A+ A-

Articles & Commentaries

ISEAS Perspective 2021/4 “Canals and Land Bridges: Mega-Infrastructure Proposals for Southern Thailand” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap

 

Prayut Chan-ocha, Thai Prime Minister
It is now up to Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha to decide on Southern Thailand’s future development. Photo: Chanlee Thirasupa, AFP.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The idea of a canal across the Isthmus of Kra in Southern Thailand, or the Kra Canal, prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, resurfaced in the late 1990s as the Khlong Thai or “Thai Canal” idea.
  • However, the high investment costs, massive and unpredictable adverse environmental impacts, and security implications have all weighed against its realisation.
  •  A mega project proposal that envisions building a “Land Bridge” between Chumphon Province on the Gulf of Thailand and an enlarged deep-sea port in Ranong Province on the Andaman Sea has now been touted.
  • The proposed project has the support of Prime Minister Prayut Chanocha’s Transport Minister Saksiam Chidchob, who sees it as being in line with other proposals to develop Southern Thailand including the Eastern Economic Corridor.
  • The Land Bridge can be supplemented by yet another proposed mega project called the “Thai Bridge” — a new freight route of expressways and undersea tunnels beneath the Gulf of Thailand, linking Chonburi Province to the proposed Land Bridge.
  • It is now up to Prime Minister Prayut to decide on Southern Thailand’s future development.

* Termsak Chalermpalanupap is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

INTRODUCTION

The race between two competing ideas for mega infrastructure projects in Southern Thailand has entered the final stretch. The old Khlong Thai or “Thai Canal” scheme has been overtaken by the new “Land Bridge”, which enjoys crucial support from Transport Minister Saksiam Chidchob.

The Land Bridge project will involve the construction of a deep-sea port in Chumphon Province on the Gulf of Thailand and the upgrading of the small port of Ranong on the Andaman Sea into a modern deep-sea port. The two ports will be connected by a dual-track railway and a motorway, which will constitute the Land Bridge for the multi-modal transport of containers and goods from the South China Sea through the Gulf of Thailand to the Indian Ocean through the Andaman Sea. [See Maps 1 and 2.] One key advantage of the Land Bridge is that it will offer international shippers an alternative route, bypassing the congested Straits of Malacca and shortening shipping time by about one day.

Map 1

Map 2

Source: Details based on information provided by the Ministry of Transport of Thailand

The same advantages have been the primary selling points of the Khlong Thai proposal, which is a twentieth-century reincarnation of the age-old idea of the Kra Canal. Now, the most talked about route for the Khlong Thai is the Route 9A — which is a 135-km open canal, without locks, at least 30 metres in depth and 400 metres in width and thus allowing two-way traffic. [See Map 3.]

The route runs from Ranod District in Songkhla Province on the Gulf of Thailand to Sikao District of Trang on the Andaman Sea. It offers a shortened distance of about 1,200 nautical miles between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, saving up to one whole day of sailing time on ships using the Straits of Malacca.

As the noisy anti-government protest movement in Thailand runs out of steam, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha appears to have gained renewed confidence in his political standing. The stage is thus set for General Prayut to take a momentous decision on infrastructure development in Southern Thailand.

Map 3

Source: Details from the Thai Canal Association Study and Development

FROM KRA CANAL TO KHLONG THAI

The idea of digging a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Southern Thailand can be traced back to the reign of King Narai the Great of the Ayutthaya kingdom.[1] In the seventeenth century, Ayutthaya was a prosperous entrepôt. Traders and diplomats from Western countries, Persia and India often landed in Tanintharyi or Tenasserim on the Andaman side of the Isthmus of Kra and travelled by land to Ayutthaya. A canal across the isthmus would have enabled them to sail directly to Ayutthaya.

Unfortunately, the Siamese kingdom lost territories in Myeik or Mergui, Dawei or Tavoy, and Tanintharyi to the Burmese kingdom in 1793, during the reign of Rama I. Digging a canal between the two seas could no longer be done at the Isthmus of Kra, which had been the narrowest section of Siamese territory on the peninsula. If constructed entirely on Siamese soil, a canal would have to be dug further south, between Chumphon and Ranong — the site now being proposed for the Land Bridge.

The Kra Canal idea was resurrected during the reign of King Mongkut (1851-1868). Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French developer of the Suez Canal, travelled to Bangkok to seek permission to conduct a field survey for the canal, but King Mongkut declined his offer.[2]

During the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), the British, who had colonised Burma in 1824, showed some interest in the Kra Canal idea. But King Chulalongkorn turned them down for fear of exposing Siam to colonisation.[3]

After the Second World War, an Anglo-Thai Peace Treaty was signed in Singapore on 1 January 1946. It included a specific prohibition on digging a canal across the Isthmus of Kra without permission of the British government. The treaty had little consequence, however, expiring as it did when Thailand joined the United Nations on 16 December 1946.

Numerous attempts to revive the Kra Canal idea from the 1950s to the 2000s failed to make any real progress. The only notable development came in 2004, during the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, when the Senate endorsed the Route 9A, to be called the Khlong Thai.[4] Thaksin was ousted in a coup on 19 September 2006, however, before he could take any initiative on the proposal.[5]

ACTIVE LOBBYING FOR THE KHLONG THAI 

Three entities have been established to promote the Khlong Thai idea: the Thai Canal Association for Study and Development (TCASD), the Thai-Chinese Commercial and Industry Trade Association (TCCITA), and the Khlong Thai Party.

The Khlong Thai Party fielded 50 candidates, running in all 14 Southern provinces in Thailand’s March 2019 general elections. It failed to win any House seat, however. The candidates altogether polled only 12,946 votes, according to the Election Commission.[6] Its election failure contradicted the claim of proponents of the project that the ambitious idea had widespread support among people in Southern Thailand.

The TCCITA is led by General Chetta Thanajaro, a former Army chief with ties to General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, who was also a former Army chief and a former prime minister. General Chavalit was Thailand’s key man in developing military-to-military cooperation between Thailand and China in opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in 1978-1989.

The TCCITA has been active in lobbying Thai senators and MPs for support of the Khlong Thai idea. Its Chinese counterpart, on the other hand, has been trying, but has so far failed, to persuade Chinese leaders to include the Khlong Thai idea in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) master plan.[7]

The TCASD is by far the most active among the three entities promoting the Khlong Thai. It advocates Route 9A as the most feasible. The Gulf of Thailand end of the Route 9A has space for special economic zones; in the mid-section, there is a good location for a new international airport; and on the Andaman side, there is a suitable location for an oil refinery complex, according to Taschai Inthavises, head of the TCASD’s Trang Provincial Chapter.[8]

The TCASD was officially established in 2015 and has been headed by General Pongthep Tesprateep, director of the General Prem Tinsulanonda Statesman Foundation.

In January 2020, the House of Representatives set up an ad hoc committee to study the Khlong Thai as well as the proposed Southern Economic Corridor. The committee is now headed by Maj Gen Songklod Tiprat, leader of the Thai Nation Power Party, which is one of the nine mini-parties — each with only one MP — in the 18-party government coalition. The committee and its three sub-committee have conducted hearings and field trips.

In July 2020, the committee suffered an embarrassing setback when one of its members, the environmental activist Prasitchai Noonuan, resigned in disgust. He accused the remaining committee members of “bias” in favour of the Khlong Thai idea, saying that they were more interested in finding ways and means of advancing it than in evaluating its pros and cons impartially.[9]

Nevertheless, Maj Gen Songklod remains confident that his committee will be able to submit a substantive report to the House of Representatives in 2021.

ODDS AGAINST THE KHLONG THAI[10]

The current estimated cost of the Khlong Thai, as cited by Maj Gen Songklod, is 2,000 billion baht,[11] or about US$66 billion. The cost will continue to rise, because of demands for higher compensation for land expropriation and the relocation of about 65,000 affected villagers. More add-ons, such as dredging longer and deeper access channels, constructing larger highway and railway bridges across the canal, and a large international airport, will only further inflate the costs.

In return, income from canal passage fees remains uncertain. It is too early to predict how shipping companies will respond to the Khlong Thai once it is in operation. The prospect of saving of just one or two days of sailing time by using the Khlong Thai may be insufficient to divert ships from the Straits of Malacca. Oil tankers bound for ports in East Asia may use the Khlong Thai because they do not need to do any shipping business in Singapore. But most other ships would still go to Singapore for trade, tourism, fuel and repairs.

Income from foreign investment in special economic zones on both ends of the Khlong Thai is also uncertain. Foreign investors now have numerous choices in Southeast Asia to set up their factories and centres for services.

Building the Khlong Thai will involve massive digging and earth-moving works. This will inevitably have a large-scale adverse environmental impact. The impact will be significant on the Andaman side, particularly at Lanta Island National Park in Krabi and Hat Chao Mai National Park in Trang. Eco-tourism has been an important source of income in Phuket, Krabi, Phang Nga, and Trang Provinces. Groups involved in the tourism sector on the Andaman coast oppose the Khlong Thai idea.

One issue that has not yet been properly examined is how the Khlong Thai will change the marine eco-systems on both ends of the proposed waterway. The water level in the Andaman Sea is usually about one metre higher than that of the Gulf of Thailand.

Perhaps among the most difficult problem facing the Khlong Thai are its strategic security implications. If Thailand owns and operates such a new international waterway in the middle of the Indo-Pacific region, it will definitely come under greater pressure from both China and the United States to choose sides in the two powers’ strategic rivalry. Former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva noted that the security implications of the Khlong Thai should not be overlooked, especially now that China-US rivalry in the South China Sea has intensified.[12] In fact, the security implications prompted Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan to dismiss the Khlong Thai idea as too problematic. “If it is proposed, I would insist on rejecting it”, said the retired former Army chief in 2016.[13]

General Prawit is still a deputy premier, and he has become the leader of the Phalang Pracharat Party, the largest party in the ruling coalition. It is safe to assume that General Prawit has not changed his mind about the Khlong Thai idea.

RESURGENCE OF THE LAND BRIDGE

Thailand’s 20-year National Strategy, covering 2018-2037, calls for further development of the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), connecting the EEC through seamless transport infrastructure with other special economic zones in the Western and Southern regions, and enhancing Thailand’s competitiveness as the regional hub for logistics and connectivity.[14] The Land Bridge proposal fits this bill perfectly.

Its proponents count on the Land Bridge to improve Thailand’s logistics performance index ranking by the World Bank, which in 2018 put Thailand at thirty-second place in the world, compared with seventh for Singapore, twelfth for Hong Kong, and twenty-seventh for Taiwan.[15]

On 15 September 2020, the Prayut Cabinet approved the allocation of 68 million baht for the Ministry of Transport’s Office of Transport Policy and Planning (OTPP) to fund a feasibility study of the Land Bridge, to conduct an environmental impact assessment, to propose a business development model, and to undertake outreach programmes to generate public understanding of the project proposal. All the studies and outreach activities are to be completed by the end of 2023 or earlier.[16]

Moreover, the State Railway of Thailand has been allocated 90 million baht for a field survey and a feasibility study on a dual-track railway from Chumphon to Ranong.[17] The new railway would be linked with the China-Laos-Thailand high-speed railway running via Bangkok, Nakhon Ratchasima,[18] Nongkhai, and Vientiane in Laos. It will also be linked to the Lat Krabang inland container depot in eastern Bangkok, as well as to dry ports under construction in four provinces.[19]

Supplementing the Land Bridge will be yet another mega project called the Thai Bridge, which involves a new freight route of highways and tunnels under the Gulf of Thailand to transport cargos from Chonburi Province in the EEC to either Phetburi or Prachuap Khirikhan — a distance of about 90 kilometres — and onward to the port at Ranong. Its proponents may have been inspired by China’s Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau bridges and expressway, which is 55 kilometres long.

The Thai Bridge project, which requires a massive investment estimated at 990 billion baht, may develop faster than the Dawei special economic zone in Myanmar, according to Deputy Prime Minister Supattanapong Punmeechaow, who leads the team of economic ministers in the Prayut administration.[20]

However, where the Prayut administration will find money to build the Thai Bridge remains an important question. Funding the Bangkok–Nongkhai high-speed railway, which will cost 431.76 billion baht, is a higher priority for the government.[21]

BIAS FOR LAND BRIDGE

Khlong Thai proponents complain that the Prayut administration has allocated too little money, just about 10 million baht, to study the project. They suspect that the Prayut administration is biased in favour of the Land Bridge.

General Prayut has maintained that both the Khlong Thai and the Land Bridge ideas remain on the table.

To be sure, Transport Minister Saksiam is clearly more in favour of the Land Bridge. He included the Land Bridge among the Prayut administration’s current list of mega infrastructure projects during his keynote address to the Investment 2020 seminar organised by Matichon newspaper in Bangkok on 25 September 2019.

Minister Saksiam believes that the Khlong Thai is not feasible now, in the wake of the pandemic, when funds for such a large-scale and long-term project are difficult to secure. On the other hand, he considers the Land Bridge feasible under some form of public-private partnership (PPP). Investment costs will be around 60 billion baht, or just 3 per cent of what the Khlong Thai would require.[22]

The minister plans to develop for international tender a single PPP package which will include the four major components of the Land Bridge: deep-sea ports in Chumphon and Ranong, a dual-track railway, and a motorway running a distance of about 120 kilometres between the two ports.

According to Minister Saksiam, cargo containers from the EEC’s Laem Chabang Port and Thai dry ports can be shipped to Chumphon, and unloaded onto trains or trucks which will ferry them to be loaded onto ships in Ranong for onward transport overseas — especially to BIMSTEC countries.[23] Transhipment via the Land Bridge can be done in just a few hours. This will bring some saving to Thai exporters, who have been using ports in Singapore and Malaysia for their world-wide international trade.

Moreover, the Land Bridge will be able to handle cargos to and from southern China using the China-Laos-Thailand high speed railway. This is one new potential advantage of the Land Bridge that the Khlong Thai lacks. Launching the Land Bridge project will create significant knock-on effects for existing ports and special economic zones in Southeast Asia. One obvious victim will be the long-delayed Dawei project, for which the Thai government seems to have diminishing political will to push.

Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project, which is scheduled to be completed in 2026, will miss Thai customers who can send their cargos to the Ranong port instead of Port Klang or Tanjung Pelepas via the ECRL.

Ports in Singapore’s Pasir Panjang and Tuas will also be likely to lose some international shipping business, especially if Chinese traders turn to use the China-Laos-Thailand railway and the Ranong port on the Land Bridge for part of their overseas shipping.

CONCLUSION

An earlier analysis of the age-old dream of a canal across the Isthmus of Kra concluded that the ambitious idea of building the Khlong Thai looks set to remain “a distant prospect”.[24] As things stand now, the Khlong Thai will remain just an elusive idea. The new buzzword of the Prayut administration for infrastructure development in Southern Thailand is the Land Bridge.

Thailand hopes to escape from the middle-income trap to reach a higher level of prosperity and income for its people by the mid-twenty-first century. To this end, it needs a game-changing initiative to enhance its economic potential and enlarge its economic profile in the post-pandemic world. The growing stability of the Prayut administration has now put the Thai prime minister in an ideal position to make a bold and timely decision on this issue.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/4, 22 January 2021.


ENDNOTES

[1] “รายงานของคณะกรรมาธิการวิสามัญ เพื่อศึกษาความเป็นไปได้ของโครงการขุดคอคอดกระ วุฒิสภา พฤษภาคม 2004” [ Report of Senate Ad Hoc Committee on the Feasibility Study of the Project to Dig the Kra Canal May 2004 ], p. 17 ( www.senate.go.th/document /Ext2191/2191331_0002.PDF, accessed 16 December 2020). Section 1 offers a summary of the historical development from the Kra Canal to the Khlong Thai.

[2] Ibid., page 18.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., page 21.

[6] The results of the 2019 general elections are available on the website of the Office of the Election Commission at www.ect.go.th/ewt/ewt/ect_th/download/article/article_20190328165029 (accessed 16 December 2020). The most successful Khlong Thai Party candidate was in the first constituency of Trang Provinces, where the party is headquartered. He received 1,707 votes, while the winning Phalang Pracharat Party candidate scored 39,416 votes.

[7] Annex 1 of the Joint Communiqué of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, issued in Beijing on 27 April 2019, did not include the Khlong Thai idea. The economic corridors and infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia listed in the annex included China-Laos-Thailand Railway Cooperation, the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand, and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the China-Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity. The Joint Communiqué is available at www.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2019/0427/c36-1311.html (accessed on 16 December 2020).

[8] “ทำไมต้องเป็นคลองไทยแนว 9A?” [Why it must be Route 9A for the Khlong Thai?], Naewna, 4 October 2018 ( www.naewna.com/likesara/368167, accessed 16 December 2020).

[9] “ประสิทธิ์ชัย หนูนวล ลาออก กมธ. ดันขุดคลองไทยแล้ว” [ Prasitchai Noonuan resigns from House committee on Khlong Thai ],Manager Online,28 July 2020 ( www.mgronline.com/south/detail/9630000077052, accessed 16 December 2020).

[10] For an earlier discussion of the pros and cons of the Khlong Thai, see Ian Storey, “Thailand’s Perennial Kra Canal Project: Pros, Cons and Potential Game Changers”, ISEAS Perspective, 24 September 2019 (www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_76.pdf, accessed 16 December 2020).

[11] “ขุดแน่ คลองไทย เพื่อเป็นศุนย์กลางการค้าของโลก” [ ‘Khlong Thai’ will definitely be built to serve as a new centre for world trade ], Siam Focus Time, 3 December 2020 ( www.siamfocustime.com/?p=66909, accessed 16 December 2020).

[12] Interview with Dr Jermsak Pinthong on “มุมมองของเจิมศักดิ์” [ Jermsak’s perspective ], 20 January 2020 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=StWlMtm1AjA, accessed 16 December 2020).

[13] “รัฐบาลไม่เอาด้วย แผนขุด ‘คลองไทย‘ เชื่อมอ่าวไทย-อันดามัน” [ Government will not support the plan to dig ‘Khlong Thai’ linking Gulf of Thailand with Andaman Sea], Post Today, 30 May 2016 ( www.posttoday.com/politic/news/434589?utm, accessed 16 December 2020).

[14] See the English translation of the twenty-year National Strategy at http://nscr.nesdb.go.th/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/National-Strategy-Eng-Final-25-OCT-2019.pdf (accessed 17 December 2020).

[15] See the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index Ranking for 2018 at www.lpi.worldbank.org (accessed 17 December 2020).

[16] For details of the cabinet’s decision, see www.thaigov.go.th/news/content/details/35110 (accessed 17 December 2020).

[17] “‘ศักดิ์สยาม’ สั่งทำแผนแลนด์บริดจ์ — ท่าเรือบก รับ ‘ประยุทธ์’ ลงพื้นที่อีอีซี 1 ต. ค.” [‘Saksiam’ calls for Land Bridge plan and dry ports plans for ‘Prayut’ when he visits the EEC on 1 October], Prachachat Business Online, 29 September 2020 (www.prachachat.net/property/news-529497, accessed 17 December 2020).

[18] Five contracts worth 40,275 million baht were signed between Thailand and China in Bangkok on 26 November 2020. They involve the construction of 101.15 kms of railway from Bangkok towards Nakhon Ratchasima. (The whole section is 253 kms in length, and it will cost 179,413 million baht). The next phase of the rail link from Nakhon Ratchasima to Nongkhai, a distance of 364 kms, will have to wait for the time being. Meanwhile, construction of the high-speed railway from China’s Yunnan Province to Vientiane has been progressing rapidly, and its completion is scheduled for 2021.

[19] About 27 billion baht have been set aside to build four dry ports to support the growing Thai national logistics network in Ban Po, Chachoengsao; Sung Noen, Nakhon Ratchasima; Nampong, Khon Kaen; and Phayuhakhiri, Nakhon Sawan. The dry port in Chachoengsao inside the EEC is scheduled to start operation in 2024. See “27,000 ลบ. ท่าเรือบก 4 จังหวัด” [27,000 million baht for dry ports in four provinces], Daily News, 28 May 2019 (www.dailynews.co.th/economic/711480, accessed 17 December 2020).

[20] See “East-South ‘Thai Bridge’ project gains momentum”,Bangkok Post. 8 October 2020 (www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1996451, accessed 17 December 2020). The Dawei project involves the construction of a deep-sea port and a massive special economic zone north of Dawei town in southern Myanmar. The joint venture of the Myanmar and Thai governments has been struggling in recent years to find funding for planned construction. If completed as planned, the Dawei special economic zone will cover 20,000 hectres, about 27 per cent of Singapore’s land area, and become the largest of its kind in Southeast Asia.

[21] This cost estimate was offered by Deputy Transport Minister Athirat Rattanases during his testimony to the Senate on 3 August 2020; a report on his testimony is available at www.thaigov.go.th/news/contents/details/35587 (accessed 16 December 2020).

[22] See cost estimates of various mega infrastructure projects in “ปั้น ‘เมกะโปรเจกต์’ ล้านล้าน แลนด์บริดจ์ – สะพานไทย — ทางด่วน — รถไฟจีน พรึ่บ อุ้มจ้างงาน 1.4 ล้านคน ฝ่าวิกฤต” [ ‘Mega projects’ worth trillions of baht : Land Bridge, Thai Bridge, Expressways, China-Laos-Thailand Railway to create 1.4 million jobs for economic recovery], Manager Online, 10 October 2020 (www.mgronline.com/daily/detail/96300000103264, accessed on 17 December 2020).

[23] Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Thailand are members of the BIMSTEC, which was initiated by Thailand in 1997. BIMSTEC stands for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

[24] Storey, op cit.

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /supportISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.   © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng   Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

“Will Pakatan Harapan’s Hold on Selangor Continue?” by Tricia Yeoh

 

ISEAS Perspective 2021/3 “Indonesia’s MUI Today: Truly Moderate or Merely Pragmatic?” by Syafiq Hasyim

 

Indonesian President Joko Widodo (R) speaks to journalists with new Vice President Ma’ruf Amin (L) after their inauguration at the parliament building in Jakarta on October 20, 2019. Ma’ruf Amin was the Chariman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) until 27 November 2020 (Photo: Adek Berry, AFP)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Despite facing various problems since its establishment in 1975, MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Indonesian Ulama Council) continues to thrive, and has even extended its influence significantly. The National Congress 2020-2025 has refreshed its leadership and portended changes that would help the organisation’s survival.
  • MUI has over time adopted different roles and orientations on the relationship between state and religion.  At various times, it has alternated between alignment with the government and a more critical stance in response to evolving circumstances.
  • At the start of his presidency, Jokowi had a tentative and sometimes uneasy relationship with MUI. However, Jokowi realised the significance of MUI’s influence during the 212 protest movement – Angkatan Bela Islam, Action to Defend Islam, and his subsequent decision to pick then MUI Chairman Ma’ruf Amin as VP running-mate helped to cement a new alliance with MUI. 
  • It remains to be seen whether the removal of conservative critics of Jokowi’s government and the induction of moderate new faces during MUI’s 2020 Congress will consolidate the recent shifts in MUI’s traditional conservatism towards a more moderate outlook. The decisive factor for such a transformation would be ideological and theological conviction, rather than political pragmatism.

* Syafiq Hasyim is Visiting Fellow at the Indonesia Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Director of Library and Culture of Indonesian International Islamic University (UIII), Jakarta. The author wishes to thank Rebecca Neo for her research assistance.

INTRODUCTION

On 25-27 November 2020, MUI finally held its Munas (Musyawarah Nasional, National Congress), months after it was postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.[1] The Congress saw the appointment of new board members for the period of 2020 to 2025. With new faces within the board members, MUI seems to indicate a future trajectory for the organization. Since its establishment in 1975, MUI has dealt with different political regimes and has been able to succeed through these years by adjusting and adapting, but also by being critical against them.

During the authoritarian era under Suharto, MUI successfully adapted[2] by acting as guardian of the government (khadim alhukuma). After losing its main political patronage when Suharto resigned in 1998, MUI quickly adjusted to the new situation. The general chairman of MUI, Kyai Ali Yafie was one of nine national figures invited by Suharto for advice in the days just before his resignation. Kyai Ali Yafie was the first person among them to say to Suharto that the call for reformasi (reform) echoed in the student demonstrations was for him to resign.[3] Through that incident, MUI successfully changed its tagline from khadim al-hukuma to khadim al-umma (guardian of the Muslim community).[4] During the era of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), MUI faced serious challenges from this Indonesian president who was himself an ulama. This effectively meant MUI could not easily argue with Wahid on Islamic issues without having strong backing for its claims. In fact, Wahid proposed a reformation of MUI, but despite the challenges it had to face during this period, MUI managed to sustain its position with the government.  

In the Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY, 2004-2014) era, MUI was able to extend its influence on the government and the Muslim community. SBY himself provided the red carpet for MUI. For the first time MUI gained recognition from the president as the aqidah police (police for faith) and as the moral police.[5] This recognition allowed MUI to become very dominant in matters of religion, especially in the use of Islam as a standard for public behaviour. MUI was also successful in issuing and revitalizing 14 fatwas that encouraged intolerance and discrimination towards minorities. One of these involved banning Ahmadiyyah, and significant attacks on Ahmadiyyah that took place over the last 15 years stemmed from this.[6] SBY intentionally recruited Kyai Ma’ruf Amin, already then a key person in MUI (and currently Indonesian vice president), as a member of Wantimpres (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden, President Advisory Council). That position made MUI stronger than ever before, and allowed the organization to consolidate its strength during the SBY era.

MUI IN THE JOKOWI ERA

During the Jokowi era, the position of MUI has changed again. Jokowi has never had any experience dealing with MUI prior to his presidency, not having been a national political figure before that. He was only mayor in the city of Solo and MUI, as an organization, did not have significant influence at the sub-national or regional level. Even after being elected governor of Jakarta in 2012, Jokowi during his two years in that position, was still not acquainted with MUI. In addition, some statements issued by MUI during the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012 were against Jokowi’s candidacy, largely based on his choice of political allies. Jokowi was then supported by secular parties such as PDIP and Gerindra and had a Christian and Chinese, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), as his running mate. All these circumstances suggest ignorance on Jokowi’s part about MUI.

In 2014, when Jokowi ran for president, MUI maintained a neutral position. This was in all likelihood due to the fact that Jokowi’s running mate was Jusuf Kalla, a person who had been long acquainted with MUI leaders such as Ma’ruf Amin and Din Syamsuddin. MUI did not show any open support for Jokowi, and in fact, a few members of MUI’s elite, expressed support for his opponent, Prabowo. Thus, Jokowi won the 2014 presidential election without any endorsement from MUI. In his first year as president, Jokowi implemented a policy that had direct impact on MUI. In the past, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) provided block grants for MUI.[7] Jokowi’s new financial policy left MUI’s subsidies pended.  This angered MUI, and some of its leaders accused Jokowi of trying to weaken MUI. Amidhan even released a statement directed at Jokowi: “MUI cannot be weakened because ulama prioritise devotion. With or without budget from the state, MUI will continue its education to the Muslim community.”[8] Some MUI elites continued using the issue to criticise and delegitimise the Jokowi government.[9]

AKSI BELA ISLAM 212

In 2015, the Jokowi government did not dispense the yearly MUI social fund. The new regulation required grants to be decided based on detailed projects, and does not condone block grants. MUI agreed in 2016 to follow the new budget proposal policy from Jokowi’s government, and began receiving a budget grant from the government. The relationship between Jokowi and MUI remained distant. On 27 November 2016, Basuki Tjahaja Utama (Ahok), the governor of Jakarta, visited fishermen on the island of Pramuka, part of Kepulaun Seribu.[10] He delivered his talk that touched on some sensitive issues. The opponents of Ahok, mostly from Islamist groups such as FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islam-Defender Front) used this matter to file a legal case, charging him with blasphemy against Islam.[11] Where Jokowi stood on this issue was yet unclear to these groups.

MUI issued a statement called Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Religious Opinion and Stance of Council of Indonesian Ulama).[12] This was not a fatwa, but Ma’ruf Amin (General Chairman of MUI 2015-2020) argued that this Religious Opinion and Stance of MUI had higher authority than a fatwa.[13] In this MUI statement, the speech of Ahok was considered a blasphemous act against Islam, and sought serious action to be taken against anyone committing blasphemy against Islam. The statement motivated Islamist groups to set up a pressure group known as GNPF-MUI (Gerakan National Pengawal Fatwa MUI, National Movement of MUI Fatwa Guard). MUI however stated it was not part of GNPF-MUI despite the use of its name. This did not lessen support for the Islamist groups on the streets.[14] This incident reflected MUI’s carelessness and opportunism in giving official statements.

Be that as it may, the Ahok case, the MUI’s Religious Opinion and Stance, and the 212 movement made Jokowi fully aware of MUI’s strong position in the country. Jokowi and Ma’ruf Amin sought a rapprochement to soften the impact of the 212 movement, which had begun to target not only Ahok but also Jokowi. Jokowi felt that MUI could be persuaded to be his new ally and MUI felt that having a good relationship with Jokowi would increase its bargaining position with the government.

SADIQUL HUKUMA

Jokowi decided at the last minute on Ma’ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate in 2019. This decision, of course, shocked many people and disappointed some of his loyal supporters. Many claimed that Jokowi had embraced his enemy. Ma’ruf Amin and MUI had been perceived as a very critical group that had been attacking Jokowi’s policies through the Ahok incident. But when Ma’ruf Amin officially became Jokowi’s running mate, MUI began active campaigning for the Jokowi-Ma’ruf pair.  After Jokowi-Ma’ruf’s landslide win, it began referring to itself as sadiq al-hukuma (friend of the government).[15] However, the term sadiq al-hukuma also connotes someone prepared to justify government policy (tasdiq, Arabic). Ma’ruf’s position as vice-president has softened MUI’s stance towards Jokowi.

In MUI, there are at least three blocks of influential groups. The largest group are those who have Nahdlatul Ulama as their organization background. The second group are those who come from Muhammadiyah. The third consists of those associated with small Muslim organizations such as DDII, Math’laul Anwar, al-Wasliyah, Perti and many others. Those who have been critical about the Jokowi-MUI partnership are mainly those from Muhammadiyah and from small Muslim organizations such as Din Syamsuddin, Muhyiddin Junaidi,[16] Bachtiar Natsir, Tengku Zulkarnaen and some others. Following the 2020 Munas, these figures are no longer part of MUI.    

MODERATION OR PRAGMATISM?

MUI has been promoting the concept of wasatiyyah Islam (moderate Islam)[17] for more than five years. This concept was introduced in response to the competing narratives promoted by Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, which advocate “Islam Berkemajuan” and “Islam Nusantara” respectively. Besides, MUI also wants to show that it is not promoting radicalism, extremism and jihadism. There are fundamental characteristics of wasatiyyah Islam such as tawasut (moderate), tawazun (balance), i’tidal (straight), tasamuh (tolerance), musawah (egalitarian), shura (democracy), islah (reform), awlawiyyah (prioritising correctly), tatawwur wa ibtikar (dynamic, creative and innovative) and tahaddur (civilised). These reflect the inclusive and pluralist stance of MUI. However, after launching wasatiyyah Islam, the stance of MUI has not changed much in its dealings with other Muslim groupings. It continues to portray Ahmadiyyah as a deviant sect and warns Muslims to beware of Syi’ah, as well as many others. Apparently, wasatiyyah Islam still operates at the conceptual level and has yet to move down to practical aspects of daily life. One could say that MUI is theoretically moderate, but practically conservative.

The new composition of MUI’s board members reflects its position of being a ‘perfect friend’ of the government.[18] Some figures who had criticised Jokowi in the past were not appointed as MUI board members at the Munas (National Congress) 2020. These included figures such as Din Syamsuddin (the presidium of KAMI, Koalisi Aksi Menyelamatkan Bangsa, Coalition of Action for Saving Nation), Tengku Zulkarnain (the representative of Mathla’ul Anwar), Bachtiar Natsir (an important figure behind the 212 movement).[19] Their absence from the new MUI board consolidates the organisation’s support for the Jokowi-Ma’ruf government. This current circumstance of MUI is thus somewhat similar to the role of MUI in the Suharto era when it was khadim al-hukuma (guardian of the government).

With its new face, many hope that MUI will shift away from conservativism towards moderatism, and become an inclusive and pluralist ulama organisation. At the very least, some hope that MUI would promote the tenets of wasatiyyah Islam. However, the history of MUI shows constant strategic shifts in its roles. Established to promote Islam in Indonesia, MUI’s role is to apply sharia to its various degrees. Sharia itself, however, has always had two inclinations; it has a conservative side as well as a moderate side. The hope is that MUI can become a moderate and inclusive organisation and demonstrate consistency in its behaviour to ensure an appropriate interpretation of the sharia for later generations.

CONCLUSION

MUI’s board members are changed every five years, and the new board (2020-2025) has raised hopes that new changes are at hand.

There is a possibility for MUI to shift to a moderate orientation. The new board may also see it becoming a good supporter of the government. By replacing conservative figures on its board with moderate ones, MUI may wish to show to it has shifted from being conservative to being moderate. However, if the swing is driven by political rather than ideological concerns, instead of being moderate, MUI could be pragmatic instead.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/3, 21 January 2021.


ENDNOTES

[1] See https://republika.co.id/berita/qjbjt8366/ini%2Dderetan%2Dkandidat%2Dketua%2Dumum%2Dmui%2D2020, viewed on 3 December 2020. Other organizations postponed their meetings because of Covid-19. Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama postponed their Muktamar which should be held in 2019 to an unfixed time.

[2] See Muhammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975 – 1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993); (Jakarta: INIS, 1993); Wahiduddin Adams, Pola Penyerapan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Dalam Peraturan Perundang-Undangan 1975 – 1997 (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 2004); Syafiq Hasyim, “Fatwas and Democracy: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) and Rising Conservatism in Indonesian Islam,” TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 8, no. 1 (2020): 21-35, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.13.

[3] This information was provided me directly by Kyai Ali Yafie when I was doing my PhD fieldwork in 2010.

[4] Syafiq Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) and Aqidah-Based Intolerance: A Critical Analysis of Its Fatwa on Ahmadiyah and ‘Sepilis,’” in Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia, ed. Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (New York: Routledge, 2016), 211–33.

[5] Hasyim, p. 215. See also Syafiq Hasyim, “Fatwa Aliran Sesat Dan Politik Hukum Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI),” Al-Ahkam 25, no. 2 (2015): 241–66.

[6] MUI, Mengawal Aqidah Umat: Fatwa MUI Tentang Aliran-Aliran Sesat Di Indonesia (Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, n.d.); Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) and Aqidah-Based Intolerance: A Critical Analysis of Its Fatwa on Ahmadiyah and ‘Sepilis.’”

[7] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/466549/tiap-tahun-mui-terima-rp-3-miliar-dana-apbn, viewed on 14 December 2020.

[8] https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/jokowi-belum-cairkan-dana-bansos-buat-mui-sebesar-rp-3-m.html, viewed on 1 December 2020.

[9] See http://dakta.com/news/111/pemerintah-jokowi-hentikan-bantuan-ke-mui, viewed on 6 December 2020.

[10] https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia%2D37996601, viewed on 14 December 2020.

[11] https://republika.co.id/berita/om302o330/penjelasan%2Dhabib%2Drizieq%2Dterkait%2Dpidato%2Dahok%2Dmenyinggung%2Dalmaidah%2D51, viewed on 14 December 2020.

[12] https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3318150/mui-nyatakan-sikap-soal-ucapan-ahok-terkait-al-maidah-51-ini-isinya, viewed on 1 December 2020.

[13] https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3318150/mui-nyatakan-sikap-soal-ucapan-ahok-terkait-al-maidah-51-ini-isinya, viewed on 1 December 2020.

[14] https://www.wartaekonomi.co.id/read204793/maruf-amin-klaim-212-itu-buatannya-gnpf-ulama-diwaspadai, viewed on 14 December 2020.

[15] https://www.madaninews.id/2607/tiga-peran-mui-sebagai-shodiqul-hukumah-khidmatul-dan-himayatul-ummah.html, viewed on 6 December 2020.

[16] https://republika.co.id/berita/qga1lt396/waketum-mui-tolak-sertifikasi-ulama, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201027090242-20-563102/wakil-ketua-mui-banyak-pihak-yang-sangat-merindukan-rizieq, viewed on 6 December 2020.

[17] https://mui.or.id/bimbingan-syariah/paradigma-islam/28522/apa%2Dyang%2Ddimaksud%2Dislam%2Dwasathiyah%2D2, viewed on 5 December 2020.

[18] https://www.wartaekonomi.co.id/read316130/menyambut-era-baru-pengurus-mui-sehati-dengan-jokowi, viewed on 6 December 2020.

[19] https://makassar.terkini.id/din-syamsuddin-bachtiar-nasir-hingga-tengku-zul-terdepak-dari-kepengurusan-mui-yang-baru, https://kabarjoglosemar.pikiran-rakyat.com/news/pr-731023899/tak%2Dada%2Ddin%2Dtengku%2Dzul%2Ddan%2Dbachtiar%2Dnasir%2Ddi%2Dmui%2Dini%2Dsusunan%2Dmui%2D2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5271799/gerbong-212-tak-lagi-ada-di-kepengurusan-mui, viewed on 3 December 2020.

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /supportISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.   © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok   Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong   Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng   Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng   Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

ISEAS Perspective 2021/2 “Sino-US Competition in Infrastructure Development: Power Plants in Vietnam” by Le Hong Hiep

 


A municipality electricity company fixes electricity cables atop a high pole in downtown Hanoi in September 2020 (Photo: Hoang Dinh Nam, AFP).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Vietnam needs to build more power plants to deal with its looming power shortage. Instead of tapping Chinese loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is working with American investors to build a series of power plants using liquified natural gas (LNG) imported from the United States.
  • Vietnam’s decision is driven by its wish to use cleaner sources of energy and to reduce financial and fiscal risks for the country.
  • These projects also strengthen Vietnam-US relations and help make bilateral trade more balanced.
  • The American government is strongly endorsing these LNG-to-power projects for both economic and strategic reasons. The United States is particularly interested in presenting regional countries with an alternative to the BRI that is based on sustainable, high-standard, market-oriented private sector investments.
  • The emergence of an alternative to the BRI is welcome news for regional countries as they will have more funding options for their infrastructure projects.
  • Competition from the United States should encourage China to make BRI lending practices more transparent, sustainable, and compatible with international standards.

* Le Hong Hiep is Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

INTRODUCTION

As a fast-growing economy, Vietnam’s demand for new infrastructure has been increasing over the years. According to the Global Infrastructure Outlook, Vietnam’s investment needs for infrastructure projects between 2016 and 2040 amount to US$605 billion, in which power plants account for US$265 billion (44 per cent).[1] Facing delays in current power projects and difficulties in getting financing for new ones, Vietnam’s power shortage is estimated to reach 6.6 billion kWh in 2021 and 15 billion kWh in 2023, or 5 per cent of the country’s total power demand.[2] If this problem persists, it will pose serious constraints to Vietnam’s economic development.

Against this backdrop, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) should be an appealing source of funding that Vietnam can tap into. However, for various reasons, Vietnam has generally shunned BRI loans.[3] Instead, it is actively working with US investors to develop its energy infrastructure. By late 2020, at least two major power plants funded by US investors using US liquified natural gas (LNG) had been approved, and at least five more similar projects are in the pipeline.

Vietnam’s decision to tap American rather than Chinese capital for its power plants not only has important implications for Vietnam-US relations but also provides an indication of how America is responding to China’s expanding economic and geopolitical influence through the BRI. If these projects are successful, they will bring credibility to America’s approach and offer regional countries a viable alternative to the BRI.

VIETNAM’S SWITCH TO LNG-FIRED POWER PLANTS

As shown in Figure 1, as of early 2020, Vietnam’s total installed capacity of power generation was 54.88 gigawatts (GW), in which hydropower and coal-fired power plants account for 71.46 per cent. However, these traditional power sources have shown limitations.

Figure 1 – Vietnam’s power generation sources as of 2020 (per cent)

Source: EVN National Load Dispatch Center

In addition to the lack of suitable locations left to build new hydropower plants, criticisms against hydropower projects have intensified, especially following recent serious flood and landslide disasters linked to a hydropower project in Quang Nam Province. Meanwhile, air pollution concerns and the Vietnamese government’s strengthening commitment to green development have caused widespread public rejection of new coal-fired power plants. Provinces such as Bac Lieu, Binh Thuan, Long An, Nghe An and Ha Tinh have cancelled coal-fired power projects planned in their jurisdiction. International financiers have also pressured investors to withdraw from coal-fired power projects in Vietnam. For example, a group of investors recently urged Mitsubishi Corp. and seven other Japanese companies to withdraw from the Vung Ang 2 coal-fired power project in Ha Tinh Province.[4] As more international banks refuse to fund coal-fired power plants, getting financing for such projects have become increasingly difficult.[5] The most feasible source of funding for new coal-fired power plants now is from China. However, the borrower would have to use Chinese technology, which is generally seen as less advanced and more polluting.[6] The rising anti-China sentiments in Vietnam would also be a major challenge.

In order to diversify away from hydro and coal-fired power, Vietnam has created a lot of incentives for investments in the renewable energy sector. As shown in Figure 1, as of 2020, solar and wind power account for 11.05 per cent of Vietnam’s total power generation capacity. By August 2020, 23 GW of renewable energy had been added to the national power development plan, including 11.2 GW of solar power and 11.8 GW of wind power.[7] In the next few years, as these renewable energy projects are completed and put into operation, the share of renewable energy in Vietnam’s energy mix will further increase.

However, as renewable energy sources are not stable due to changing weather conditions, Vietnam still needs more stable sources of energy to serve as baseload power. In this regard, LNG-fired power plants provide the most promising option as they are seen as much cleaner than coal-fired power plants while safer and less difficult to develop than nuclear power plants. Currently, Vietnam is planning 10.4 GW of gas-fired power by 2028, most of them use imported LNG. The key challenge, however, is to get funding for these projects.

THE ROLE OF AMERICAN INVESTORS

Vietnam has developed more than 10 gas-fired power plants, but most of them (except for the Phu My 2.2 and Phu My 3 projects in Ba Ria – Vung Tau Province) are developed by domestic investors. All these plants use gas from Vietnam’s gas wells in the South China Sea. As the domestic gas supply is rather limited while new gas development projects have been delayed, Vietnam finds engaging American investors to build new power plants using LNG imported from the United States a convenient option for various reasons.

First, engaging American investors will help strengthen US-Vietnam relations. This is an important consideration, given that Vietnam is keen to maintain strong ties with the United States for both economic and strategic benefits. The United States is currently Vietnam’s biggest export market, while strategic cooperation with Washington is important for Vietnam’s efforts to balance against China in the South China Sea.

Second, importing LNG from the United States will help reduce America’s trade deficit with Vietnam, which stood at $55.8 billion in 2019.[8]  This large and swelling trade deficit has been a major source of resentment for the administration of President Donald Trump. In December 2020, the US Treasury labeled Vietnam as a currency manipulator and accused Vietnam of manipulating its currency to gain “unfair competitive advantage in international trade”.[9] Importing US LNG for its power plants will therefore enable Vietnam to achieve the dual goals of addressing America’s trade concerns and improving its energy security.

Third, working with US private investors will reduce financial and political risks for the Vietnamese government. Unlike Chinese loans under the BRI which are normally arranged through government-to-government agreements and require government guarantee, most LNG-to-power projects in Vietnam are proposed by private investors under the independent power producer (IPP) model. Under this model, the Vietnamese government only needs to commit to buy electricity from such projects at an agreed price. Financial arrangements for the construction of the projects will be made by the investors, which helps reduce the fiscal burden on the Vietnamese government.

Fourth, as Washington is providing support for the LNG industry to turn America into a major LNG producer and exporter,[10] importing US LNG can be a sustainable option for Vietnam in terms of pricing and supply capacity. Moreover, US investors, with their proven financial and technical track record, can better ensure that their projects are implemented successfully without the problems normally associated with China-backed infrastructure projects, especially cost overruns and project delays.

Table 1- Vietnam’s major LNG-to-power projects related to American investors

 Project nameCapacityInvestment value (US$)American investorStatus
1Son My 22.2 GW1.7 billionAES*Approved, commissioned in 2024
2Bac Lieu LNG3.2 GW4 billionDelta Offshore EnergyApproved, phase 1 commissioned in 2023
3Chan May LNG4 GW6 billionPacific Rim Investment and Management Inc.*Proposed, phase 1 commissioned in 2024
4Long Son LNG3.6 GW4.39 billionGeneral Electric*Proposed, phase 1 commissioned in 2025
5Hai Phong LNG4.5 GW5.09 billionExxonMobil*Proposed, phase 1 commissioned in 2026
6Long An LNG3 GW2.88 billionGeneral Electric*Proposed, phase 1 commissioned in 2025
7Mui Ke Ga3.6 GW4.2 billionEnergy Capital Vietnam, Excelerate*Proposed, phase 1  commissioned in 2028

* These projects are not wholly-owned by American investors, and there are local or third-country partners involved.

Source: Author’s own compilation

As of December 2020, more than 20 LNG-to-power projects have been proposed in Vietnam. Among these, two have been approved to be developed by American investors. As shown in Table 1, some other projects that have entered advanced stages of their application are also associated with American investors. In the next few years, more America-backed projects are expected to be announced.

AN EMERGING ALTERNATIVE TO THE BRI?

These projects have been considered favorably by not only Vietnam but also America. A primary example is the Bac Lieu LNG-fired power plant. This project is developed by Delta Offshore Energy, a special purpose vehicle established in Singapore but owned by three American shareholders. In September 2019, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) added the project to the US Commercial Advocacy Program, which enables the project to enjoy certain benefits, including lobbying efforts led by US government agencies. Shortly after that, the project was approved by the Vietnamese government and added to the national Power Development Plan 7 in December 2019. It has since been highlighted as a marquee project of US-Vietnam energy cooperation. At the Indo-Pacific Business Forum held in Hanoi in October 2020, under the witness of Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh and US Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Delta Offshore Energy signed a master teaming agreement with three other American firms (Bechtel, General Electric and McDermott) to prepare for the execution of the project.

Commenting on the event, which also witnessed the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop the Hai Phong LNG power project and a joint venture agreement for the development of the Son My LNG import terminal, the US embassy in Hanoi stated that “the United States is committed to helping Vietnam meet its growing energy needs”.[11]

The US government’s support for America-led LNG-to-power projects in Vietnam is a telling example of how the US is countering China’s BRI. Since the BRI’s launch in 2013, China has been able to use the initiative to advance its economic and strategic agenda across the region at the expense of the United States and its allies. A key factor causing many regional countries to embrace the BRI was that BRI was almost the only game in town. The LNG-to-power projects that the United States is backing in Vietnam therefore provides early evidence that Washington is taking concrete actions to present regional countries with an alternative to the BRI.

Towards this end, the United States and Vietnam signed in November 2019 a Cooperation Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance. The initiative was designed to achieve the two countries’ mutual goals of supporting infrastructure development through market-oriented, private sector investments. The agreement is said to support the broader US Government Indo-Pacific Strategy by complementing initiatives such as the Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy (Asia EDGE) and the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN). [12] At the regional level, Washington has also signed similar agreements with South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand.

The participation of private investors like Delta Offshore Energy, ExxonMobil, AES or General Electric makes America’s approach to assisting the region’s infrastructure development markedly different from the BRI, as the implementation of the BRI has so far been dominated by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Moreover, while most BRI projects use loans arranged through government-to-government agreements or provided by Chinese state-owned banks, America-backed projects use market-based financing arrangements negotiated between investors and international creditors. In the energy sector, America’s promotion of LNG-to-power projects also contrasts with the BRI’s approach, which has mainly focused on hydro or coal-fired power plants. In Vietnam, Chinese investors and contractors have built many coal-fired power plants, and the BRI’s only energy project in the country so far is the 1.2 GW Vinh Tan 1 coal-fired power plant in Binh Thuan Province.

America is also working with Japan to support Vietnam’s energy infrastructure development under the Japan-US Strategic Energy Partnership. In a joint statement at a trilateral forum on LNG held in December 2020, the two countries pledged to provide financial assistance for Vietnam to build LNG-fired power plants and receiving terminals.[13] Japanese investors are also actively investing in such projects on their own or in collaboration with American partners. For example, during US National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien’s visit to Vietnam in November 2020, Mitsubishi, General Electric and their Vietnamese partners signed an MOU to develop the Long Son LNG power project. In the same month, Tokyo Gas, Marubeni and Vietnamese partners also signed an MOU to build the Quang Ninh LNG-fired power plant.

The collaboration between America and its allies and partners therefore highlights another major difference in the approaches of America and China to international infrastructure development. While China has funded BRI projects mostly by its own money, America has tried to pool resources from its allies and partners. In the long run, this approach together with the market-based financing mechanism will make America’s strategy more sustainable. Washington has strengthened collaboration with its allies for not only project financing but also standard setting. A primary example is the Blue Dot Network (BDN), an initiative announced in November 2019 by the United States, Japan, and Australia to provide assessment and certification of “quality infrastructure investment that is open and inclusive, transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally and socially sustainable, and compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations”.[14] Another goal of the initiative is to mobilize private capital for infrastructure development projects across the Indo-Pacific. As Vietnam’s LNG-fired power projects appear to meet the above criteria, it is likely that they will soon be certified as BDN projects.

CONCLUSION

US-China strategic competition has expanded to different areas, including funding infrastructure development projects in developing countries. Bilateral competition in this domain has particularly intensified since 2013 when China rolled out its BRI. Until recently, China has been successful in promoting the BRI partly because the United States lacked a coherent and viable strategy to compete with the BRI. However, the case of America-backed LNG-to-power projects in Vietnam provides early evidence that Washington is taking concrete steps to counter the BRI in an effective manner. A comprehensive strategy to help regional countries build quality infrastructure in line with America’s economic and strategic visions is also taking shape. This will present a formidable challenge to the BRI at a critical juncture when the BRI itself is facing significant international and domestic setbacks, leading to Beijing’s decision to scale back the initiative and adopt a more conservative approach.[15]

The availability of an alternative to the BRI should be welcome news to regional countries as they can thus avoid dependence on any single source of funding. Competition from the United States and its allies will also force China to become more responsible and make its BRI lending practices more transparent, sustainable, and compatible with international standards. If the United States and its allies can successfully implement its infrastructure development financing model in Vietnam and replicate it in other countries, Washington can strengthen its strategic and economic position in the Indo-Pacific and counter China’s expanding influence more effectively. For Vietnam, the participation of US investors brings a critical source of funding at a time when the country desperately needs to build more power plants to deal with its looming power shortage. If these LNG-to-power projects are successful, Vietnam may also consider engaging American investors in other infrastructure projects as well. In the meantime, the priority for both Vietnam and the United States is to make sure that these LNG-to-power projects are successful. One challenge Vietnam may face along the way is how to manage the possible increase in its electricity retail price given that LNG-fired power is relatively more expensive than coal-fired or hydro power. If this challenge is addressed properly, there are good reasons to believe that Vietnam-US cooperation in the development of energy infrastructure will strengthen over the next decade.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/2, 19 January 2021.


ENDNOTES

[1] Global Infrastructure Hub, “Global Infrastructure Outlook – Infrastructure investment needs – 50 countries, 7 sectors to 2040”, July 2017, https://d2rpq8wtqka5kg.cloudfront.net/389138/open20170919030300.pdf

[2] “Từ 2021, mỗi năm Việt Nam sẽ thiếu hàng tỉ kWh điện”, Tuổi Trẻ, 9 November 2019, https://tuoitre.vn/tu-2021-moi-nam-viet-nam-se-thieu-hang-ti-kwh-dien-20191109084941987.htm

[3] For an analysis of Vietnam’s perception of the BRI, see Le Hong Hiep, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam: Challenges and Prospects”, ISEAS Perspective, 2018 (18).

[4] “Ditch Vietnam coal-fired plant, investors tell Mitsubishi and banks”, Nikkei Asia, 29 November 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Ditch-Vietnam-coal-fired-plant-investors-tell-Mitsubishi-and-banks

[5] “Banks Shunning Coal Financing Bodes Badly for New Plants in Asia”, Bloomberg, 25 February 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-25/banks-shunning-coal-financing-bodes-badly-for-new-plants-in-asia

[6] Author interview with Vietnam energy expert, November 2020.

[7] “113 dự án năng lượng tái tạo đã cơ bản được giải tỏa công suất”, Vietnam Electricity, 4 September 2020, https://www.evn.com.vn/d6/news/113-du-an-nang-luong-tai-tao-da-co-ban-duoc-giai-toa-cong-suat-6-12-26358.aspx

[8] Office of the US Trade Representative, “Vietnam”, undated, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/vietnam

[9] “U.S. Treasury labels Switzerland, Vietnam as currency manipulators”, Reuters, 16 December 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-currency-manipulation-idUSKBN28Q1SF

[10] “The US is helping the natural gas industry make a profit — at the expense of the environment”, The Texas Tribune, 12 December 2018, https://www.texastribune.org/2018/12/12/us-helping-private-natural-gas-companies-make-profit/

[11] Facebook page of US Embassy in Hanoi, 29 October 2020, https://www.facebook.com/usembassyhanoi/posts/3930934623602037

[12] US Department of the Treasury, “United States and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam Sign Cooperation Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Finance”, 7 November 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm829

[13] “Vietnam teams with Japan and US for low-carbon electricity”, Nikkei Asia, 4 December 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Vietnam-teams-with-Japan-and-US-for-low-carbon-electricity

[14] US Department of State, “Blue Dot Network”, undated, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/

[15] For example, according to data compiled by researchers at Boston University, BRI lending by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China decreased from a peak of US$75 billion in 2016 to just US$4 billion in 2019. See “China curtails overseas lending in face of geopolitical backlash” Financial Times, 8 December 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/1cb3e33b-e2c2-4743-ae41-d3fffffa4259

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735  
Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here to support.
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed.   Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.  
© Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.
Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok  
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong  
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng  
Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng   Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

ISEAS Perspective 2021/1 “Communist Party of Vietnam Leadership Appointments – The Geography Factor” by Ha Hoang Hop and Lye Liang Fook

 

Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Tran Quoc Vuong
Early indications show that Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc (left) and Tran Quoc Vuong (right), will be possible candidates for the position of general secretary. The inclusion of Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who comes from the Centre, indicates a break from the established practice. (Photo: Nhac Nguyen, Francois Lo Presti, AFP)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) installs its personnel based on criteria such as competence, experience, age limits, gender and geographical origins. The last factor significantly affects the personnel line-up.
  • Historically, two political geographic regions were formed around the feuding armies of Trinh and Nguyen starting from 1620. In 1834, a Nguyen king (Minh Mang) divided the country into three regions – North, Centre and South. The French colonial government essentially maintained this division until 1945.
  • From 1954 to 1975, Vietnam was divided into North and South Vietnam. These divisions, feudal clashes and the wars of resistance against foreign powers further shaped the centres of power in Vietnam.
  • After Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, the CPV leadership took into account geographical origins in its personnel line-up by seeking a balance among leaders from the North, the Centre and the South, following the tradition established by the Nguyen dynasty.
  • To date, the general secretary and prime minister are selected from two different regions. This leadership line-up is a top-down practice that nurtures political groups whose members are connected by their geographical origins.

* Ha Hoang Hop is Visiting Senior Fellow of the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute; and Lye Liang Fook is Coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme and Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Programme at the same institute. This Perspective is part of a series and builds on earlier pieces related to the 13th National Congress.

INTRODUCTION

The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) will hold its all-important 13th National Congress early this year.[1] The 13th plenum of the Party’s Central Committee in October 2020 made further progress in terms of the personnel preparation for the national congress – coming up with the list of candidates for the central committee of the 13th National Congress term. The 14th plenum in December 2020 decided on the list of candidates for the Politburo and Secretariat of the 13th National Congress.

The Politburo further decided to hold the 15th plenum just before the 13th National Congress to deliberate on the list of candidates for the four top national positions (general secretary, prime minister, state president and chairperson of the national assembly).[2] This paper provides an overview of the personnel installation at the national level, with a focus on the geographical dimension of the selection in terms of the practice and criteria used.

GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS IN PERSONNEL INSTALLATION

The Top National Leadership

At the national leadership level, the CPV first devised the scheme of “collective leadership” at the 7th National Congress in 1991 that comprised the four top positions of the Party’s general secretary, state president, prime minister and chairperson of the national assembly.[3] It was also at this same congress that the Party instituted the rule of geographical origins which stipulated that the positions of the general secretary, state president and prime minister must be held by three separate individuals from different geographical parts of Vietnam, i.e. from the North, Centre and South,[4] and that no two individuals are to have come from the same region.[5]

The rule of geographical origins was relaxed somewhat at the 10th National Congress in 2006 when the CPV decided that only the general secretary and prime minister need to be from different regional parts of Vietnam. General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, who came from the North, secured a second term, and both the President Nguyen Minh Triet and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung hailed from the South. Similarly, during the 11th National Congress term (2011-2016), apart from General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong who came from the North, both President Truong Tan Sang and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung hailed from the South.

At the 12th National Congress in 2016, the principle that only the general secretary and prime minister need to be from different geographical regions of Vietnam was adhered to. So for the 12th National Congress term (2016-2021), General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong came from the North while Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc came from the Centre.

At the upcoming 13th National Congress, one possible scenario is the continuation of the established practice of having the general secretary and prime minister come from different geographical regions of Vietnam. Another increasingly possible scenario, which will be a break from convention if it comes to pass, is for the general secretary and prime minister to come from the same geographical region. In this scenario, Nguyen Phu Trong will stay on as general secretary for a third term despite his age and ill health. A possible candidate for prime minister is existing Politburo member Pham Minh Chinh (concurrently secretary of the CPV Central Committee and head of the Party’s Organisation Commission) who is from the northern province of Thanh Hoa.[6]

Another question that remains to be answered is whether the post of general secretary and president will remain in the hands of a single individual as is the case at present. The CPV could consider to continue to merge the positions of general secretary and state president in the interest of simplicity and for the sake of diplomacy so that on official trips abroad, the general secretary could be accorded the status of a head of state. The practice of having these two positions held by two separate individuals has been applied since 1945, driven by a primary consideration, i.e. to avoid over-concentration of power and the growth of an individual personality cult.[7]

What is clear is that since the 7th National Congress in 1991, there has been a stress on the general secretary being an individual from the North. At the same time, this individual must be “a master in Marxism, Leninism and Ho Chi Minh doctrine”.[8] In the upcoming 13th National Congress, there were earlier indications that Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Tran Quoc Vuong, current standing member of the CPV’s Secretariat, were possible candidates for the position of general secretary. The inclusion of Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who comes from the Centre, would seem to indicate a break from the established practice. However, one latest indication as mentioned above is that Nguyen Phu Trong would be the frontrunner for staying on as general secretary.

Tran Quoc Vuong could be another frontrunner as he has the support of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. Tran Quoc Vuong also has experience in fighting corruption as head of the Central Committee on Control and Scrutiny, a post he held from 2016 to 2018. He is more likely to carry on the anti-corruption fight if he becomes general secretary. Another factor is that Tran Quoc Vuong is a Northerner. As mentioned above, the CPV’s general secretaries generally come from the North. There is some historical context behind this geographical emphasis. In January 1930, the three communist parties in the North, the Centre and the South of Vietnam, then a French colony, merged into a single party[9] with a majority of the leaders coming from the North. Interestingly, some of these leaders came from what we know today as the CPV’s definition of the political North.[10] Even among the CPV rank and file, there is greater representation of members from the North. For instance, among the current 5.4 million party members as of end 2020, more than 60% are from the North.

From the CPV’s perspective, the term ‘geographical origins’ is not merely a narrow construct denoting birthplace or ancestral village but also includes how politically active an individual has been in a particular region. In this regard, General Secretary Le Duan (1960 – 1986) was considered a Southerner even though he was born in Quang Tri, a central province. This was because Le Duan spent a large part of his political career in the South. In the same vein, Nguyen Van Linh who succeeded Le Duan and was general secretary from 1986 to 1991, and who initiated Doi Moi (economic renovation), was considered politically a Southerner although his birthplace was in Hung Yen province in the North.

At the moment, there appears to be a nice geographical balance in the top leadership with General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong from the North, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc being from the Centre, and Chairperson of the National Assembly Madame Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan being from the South. Traditionally, since the 7th National Congress, the prime ministers have come from the South, such as Vo Van Kiet (1991-1996), Phan Van Khai (1996-2006), and Nguyen Tan Dung (2006-2016). The primary reason is that since the South has contributed most to the state coffers, it is important to give it due recognition by having the prime minister come from there.[11] But the fundamental reason lies in the CPV’s will to enhance political unity and solidarity throughout the country. However, it is worth noting that the current prime minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc is an exception; he is from the Centre. He became prime minister in 2016 since no member of the Politburo in the 12th National Congress who was from the South satisfied the selection criteria for that position. 

The Politburo and the Secretariat

In the current Politburo of the 12th National Congress, we can also discern representation based on the geographical origins of the North, Centre and South. The North has two explicit groups. One comprises Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh provinces which have contributed five members to the Politburo.[12] This group, especially those from Ha Nam and Nam Dinh, is a closely knitted one. The other consists of Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces which has contributed one member of the Politburo and three members of the Secretariat.[13] They also form a close-knit group. The Centre has contributed one member of the Politburo and one member of the Secretariat.[14] The South has contributed five members of the Politburo and one member of the Secretariat (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Members of the Politburo of the 12th National Congress Term

 Geographical RegionsProvincesPolitburo (12th National Congress term – list all members)Status
1NorthNam DinhDinh The HuynhTo Step down
2NorthHa NamNgo Xuan LichTo Step down
3NorthNinh BinhTran Dai QuangDeceased
4NorthNam DinhPham Binh MinhTo Remain
5NorthNam DinhDinh La ThangProsecuted
6NorthSon LaMs. Tong Thi PhongTo Step down
7NorthThai BinhTran Quoc VuongTo be decided
8NorthHa NoiNguyen Phu TrongTo be decided
9NorthThai BinhHoang Trung HaiTo Step down
10NorthPhu ThoNguyen Van BinhTo Step down
11NorthThanh HoaPham Minh ChinhTo Remain
12NorthHung YenTo LamTo Remain
13NorthNghe AnVuong Dinh HueTo Remain
14CentreQuang NamNguyen Xuan PhucTo be decided
15SouthBen TreMs. Nguyen Thi Kim NganTo be decided
16SouthTra VinhNguyen Thien NhanTo Step down
17SouthLong AnTruong Hoa BinhTo Step down
18SouthQuang BinhTruong Thi MaiTo Remain
19SouthVinh LongVo Van ThuongTo Remain

Source: Various public sources

There are six other members of the Politburo and one other member of the Secretariat from the North but they are not in any group or quasi-group.[15] In the South, the members of the Politburo and Secretariat do not explicitly form any group. In general, the members of the Politburo and Secretariat tend to originate more from the North. In a way, this enables them to have more power to make changes in the Party and government organisations and personnel at various levels.

In the personnel line-up for the upcoming 13th National Congress, all members of the Secretariat of the 12th Congress from Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces will be elevated to the Politburo. The other Northern provinces of Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh can expect to have three or four members of the Politburo, the Centre can expect two or three and the South three or four.

The rest will be elected from the candidates to the Central Committee of the 13th National Congress. Some Central Committee members will also be elected to become members of the Secretariat.

Central Committee

The current Central Committee of the 12th National Congress has 180 full members and 20 alternate members.[16] Among the full members are at least 23 members from the Northern group of Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces.[17] This group has the biggest number of members in the Central Committee of the 12th National Congress. Except for a few who will step down at the 13th National Congress, most of them will serve in the Central Committee of the 13th National Congress and some of them will be promoted to the Politburo and/or the Secretariat of the 13th National Congress and even the 14th National Congress. The other northern group is made up of those from Ha Nam, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh provinces, and have at least 18 full members on the Central Committee of the 12th National Congress.[18]

To maintain their presence, both groups must have worked hard in the 10th and the 11th National Congress to be included in the personnel line-up in the current Central Committee, the Politburo and the Secretariat.

At least two members of the Central Committee can recommend or promote one individual as candidate for the Central Committee in the upcoming National Congress.

The usual route is for members of the Central Committee to promote or recommend a number of individuals to form a preliminary list of candidates. Another less common route is for members of the Central Committee from one particular geographical group to recommend or promote an individual who is also in that group in an effort to retain their power and influence. The Central Committee has the so-called central list of recommended individuals; this list is somewhat less affected by the geographical dimension.

SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The source of the present-day groups that can be discerned to be based on geographical origins has some connections to Vietnam’s history. For example, there were two distinct geographical regions that were formed during the feuding war between the Trinh and Nguyen clans (1620 – 1672). In 1802, Nguyen Anh, a young prince, founded the Nguyen dynasty, and in 1834, Minh Mang, a Nguyen emperor, announced the division of Vietnam into three regions: the North, the Centre and the South. From 1887, the French colonialists re-affirmed this division, which lasted until 1945.[19]

Even before the Trinh and Nguyen clans came along, the North was a distinct centre of political power. In particular, the Tran dynasty was founded in Nam Dinh province in 1223. From 1257 to 1288, it defeated the Mongolian Yuan invaders thrice. Over time, and as a result of the victories of the Tran dynasty, the then Nam Dinh prefecture (comprising present-day Hung Yen, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, and Thai Binh), became a centre of political power in Vietnam. The people in this quasi-group of provinces have nurtured a tradition of being a strong centre of political power until the present day.

Also in the North, Thanh Hoa province had a special contribution to the history of Vietnam: this single province was itself a centre of power that lasted some 300 years, straddling the Le and Nguyen dynasties. The clans of Trinh and Nguyen, mentioned above, both originated from Thanh Hoa; albeit the clan of Nguyen went to the South and later founded the Nguyen dynasty.[20] 

After the Second World War, with Vietnam divided into the North and the South by the 1954 Geneva Agreement, many communists shifted from the South to the North to prepare for eventual reunification. Following Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, Party organisations were re- strengthened in the Centre and the South, and soon entrenched themselves there, forming local political support bases for the ruling CPV regime headquartered in the North. In a way, the history of Vietnam from the 17th century to the present day have re-enforced the culture of three distinct geographical regions.

The CPV was founded in January 1930 through the merger of three then-existing communist parties in Vietnam. At that time, the general secretaries of all the three parties were almost all from the North[21] – Bac Ninh, Ha Noi, Hung Yen, Hai Phong, Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh provinces. Since the 1930s, all CPV general secretaries have been from the North, except for Le Duan and Nguyen Van Linh who were politically considered as being from the South (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: General Secretaries of the CPV (1930 to present date)

Geographical RegionsProvincesGeneral SecretariesDuration
NorthHa TinhTran Phu1930 – 1931
NorthNghe AnLe Hong Phong1931 – 1936
NorthHa TinhHa Huy Tap1936 – 1938
NorthBac NinhNguyen Van Cu1938 – 1940
NorthNam DinhTruong Chinh1940 – 1956
NorthNghe AnHo Chi Minh1956 – 1960
SouthQuang TriLe Duan1960 – 1986
NorthNam DinhTruong Chinh1986
SouthHung YenNguyen Van Linh1986 – 1991
NorthHa NoiDo Muoi1991 – 1997
NorthThanh HoaLe Kha Phieu1997 – 2001
NorthBac KanNong Duc Manh2001 – 2011
NorthHa NoiNguyen Phu Trong2011 – Present

Source: Various public sources

At the 2nd National Congress in 1951, the Party[22] established a personnel body to oversee the personnel and organisational matters of the Party and the government. However, the choice of members of the Central Committee, the Secretariat and the Politburo was based solely on the will and preference of the top leaders and members of the Politburo. At that time, the top leaders and individual members of the Politburo had a few cadres under their personal tutelage. Without going through any objective assessment of competence, knowledge, experience and morality, a protege could secure a strong endorsement for promotion. More often than not, leaders tended to take care of individuals who were from the same province as themselves.

The propensity for leaders to promote fellow-provincial or fellow-regional men into positions of influence has been a basic motivation for nurturing geographical groups.[23] Groups often create narratives to hail their own achievements and lay claim to leadership roles. They sometimes disguise political infightings as the practicing of democratic centralism. Inside each larger group, there may be smaller groups with links to particular provinces or provincial districts.

Personnel installation is a top-down process: the Central Commission of Personnel and Organisation assists the Central Committee and the Politburo to select cadres from the various regions and provinces, from central apparatus (such as ministries, central commissions of the Party, Fatherland Front, Communist Youth, Women’s Union). The selected cadres are sent to be trained at Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy (the Party’s organ) and National Administrative Academy (the state organ). After training, these cadres are assigned to posts at the Party and state organisations via personnel decisions and through Party congresses.

For instance, Directive No. 35 of 2019 issued by the CPV Politburo[24] aims to maximise the number of provincial party secretaries being from provinces other than the ones they are serving in. To date, about 46 percent of provinces have such party secretaries.[25] Quite a few of these party secretaries are from the political geographical groups of Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Ha Nam, Nam Dinh.

In addition, Directive No. 214 of 2020 issued by the CPV Politburo[26] contain a set of rules for personnel selection based on competence, experience, morality, ethnicity, gender, and health. Although this directive appears to be a step towards more objective criteria for selection of top leaders, it is unclear to what extent these criteria are adhered to in actual practice. More often than not, the unwritten rules of political geographical arrangements are used to temper, even to object to earlier choices made on the basis of such criteria.

CONCLUSION

A key objective of CPV politics is to promote political solidarity and unity nationwide by having a leadership that is based on some form of equilibrium among the different geographical regions of Vietnam. The South and the North, which have traditionally been more dynamic in either generating wealth or functioning as political centres than the Centre, are more prominent in the top national leadership, and in key institutions such as the Central Committee and the Secretariat.

However, the CPV and the government have made a special effort to ensure that the Centre is represented as well. This was demonstrated when the 12th National Congress reached a consensus to install Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who is from the Centre, to the position of prime minister in 2016. If he is re-elected at the 13th National Congress, he is likely to assume another key role.[27] It is also possible that he may step down. In addition, representation of the Central provinces may be strengthened with one or two more individuals from this region being elevated to the Politburo (see Table 3 below).

Table 3 – First-time Candidates as Members of the Politburo of the 13th National Congress

 Geographical RegionsProvincesPolitburo
(13th National Congress term’s candidates)
1NorthPhu ThoLuong Cuong
2NorthNinh BinhDinh Tien Dung
4NorthHa NamDao Ngoc Dung
5NorthNghe AnPhan Dinh Trac
6NorthNghe AnNguyen Xuan Thang
7NorthHa TinhMs. Le Thi Nga
8NorthHa NamMs. Bui Thi Minh Hoai
9NorthHa TinhTran Cam Tu
10NorthHa TinhLe Minh Hung
11NorthTuyen QuangDo Van Chien
12CentreQuang NgaiNguyen Hoa Binh
13CentreThua Thien – HueBui Thanh Son
14SouthTay NinhNguyen Van Nen
15SouthHau GiangTran Thanh Man
16SouthAn GiangMs. Vo Thi Anh Xuan
17SouthBac LieuLe Minh Khai
18SouthTien GiangNguyen Trong Nghia

Source: Various sources

Current indications are that the incoming general secretary is likely to be someone from the North. This will not come as a surprise as the Northern provinces that include Thanh Hoa, Nghe An and Ha Tinh have traditionally been part of the CPV’s definition of the geographical North as well as the political centre.

The line-up of the top leadership remains fluid at the moment. One must wait at least until the 15th plenum of the 12th National Congress is held to learn how many members of the Politburo who are older than 65 will be retained at the 13th National Congress. At the 15th plenum, there is a possibility that the general secretary and prime minister could come from the same geographical region of Vietnam. If this should come to pass, it would represent a break with convention.

ISEAS Perspective 2021/1, 15 January 2021.


ENDNOTES

[1]  The 13th National Congress will be held from 25 January to 2 February 2021 in Hanoi; see Vietnam government news at VGP News at Ban Chấp hành Trung ương triệu tập Đại hội XIII từ ngày 25/1/2021 | BÁO ĐIỆN TỬ CHÍNH PHỦ NƯỚC CHXHCN VIỆT NAM (baochinhphu.vn)

[2] Holding a 15th plenum before a National Congress is not a record. At the CPV’s 2nd National Congress in the 1950s, a 16th plenum was held.

[3] Prior to 1991, the post of chairperson of the national assembly was not as important as the other three posts.

[4] The CPV’s definition of the geographical regions is different from physical geographical regions of Vietnam. Based on the Party’s definition, the North consists of all the Northern provinces down to Ha Tinh province; the Centre stretches from Quang Binh province southwards to Phu Yen province (including all the Central Highland provinces); and the rest of the provinces comprises the South.

[5] Lye Liang Fook and Ha Hoang Hop, Vietnam’s 13th Party Congress: Document Preparation and Personnel Lineup, Perspective No. 84, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 6 August 2020. /wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_84.pdf.

[6] In addition, there are indications that existing Politburo member Vuong Dinh Hue will become chairperson of the national assembly. Hue was previously minister of finance and head of the CPV Central Economic Commission. He has a doctoral degree in economics and was a professor at the Hanoi University of Finance and Accountancy in the 1990s. 

[7] The CPV wanted to avoid the personality cult of Joseph Stalin and the over-concentration of power by Mao Zedong. It wanted to avoid the power concentration of Mikhail Gorbachev as well, especially in his later years as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[8] The Platform of the Nation Building in the Transition Period to the Socialism – the 7th National Congress of the CPV, 1991. Source: https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/ban-chap-hanh-trung-uong-dang/dai-hoi-dang/lan-thu-vii/cuong-linh-xay-dung-dat-nuoc-trong-thoi-ky-qua-do-len-chu-nghia-xa-hoi-1558.

[9] The Communist Party of Indochina, the Communist Party of Annam, and the Communist League of Indochina joined together to form a united communist party called the Communist Party of Vietnam (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam) in Hong Kong on 3-7 February 1930.

[10] Among all the general secretaries, only Nguyen Van Linh is politically considered as originating from the South. But interestingly, he was born in the North, but spent his political life in the South from age 15.

[11] Since 1995, the South has been contributing more than 60% of Vietnam’s total state budget.

[12] The five members of the Politburo are Dinh The Huynh (inactive due to illness), Dinh La Thang (dismissed and prosecuted), Tran Dai Quang (deceased), Ngo Xuan Lich (Defence Minister) and Pham Binh Minh (Deputy Prime Minister cum Foreign Minister). Only Pham Binh Minh will be a candidate for the Politburo of the 13th National Congress since Ngo Xuan Lich will step down and retire due to his age. We can expect new candidates to be selected from this group to the Politburo and the Secretariat of the 13th National Congress.

[13] They are member of the Politburo Vuong Dinh Hue (from Nghe An), member of the Secretariat Phan Dinh Trac and Nguyen Xuan Thang (both from Nghe An), and member of the Secretariat Tran Cam Tu (from Ha Tinh).

[14] They are Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc (member of the Politburo, from Quang Nam province), and Chief Justice Nguyen Hoa Binh (member of the Secretariat, from Quang Ngai province).

[15] The six members of the Politburo are: Nguyen Phu Trong (from Hanoi), Tran Quoc Vuong (from Thai Binh province), To Lam (from Hung Yen province), Pham Minh Chinh (from Thanh Hoa province), Hoang Trung Hai (from Thai Binh province) and Nguyen Van Binh (from Phu Tho province); and the member of the Secretariat is Luong Cuong (from Phu Tho province).

[16] Vietnam Party Central Committee meets to identify successors, Vietnam Express, 11 May 2020, at https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-party-central-committee-meets-to-identify-successors-4097508.html.

[17] The list of members of the Central Committee of the 12th National Congress,  https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/ban-chap-hanh-trung-uong-dang/ban-chap-hanh-trung-uong-dang/khoa-xii.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ben Kiernan, Việt Nam: A History from Earliest Time to the Present (USA: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[20] General Secretary Le Kha Phieu (1997-2001) was from Thanh Hoa. Vietnam’s longest serving prime minister Pham Van Dong (1955-1987) was born in Quang Ngai province, but his home village was in Thanh Hoa province.

[21] The CPV definition of political geography is used in this piece.

[22] The CPV presented itself as the Vietnam Workers’ Party until 1976.

[23] As an example, Ho Duc Viet, during his five years as Head of the CPV Central Commission on Personnel and Organisation, recruited many cadres from Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces to many party organisations and state apparatus. A dozen or two are now members of the Central Committee; and a few are members of the Politburo and Secretariat.

[24] Decision No. 35 of the Politburo on convening all level party congresses to prepare for the 13th national congress, https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/bo-may-hanh-chinh/Chi-thi-35-CT-TW-2019-dai-hoi-dang-bo-cac-cap-tien-toi-Dai-hoi-dai-bieu-toan-quoc-lan-thu-XIII-417004.aspx.

[25] 22 of the provincial party secretaries are not locals, see https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/dai-hoi-dang/22-bi-thu-tinh-uy-khong-la-nguoi-dia-phuong-682422.html.

[26] Decision No. 214 of 2 January 2020 on the criteria for selection of cadres (Quy định số 214-QĐ/TW, ngày 02/01/2020 của Bộ Chính trị về khung tiêu chuẩn chức danh, tiêu chí đánh giá cán bộ thuộc diện Ban Chấp hành Trung ương, Bộ Chính trị, Ban Bí thư quản lý), 19 November 2020,https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/he-thong-van-ban/van-ban-cua-dang/quy-dinh-so-214-qdtw-ngay-02012020-cua-bo-chinh-tri-ve-khung-tieu-chuan-chuc-danh-tieu-chi-danh-gia-can-bo-thuoc-dien-ban-6021.

[27] There are indications that Nguyen Xuan Phuc could be president.

ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute   30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735   Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click hereISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article.Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok
Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong
Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng
Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng
Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s).

“Urban Transition in Hanoi: Huge Challenges Ahead” by Danielle Labbé

 

“Non-State Chinese Actors and Their Impact on Relations between China and Mainland Southeast Asia” by Enze Han

 

2020/147 “Malaysia’s 2021 Budget Aims to Sustain Recovery Momentum and Kickstart Post-pandemic Rebuilding of the Economy” by Yeah Kim Leng

 

The Making of Anwar Ibrahim’s “Humane Economy”” by Khoo Boo Teik

 

2020/146 “Social Media Preachers: Unlicenced and Unbounded in Spreading Their Ideas” by Mohd Faizal Musa