parties and active DPRD members. The high involvement of political party elements and active DPRD members indicated their strategy to attract their respective party-based constituents.
Figure 2: Campaign team composition
The two candidates also sought support from various ethnic-cultural organizations, such as the Local Youth Association (Perpat), the Batak-Mandailing community, the Minang Family Association, and others.
Rudi-Amsakar’s campaign team used three teams of volunteers, namely, “Rudi-Amsakar Community”, “HMR Volunteers”, and “Friends of Rudi-Amsakar” (Shabara). Specifically, the Shabara team, which consists of mainly young people, targeted youth groups. The “HMR Volunteers” targeted the general public such as workers’ groups, millennial communities, and social organizations. Meanwhile, “Rudi-Amsakar Community” focused on housewives.
SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, a direct election campaign involving big crowds remained prohibited. As a result, both candidate pairs used social media as their campaign means. Here, the campaign team of both camps targeted the millennial group between 24 and 38 years old. Based on Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS) data, 560,498 people have voting rights in Batam, and around 62% of voters in the city belong to the millennial group.
Both camps used Facebook and Instagram as their platforms, but only Lukita-Basyid’s campaign team included Twitter as an alternative platform. This last platform, however, was probably not as effective as the others since few people use Twitter in Batam. In their Facebook account, Lukita-Basyid promoted photos and flyers containing pictures of the candidates and their slogan “Yuk Berubah” – “Let’s change”. In addition, it also shared videos featuring various problems in the city and their offered solutions if elected. Overall, the social media campaign was observed to be not quite effective in boosting their popularity. Despite the Lukita-Basyid pair having slightly more Facebook followers, the incumbent’s political popularity remained too strong for the challenger. This was because the incumbent pair had shown some credible progress in developing the city’s infrastructure and perhaps most importantly, had access to deliver direct social assistance programmes to the community, such as distribution of staple food, in the run-up to the election campaign. All these greatly increased their popularity.
ELECTION OUTCOMES
The Batam mayoral election in 2020 was a battle between a popular incumbent and a newcomer in local politics. In fact, the battle was lopsided. The quick count results released by the General Elections Commission (KPU) showed a convincing win for the incumbent, with 73% of the votes going his way, up from the 60% he won in the previous election.
Figure 3. Real count results by sub-districts
Compared to Rudi-Amsakar, who have been the incumbent Mayor-Vice-Mayor since 2016, the popularity of Lukita-Basyid was not very significant. Lukita had only served as Head of BP Batam for 15 months and he mostly worked outside Batam. This could have decreased his visibility to the general population. Figure 3 shows that Rudi-Amsakar won convincingly in all sub-districts in Batam. This set of results is a repeat of the 2015 mayoral election’s results, which also showed the same pair winning in all sub-districts (Figure 4). In the 2015 election, the pair competed against Ria Saptarika-Sulistiana.[15]
Figure 4. Real count results by sub-districts, 2015
Based on real count data per sub – district for both the 2015 and 2020 elections, Rudi – Amsakar’s biggest ballot pocket remained in Sagulung sub – district. In this election, there was a sharp increase in the number of voters for Rudi – Amsakar. 73% of the votes in Sagulung were cast for the pair. This result represented a sharp increase from their achievement in the 2015 election, where they only received 57% of the votes in the same sub – district. The surge in votes was the result of several popular policies implemented by the incumbent Mayor. These included the provision of free land certificates to the Sagulung community, plans for the reduction of annual compulsory housing allowance (UWTO), educational assistance and relaxation of school zoning rules.[16]
It is important to note that Covid – 19 greatly influenced Rudi – Amsakar’s electability. In response to the pandemic, the city administration headed by Rudi had initiated several social assistance (Bansos) programmes. These included basic food packages for the community, funded by Batam Municipal Government and BP Batam. As mentioned above, Rudi is the Mayor of Batam as well as the ex – officio Head of BP Batam. The bulk of the Bansos was given before the start of the campaign period in November. Between March and November, people had already received some real assistance from the city government. During the election campaign, the incumbent is obliged to take official leave and is prohibited from using government facilities for political campaigns. Nevertheless, during the campaign period, various social assistance programmes were continuously channelled and funded by their political party, i.e., Nasdem, from providing masks and food supplies, to the handing out of hand sanitizers with the slogan “Nasdem Sayang Kamu” or “Nasdem loves you”.[17]
In fact, Nasdem played a critical role in ensuring a win for the incumbent mayor. The party was very active campaigning for Rudi, who is the Head of the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) Nasdem of Kepri Province. Lukita, on the other hand, did not get full political support, especially from PDI – P, which was too concentrated on campaigning for its own candidates, Soerya Respationo – Iman Sutiawan, in the Kepri gubernatorial election. The latter lost in the election, while Rudi’s wife, Marlin Agustina, won the election as Vice Governor of Kepri Province.
Finally, campaign restrictions due to Covid – 19 made it difficult for Lukita – Basyid’s campaign team to garner support. As a result, their campaign strategies relied heavily on social media and networking with elite community leaders, such as IKBI (Ikatan Keluarga Batak Islam), IKMAL (Ikatan Keluarga Maluku), and Banteng Muda Indonesia (BMI). This had limited impact on their electability. Meanwhile, the Rudi – Amsakar team effectively approached local neighbourhood through Hamlet Associations Forum (Forum Rukun Tetangga/Rukun Warga Kota Batam) and other social institutions managed by the urban community government department. Moreover, as incumbent leaders in Batam, Rudi – Amsakar could use official government channels to communicate with the populace, including providing Covid – 19 related social assistance programmes, such as food packages. This was especially done before the start of the election campaign period (between March and October). Such channels proved more effective than the social media campaign, as the latter did not translate into tangible benefits for the populace. All in all, Rudi – Amsakar’s campaign strategy was more effective in reaching the grassroots.
CONCLUSION
The success of Rudi – Amsakar in winning their second term can be attributed to solid political support from eight political parties. The pair’s dominance in the two elections shows their growing popularity and political consolidation among the bureaucratic elites and the grassroots community in Batam. The challenger, despite high expectations to bring changes, had however failed to offer a differentiated and attractive campaign programme. The incumbent had a strong advantage given their achievements in building infrastructure in the city and most importantly their access to social assistance programmes to support the grassroots community from the pandemic.
Looking at Rudi’s campaign programmes, one may expect a continuation of some economic ones, such as the zoning programme, i.e., setting a demarcation between trade and government areas to optimise land use; promotion of tourism special economic zones; and continuation of some infrastructure projects, including port and roads.
What remains unclear is their strategy for accelerating Batam’s economic recovery, especially its lacklustre manufacturing sector.
Appendix: Table A1: Lukita – Basyid’ Campaign Programme
Table A2: Rudi-Amsakar’s Campaign Programme
ISEAS Perspective 2021/9, 4 February 2021.
____________________
ENDNOTES
[1] Andrew M. Carruthers (2018). Living on the Edge: Being Malay (and Bugis) in the Riau Islands, ISEAS Trends No.12.
[2] https://batampos.co.id/2020/12/08/pasien-covid-19-di-batam-bertambah-lagi-segini-jumlahnya-6/
[3] https://batam.tribunnews.com/2015/12/22/kpu-umumkan-rudi-amsakar-jadi-wali-kota-batam-terpilih-kini-tinggal-tunggu-hasil-audit-keuangan
[4] https://pilkada2015.kpu.go.id/batamkota/form_db1
[5] Yanuar Nugroho, Yoes Kenawas, and Sofie S. Syarief. A Post-mortem Analysis of Indonesia’s 2020 Pilkada, forthcoming.
[6] https://www.antaranews.com/berita/659648/darmin-nasution-lantik-lukita-tuwo-jadi-ketua-bp-batam
[7] https://batam.tribunnews.com/2020/09/27/harta-calon-wakil-wali-kota-batam-abdul-basyid-has-rp-71-m-aset-terbesar-tanah-bangunan-di-batam?page=4
[8] https://mediacenter.batam.go.id/2019/08/12/kpu-tetapkan-50-anggota-dewan-terpilih/
[9] https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20190924071729-92-433236/jokowi-resmikan-kepemimpinan-bp-batam-oleh-wali-kota
[10] https://mediacenter.batam.go.id/2019/08/12/kpu-tetapkan-50-anggota-dewan-terpilih/
[11] /wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_140-ii.pdf
[12] https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1905552/pasangan-suami-dan-istri-menang-di-pilkada-kepri-2020
[13] https://kpud-batamkota.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/SYARAT-PENCALONAN-LUKITA-BASYID.pdf
[14] In the 2015 Batam Pilkada, Rudi-Amsakar’s campaign theme was ”Terwujudnya Batam sebagai Bandar Dunia Madani yang Berdaya Saing, Maju, Sejahtera, dan Bermartabat” or the realization of Batam as a Competitive, Advanced, Prosperous, and Respectable Global Port
[15] The battle between the two pairs was a competition between two old-guards. Both Rudi and Ria have both served as Deputy Mayor of Batam during Ahmad Dahlan’s mayoral period (2006-2016).
[16] http://infopublik.id/read/242046/walikota-batam-serahkan-2.700-sertifikat-tanah-.html
[17] https://wartakepri.co.id/2020/11/11/hut-partai-nasdem-ke-9-m-kamaluddin-29-ribu-masker-akan-dibagikan-untuk-masyarakat-kepri/
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“The Prospects and Dangers of Algorithmic Credit Scoring in Vietnam: Regulating a Legal Blindspot” by Nicolas Lainez
ISEAS Perspective 2021/8 “The Fall of Warisan in Sabah’s Election: Telltale Signs, Causes and Salient Issues” by Arnold Puyok
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Public opinion polls conducted prior to the 16th Sabah state election provided telltale signs of Warisan’s loss of support and impending electoral defeat.
- Warisan’s fall from power was mostly due to the party’s inability to address the priority needs of the largely rural Muslim Bumiputera and Kadazandusun voters.
- Research fieldwork during the election campaign and post-election analysis reveal that rural Sabah voters are more concerned with bread-and-butter issues, while their partisan loyalties are not steadfast. They are willing to trade their political support for programmes and policies that yield tangible benefits.
- The new state government led by Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) will face the twin challenges of appeasing increasingly demanding voters and delivering public goods effectively.
- As GRS navigates these politically uncertain times, its future in Sabah looks unpromising.
* Arnold Puyok is Senior Lecturer in Politics and Government Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS).
INTRODUCTION
In the recent Sabah state election, GRS (Gabungan Rakyat Sabah), comprising BN (Barisan Nasional), PN (Perikatan Nasional) and PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah), won 38 seats in the state legislative assembly, prevailing over a Warisan – led coalition by a six – seat margin. The three candidates who contested as independents later pledged their support to GRS, buffering that coalition’s grip on Sabah politics.
The incumbent Warisan’s defeat was not unexpected given the change in mood among voters, as reflected in the two surveys carried out by Sabah – based think tank, Society Empowerment and Economic Development of Sabah (SEEDS), released prior to the election.[1] The two surveys clearly show voter sentiments and inclinations across all party affiliations overwhelmingly favouring the PN – led federal government, while Warisan enjoyed solid backing only from its affiliated voters, along with firm disapproval from BN – and PN – affiliated voters. Support for Warisan further ebbed between late August and the conclusion of the election campaign period. The two surveys also provide a glimpse into the issues most salient to the voters.
This article aims to answer these questions: To what extent does the mood of the voters prior to the election reflect on the electoral outcomes? What caused the swing in support to GRS? Which issues saliently influenced voters?
WARISAN’S STEEP RISE AND SHAKY POSITION
First, it is important to provide an overview of Sabah politics after Warisan’s rise in 2018. The expectations towards the party were high with people being disenchanted with Sabah UMNO’s dominance and the slew of corruption scandals implicating BN leaders. In short, the people wanted a drastic change and they were willing to give Warisan a chance, and ending BN’s decades – long rule over Sabah.
Warisan’s checkered record after just 22 months in power is characterised by the party’s inability to deliver on the promises of reforming the state administration and of transforming Sabah’s economy. Many welcomed the changes brought about by Warisan such as abolishing communal land titles and stopping illegal logging, among other things.[2] Some, however, criticized Warisan for politicising the GLCs (government – linked companies) and for failing to introduce a comprehensive and long – term economic plan for Sabah.[3]
With 13 lawmakers leaving Warisan to support former chief minister Musa Aman, trouble brewed further within Warisan.[4] The defectors – most of whom were Musa loyalists – were believed to be alienated in terms of various political appointments and the distribution of government projects.[5] Shafie’s failure to persuade them to stay put and to urge party members to close ranks led to a mini rebellion in Warisan. The party’s decision to support former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad – a divisive figure in Sabah – and to go against the federal government under PN – weakened Warisan’s position further. Warisan thus entered the state election a wounded lion.
PRE – ELECTION MOOD
The first survey, conducted on 24 – 31 August 2020, gauged the perception of the performance of the PN – led federal government and the Warisan – led state government. A majority of the 2,350 respondents[6] said that PN had managed the country well (Table 1). The same affirmative response could also be seen among the voters affiliated to Warisan and Sabah – based parties, showing the bipartisan nature of the approval of the PN administration (Table 1).
Even though 42.3 percent of the respondents said that Warisan had managed the country well, a sizable 36.5 percent responded in the negative (Table 2). More than half of the voters affiliated to BN/PN and Sabah – based parties also thought that Warisan had not managed Sabah well. This may be attributed to complaints that the Covid – 19 financial aid that Warisan promised to distribute did not reach the rural people and that Warisan did not have a clear economic recovery plan similar to what had been introduced by the federal government.
Table 1: Perception of the PN – led Federal Government
Source: SEEDS (2020a)
Notes: (1) Parti Warisan Sabah, Pakatan Harapan (PKR, DAP, Amanah), UPKO (United Progressive Kinabalu Organisation); (2) BN/PN parties/affiliates: UMNO, Bersatu, Star Sabah, Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS), Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Sabah People’s Progressive Party (SAPP); (3) Parti Cinta Sabah (PCS), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah (Gagasan), Parti Kerjasama Anak Negeri (AN), Parti Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Sabah Bersatu (USNO), Parti Perpaduan Rakyat Sabah (PPRS), Parti Harapan Rakyat Sabah (HARAPAN RAKYAT), Parti Kebangsaan Sabah (PKS), Pertubuhan Perpaduan Rakyat Kebangsaan Sabah (PERTUBUHAN)
Table 2: Perception of the Warisan – led Sabah Government
Source: SEEDS (2020a)
In the same survey, the respondents were also asked whether or not Warisan should continue to lead Sabah. The responses were telling, particularly among young adults (between 21 – 40 years old) and seniors (61 years old and above), who were virtually split 50 – 50, reflecting a marginal incumbency advantage for Warisan. While slightly more than half of middle – aged adult respondents said Warisan should continue to lead Sabah, 47.6 percent responded in the negative.
Table 3: Should Warisan Continue to Lead Sabah?
Source: SEEDS (2020a)
The findings of the second survey, conducted on 21 – 24 September toward the end of the election campaign period and involving 1,238 respondents, continued to sound the alarm bell for Warisan. In this second sweep – a repeat of the same survey questionnaire on a different, Sabah – wide sample of respondents – there is a slight increase in the share of respondents who said they were satisfied with the performance of Sabah Chief Minister Shafie Apdal (Table 4). This, however, was counter – balanced by the increase in the proportion of respondents who were very unsatisfied with Shafie. There were also more respondents who felt that Warisan was not managing Sabah very well (Table 5).
Table 4: Change in Perception of the Performance of Chief Minister Shafie Apdal
Source: SEEDS (2020a & 2020b)
Table 5: Change in Perception of the Performance of the Warisan – led State Government
Source: SEEDS (2020a & 2020b)
The survey also sheds some light on the issues that may have influenced voters. Infrastructural development emerged more saliently among factors influencing respondents’ voting decisions, capturing the importance of Sabahans’ material well – being – specifically, the lack of connectivity and public facilities which are perennial issues in Sabah. Very large proportions also named state government and federal government performance as highly significant factors, while issues of a more political or ethical orientation, such as state – federal relations, Philippine claim to Sabah and party hopping, were also important, but to a lesser extent (Table 6).
Table 6: Issues Affecting Voting Decision
Source: SEEDS (2020b)
Note: For this section in the questionnaire, respondents were asked: “what are the important issues affecting your voting decision?
Comparison of public approval of the federal PN government versus the Warisan state government also proves instructive. PN rated better than Warisan in terms of the way it handled key issues such as economic management, governance, security and the Covid – 19 pandemic (Table 7). These responses may derive from the greater visibility of the federal government in these matters that decidedly come under federal jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the state government also can play significant roles in economic management, and the question of governance pertained mostly to the conduct of political leaders and anti – corruption measures, for which governments at all levels hold responsibility. Nonetheless, Warisan’s lower approval ratings boded ill. When it comes to ethnic relations, Warisan fared well. This is understandable, given that PN had been accused of supporting PAS’s brand of politics which is deemed unsuitable in Sabah.
Table 7: Percentage of Respondents Satisfied with Government Handling of Key Issues
Source: SEEDS (2020b)
The two surveys painted a general picture of voter sentiments in the run – up to polling day on 26 September. But to what extent did the mood of the voters prior to the election reflect on the electoral outcomes? Which issues were most salient in influencing the voters’ decision? What, ultimately, caused the swing in support to GRS?
RESULTS, CAUSES AND SALIENT ISSUES
Warisan maintained its dominance in the Tawau/East Coast Division, its traditional stronghold (For a map of the election outcomes, see Anan 2020). However, overall, there was a significant decrease in the number of votes Warisan received in the Muslim Bumiputera constituencies (Table 8). Warisan and its allies were also not able to improve on their performance in the Kadazandusun constituencies, obtaining only 32.60 percent of the popular vote there compared to GRS’ 50.39 percent (Table 9). In fact, Warisan’s ally UPKO only managed to win one seat out of the 10 seats it contested in the Kadazandusun areas.
Table 8: Muslim Bumiputera Constituencies: Popular Votes, Seats Contested and Seats Won, by Party/Coalition
Source: recalculated from https://dashboard.spr.gov.my/#!home [7]
Note: number in parentheses show the popular votes obtained in 2018
Table 9: Kadazandusun Constituencies: Popular Votes, Seats Contested and Seats Won, by Party/Coalition
Source: recalculated from https://dashboard.spr.gov.my/#!home
Note: number in parentheses show the popular votes obtained in 2018
Clearly, there was a significant swing of support from Warisan to GRS, especially in the Muslim Bumiputera and Kadazandusun areas. What were the issues that account for this? Observers attribute this to a confluence of factors such as the party’s inability to win the support of the Kadazandusun, disorganised campaigning, poor handling of the PTI (pendatang tanpa izin or illegal immigrants issue), low voter turnout, and so on (see, for instance, James Chin and Bridget Welsh).[8]
The election shows that the mood and needs of the voters (particularly those in the rural areas) cannot be taken for granted. Warisan campaigned on the idea that unity and non – racial politics are the key for Sabah’s progress. This approach, according to the Ilham Centre think tank, was effective and managed to capture the voters’ imagination.[9]
Warisan went on and promoted messages such as “Sabahans unite not divide” and “In God we trust, unite we must”. Billboards were also erected in strategic areas showing Shafie’s famous quote: “We are here to build a nation, not a particular race or religion”. The message was accompanied by Shafie’s self – portrait á la Che Guevara – the Cuban revolutionary leader. While such messages resonated well among those in the semi – urban and urban areas, the voters in the interior were less excited, and had “different priorities”.[10] Some even downplayed the messages, accusing Warisan of wanting to integrate foreigners (read: illegal immigrants) into society on the pretext of unity and nation – building.[11]
The new narrative that Warisan was trying to promote was not rejected outright; instead some criticised the party for its failure to address more pressing issues facing the people such as economic livelihood and infrastructural development. PN quickly filled this void by elevating Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin who was already quite likeable for his populist policy in handing out various economic assistance in responding to the Covid – 19 outbreak. In the first survey by SEEDS, 89.6 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the performance of Muhyiddin as prime minister.[12]
PN’s strategy of putting Muhyiddin Yassin’s face along with the tag “abah” (our father) and “kita jaga kita” (we take care of each other) on its campaign posters worked well in increasing his popularity among voters in the interior. On – the – ground observation during the campaign period found spirited support for PN due to its distribution of various financial aid to the needy to alleviate their economic hardship, including one woman vegetable seller interviewed for this research.[13] While PN was credited for extending economic support, Warisan was blamed for failing to make sure that financial aid reached the rural people.[14]
We also found broad support for local – based parties affiliating with PN as it had the access and necessary resources to develop the country. One university student residing in Keningau said that Star Sabah was in a much better position to develop the area as it was part of the ruling coalition (Jeffrey Kitingan of Star Sabah was one of the main contenders for the state seat of Tambunan under the Keningau parliamentary seat).[15] The same sentiment was echoed by a candidate contesting as an independent in Matunggong (a state seat under the Kudat parliamentary seat in the north of Sabah) who claimed that the people in his constituency were struggling to commute to the nearby town as the road access was bad.[16] He supported PN openly, hoping that the ruling coalition would improve the infrastructural development in his constituency. While doing fieldwork in Keningau, the author saw a banner that read: “ada aspal/jambatan, ada undi” (tar the roads and build a bridge, and our vote is guaranteed). The message from the voters was clear: their support depended on programmes and policies that yield tangible benefits.
Signs of impending loss of support were clear for Warisan but the party did not act swiftly to reconnect with voters or to address their most pressing needs: infrastructural development and economic security. While promising to work with PH at the federal level in bringing the much – needed reforms to Sabah, Warisan was not bold enough to initiate meaningful changes in the administration. The mood of the electorate prior to the election gave some indication about the issues that are salient to them and their perception of PN and Warisan leaders.
Despite suffering defeat in the election and now struggling to look for a stable federal partner, all is not lost for Warisan. It is still the party with the most number of seats (22) in the state legislative assembly. All that Warisan needs to do is to play its role effectively as the opposition in order to regain the people’s trust.
The people are watching GRS closely. The new Chief Minister Hajiji Noor is known for his “nice guy” image but his leadership ability in managing a complex state like Sabah is yet to be proven. There is already grumbling that GRS is slow in tackling the state’s economy despite the recent formation of the Sabah Economic Council.[17]
CONCLUSION
The change in perception of Warisan prior to the election was significantly reflected on the electoral outcomes. Warisan’s defeat was not only attributable to the party’s internal weaknesses but also to its failure in addressing bread – and – butter issues in the rural Muslim Bumiputera and Kadazandusun areas. GRS was quick to take advantage by convincing voters that it had the access and the necessary resources to alleviate voters’ economic concerns during the Covid – 19 pandemic. The election showed that voters particularly in the rural Sabah are still attracted to programmes and policies that can yield tangible benefits. This explains why despite Warisan’s effort of promoting unity, values and sense of belonging in its campaigns, it failed to draw the support of the largely rural voters. The challenge for the GRS – led government is to meet the expectations of the increasingly demanding voters and to deliver public goods effectively.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/8, 29 January 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] Society Empowerment and Economic Development of Sabah (SEEDS) (2020a). ‘The Sabah Imperative: PRN 2020 Key Realities on the Ground’ <https://www.facebook.com/seedssabah1/>(accessed 15 October 2020) & Society Empowerment and Economic Development of Sabah (SEEDS) (2020b). ‘SEEDS Sabah Electoral Project 2020: Findings from the Second Sweep’ <https://www.facebook.com/seedssabah1/>(accessed 15 October 2020).
[2] Julia Chan, “Shafie’s year – end rated: The good, the bad… and the ‘we’ll see’”, Malay Mail, 26 December 2018 <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/12/26/shafies – year – end – rated – the – good – the – bad… – and – the – well – see/1706276> (accessed 11 October 2020).
[3] FMT Reporters, “You’re just like BN, Bersih slams Warisan on GLC appointments”. Free Malaysia Today, 4 June 2020 <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/06/04/youre – just – like – bn – bersih – slams – warisan – on – glc – appointments/> (accessed 11 October 2020) & FMT Reporters, “Warisan excuse proves it failed to manage Sabah economy, Najib says”, Free Malaysia Today < https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/08/03/warisan – excuse – proves – it – failed – to – manage – sabah – economy – najib – says/> (accessed 14 October 2020).
[4] Julia Chan, “Warisan assemblymen who supported Musa Aman in toppling state govt considered sacked”, Malay Mail, 31 July 2020 < https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/07/31/warisan – assemblymen – who – supported – musa – aman – in – toppling – state – govt – consider/1889900> (accessed 20 December 2020).
[5] An anonymous UMNO party leader, text message to author, 20 December 2020.
[6] The respondents were selected from Sabah’s 25 parliamentary seats, stratified according to voting districts, age group and ethnicity.
[7] “Pilihanraya Umum DUN Sabah Ke – 16” (The 16th Sabah State Legislative Assembly Election), Election Commission of Malaysia < https://dashboard.spr.gov.my/#!home> (accessed 20 October 2020)
[8] James Chin, “Commentary: Sabah’s surprise results – and how Warisan lost big in state elections”, Channel News Asia, 28 September 2020 <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/sabah – election – results – how – warisan – lost – big – grs – won – huge – 13156026> (accessed 14 October 2020) & Bridget Welsh, “Why Warisan Plus lost – a preliminary analysis”, Malaysiakini, 28 September 2020 <https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/544346> (accessed 15 October 2020).
[9] Panel Penyelidikan Ilham Centre (lham Centre Research Panel). 2020. Ringkasan Eksekutif: Pola Pengundian Pilihan Raya Negeri Sabah 2020 (Executive Summary: Voting Pattern in the 2020 Sabah State Election). Ilham Centre.
[10] Anonymous Chinese NGO volunteer, text message to author, October 11, 2020.
[11] Anonymous Kadazandusun party volunteer, text message to authors, October 11, 2020.
[12] SEEDS (2020a).
[13] Anonymous, personal communication, September 23, 2020.
[14] James Chin, “Commentary: Sabah’s surprise results – and how Warisan lost big in state elections”, Channel News Asia, 28 September 2020 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/sabah – election – results – how – warisan – lost – big – grs – won – huge – 13156026 (accessed 11 October 2020)
[15] An anonymous undergraduate student of Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), personal communication, September 24, 2020.
[16] An anonymous member of a local – based party, personal communication, September 20, 2020.
[17] n.a. 2020. “Sabah Economic Council formed, Daily Express, 29 October 2020 < https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/160730/sabah – economic – council – formed/> (accessed 8 December 2020).
ISEAS Perspective 2021/7 “The South Kalimantan Gubernatorial Election: Oligarchic, Bureaucratic and Dangdut Politics” by Norshahril Saat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The regional election in South Kalimantan (Kalimantan Selatan or Kalsel) did not elicit much attention from observers before the 9 December polls. The focus was instead on the contests in Jawa and Sumatera.
- In Kalimantan Selatan, the gubernatorial contest was between incumbent Haji Sahbirin Noor, who paired with his former rival Haji Muhidin; and Denny Indrayana and Difriadi Drajat. The Sahbirin – Muhidin pair had always been the favorites to win, having received backing from more political parties and rich businesses than their rivals.
- During the campaign, the Denny – Rifdiadi team lodged several complaints against their opponent to the local election commission for breaching electoral regulations laws. The main complaint was that Sahbirin took advantage of his position as incumbent to garner votes, including claiming credit for nationwide Covid-19 aid distributed to the masses.
- While an analysis about Pilkada 2020 generally revolves around dynastic politics and identity politics, the South Kalimantan election offers interesting insights into the role of political oligarchy, of bureaucratic partisanship, and of the electoral commission. Sahbirin only managed to secure a minute majority of 0.48 percent, which now means that the election result may only be resolved by the constitutional court.
*Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Co-coordinator of the Indonesia Studies Programme. He wishes to thank Mr Muhajir Ahmad, PhD Candidate of Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University (ANU), and Mr Made Supriatma, Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, for their comments.
INTRODUCTION
The 2020 Indonesia regional election (Pilkada) was conducted while the country was battling to keep the number of Covid-19 cases down.[1] For some observers, dynastic politics featured strongly in the Pilkada. They consider the contests in some seats to have been a “family affair.”[2] So profound was the focus on dynastic politics that relatively little attention was given to identity politics, a subject that dominated recent Indonesian elections.[3]
This article argues therefore that dynastic politics or identity politics did not feature much in the South Kalimantan gubernatorial election. The tussle instead centered on the role of the provincial bureaucracy and the advantages of incumbency. Although the South Kalimantan (Kalsel) election did not raise much excitement before the polls, the post – election competition has become all the more interesting to watch after the incumbent Haji Sahbirin Noor secured a meagre 0.48 percent majority against his opponent Denny Indrayana. There is a strong possibility that the electoral outcome will be decided by the national constitutional court.
The gubernatorial contest in the South Kalimantan province escapes many Indonesian and international analysts’ attention because of their tendency to focus on the contests in Jawa and Sumatera. Focusing on the South Kalimantan election raises some interesting findings: first, it allows for a better understanding of the community, the majority of whom are Muslims living in Borneo. Whether Islam plays a major role in politics here is subject to interpretation.[4] The truth is that while Muslims make up 96.7 percent of South Kalimantan’s 4.8 million people, identity politics do not feature much. Unlike in Jakarta, where there is an economically powerful and assertive non – Muslim minority, South Kalimantan Muslims finds little need to affirm their identity. Examining South Kalimantan closely may also open doors for a better understanding of neighboring provinces such as East Kalimantan—where the future capital of Indonesia is planned to be—North Kalimantan, and West Kalimantan. But more importantly, the gubernatorial contest in South Kalimantan offers new perspectives about provincial and regional elections in Indonesia. It appears that the province’s bureaucracy, the provincial Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu Kalsel), and the Constitutional Court in Jakarta can play a significant role in determining outcomes. The South Kalimantan contest also underscores the prevalence of oligarchic and bureaucratic politics, and how voters are beginning to challenge them through their votes.
BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTH KALIMANTAN ELECTION
South Kalimantan is a Muslim majority society. Its capital, Banjarmasin, is the birthplace of many influential ulama (religious elites). Until today, the ulama’s role in shaping political discourses and opinions of the populace should not be underrated. The Banjarese — the 10th largest ethnic group in Indonesia — are one of the biggest groups in South Kalimantan. Since the 16th century, the province’s Islamic character has been strong.[5] In fact, the province produced one of the greatest Islamic scholars in the region, Muhammad Arsyad al – Banjari (1710 – 1812). He is credited with transforming the religious community in the province as well as the region after his return from his studies in Mecca. Another famous 19th century ulama who made significant contributions was Muhammad Nafis al – Banjari. In more recent times, Islam has featured prominently in the province’s political debates. Politicians seeking to make headway will occasionally pay tribute to the Banjar ulama to gain their blessings or to demonstrate a public show of piety. One famous ulama with such stature was Tuan Guru Ijai (Muhammad Zaini Abdul Ghani, b.1942 – d.2005). Another of equal influence was Kyai Haji Zuhdiannor or Guru Zuhdi (b.1972 – d.2020).
In the 2019 presidential election, South Kalimantan was overwhelmingly pro – Prabowo Subianto. He secured 64.07 percent of the votes in the province (1,467,906 million votes) against Jokowi, who won only 35.93 percent (823,219 votes).[6] To recall, identity issues featured strongly in Prabowo’s campaign. In the 2020 South Kalimantan gubernatorial election, the contest for the governor and vice – governor positions was a two – way fight between H Sahbirin Noor the incumbent, who paired up with H Muhidin; and Denny Indrayana and Difriadi Drajat. Interestingly, in the 2015 South Kalimantan Pilkada, Sahbirin ran against H Muhidin and won by a 0.78 percent majority.[7]
There are altogether 55 seats in the South Kalimantan provincial legislative assembly (DPRD), and the current assemblymen were elected in September 2019. The current term of government lasts until 2024. In line with Indonesia’s electoral rules, a candidate must be endorsed by 20 percent of DPRD members or 25 percent of accumulated valid votes in the previous DPRD election.[8] The Sahbirin – Muhidin pair was supported by 40 assemblymen and six parties: Golkar, PAN, PKS, PKB, Nasdem and PDI – P, or 73 percent support.[9] The Denny – Difriadi pair was on the other hand endorsed by 14 assemblymen and four parties, namely Gerindra, Demokrat, PPP and Berkarya, equaling 25 percent support. Ironically, these endorsements do not reflect how parties are currently aligned in the South Kalimantan DPRD. The table below shows how some Gerindra and PPP, the parties in the current South Kalimantan government, lent their support to opposition candidates Denny and Difriadi.
Sahbirin was the clear favorite to retain the governorship, and his choice of H Muhidin as his running mate also boosted his chances for re – election. In the 2015 election, both Sahbirin and Muhidin were opponents, and Sahbirin won by 0.78 percent. Their reconciliation was expected to heal old wounds that would present a commanding and formidable partnership for the future. Moreover, the pair was endowed with huge resources at their disposal. Muhidin was named the richest candidate to run for Pilkada 2020, with a wealth estimated at Rp674billion (milliar) or SGD$63.2 million.[10] This includes 19 plots of land in Banjarmasin, Banjar, Tapin, and South Jakarta. He also exhibits ownership of posh vehicles such as Harley Davidson, Mini Cooper, and Lexus. Some voters consider Muhidin a generous and down – to – earth man. He said that being one of the richest candidates to contest in the election is also a plus, because he would not have to think too much about getting more money if elected. Nevertheless, how he managed to acquire wealth may be more important than counting the assets in his possession. Muhidin profited from coal mining, a major natural resource readily available in the province, and was one of those who benefitted from the country’s decentralization policy.
However, Denny’s challenge was one that Sahbirin never took lightly. Denny was the vice – minister of law and human rights between 2011 and 2014, during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency. His running mate was also not a political novice: between 2010 and 2015, Derajat was the vice bupati of Tanah Bumbu, a district in South Kalimantan.
ISSUES DURING THE CAMPAIGN
The vote count gave Sahbirin and Muhidin the victory, but only by a tiny margin of 0.48 percent. In fact, there were instances during the counting when Denny – Rifdiadi pair was leading. On 9 December, Indikator’s quick count showed Denny – Difriadi leading by 50.39 percent.[11] Charta Politika also made similar conclusions based on its quick counts.[12]
Sahbirin and Muhidin used the acronym Paman BirinMu during their campaign. Though the term BirinMU is the pair’s combined, shortened names, it can be read as “Your Uncle Birin.” Meanwhile Denny and Difriadi used the acronym H2D. Comparing the two teams, Denny and Difriadi’s campaign and policy recommendations were more substantive and encompassing: the duo focused on spirituality, environment and human resource. The pair also underscored the significance of governing principles, as well as infrastructural development. On the other hand, Sahbirin and Muhidin focused on energy development. Their manifesto was “Progress, Development, Welfare and making South Kalimantan the window to the Capital City” (Maju, Makmur Sejahtera Berkelanjutan Menuju Kalsel Gerbang Ibu Kota Negara). Their aim was to take advantage of the fact that South Kalimantan is in close proximity to the proposed new Indonesian capital in East Kalimantan.[13] Even though the province is a major producer of coal, and exports coal to other provinces, Sahbirin promised to embark on a massive solar energy project, which could provide free electricity for all South Kalimantan residents.
Denny performed better than expected for several reasons. Among others, he was backed by strong national politicians such as Prabowo Subianto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.[14] As expected, Gerindra and Demokrat supported Denny’s candidacy. Demokrat’s endorsement of Denny was anticipated because the party sits in opposition to the Sahbirin South Kalimantan government. Nevertheless, it was Gerindra’s decision to withdraw its support from Sahbirin that surprised many, since the party remains part of the South Kalimantan government. Reasons for the Gerindra move were manifold. South Kalimantan was Prabowo’s stronghold in the 2019 presidential election, and the move can be read as an attempt by Prabowo and his party Gerindra to carve out a support base in the province, which has traditionally been Golkar’s stronghold. Moreover, Denny was also one of Prabowo’s lawyers when the defeated presidential candidate fought his case in the constitutional court. Sahbirin’s decision to bring Muhidin into his camp could also have triggered the Gerindra shift. In the 2019 presidential election, the South Kalimantan chapter of the Islamic party PAN supported Jokowi – Ma’ruf Amin even though at the national level, the party supported Prabowo – Sandiaga Uno. Muhidin, a PAN leader, had failed to tow the party line.
On the other hand, Sahbirin was unable to draw enough of Muhidin’s supporters to his camp. Opposition to Sahbirin could be due to his leadership qualities. So far, 14,800 South Kalimantan residents have tested positive for Covid – 19, and more than 570 people have died.[15] Sahbirin styled himself similarly to President Jokowi, with his blusukan (going to the ground unannounced) and reached out to village folks during his first term in government. This however did not have much resonance on the ground. But there could be other reasons for voters’ rejection of Sahbirin: his association with the luxurious Kiram Park, which the locals call Paman Birin Villa, for example. The site, among others, have hosted numerous motor sporting events and dangdut parties, which coincidently, are the governor’s hobbies.[16] Dangdut is a popular Indonesian music genre featuring men and women (especially the latter) gyrating to the beat. Moreover, Sahbirin’s rumored close connection with the generally unpopular coal magnate, Haji Isam, or Andi Syamsuddin Arsyad, did not help the incumbent’s campaign.
Throughout the campaign, the use of smear tactics and the circulation of fake news were common. Denny Indrayana was also a victim of black campaigning. News was circulated that Denny was not cleared of a 2014 corruption case related to a payment gateway when he was vice – minister of law and human rights.[17] Denny said that this was a timeworn case and asserted that he had already been cleared of any wrongdoing in 2015. In response, Denny claimed that it was Sahbirin that had incurred great losses for the province through embarking on failed mega projects. Muhidin was also not spared by Denny’s team, and it was claimed that the vice – governor candidate had a history of being investigated for corruption, too. In 2014, he was accused of paying a bribe to Adriansyah, the bupati (regent) of Tanah Laut, of Rp3 billion while he was the Banjarmasin mayor; this was tied to his connection to PT Binuang Jaya Mulia—a coal mining business—of which he was a shareholder.[18] The charges were later dropped.[19]
Islam or identity politics did not feature much in the South Kalimantan campaign this time, compared to the 2005, 2010, and 2015 elections. In previous elections, there were instances in which candidates solicited support from religious figures to boost their chances. However, identity politics did not manifest much this time since both camps had equal outreach to the Muslim base. For example, PPP was on Denny’s side, while PAN, PKS, PKB were on the side of Sahbirin. While the two contestants did not raise many issues on Islamic matters, the practice of seeking endorsement from Islamic organizations continued. Denny, for example, sought support from South Kalimantan’s Muhammadiyah leaders.[20] Denny also capitalized on Sahbirin’s relatively less pious image by shoring up his own Islamic image. For example, he introduced himself as Haji Denny (having performed the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca) before calling himself Professor Denny.[21] He also described his candidacy as Hijrah Gasan Banua, to mean answering the “call to serve Kalimantan Selatan, by returning to his birthplace” rather than remaining in Jakarta.[22] The choice of the word hijrah is significant; in Islam, it means a religiously noble migration for the betterment of society. The image Denny portrayed contrasted from the numerous videos on social media of Sahbirin singing and dancing with female dangdut artists. Though popular amongst Banjarese, this is frowned upon by conservative Muslims.
A BUREAUCRATIC – POLITICAL DIVIDE IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN
However, what is interesting in the South Kalimantan election is the role of the regional bureaucracy. In democracies, the bureaucracy may support the elected government in implementing policies but it should not be involved in campaigning during elections. However, in previous elections, there had been reports that the South Kalimantan bureaucracy was partisan and would assist incumbent governors for re – election. For example, in 2010, Governor Rudi Arifin was able to retain his position with strong support from the bureaucracy.[23]
In the 2020 campaign, numerous reports were made about the incumbent Sahbirin abusing the powers of his office. The Denny – Ridiadi team accused Sahbirin and Muhidin of defaulting on several election laws: all in all committing 107 offences Denny and Rifdiadi argued that the offences were conducted in a systematic fashion and the incumbent should therefore be disqualified.[24] Details of the offences were not revealed, but reports suggested that they were related to abuse of Covid – 19 assistance funds (bansos Covid – 19).[25] On 5 November, Denny showed a packet of rice and a straw bag with Sahbirin’s name written on them to the media as he made a complaint to the South Kalimantan election supervisory body (Bawaslu). He was making inferences that Covid – 19 aid was being politicized to garner votes in the election.[26] The South Kalimantan Bawaslu squashed the claims, citing that no infringement of electoral rules had happened. Denny then made a report at the Bawaslu national level, but on 25 November, a few days before the polls, the national election supervisory agency issued a statement rejecting Denny’s claim of electoral fraud and said that there was not enough evidence to disqualify Sahbirin and Muhidin.[27] Its contention: only one of the reported abuses was conducted after Sahbirin was named a gubernatorial candidate, thus it did not meet the requirement of “structured” and “massive” fraud. Denny’s legal team remained optimistic, sharing that there were two charges against Sahbirin: the first was abuse of power as governor for electoral advantage, and the second, structural, systematic, and massive fraud. The election commission only dismissed the second complaint but did not issue any ruling on the first.[28]
CONCLUSION
The Denny – Difriadi team is now taking the fight at the constitutional court. The latest is that Denny’s team claims that there were voting irregularities in some districts which recorded 100 percent voter turnout, whereas on average, only 50 percent of voters turned out in the province.[29] Throughout the campaign, Denny and Difriadi had to overcome the resources that were at the incumbent’s and his running mate’s disposal. Whatever the outcome, the pair can claim moral victory, given the small victory margin the incumbent managed to achieve. Moreover, although the incumbent is backed by a majority of the political parties in the provincial parliament (DPRD Provinsi), and by a majority of the assemblymen, he failed to achieve a convincing victory.
Denny Indrayana has revolutionized politics in South Kalimantan, bringing the rule of law into serious play. Sahbirin – Muhidin’s marginal victory shows that voters are not decisively influenced by money, oligarchic, and bureaucratic politics. The contest in South Kalimantan did not end with the polling but is in fact just beginning. It is reminiscent of the 2019 presidential election when the losing candidate Prabowo brought the issue to court, even though the margin of victory for Jokowi was much bigger than in this case. Only time will tell whether Sahbirin will seek reconciliation with Denny, as Jokowi did with Prabowo by recruiting him into his cabinet. As mentioned, Sahbirin looks up to Jokowi, while Denny is a Prabowo ally. There was a precedent to this possibility; in 2016, Sahbirin and Muhidin were competing with each other, but came together in 2020. While the governance setup at the provincial level may be different from that at the national level, such that the provincial governor does not have a cabinet to form, and instead picks career bureaucrats as part of the administration, all eyes are on how the gubernatorial election in 2025 will pan out.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/7, 28 January 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] In total, nine provinces, 224 districts and 37 cities held polls concurrently. The closely watched gubernatorial contests were for West Sumatera, Riau Islands, and Jambi provinces. Surabaya (East Jawa), Medan (North Sumatera), Batam (Riau), and Surakarta (Central Jawa) also witnessed fierce contests for the mayoral posts.
[2] The Economist, “Indonesia politics is becoming a family affair,” 3 December 2020. Gibram Rakabuming Raka, the son of Indonesian president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) ran in the Surakarta mayoral election. Jokowi’s son – in – law, Bobby Nasution, competed for the mayoral election in Medan. In the same vein, the daughter of vice president Ma’ruf Amin, Siti Nur Azizah, ran for the mayoral contest in South Tanggerang against the niece of the defence minister Prabowo Subianto, Rahayu Saraswati Djojohadikusumo. See also Marchip Irfan Gorbiano, “Competitive South Tangerang election takes national spotlight,” The Jakarta Post, 5 December 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/12/05/competitive – south – tangerang – election – takes – national – spotlight.html
[3] In the heated 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial contest, scholars observed that Indonesia was experiencing a “conservative” turn. In that election, the incumbent governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) was defeated, partly due to smear campaign attacking his religion and ethnicity. He was later jailed for blasphemy. In the run up to the 2019 presidential election, the focus on identity politics also outweighed other issues. After Jokowi’s commitment to Islam was constantly casted in the spotlight by his opponents, he selected controversial cleric Ma’ruf Amin to be his running mate, and the pair eventually won. While identity politics apply to national and Jakarta politics, a deeper analysis about how it shapes political discourses in the region, especially in Muslim dominant provinces, cities or districts, remain wanting.
[4] Especially when Muslims in Jawa and Sumatera are often deemed to have become more conservative since the fall of the Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998.
[5] Mujiburrahman, “Islamic Theological Texts and Contexts in Banjarese Society: An Overview of the Existing Studies,” Southeast Asian Studies, Vol 3(3), December 2014: 611 – 641.
[6] See Komisi Pemilihan Umum, https://pemilu2019.kpu.go.id/#/ppwp/hitung – suara/
[7] Sahbirin’s running mate then was H Rudy Resnawan.
[8] In this case, referring to the 2019 election.
[9] Sukarli, “Sahbirin – Muhidin daftar ke KPU Kalsel Didikung Sembilan Parpol,” Antara, 5 September 2020.
[10] Tribun – timur.com, “Siapa Haji Muhidin? Calin ke Daerah Terkaya di Indonesia, harta Rp 774 Miliar,” 4 December 2020, https://makassar.tribunnews.com/2020/12/04/siapa – haji – muhidin – calon – kepala – daerah – terkaya – di – indonesia – punya – harta – rp – 674 – miliar
[11] Eko Ari Wibowo, “Update Quick Count Indikator di Pilkada Kalsel: Denny Indriyana Unggul Tipis,” Tempo, 9 December 2020. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1413054/update – quick – count – indikator – di – pilkada – kalsel – denny – indrayana – unggul – tipis/full&view=ok
[12 Eko Ari Wibowo, “Quick Count Charta politika di Pilkada Kalsel: Denny Indrayana Unggul 52 persen,” Tempo, 9 December 2020, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1413004/quick – count – charta – politika – di – pilkada – kalsel – denny – indrayana – unggul – 52 – persen/full&view=ok
[13] Alpri Widianjono, “ Pilgub Kalsel 2020, Perbedaan Data Bikin Suasana Debat Paman BirinMu dan H2D Menghangat,” Banjarmasin Post, 20 November 2020, https://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com/2020/11/28/pilgub – kalsel – 2020 – perbedaan – data – bikin – suasana – debat – paman – birinmu – dan – h2d – menghangat
[14] Tempo, “Pilkada Kalsel: Denny Indrayana Nomor 2, Sahbirin Nomor 1” 24 September 2020.
[15] See website for Covid – 19 pandemic, https://corona.kalselprov.go.id
[16 Jumarto Yulianus, “Ulang Tahun Kalimantan Selatan Demeriahkan Pesta Rakyat,” Kompas, 9 August 2018, https://kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2018/08/09/ulang – tahun – kalimantan – selatan – dimeriahkan – pesta – rakyat/
[17] Denny Susanto, “Denny Indrayana Tertimpa Kampanye Hitam di Kalsel,” Media Indonesia, 17 November 2020, https://mediaindonesia.com/nusantara/361496/denny – indrayana – tertimpa – kampanye – hitam – di – kalsel
[18] Indonesia Corruption Watch, “Calon Wakil Gubernur Kalimantan Selatan – H. Muhidin,” 7 December 2020, https://antikorupsi.org/id/node/87736. See also Jakarta Post, “Dossier of Banjarmasin mayor submitted,” 14 March 2014.
[19] Still, money politics does not seem to be the main contention in this election, and there were no major reports of such abuses happening on a large scale.
[20] Tempo.co, “Sowan ke Muhammadiyah Kalsel, Denny Indrayana Minta Doa Restu Maju Pilkada 2020m” 20 August 2020. However, whether this is advantageous to Denny’s campaign remains questionable, since South Kalimantan is generally pro – NU.
[21] He is still a law professor at UGM, Yogyakarta.
[22] Kumparan, “Denny Indrayana – Difriadi: Hijrah Gasan Banua, Kekayaan Alam Kalsel Akan Kembali,” 20 August 2020.
[23] LIPI, “Relasi Birokrasi dan Politik di Kalimantan Selatan,” http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/in/kolom/politik – lokal/576 – relasi – birokrasi – dan – politik – di – kalimantan – selatan.html . However, such finding was not extended to the mayoral contests at the district level.
[24] Antara, “Denny Indrayana Laporkan Sahbirin Noor – Muhidin Ke Bawaslu Kalsel,” 3 November 2020.
[25] Bangun Santoso and Willy Hidayat, “Lanjut ‘Perang’ di MK, Denny Indrayana Gandeng Eks Jubir KPK dan Mantan ICW, Suarakaltim.id, 22 December 2020, https://kaltim.suara.com/read/2020/12/22/110340/lanjut – perang – di – mk – denny – indrayana – gandeng – eks – jubir – kpk – dan – mantan – icw
[26] See Kompass TV report, “Cagub Kalsel Laporkan Petahana dengan Dugaan 107 Persitiwa Pelanggaran Polkada,” 5 November 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrimPpbo2Wo
[27] Yunan Tanjung, “Tak cukup bukti, Bawaslu RI Tolak Laporan Denny Indrayana,” RRI.co.id, 26 November 2020.
[28] Denny Susanto, “Bawaslu Tolak Banding Denny Indrayana,” Nusantara, 27 November 2020, https://mediaindonesia.com/nusantara/364451/bawaslu – tolak – banding – denny – indrayana
[29] Antara News, “Denny Indrayana curigai kejanggalan perhitungan suara Pilkada Kalsel,” 12 December 2020, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1892084/denny – indrayana – curigai – kejanggalan – penghitungan – suara – pilkada – kalsel
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ISEAS Perspective 2021/6 “Vietnam’s Role in Regional Peace and Mediation” by Hoang Oanh
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Vietnam institutionalised in official documents a ‘reconciliation/mediation role’ for its diplomacy even before taking on the 2020 ASEAN chairmanship and the country’s non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
- This new thrust demonstrates Vietnam’s growing confidence on the regional, if not international stage. Hanoi recognises that it is in its interest to contribute to international peace and security.
- However, Vietnam has to overcome significant challenges to play a role in reconciliation and mediation. As a newcomer to this field, Vietnam will need significant time and resources to build up its capacities and reputation.
- Undertaking a lower key mediation role that focuses on facilitating understanding and dialogue among disputing parties should be Vietnam’s current aim.
- For a start, the country could seek a mediating role in regional security issues and enhance its peacekeeping contribution to demonstrate its commitment and build up its reputation in the area.
* Guest writer, Hoang Oanh, is Deputy Director, Center for Regional Studies and Foreign Policy, Institute of Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
INTRODUCTION
Vietnam’s rapid economic development political stability, and successful hosting of various high-profile international events have raised the country’s regional and international profile. With this new spotlight, however, has come expectations from inside and outside of Vietnam for the country to contribute more to international peace and security. [1]
Recent developments in Vietnam’s foreign policy demonstrate the country’s stronger commitment to peace and reconciliation:
- The themes drawn up to guide its engagement in multilateral forums concentrate on peace and reconciliation – the expressed theme for Vietnam’s non-permanent seat on the UNSC is “Partnership for Sustainable Peace”, focused on conflict prevention, peace building, post-conflict reconstruction, and on strengthening the role of multilateralism and multilateral institutions in peace and security.[2]
- A priority for its ASEAN chairmanship also emphasises a “cohesive ASEAN” gained through fostering solidarity and unity among its members.[3]
- Vietnam started its 2020-2021 UNSC term with two initiatives that exemplify the themes: One open session on UN Charter compliance, stressing the need to enhance dialogue, multilateralism, and peaceful tools provided by the UN for conflicts and disputes; and one meeting to ‘bridge’ the UN and ASEAN, aimed at increasing understanding between the two bodies and promoting ASEAN’s contribution to UN initiatives, especially peacekeeping. For the first time, at the initiative of Vietnam, an information briefing on ASEAN took place at the UNSC.[4]
- Vietnam has rapidly increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations,[5] and the recent passage of the National Assembly Resolution on Vietnam’s participation in UN PKO in November 2020 has laid a legal foundation for its further contribution. Vietnam is also eager to upgrade its UN peacekeeping training centre into a regional facility for the Asia Pacific.[6] The country has also been willing to share its experience in post-conflict reconstruction, national reconciliation, promoting integration, and sustainable development. For instance, Vietnam has actively shared its experience on tackling post-conflict issues at various multilateral forums, such as through its work with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), working on topics such as the handling of bombs, mines, and unexploded ordinances.[7] It has also emphasised the role of women in post-conflict reconstruction, as a part of efforts to promote the UNSC Resolution 1889 (2009) on Women and Peace and Security.[8] Bilaterally, it has shared lessons on reunification, national reconciliation, and reforms with both of its Korean partners.[9]
These diplomatic efforts, particularly Vietnam’s hosting of the second Trump-Kim Summit in February 2019, have fuelled discussions among intellectuals and general public about a Vietnamese ‘reconciliation diplomacy’ or ‘mediation diplomacy’. These discussions mainly feature two key ideas: (i) Vietnam’s repositioning as a middle power, and the need to build a ‘niche diplomacy’ to contribute more effectively in global affairs;[10] and (ii) Vietnam possibly becoming ‘Asia’s Helsinki’ or a ‘peace bridge’.[11] One former deputy foreign minister remarked: “Although it is still too early to talk about it, but a ‘reconciliation diplomacy’ or ‘mediation diplomacy’ is not impossible for Vietnam if we take into account Vietnam’s history or its recent efforts and contributions to world peace. However, what we need is not just a slogan, but we have to initiate concrete actions to implement the objective”.[12]
This paper explores Vietnam’s possible role and options in the field of peace and conciliation. It argues that the time is ripe for Vietnam to play a limited mediation role in line with the country’s national interests. It concludes with some policy recommendations for Vietnam to play such a role.
WHY SHOULD VIETNAM CONSIDER A MEDIATION ROLE?
(i) A new thrust in foreign policy
Vietnam has long declared a foreign policy goal of “willing to become a friend and reliable partner of all countries in the world community, striving for peace, independence and development”.[13] However, it was only recently that Vietnam placed greater emphasis on the goal of proactive contribution to international peace and security. Directive No. 25 CT/TW of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee (issued on 8 August 2018) on enhancing the role of multilateral diplomacy stated that the country would need to shift from merely “attending” to “actively participating” and “actively contributing” to multilateral institutions, accelerating efforts to play a “leading or mediatory role in multilateral organizations and forums having strategic importance to the country”[14] in accordance with the specific capabilities and conditions of the country.[15] Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly used the phrase “hoa giai” (translated as either reconciliation or mediation in English) in their public speeches,[16] and stated that Vietnam should gradually promote the role of mediation in regional and global issues.[17]
“Hoa giai” in the Vietnamese language implies the involvement of a third party. According to the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Vietnam, “Reconciliation/Mediation means peacefully solving disputes by arrangements and negotiation with the assistance of a third party”.[18] “Hoa giai” is a common practice in Vietnamese culture, where bringing disputes to legal authorities is not a preferred option. Officially, Vietnam uses the word “hoa giai” to indicate that the country is willing to take on the role of a third party, such as in mediating international disputes and conflicts, though preferably under a multilateral framework.
Directive 25-CT/TW was issued in preparation for Vietnam’s 2020 ASEAN chairmanship and its non-permanent seat on the UNSC. This directive, however, has long-lasting and significant implications for Vietnam’s foreign policy. It signals, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh puts it, “an important milestone in foreign policy thinking”.[19] It is remarkable that, for the first time, mediation diplomacy has been institutionalised. While this highlights a sense of responsibility and desire to contribute to international peace and security, it also demonstrates Vietnam’s growing confidence on the regional, if not international stage. Vietnam draws this growing confidence from what it perceives as an increased degree of trust and encouragement from the international community. Directive 25-CT/TW, thus, can be seen as an institutionalisation of Vietnam’s newfound confidence and willingness to take on a bigger role in international affairs.
(ii) Vietnam’s capabilities and advantages
Mediation resonates with Vietnamese cultural and historical traditions: It could be argued that reconciliation diplomacy is not simply a new direction but harks back to Vietnam’s history of reconciling with former enemies after conflicts. A master strategist in the 15th century, Nguyen Trai, declared after a military victory that the country would facilitate the return of prisoners of war (Chinese troops) to “repair the bilateral friendship [and] end war forever”.[20] King Tran Nhan Tong (1258-1308) has also been seen as a symbol of Vietnam’s reconciliatory spirit.[21]According to The Complete Annals of Đại Việt,King Tran Nhan Tong stripped the reward of a prince who continued to hunt for Yuan troops after the king had ordered a ceasefire. To alleviate his mandarins’ fear of any post-war political retribution, the king also had any supposed proof of treason burnt.[22]
In the contemporary period, Vietnam has established high-level partnership frameworks with all its former foes – France, the United States, and China. Vietnam has also made significant efforts and achievements in national reconciliation, particularly with new political and legal frameworks that facilitate the return and participation of overseas Vietnamese in Vietnam’s political, economic, and social life. Notably, four out of the 15 members of the current prime minister’s Economic Advisory Group are overseas Vietnamese intellectuals.[23] The government has also actively promoted outreach efforts targeted at overseas Vietnamese communities in the United States. The return of Mr Nguyen Cao Ky, former prime minister of the South Vietnamese administration that fought against the Vietnam Communist Party in the North, in 2004, during which he expressed support for national conciliation, was a symbolic success in the process.[24]
Vietnam’s improved international prestige: Vietnam has been pursuing a proactive foreign policy through its expanding diplomatic network, which is currently ranked 38th in the world and 10th in Asia.[25] It has established 189 diplomatic relations, among which are three comprehensive strategic partnerships, 14 strategic partnerships, and 13 comprehensive partnerships. One notable feature of Vietnam’s foreign policy is the emphasis on ties with “traditional friends”,[26] many of which are currently involved in disputes and conflicts that might require international support to promote reconciliation efforts. Vietnam’s economic development model as well as its experience with reform and ‘opening-up’ could be a source of inspiration for others.[27]
Organisational capability and confidence in its diplomacy: The experience gained from its roles at important multilateral institutions and from hosting big international events has boosted Vietnam’s confidence in its diplomacy. The second Trump-Kim Summit held in February 2019 was a political and logistical success, praised by both Trump himself and DPRK officials.[28] Vietnam’s efforts in facilitating a safe long journey by train for Kim also demonstrates Vietnam’s commitment, diligence, and ability to deliver a key event at very short notice.[29]
Strong domestic support: Among the Vietnamese people, there is a strong sense of gratitude and desire to contribute to international peace, in acknowledgement of the international community’s support for Vietnam during its wars, post-war reconstruction, and modern development.[30]As stated in a news briefing, the second US-DPRK Summit held in Vietnam is particularly meaningful as Vietnam, during its past wars, had counted on the support of international third-party mediators in the Geneva and Paris negotiations in 1954 and 1973 respectively.[31] Today, Vietnam is thus willing to mediate peace between the United States and DPRK, for the region and the world.[32] Despite the significant amount of financial and human resources spent on the event, as well as the inconvenience and disruption it brought to daily life, the Vietnamese people are supportive and proud to have played such a role in the US-DPRK negotiations.
(iii) It serves Vietnam’s interests
Vietnam’s national interests has three broad dimensions: security, economic development, and prestige. A mediation role supports Vietnam’s national interests in all three dimensions. In terms ofsecurity,maintaining a peaceful and stable external environment is one of the most important goals of Vietnam’s foreign policy.[33] Contributing to efforts to manage disputes in the region directly complements this goal. More importantly, upholding a rules-based international order is of great importance given Vietnam’s two main security challenges – territorial disputes in the South China Sea and water management issues in the Mekong. By playing a mediating role, Vietnam reinforces and promotes the norms of peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, while signalling its rejection of unilateral and violent acts which contravene international law. Such a role would also help Vietnam enhance its own conflict management and resolution capacities.
Playing an active role in managing international disputes also serves Vietnam’s economicinterests. According to a Moody report, if tensions on the Korean Peninsula continue to escalate and lead to conflict, other than the parties directly involved (North Korea, South Korea, and the United States), Vietnam and Japan would be the most badly hit. This is because approximately 20 per cent of Vietnam’s intermediate goods are imported from South Korea, while its exports to South Korea account for more than 5 per cent of its GDP.[34]
Last but not least, a mediating role will improve Vietnam’s image and reputation, which in turn, will translate into many concrete benefits. Vietnam would for instance become increasingly attractive as a tourist destination and business environment. Its national products would become more desirable, and the country could even experience an increase in its soft power.
EXPLORING A MEDIATION ROLE FOR VIETNAM
The current challenge for Vietnam is to translate a very general official guideline into practical policies which address geopolitical realities, while being in step with the country’s comfort level, capacities, and resources. A ‘third-party’ reconciliatory role could potentially involve anything from providing good offices to taking on mediation, inquiry, conciliation, and arbitration responsibilities[35] before, during, and after a conflict. Many of these responsibilities, such as conciliation and arbitration, require a significant level of engagement and demand more political and financial costs and greater capabilities and experience.
Mediation itself also has a wide range of approaches, from the lowest level of good offices to actively inducing a certain solution to disputes. As outlined by Touval and Zartman (1985), there are three general approaches: information strategies, formulation strategies, and manipulation strategies, depending on the level of involvement of the mediator.[36]
If Vietnam is to take on such a ‘reconciliatory role’, it will need to develop a clear conceptualisation and a feasible operational strategy. Firstly, it should start with a narrower focus – a modest mediation role or the first and second approaches listed above. There are three main reasons for this: (i) Despite having a long tradition of peace diplomacy, Vietnam is still a ‘newly reborn kid on the block’ in a professional field that requires specialised expertise, experience, practical guidance, as well as considerable political, financial, and administrative support. The challenge is greater when it has to operate in an increasingly competitive environment, where the number of third-party facilitators and mediators (at local, national, regional, and international levels) has significantly increased in the last decade;[37] (ii) The fundamental principles of Vietnamese foreign policy, including a respect for sovereignty, self-determination, and non-interference, will limit the extent of its engagement. Vietnam’s own experience with mediation also discourages the country from a manipulative approach – during the Geneva Conference negotiations, its own interests were negatively affected by the calculations of bigger powers;[38] (iii) While Vietnam’s close relationships with all parties, particularly the disputing parties, is an advantage; this also requires the country to firmly uphold its neutrality.
With a moderate mediation role, Vietnam can consider several options such as good offices, shuttle diplomacy, facilitating negotiations, capacity building, and experience sharing with relevant parties. Directive 25 advocates a mediatory role in a multilateral setting; however, as mediation is often a very long process and Vietnam will not always be able to hold high-profile posts at multilateral forums, it will have to explore both multilateral and bilateral approaches.
Secondly, Vietnam will have to overcome several significant challenges. An operational masterplan needs to be designed to build domestic consensus and political will, lay the institutional foundations, mobilise financial and human resources, and build the necessary capacities: (i) Peace making and mediation in particular require the right set of competencies – both at the level of individuals and institutions. While pooling a few eminent individual peace-makers is important, it is more vital to build institutional capacity and an organizational culture that enables a well-coordinated engagement and allows sustainability given the rotational nature of the country’s diplomatic system. (ii) Managing relationships with other actors including civil society, the academia, and foreign actors is also a challenge. (iii) Economic resources provide important leverage to peace-making when the mediator might have to fund confidence-building activities, shuttle diplomacy, or back the implementation of peace agreements. This could be a big challenge given Vietnam’s plan to streamline and downsize its public spending.[39]To overcome the above challenges, Vietnam will need to reach out to relevant partners and experienced mediators for assistance and build cooperative partnerships.
Thirdly, Vietnam should aim to boost its peace reputation and offer to undertake an appropriate role in regional issues. The second Trump-Kim Summit in Hanoi demonstrated Vietnam’s capability in hosting high-profile events. Both the parties were also pleased with Vietnam’s efforts. There have already been many players involved in mediating efforts on the Korean issue. Trump and Kim also have their own direct channels. However, Vietnam is uniquely placed to be an effective facilitator for conversation. Vietnam has a non-hostile and neutral profile, with no geopolitical motives. The DPRK is very sensitive to any perceived influence from a third party – North Korea’s chief negotiator Kim Myong Gil, for instance, once criticised Sweden for acting like a “backseat driver” when mediating nuclear negotiations.[40] Moreover, as the DPRK has a relatively high level of trust in Vietnam, its leadership is comfortable learning from Vietnam’s experience in economic development and reform, as well as Hanoi’s ability to maintain good relationships with both the United States and China.[41] In fact, Kim’s 2019 visit to Vietnam was designated as an “official friendship visit”, a term that connotes an even higher status than Kim’s previous visits to China.[42] While the Trump-Kim meeting was underway in Hanoi, a separate DPRK delegation made field trips to Vietnam’s industrial parks and factories.[43]
Presently, the United States and North Korea do not wish to appear weak and lose their bargaining power in their ongoing tug-of-war. In this regard, they can consider the alternative of approaching a credible third country to explore ways to move forward without being seen as ceding ground unnecessarily. Given its comparative advantage, Vietnam could facilitate an agreement that meets both parties’ near-term objectives (i.e. reducing tensions and diffusing crises) that can lay the basis for a longer-term solution. Vietnam should also further promote humanitarian assistance to mitigate food shortages and natural disasters,[44] and encourage the exchange of students, academics, and officials, especially on issues related to economic planning and transition.
Within the region, Vietnam should support ASEAN, the UN and relevant parties in promoting dialogue towards long-term solutions to conflicts and facilitating the safe and dignified repatriation of refugees in Myanmar’s Rakhine state.[45] More specifically, Vietnam could continue to strengthen the ASEAN consensus on a regional approach and the association’s crucial role in helping Myanmar reach a solution; facilitate dialogue between relevant parties on technical issues such as illegal migration, human trafficking, refugee repatriation; and share its experience in working with relevant partners on refugee repatriation,[46] rehabilitation, and reconciliation.
Last but not least, Vietnam should further enhance its PKO participation in both quantity and quality, particularly expanding its PKO functions to include policing and enhancing women’s representation. These measures will promote effective community outreach and confidence-building, leading to lasting and positive impact on the ground. In fact, Vietnam has performed pretty well in promoting the role of women.[47] Beyond their assigned duties, they actively take on other roles such as teaching children, sharing farming experience with the local people, and encouraging the participation of women and girls in political processes.[48] Vietnam should also share its own successful experiences on national reconciliation and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction, and possibly explore a mediation role involving its PKO missions at a proper time.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/6, 27 January 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] Editorial Department (2020), “The gioi dat ky vong vao Viet Nam,” Nhan Dan Online, at https://nhandan.com.vn/tin%2Dtuc%2Dthe%2Dgioi/the%2Dgioi%2Ddat%2Dky%2Dvong%2Dvao%2Dviet%2Dnam%2D446302
[2] Deputy PM, FM Pham Binh Minh’s article on occasion of VN’s assumption of UNSC Presidency (2020) VGP News, at http://news.chinhphu.vn/Utilities/PrintView.aspx?ID%3D38471
[3] VNA (2020), “ASEAN Chairmanship: For a cohesive and responsive ASEAN,” Nhan Dan Online, at https://en.nhandan.com.vn/highlights/item/8318102%2Dasean%2Dchairmanship%2Dfor%2Da%2Dcohesive%2Dand%2Dresponsive%2Dasean.html
[4] VNS (2020), “Viet Nam successfully fulfils role as President of UNSC in January,” Viet Nam News, at https://vietnamnews.vn/politics%2Dlaws/591739/viet%2Dnam%2Dsuccessfully%2Dfulfils%2Drole%2Das%2Dpresident%2Dof%2Dunsc%2Din%2Djanuary.html
[5] Although Vietnam is relatively new to peacekeeping and has only started its deployment since 2014, it has significantly stepped up its efforts. Up to January 2020, it had sent 43 officers and 126 military doctors and medical personnel to South Sudan. Since 2018, Vietnam has sent whole PKO unit forces with two Level-2 field hospitals to South Sudan, and is ready to deploy the third one by the end of 2020. It is also currently ready to dispatch 295 military engineers and is training police force for PKO in South Sudan. Lonicera Vu (2020), “Vietnamese peacekeepers maintain peace to the world to defend the country,” Vietnam Times, 30 May, at https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/vietnamese%2Dpeacekeepers%2Dmaintain%2Dpeace%2Dto%2Dthe%2Dworld%2Dto%2Ddefend%2Dthe%2Dcountry%2D20863.html
[6] Hoang Thuy (2020), Vietnam eyes UN peacekeeping center for Asia-Pacific, VNExpress, at https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam%2Deyes%2Dun%2Dpeacekeeping%2Dcenter%2Dfor%2Dasia%2Dpacific%2D4128709.html
[7] Vietnam shares experience in tackling post-war bombs, mines and UXOs (2017). Voice of Vietnam, 7 September, at https://vovworld.vn/en%2DUS/news/vietnam%2Dshares%2Dexperience%2Din%2Dtackling%2Dpostwar%2Dbombs%2Dmines%2Dand%2Duxos%2D574174.vov
[8] Cross-Cutting Report No. 2: Women, Peace and Security. Security Council Report, at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research%2Dreports/lookup%2Dc%2Dglkwlemtisg%2Db%2D6239031.php
[9] Vietnam shares experience in national reunification (2015). Nhan Dan, 23 May, at https://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/external%2Drelations/item/3366602%2Dbir%2Dseba%2Dproject%2D%E2%80%93%2Da%2D
Huileng Tan (2019), North Korea has been studying Vietnam’s reforms for years, CNBC, 24 February, at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/25/north-korea-has-studied-reforms-in-hanoi-ex-advisor-to-vietnam%20pm.html#:~:text%3DNorth%20Korea%20has%20been%20closely,government%20advisor%20said%20on%20Monday.&text%3DU.S.%20President%20Donald%20Trump%20and,Hanoi%20on%20Wednesday%20and%20Thursday
[10] Vu Le Thai Hoang (ed.) (2020), Ngoai giao chuyen biet: Huong di, uu tien moi cua ngoai giao Viet Nam den 2030 [Niche Diplomacy: New Orientation and Priority of Vietnam Diplomacy toward 2030], Hanoi: Su That Publishing House.
[11] Duc Khai (2019), “Thuong dinh My – Trieu Ha Noi: The hien ro net vai tro ‘cuong quoc hang trung’ cua Viet Nam,” The World and Vietnam Report, at https://baoquocte.vn/thuong%2Ddinh%2Dmy%2Dtrieu%2Dha%2Dnoi%2Dthe%2Dhien%2Dro%2Dnet%2Dvai%2Dtro%2Dcuong%2Dquoc%2Dhang%2Dtrung%2Dcua%2Dviet%2Dnam%2D88375.html
[12] Pham Hang (2019), “Nguyen Thu truong Ngoai giao Nguyen Phu Binh noi ve vai tro trung gian cua ngoai giao Viet Nam,” The World and Vietnam Report, at https://baoquocte.vn/nguyen%2Dthu%2Dtruong%2Dngoai%2Dgiao%2Dnguyen%2Dphu%2Dbinh%2Dnoi%2Dve%2Dvai%2Dtro%2Dtrung%2Dgian%2Dcua%2Dngoai%2Dgiao%2Dviet%2Dnam%2D88380.html
[13] Editorial Department (2006), “Vietnam’s present Foreign Policy,” Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government Portal, at http://chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/strategies/strategiesdetails%3FcategoryId%3D30&articleId%3D3036
[14] UNSC seat enables Vietnam to contribute more to global peace (2019), Nhan Dan, https://en.nhandan.org.vn/politics/external%2Drelations/item/7559702%2Dunsc%2Dseat%2Denables%2Dvietnam%2Dto%2Dcontribute%2Dmore%2Dto%2Dglobal%2Dpeace.html
[15] Nhat Phong (2020), “Năm 2020: Nâng tầm ngoại giao đa phương,” The gioi va Viet Nam, at https://baoquocte.vn/nam%2D2020%2Dnang%2Dtam%2Dngoai%2Dgiao%2Dda%2Dphuong%2D108123.html
[16] Bui, Thanh Son (2020), “Dong gop cua nganh doi ngoai trong qua trinh doi moi tu duy, phuc vu su nghiep doi moi,” Nhan Dan Online, at https://nhandan.com.vn/tin%2Dtuc%2Dthe%2Dgioi/dong%2Dgop%2Dcua%2Dnganh%2Ddoi%2Dngoai%2Dtrong%2Dqua%2Dtrinh%2Ddoi%2Dmoi%2Dtu%2Dduy%2Dphuc%2Dvu%2Dsu%2Dnghiep%2Ddoi%2Dmoi%2D608766
[17] PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc (2019), “Doi ta vi Hoa binh ben vung: Viet Nam san sang dong gop tich cuc cho no luc chung cua quoc te vi hoa binh, an ninh,” VOV5.vn, 9 June, at https://vovworld.vn/vi%2DVN/chinh%2Dtri/doi%2Dtac%2Dvi%2Dhoa%2Dbinh%2Dben%2Dvung%2Dvn%2Dsan%2Dsang%2Ddong%2Dgop%2Dtich%2Dcuc%2Dcho%2Dno%2Dluc%2Dchung%2Dcua%2Dquoc%2Dte%2Dvi%2Dhoa%2Dbinh%2Dan%2Dninh%2D756061.vov
[18] Hoi dong quoc gia chu bien chuyen nganh tu dien bach khoa Vietnam (1995), Tu dien bach khoa Viet Nam [Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam], volume II, Nha xuat ban Tu dien Bach khoa (Ha Noi), p. 473.
[19] Vice PM Pham Binh Minh (2019), “Doi ngoai nam 2018: Sang tao trong cach lam, hieu qua trong hanh dong,” VietnamNet, at https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi%2Dsu/chinh%2Dtri/doi%2Dngoai%2Dnam%2D2018%2Dsang%2Dtao%2Dtrong%2Dcach%2Dlam%2Dhieu%2Dqua%2Dtrong%2Dhanh%2Ddong%2D499099.html
[20] Le Van Lan (2018), “Nguoi Viet, nuoc Viet hoa hieu,” Nguoi Lao dong, at https://nld.com.vn/thoi%2Dsu/nguoi%2Dviet%2Dnuoc%2Dviet%2Dhoa%2Dhieu%2D20180208111943998.htm
[21] There has been an initiative on a reconciliation award named after the King. See more at: “Tran Nhan Tong Reconciliation Award to be launched in the US” (2012). VietnamNet, 19 June, at https://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/23461/tran%2Dnhan%2Dtong%2Dreconciliation%2Daward%2Dto%2Dbe%2Dlaunched%2Din%2Dthe%2Dus.html
[22] Ngô Sĩ Liên (1993) Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư, translated from Nội các quan bản Edition (1697). Hanoi: Social Sciences Publishing House, p. 199.
[23] Thu Ha (2010), “Hòa hợp dân tộc qua góc nhìn của ông Nguyễn Cao Kỳ,” Que huong, 27 April, at http://quehuongonline.vn/doi%2Dsong/hoa%2Dhop%2Ddan%2Dtoc%2Dqua%2Dgoc%2Dnhin%2Dcua%2Dong%2Dnguyen%2Dcao%2Dky%2D14900.htm
Dang Minh Khoi (2020), “Công tác về người Việt Nam ở nước ngoài,” Tap Chi Cong San, 26 March, at http://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/50%2Dnam%2Dthuc%2Dhien%2Ddi%2Dchuc%2Dcua%2Dchu%2Dtich%2Dho%2Dchi%2Dminh/%2D/2018/816007/view_content
[24] “Former Saigon PM talks about homeland” (2010) Viet Nam News, 4 November, at /https://vietnamnews.vn/politics%2Dlaws/205369/former%2Dsaigon%2Dpm%2Dtalks%2Dabout%2Dhomeland.html
[25] Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Index 2019, at https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country_rank.html#
[26] Pham Binh Minh (2015) Ngoại giao góp phần xứng đáng xây dựng và bảo vệ Tổ quốc, Vietnam Government Portal News, 15 August, at http://baochinhphu.vn/70%2Dmua%2Dthu%2DCach%2Dmang/Ngoai%2Dgiao%2Dgop%2Dphan%2Dxung%2Ddang%2Dxay%2Ddung%2Dva%2Dbao%2Dve%2DTo%2Dquoc/234114.vgp
“Vietnam respected in international arena: Ambassador,” Vietnam News Agency, 28 August 2020, at https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam%2Drespected%2Din%2Dinternational%2Darena%2Dambassador/182029.vnp
[27] Nguyen Viet Phuong (2019), “Thuong dinh My – Trieu Ha Noi: Noi cong dong quoc te dat niem tin hoa binh,” The gioi va Viet Nam, at https://baoquocte.vn/thuong%2Ddinh%2Dmy%2Dtrieu%2Dha%2Dnoi%2Dnoi%2Dcong%2Ddong%2Dquoc%2Dte%2Ddat%2Dniem%2Dtin%2Dhoa%2Dbinh%2D88274.html
[28] Nguyen Viet Phuong, and Vu, Khang (2019), “After the Hanoi Summit: Next steps for the US, North Korea, and Vietnam,” The Diplomat, 2 March, at https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/after%2Dthe%2Dhanoi%2Dsummit%2Dnext%2Dsteps%2Dfor%2Dthe%2Dus%2Dnorth%2Dkorea%2Dand%2Dvietnam
[29] Vietnam only had a two-week preparation period, much shorter than the two-month advance notice given for the leaders’ meeting in Singapore in June 2018.
[30] Security Council, “Security Council urges renewed measures to improve women’s participation in peace processes,” reaffirming the key role women can play in rebuilding war-torn societies, United Nations at https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9759.doc.htm
[31] These diplomatic processes are considered consequential in Vietnam’s struggle for its independence in view of the power imbalances between Vietnam and its much stronger adversaries. As a complete military victory was too costly, and even impossible, the then Vietnamese strategy was to combine “fighting and negotiation”. See Vo Van Sung (2012), “Suy ngẫm về bài học “vừa đánh vừa đàm” trong chiến tranh bảo vệ Tổ quốc,” Nhan Dan, 13 December, at https://nhandan.com.vn/tin%2Dtuc%2Dsu%2Dkien/suy%2Dngam%2Dve%2Dbai%2Dhoc%2Dvua%2Ddanh%2Dvua%2Ddam%2Dtrong%2Dchien%2Dtranh%2Dbao%2Dve%2Dto%2Dquoc%2D582129
[32] Nguyen Hong Diep (2019), “Thuong dinh Hoa Ky – Trieu Tien: Kien tao hoa binh, nang tam vi the,” Thong tin Doi Ngoai,at http://tapchithongtindoingoai.vn/su%2Dkien%2Dva%2Dbinh%2Dluan/thuong%2Ddinh%2Dhoa%2Dky%2Dtrieu%2Dtien%2Dkien%2Dtao%2Dhoa%2Dbinh%2Dnang%2Dtam%2Dvi%2Dthe%2D21338
[33] Luu Ngoc Khai, and Dang Cong Thanh (2019), “Duong loi doi ngoai cua Dang theo tinh than Nghi quyet Dai hoi XII – Mot tam cao moi,” Bao Dien tu Dang Cong san Viet Nam, at http://dangcongsan.vn/tu%2Dlieu%2Dtham%2Dkhao%2Dcuoc%2Dthi%2Dtrac%2Dnghiem%2Dtim%2Dhieu%2D90%2Dnam%2Dlich%2Dsu%2Dve%2Dvang%2Dcua%2Ddang%2Dcong%2Dsan%2Dviet%2Dnam/tu%2Dlieu%2Dcuoc%2Dthi/duong%2Dloi%2Ddoi%2Dngoai%2Dcua%2Ddang%2Dtheo%2Dtinh%2Dthan%2Dnghi%2Dquyet%2Ddai%2Dhoi%2Dxii%2Dmot%2Dtam%2Dcao%2Dmoi%2D544967.html
[34] Yuda Masayuki and KikuchiTomomi (2017), “Vietnam and Japan would be among hardest hit by a Korean conflict,” Nikkei Asian Review, 4 October, at https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Vietnam%2Dand%2DJapan%2Dwould%2Dbe%2Damong%2Dhardest%2Dhit%2Dby%2Da%2DKorean%2Dconflict2
[35] J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, Cambridge University Press (Fifth Edition 2011), p. 26.
[36] Information strategies: the mediator primarily serves as a facilitator of information, laying the groundwork for further substantive progress in the conflict resolution process. Formulation strategies are those where a mediator serves as a facilitator for actual negotiations by providing a meeting place, and moderating discussions. Manipulative strategies: a mediator actively engages the parties and shapes the negotiations. See William Zartman and Saadia Touval (1985), “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics,” Journal of Social Issues, 41(2), 27–45.
Jacob Bercovitch (1997), “Mediation in International Conflict.” In I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., Peacemaking in International Conflict. Washington, DC: United States Institution of Peace Press., pp. 137-138.
[37] The European External Action Service (2016), Global Challenges and Trends in International Peace: Mediation and Diplomacy: A Background Note, p. 2, at http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/20160519%2Dglobal%2Dchallenges%2Dand%2Dtrends_final_en.pdf
[38] The Geneve Accords was a legal commitment from the great powers to respect the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam (together with Cambodia and Laos). However, Vietnam could not ultilise the military advantages it had gained on the ground to leverage a better settlement as China and the Soviet Union made concessions on the Vietnamese demarcation line for their own interests. See Vu Khoan (2014), “Hiep dinh Gio-ne-vo, 60 nam nhin lai”, Quan doi Nhan dan Online, at https://www.qdnd.vn/thoi%2Dsu%2Dquoc%2Dte/binh%2Dluan/hiep%2Ddinh%2Dgio%2Dne%2Dvo%2D60%2Dnam%2Dnhin%2Dlai%2D447282
Fredrik Logevall (2012). Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. Random House, pp. 607-620.
[39] Vietnam needs to cut recurrent spending to ensure healthy budget (2018), Nhan Dan, at https://en.nhandan.com.vn/_mobile_business/_mobile_economy/item/6076102%2Dvietnam%2Dneeds%2Dto%2Dcut%2Drecurrent%2Dspending%2Dto%2Densure%2Dhealthy%2Dbudget.html.
[40] Oliver Hotham (2019), “Sweden no longer needed to mediate North Korea-U.S. talks: DPRK diplomat,” NKNews, 19 November, at https://www.nknews.org/2019/11/sweden%2Dno%2Dlonger%2Dneeded%2Dto%2Dmediate%2Dnorth%2Dkorea%2Du%2Ds%2Dtalks%2Ddprk%2Ddiplomat
[41] Le Dinh Tinh & Nguyen Duc Chinh (2019) “Why Vietnam Is More Than Just a Venue for the United States and DPRK Summit: A View From Hanoi,” Pacific Forum, 1 March.
[42] Lye Liang Fook and Ha Hoang Hop (2019), “Vietnam-North Korea Relations: Still a Special Relationship?,” ISEAS Perspective, Issue: 2019, No.18, p. 3.
/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_18.pdf
[43] Eric Talmadge (2019), “On summit sidelines, North Koreans study Vietnam’s economy,” APNews, at https://apnews.com/eb50d09b6fa94e2e8166098be7dedc5c
[44] Vietnam offered the DPRK 100 tonnes of rice aid in 1995 and another 13,000 tonnes in 1997. From 2000 to 2012, it supported the DPRK with 22,700 tonnes of rice, 5 tonnes of material rubber, and US$50,000 in emergency aid. It offered US$70,000 in flood relief to the North Asian nation in 2016. See “Official visit to set historic milestone in Vietnam-DPRK relations” (2019), Viet Nam News Agency, 28 February, at https://en.vietnamplus.vn/official%2Dvisit%2Dto%2Dset%2Dhistoric%2Dmilestone%2Din%2Dvietnamdprk%2Drelations/147476.vnp
[45] Political Department (2018), “Vietnam, Myanmar issue joint statement,” Nhan dan Online, at https://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/external%2Drelations/item/8237902%2Dvietnam%2Dmyanmar%2Dissue%2Djoint%2Dstatement.html
[46] Jennifer Pagonis (2006), “Cambodia, Viet Nam and UNHCR agree on further Montagnard cooperation,” UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, 22 August, at https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2006/8/44eb03442/cambodia%2Dviet%2Dnam%2Dunhcr%2Dagree%2Dfurther%2Dmontagnard%2Dcooperation.html
[47] Up till Oct 2020, Vietnam has sent 23/166 female officers (13.8%) for UN PKO missions in South Sudan, which is higher than the UN average rate (4.8% of military contingents and 10.9% of formed police units). See more at: Women in Peacekeeping. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women%2Dpeacekeeping#:~:text%3DIn%202020%2C%20out%20of%20approximately,units%20in%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20missions.
[48] Women’s participation key to effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding (2020), at https://www.vn.undp.org/content/vietnam/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/UNSCR1325.html
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ISEAS Perspective 2021/5 “How the 2020 Pilkada Reflected Major Structural Flaws in Indonesian Politics” by Yanuar Nugroho, Yoes C. Kenawas, and Sofie S. Syarief
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Indonesia’s regional elections (Pilkada) was held for 270 regions (municipalities/regencies and provinces) simultaneously on 9 December 2020—with the budget raised by about IDR5.2 trillion (US$370 million) for implementation of health protocols during the elections. Despite wide criticism of the decision to proceed with the elections during the pandemic, high turnouts were achieved, averaging 76%.
- The 2020 Pilkada was remarkable for the lack of genuine ideological contestation among the candidates and political parties. This was reflected in the fluidity of political coalitions formed largely to pursue power instead of policy preferences.
- Dynastic politics featured more prominently in 2020 Pilkada than before. For example, the President’s son and son-in-law contested and won in Solo and Medan. Many office-holders also clearly benefited from the advantages of incumbency, while newcomers suffered from high barriers to entry into the political arena.
- The socio-political implications of these developments are worrying. The winning or ruling coalitions will not face any real opposition if transactional politics is the order of the day. Consequently, check-and-balance mechanisms will be weak or non-existent, and room for public criticism will shrink. Worst, these trends at the regional level may influence politics at the national level and weaken democracy in the country.
* Yanuar Nugroho is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore and former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of Indonesia 2015 – 2019. Yoes C. Kenawas is PhD Candidate at Northwestern University, USA, and Sofie S. Syarief is Journalist, Kompas TV, Indonesia. The authors would like to thank Titi Anggraini of PERLUDEM for sharing insights on Pilkada 2020 and Aninda Dewayanti of ISEAS for helping with the election data.
LESS IDEOLOGY, MORE SELF INTEREST: A CHRONIC PROBLEM
In its most idealistic form, the foundation of democratic representation is the ability of voters to “elect politicians who reflect their beliefs and preferences”.[1]
Using Müller and Strøm’s categorisation,[2] if the objectives of political parties are “vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking”, the question then is: What fundamental principles can they offer to represent the people’s beliefs and preferences?
There is a broad consensus that Indonesia’s political landscape lacks ideological contestation. Although the country’s party system is more institutionalised than those in most neighbouring countries,[3] its parties do not necessarily display ideological differences.[4] They are therefore able to offer only limited social and economic policy alternatives.[5] The only differentiation between parties is in the religious dimension, often identified as ‘cleavage’.[6] This absence of fundamental socio-economic values to be contested paves the way for patronage to become the main driver of party behaviour,[7] and necessarily leads to transactional politics based on the personal interests of those in power.
Subsequently, as voters become increasingly pragmatic and transactional in response to political actors’ ability to provide cash or other tangible goods,[8] the fundamental implication for the way the country is run becomes ever more lethal. The lack of ideological concerns (or in a broader sense: ideals) and the personal interest in power, have come to characterise the way the government works, both at the national and sub-national levels. This has become a chronic disease spreading across government institutions and parliament, paralysing them from carrying out their prime responsibilities. Public policies and decisions also come to be crafted in an increasingly transactional fashion.
While a full-fledged analysis of this chronic problem may be a subject for another paper, here we argue that the recent regional elections (or Pilkada) in Indonesia in December 2020 amidst the COVID-19 pandemic evidently reflect the worrying conditions mentioned above, namely that in the absence of ideological contestations, self-interests take over, diminishing politics into a mere grab for power. This early post-mortem of the 2020 Pilkada considers how Indonesia’s electoral dynamics matter to the future of its democracy.
PILKADA 2020: A POST-MORTEM
Three patterns repeatedly appeared throughout the 2020 Pilkada, i.e., single-pair (sole candidate) elections, dynastic politics, and the challenge of holding elections amid a health crisis.
Single – Pair Elections
One of the main trends in the 2020 Pilkada is the increased occurrence of single candidacy, indicating the tendency among incumbents to monopolise and insulate the electoral arena from competition.[9] The results confirm this observation: Solo candidates won in four cities and 21 regencies (Table 1). They secured between 52.5% to 96.2% of total votes in their respective regions, and chalked up median electoral gains of 79.75%.[10] This time, no ‘Kotak Kosong’ (empty ballot boxes) came out as the victor, unlike what happened in Makassar in the 2018 Pilkada.[11]
Table 1. Background of single-pair candidates and their electoral gains in the 2020 Subnational Elections
Source: KPU Electronic Recapitulation System (Sirekap); authors
This shows two continuing trends. First, political coalitions are increasingly fluid, and ideological stances play a minimal role in their formation. The head-deputy combinations have not necessarily come from the same national coalition camp. The head may be a PDIP’s cadre while the deputy may be a Democrat. Thus, while a candidate may be a PDIP cadre, the parties that endorsed him or her may include parties from outside the national governing coalition (See also Table 2). Parties fight over short-term political—in many cases, material—interests, and not in representation of cleavages in society.[13]
Table 2. Coalition of political parties of single-pair candidates in the 2020 Regional Elections
The second trend is the growing tendency and ability of the elites to insulate the local electoral arena. Unsurprisingly, this capability tends to belong to incumbents and dynastic candidates. Our data show that 21 out of the 25 single-pair candidates were incumbents.[14] This suggests that it is difficult for most newcomers to get ahead; enormous political and material capital—known as ‘incumbency advantage’—is required.[15] Newcomers who do succeed, tend to belong to the second type of candidate: the dynastic candidates.[16]
The Performance of Dynastic Candidates
The increased presence of dynastic candidates indicates the pool of local elites supply is shrinking. The number of dynastic candidates has in fact increased more than threefold in a short time, for example from 52 in 2015 to 159 in 2020,[17] i.e. in just one electoral cycle.[18] Three factors contributed to this. First, the rescission of the ‘anti-dynastic’ clause in the Law No 8/2015 on Regional Elections opened the door for relatives of political elites to run in Pilkada.[19] This is related to the second factor, which is that many incumbents or former incumbents consequently began promoting relative(s) to run for office, in order to extend—and expand—their political domination. Finally, dynastic candidates and political parties share a symbiotic relationship:[20] the former need the latter’s endorsement in subnational or legislative elections, while the latter need the former’s support to fund regional operational costs and to attract votes.
While the number of dynastic candidates in the 2020 elections may have surged, the preliminary results for them are rather mixed. Apparently 74 won, 81 lost, and 6 are still waiting for the final decision, delayed by the vote margins being less than two per cent. Dynastic politicians who won include President Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, and son-in-law, Muhammad Bobby Afif Nasution, in the Solo and Medan mayoral elections respectively. Their victories set a new record: for the first time in Indonesian history, two family members of a sitting President won subnational elections.[21] Several other high-profile dynastic candidates also won.[22] At the same time, some who share family ties with national political figures were defeated.[23] Their losses indicate that family brand-name is not the only determinant for victory at the subnational level. Some of these lost to popular incumbents.[24]
The win/loss ratio of dynastic candidates in this election cycle presents a contradictory picture of Indonesia’s elite circulation. On the one hand, their increasing number suggests that the pool of elites supply is narrowing. On the other hand, the direct local elections (Pilkada langsung) system provides a fighting chance for non-dynastic politicians to defeat dynastic candidates.[25] There is however no guarantee that non-dynastic candidates, after their victories, will not establish their own dynasties. Still, the results show that a political dynasty is not an all-powerful entity.[26] What Indonesia needs, though, is a level electoral playing field and the work should start early in the candidacy process.
Elections During a Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic has been shaping discussions related to the conducting of elections during a global health crisis. Activists, analysts, and mass organisation leaders expressed grave concerns when it was decided that elections would be held on 9 December 2020, with many predicting that the voter turnout would be low due to health concerns.[27]
Yet, against the odds, Pilkada 2020 showed the opposite. Election Commission (KPU) data put voter turnout at 76% on average.[28] Although slightly below KPU’s ambitious target of 77.5%, this was nevertheless impressive, given the rising rate of Covid-19 cases at the time.
Three factors might have contributed to this. First, institutionally, Indonesia has one of the world’s most voter-friendly electoral management designs, which lowers the barrier for voters getting to the voting stations.[29] Most of the responsibility of voter registration is in the hands of KPU, not the voters. Furthermore, to increase voter turnout, the government picked a national holiday as polling day, even when not all subnational units were involved in the 2020 elections.[30] The government also took into account the geographical variable in determining the location of voting stations. To calm voter concerns about COVID-19, KPU added a number of preventive measures, including reducing the number of voters allowed at each voting station to prevent crowds and shorten the queues, and providing necessary equipment and supplies to protect the health of voters and staff at all polling stations.[31] KPU also ensured that those in quarantine could cast their ballots, by sending KPPS to the quarantine sites.
Second, local political dynamics also influenced voter mobilisation on election day. All Pilkada, except Jakarta, adopt the First Past the Post (FPTP) system: the candidate who secures the most votes will automatically win the race and there will be no second round.[32] In such a context, all competing candidates will go the extra mile to mobilise voters, including mobilising their most ardent supporters (tim sukses). They work hard to ensure that members of their local networks cast their vote, including disbursing money for turnout buying if necessary.[33] This year, this trend was particularly apparent in regions where there were only two pairs of candidates and where political polarisation between these two existed.
Finally, the central government made an extra effort to ensure that Pilkada was conducted safely and peacefully, and with high turnout rate. For various reasons, it had insisted that the Pilkada be held on December 9, 2020, with the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) and of Communications and Information (Kominfo) doing the heavy lifting to promote it. The Kominfo, for example, put out numerous election-related advertisements. Although these were mainly on health protocol during voting, they showed how the government was trying its best to convince the people that voting during the pandemic was safe. In a similar vein, the Kemendagri formed a dedicated section to monitor the recording process of e-ID (e-KTP) and the Civil Registry Information Letter.[34] These initiatives were taken by the central government to ensure that their decision to set the election in motion was a correct one, on the one hand, and, on the other, to preserve its legitimacy despite its failure thus far in handling the pandemic nationwide.
It is too early to determine which political party reaped the most advantage in the 2020 Pilkada, because of the fluidity of the multi-party coalitions supporting the winning candidates. The result of the single-pair races, however, can give us an early indication (See Table 2). Eleven elected regents and mayors are identified as PDIP’s cadres; five are Golkar’s; two are Nasdem’s; one is from the Democratic Party (PD); and the party affiliation of the other six regents/mayors is unknown. Seven of the elected deputy regents/mayors are cadres of PDIP; three are Golkar’s; two are affiliated with the National Awakening Party (PKB); one with PD; and the party affiliation of the other 10 elected deputy regents/mayors is unknown. In three regions—Badung, Semarang City and Gunungsitoli—both the elected heads and deputies are identified as PDIP cadres. While these results cannot be extrapolated nationally directly, the indication is therefore that PDI-P cadres won a majority of the Pilkada.
REGIONAL ELECTIONS DURING PANDEMIC, WHY?
In the Indonesia context, the longer elections are postponed, the shorter term of office the winning politicians will hold. This Pilkada had already been postponed once (from 23 September to 9 December 2020). Shorter terms of office mean less access to resources and policymaking. Moreover, another delay would mean that some officeholders may run after their terms of office are over, losing their advantage of running an election as an incumbent, adding uncertainty in the internal power configuration and support within their party.
This consideration led the government to support its political dignity by supporting a narrative showing that their decision to uphold the regional election was legitimate and would not be a health hazard, and explains why the massive advertisement for Pilkada was carried out by the government—instead of KPU. During the campaign period, any violation of health protocol regulations, especially on crowd emergence, was met with a stern penalty,[35] arguably because the government did not wish to face any further resistance to the regional election. Cabinet members also made statements to reinforce the safety of the election: Home Minister Tito Karnavian, rather than the Election Commissioner, repeatedly issued warnings regarding health regulations during the election process.[35] Five days after the election, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs stated adamantly that no COVID-19 cluster had emerged during the election.[37][38]
In hindsight, the regional elections can be seen as a means for mobilising governmental resources rather than as an expression of the government’s commitment to democracy. On the surface, the KPU ticked almost all the procedural requirements, including ensuring the implementation of health protocols in all voting stations. The substantive aspects of democracy, however, once again failed to dominate public debate; this was because the dominant topics throughout the elections were mostly related to the ways in which the government and KPU could minimise the risks of creating new pandemic clusters. Although the issues of dynastic politics and of sole candidates emerged sporadically, there was much less discussion about how Indonesians should deal with the shrinking pool of candidates. The public hardly paid any attention to deficiencies in the process of candidate recruitment, or to the candidates’ integrity and objectives. That the results of 2020 Pilkada will bring significant advancement for the public remains highly uncertain.
In short, Indonesia’s representative democratic system appears to be malfunctioning, and its democracy caters too much to the whims of its patrons. Performative and procedural aspects are brought forward to legitimise power-seeking behaviour, and consequently, it is difficult to directly observe whether elections—especially regional elections—actually influence elite behaviour to bring significant and structural progress to the people.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INDONESIA’S DEMOCRACY
Most scholars of Indonesian politics believe that oligarchic elites have a tight grip on the country’s institutions.[39] These patronage tendencies along with the lack of ideology make party lines quite meaningless. Coalition of parties present themselves as opposites to gain votes, while fluid coalitions—not necessarily reflective of the national alignment—can be formed to bolster local candidates, as was seen during all four sets of Pilkada in 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2020.[40] Quoting an analyst, “The motivation of almost all parties in the 2020 regional election coalitions was electoral interest.”[41]
This pragmatic approach offers little fundamental policy, programmes, or even ideas for improving socio-economic-political conditions in society. The government practically runs on transactional politics, and the bureaucracy has become an extension on the interest of many political actors. These are not interested in ideological contestation and work mainly based on mere interest in power. Now, with no real opposition, except perhaps from the small party, PKS, there are no real checks-and-balances by the legislative on the executive. The government acts almost without control from the parliament. The decision to push for regional elections despite the pandemic, or other decisions such as the passing of the Law on KPK, or Omnibus Law, or the disbanding of FPI, are examples of this.
There is clearly an urgent need for structural changes among political parties, and to the political system.[42] The patronage and the lack of ideological dimensions have led to stagnation in political parties, and they are unable to attract younger people, which contributes to, and becomes a fertile ground for, the growth of political dynasties, even at the regional level.
Reforming the parties should therefore be a priority in the continued democratisation of Indonesia. Conditions that encourage political parties to come up with concrete programmes with ideological ambitions are sorely needed, as is political education for the public to empower voters to ‘punish’ political parties that fail to offer actionable programmes. In a young democracy like Indonesia, nobody knows how long this will take. But surely if that fails, then democracy will also vanish.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/5, 25 January 2021.
ENDNOTES
[1] Fossati D, Aspinall E, Muhtadi B, Warburton E. (2020) Ideological representation in clientelistic democracies: The Indonesian case. Electoral Studies 63:102111.
[2] Müller W and Strøm K (eds). (1999) Policy, office, or votes? How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[3] Hicken A and Kuhonta E. (2011) Shadows from the past: Party system institutionalization in Asia. Comparative Political Studies 44, 5: 572-597. See also Croissant A and Völkel P. (2012) Party system types and party system institutionalization: Comparing new democracies in East and Southeast Asia. Party Politics 18, 2: 235-265.
[4] See, among others: Fiona U and Tomsa D. (2020) Changing patterns of factionalism in Indonesia: From principle to patronage. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39, 1: 39-58; Slater D and Simmons E. (2012) Coping by colluding: Political uncertainty and promiscuous power sharing in Indonesia and Bolivia. Comparative Political Studies 46, 11: 1366-1393; Mietzner M. (2013) Money, power, and ideology: Political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Singapore: NUS Press; Ufen A. (2018) From aliran to dealignment: Political parties in post-Soeharto Indonesia. South East Asia Research 16, 1: 5-41; and Fossati D. (2019) The resurgence of ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, aliran and political behaviour. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 38, 2: 119-148.
[5] Fossati D, et al (2020) op.cit.
[6] Mietzner M. (2013) op.cit.
[7] Aspinall E. (2014) Parliament and patronage. Journal of Democracy 25, 4: 96-110. See also Dettman S, Pepinsky T, and Jan P. (2017) Incumbency advantage and candidate characteristics in open-list proportional representation systems: Evidence from Indonesia. Election Studies 48, 111-120.
[8] Aspinall E. (2014) op.cit.
[9] Wilson I. and Yew-Foong H. (2020), Signs of democratic contraction and recentralisation of power in Indonesia’s 2020 regional elections. ISEAS Perspective, No. 140, 7 December.
[10] This number excludes the percentage of total votes in Kabupaten Pegunungan Arfak which was unavailable at the time of the writing.
[11] The authors anticipate missing data of candidates’ dynastic status. The unavailability of a single and publicly available national family registry presents enormous challenges in identifying all members of political dynasties in Indonesia.
[12] For a detailed description of the 2018 regional elections in Makassar, see Wilson I and Yew-Foong H. (2020) ibid., pp. 4-5 and David Binns, “Incumbents with attitude in Indonesia’s local elections”, New Mandala, 4 November 2020. https://www.newmandala.org/incumbents-with-attitude-in-indonesias-local-elections/
[13] Buehler M and Tan P. (2007) Party-candidate relationships in Indonesian local politics: A case study of the 2005 regional elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province. Indonesia 84: 41-69.
[14] Either the heads and their deputies or deputy heads.
[15] On the topic of incumbency advantages in subnational elections in Indonesia, see Testriono and Schraufnagel S. (2020) Testing for incumbency advantages in a developing democracy: Elections for local government leaders in Indonesia. Contemporary Southeast Asia 42, 2: 200-223.
[16] Hanindhito Himawan Pramana’s candidacy in Kabupaten Kediri is a case in point. He is the Cabinet Secretary’s son and a seasoned politician of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), Pramono Anung. Another example is Susanti Dewayani’s candidacy as Asner Silalahi’s deputy in Kota Pematangsiantar. Susanti is the mother-in-law of Boy Iskandar Warongan, an MP in Pematangsiantar, and the wife of a wealthy local entrepreneur Kusma Erizal Ginting. Note that some of the incumbents are also members of political dynasties. Additionally, among the three newcomers, only the pair of Afif Nurhidayat and Muhammad Albar in Wonosobo (Central Java) does not belong to any political dynasty.
[17] Yoes C. Kenawas had previously recorded 146 dynastic candidates in the 2020 elections. This article provides the latest update on the number of dynastic politicians who competed in the 2020 elections. See Kenawas, YC. (2020) Dynastic politics: Indonesia’s new normal, Indonesia at Melbourne, 29 September 2020. https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/dynastic-politics-indonesias-new-normal/
[18] Except Makassar, all regions that held subnational elections in 2020 belong to the same set of regions that held subnational elections in 2015.
[19] Michael Buehler, “Married with children”, Inside Indonesia, 20 July 2013. https://www.insideindonesia.org/married-with-children
[20] Kenawas, YC. (2020) op.cit.
[21] Previously, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, had won a parliamentary seat in 2019 when the President was still in the office. This year, President Yudhoyono’s nephew, Indrata Nur Bayuaji, won local elections in Pacitan, East Java.
[22] This includes Hanindhito Himawan Pramana (son of the Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung), Ipuk Fiestianani Azwar Anas (wife of the Regent of Banyuwangi Abdullah Azwar Anas), and Adnan Purichta Ichsan (nephew of the Minister of Agriculture Syahrul Yasin Limpo).
[23] They include Vice President K.H. Ma’ruf Amin’s daughter, Siti Nur Azizah, and the Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto’s niece, Rahayu Saraswati Djojohadikusumo (Sara). Both Siti and Sara lost the South Tangerang mayoral elections to the Deputy Mayor of South Tangerang, Benjamin Davnie, who paired with a member of a powerful local Bantenese dynasty, Pilar Saga Ichsan. Ichsan himself is the eldest son of Ratu Tatu Chasanah, the Regent of Serang, who was just re-elected for her second term in office. Pilar is the niece of the current Mayor of South Tangerang, Airin Rachmi Diany, who married the brother of a former Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut Choisiyah. This means Pilar has five relatives currently occupying elected offices, including Andhika Hazrumy (Deputy Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut’s son), Tanto Warsono Arban (Deputy Regent of Pandeglang, Ratu Atut’s son-in-law), Andiara Aprilia Hikmat (a member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD), Ratu Atut’s daughter), Tubagus Haerul Jaman (a member of the People’s Representative Council (DPR), Ratu Atut’s step-brother), and Adde Rosi Khoerunnisa (a DPR member, Ratu Atut’s daughter-in-law and Andhika Hazrumy’s wife). Similarly, Titik Masudah (sister of the Minister of Manpower, Ida Fauziyah) and Munafri Arifuddin (nephew of the former Vice President Jusuf Kalla) were defeated by local dynastic candidates in Mojokerto and Makassar respectively. Munafri lost to the pair of Danny Pomanto and Fatmawati Rusdi. While Danny is not a member of any political dynasty, Fatmawati is the wife of Rusdi Masse Mappasessu, former Regent of Sidenreng Rappang (South Sulawesi) from 2008 to 2018 and now member of DPR RI from the National Democrat Party (Partai Nasdem). Rusdi is also an influential member of the Nasdem Party.
[24] See Binns, D. (2020) “Incumbents with attitude in Indonesia’s local elections”. New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/incumbents-with-attitude-in-indonesias-local-elections/ for more nuanced account. Munafri Arifuddin, for example, lost for the second time to Danny Pomanto, a popular former Mayor of Makassar who was disqualified from joining the 2018 Makassar mayoral elections. Siti Nur Azizah, Rahayu Saraswati Djojohadikusumo, and Titik Masudah, however, lost to other dynastic candidates who were able to build better local networks. Pilar’s victory against Siti and Rahayu was inseparable from Airin Rachmi Diany’s status as the incumbent Mayor of South Tangerang who controls the local government’s budget, bureaucratic networks, and well-oiled tim sukses (success teams). Similarly, Titik Masudah suffered a defeat by Ikfina Fahmawati, the wife of former Regent of Mojokerto Mustafa Kamal Pasa), who is now in jail due to his involvement in a bribery case. Despite the physical absence of Mustafa, Ikfina ‘inherited’ her husband’s political networks –both within the bureaucratic structure and the tim sukses—in Mojokerto.
[25] In Batanghari (Jambi Province), for example, the pair of Muhammad Fadhil Arief and Bakhtiar defeated three dynastic candidates, including Yunninta Asmara (the wife of Batanghari Regent Syahirsyah) and the pair of Muhammad Firdaus (son of the late Deputy Regent of Batanghari Sofia Joesoef) and Camelia Puji Astuti (daughter of the former Deputy Governor of Jambi Hasip Kalimuddin Syam). A similar story can be found in Timor Tengah Utara, Bolaang Mongondow Timur, and Minahasa Selatan.
[26] Aspinall E. and As’ad M.U. (2016) Understanding family politics: Successes and failures of political dynasties in regional Indonesia. South East Asia Research 24, 3: 420-435.
[27] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/06/voter-turnout-in-upcoming-elections-may-drop-nearly-50-percent-due-to-covid-19-lsi.html and https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5059658/partisipasi-pemilih-pilkada-2020-saat-pandemi-dinilai-sulit-capai-target-775
[28] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1415456/kpu-sebut-partisipasi-pemilih-pilkada-2020-capai-7613-persen
[29] Interview with Titi Anggraini of Perludem (26/12/20)
[30] The government also decided to hold the elections on Wednesday to discourage voters from taking a long weekend, which could have further reduced the voter turnout.
[31] This included portable hand washing stations, contactless thermometers, dedicated voting booths for those whose body temperature was above 37.3C, and personal protective equipment for the polling station working committee (KPPS).
[32] In cases where the winning margin is less than 0.5 to 2 percent (depending on the size of local population), the losing candidates may challenge the election result at the Constitutional Court (MK).
[33] Nichter S. (2008)Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. American Political Science Review 102, 1: 19-31; Muhtadi B. (2019) Vote buying in Indonesia: The mechanics of electoral bribery. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore.
[34] https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/pr-011061154/tito-karnavian-beberkan-strategi-khusus-untuk-pilkada-2020-di-tengah-pandemi-covid-19
[35] https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/11/25/18503421/polri-ada-1448-pelanggaran-protokol-kesehatan-selama-kampanye-pilkada?page=all
[36] For example: https://www.merdeka.com/politik/mendagri-paparkan-langkah-penegakan-protokol-kesehatan-saat-pilkada-2020.html
[37] The government is well aware that the incubation period of the virus varies generally from 3 to 14 days after initial infection. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20201214190933-4-209042/klaim-mahfud-md-pilkada-serentak-2020-bebas-klaster-covid-19
[38] It is worth noting that the Regent of East Luwu, South Sulawesi, an incumbent, was hospitalised three days after the election due to Covid-19 and died on 24 December 2020. https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/24/10521871/bupati-luwu-timur-meninggal-dunia-setelah-terjangkit-covid-19?page=all
[39] Mietzner M. (2015) Reinventing Asian populism: Jokowi’s rise, democracy, and political contestation in Indonesia. East West Center, Honolulu; Hadiz, V. R. and Robison, R. (2014) The political economy of oligarchy and the recentralization of power in Indonesia in Beyond oligarchy: Wealth, power, and contemporary Indonesian politics, Ford M. and Pepinsky T. Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, Ithaca; Winters J.A. 2011 Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press, New York.
[40] https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/335081/pilkada-di-jatim-dikuasai-pdip-dan-gerindra, https://lokadata.id/artikel/asal-menang-dalam-pilkada-2017, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4083401/pdip-gerindra-koalisi-di-48-daerah-pdip-pks-di-33-daerah, and https://rmco.id/baca-berita/pilkada/45854/bersatu-di-13-pilkada-pdippks-ternyata-bukan-minyak-dan-air
[41] Informal interview with Arya Fernandes of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (21/12/20).
[42] However, it is not something that could be realistically done—at least in the short run.
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