In this hybrid seminar, Dr Mohd Faizal Musa, Dr A’an Suryana, and Dr Pradana Boy presented their findings on the reactions of Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims towards the historical conflict between Israel and Palestine.
Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme Hybrid Seminar
Tuesday, 6 February 2024 — ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute held a hybrid seminar on “The Israel and Palestine Conflict: Muslims’ Responses in Indonesia and Malaysia”. Moderated by Dr Syaza Shukri (Visiting Fellow, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute), the seminar featured presentations by Dr Mohd Faizal Musa, Dr A’an Suryana, and Dr Pradana Boy who spoke about Indonesia and Malaysia’s historical and contemporary approach towards the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The seminar drew approximately 138 online and in-person participants consisting of researchers and academics, students, policymakers and diplomats.
Dr Mohd Faizal Musa began his presentation with a brief historical overview of Malaysia’s relations with Palestine, beginning with an explanation of Malaysia’s refusal to recognise the formation of the state of Israel in 1956. Highlighting that Palestine is close to the hearts of Malaysian Muslims as a holy site in Islam, Dr Faizal said that such a sentiment has been reflected in Malaysia’s foreign policy since the time of its first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. In 1960 Malaysia had announced that it would not recognise the state of Israel for fear of being denounced by the Arab states and other Islamic countries.
Focusing on the Malaysian government’s approach towards Israel and Palestine under various prime ministers, Dr Faizal suggested that Islam, and support from Muslim voters, was an important determining factor in the government’s support for Palestine since the time of Tunku Abdul Rahman. He shared that there are four factors which have shaped Malaysia’s official support for Palestinians. This includes (1) Islam as a unifying factor which provides a sense of brotherhood between Malays and Palestinians; (2) idiosyncratic Malay leadership, particularly during the administrations of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim; (3) never-ending conflict in the Middle East which has spurred Malaysia to craft a solution for peace in the region; and (4) the weaknesses of major powers in addressing these conflicts.
While Malaysia initially supported the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the administrations of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, and Tun Hussein Onn, the government under subsequent premiers grew to support Hamas as the PLO’s and Fatah’s influence waned in the 1990s. Apart from the recognition of the PLO’s diplomatic status and the establishment of an office in Kuala Lumpur in the 1980s, the Palestinian Cultural Organisation in Malaysia (PCOM) was also formed in 2011 at the request of Ahmad Zahid Hamidi when he visited Gaza. However, the most important development was in 2013 when Prime Minister Najib Razak and his wife went to Palestine in 2013, being the first top Malaysian leader to visit. However, his visit was not necessarily viewed as genuine support for Palestine, but as a political ploy to gain the support of Muslim voters at home. Furthermore, while he was welcomed by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas, his visit was not well received by Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas.
Since the outbreak of the war on 7 October 2023, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s support for Palestine has been defined by four major moves. These include (1) mass gatherings; (2) the commemoration of Palestine Solidarity Week in schools; (3) using the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit as a platform to speak against Israeli aggression; and (4) a docking ban on Israeli ships. Dr Faizal concluded that Malaysia’s approach must not be understood as genuine support for Palestine. He argued that their approach is also opportunistic as it helps ruling parties get support from Muslim voters.
Dr A’an Suryana then began his presentation by speaking about Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi whose presence and speech at a large pro-Palestine protest in Jakarta on 5 November 2023 broke from previous practice of Indonesian politicians who are largely absent from street protests. Dr A’an highlighted that while Indonesian politicians and academics often claim that Indonesia has been consistent in supporting Palestine and condemning Israel, the reality is more complex, and Indonesia’s approach has been marked by both change and continuity over the years.
Beginning with Indonesia’s foreign policy during the rule of President Soekarno from 1949 to 1967, Islam played little role in influencing the government’s stand. Instead, Soekarno’s approach towards Israel and Palestine stemmed from his strong sense of anti-colonialism. While Israel was perceived as a bridgehead of Western colonialism, the Arab states supported Indonesian independence. Indonesia also needed the support of the Arab states to annex West Irian in 1963. Thus, support for Palestine stemmed from the mutual support between Indonesia and the Arab states. However, things changed with President Soeharto who was cautious not to spark the rise of Islamic militancy. While Indonesia continued to support Palestine, they developed a backchannel relationship with Israel for pragmatic purposes concerning domestic politics. However, the situation changed in the late 1980s when Soeharto allowed the PLO to open an office in Indonesia in 1989.
President Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration (2000–2001) marked a change in Indonesian foreign policy, as he was more friendly towards Israel, although he remained committed to the Palestinian cause. This approach was characterised by his tendency towards humanism. While he encouraged the opening of an Indonesian commercial office in Palestine, he also encouraged commercial relations with Israel. Following that, Megawati’s rule from 2001 to 2004 marked a continuation of the anti-colonial sentiment of her father Soekarno, but shifted once again under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014) who was more active in supporting Palestine, enhancing capacity building for Palestine, and providing them with medical and financial aid.
Under the current Jokowi government, Indonesia has adopted a tougher stand against Israel and is firmer in its support for Palestine. The top leadership has affirmed that Palestine is at the heart of Indonesian foreign policy, and they also condemned Donald Trump’s acknowledgement of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Overall, Dr A’an concluded that Indonesia has been consistent in supporting Palestine’s independence and upholding their stand that diplomatic relations with Israel would only be possible after the two-state solution is reached. However, there have been changes in terms of the degree and nature of relations with Israel.
Dr Pradana Boy then gave the final presentation on Indonesian civil society’s responses to the conflict. He spoke about how the recent escalation of the conflict has renewed Indonesian Muslims’ support for Palestine, and that it has united Indonesian Muslims across the ideological and political spectrum.
After providing an overview of the various global reactions to the outbreak of the war, Dr Pradana highlighted that Indonesia’s response is unique in the sense that the war has unified Indonesian Muslims whether they are of a moderate, liberal-progressive, or radical-conservative, modernist-reformist, revivalist, or traditionalist Islamic orientation. He illustrated that Indonesian Muslims’ responses have come in various forms including humanitarian aid, social media activism, interfaith dialogue, street protests, and government diplomacy.
One of the key civil society organisations that responded to the conflict was Muhammadiyah, which donated 45 billion Indonesian rupiahs to Palestine through Muhammadiyah Philanthropy Agency. They have also been providing education for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Indonesia. Another mass-based organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama, also responded in similar fashion, providing financial aid for Palestinians, and releasing public statements on their position. Apart from mass-based organisations, there were also individual preachers who responded to the war. While most of them were hostile in their responses towards Israel, others were neutral while somehow still encouraging people to improve their understanding of the historical context of the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
Dr Pradana concluded his presentation with a reflection that while Indonesian Muslims are united in their support for Palestine, more substantive initiatives or solutions must be offered to resolve the conflict.
The seminar concluded with a Question-and-Answer segment that addressed various themes concerning domestic security, the nature of Indonesia and Malaysia’s responses and the reasons behind them, and internal competition with regard to providing support for Palestine. Questions were asked about whether support for Palestine and condemnation of Israel could threaten domestic security, and whether the speakers consider both countries’ responses to be mild and even hypocritical given that they treat refugees poorly. There were additional questions about how both countries’ positions might change according to future changes in domestic politics as well as geopolitics in the Middle East.