Trends in Southeast Asia

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed — with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation.

• ASEAN’s response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a “practical guide” for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.

• For the implementation of the Guide to be effective, certain notable aspects should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the additional costs organizations will bear in putting into place the checks and balances premised by the guide should be reassessed, especially the disproportionate impact these will have on MSMEs. Additionally, labour availability for these suggested governance mechanisms may be lacking, with rising skills and human resource gaps in integral areas such as cybersecurity. Moreover, on a national level, policymakers should be wary of potential disparities between institutional and regulatory maturity for AI system implementation relative to business readiness for implementation on the ground.

• For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/18, June 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners.

• Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia, they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions.

• Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities.

• Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region’s lack of decisive coal phaseout plans.

• As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure.

• More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements.

• These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/17, June 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers.

• Vietnam’s foreign policy adopts the paradigm of “cooperation” and “struggle” in its relations with major powers, and defines “national security” as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security.

• Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an “object of struggle” on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam’s partner in the South China Sea but an “object of struggle” when it comes to regime security.

• The Vietnamese public’s favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.

• A friendly relationship with China is essential for Vietnam’s favourable external environment, warranting Hanoi’s accommodation and deference to Beijing on non-critical issues. However, it has meticulously avoided dependencies and vulnerabilities to China through diversifying economic ties and engaging in “soft balancing” with other powers and through ASEAN. Party-to-party links provide China with powerful access to Vietnamese leaders, but the US is catching up by giving assurances to respect Vietnam’s political system, and strengthening “party diplomacy” with the CPV.

• In its relationship with the US, Vietnam prioritizes economic ties, addressing war legacy issues, leveraging US support to build capacities in traditional and non-traditional security, and avoiding geopolitical posturing that could provoke China.

• Vietnam-US relations are characterized by pragmatism, with both sides prioritizing shared geopolitical and economic interests over ideological differences. The sustainability of this approach is uncertain, given the CPV’s tightening of domestic control and the “securitization of the Vietnamese state” in the anti-corruption campaign.

• Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/16, June 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The People’s Justice Party (PKR) may in many ways be synonymous with its larger-than-life leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who, although only president for six of the party’s twenty-five years, has always been its de facto leader and adviser. However, PKR is much more than only about Anwar, and this paper traces the evolution of the party independently of Anwar as a person.

• PKR’s evolution can be broken down into four main periods: 1998–2004 (formative), 2005–13 (golden era), 2014–18 (all-in for power), and 2019–22 (lessons on restraints). From 1998 to 2022, PKR tended to adopt a big-tent approach (internally and externally), ideological synthesis to find a middle ground, and a loose organization led by a charismatic personality at the top and self-organization at the grassroots.

• PKR was born out of a major crisis when Anwar, then deputy prime minister, was sacked in 1998 and subsequently jailed twice in the following two decades. For the most part, the party operated with its figurehead in jail, thus learning how to rely on coalition strengths, working with civil society, mass movements, and political parties to survive and win power.

• The party’s loose organization became beneficial when it partnered with parties that are ideological opposites such as DAP and PAS (as part of Pakatan Rakyat in 2008), and expanded party enfranchisement via a one-person-one-vote system. This also allowed PKR to adopt a middle-ground approach in policies such as hudud and the New Economic Policy (NEP).

• However, openness and loose organization led to factionalism within the party, resulting in large-scale defections during the 2009 Perak crisis, the 2014 Selangor menteri besar crisis, and the 2020 Sheraton Move. Without pushing its big-tent approach to the limit and without working with arch-enemy Mahathir Mohamad, PKR would not have emerged victorious in the first-ever change in government in 2018 and Anwar Ibrahim would not have been pardoned and freed. Notwithstanding that, it also led to a fractious coalition and a loss of trust in the leadership during Pakatan Harapan’s term in government (2018–20).

• The post-election Unity Government with Anwar Ibrahim as the tenth prime minister marks PKR’s first “real” governing experience, and this would not have been possible without PKR’s core identity operating in full gear.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/15, May 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Whenever the Islamist party PAS comes to power in Terengganu, its political agenda has been to combine populist-type development programmes with the wish to turn Terengganu into a shariah-compliant state.

• Terengganu’s state budget is however heavily dependent on the federal government, to the tune of 80–90 per cent. This hinders the state government’s policymaking and implementation, especially when the federal government is controlled by its political opponents.

• This article argues that the politics of development play a more central role in determining the durability of the PAS state government in Terengganu than it does in neighbouring Kelantan. In other words, PAS cannot simply carry out its Islamic agenda without being complemented by tangible economic progress if it aspires to govern beyond a single term; PAS’s loss in the 2004 election after being in power for one term is a prime example of this dynamic.

• One reason that the current PAS state government managed to get re-elected in 2022 was the unimpeded flow of oil royalty payments into state coffers since 2018, which allowed the state government to fulfil its campaign promises; PAS’s inclusion in the Perikatan Nasional federal government in 2020 further improved the state government’s financial standing.

• When the reins of the federal government changed hands to PAS’s political opponents in 2022, the oil royalty payment to Terengganu again became an acrimonious issue, in many ways reprising the post-1999 situation.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/14, May 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Malaysia’s support for Palestinian independence has always been based on religion. Historically, Malaysia has had warm relations with Palestinian leaders including the Palestine Liberation Organization—during Hussein Onn’s and Mahathir Mohamad’s administrations—and Hamas since Najib Razak’s administration.

• However, Malaysia’s support is not just based on their affinity to Palestinians as fellow Muslims but is also a matter of domestic politics. Support for Palestine has been used as a political tool for various quarters to prove that they are more Islamic than the other.

• Malaysia is now led by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a former student leader who rose to prominence in the 1970s for his activism on issues regarding the Muslim ummah, including Palestinian independence. Over the years, Anwar has demonstrated consistency in his support for Palestinians, and this has especially been the case since the outbreak of Israeli aggression against Gaza which began on 7 October 2023.

• As a result, Malaysia has gained global prominence for its aggressive stand against Israel. Thus, this paper discusses the Malaysian government’s responses to issues pertaining to Palestine over the years. In doing so, it illustrates that while Islam has been a crucial rallying point in supporting the rights and independence of the Palestinians, it is also arguable that Malaysia’s foreign policy outlook is also influenced by domestic politics and the need for the government of the day to maintain its support from the Muslim voter base.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/13, April 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• There is an increasing trend among young Malay voters in Malaysia to support the Perikatan Nasional coalition, with a particular emphasis on the Islamist party PAS.

• Despite recognition of the weak economy as a significant national concern, young Malay voters continue to place a higher emphasis on Muslim leaders who assert their commitment to safeguarding the rights of Islam in Malaysia.

• Consistent with theories on political socialization, the influence of family members significantly affects young Malay voters in Malaysia, particularly due to their limited political awareness of alternative channels like formal schooling.

• Young Malay voters acknowledge the significant impact of social media and TikTok, particularly in how these shape the voting patterns of their peers. They nevertheless maintain a perception of their own impartiality in this regard.

• Interestingly, the influence of Islamic institutions, with their own educational philosophy, on the political behaviour of Malay youth is minimal, as their political ideas are already shaped by their early experiences.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/12, April 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Since the start of Operation 1027, Myanmar’s resistance groups have gained control over large parts of key overland trade routes and a number of important border crossings, fundamentally changing the realities in the control of border trade.

• Despite these losses, the State Administration Council (SAC) retains control-of-trade-related institutions that are vital for accessing an international trading system characterized by state-to-state interactions—giving them significant influence over trade even if they do not control trade routes and border crossings.

• International precedents from territories such as Palestine, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that non-state actors face significant challenges engaging in trade, and are vulnerable to frequent changes in trading arrangements. Perhaps the most important factor shaping trade in these territories is the state of their relationship with either the state of which they are nominally a part, or a neighbouring state.

• Thailand allows small-scale trade and limited movement of people through “checkpoints for border trade”, which exist outside the formal system and are unilaterally established by Thailand. These checkpoints represent an alternative opportunity to reshape border trade.

• If Myanmar’s resistance hopes to transform trade from a revenue source to a meaningful strength, their prospects are best if they collaborate and develop a status-neutral plan (e.g., not requiring diplomatic recognition nor denying recognition to the SAC) for trading arrangements with neighbours, and enhance dialogue with them about this plan.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/11, April 2024

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• As digital platforms continue to evolve, youths increasingly employ social media, online forums, and digital campaigns to advocate for social and political change. While this phenomenon is often considered disparagingly as slacktivism, recent studies find that individuals engaging in digital activism often also participate in other conventional forms of activism.

• Despite a surge in youth activism across Southeast Asian countries, comparative analysis in this region remains scarce. Using data from the World Values Survey of several studies, and case studies on Indonesia, this article examines the extent to which online political activism serves as a catalyst for mobilization, awareness and community building among young people in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

• Additionally, it examines the interplay between online and offline political activism and its impact on traditional forms of activism.

• The study argues for a reciprocal relationship between online and offline political activism, particularly noting the potential for digital efforts to influence real-world action, especially on cohesive issues such as corruption.

Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/10, April 2024