2020/12, 5 February 2020
A plan to initiate dialogue between Thai authorities and the armed separatists of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) in Malaysia next month will bring a ray of hope to the predominantly Muslim Patani region of South Thailand. This, however, is predicated on stakeholders compromising for the sake of lasting peace.
2020/11, 23 January 2020
ISEAS’ State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey Report of policy elites in the 10 Southeast Asian states is difficult reading for the USA for two reasons.
2020/10, 22 January 2020
Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on a state visit to Myanmar in January 2020. Chinese media has highlighted the significance of the visit in strengthening the “Pauk-Phaw” (fraternal) friendship between the two countries as exemplified by the more than 30 agreements signed, and China’s support for Myanmar’s development path and its efforts to address the situation in Rakhine state. Yet, Xi’s visit has significance beyond the bilateral level.
2020/9, 22 January 2020
Thailand’s embattled Future Forward Party is not yet completely out of the woods, even after the 21 January ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that it was “not guilty” of charges of sedition. The party still faces the more serious allegation that, in accepting 191 million baht in loans from its leader, the billionaire Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, it has unlawfully submitted itself to his financial domination.
2020/8, 21 January 2020
Three recent opinion polls on Asian views of China as a major power show China’s growing difficulty in translating its growing economic and strategic weight (hard power) into trust of China as a leading power (soft power). All three polls show very low levels of trust in China as a major power and sharp declines in this vital component of soft power from 2018 to 2019.
2020/7, 20 January 2020
As Myanmar’s 2020 general elections approach, the prominence of fake news and hate speech on Facebook and the regulation of the use of that extremely popular social media platform for campaigning have become topics of frequent discussion in the country. But it is a mistake to underestimate Myanmar’s Facebook users, even if many of them have proven to be prone to anti-Rohingya hate speech and to the dissemination of fake news in the past several years.
2020/6, 20 January 2020
Two rallies, organized as exercise events by supporters and opponents of the government of General Prayut Chan-ocha, respectively, were held in Thailand on Sunday, 12 January. The rallies sent out contrasting political messages on what kind of world — dormant or awake — the participants wanted to live in.
2020/5, 16 January 2020
China’s growing role in helping to ‘negotiate’ ceasefires and peace between Myanmar’s military and government on the one hand and the country’s ethnic armed groups on the other hand is a fact. It has led to expectations that China can help broker peace in Myanmar. But careful consideration suggests that China can only play a partial role in this area.
2020/4, 15 January 2020
The ease with which the coalition government led by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha has passed the second and final third readings of Thailand’s 2020 budget bill in the House of Representatives heralds the start of a new chapter in the country’s politics.
“No-Confidence Motion in Thailand: Collateral Damage” by Termsak Chalermpalanupap
The Thai opposition’s campaign to pressure Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha and five of his ministers is generating a blast of political hot air. Still, the joint motion calling for a no-confidence debate – which will be held at the end of February – might actually result in some collateral damage. At least two of the five ministers are vulnerable and dispensable.