2024/47 “Two Borneo Neighbours on Diversity: Comparing Religious Authority in Brunei and Sarawak” by Norshahril Saat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Borneo represents a unique case study of religious diversity. It is ethnically diverse and presents three sovereign states: Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. This paper focuses on Muslim attitudes towards diversity in Sarawak and Brunei and how Islamic institutions navigate issues and concerns.
- Sarawakian politicians and religious leaders are more vocal today than a decade ago in articulating minority rights and concerns than their counterparts in Putrajaya. In managing religious diversity, its leaders and religious elites (mufti) have argued for autonomy and have distanced themselves from the conservative and revivalist trends of Peninsula Malaysia.
- By contrast, Brunei is a small standalone state promoting its national philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), which now wants to push the Islamization agenda further. The religious elites have issued fatwas reversing court traditions, but they generally uphold the royalist ideology.
- Sarawak and Brunei, as neighbouring entities, offer interesting insights through the divergence in their pluralist and conservative trajectories. This paper considers the significance of political culture, demography, and religious elites’ training as factors contributing to contemporary trends. It also measures religious institutions’ preparedness in confronting external trends, especially as propagated through social media.
*Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Program (RSCS) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is the author of The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia (Amsterdam University Press).
ISEAS Perspective 2024/47, 27 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
The Borneo island shares a common history of Islamization seven or eight centuries ago, housing Islamic kingdoms such as Brunei and Banjarmasin.[1] Today, the island is located off the sovereign states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, each with its own sub-regions. This paper compares Islamic institutions and religious authority in contemporary Sarawak (a Malaysian state) and in Brunei, focusing on Muslim attitudes towards inter-faith and intra-faith initiatives. The island is one of the most diverse religiously and ethnically compared to other parts of Southeast Asia. Generally, ethnic characterizations in Malaysia refer to Malays versus the others, while Brunei is almost homogeneously Malay.
Nevertheless, Sarawak is unique because the Bumiputera, a term to consolidate all indigenous communities, outnumber the Malays. While Islam is the dominant religion in Borneo, a sizeable Christian community lives in Sarawak, which makes the study of Muslim-Christian relations there interesting.[2] Official statistics from 2023 indicate that 76.1% of its population are Bumiputera, with 23.4% Chinese;[3] it has about 20 ethnic groups. The 2020 census indicates that 62.1% are Christians and 19.2% are Muslims.[4] By contrast, the Malays/Muslims constitute 73.8% of Brunei’s 450,500 population, while the Chinese make up 9.6%.[5] But beyond inter-religious issues, the intra-religious dynamic, such as tensions between Sunni-Shias, progressive-conservative, and royalist(traditionalist)-revivalists, is worthy of more study.
This paper covers the behaviour of Islamic elites and their respective institutions. Besides comparing the origins, nature and functions of religious institutions, it also analyses fatwas or religious opinions relating to religious diversity, both inter-faith (Muslims and non-Muslims) and intra-faith (between the different Muslim denominations). How does one account for existing orientations towards other religious groups?
The paper will first trace the origins of Brunei’s Islamic institutions and understand some common attitudes towards diversity. A similar discussion on the religious institutions and elites in Sarawak will follow. It will highlight some issues and tensions that measure attitudes towards interfaith and intra-faith diversity. Lastly, the paper discusses the development, or the lack thereof, of an indigenous religious class and how both societies navigate the openness of religious debates on social media. This section will also examine how institutional design and political contestation are crucial in developing pluralist religious discourse in both states.
BRUNEI: MALAY, ISLAM AND MONARCHY (MIB)
Brunei is an absolute monarchy. Many consider the late Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddien Saadul Khairi Waddien (reign 1950-1967) the founder of modern-day Brunei. The Written Constitution of Brunei Darussalam 1959 (PBNB), part II Article 3(2), states that the Sultan shall be the Head of Religion, and Sunni Islam is the state’s official religion.[6] The constitution also indicates that no Chief Minister or Deputy Chief Minister or State Secretary can be appointed unless he is Malay, Muslim and a follower of the Shafie/Sunni school of law. Interestingly, the constitution also underscores the separation of the Mufti department from the Islamic Council and Jurist under the Islamic administration.
Since 1984, when Brunei gained independence, the Kingdom adopted the Malay Islamic Monarchy (MIB) as the state philosophy. However, the ruling elites and citizens assume that the philosophy existed even before 1906 (some date it to the 10th Century).[7] Historically, Brunei played a significant role in Islamizing Borneo and even the Malay world.
On Islamic matters, the most influential body after the Sultan is the Brunei Islamic Religious Council and the Mufti. The Council houses a legal committee which the Mufti chairs.[8] In a way, Brunei’s fatwa-issuing body arrangement is like many Malaysian states including Sarawak. The state also supports a mufti department that researches and issues fatwa and sermons and oversees the censorship of films and publications. The religious establishment also includes the courts, the baitulmal and zakat collection, and plays other roles, including managing the religious endowment, and providing assistance for musafir (converts), cemetery, and employment of religious officials in mosques.
The current Brunei mufti is Ustaz Haji Abdul Aziz Bin Juned, who has been helming the position since 1994. He graduated from the prestigious Al-Azhar University (Cairo) and studied at a Singapore religious school in his younger days. So far, in Brunei’s post-independent history, he is only the second to occupy the position. His predecessor, Ismail Omar Bin Abdul Aziz, was mufti between 1967 and 1994; he was a graduate of Al-Azhar University, and was born in Johor. Interestingly, Brunei had to search for a mufti from Johor, though that would have been an obvious path to take if the state preferred someone from the Malay world. The Johor ulama institution has historically been closely tied to the royal courts. Johor had been a Malay nation upholding Sunni and Sufi doctrines closely.[9] Haji Abdul Aziz had been Ismail Omar’s understudy, and a Bruneian.
Under the current Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, Brunei demonstrates a deep Islamic identity and commitment to the religion. It emphasizes the Malay Islamic Monarchy philosophy and the Negara Zikir (Chanting Nation, in line with Sufistic elements). Personally, the Sultan also demonstrates strong convictions for the faith. On 5 April 1992, the Sultan surprised congregants during a Friday prayer at the Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque when he went to the pulpit to deliver the sermon. The mufti Haji Abdul Aziz recapped the episode:
“His religious inclinations became clear when, for the first time His Majesty agreed to deliver the sermon at the end of the Hari Raya Aidilfitri congregational prayer on 1 Syawal 1413 (5 April 1992). His Majesty’s decision to go up the pulpit and deliver the sermon surprised everyone, for it had never happened before… The atmosphere immediately became very still, one of great expectations. Those who had been sitting in front with their backs towards the pulpit were now turning around to face the pulpit instead, an unusual happening indeed.”[10]
It was one of the many moments in which the Sultan publicly demonstrated his religious leadership. In 1987, the Sultan performed his first haj pilgrimage to Mecca. He was greeted by a huge crowd at the airport upon his return, and received a royal salute and inspected the guard of honour.[11]
BRUNEI FATWAS IN RECENT YEARS
Generally, the thinking of the mufti, religious institutions, and other religious elites is aligned with the MIB philosophy. This does not mean the mufti lacks autonomy or independence of thinking. One example is the fatwas on several court rituals, which the muftis critically re-examined. As an absolute monarchy, there are occasions in which the royal family parades its symbols of power and rituals, in accordance with Malay customs. In 1972, the religious council issued a fatwa popularly known as the Golden Cat fatwa. The mufti was asked to review some court rituals and give his opinion on whether these symbols were aligned with Islam and the Shafie school of thought. The questions included the permissibility of using Quranic verses on royal symbols and the status of two golden cat sculptures placed in front of the throne during royal ceremonies. Also queried were the caricatures of animals or living things found on flags and crowns. A fatwa was issued, and these acts were declared haram (forbidden in Islam) and discontinued. Relatedly, some other court accessories and artifacts were declared haram; one example was the Kabok Perak (Silver Jar), which contained water used for court rituals. The jar was declared un-Islamic and hence replaced with a glass jar. This shows that the mufti can exercise authority to reverse a longstanding royal custom.
A more recent fatwa can be considered courageous and would probably not have been passed by the religious authorities in Brunei’s neighbours. The Brunei mufti declared that smoking cigarettes would be forbidden. This fatwa would not have been passed in Malaysia or Singapore as it would have created an uproar among smokers. In a book that deliberated on the fatwa, Cigarette is Haram, Sharifah Khadijah states that, “Therefore it is very clear that, from the aspect of madharrah (harm) there can be no excuse to lighten the hukm of cigarettes and smoking. We cannot take it lightly and ignore the destruction falling upon mankind due to smoking because Islam itself is a religion of safety and succour. Hence, relying on syara’/shara as well as strong scientific reasons, it is ruled that cigarette and smoking are haram.”[12]
In a publication entitled Islam in Brunei, numerous fatwas were deliberated which touch on Muslim-non-Muslim relations, as well as intra-Muslim issues. It details some rulings that demonstrate the state’s priorities to uphold a dominant Islam, since the majority of Bruneians are Muslims, and of the Sunni and shafie school. For example, a market in Bandar town that supplies pork was asked to move to a more secluded place on Jalan Teraja.[13] Similarly, building new places of worship other than mosques is restricted. Ideologies deemed to be anti-Islam, such as Marxism, secularism, Ahmadiah, and Bahaism, are also banned.[14]
Recently, Brunei gained some negative publicity among scholars and the media after the Sultan’s announcement that the country would implement shariah laws, under the Syariah Criminal Offences Code 2013. The announcement drew flak from the international community,[15] as it was intended to be implemented on anyone regardless of nationality or religion. The law also called for stoning for adultery and of homosexuals, though the Brunei government did say that punishments would only be carried out following the high standard of having two men with high moral and piety being witnesses; this was per Islamic law requirements. The law was to be fully implemented on 3 April 2019, but details on how it would be enforced remain wanting, and there have been no major reports of anyone being punished under the new legal changes.[16]
ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN SARAWAK
Islamisation in Brunei and Sarawak began before the pre-European colonial period in the 16th Century. When Islam first reached their shores, a sheriff of Arab descent was put in charge of Islamic affairs. In 1841, under Brooke’s rule, the Datu’s courts were installed. More than nine decades later, on 1 May 1955, the Islamic Religious Council of Sarawak was formed. After Sarawak joined Malaysia in 1963, Islam was administered in the state the same way this was done in Peninsula Malaysia. According to the Malaysian constitution, Islam is the religion of the federation. However, the Malay rulers have jurisdiction including deciding on key appointments of the mufti and members of the religious council of their respective states. Since Sarawak does not have a Malay ruler, unlike in states such as Pahang, Johor, Terengganu, Perlis, Selangor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perak, and Negeri Sembilan, appointments in the Sarawak religious council are overseen by the Malaysian King, a position rotated among the nine rulers every five years.[17]
However, Sarawak demonstrates some exceptions in Islamic matters. In 1963, Sarawak and Sabah had stipulated that Islam should not be declared as state religion as a condition for joining Malaysia under the Malaysia Agreement 1963. In 1973, Sabah revoked this condition, but not Sarawak. In 2015, when the status of Islam was raised in Sarawak, the state government re-affirmed that Islam is not its official religion and a line suggesting this to be so was removed from the government’s website. Not having formal recognition as official state religion does not however negate a role for Islam in the state and in Sarawak’s broader Borneo identity. Sarawak leaders call its maintenance of religious harmony “The Sarawak Formula”.[18] Islamic religious institutions in Sarawak continue to issue fatwas, and should the fatwa be published in the gazette, it gains legal standing as an enforceable law. At the everyday level, Sarawak Muslims continue to practice their faith, and share a school of jurisprudence similar to that practiced in Brunei and Peninsula Malaysia, namely the Sunni and Shafie school of thought. Like any other fatwa institution, the current mufti Datu Haji Kipli bin Haji Yassin shared that MAIS has a chairman, and the mufti acts as the ex-officio member.[19] The fatwa committee has ten members and the mufti chairs it; the Malaysian King makes all appointments.
SARAWAK’S EXCEPTIONALISM THROUGH FATWAS
Compared to neighbouring Brunei and many other states in Peninsula Malaysia, Sarawak’s religious authorities are more pluralist on both interfaith and intra-faith issues. The mufti office’s response to the kalimah Allah (the use of the term Allah as God by non-Muslims), attitudes towards Shiism, and religious conversion demonstrated this.
In 2008, the national fatwa council based in Kuala Lumpur issued a non-binding edict that the term “Allah” (God for Muslims) could only be used by Muslims, and other religions should not apply the term to refer to their God. It emphasized the need for Muslims to protect the term. In instances where the term was used in a derogatory fashion, then the parties involved would be sanctioned according to the federal constitution. Now, fatwas issued at the federal level do not apply to states unless passed and gazetted by the respective religious councils; and in this case, the Sarawak Religious Council did not do so.
The controversy started in Sarawak when Bibles used by the Christian community used the term “Allah.” This purportedly led to confusion among Muslims, including those living on the peninsula. The matter was brought to the courts by a Sarawakian, Jill Ireland. The High Court soon ruled that non-Muslims are allowed to use the term “Allah”, plus three others: kaabah, solat, and baitullah. It stated that the government’s earlier decision prohibiting it 35 years ago was “illegal” and “irrational.”[20] The Malaysian government initially appealed against the ruling, but later withdrew it. The Prime Minister gave assurance that despite the High Court ruling, only Christians in Sarawak are allowed to use the term in their publications. This allows for the differing stances taken by the Sarawak Mufti and by the Malaysian government to co-exist.
In the same vein, the Sarawak religious authorities and the state government have been seemingly open about Muslims converting out of Islam. In other Malaysian states, murtad (conversion out of Islam) is deemed sensitive and complex. As religion is indicated on every Malaysians’ identity card, changing one’s religious status gets complicated. There are also other consequences stemming from a conversion: this may affect the religious status of the child/children, especially minors, whether they remain Muslims or not, and the status of marriages if only one of the couple converts out of Islam, since mixed religious marriages are considered illegal. However, Sarawak seems to be open about religious conversion, as demonstrated by the case of Roneey Rebit, who managed to remove Islam from his identity card.[21] Both of Sarawak’s recent chief ministers, Adenan Satem and Abang Johari, have committed to amending state law to allow conversion out of Islam.[22]
The Allah issue and religious conversion are interfaith ones, and the Sarawak religious elites have been demonstrating a pluralist attitude on these matters. However, their attitude towards intra-faith matters is less open. Shiah, a sect in Islam that is quite different from the dominant Sunni school of thought in Malaysia, is not accepted in Sarawak. Initially, the attitude to Shiism had been quite open, but in 2012, a 1996 fatwa against it was reinstated at the federal. However, Sarawak (and Sabah) has not gazetted it, which means that the fatwa still does not carry the weight of law in these states.
Religious conservatism, it seems, is not welcomed in Sarawak, and evidently, the Islamic PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia), which has increased its vote share and seats nationally since the 2022 general elections and 2023 state elections, has not been able successful in Sarawak. Sarawak Chief Minister Abang Johari has continued to discuss the Sarawak formula for maintaining racial and religious harmony.
CONCLUSION
What explains Sarawak’s pluralism vis-à-vis Brunei today? The obvious answer is demography, with Sarawak being more multicultural and having a lower population density than Brunei, which is more homogeneously Malay/Muslim. Yet, demography alone cannot satisfactorily explain the behaviour of the religious elites (the muftis) and their responses to religious and ethnic minorities and intra-faith diversity. Religious elites make judgements according to their reading of texts and religious traditions and applying them according to social conditions. Their views cannot be persuaded, at least in theory, by what society thinks. Moreover, since contemporary religious discourse is also shaped by social media, which chips away at the influence traditional mediums of religious dissemination such as mosques, madrasahs and fatwas, does this also affect the religious elite’s responses?
Observably, the religious leaders in Sarawak are mostly trained in Malaysian universities and interestingly, in neighbouring Singapore madrasahs. The current mufti Kipli Yasin received his training from the University of Malaya. Except for Loling Othman Alwi, who was educated at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the rest took courses at Islamic College Malaya. By contrast, Brunei has only had two muftis since independence, and both are graduates of the Al-Azhar University. However, training in Al-Azhar alone does not imply conservatism, as many Southeast Asian ulama from the region are trained from the university, and their attitudes vary greatly.[23]
The views of the religious elites in Sarawak and Brunei parallel those of the political elites except under certain very few circumstances. In the current political climate, the muftis in Sarawak have more leeway to disagree with those in the Peninsula. Sarawak muftis follow the guidance of the political elites that respect non-Muslims and indigenous communities. While their patron is by constitution the Malaysian King, they are aligned with Sarawak chief ministers. Sarawak ulama also exercise autonomy of judgement by the strategy of not aligning fatwas with muftis in Putrajaya. As for Brunei, while the ulama have reversed many court customs, they generally promote MIB, Negara Zikir, and shariah laws, and uphold strict views on inter-faith and intra-faith issues.
Still, contemporary religious elites everywhere are grappling with a borderless exchange of ideas through social media, which have supplanted local and traditional authorities in favour of celebrity preachers, some of whom are English speaking. The changing class dynamics in both countries will likely stretch religious thought and challenge accepted traditions. Comparing the two, the Sarawak religious discourse has a longer history of negotiating differences than Brunei’s.
To be sure, Brunei society has developed a strong middle-class society, which means mosques and madrasahs no longer have full monopoly of the religious discourse. In these traditional mediums, preachers and teachers must be approved officially. However, Bruneians, especially the young, are consuming content online, including religious ones; yet, Brunei does not have many homegrown influencers and popular preachers.[24] The young may require time to reconcile the singular MIB ideology with alternative discourses on religion and identity, which they are now exposed to daily. Already Bruneians are familiar with foreign preachers, including Singaporean-born Tarmizi Wahid (known as Mizi Wahid) and Malaysian Wadi Anuar. Besides, they are also exposed to English-speaking ones such as Mufti Menk, Nouman Ali Khan, Dunia Shuaib and Zakir Naik. The nexus between Malayness, monarchy, and Islam may be foreign to these influencers/preachers.
As for Sarawak, the religious elites are always confronted with muftis from the peninsula, and they are always in a dilemma to situate the collective federal Islamic positions onto the local Sarawak context. Conservative thought from Peninsular Malaysia does not apply to Sarawak’s multi-religious and multicultural setting,[25] and young Sarawakians are better placed to negotiate differences found on social media. In the age of social media, Sarawakians are ahead of their neighbours when internalizing external ideas.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735. Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/46 “Southeast Asian Perceptions of China: Beijing’s Growing Power is Recognised, but Feared” by Lee Sue-Ann and William Choong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Much has been made of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey (SSEA) findings that if forced to choose, a very slim majority of the Southeast Asian respondents would prefer that ASEAN aligns with China rather than the US. This signifies a reversal of previous years’ trends which saw strengthening regional support for aligning with the US.
- But multi-year data trends from the annual survey suggest that the reason is that China is not so much loved more than the US, but that it is feared more. Data show that while China continues to be perceived as the pre-eminent regional economic, political and strategic power, there is anxiety about how China will exercise this power.
- Preferences for China’s leadership in various aspects such as upholding free trade and championing an international rules-based order remain consistently low. Trust levels that China would “do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance are also dismally low.
- Taken together, these indicators suggest that the region’s preference for aligning with China is more about an erosion in confidence in US leadership and a concomitant desire to ‘keep the peace’ with China.
- But the message from the region to China is clear. There is an overwhelming desire to see China match words with deeds by resolving maritime territorial disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law and respecting smaller states’ national sovereignty and agency.
- As China finds itself navigating an increasingly fraught external environment amidst intensifying rivalry with the US and Europe, it is in Beijing’s strategic interests to seize the opportunity to substantively improve the credibility of its global and regional leadership by matching words with actions.
* Lee Sue-Ann is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, and editor at Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She also directs the Media, Technology and Society Programme at the Institute. William Choong is a Senior Fellow at RSPS and the Managing Editor of Fulcrum.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/46, 18 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has been publishing its State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) survey report every year since 2019. The survey seeks to capture perceptions of experts and opinion-makers across Southeast Asia on strategic matters. It employs a random purposive sampling of over 100 respondents in each of the 10 ASEAN member states – constituting a sample size of around 1,000 respondents ASEAN-wide. A 10 per cent weighting average is then applied to each country’s responses to calculate the regional average to ensure that each country is equally represented, similar to ASEAN’s consensus decision-making process.
This ISEAS Perspective focuses on the data trends pertaining to regional attitudes towards China. Serving as an update on a similar report published last year on the region’s attitudes towards the United States,[1] this analysis crystallises some key takeaways on the region’s perceptions of China’s power and influence vis-à-vis the US, and the messages the region is telegraphing to China regarding concerns over the future trajectory of intensifying US-China strategic rivalry.
IF FORCED TO CHOOSE …
Much has been made of this year’s SSEA findings that if forced to choose, a very slim majority of the Southeast Asian respondents would prefer that ASEAN aligns with China rather than the US. [2] This signifies a significant reversal of previous years’ trends. Since the question was first posed in 2020, there had been a strengthening trend towards preferring alignment with the US over China. The fact that this trend reversed in 2024 to the point where China has pipped the US for the first time is likely an indicator of deeper undercurrents concerning US leadership in the region (Figure 1). Across Southeast Asia, there is a heightened sense of uncertainty over the future trajectory of US leadership amidst deepening polarisation in its domestic politics and the US presidential elections in November this year. In November 2023, the US failed to deliver on the digital trade pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) due to opposition in Congress, accentuating concerns that Washington remains hamstrung in its economic engagement with Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.[3]
Figure 1: Percentages of ASEAN-wide survey respondents who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
Significantly, the levels of support for China among the three Muslim-majority states in ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – have strengthened significantly, with all three countries registering 15-20 percentage point increases in their level of support for aligning with China. (Figures 1a-1c) In all three countries, a whopping 70 per cent or more of respondents said that they would prefer ASEAN to align with China rather than the US. This suggests the entrenchment of various relevant factors. Apart from the deepening economic ties with China in all three countries, the global spotlight on the Israel-Hamas conflict and the disproportionate number of casualties on the Palestinian side probably increased antipathy towards the US. The Palestinian cause and America’s traditional support for Israel have long been hot-button issues that shape perceptions of the US as being biased against the Muslim world and practising double-standards in global affairs. The respondents were polled in January-February 2024 when sympathy for Israel was falling, and concerns about the humanitarian situation in Gaza were increasing. For Southeast Asian Muslims, the Palestine issue has become a visceral identity issue, not just a religious issue, that would predispose them to lean away from countries overtly supporting Israel.
Figure 1a. Percentages of survey respondents from INDONESIA who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
Figure 1b. Percentages of survey respondents from MALAYSIA who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
Figure 1c. Percentages of survey respondents from BRUNEI who say ASEAN should choose the US or China if forced to align with one of the two strategic rivals
POWER PERCEPTIONS
Multi-year data trends from the annual survey unequivocally show that China is perceived as the region’s most influential economic, political and strategic power. A clear majority of survey respondents consistently identify China as the region’s most influential economic power, although in the past two years, the percentage of respondents who think so has dropped quite significantly from around 75 per cent to around 60 per cent (Figure 2). This perhaps reflects the ripple effects of China’s tough Covid-19 lockdown and its ongoing economic slowdown. Nevertheless, the region’s perceptions of America’s economic heft have always been significantly lower, usually in the single digits, though this has been creeping up slightly over the past two years. These perceptions belie the fact that the US remains a vital trading partner for the region and is still the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Figure 3).
Figure 2. Percentage of survey respondents who identified China or the United States as the region’s most influential economic power
Figure 3: Amount of FDI inflows to ASEAN Countries from the United States and China from ASEAN investment report (2017-2023)
As for the region’s perceptions of who the pre-eminent political and strategic power is, it is somewhat of a surprise that survey respondents region-wide have consistently put China above the US despite the significant edge the US continues to enjoy over China in terms of military power and defence diplomacy activities (for example, China conducted 128 combined-military exercises in 2003-22, a mere 10 per cent of America’s 1,113 exercises done in the same time period).[4] Perceptions of US influence trended fairly significantly downward in 2024, likely a reaction to concerns over Washington being distracted, by other geopolitical priorities such as the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict, and by domestic challenges (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Percentage of survey respondents who identified China or the United States as the region’s most politically and strategically influential power
GAP BETWEEN POWER PERCEPTIONS AND REGARD FOR LEADERSHIP
Yet, preferences for China’s leadership in various aspects such as championing free trade, maintaining a rules-based order and upholding international law are consistently low. Despite China being the region’s top trading partner, it is significant that survey respondents ASEAN-wide did not express high confidence that China could be counted on to champion the global free trade agenda. Significantly, in light of the greater protectionist turn in the US, the region appears to increasingly pin hopes on ASEAN to pick up the mantle,[5] signifying a desire for greater regional resilience and self-reliance (See Table 1).
Table 1: Percentage of survey respondents who had the most confidence in the following countries and/or regional organisations to champion the global free trade agenda
| ASEAN | Australia | China | EU | Japan | US | |
| 2020 | N.A. | 7.1% | 16.5% | 26.9% | 27.1% | 13.0% |
| 2021 | 21.5% | 3.1% | 13.2% | 21.5% | 15.5% | 19.7% |
| 2022 | 15.5% | 1.4% | 24.6% | 14.1% | 9.0% | 30.1% |
| 2023 | 23.5% | 3.0% | 14.8% | 17.6% | 9.2% | 21.9% |
| 2024 | 29.7% | 1.7% | 18.5% | 13.9% | 9.0% | 22.1% |
For all of China’s peace-loving rhetoric on its non-hegemonic intentions and its vision of building “a community with a shared future for mankind” through various initiatives such as the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative, the region consistently reflects a relatively dim view of China’s leadership in upholding the rules-based order. Generally, China comes in a distant fourth place compared to other countries and organisations such as the US, EU, Japan and ASEAN. Instead, there is still a strong preference for US leadership on this front (Table 2).
A fundamental reason for this is that there remains a high degree of skepticism about China’s commitment to matching words with deeds. As demonstrated in the reactions to the Chinese defence minister’s remarks at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, several participants called out the inconsistencies between China’s peaceable words and its aggressive deeds in the South China Sea. At the discursive level, there is also a disconnect between China’s pledges to uphold international law and its advocacy of strengthening the authority of the United Nations, exemplified by its refusal to participate in and accept the judgement of a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) dispute resolution process which ruled in 2016 that China’s nine-dash line claims in the South China Sea were incompatible with UNCLOS and therefore invalid.
From the Chinese perspective, the region’s continued preference for US leadership over China in upholding the rules-based order may also seem inconsistent and odd in light of the various examples of America’s own practice of exceptionalism in multilateral settings, notably America’s failure to ratify UNCLOS. But this inconsistency can be explained in terms of differences in regional threat perceptions of the US and China. Unlike China, the US is not party to any of the region’s territorial disputes. Its presence in the region is therefore generally seen as more benign and a force for stability. Rather than feeling as “victims” of the US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region (as Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun had put it at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue),[6] US FONOPs have served to preserve a much-appreciated balance of power in the region.
Table 2: Percentage of survey respondents who had the most confidence in the following countries and/or regional organisations to provide leadership in maintaining the rules-based order and upholding international law
| ASEAN | Australia | China | EU | Japan | US | |
| 2020 | N.A. | 5.1% | 6.6% | 33.4% | 21.3% | 23.7% |
| 2021 | 17.5% | 2.4% | 4.4% | 32.6% | 11.6% | 24.5% |
| 2022 | 16.8% | 1.9% | 13.6% | 16.6% | 7.7% | 36.6% |
| 2023 | 21.0% | 3.4% | 5.3% | 23.0% | 8.6% | 27.1% |
| 2024 | 26.9% | 1.6% | 11.5% | 16.9% | 8.8% | 27.9% |
The region’s “fear factor” regarding China is reflected in the responses to the question about whether respondents believed China would “do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance. It is significant that the majority of respondents in each country except Laos had no confidence that China would “do the right thing”. When asked why China was distrusted, the overwhelming answer region-wide was that China’s economic and military power could be used to threaten the respective ASEAN country’s interests and sovereignty.
Table 3: Responses of ASEAN-wide survey respondents when asked how confident they were that China will “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance
| No Confidence | Little Confidence | No Comment | Confident | Very Confident | |
| ASEAN | 15.30% | 34.80% | 25.10% | 21.00% | 3.80% |
| Brunei | 9.10% | 33.80% | 41.60% | 13.00% | 2.60% |
| Cambodia | 12.70% | 36.00% | 19.60% | 26.50% | 5.30% |
| Indonesia | 9.40% | 39.60% | 17.00% | 30.60% | 3.40% |
| Laos | 8.10% | 19.40% | 40.00% | 26.30% | 6.30% |
| Malaysia | 8.40% | 32.00% | 27.60% | 27.10% | 4.90% |
| Myanmar | 28.00% | 37.60% | 25.90% | 7.40% | 1.10% |
| Philippines | 28.80% | 42.30% | 14.90% | 13.00% | 0.90% |
| Singapore | 12.50% | 38.80% | 23.10% | 20.50% | 5.10% |
| Thailand | 11.40% | 36.30% | 18.40% | 30.30% | 3.50% |
| Vietnam | 24.50% | 32.00% | 23.50% | 15.50% | 4.50% |
Table 4: Responses of ASEAN-wide survey respondents when asked why they distrusted China
| China’s economic and military power could be used to threaten my country’s interests and sovereignty | China does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership | I am concerned that China is distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues | My country’s political culture and worldview are incompatible with China’s | I do not consider China a responsible or reliable power | China’s future stability has become more uncertain after the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress | |
| 2020 | 55.3% | 11.6% | 9.3% | 7.9% | 15.9% | N.A. |
| 2021 | 54.5% | 9.1% | 10.7% | 6.4% | 19.3% | N.A. |
| 2022 | 49.6% | 8.4% | 11.4% | 7.6% | 26.6% | N.A. |
| 2023 | 41.4% | N.A. | 11.3% | 7.9% | 26.6% | 12.7% |
| 2024 | 45.5% | N.A. | 15.4% | 10.1% | 17.6% | 11.4% |
DESIRE TO KEEP THE PEACE
But notwithstanding the doubts about China’s ability to play a positive leadership role, there is also a palpable desire among ASEAN member states to keep the peace with China. When asked about the outlook for bilateral relations with China over the next few years, the majority of respondents in 7 out of 10 ASEAN countries said they expected relations to improve. Only respondents from the Philippines said they expected relations to worsen, while respondents from Singapore and Myanmar expected relations to stay the same.
When asked for the top two measures China could take to improve its relations with regional states, the consensus was clear and consistent: China should seek to resolve outstanding maritime territorial disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law; and China should respect smaller countries’ sovereignty and agency (Table 4).
Table 4: Responses of ASEAN-wide survey respondents when asked to identify the top two measures China should take to improve relations with their respective countries.
| China should resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international law | China should make bilateral trade truly mutually beneficial by addressing trade imbalances | Deepen mutual understanding by enhancing people-to-people relations | China should respect my country’s sovereignty and not constrain my country’s foreign policy choices | The fault lines between my country and China cannot be bridged | |
| 2020 | 66.4% | 53.4% | 22.5% | 59.5% | 7.1% |
| 2021 | 55.2% | 36.2% | 8.3% | 66.5% | 11.2% |
| 2022 | 64.6% | 33.3% | 14.8% | 77.3% | 10.0% |
| 2023 | 59.8% | 47.4% | 31.7% | 54.2% | 7.0% |
| 2024 | 67.0% | 40.2% | 25.6% | 60.0% | 7.3% |
IMPLICATIONS: WHAT SHOULD CHINA DO?
In his book The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli famously said that it is safer to be feared than loved because love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for partisan advantage, while fear preserves through dread of punishment, and that never fails. However, he went on to advise that a prince should inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred. These sayings hold some wisdom for Beijing. The external environment has turned more hostile and challenging for Beijing in light of the hardening attitudes in US and Europe towards China, the intensifying competition in critical and emerging technologies, and, probably most concerning for Beijing, the recent election outcome in Taiwan which may have emboldened the island’s pro-independence movement. Under these circumstances, it is tempting for Beijing to lash out and play a strong defence by going on the offence, and to demonstrate its ability to “punish” those who seek to cross its “red-lines”. But this could be counter-productive in the long term, and risks touching off a regional security dilemma in which one country’s defensive preparations are seen as threatening to the other.
Instead, it may serve Beijing better to remember that during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, and similarly at the height of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, China accrued a significant amount of goodwill by not devaluing its currency, the Yuan. Between late 2008 and June 2010, China’s central bank effectively held the US dollar-yuan rate at 6.83. This reflected Beijing’s desire to maintain currency stability amid economic and financial uncertainties, even in the face of domestic pressures to depreciate the Yuan.[7] In 1997-98, China had also provided Thailand and other Asian countries with US$4 billion via bilateral channels within International Monetary Fund frameworks.[8] China was seen then as a “responsible” and central actor in stabilising the regional economic environment.[9]
Today, as the region finds itself increasingly forced to make binary choices between the US and China – especially in the areas of technology and critical supply chains – Beijing can likewise score strategic points if it can exercise temperance and restraint. It could, for instance, choose to take the moral high ground and not go tit-for-tat with the US on trade tariffs – similar to what President Xi did in the wake of Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership in 2017. Back then, President Xi took a high-profile swipe at Trump at the World Economic Forum, affirming the benefits of globalisation and the need to “reaffirm unambiguously” the need for open markets and rules-based trade.[10] After President Biden raised tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and solar cells in May 2024, Chinese trade experts reportedly urged President Xi to exercise caution and take “the moral high ground”, lest a tit-for-tat cycle hurts the slowing global economy.[11]
China should continue to demonstrate support for the developmental needs of the region and Global South. Already, China’s Global Development Initiative has been backed by Southeast Asian countries, which see it contributing to their development and China upping its regional economic engagement.[12] More importantly, China could demonstrate its commitment to de-escalate tensions and the potential for conflict over disputed territories, even if a lasting conflict resolution in accordance with international law remains a distant goal.
The region has been telegraphing a consistent message to China: A large part of the reason why China is more feared than loved is because there is still little confidence among Southeast Asians that China will rise in a manner that would see it playing a stabilising role in the region in the long term. Now that the mood in the US appears to be turning ever more insular and protectionist, a window of opportunity for China exists. It has scored points against the US and other Western powers by pointing out the many instances of their double standards and hypocrisy. However, China should not add to global cynicism by wielding its growing power and influence no differently in the region.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/45 “Southeast Asia and the Global South: Rhetoric and Reality” by Hoang Thi Ha and Cha Hae Won
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Global South discourse has been gaining greater salience in contemporary global politics, driven by the shift of the world’s centre of gravity to the Indo-Pacific, the rise of non-Western powers, and intensified great power competition.
- Both China and the US recognise the strategic importance of engaging the Global South. China focuses on infrastructure development and economic integration with developing nations, while the US prioritises a values-driven development agenda. US engagement with the Global South is further constrained by its withdrawal from the global free trade agenda and its focus on industrial revitalisation through reshoring and friendshoring,
- Southeast Asian countries are associated with the Global South across various material indicators and normative dimensions, including their developmental level, membership in organisations representing the Global South, and alignment with the Global South discourse advocating for a more representative and equitable international order.
- However, Southeast Asian countries make their foreign policy decisions based on their respective national interests rather than on ideological solidarity with the Global South. This is evident in their varied responses to the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and South China Sea disputes.
- In economic relations, the region’s prosperity has hinged on its interconnectedness with both the Global North and South, its pragmatism, and its ability to bridge diverse value systems rather than ideological allegiance to any bloc, especially one as heterogeneous as the Global South.
* Hoang Thi Ha is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator and Cha Hae Won is Research Officer at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/45, 14 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
The Global South discourse – which highlights the perspectives and development needs of developing nations, along with their demand for a more “democratic and equitable international order”[1] – has garnered growing attention in recent years. One catalyst for the comeback of the term “Global South” is the intensifying great power competition. As these powers vie for international support, they increasingly speak of the importance of taking into account Global South perspectives and interests.
Major powers’ approaches to Southeast Asia have begun to embrace the Global South discourse. China positions its relations with the region not only within the traditional context of its neighbourhood policy but also in the Global South framework. Its recent statements to Southeast Asian audiences co-opt Global South language to critique the West and advance its discourse power, such as “safeguarding the interests of developing countries”, “true multilateralism”, “equal and orderly multipolar world”, “universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalisation”, and “common peace, development and prosperity.”[2]
Competing with China for leadership and representation of the Global South, Indian Prime Minister Modi has urged ASEAN leaders to “elevate the Global South for the common interest of all”.[3] Meanwhile, Japan is seeking to be a bridge between the Global North and Global South, and views ASEAN as an important gateway for Japan to strengthen relations with the Global South.[4]
This article contextualises Southeast Asian countries within the Global South discourse, examining where they align with the characteristics generally associated with the Global South and where they diverge in terms of development levels, positions on global governance and security issues, participation in multilateral institutions, and economic relations. It starts by exploring the normative concepts associated with the term “Global South” and its growing salience in global politics today. It then posits that the complexity and diversity of Southeast Asia mirror the broader heterogeneity within the Global South, where states make foreign policy based on their national interests rather than aligning wholly with the normative discourse surrounding the Global South. While regional countries exhibit common concerns, needs, and historical associations with the Global South, they are deeply integrated with different political and economic value systems. This interconnection enables them to thrive in ways that defy simplistic Global North-South classifications.
GLOBAL SOUTH: WHAT’S IN A NAME, AND WHY NOW?
What the term “Global South” entails and whether it merits any analytical or policy relevance have sparked many debates among its supporters and critics.[5] Its meanings are fluid, depending on the specific context and prevailing international circumstances, often appropriated by different countries to advance their own agendas. The term gained traction in the 1970s and 1980s to underscore the socio-economic divide between developed nations, mostly in the Northern hemisphere, and post-colonial developing countries, mostly in the Southern hemisphere.[6] It is viewed as a less derogatory alternative to the term “Third World”, which is used to distinguish developing non-aligned nations from the industrialised democratic “First World” and the now-defunct communist Soviet-led “Second World”.[7] In its most simplistic interpretation, “Global South” is employed by its proponents to denote the “Rest” of the global community versus the “West”,[8] signifying the former’s desire for a multipolar world and their challenge to the Western liberal values and privileges embedded in the system. While such contestations have historically existed, they are more pronounced today, propelled by the shift of the world’s centre of gravity from the Trans-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the ascent of non-Western powers like China and India, and the West’s relative decline.
As it encompasses a diverse array of developing countries in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, the term “Global South” glosses over numerous contradictions, diversities and exceptions. The fact that the two self-proclaimed leaders of the Global South – China and India – cannot forge Asian solidarity because of their own territorial disputes, nationalism, and contest for influence in their neighbourhood, is a clear reflection of this condition.[9]
Despite its inherent heterogeneities, some characteristics are generally associated with the Global South. Firstly, it represents the general state of underdevelopment across many developing nations and their economic divide with industrialised and developed countries. The former are represented in the Group of 77 (G-77), which now boasts 134 member countries.[10] The latter are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the more exclusive Group of Seven (G-7). Secondly, this North-South economic divide is perceived by Global South countries as “rooted in the colonial era and sustained by global capitalism”,[11] perpetuated by the imbalances in the post-World War II international system favouring Western countries. These imbalances persist in developing countries’ limited representation and decision-making power in the United Nations Security Council and international financial institutions, the dominance of the US dollar, and developed countries’ discriminatory trade policies. Thirdly, Global South countries historically share normative solidarity in anti-colonialism, anti-neocolonialism, anti-hegemonism and advocacy for multipolarity. They have consistently voiced their calls for global governance reforms, stressing the importance of national sovereignty and opposing external interference, resisting Western-centric agendas concerning human rights and democracy, and demanding more equitable access by developing countries to markets, technologies and finance. As noted by Nour Dados and Raewyn Connel, “the term Global South functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment. It references an entire history of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained.”[12]
These normative commonalities make the Global South discourse appealing to non-Western powers in their contest for global influence. It also pressures the West to refocus on addressing the developing world’s economic needs instead of merely pursuing a values-driven agenda surrounding environmental standards, labour rights, civil society and gender equity. Despite its inherent heterogeneities, the increasing use of the term “Global South” in today’s global politics demonstrates that whether the Global South exists as an ontological reality matters less than how nations utilise it to advance their interests. As described by Sarang Shidore “the global south exists not as a coherent, organised grouping so much as a geopolitical fact.”[13]
China, in particular, has actively utilised the Global South discourse, portraying itself as the world’s largest developing country, hence “a natural member of the ‘Global South’”.[14] China maintains longstanding institutional connections with the Global South through the “G-77 and China” framework.[15] Beijing also played a key role in the BRICS expansion to include Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2023.[16] Beijing’s strategic elbow-locking with the Global South is evident in its launch of the Global Development Initiative and China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) aimed at promoting South-South cooperation, and its increased contribution to the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund. This concerted effort is seen as a significant repositioning of the Global South “to the centre of Chinese foreign policy”.[17]
China’s investment in the Global South aligns with its strategic goals amid its intensifying competition with the US and estrangement from the West. From the Chinese perspective, alignment with the Global South forms “a strong constraint on hegemony, Cold War thinking, and bloc politics” and helps boost China’s international legitimacy, support and partnerships since it views the Global South as “gradually coalescing into a united international political and economic force” to reshape global governance.[18] China also co-opts the Global South’s anti-hegemonic discourse, especially the appeal of global governance reforms to achieve a more “equitable” international system. By aligning itself with this discourse and presenting itself as a champion of developing countries’ interests, China seeks to challenge Western dominance in the international system and secure a greater role in shaping the global order. China’s investment in the Global South also has a powerful economic logic as developing countries have emerged as the largest markets for Chinese goods, investments and development financing. For example, the ten ASEAN countries collectively are currently China’s largest trading partner, a major export market for Chinese electric vehicles (EV), and a key destination of Belt and Road Initiative financing.[19] The increasing protectionist policies by the US and its western allies, which disadvantage Chinese goods and investments in these countries, have underscored the urgency of China’s economic pivot towards the developing world.[20]
While the US does not embrace the “Global South” discourse, it recognises the strategic necessity to compete with China in the developing world, especially in terms of addressing shared global challenges, as articulated in its 2022 National Security Strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy.[21] It launched the new strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa in 2022[22] and the first ever U.S. Pacific Partnership Strategy,[23] hosted the inaugural Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit,[24] and donated nearly 700 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines to 116 developing countries.[25] The proposed budget request of US$63 billion for the US State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2024 reflects this strategic imperative, supporting initiatives aimed at “outcompeting China” and addressing global development challenges.[26] However, while China’s focus is primarily on infrastructure building and economic integration with the Global South, the US’ development agenda is heavily values-driven, with a strong emphasis on supporting democracies, promoting gender equality, fighting corruption, and addressing climate change.
The US has also pooled resources with its Indo-Pacific partners with a view of “offering a better value proposition to developing countries”.[27] Initiatives such as the Quad Vaccine Partnership, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,[28] the G-7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative,[29] and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)[30] and the Blue Dot Network are aimed at meeting global challenges and infrastructure needs in the developing world.[31] However, their tangible outcomes have been limited. Challenges include the discrepancy between ambitious plans for high-quality infrastructure on the one hand, and insufficient financing to realise these projects, on the other. The Biden administration’s strategic priorities on rebuilding national power and strengthening alliances have necessitated re-thinking on globalisation and free trade policies, towards a greater emphasis on economic security and industrial revitalisation through reshoring and friendshoring. This shift implies that access to the US market, technologies, and investments will face more restrictions for the majority of developing nations going forward. Furthermore, the US political economy, which relies on the private sector to drive foreign investments (and infrastructure building is not Corporate America’s forte) poses structural constraints for Washington in matching the magnitude of Chinese state-led investments in developing countries.
SOUTHEAST ASIA WITHIN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: POINTS OF CONVERGENCE
As post-colonial nations with mostly developing economies and non-aligned foreign policies, Southeast Asian countries are generally categorised as part of the Global South, albeit with Singapore and Brunei as outliers in terms of development level. Singapore’s per capita GDP of US$82,808 nearly doubles the OECD average of US$44,671 whereas Brunei closely trails the OECD at US$37,512. The remaining Southeast Asian countries fall well below the OECD average, spanning from US$1,000 to US$12,000.[32] Singapore and the OECD also share similar levels of human development index (HDI), with respective HDI at 0.949 and 0.906. Following behind are Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand in the low 0.8 range; Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines in the low 0.7 range; and Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Timor-Leste between 0.5-0.6.[33]
In terms of membership in multilateral institutions associated with the Global South, all Southeast Asian countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-77, whose aim is to promote the collective interests of developing countries, enhance their negotiating capacity on international issues, and foster South-South cooperation. Statements by Southeast Asian leaders at these fora emphasise the importance of upholding sovereignty and political independence, reforming multilateral institutions for more equity and greater presentation of developing countries, refraining from trade discrimination, adequately financing developing countries to meet sustainable development goals.[34] On the climate change issue, they uphold the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities” (CBDR-RC), emphasise the historical contributions of developed countries to greenhouse gas emissions, and demand assistance to developing nations to achieve climate goals.[35] China is on the same page with Southeast Asian countries in this respect. The US acknowledges the CBDR-RC but such acknowledgment does not imply that it “recognizes or accepts any international obligation or liability, or alleviates the liability of the developing country”.[36]
Southeast Asian countries have historically demonstrated normative alignment with the Global South through common voting behaviours on political issues at the UN. In the early 1990s, they advocated “Asian values” as a challenge to “the hegemony of liberal democracy as a political norm”.[37] They consistently support resolutions aligned with Global South perspectives on human rights and democracy, which challenge the universalisation of human rights, oppose unilateral coercive measures, and advocate for “alternative approaches” to the realisation of human rights, placing emphasis on “cultural diversity”, “national and regional particularities”, “the right to development” and “the economic-social dimensions” of democracy (Figure 1). Conversely, they vote against or abstain from Global North-leaning human rights resolutions that criticise human rights conditions in other countries (Figure 2). China’s voting aligns closely with Southeast Asian countries, while the US’ voting stance is diametrically opposed. Another area of alignment between Southeast Asian countries and the Global South, including China, is in supporting resolutions on “decolonisation”. Accordingly, they consistently vote for resolutions condemning Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory and affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. In stark contrast, the US has consistently stood in direct opposition (Figures 3 and 4).
Figure 1. Votes for Global South-Leaning Human Rights Resolutions (2019 – 2023)
Source: UN Digital Library (Compiled by authors)
Figure 2. Votes for Global North-Leaning Human Rights Resolutions (2019 – 2023)
Source: UN Digital Library (Compiled by authors)
Figure 3. Votes on Resolutions Pertaining to Decolonisation (2019-2023)
Source: UN Digital Library (Compiled by authors)
Figure 4. Votes on Resolutions Supporting the Palestinian People and Statehood
(2019-2023)
Source: UN Watch Database (Compiled by authors)
WHERE RHETORIC DOES NOT MATCH REALITY
National Interests Override Global South Rhetoric
Despite the normative alignment among Global South nations in demanding a more equitable world order, Southeast Asian countries do not make their foreign policy decisions based on their ideological solidarity with the Global South, but primarily on their respective national interests and priorities. There is considerable diversity within Southeast Asia, and their foreign policies do not always match the normative expectations associated with the Global South.
For example, while many commentaries have highlighted varied international responses to the Russia-Ukraine war as a reflection of the Global North-South contrast,[38] Southeast Asian responses span the whole spectrum (Figure 5), challenging assumptions of uniform alignment within the region or with the Global South. Singapore has imposed sanctions on Russia and supported UNGA resolutions condemning Russia; the Philippines transitioned from abstentions to supporting these resolutions under the Marcos Jr administration; Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand maintain a neutral stance, offering certain support for resolutions condemning Russia; and both Vietnam and Laos predominantly abstained (78% of the votes).
On the Israel-Palestine issue, despite their widespread sympathy for the Palestinian people and support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, Southeast Asian responses to the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 were varied between Muslim majority nations and non-Muslim nations. Singapore and the Philippines condemned the attacks by Hamas which then led to Israel’s subsequent disproportionate attacks on Gaza. Muslim-majority Indonesia attributed “the root of the conflict” to “the occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel”,[39] Malaysia expressed solidarity with the Palestine people and maintains ties with Hamas,[40] and Brunei condemned Israel’s occupation and illegal settlements.[41] Thailand and Vietnam meanwhile have expressed concerns but adopted a more neutral stance.[42]
Closer to home, the South China Sea (SCS) issue sheds light on how nations in Southeast Asia and the Global South at large have prioritised their interests over standing up for international law and for fellow small states in the face of larger powers, i.e. China. This dynamic has played out at NAM meetings in recent years. In 2016, ASEAN countries reached a consensus for an update on the SCS language in the conference’s Final Document (the update mentioned their concerns over developments in the SCS), but it eventually was not reflected due to objection by some NAM members. At the 2024 NAM, ASEAN countries even failed to reach consensus on the group’s proposed wording on the SCS due to differences among themselves.[43]
Figure 5. Votes on Resolutions Condemning Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023)
Source: UN Watch Database (Compiled by authors)
Global North-South Interconnection, Not South-South Cooperation, Is Key to Southeast Asia’s Economic Success
While joining the Global South chorus in demanding for a more just world, Southeast Asia – perhaps more than any other Global South sub-region – stands out as a success story of globalisation through cross-border trade, investment and technology flows. Since the end of the Cold War, all Southeast Asian nations, except for the Philippines, have climbed up their respective income levels in World Bank rankings. Their economic development is intricately tied to extensive connections with both developing and developed nations as they play a significant role in the global supply chains. ASEAN has consistently been either the first or second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing world. Despite a decline in global FDI flows, the region remains an attractive investment destination, reaching US$224 billion in 2022, accounting for 17% of global FDI despite representing only 8% of the world population.[44] Collectively, ASEAN countries rank as China’s largest trading partner, Japan and Korea’s 2nd largest trading partner, the EU’s 3rd trading partner, and India and the US’ 4th largest trading partner. As noted by Ian Chong, “much of the region’s economic growth and prosperity over the past three decades lay in accessing capital and technology from North America, Europe and Japan to produce components for export to China or assemble parts from China for the world market.”[45] Between 2013 and 2022, Global North countries collectively accounted for 36-38 per cent of ASEAN’s total trade, the rest of the world 19-22 per cent, and China 14-20 per cent.
Notably, ASEAN maintained a robust trade surplus with Global North countries at US$82.4 billion on average in 2013-2022 and sustained an equivalent trade deficit of US$84 billion with China in the same period.[46] Of note, the trade dynamics between China and ASEAN increasingly resemble the typical North-South pattern with China exporting high-value, high-tech manufactured goods while some Southeast Asian nations mainly export commodities or serve as assembly and packaging locations.[47] In these economic relations, the pursuit of national economic power and the logic of capitalism trump any abstract notion of South-South solidarity.
The economic realities of Southeast Asian countries demonstrate that they have been active participants and beneficiaries of the current economic system, not hapless victims or passive price-takers. In fact, through ASEAN and other minilateral approaches, they have forged a network of regional free trade agreements with almost all major trading partners, actively shaping rules that align with their interests. While grievances exist, particularly regarding trade conditionalities imposed by developed nations on environmental or political grounds, they do not represent wholesale discontent with the system, as implied by the Global South rhetoric.
CONCLUSION
The resurgence of the Global South discourse has magnified the voices of developing nations, including those in Southeast Asia, enabling them to air their grievances and advocate for their interests more assertively. However, despite the general normative alignment within the Global South in the demand for a more “democratic and equitable international order”, the realities of global politics and economy are far more intricate, diverse and nuanced than the simplistic North-South binary. This complexity is particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia.
In this regard, Indonesia presents an intriguing case. On the one hand, it is the most vocal ASEAN country in pushing the Global South discourse for its own interests. President Joko Widodo asserted, “Global South nations must have the opportunity to export more than just raw materials, unlike during the colonial era”, to make the case for Indonesia’s development of downstream industries in the EV supply chain.[48] A senior Indonesian diplomat lambasted the EU’s deforestation regulations, which impact Indonesian timber and palm oil exports, as “recolonisation of the Global South”.[49] Foreign minister Retno Marsudi actively highlighted the needs and grievances of the Global South at many international engagements.[50] On the other hand, Indonesia has applied for accession to the OECD, hoping that OECD standards will serve as benchmarks and best practices, and that OECD membership will provide peer support for its development.[51] Indonesia’s hedging of its bets between the Global South and North illustrates the Southeast Asian DNA of pragmatism and inclusiveness. The success formula for Southeast Asian countries has historically been their ability to integrate into and bridge between different value systems rather than ideologically subscribing to a particular bloc, especially one that is as heterogeneous as the Global South.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/44 “Anti-Corruption Politics and Shifts in Central-Local Relations in Vietnam” by Nguyen Khac Giang
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- In Vietnam, the provinces often wield significant influence over the central government, as evidenced by the popular saying “phép vua thua lệ làng”, meaning “The king’s order stops at the village’s gate”.
- This power dynamic has drastically changed since the launch of the anti-corruption campaign. Since 2021, half of the removed members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) were provincial leaders, resulting in a decrease in provincial representation in the Committee from 40 per cent to 28 per cent.
- The government has implemented disciplinary measures, rotation policies for officials, and institutional reforms to curb the fragmented power of provinces and shift the balance towards the central authority.
- While these reforms have helped combat widespread abuse of power and corruption by provincial elites, they have also contributed to the already sluggish decision-making process in the provinces, negatively impacting their socio-economic performance.
- Moving forward, Vietnam must strike a balance between its anti-corruption efforts and the need for provincial autonomy, to sustain economic growth at the local level. This balance can be achieved by reducing the number of provincial administrative units and expanding accountability mechanisms from the bottom up.
*Nguyen Khac Giang is Visiting Fellow in the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously Research Fellow at the Vietnam Center for Economic and Strategic Studies.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/44, 13 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
In early April 2024, Duong Van Thai, the party secretary of Bac Giang – an industrial province in northern Vietnam – was summoned by the Central Inspection Commission (CIC) for enquiries regarding several publicly auctioned projects in his province. He was brought in for a process known as “câu lưu” (literally meaning “arrest awaiting investigation”).[1] Thai disappeared from the public eye for over a month before being formally arrested in connection with the Thuan An Group scandal, which also implicated former National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue.[2] This method of “câu lưu” was typically applied to criminal suspects or pro-democracy activists, making it a shocking event in the Vietnamese political system. Provincial elites in the country were known to have significant autonomy from the central government and were rarely subjected to such treatment.[3] However, since the anti-corruption campaign intensified in 2016, this practice has become increasingly common in affecting provincial leaders. The frequent use of these methods, similar to China’s infamous “shuanggui”,[4] indicates a decrease in provincial power within Vietnamese politics.
This article analyses how central authorities have utilised the anti-corruption campaign to curb local power. It also delves into the implications of these actions for the dynamics of Vietnamese politics, and their wider social and economic effects. The article also argues that maintaining a healthy balance between provincial autonomy and central authority will be a crucial task for Vietnam’s leadership.
THE RISE AND FALL OF VIETNAMESE PROVINCES
Vietnam is a one-party state with a high level of decentralisation, and its provinces often wield significant autonomous power relative to the central government, as encapsulated by the saying “phép vua thua lệ làng” (The king’s order stops at the village gate).[5] Since the CPV’s 6th National Congress that marked the beginning of Vietnam’s Đổi mới era, provincial leaders have consistently made up the largest group in the Party’s Central Committee, the country’s most important decision-making institution.[6] Provincial authorities are also granted a considerable level of autonomy in making economic policies, which has greatly contributed to the country’s economic success in the past four decades.[7] The autonomous power of provincial elites is evident in the relatively stable Central Committee. From 1986 to 2016, only one provincial leader, Ha Trong Hoa – Thanh Hoa Province’s party secretary, was removed from the Committee. This was in 1988.[8] There have also been instances where the Committee vetoed decisions made by the Politburo and the general secretary. These notable cases include the objection of the ill-fated Standing Committee of the Politburo at the 8th Congress, the earlier-than-expected retirement of General Secretary Le Kha Phieu in 2001, and the failure to discipline Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2012. At the 12th plenum of the 10th Central Committee in 2010, the Committee also decided not to discipline Huynh Minh Doan, Dong Thap Province’s party secretary, despite the Politburo’s recommendation.[9]
However, the fortune of provincial elites has reversed since 2016, when General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong defeated his political rival Nguyen Tan Dung and committed to accelerating the anti-corruption campaign. The CPV under Trong has relentlessly sought ways to rein in unchecked provincial power, which was considered a major source of corruption in the regime. The two biggest economic hubs, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, were initially targeted. In 2018, Ho Chi Minh City Party Secretary and Politburo member Dinh La Thang was sentenced to 30 years in prison on corruption charges.[10] In 2020, Hanoi’s Chairman Nguyen Duc Chung was arrested while its party secretary Hoang Trung Hai was disciplined and relieved of his duties.[11]
Trong’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign, known as the “blazing furnace”, did not stop there. Just six months into the 13th Congress in 2021, Binh Duong Party Secretary Tran Van Nam was arrested on corruption charges.[12] Since then, 13 Central Committee members from provinces have been removed from their positions for different reasons, reducing the share of provincial members in the Committee from 40 per cent to 28 per cent.[13]
While the first phase of the anti-corruption campaign (2013 – 2021) concentrated on violations at central institutions, especially state-owned enterprises, the second phase seems to target “backyard companies” – businesses established by family members or cronies of senior politicians to gain exclusive access to business opportunities at the provincial level.[14] This is evident in the network mapping (Figure 1) of four major corruption scandals since 2021: the Viet A test kit scandal, the repatriation flight scandal, the AIC case, and the Phuc Son Group (Hậu “pháo”) case.
Figure 1. Provinces involved in four major corruption scandals since 2021
Source: Author’s compilation.
These major anti-corruption investigations have not only brought down top central politicians, including presidents Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong, National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, deputy prime ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vo Duc Dam, but also had a devastating impact on provinces with links to the fallen “tigers”.[15] Therefore, it is no coincidence that since 2021, most disciplined officials in the anti-corruption campaign are from local institutions. According to this author’s dataset on disciplined officials from 2021 to April 2024, provincial officials account for 57.6 per cent of these, while central government officials make up 21 per cent. Meanwhile, police and central party agency officials only constitute 2.2 per cent and 1.9 per cent, respectively (Figure 2).[16]
Figure 2. Disciplined senior officials by occupation
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the CPV Central Inspection Commission’s list of disciplined officials (2021-24)
THE CENTRE TAKES BACK CONTROL
The anti-corruption campaign has a two-pronged approach: punishing corrupt officials and establishing a robust governance system to prevent future corruption. This approach involves conducting rigorous anti-corruption investigations against provincial elites and implementing tactical and institutional measures to curb their power and dismantle the localised networks of businessmen and provincial elites. At the National Conference to Review Anti-Corruption Efforts for the Period 2013–20, General Secretary Trong emphasised the danger of “localism” and “regionalism” as they foster venality and interest groups.[17] The party’s long-term goal is to eradicate the entrenched power of local officials through a combination of three methods: deploying central officials to local positions, accelerating the rotation of cadres, and institutionalising local anti-corruption measures.
Initially, the central leadership used its position to strategically assign central officials with strong party or internal affairs backgrounds to replace fallen provincial leaders in the anti-corruption campaign. For example, in Ho Chi Minh City, Nguyen Thien Nhan, Chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, was appointed to replace Dinh La Thang as the city’s party secretary after Thang’s arrest in 2017.[18] In 2020, Nguyen Van Nen, formerly the CPV’s Chief of Staff, succeeded Nguyen Thien Nhan.[19] This trend has intensified after the 13th CPV National Congress in 2021, particularly as the anti-corruption campaign has shifted its focus to provinces. For instance, following the arrest of Hai Duong’s party secretary Pham Xuan Thang in the Viet A scandal, CIC Vice Chairman Tran Duc Thang was dispatched to replace him in 2022. In early 2024, following the arrest of Lam Dong’s party secretary, Vice Head of the Central Internal Affairs Commission Nguyen Thai Hoc was assigned to the role. Other provinces, such as Khanh Hoa, Dong Nai, and Da Nang, also saw central officials taking over, although these appointments were not made immediately after the conclusion of the anti-corruption investigations in these provinces.
The deployment of central officials, especially those with solid backgrounds in internal affairs, serves two critical purposes. First, it stabilises local governments following an investigation, acting as an emergency measure to ensure central control over turbulent local situations. Second, in the medium and long term, this approach aims to eradicate the roots of localised networks. Unlike China, where leaders are often rotated across provinces, many Vietnamese provinces have traditionally been led by local leaders or those with long-term ties to the region, making them susceptible to the entrenched power of local authorities.
Furthermore, the CPV has also accelerated the implementation of the cadre rotation policy (luân chuyển cán bộ) at the “strategic level”, which involves the top provincial leadership. Cadre rotation is not new under communist regimes. China, for example, has been employing this policy since 1992 with great success.[20] Concerned about the negative impact of decentralisation and localism,[21] Vietnam’s central authority has been trying to recentralise by adopting a cadre rotation policy similar to that of China. In 2002, the Politburo issued Resolution 11-NQ/TW aimed to promote the frequent rotation of senior leaders within the system.[22] This policy was further institutionalised with the issuance of Regulation 98-QD/TW in 2017 and Regulation 65-QD/TW in 2022.[23] The CPV aims to have no locally-grown provincial party secretaries by 2025.[24]
This policy gained limited success in the early stages. During the 2000-2005 term, only 16 out of 63 provincial or municipal Party secretaries appointed by the Central Committee were not locals, making up 25.4 per cent. This pattern continued in the following terms, with a more or less similar percentage of non-local secretaries.[25] However, since the anti-corruption campaign accelerated in 2016, there has been a considerable change. In the 2015-2020 term, the number of non-local secretaries increased to 23 out of 63 (36.5 per cent). Since 2021, this number has risen even further, with two-thirds of the provincial party secretaries (42 out of 63) being non-locals as of April 2024.[26] It is highly likely that by the 14th Congress in 2026, the CPV will have achieved its target of having non-local party leaders for all 63 provinces and municipalities.
Institutional measures have also been intensified. In 2022, the CPV mandated that each province establish an anti-corruption steering committee, which is required to report every three months to the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee, headed by Trong. By the end of 2022, all provinces had complied with this directive.[27] The centre has also issued various laws and regulations to supervise anti-corruption activities. Since 2016, the Government Inspectorate has launched the Anti-Corruption Evaluation Index to rank provinces and ministries based on their anti-corruption efforts.[28] Ironically, the leaders of Vinh Phuc Province, which ranked first in 2023, were implicated in the Phuc Son Group corruption scandal in early 2024, highlighting the ongoing challenges in fully rooting out local corruption.[29]
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The anti-corruption campaign and the subsequent centralisation efforts have had mixed impacts on the provinces. On a positive note, these efforts have partially addressed the issue of entrenched localism in Vietnam, which led to the problem described by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong as “hot on top, cold below”.[30] Before the “blazing furnace” started, some localities did not detect or prosecute any corruption cases each year. However, recently, all localities have detected and prosecuted corruption cases at different degrees.[31] Centralisation also aids in constructing unified development policies, particularly for regional development plans which require better coordination among provinces.
However, centralisation efforts have also deterred bottom-up innovation, which was a hallmark of Vietnam’s Đổi mới era and which differentiated it from China’s top-down approach to reform. In fact, provincial autonomy has significantly contributed to Vietnam’s successful market reforms over the past four decades. The success of “fence-breaking” (phá rào) experiments in several provinces, including Vinh Phuc and Ho Chi Minh City, encouraged central leaders to adopt wide-ranging reforms in the late 1980s.[32] The competition among the 63 provinces in attracting investments has contributed to vast improvements in Vietnam’s business environment in recent decades. With the current political climate, provinces are hesitant even to spend public investment, not to mention implementing innovative policies.[33] This, combined with the existing problem of bureaucratic paralysis, has resulted in a lack of economic dynamism in some provinces in recent years.[34] In addition, while the anti-corruption campaign has not yet deterred the inflow of foreign direct investment, prolonged uncertainty might erode investors’ confidence in Vietnam’s political stability. This is further compounded by slower administrative procedures and reforms that have proven to be disruptive to businesses.[35]
Furthermore, the negative impact extends beyond the local level. Centralisation can also jeopardise Vietnam’s collective leadership system, which relies on the relative power of the Central Committee. Throughout history, the Committee has played a crucial role in maintaining checks and balances, holding the party leadership accountable and preventing the accumulation of arbitrary power, as seen in the removal of General Secretary Le Kha Phieu and the dissolution of the Standing Committee of the Politburo in 2001.[36] The provinces, which accounted for roughly 40 per cent of the Central Committee membership prior to 2021, are an integral part of the intra-party democratic mechanism. As the central leadership, particularly the Politburo, is increasingly staffed with securocrats who have limited experience in governance but a strong determination to combat corruption, it will be more challenging for Vietnam to address rising multifaceted issues, from foreign policy and economic recovery to climate change.[37]
CONCLUSION
The anti-corruption campaign has been instrumental in centralising power and reigning in the previously unchecked authority of provincial leaders. However, it has also brought about difficulties in terms of economic development policies and maintaining a balance of power within Vietnam’s collective leadership system. Going forward, the CPV should aim for a better balance between central control and provincial autonomy, accelerate administrative reforms to improve provincial governance, and encourage bottom-up accountability mechanisms instead of depending on top-down supervision to prevent local corruption.
First, while fighting corruption is crucial for building a clean business environment in the provinces, it should be seen as the first stepping stone rather than a final solution. As such, while the cadre rotation policy might be helpful in preventing local corruption, it may not necessarily contribute to the formation of a cohesive local leadership team that can effectively address specific regional issues. Rotated cadres, regardless of their qualification, often encounter difficulties in gaining the trust and cooperation of local officials, who might have reservations about the contextual knowledge of these “parachuted” leaders. Therefore, instead of having a hard target of non-local provincial leadership, the CPV should combine this policy with accelerating the direct voting pilots, which allow party members at certain levels to vote for their leadership committees.[38] This pilot programme has thus far been restricted to the district level, as the CPV is still deliberating its potential impacts. However, if carried out at the provincial level, this will provide the local party leadership with the legitimacy it needs to carry out both anti-corruption efforts and socio-economic policies.
Second, the CPV should also accelerate administrative reforms, and when possible, reduce the number of provinces.[39] Vietnam’s current administrative structure includes 63 provinces and municipalities, a substantial increase from the 40 provinces at the beginning of market reforms. For comparison, China manages only 34 province-level administrative regions despite being 30 times larger in size and 14 times more populous than Vietnam. Reducing the number of provincial units will reduce bureaucratic overlaps and unhealthy competition for investment between provinces, and enable more streamlined and efficient governance from central authorities.
Third, effectively addressing the persistent issue of corruption at the local level requires more than a top-down approach. The CPV should also depend on grassroots efforts, including its vast network of party branches and local members, to supervise local governments’ activities.[40] To facilitate this, it must provide safe and frequent channels for citizens to hold provincial leaders accountable, broaden the direct voting methods for local offices, create favourable conditions for civil society organisations, and strengthen the independent role of the media. It would be counterproductive to combat corruption in bureaucracy by adding more bureaucracy.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735. Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/43 “The Impact of China’s Digital Silk Road on the Digital Domain of the Philippines” by Julio S. Amador III and Deryk Matthew N. Baladjay
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Philippines’ legal framework for new technologies needs to be properly aligned with developments in the digital domain in order to accommodate investments and economic opportunities in the long run.
- The Marcos Jr. administration’s digitalisation efforts are caught in the middle of the geopolitical contests between China and the United States.
- The Philippines’ digitalisation thrust is being conducted simultaneous with China’s implementation of its Digital Silk Road. The accommodation of Chinese technologies brings with it risks and consequences of concern to the state.
- The Philippines’ outdated legal framework is unable to meet the new concerns posed by the en masse entry of Chinese technologies.
- Philippine institutions need to be resilient from foreign influence while accommodating investments that can bolster its digital push.
*Julio S. Amador III is Senior Fellow at the Ateneo Policy Center and Philippine Lead Investigator for the NORM Project. Deryk Matthew N. Baladjay is Research Associate for the NORM Project. This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway as part of the project ‘Shaping the Digital World Order: Norms and Agency along the Digital Silk Road in Southeast Asia (NORM)’, under grant number 325129. For more information on the NORM project, please visit: https://www.prio.org/projects/1920.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/43, 12 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
One of the first policy directives given by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to his government is the “digitalisation of vital government services.”[1] However, this mandate is nothing new to the wider global economy. The ongoing process of digitalisation is swiftly reshaping the contours of business and trade, while intersecting with international politics. The evolution of innovative technologies facilitated the emergence of a world without conventional borders, albeit accompanied by a surge in intricate digital challenges. Noteworthy among these challenges are dilemmas associated with managing cross-border data flows, enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and safeguarding consumer welfare. These concerns, far from being confined within domestic borders, extend to regional domains and global ones, marking a paradigm shift in the complexity and interconnectivity of contemporary digital issues.[2]
The digital sector, buoyed by robust government support, serves as a substantial driver of the Philippine economy. As of 2020, the estimated value of the Internet economy within the Philippines amounted to USD 7.5 billion. Projections indicate a noteworthy annual growth rate of 30 percent, with expectations set for the sector to expand significantly, reaching an estimated escalation to USD 28 billion by 2025. This trajectory underscores the pivotal role played by government backing in fostering the growth and sustainability of the country’s digital landscape.[3] Bilateral partners also play a significant role in supporting the Philippines’ digital transformation.[4] Of all countries with much stake in the Philippines’ digitalisation, none has matched the promise and ambition of China’s economic presence in the country.[5] Through its Belt and Road Initiative or other informal channels, Beijing and Manila continue to hold economic engagement in high regard. China is flooding the Philippine market with its technologies. To recall, China has been and continues to provide cheap and competitive technology alternatives to Filipinos;[6] its 5G technology is dominating the telecommunications sector;[7] it has begun introducing cloud-based technology[8] and financial technologies;[9] and Beijing has even nearly funded and operated a city-wide surveillance initiative.[10]
While the entrance of Chinese technology into the Philippine digital injects innovation and competition, concerns loom over data security, privacy, and potential economic dependencies. The expanding footprint of Chinese tech giants raises questions about the implications for the nation’s digital sovereignty and the need for a robust legal framework to address these complex issues. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s links with private companies,[11] and the presence of domestic laws that allow the PRC government to request people’s data from private entities, states and peoples have rightly expressed concern over China’s involvement in technology.[12] China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious global infrastructure project, and its Digital Silk Road (DSR) extension further complicate the digital landscape in the Philippines. The Digital Silk Road, focusing on digital interconnectivity, introduces the Philippines to the complexities of international digital cooperation, requiring careful consideration of its implications on national security, technology standards, and regulatory frameworks.[13]
Major challenges for the Philippines include a potential lack of institutional capacity to negotiate complex agreements, manage the cybersecurity risks associated with increased digital interconnectivity, and ensure that economic benefits are distributed equitably. As the country seeks to balance between embracing technological advancements and safeguarding its interests, the importance of strategic planning, international collaboration, and domestic capacity building cannot be overstated.
As the Philippines grapples with the influx of Chinese technology and participation in BRI-DSR, the need for a stronger legal and policy framework becomes increasingly apparent. The existing laws have proven insufficient in addressing the intricate challenges posed by the digital age; what is required is a comprehensive and adaptive legal infrastructure that safeguards national interests, ensures data privacy, and promotes fair competition. In navigating these uncharted waters, the Philippines requires astute policy decisions, legal fortification, and diplomatic acumen. This comprehensive examination of the evolving digital landscape in the Philippines encompasses not only economic and technological considerations but also geopolitical and legal dimensions.
THE PHILIPPPINES’ DIGITALISATION EFFORTS
The Philippines is embracing the digital age, as signalled by recent policy pronouncements from the Marcos Jr. administration. However, despite a longstanding ambition for a digital presence, it was not until the onset of the coronavirus pandemic that major service sectors were prompted to embrace digital technologies.[14] Spearheading the country’s digitalisation efforts is the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT), established in 2017.[15] The DICT is mandated to enhance ICT policy and planning, improve public access to technologies, facilitate intra-agency resource-sharing and capacity-building, ensure consumer protection, and foster ICT industry development.
The Philippine government cannot create and implement effective and efficient digitalisation projects and programmes without digital-focused and up-to-date legislation and regulations. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, the Philippine government took a regulatory and preventive approach[16] when it passed several of its digital-focused legislation, such as the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of 1995,[17] the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998,[18] and the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007.[19] Subsequently, the country pioneered legislation relevant to the changing digital landscape, with the Electronic Commerce Act[20] and the Data Privacy Act of 2012[21] being among the first of their kind in the ASEAN region. Soon after, legislation began to focus on the rapid facilitation of digital adoption in the Philippine government. Laws began to focus on encouraging foreign direct investments, inviting international interlocutors, and facilitating the ease of doing business among market players.
In spite of new laws and regulations, the Philippine Government lags in ensuring that its earlier established laws remain relevant and updated. This has resulted in a corpus of antiquated laws regulating new technological breakthroughs. The chasm that exists between the two has slowed the Philippines’ digitalisation push which began as early as the late 1990s. For instance, the 1995 Public Telecommunications Law, which is still in effect, is designed to focus on traditional telecommunications and does not include substantial provisions on the internet. While technological breakthroughs are very fluid and dynamic, legal responses and regulatory approaches have been reasonably short-sighted.[22] Because of the chasm, the Philippines had delayed policy responses to important technological novelties such as AI,[23] cloud technology,[24] quantum computing,[25] and many more. Innovation was bolstered by the passing of the Philippine Innovation Act in 2019.[26] Addressing legal gaps had largely been a wait-and-see strategy, based on systematically learning from international best approaches and adopting a tailored approach unique to the country, as done with the Data Privacy Act of 2012 which drew heavy inspiration from the European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive and the subsequent proceedings on the General Data Protection Regulation that began as early as June 2011.[27] What the Philippines cannot properly address legally and has raised alarm among certain sectors is the dual nature of technologies entering the country.
CONTENDING WITH CHINESE TECHNOLOGY
Since late 2013, China’s BRI has put the country in a leading global role in economic development. Starting with only nine countries, BRI has captured the attention of both developed and developing nations. This momentum rapidly accelerated,[28] resulting in a total of 148 countries signing memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with China. As an integral component of BRI, China initiated the DSR in 2015. This sets itself apart from the BRI not only in its thematic emphasis but also in terms of the involved Chinese stakeholders, contract types, and geographical scope.[29] Today, through the DSR, China has invested in the Philippines along certain critical fronts including digital infrastructure (both hard and soft infrastructures), major smart city projects, financial technology, and the Philippine supply chain.
China’s engagement in telecommunications, both terrestrial and subsea projects, has also been a focal point. The duopoly of Smart Communications and Globe Telecom, powered by Huawei, has played a central role in this domain, with the entry of new players like DITO Telecommunity and Converge ICT disrupting the industry.[30]
Surveillance technology export is another noteworthy aspect, with China’s influence extending to the installation of monitoring systems in major Philippine cities.[31] Projects like the “Safe Philippines” initiative, backed by China, involved the deployment of thousands of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras.[32] China’s export of surveillance technology has faced scrutiny and public opposition, leading to the discontinuation of some projects.[33]
The DITO[34] and Safe Philippines[35] projects raise significant national security concerns, particularly in light of the Chinese National Intelligence Law of 2017.[36] As a joint venture between a China state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a Philippine private company, DITO may bear the brunt of the requirement to provide data to the Chinese government, and this arrangement has direct implications for national security. Entrusting control of parts of the Philippines’ national telecom infrastructure to Chinese SOEs presents clear risks. China’s well-documented use of cyber-attacks for strategic and economic advantages adds an additional layer of concern. Given the Philippines’ existing vulnerability to cyber-attacks, relinquishing control over cyber-infrastructure could potentially compromise the country’s ability to defend itself. TikTok, a social media platform owned by Chinese company ByteDance, is immensely popular in the Philippines,[37] ranking as the most downloaded entertainment app despite controversies. The surge in TikTok usage is noted to be correlated to an increase in China-related disinformation in the Philippines,[38] prompting discussions on potential security risks associated with the platform.
Overall, China’s evolving economic interests in the Philippines underscore a strategic pivot towards digital domains, encompassing a wide spectrum of sectors from infrastructure and telecommunications to energy, surveillance technology, and entertainment platforms. Undeniably, the shift toward a digital economy offers the potential to enhance efficiency, innovation and productivity, and generate new job opportunities. However, trust and confidence in China’s BRI has taken a toll on account of slow delivery of promised gains.[39] This shift in the Philippines’ disposition towards the BRI not only reflects geopolitical considerations but also highlights increasing concerns about China’s economic deceleration,[40] property market crises, and the associated challenges tied to foreign investments. For the Philippines, China’s engagement[41] seems to be characterised by a form of diplomacy often referred to as a “pledge trap”, that involves strategic concessions in the South China Sea in exchange for promises of investment which have not, for the large part, materialised.[42]
Moreover, concerns arise about BRI-DSR projects being coupled with authoritarian tendencies, enabling governments to use centralised power to control citizens through digital tools and technology.[43] Some democracies, like the Philippines, are worried that China might spread its model of technology-driven authoritarianism.[44] This concern comes as Chinese firms get involved in building 5G networks and infrastructures in recipient countries, setting technology standards. This involvement raises fears of spying and coercion. Already, PRC-based hackers are attempting to breach the websites of Philippine political leaders and national security organisations, aggravating an already volatile security relationship with China.[45] Additionally, the DSR, along with technology norms pushed by other states, offers ways for countries to control their internet through measures like filtering, content moderation, data localisation, and surveillance. What is more worrying is that the CCP’s tightening of its control over PRC tech companies encourage values and practices that can lead to a more divided global internet.[46] This divide emerges[47] as some democracies opt for internet control while others stick to preserving internet freedoms.
CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The country’s archipelagic nature necessitates digital transformation of all its regions, not simply of the major city hubs. The Philippines will have much to do in terms of connectivity and infrastructure, its regulatory and innovation environment, and digital literacy. Taken together as part of a whole, these point to an overarching goal of building up internal resiliencies, so that the Philippines can safely harness technologies.
The Philippines’ deployment of diverse technologies for digital infrastructure, including fixed lines, wireless mobile, satellite internet, and underwater cables. However, acquiring and establishing these technologies is a difficult task, particularly in the absence of sufficient funds for infrastructure investment. Failure to address the connectivity issue will exacerbate the digital divide, particularly due to rapid technological advancements. Findings have indicated that access to adequate internet speeds diminishes in the rural areas of the Philippines.[48]
The Philippine government must also be equipped with relevant policies to facilitate its digitalisation initiatives and adapt to emerging technologies. Unfortunately, many of these regulations are antiquated and lack prompt and clear solutions to the demanding and swiftly evolving requirements posed by Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. As per the International Telecommunication Union, the Philippines is the third most expensive provider of ICT services among all ASEAN countries,[49] considering various ICT price categories. Furthermore, the Philippines’ complex and tedious bureaucratic processes deter many possible investors and competitors from participating in its digital ecosystem, impeding its development.
Connectivity reforms are capital-intensive. The government needs to engage with a wider range of foreign investors from different countries to facilitate and encourage direct foreign investments. Telecommunication companies play a big role in connectivity initiatives, and enabling and supportive network of laws, such as Executive Order No. 32,[50] will streamline the permitting process for the construction of telecommunications and internet infrastructure. Private sector linkages are also important. By partnering and coordinating with relevant actors in the private sector, the government can establish strategies and frameworks to motivate them to participate, stimulate investments, and jumpstart digital infrastructure in the country.
Regulation is a double-edged sword, and it must facilitate innovation. The Philippines will need to update legislation by developing custom-made reforms taken from international best practices in consultation with domestic and foreign partners. The digital transformation of regulatory processes needs to be supported as well. For instance, the roll out of the novel Electronic Business One-Stop Shop (EBOSS) system[51] by the DICT, ARTA, and the DILG require resources and support to ensure that national government agencies and local government units have the human and physical capacity to fully integrate it. This would also propel its efforts to establish ease of doing business for the business community. The government needs to support projects that promote good regulatory principles. The Philippine-Business Regulations Information System (PBRIS)[52] for example aims to cultivate and practise good and sound regulatory principles among government agencies, such as conducting regulatory impact assessments before agencies introduce or revise new regulations.
Advancing digitalisation in the Philippines poses challenges for stakeholders due to several factors. Given the country’s limited capacities and its association with China, ongoing collaboration in digital development is unavoidable. However, to mitigate the possible risks that come along with engaging with Beijing, the Philippines must equip itself with the necessary tools and mechanisms to maintain a balance between advancing its digital development and ensuring digital security. President Marcos Jr.’s renewed push for digitalisation is a good signal as significant digital reforms begin taking shape. However, much like with past administrations, reforms only hold if there is impetus and political will.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2024/42 “Corruption Eradication in Indonesia: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back” by Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana, Gunardi Endro, Siwage Dharma Negara
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is arguably one of the most important milestones in Indonesia’s anti-corruption drive since the fall of Suharto. Since its establishment, KPK has investigated more than 1,500 corruption cases.
- During President Jokowi’s administration, there was a tremendous backlash against KPK’s sting operations and its exposure of corruption in powerful state agencies, including the Police. The government and the parliament wanted tighter supervision of the agency, and wanted it to focus on corruption prevention rather than organising operations to catch perpetrators red-handed.
- In late 2019, the passing of a new KPK law led to the creation of a Supervisory Council, which significantly circumscribed the KPK’s autonomy to conduct anti-corruption operations. There was a growing perception that the KPK was no longer free from political interference, and instead had become a political tool to undermine political opponents.
- A recent extortion case involving the KPK chief himself indicates that the system for combatting corruption in Indonesia may also be corrupt.
- Public expectations for corruption eradication will never be met unless fundamental reforms are implemented within KPK and other law enforcement agencies, including the National Police and the Attorney General’s Office. The KPK itself is under-resourced and under-staffed. It would be difficult to restore the agency’s credibility unless it regains its previous status as an independent agency instead of being part of the civil service. More fundamentally, progress in eradicating corruption in Indonesia would require a broader inculcation of integrity and accountability standards across the government, and curbs of the cosy relationships between politicians and big business.
* Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana is Lecturer at the School of Government and Public Policy, Indonesia. Gunardi Endro is Lecturer at Universitas Bakrie, Indonesia. Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. The authors would like to thank Cassey Lee, Francis Hutchinson, Manggi Habir, and Maria Monica Wihardja for their comments on an earlier draft.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/42, 10 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission or KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) is facing a serious challenge after its Chief, Firli Bahuri, who is also a Police General, was charged with extortion; he had allegedly demanded money from former agriculture minister Syahrul Yasin Limpo. The latter stood indicted for corruption in the procurement of goods and services within the Ministry of Agriculture and for the gifts and gratifications he received from inside and outside the Ministry.[1]
In March this year, KPK arrested 15 employees at its detention centres for allegedly extorting detainees between the years 2019 and 2023. The investigation was triggered by a report from the KPK Supervisory Council that 78 detention centre workers were involved in collecting illicit fees from detainees in exchange for illegal services such as the smuggling of cash or communication devices into their cells.[2] This recent incident shows the massive challenge of fighting corruption in Indonesia. Law enforcement officials who are responsible for upholding the rules and regulations often break the law to enrich themselves.
There have been several corruption cases involving high-ranking state officials during President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi’s) administration. Besides Syahrul, five other ministers within Jokowi’s cabinet have faced corruption charges since he took office in 2014. These were Social Minister Idrus Marham (Riau power plant case); Youth and Sports Minister Imam Nahrawi (embezzlement of grants from the Indonesian National Sports Committee or KONI); Maritime and Fishery Minister Edhy Prabowo (collision and gratuity in permits to export lobsters and lobster eggs); Social Minister Juliari Batubara (embezzlement of grants and aids for Covid-19 crisis management); and Information Minister Johny G Plate (embezzlement of funds from the construction of base transceiver stations (BTS) towers).[3]
Why have there been so many corruption cases involving government officials and even ministers during the Jokowi administration? As of now, there are six ministers in Jokowi’s cabinet compared to five ministers in Yudhoyono’s cabinet caught in corruption cases.[4] How should we assess this development? Does this mean the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been ineffective? Or is it because the KPK has become more effective in uncovering corruption? This essay examines the challenges facing Indonesia’s corruption eradication efforts. It looks at KPK’s unique role in the regulatory and institutional setup of Indonesia’s governance system and examines various ways to increase KPK’s effectiveness.
THE BEGINNING OF THE CORRUPTION ERADICATION DRIVE
The key milestone of Indonesia’s effort to fight corruption began with the enactment of Law No 31/1999 on corruption. The law gave birth to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), an independent agency that deals with corruption cases that are too difficult to handle for the prosecutor’s office and the police. Over the years, KPK has been dealing with a number of major corruption cases, such as the Century bailout, electronic ID (e-KTP), and the Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI), among others (Table 1).[5] Given its early achievements, public trust in KPK grew strong. A survey conducted in 2008 showed that the agency was ranked as the law enforcement agency most trusted by the public, above the National Police, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office.[6]
Table 1: Select Major Corruption Cases under KPK Investigation
| Case | Year | Value | Outcome |
| Century bank bailout | 2008 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 6.7 trillion | KPK succeeded in imprisoning several related suspects, including Budi Mulya, former Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia for Monetary Management, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison. |
| Construction of the Hambalang National Education, Training and Sports School Center | 2010 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 464-706 billion | KPK succeeded in imprisoning several related suspects, including former Chairman of the Democratic Party, Anas Urbaningrum, former Minister of Youth and Sports Andi Mallarangeng and former member of the national parliament Angelina Sondakh. |
| Construction of the SEA Games Athletes’ Village in Palembang, Riau Province | 2011 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 55 billion | KPK succeeded in imprisoning several related suspects, including former General Treasurer of the Democratic Party Muhammad Nazaruddin. |
| Procurement of electronic ID (e-KTP) | 2011 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 2.3 trillion. | KPK succeeded in imprisoning several related suspects, including Setya Novanto, former Chairman of the National Parliament, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison. |
| Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance or BLBI | 2013 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 4.58 trillion. | KPK named businessman Sjamsul Nursalim and his wife as suspects. In 2021, however, KPK announced it had dropped the protracted bailout graft case against Sjamsul Nursalim and his wife. The decision was taken after years of unsuccessful attempts to build a strong case. |
| Purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG). | 2012 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 2.1 trillion. | KPK named former President Director Pertamina Karen Agustiawan as a suspect. |
| Procurement and maintenance project for quayside container crane (QCC) units at PT Pelindo II | 2015 | Estimated state losses of around Rp 32 billion | KPK named the President Director of PT Pelindo II Richard Joost Lino as a suspect. Lino was sentenced to 4 years in prison. |
Note: US$ 1 = Rp 16,045 (as of 24 May 2024)
Source: various media reports
Corruption is a complex issue, and many factors, including lack of awareness, integrity, transparency and accountability, make it difficult to fight.[7] Through various sting operations (Operasi Tangkap Tangan or OTT), KPK has caught many government officials, especially heads of provincial, district/municipal governments, red-handed.[8] Arguably, the high costs of holding political office/positions were deemed the main factor in explaining why many regional officials were involved in corruption cases.[9]
Despite its achievements in uncovering several high-profile cases, KPK’s corruption eradication efforts have not been without controversies. Scandals, internal controversies, and political interference have adversely affected public perceptions about the roles and effectiveness of the KPK. In some cases, KPK also had to deal with other law enforcement agencies, such as the National Police (POLRI). In 2009, there was a confrontation between the KPK and POLRI, which was dubbed the house lizard vs crocodile (Cicak vs Buaya) case, depicting the KPK as a small house lizard and the national police as a large crocodile. The KPK was accused of wiretapping the Head of Criminal Investigation, Commissioner General Susno Duadji, who was being investigated for receiving a bribe amounting to Rp 10 billion in the Century Bank case.[10] POLRI countered by charging the KPK leaders with legal issues. Two Deputy Chairmen of KPK, Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra Martha Hamzah were detained, which then sparked strong reactions from corruption activists and the public.[11]
More friction between the KPK and the Police happened in 2012 when the KPK investigated allegations of corruption in the acquisition of a driving license (Surat Izin Mengemudi or SIM) simulator involving the former Head of the National Police Traffic Corps, Inspector General Djoko Susilo.[12] Not long after this case was opened, the KPK investigator Novel Baswedan was accused of being involved in the abuse of a detainee in 2004 when he was Head of the Investigation Unit for the Bengkulu Regional Police.[13]
The tensions between the two agencies continued during the administration of President Jokowi in 2015, when KPK named Commissioner General Budi Gunawan as a suspect in cases of alleged receipt of gifts or gratification.[14] This case prevented Budi Gunawan from becoming the National Police Chief. In retaliation, POLRI named KPK Deputy Chairman Bambang Widjojanto as a suspect in providing false information at the Constitutional Court trial in the West Kotawaringin Regional Head Election dispute case in 2010.[15] The KPK leader at that time, Abraham Samad, was also named by the police as a suspect in the document falsification case. The determination of both KPK leaders as suspects triggered strong public reactions against the ‘criminalisation’ of corruption activists, forcing the Attorney General at that time, HM Prasetyo, to dismiss the charges against Samad and Widjojanto.[16]
Nevertheless, KPK’s operations have been perceived by the Jokowi government, as revealed by the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs, as being less effective and of creating a negative image of the country.[17] Minister Luhut Pandjaitan said that KPK should focus on preventive measures and education rather than sting operations.[18] This statement indicates a perception within the government that KPK has gone too far and must somewhat be controlled. Moreover, the contentions between KPK and both the national police and the government have reduced the agency’s efficacy in preventing and eradicating corruption. Establishing complementary roles among the above institutions remains elusive due to the intricacies involved, whereas the politics of corruption prevention and eradication signals the ever-presence of conflicts, disruptions and dissolutions. Given the prevailing political regime, which stipulates transactional politics and coalitional government, KPK’s flexibility is being tested.
POLITICAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL KPK
During President Jokowi’s term, KPK’s power and independence have arguably been reduced through legislative amendments. In 2019, the government tabled the Law No. 19/2019 in the parliament. The new law has some serious implications for the agency’s operations as it imposes political control that diminishes its ability to operate independently.[19] The new law transforms KPK from an independent agency to a central government body. Critics argue the law has weakened the decision-making structure within the agency.[20] KPK’s operation is now controlled by the President through a supervisory council (Badan Pengawas KPK). KPK’s requests for surveillance must now be approved by the board, which impedes the agency’s powers. As a result, KPK has become just another politically controlled auxiliary state agency. Its personnel are to be reclassified from independent staff to state officials. Some of its investigators have faced growing hostility and have been removed from their positions.[21] Between January and November 2020, 38 personnel left KPK due to disappointment with the new law and organisational changes.[22]
WHY DOES CORRUPTION PERSIST?
A recent report from Transparency International finds that corruption has worsened during President Jokowi’s administration. Indonesia’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is a composite indicator to measure perceptions of public sector corruption on a scale of zero (very corrupt) to 100 (very clean) in 180 countries, has declined from 40 in 2019 to 34 in 2022.[23] The drastic decline in Indonesia’s CPI score in 2022 indicates that corruption eradication in the country has become increasingly ineffective (Figure 1).
According to a recent survey conducted by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, public perception towards law enforcement agencies is quite low. Particularly, trust in KPK has decreased significantly from 83.1 per cent in 2017 to 72.7 per cent in 2022.[24] The decline in public trust in the KPK aligns with their perception of the agency losing its independence after the KPK Law passed in 2019. Persistent weak law enforcement has translated into general distrust in the law itself and in the bureaucratic apparatus in charge of upholding the regulations.
Figure 2 shows that the number of corruption cases fell in 2019 and 2020. This does not mean corruption has improved during that period. On the one hand, the revision of the KPK Law in 2019 affected the ability of the agency to investigate new cases. On the other hand, the Covid-19 pandemic affected the operational ability of KPK. Interestingly, as the pandemic subsided, the number of cases increased, after 2020.
Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index (2002-2023)
Source: Transparency International. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2024/01/31/skor-indeks-persepsi-korupsi-indonesia-2023-stagnan-peringkatnya-turun
Figure 2: Number of corruption cases investigated by KPK (2004-2023)
Source: Katadata. (https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2024/03/06/kpk-tangani-1500-kasus-korupsi-dalam-dua-dekade)
Digitalisation of public services is claimed to be a major strategy for eradicating corruption through prevention. Arguably, digitalisation helped in reducing petty corruption, such as what many people faced in the past when they applied for ID Card (KTP) and/or driver’s license (SIM). Nevertheless, state loss due to corruption has continued to increase over the years according to the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW). Ganjar Pranowo, the non-elected presidential candidate, cited data from ICW and said that the state had lost Rp 230 trillion over the last ten years to corruption (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Estimated State Losses due to Corruption, 2012-22 (trillion Rp)
Note: ICW does not provide information on how the losses are computed.
Source: ICW (https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2023/12/12/cek-data-ganjar-sebut-kerugian-negara-akibat-korupsi-tembus-rp230-t-dalam-10-tahun-terakhir-benarkah)
Figure 3 indicates state losses due to corruption which had increased exponentially after revision of the KPK Law. While KPK argued that the analysis carried out by ICW was incorrect,[25] the results are in line with the report from Transparency International.[26] If the figures are accurate, the effort to combat corruption may have moved backwards in recent years.
So, why does corruption in Indonesia remain persistent? There are several factors driving it. Below we discuss the three most critical ones.
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Institutions responsible for preventing and combating corruption are often, if not always, underfunded, understaffed, and lacking the necessary resources and capacity. In 2023, KPK received around Rp 1.27 trillion (approx. US$ 79 million) to support its operation from the state budget. This figure is equal to 0.04 per cent of the total state spending.[27] Also, the employment status of KPK’s personnel was changed from contract employees to civil servants through the new KPK Law.[28] With only one office in Jakarta, KPK is overwhelmed when managing cases in the region due to inadequate human resources. Moreover, the non-independent Supervisory Board has further constraint the agency’s capability to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
Institutional constraints have led to cherry-picking of cases to investigate. Given such constraints, the KPK must be more selective, and tend to prioritise cases that impact the institution’s survival rather than cases that could strengthen its reputation. Under the control of a strong coalition government, some have argued that the agency may have lost its ability to say ‘no’ to politicians.[29]
During Jokowi’s administration, there have been signs that anti-graft enforcement has been increasingly targeted at those from the opposition camp and their supporters.[30] The KPK has been accused of cherry-picking graft suspects. Even though politicians from the PDIP Party have been indicted for graft by the KPK, these cases usually involved menial and low-profile politicians accepting small bribes at the regional level. These politicians include Damayanti Wisnu Putranti (Komisi V DPR),[31] Sri Hartini (Bupati Klaten),[32] Muhammad Samanhudi Anwar (Walikota Blitar),[33] and Supian Hadi (Bupati Kotawaringin Timur).[34] In contrast, there have been cases involving high-profile politicians from opposition parties, such as Johnny G. Plate (Former Minister of Communication and Information Technology, from Nasdem) and Syahrul Yasin Limpo (Former Minister of Agriculture, also from Nasdem). As a result, the public perception is that anti-corruption enforcement has been used to weaken the opposition camp.
How will anti-corruption enforcement change under the new government? The President-elect, Prabowo, has promised to enact new legislation to strengthen corruption prevention and eradication as well as to put in place more stringent criteria for the selection of the KPK head. The proposed Asset Forfeiture Bill initiated by the Jokowi administration needs to be completed urgently.[35] Nonetheless, the Indonesian Corruption Watch has opined that the proposed bill is unlikely to be passed. The reason for this is that such a bill will lead to greater scrutiny of funding for political parties and political coalitions. Moreover, a stronger anti-corruption regime would also put greater scrutiny on future deals between foreign investors and government officials and politicians.[36] This is why parliament has been reluctant to discuss the bill.[37] The investigation and prosecution of powerful politicians and officials for corruption is also not likely to happen in the future as Prabowo has publicly vowed to focus on corruption prevention as opposed to prosecuting the corrupted.[38] Given that Prabowo is likely to continue Jokowi’s legacy of coalitional government and transactional politics, the prospects of a stronger anti-corruption regime are dim.
TRANSACTIONAL POLITICS AND COALITIONAL GOVERNMENT
Jokowi’s cabinet consists of reformist aspirants, parties’ supporters and New Order proponents.[39] Jokowi developed legitimacy by accommodating the interests of various proponents, including elites, rather than siding exclusively with popular demands.[40] The mix between politics and business has long been a tradition. It creates a fertile land of conflict of interest and encourages the use of public positions for private gains. This often leads to a collusion between public officers and private firms to influence public policies for their benefits.[41] The elected members of the district, provincial, and national parliaments are dominated by business people,[42] and the background of the current regent/mayor, governors and ministers are from the business/private sector. In fact, many political parties are led by or connected to business people, e.g., Nasdem, Surya Paloh; Golkar, Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie; Perindo, Harry Tanoesoedibjo; and Gerindra, Hasjim Djojohadikusumo. The only major party that is not lead by a business person is PDIP.
In matters of candidacy, succession and ascendancy, governors and mayors prefer to support candidates who can bring money to the table. This is well known as ‘Mahar Politik’ or political dowry.[43] Should this political practice continue, the collusion between public officers and private firms to influence public policies for their benefit will also persist.
WEAK CULTURE OF INTEGRITY
Arguably another factor that contributes to pervasive corruption in a country is its culture. In the context of eradicating corruption, building a culture of integrity is critical. Without creating such a culture, law enforcers themselves are at risk of committing corruption. The results of the Integrity Assessment Survey (SPI) conducted by KPK every year from 2021 to 2023 show a downward trend, indicating the risk of corruption in government institutions is getting higher.[44] Efforts to improve a culture of integrity are carried out through anti-corruption education at all levels of education and involving collaboration with all stakeholders who have authority in the education sector. However, the Education Integrity Index (IIP) itself has not shown any improvement, and schools have not demonstrated massive and conducive exemplary behaviour.[45] Ironically, cases of corrupt acts in the education sector are still widespread, such as gratification, illegal levies, collusion between school leaders, nepotism in admitting new students, and plagiarism.[46]
CONCLUSION
Public expectations for corruption eradication will never be met unless there is fundamental reform within KPK and other law enforcement agencies, such as the National Police and the Attorney General Office. There is a need to clean up and improve the integrity of these law enforcement agencies.
The enactment of the 2019 KPK Law has brought serious setbacks in the fight against corruption. The incoming new government will face tremendous challenges in finding effective strategies to deal with persistent corruption. There are several measures that can be implemented to effectively combat corruption. One is to restore KPK’s power by making it a more independent agency. Moreover, the government should consider increasing the funding for the agency, and improving the collaborative framework between KPK and other agencies such as the Police, Attorney General Office, Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK) and Financial & Development Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawasan Keuangan & Pembangunan or BPKP). Then, to address transactional politics, there is a need to regulate political financing. This may include transparency and limits on campaign contributions, public financing of political campaigns, and stricter disclosure requirements for political donations. Even within a big coalition government, corruption can be minimised with strict enforcement of transparency and accountability laws requiring politicians and businesses to disclose their financial transactions, assets, and conflicts of interest. Finally, to build a culture of integrity, it is important to raise public awareness about the negative impacts of corruption on society and to encourage citizen participation in efforts to combat corruption. Public campaigns, educational programmes, and civic initiatives aimed at promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance need to be intensified.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735. Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support/get-involved-with-iseas/ | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Editorial Committee: Terence Chong, Cassey Lee, Norshahril Saat, and Hoang Thi Ha Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Lee Poh Onn, Lee Sue-Ann, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
“From Paper to Practice: Utilizing the ASEAN Guide on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance and Ethics” by Kristina Fong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed — with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation.
• ASEAN’s response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a “practical guide” for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.
• For the implementation of the Guide to be effective, certain notable aspects should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the additional costs organizations will bear in putting into place the checks and balances premised by the guide should be reassessed, especially the disproportionate impact these will have on MSMEs. Additionally, labour availability for these suggested governance mechanisms may be lacking, with rising skills and human resource gaps in integral areas such as cybersecurity. Moreover, on a national level, policymakers should be wary of potential disparities between institutional and regulatory maturity for AI system implementation relative to business readiness for implementation on the ground.
• For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/18, June 2024
“Who’s Doing What? A Closer Look at Methane Climate Impact and Commitments in Southeast Asia’s Energy Sector” by Qiu Jiahui
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners.
• Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia, they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions.
• Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities.
• Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region’s lack of decisive coal phaseout plans.
• As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure.
• More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements.
• These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/17, June 2024
2024/41 “Engaging Southeast Asia: The EU’s role as a Resilient and Reliable Middle Power?” by Eugene R.L. Tan and Joanne Lin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The European Union (EU) consistently occupies the top spot in Southeast Asia as the preferred and trusted “third party” in hedging against the uncertainties of US-China rivalry and in commitment to “doing the right thing” in the wider interests of the global community.
- The EU’s strong economic and normative presence in the region is recognised. It is ASEAN’s third largest trading partner and source of FDI. Brussels is also recognised for its strong values regarding multilateralism and its commitment to a rules-based order, forming the cornerstone of the ASEAN-EU strategic partnership.
- However, trust in the EU amongst Southeast Asians is at its lowest level since it launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021. This is due, in part, to the preoccupation of its member states with domestic and European issues such as Ukraine, as well as unresolved disputes and trade concerns with Southeast Asian countries over palm oil and the EU’s carbon policies. Concerns about human rights violations, democratic backsliding and governance deficit happening in several ASEAN countries continue to underscore the inherent tensions between the EU’s normative aspiration and its pragmatic engagements in the region.
- The EU has room for improvement if it wishes to make good on its Indo-Pacific strategy. It needs to recognise the practical limitations that Southeast Asian countries have in complying with its regulations. It can facilitate economic development across the region through capacity-building programmes aimed at harmonising regulatory standards. It should also focus on its strengths in areas of non-traditional security rather than traditional military domains. Most importantly, the EU should recalibrate its balancing of principles and pragmatism to not only advance mutual interests but also cement its relevance in Southeast Asia.
* Eugene R.L. Tan is a Research Officer with the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute; and Joanne Lin is Co-coordinator and Associate Senior Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
ISEAS Perspective 2024/41, 5 June 2024
INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s (EU) role in Southeast Asia continues to be acknowledged, particularly amid the escalating competition between the US and China. As a longstanding dialogue partner of ASEAN since 1977, the EU has emerged as a major development partner for ASEAN and stands as the region’s third largest trading partner and foreign direct investment (FDI) source.[1] As its relations with ASEAN have been elevated to a strategic level since 2020, the EU has extended its influence beyond economic and normative domains.
There is plenty of evidence underscoring the EU’s consistent image as a reliable and pivotal actor in Southeast Asia. In the State of Southeast Asia surveys,[2] the EU has, since 2021, occupied the top spot as the region’s preferred and trusted “third party” in hedging against the uncertainties of the US-China strategic rivalry (see Figure 1). The EU also remains a trusted global actor committed to “doing the right thing” in the wider interests of the global community, according to the same survey. Notably, in the 2024 survey,[3] the EU emerged as the fourth most strategically relevant dialogue partner, among eleven countries, positioning it closely behind China, the US, and Japan (see Table 1).
Figure 1: Annual ranking of preferred and trusted third-party for ASEAN
Source: State of Southeast Asia Surveys[4]
Table 1: Dialogue Partners ranked in order of strategic relevance in 2024
| Rank | Dialogue Partner | Mean Score |
| 1 | China | 8.98 |
| 2 | US | 8.79 |
| 3 | Japan | 7.48 |
| 4 | EU | 6.38 |
| 5 | ROK | 5.71 |
| 6 | UK | 5.52 |
| 7 | Australia | 5.51 |
| 8 | Russia | 5.08 |
| 9 | India | 5.04 |
| 10 | Canada | 3.81 |
| 11 | NZ | 3.70 |
Source: 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey
The EU seems poised to strengthen its role as a middle power in an increasingly strategic region of geopolitical contestation. In 2021, the European Council launched its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in an attempt to strengthen its access to regional markets, strengthen its supply chain and uphold the tenets of a rules-based international order as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[5] Despite the EU’s ambition in the Indo-Pacific, it faces certain constraints. The ongoing war on its Eastern flank and serious concern about its ability to fund its own defence amid wavering US support cast doubt on the EU’s commitment to Southeast Asia. Furthermore, echoes of disunity have been getting louder, not only from smaller member states like Hungary,[6] but also between larger member states like France and Germany; notably, the lack of a “common front” in their bilateral relationships with China[7] is indicative of wider divergences between the pair of countries leading the EU’s Indo-Pacific approach. Considering these challenges, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz characterised Europe’s trajectory in the last two years as a “Zeitenwende” (i.e. historic turning point), prompting an inward focus on addressing domestic capacity and challenges.
The perception of a disunited and conflict-ridden Europe can have ripple effects in Southeast Asia. Concurrently, persistent concerns about human rights violations, democratic backsliding and governance deficit in certain ASEAN countries continue to underscore the inherent tensions between the EU’s normative aspiration and its pragmatic engagements in the region. This article examines the EU’s role as a resilient and reliable middle power in shaping Southeast Asia’s future, while exploring avenues for the EU to play a more influential role in the region.
EU’S ECONOMIC AND NORMATIVE POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Despite the absence of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN, the EU maintains a robust economic presence in the region. As ASEAN’s third largest trading partner (trailing only behind China and the US), ASEAN-EU trade reached US$ 295.2 billion in 2022, marking a significant 9.6% year-on-year growth.[8] Additionally, the EU maintains its economic foothold as the third-largest source of FDI into ASEAN, with a substantive inflow of US$24 billion in 2022.[9] According to data from ASEAN Investment Reports[10] from the same period, EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands were among ASEAN’s top sources of FDI.
Moreover, EU institutions, alongside their member states were the second largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) to the region between 2015 and 2021 (see Figure 2), signifying the EU’s multifaceted economic commitment to the region. The EU has also been viewed as the fourth most influential economic power in the region in the State of Southeast Asia from 2019 – 2024, ahead of middle powers such as Australia, India, South Korea, and the United Kingdom (UK).
Figure 2: Proportion of ODA Commitments by Countries and International Organizations (2015 – 2021)
Source: Lowy Institute Southeast Asia Aid Map[11]
Beyond its economic clout, Brussels is also recognised as a strong normative actor in the region. As part of its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,[12] the EU has sought to cooperate with like-minded countries to set standards and promote good regulatory practices.[13] It indicated its ambition to promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture and safeguard freedom of navigation in the region through capacity-building initiatives. As such, shared values, including multilateralism and commitment to a rules-based order, remain the cornerstone of the ASEAN-EU strategic partnership.[14] This has translated into greater confidence in Brussels’ capacity to champion global free trade and maintain a rules-based order, with the EU ranking above other middle powers in the region across both measures (see Figures 3 and 4).
Figures 3 and 4: Annual ranking of external partners based on the degree of confidence that they will champion global trade or provide leadership to maintain a rules-based order
Source: State of Southeast Asia Surveys[15]
“PROTECTIONIST” BRUSSELS AND DIVERGING VALUES
While the EU’s influence and standing appear relatively strong, its engagement with the region is not without challenges. Persistent economic issues, such as unresolved disputes over palm oil and regional anxiety regarding the EU’s carbon policies, present ongoing obstacles. Furthermore, regional, and global geopolitical challenges such as the Myanmar crisis and the Israel-Hamas war complicate the EU’s engagements with some ASEAN member states, particularly Muslim-majority countries. As such, trust levels in the EU amongst Southeast Asians are at their lowest since it launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021 (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Confidence in the EU to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance among Southeast Asian Respondents
Source: State of Southeast Asia Surveys[16]
A growing source of distrust are the EU’s ongoing trade disputes with Indonesia and Malaysia over protectionist practices. The EU formally challenged Indonesia’s “unlawful export restrictions” on nickel and iron ores at the WTO.[17] The WTO has ruled in favour of the EU since October 2022, and the ban remains in effect while Indonesia appeals the decision.[18] Concurrently, the EU’s implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II)[19] to phase out the import of palm oil by 2030 has sparked contention. As the largest producers of palm oil globally, both Indonesia and Malaysia have lodged cases with the WTO,[20] arguing that the EU had similarly infringed on the rules of international trade. Similar concerns have been voiced by rubber producers across the region in response to the EU’s regulation on deforestation-free products, which entered into force in June 2023.[21] Producers from Indonesia,[22] Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia have expressed concern that Brussels’ “unilateral and unrealistic”[23] action would disproportionately disadvantage smaller farmers over large corporations.
As such, the perceived disjuncture between Brussels’ opposition to Indonesian critical mineral protectionism and its own exercise of “protectionist”[24] and “discriminatory”[25] practices, such as favouring European biofuels like rapeseed oil,[26] invites accusations of hypocrisy and double standards. Moreover, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has been criticised as a protectionist tool benefiting EU companies at the expense of Southeast Asian competitors.[27] These measures have incurred reputational costs for the EU in the region,[28] as reflected in the decline in confidence in the EU to champion the global free trade agenda, between 2020 and 2024 among Indonesian and Malaysian respondents (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Confidence among Malaysian and Indonesian Respondents in the EU to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance
Source: State of Southeast Asia Surveys[29]
These trade disputes with Indonesia and Malaysia have impeded progress in an already tricky free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation process for the EU. For instance, despite engaging in 16 rounds of talks since 2016, the EU and Indonesia have made little headway, with no resolution in sight.[30] Similarly, the EU and Malaysia have suspended talks on their bilateral FTA since 2012.[31] At the regional level, the EU has only managed to put into force bilateral FTAs with two ASEAN member states – Singapore and Vietnam, with two others, namely Thailand and the Philippines, remaining under negotiation (see Annex A). This limited progress has hindered efforts to establish a wider region-to-region FTA between the EU and ASEAN, dampening regional confidence in the EU’s ability to champion the global free trade agenda over time.
On another front, the EU’s emphasis on values such as “fair trade”,[32] particularly in linking trade to democracy and other non-economic outcomes, has proven to be counterproductive and fraught with sensitivities.[33] The inherent misalignment regarding democracy is a persistent point of contention due to the diverse governance system in Southeast Asia,[34] leading ASEAN countries to consistently resist European democracy and human rights policies.[35] While it should be noted that Brussels has tamped down its proselytizing on “values”, it still holds numerous criticisms and resolutions against all ASEAN countries, including Singapore (see Annex A). Cognisant of this, the EU has struggled to prevent bilateral issues from complicating inter-regional cooperation.[36]
The increasing divergence between the worldviews of ASEAN and the EU is further exemplified by their differing responses to the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict. On the former, the EU has taken a firm stance against Russia’s aggression while ASEAN’s reaction has been largely ambivalent, with only Singapore imposing financial sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.[37] Interestingly, the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey[38] highlights that economic concerns, such as the increase in energy and food prices, are prioritised by the majority in the region (68.4%). This emphasis underscores the region’s focus on immediate economic challenges over broader values such as the erosion of trust in a rules-based order and the violation of national sovereignty (14.5%).
On the Israel-Hamas conflict, there is a convergence of opinion between the EU and ASEAN on humanitarian grounds, with both parties agreeing that Israel should not be allowed to cut off humanitarian aid from the Gaza strip. Beyond this singular intersection however, opinions between the two regions diverge significantly. For the EU, the predominant position is to condemn the attacks on Israeli civilians on 7 October as “unjustifiable and inexcusable”.[39] By contrast, ASEAN member states have had a plethora of different responses to the conflict,[40] which is reflected in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Statement.[41] While the position of some ASEAN member states, like the Philippines, may align more closely with that of the EU, others such as Malaysia and Indonesia have instead shown solidarity with the Palestinians.[42]
A UNION DIVIDED AND WEAK
Apart from trade tensions and diverging values, Southeast Asian respondents have been consistently concerned regarding the EU’s potential to be distracted by internal affairs and its perceived lack of capacity or political will to engage globally. These concerns were the two most cited reasons in the State of Southeast Survey between 2020 and 2024 for respondents to distrust Brussels (see Table 2).
Table 2: Proportion of Southeast Asian responses to the question “Why do you distrust the EU?”
| Response to “Why do you distrust the EU?” (%) | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
| The EU does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership | 33.70 | 25.90 | 26.70 | 33.40 | 28.20 |
| My country’s political culture and worldview are incompatible with The EU’s | 16.60 | 9.50 | 12.40 | 9.20 | 16.50 |
| I am concerned that The EU is distracted with its internal affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues | 35.40 | 38.70 | 30.10 | 29.40 | 28.70 |
| The EU’s stance on environment, human rights, and climate change could be used to threaten my country’s interests and sovereignty | 3.50 | 15.10 | 17.70 | 14.50 | 11.10 |
| I do not consider The EU a reliable power | 10.80 | 10.80 | 13.10 | 13.50 | 15.50 |
Source: State of Southeast Asia Surveys[43]
Indeed, realistic concerns persist regarding the EU’s ability to foster solidarity amongst its member states. Contentious disagreements within the EU over funding support to Kyiv underscores this challenge[44] Furthermore, domestic issues such as mounting dissatisfaction over the rising cost of living, agricultural protests sparked by EU’s regulations,[45] the European debt crisis and bailout negotiations[46] as well as the complexities of the EU’s policy towards Israel and Palestine[47] are just some examples of internal tensions.
Externally, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the escalating violence in the Middle East are expected to strain the EU’s policymaking capabilities and divert resources from its Indo-Pacific ambitions.[48] Furthermore, the EU’s overreliance on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for its defence raises questions about its commitment to security cooperation with Southeast Asia. With the possibility of a second Donald Trump US presidency on the cards following the upcoming US Presidential elections, EU members may face increased pressure to bolster their defence spending,[49] further complicating the EU’s strategic posture.
Indeed, despite its lofty ambitions to play a security role in the Indo-Pacific, the EU’s security endeavours have unfolded in a piecemeal manner that is primarily led by larger member states, with Germany and France accounting for 79% of all arms transfers from EU countries to the region between 2019 and 2023 (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Breakdown of Arms Transfers to Southeast Asia by EU member states respectively (2019-2023
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database[50]
Similarly, despite its pledges to increase its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, France remains the main driver of the EU’s naval efforts (see Figure 8). In 2023 alone, France led the EU by participating in 8 military exercises with Southeast Asian countries. However, it continues to trail middle powers in the region which have a more established naval presence, such as Australia and the United Kingdom (UK).
Figure 8: Number of Regional Military Exercises observed or participated in among external powers in 2023
Source: Data compiled by authors
STRENGTHENING EU’S RELEVANCE IN THE REGION
While the EU may face challenges in realising its security ambitions, it still holds some sway in the region and may yet find its sweet spot. Its steadfast role as a normative and economic partner has fostered trust among Southeast Asian states.
The EU has room for improvement if it wishes to make good on its Indo-Pacific strategy. Squaring away its trade disputes with countries in Southeast Asia is a tricky fruit for the EU to pick. However, the EU can recalibrate its balancing of principles and pragmatism by recognising the practical limitations that Southeast Asian countries have in complying with its regulations. Instead of expecting ASEAN to achieve EU trade standards outright, the EU can facilitate economic developments across the region through capacity-building programmes aimed at harmonising regulatory standards within ASEAN.
Rather than focusing on hard security, a domain better suited to its most capable member states,[51] the EU can focus its strengths on areas of non-traditional security. These include cybersecurity, food security, combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, climate change mitigation, sustainable development, and the regulation of emerging technologies such as AI governance and data protection.
In sum, the EU has been a steadfast partner for Southeast Asian countries and has fared well as a normative and economic power in the region. By working on its trade relations, prioritising pragmatism and focusing on areas of strength, the EU can remain a relevant and reliable middle power in Southeast Asia.
Annex A
Summary of Relations between ASEAN Member States – EU
| AMS | Key Agreements Signed with EU | Key Agreements in Progress | Bilateral Issues with the EU |
| ASEAN | EU-ASEAN Strrategic Partnership EU-ASEAN Plan of Action 2018-2022 EU-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement EU-ASEAN Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement | EU-ASEAN FTA | |
| Brunei | EU-Brunei Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) | HUMAN RIGHTS: EU Parliament condemned the entry into force of the Sharia Penal code due to human rights concerns | |
| Cambodia | EU-Cambodia 1977 Cooperation Agreement | HUMAN RIGHTS: EU Commission withdrew part of tariff preferences under Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme due to human rights issues. HUMAN RIGHTS: EU Parliament adopts resolution regarding political persecution and human rights violations | |
| Indonesia | EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement | BIOFUELS: Dispute over palm oil HUMAN RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY: EU Parliament “expressed concern” over proposed Indonesian criminal code | |
| Laos | EU-Laos 1997 Cooperation Agreement Everything But Arms (EBA) Trade Initiative [Not agreement] | HUMAN RIGHTS: EU notes human rights concerns on displaced people from dam construction, sexual exploitation of children HUMAN RIGHTS: EU “raised concern” about lack of progress on human rights issues | |
| Malaysia | EU-Malaysia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) | EU-Malaysia FTA | BIOFUELS: EU Commission launched the Renewable Energy Directive which led to disputes about biofuels such as palm oil HUMAN RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY: EU Parliament has condemned the use of the death penalty, the lack of LGBTQ Rights and no freedom of speech |
| Myanmar | Everything But Arms (EBA) Trade Initiative [Not agreement] | DEMOCRACY: Sanctions and condemnations due to military coup HUMAN RIGHTS: Condemnations due to Rohingya Crisis | |
| Philippines | EU-Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) Agreement on finding a “peaceful and inclusive solution” to SCS GSP+ trade preferences scheme | EU-Philippines FTA | HUMAN RIGHTS: The Philippines “reminded” to comply with Human Rights standards as part of its commitment to the GSP+ Agreement HUMAN RIGHTS: Threatened to withdraw temporarily GSP+ Preferences (but no action yet) HUMAN RIGHTS: Strongly condemned extrajudicial killings and human rights violations in Duterte’s war on drugs |
| Singapore | EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EUSPCA) EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (EUSIPA) EU-Singapore Digital Partnership (EUSDP) | HUMAN RIGHTS: EU Parliament calls for the abolition of the death penalty | |
| Thailand | EU-Thailand 1980 Framework Agreement EU-Thailand Partnership and Cooperation Agreement | EU-Thailand FTA | HUMAN RIGHTS: EU Parliament adopted “several resolutions” condemning Human Rights and migrant/labour rights violations |
| Vietnam | EU-Vietnam Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement EU-Vietnam Framework Participation Agreement EU-Vietnam Sustainable Energy Transition Programme (SETP) | HUMAN RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY: EU Parliament adopted a resolution on Vietnam for unlawful arrest of human rights activists and journalists |
Source: European Parliament Fact Sheets on the European Union: Southeast Asia[52]
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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“Understanding Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Choices Amid Sino-US Rivalry” by Hoang Thi Ha
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers.
• Vietnam’s foreign policy adopts the paradigm of “cooperation” and “struggle” in its relations with major powers, and defines “national security” as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security.
• Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an “object of struggle” on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam’s partner in the South China Sea but an “object of struggle” when it comes to regime security.
• The Vietnamese public’s favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.
• A friendly relationship with China is essential for Vietnam’s favourable external environment, warranting Hanoi’s accommodation and deference to Beijing on non-critical issues. However, it has meticulously avoided dependencies and vulnerabilities to China through diversifying economic ties and engaging in “soft balancing” with other powers and through ASEAN. Party-to-party links provide China with powerful access to Vietnamese leaders, but the US is catching up by giving assurances to respect Vietnam’s political system, and strengthening “party diplomacy” with the CPV.
• In its relationship with the US, Vietnam prioritizes economic ties, addressing war legacy issues, leveraging US support to build capacities in traditional and non-traditional security, and avoiding geopolitical posturing that could provoke China.
• Vietnam-US relations are characterized by pragmatism, with both sides prioritizing shared geopolitical and economic interests over ideological differences. The sustainability of this approach is uncertain, given the CPV’s tightening of domestic control and the “securitization of the Vietnamese state” in the anti-corruption campaign.
• Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.
Trends in Southeast Asia 2024/16, June 2024