2021/59 “Japan Passes China in the Sprint to Win Cambodian Hearts and Minds” by Luo Jing Jing and Kheang Un
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- When the Cold War ended, Japan actively engaged Cambodia through provision of development aid and in subsequent years through promotion of trade and investment.
- Since 2010, Japan’s foreign policy toward Cambodia includes a new geopolitical dimension of balancing China’s influence in Cambodia.
- Strategies include non-interference in Cambodia’s domestic affairs and providing development assistance that aligns with the Cambodian government’s development plan, focusing on infrastructure, human capital development, and agriculture.
- Tokyo has further promoted its soft power through emphasizing the quality and sustainability of this development assistance, including Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. It has been relatively successful given the Cambodian population’s mixed perceptions toward China’s engagement in Cambodia.
- Cambodia values Japan’s balancing-China strategy, as it suits Cambodia’s foreign policy of diversification. Hedging with multiple world powers helps Cambodia prevent all its international relations eggs from being in one basket.
- While the Japan-China rivalry in the domains of diplomacy, economics and soft power remains manageable, Cambodia will benefit politically and economically from Japan’s balancing-China strategy.
* Luo Jing Jing is a doctoral candidate at the School of International Relations and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University, Fujian, China. Kheang Un is an Associate Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has actively engaged Cambodia in terms of development aid, trade and investment. Japan was Cambodia’s biggest donor until it was surpassed by China in 2007. By around 2007, the rising intensity of China’s engagement in Cambodia in terms of trade, investment and aid led Japan to recalculate its Cambodia strategy which shifted from mainly humanitarianism and economic interests to balancing China. This paper analyses Japan’s geopolitical balancing-China strategy in Cambodia and future ramifications of Japan-Cambodia relations.
JAPAN’S HUMANITARIANISM AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN CAMBODIA
In the lead up to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements (PPAs) in October 1991, Japan played a key role in the search for a comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian conflict and the reconstruction of Cambodia thereafter. First, Japan coordinated meetings between the warring Cambodian factions that added an impetus for the finalisation of the PPAs. Second, during the implementation process of the PPAs, Japan assigned its top diplomat—Mr. Yasushi Akashi—to serve as head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and contributed troops to the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Cambodia. They were the first Japanese soldiers to set foot on foreign soil since the end of World War II.[1] Third, following the implementation of the PPAs, Japan spearheaded the mobilisation of international resources for Cambodia’s reconstruction. In 1992, Japan successfully convened the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia in Tokyo which kick-started its multi-billion-dollar overseas development assistance (ODA) to Cambodia. The conference subsequently evolved into the Cambodian Consultative Group (CCG) that includes key Western donors and the World Bank, whose role is to mobilise and coordinate development assistance for Cambodia.[2] Japan was Cambodia’s largest donor until it was surpassed by China in 2007 (see Table 1). By 2019, Japan’s total accumulated assistance to Cambodia was US$2.9 billion,[3] focused on infrastructure development, education and training, agriculture, and healthcare.
Up until roughly 2010, as with its relations with Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, Japan’s close relations with Cambodia were to advance its economic interests through the promotion of trade and investment liberalisation, and consolidate Japan’s vertically integrated production chain network in Southeast Asia. This production chain network resulted from Japan’s response to the 1985 Plaza Accords in which the United States pressured Japan to appreciate its currency to reduce its trade surplus with America. To maintain its export competitiveness, Japan relocated its investments to Southeast Asia, mainly to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand where labour was cheap.[4] With the formation of the ASEAN Common Market (AEC), effective in 2015, as a single market and production base, ASEAN member states have become even more important to Japan’s economy, serving not only as a depository of Japanese investments but also a market for Japanese products. Moreover, being situated between two rapidly growing and modernising economic giants, India and China, the AEC has become an increasingly significant site for production that attracts increased foreign investment in manufacturing based on the region’s market segmentation and specialisation.[5]
Source: This table is adapted from Chansok Lak, “A Comparative Studies on Soft Power of Japan and China on Cambodia’s Foreign Policy,” Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan, 2019.
+To complement missing data in Lak’s presentation, the figure for Japan’s aid in 2011 including grant aid and other assistance is taken from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Cambodia,” at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000142541.pdf (accessed 10 March 2021).
JAPAN BALANCING CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA
Since the 2000s, as part of its going-out strategy, China has intensified its engagement with developing countries through aid, trade and investment. In Southeast Asia, nowhere is the intensity of China’s aid, trade, investment and security cooperation more evident than in Cambodia. The two countries upgraded their relations to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2010. Chinese aid to Cambodia increased from US$2.61million in 2000 to US$154.1 million in 2010 to US$420.56 million in 2020.[6] China’s bilateral trade with Cambodia has also increased exponentially from US$223.55 million in 2000, to US$1.44 billion in 2010, to US$9.43 billion in 2019;[7] and it is expected to increase further following the signing of the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement in 2020.[8] Sino-Cambodian military relations have also been close, as evidenced by ongoing Chinese military aid and training, and annual joint military exercises.[9]
The ever-closer relations between Cambodia and China have spurred concern from Japan as well as the United States. These countries are worried about the unchecked influence of China in a country, which has implications for the balance of power in the region. In light of these developments, Japan has devised multi-pronged strategies to promote closer ties with Cambodia, with an eye towards countering China’s influence. Bilaterally, Japan has continued to provide Cambodia with financial and technical assistance for education and training, healthcare, agriculture and infrastructure development. Japan’s key infrastructure development assistance to Cambodia includes three major bridges and over 1,000 kilometers of roads.[10] Cambodia also benefits from Japan’s ASEAN connectivity projects in the form of trade-promoting corridors.[11]
Furthermore, in 2016 under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan launched its version of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) which centres on three pillars: the promotion and establishment of rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade; commitment to peace and stability; and the pursuit of economic prosperity through improving connectivity. With a financial commitment of US$100 billion for financing the construction of roads, bridges and ports in Asia, FOIP ensures that Beijing’s BRI is not the only game in town. FOIP further strengthens Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) with key emphasis on job creation, social and environmental impacts, and quality. As Axel Berkofsly states, such “deliberate focus on building ‘quality’ infrastructure can be seen as a direct attack on the perceived flaws of China-built projects.”[12] The authors’ field research suggests that in its earlier stage, the quality of Chinese-built infrastructure such as roads appeared to be compromised due to Cambodia’s poor governance and lack of oversight associated with Chinese companies’ system of multilayered sub-contracting.[13] However, efforts were subsequently made by both sides (Cambodia and China) to address the quality issue.
As mentioned earlier, until the 2000s, Southeast Asia has been regarded as the backyard for Japan’s investment, markets and natural resources. China’s rise and its outward-oriented foreign and economic policies have changed the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of Southeast and East Asia. Japan has had to contend with a new donor, investor and geopolitical rival. To counteract China, Japan has systematically and strategically promoted and revamped its investment and assistance strategies toward Cambodia and other ASEAN member states.[14] Among others, Japan’s key PQI-linked projects in Cambodia are the US$800 million sky-train in Phnom Penh and the US$244 million Sihanoukville port upgrade.[15] The latter project, in particular, is an illustration of Japan’s balancing-China strategy and Cambodia’s hedging strategy (more details below) given that Sihanoukville is the hub of China’s economic activities. In the words of Luo and Un, “the Chinese have literally taken over the city.”[16]
Japan’s investment in Cambodia reflects the country’s importance in regional production networks and supply chains. By 2019, Japan had 1,700 businesses in Cambodia. The total amount of Japanese investment in Cambodia between 1994-2019 was US$2.5 billion.[17] This amount is low compared to China’s total investment in Cambodia which amounted to US$6.1 billion between 2013-2018.[18] However, Japanese investment is different from Chinese investment in some aspects. While China’s investment is concentrated in labour-intensive industries like garment and footwear, Japanese investments are largely concentrated in the production of car parts and components, and electrical parts. Japan, like China, has also played an important role in the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs); one in Phnom Penh, and two in Poi Pet in Northwestern Cambodia. Japanese companies also invest in shopping malls to capture the growing consumption expenditure of Cambodia’s rising middle class.[19]
On a multilateral front, Japan has revamped the Japan-Mekong Initiative to counter China’s Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework (LMC) formed in 2015 following the inauguration of the BRI. The LMC’s scope is multi-dimensional, encompassing not only water management of the Mekong-Lancang but also other vital areas for inclusive and sustainable development including health, infrastructure, agriculture, trade and investment.[20] Despite China’s declaration of its action plan in the 2020 LMC Leaders Meeting for enhancing transparency and cooperation of water management of the Mekong to mitigate floods and droughts associated with China’s upstream water management, sustainable development of the Mekong remains a challenge for the other riparian states. The Japan-Mekong Initiative has focused on infrastructure development with special emphasis on the environment, sustainability, quality and inclusiveness.[21]
Japan appears to have experienced relative success in comparison to the United States and the European Union in terms of balancing China in Cambodia. Two factors have apparently contributed to Japan’s success. The first is that, unlike the United States and the European Union, but similar to China, Japan’s foreign policy is based on the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Such non-value-based foreign policy rooted in the “ODA Charter of Japan has essentially sought to realise economic development as a precondition of improving human security” including human rights. [22] Consequently, Japan has never attached conditionalities related to human rights and promotion of democracy to its ODA. For example, in 2017, Japan adopted divergent policies from the European Union and the United States in response to the Cambodian government’s actions to stifle the opposition by dissolving the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) on the grounds that the party colluded with the United States to organise a “color revolution” to overthrow the Cambodian government. While the European Union and the United States imposed a variety of sanctions against Cambodia and its leaders, Japan maintained its relations with Cambodia as usual, prompting human rights organisations to accuse Japan of “acting like China.”[23]
The second factor that accounts for Japan’s relative success is that its assistance is in line with the Cambodian government’s strategic development plans that focus on four key areas: development of social and economic infrastructure; improvement of basic social services (health and medical care); promotion of agriculture and rural development; and human resource development.[24] Conversely, EU and US assistance is directed more at promoting democracy and human rights. Moreover, while the EU and the United States channel their assistance to civil society organisations, Japan directs its development assistance to the Cambodian government. As a result, Japan’s strategy of balancing China in Cambodia suits Cambodia’s foreign policy of diversification through hedging with multiple world powers. As a state highly dependent on foreign aid and preferential trade access, Cambodia’s optimal foreign policy option is to avoid placing all its eggs in one basket. The statement by Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation clearly reflects Cambodia’s foreign policy of diversification:
“Cambodia also welcomes and supports all initiatives that promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region, and that are mutually beneficial and complementary. It is, therefore, crucial and necessary to build synergy and complementary among flagship regional initiatives such as the “Belt and Road”, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, and other policies of major regional countries toward Southeast Asia, as well as various mechanisms under the Mekong sub-regional cooperation.”[25]
Furthermore, the authors’ fieldwork suggests that Japan’s soft power in Cambodia is stronger than that of China’s. Japan’s higher soft power derives from three factors: Japan’s long reputation for the quality of its products; its quality infrastructure development and sustainable economic investment; and its nationals’ good behaviour. In contrast, Cambodians are skeptical of the quality and sustainability of Chinese economic investment and infrastructure development in Cambodia. Such skepticism increased following the Chinese investment bubble bust, and the disorder and crimes involving Chinese nationals in the coastal city of Sihanoukville.[26] On Cambodians’ perception of the two countries, a Cambodian scholar has remarked that while China commands “a stronger government-to-government relation with Cambodia” than Japan does, the latter commands “more popularity among Cambodians.”[27]
JAPAN’S EXPECTATIONS AND CAMBODIA’S RESPONSES
Japan’s overarching strategy is to “pull Cambodia away from China’s enormous influence” through increased Japanese development assistance, trade and investment.[28] Although Cambodia is not economically significant in Southeast Asia, it possesses geopolitical significance. A Chinese observer based in Cambodia notes that in comparative terms “Cambodia is so important to China due to ASEAN’s consensus decision making.” [29] The division among ASEAN members over how to address overlapping claims in the South China Sea between China and some ASEAN member-states grants Cambodia geopolitical significance. The general belief among China’s rivals, including Japan, is that the inability of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to issue its usual joint communique in 2012 and 2016 resulted from China’s influence over the ASEAN agenda through its pressure on Cambodia and Laos.[30] While this may be true to some extent, the more important reality is that due to limited intra-ASEAN economic assistance, Chinese financial assistance is critical not only for Cambodian economic development but also for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party legitimacy.[31] In this regard, there is room for other regional players to play a role.
Japan can continue to proactively engage Cambodia to not only strengthen Japan-Cambodia ties but also to enhance its ties with ASEAN as a whole. Reducing Cambodia’s reliance on China’s largesse (via Japan providing a viable alternative) means that Beijing’s influence on Phnom Penh can be kept in check. Furthermore, to counteract China in the South China Sea, Japan and its key allies need support from ASEAN and its individual members. Because of Cambodia’s foreign policy diversification strategy, the former was the first country from Southeast Asia to express support for the Japan-proposed FOIP.[32] In 2017, Cambodia’s support for Japan’s FOIP resulted in military cooperation with Cambodia, including navy ship visits and provision of military assistance to Cambodia’s peacekeeping operation.
CONCLUSION
In terms of soft power, Japan has won the “hearts and minds” of the Cambodian public who admire the quality of Japanese-funded infrastructure, the behaviour of Japanese tourists and investors, and the benefits of Japanese investment. Conversely, China’s soft power appears to have landed in a hard place in Cambodia. This is due in large part to the negative impact of online gambling and its associated negative impacts in Sihanoukville, the improper conduct of Chinese in Cambodia, and the poor-quality infrastructure projects in the initial phase of Chinese investment. However, China has closer government-to-government relations with Cambodia than Japan does. Such a relationship is based on shared common political norms, and China’s “unwavering commitment” to promote economic development and support political stability and peace in Cambodia.[33] At present, China’s engagement is necessary but not sufficient for Cambodia to realise its goal of becoming a middle-income country by 2030.
In the final analysis, Cambodia welcomes Japan’s strategy of counter-balancing China, for it offers Cambodia much-needed development assistance, investment and trade. As long as Sino-Japanese rivalry is kept manageable, Cambodia can afford to remain neutral. Such a position is premised on the assumption that the Sino-Japanese rivalry does not deteriorate into open conflict. If such a conflict ensues, Cambodia will be hard-pressed to choose between China and Japan. Although imaginable, such open conflict remains remote, a situation that permits Cambodia to benefit politically and economically from Japan’s balancing-China strategy.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/59, 30 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japanese Participation in UN Peacekeeping: Cambodia,” athttps://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/02_2.html (accessed 21 September 2020).
[2] Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. No. 1. Oxford University Press, USA, 1995,p. 72.
[3] Chan Samarith Samath, “Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Strategy in a Changing Regional Security Architecture,” AVI Perspective, No. 3, 2020, at https://asianvision.org/archives/publications/avi-perspective-issue-2020-no-03 (accessed December 3, 2020).
[4] Stephen Thomsen, “Southeast Asia: The Role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in Development,” OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 1999, at https://search.oecd.org/countries/thailand/WP-1999_1.pdf (accessed September 21, 2020; Francois Nicholas, “Catching Up or Staying Ahead: Japanese Investment in the Mekong Region and the China Factor,” Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute of International Relations, May 2018, at https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nicolas_japanese_investment_mekong_region_2018.pdf (accessed September 23, 2020).
[5] See Siow Yue Chia, “The ASEAN economic community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects.” In A World Trade Organization for the 21st Century. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014.
[6] Cambodian rehabilitation and development board council for the development of Cambodia: the Cambodia ODA database, at http://odacambodia.com/projectlist/project_list_readonly.asp.
[7] 中国国家统计局：中国统计年鉴2001，2011和2019. (National Bureau of Statistics of China: China Statistical Yearbook 2001, 2011 and 2019.)
[8] Authors’ interviews with representatives of Chinese and Cambodian business associations and entrepreneurs, Phnom Penh, November-December, 2020.
[9] For example, China’s military assistance to Cambodia was over US$2 million in 1997; US$195 million in 2013; over US$100 million in 2018 and US$84 million in 2019. Please see Reuters, China Pledges over $100 Million Military Aid to Cambodia,” 19 June 2018, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-china/china-pledges-over-100-million-military-aid-to-cambodia-idUSKBN1JF0KQ (accessed 10 March 2021); Prashanth Parameswaran, “China Pledges New Military Aid to Cambodia,” 10 November 2015, at https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/china-pledges-new-military-aid-to-cambodia (accessed 10 March 2021); and Narim Khoun, “China Grants $84 million for RCAF’s Development,” 22 October 2019, at https://www.khmertimeskh.com/653189/china-grants-84-million-for-rcafs-development (accessed 10 March 2021).
[10] The key main bridges are Nihon Bridge (rebuilt in 1994), crossing the Basac River in Phnom Penh; Kizuma Bridge (completed in 2001), crossing the Mekong in Kampong Cham province; and Tsubasa Bridge (completed in 2015) crossing the Mekong River in Svay Rieng Province. These infrastructure projects were constructed at different times after Japan established diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1993.
[11] These economic corridors are the East-West Economic Corridor, North-South Economic Corridor and Southern Economic Corridor. For further information please see, Han-Peter Brunner, “What is Economic Corridor Development and What Can Its Achieve in Asia’s Subregions,” Asian Development Bank, Manila, the Philippines, 2013, at https://www.adb.org/publications/economic-corridor-development-and-what-it-can-achieve-in-asia-subregions (accessed 10 March 2021).
[12] Axel Berkofsky, “Tokyo’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: Quality Infrastructure and Defence to the Fore,” ELCANO Royal Institute, 14 March 2019, at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/asia-pacifico/ari34-2019-berkofsky-tokyos-free-and-open-indo-pacific-quality-infrastructure-defence-fore (accessed 23 September 2020).
[13] Authors’ interviews with representatives of Chinese state-owned enterprises, Phnom Penh, November 2020.
[14] Berkofsky, “Tokyo’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
[15] May Kunmakara and Khoun Narim, “PM Asks Japan to Invest $800m in Skytain,” The Khmer Times, 8 August 2019, at https://www.khmertimeskh.com/77056/pm-asks-japan-invest-800m-skytrain/ (accessed 3 October 2020).
[16] Jing Jing Luo and Kheang Un, “Cambodia: Hard Landing for China’s Soft Power?” ISEAS Perspective, No. 111, 2020.
[17] Sorn Sarath, “Hun Sen Delivers Investor Speech in Japan,” The Phnom Penh Post, 30 May 2019, at https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/hun-sen-delivers-investor-speech-japan (accessed 4 October 2020).
[18] For further discussion see Pesei Hin, “China Still No1 Source of FDI,” The Phnom Penh Post, 23 September 2019, at https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/china-still-no1-source-fdi (accessed 10 March 2021), and Council for the Development of Cambodia, “FDI Trend,” at http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/why-invest-in-cambodia/investment-enviroment/fdi-trend.html (accessed 10 March 2021).
[19] Nicola Mocci, “History of Japanese Cooperation in Cambodia beyond Realist and Idealist Approach.” Asia Maior, at https://www.asiamaior.org/the-journal/history-of-japanese-cooperation-in-cambodia-beyond-realist-and-idealist-approaches.html (accessed 11 September 2020).
[20] Speech by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the third Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, 25 August 2020, At http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyxw_5/t1808972.htm.
[21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “The Mekong-Japan Initiative for SDGs toward 2030,” 4 November, 2019, at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000535957.pdf (accessed 10 March 2021).
[22] Nicola Mocci, “History of Japanese Cooperation in Cambodia.”
[23] Human Rights Watch, “Japan Should Stop Acting Like China in Cambodia,” 22 March 2019, at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/22/japan-should-stop-acting-china-cambodia (accessed 7 December 2020).
[24] Sim Onn Leang, “Cambodia-Japan Relations: Bilateral Cooperation and the Changing Dynamics of Triangular Affairs.”
[25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Cambodia, “Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Direction,” at https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/foreign-policy-2 (accessed 10 March 2021).
[26] Authors’ fieldnotes, November-December, 2020.
[27] Kin Phea, interview with authors, 27 November 2020.
[28] Kin Phea, Director of International Relations Institute, Royal Academy of Cambodia, interview with authors, 27 November 2020. [29] Interview with authors, Phnom Penh, 11 November 2020.
[30] Manuel Mogoto, Michael Martina, and Ben Blanchard, “ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia Blocks Statement,” Reuter, 25 July 2016, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean-idUSKCN1050F6.
[31] Kheang Un, “Cambodia in 2011: A Thin Veneer of Change.” Asian Survey 52, no. 1 (2012): 202-209.
[32] Sok Siphana, “Reflections on ASEAN-Japan Partnership,” AVI Policy Brief, Issue 2020, No. 16, 28 September 2020, at https://asianvision.org/archives/publications/avi-policy-brief-issue-2020-no-16-reflections-on-asean-japan-partnership (accessed 2 January 2021).
[33] Kin Phea, interview with authors, 27 November 2020.
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2021/58 “Vaccines and Vaccinations in Southeast Asia’s Fight against Covid-19” by Kevin S.Y. Tan and Grace Lim
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Vaccines are now a vital component for all countries to turn the tide in the Covid-19 pandemic.
- Partly due to vaccine nationalism, questions and issues surround the reliable supply of vaccines to Southeast Asia and the eventual normalisation of travel.
- Vaccine diplomacy by growing vaccine powers such as China help address supply gaps in Southeast Asia, but come at the cost of increased dependency.
- Southeast Asian states, through the support of ASEAN, need to enable multilateral recognition of vaccinations to restore travel and to work towards vaccine independence to avoid potential geopolitical vulnerability.
*Kevin S.Y. Tan is Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Adjunct Faculty at the School of Global Studies, Thammasat University. Grace Lim is a final year economics and management major at the University of London.
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of 2021, there has been a growing sense of hope that some parts of the world may have turned the corner in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. Such optimism is largely attributed to the arrival of Covid-19 vaccines playing a pivotal role in reducing infections and deaths. The progress made by vaccines is certainly encouraging but questions remain. Firstly, this pertains to issues of availability, distribution and efficacy regarding the different vaccines purchased and used by various countries.
Secondly, with the expected lowering of infections,[1] there have been discussions on the use of so-called ‘vaccine passports’[2] in addition to earlier efforts on the use of ‘reciprocal green lines’ or ‘travel bubbles’ between countries. How will they be implemented? Finally, the use of vaccines also appears to herald new developments in geopolitical relations in the wake of what several observers have labelled ‘vaccine diplomacy’.[3] Will a corresponding vaccine dependency result in new geopolitical alignments? Examining these questions and issues, we argue for the importance of vaccine independence for countries in Southeast Asia.
WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN AND FROM WHERE?
The first country in Southeast Asia to begin administering Covid-19 vaccines to its citizens and residents was Singapore. The official rollout of the island-state’s vaccination programme began on 30 December 2020,[4] after the country received an undisclosed number of doses from Pfizer a few days prior. Indonesia followed on 13 January 2021,[5] initially employing a Chinese vaccine produced by Sinovac Life Sciences based in Beijing. Since then, Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam have received delivery of vaccines from a combination of sources in various stages.
By mid-April 2021, therefore, all Southeast Asian countries, have begun nationwide vaccination programmes, with Timor Leste being the final country in the region receiving vaccines.[6] This bodes well for a recovery process for the region provided the momentum is maintained. A key concern has been the varying levels of access to vaccines among countries. This follows earlier observations from the start of the year, where high-income countries with only 16% of the world’s population had access to 60% of the vaccine doses.[7] In addition, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has reported that the rate of vaccinations correlates with relative national wealth,[8] and that more than 85 poor countries will not have widespread access to coronavirus vaccines before 2023. This same report further predicted that most of Southeast Asia would not achieve widespread coverage in vaccinations till late 2022.
Hence, while there have been deliveries of Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna and Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines in recent months to various countries in Southeast Asia, their numbers have not been particularly high compared to the rate at which the same vaccines have been pre-ordered, supplied and distributed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Despite the efforts of COVAX and GAVI, it appears that supplies of vaccines from pharmaceuticals based in the West have not been ideal. This has been increasingly blamed on ‘vaccine nationalism’[9] where the supply of vaccines has been subjected to unequal prioritization due to the competing interests of different countries.
While agreements or pre-orders may be made for vaccines, their eventual arrival and subsequent dissemination is a separate matter. This imbalance ultimately affects the rate of vaccinations for different countries, which in turn will impact the overall global fight against the pandemic. In order to overcome challenges in supply, a number of Southeast Asia countries have relied on alternate sources of vaccines, with the greatest support coming from China’s Sinovac Life Sciences, CanSino Biologics and Sinopharm.[10]
Consequently, the current Covid-19 vaccine landscape has become a complex one, as more options have emerged, leading to comparisons. And while the prevailing medical view[11] is understandably practical in its evaluation of Covid-19 vaccines, questions surrounding the efficacy levels of various vaccines are inevitable. This is because it is apparent that not all vaccines are equal.[12] In the case of the Chinese-made Coronavac vaccine from Sinovac, inconsistent test results regarding its efficacy, ranging from 50.4 percent to 83.5 percent,[13] have raised concerns. These concerns have also been further heightened by occasional reports of adverse or even fatal effects on certain individuals.[14] Similarly, growing safety concerns over blood clotting allegedly linked to the Oxford-AstraZeneca[15] and Johnson & Johnson[16] vaccines have emerged.
The low level of public trust in vaccines in various societies may need to be addressed since these contribute to vaccination hesitancy and even conspiracy theories[17] surrounding them. A recent survey in the Philippines revealed that 84 percent[18] of respondents were uncertain of the safety of Covid-19 vaccines in general. This was similarly reflected in Malaysia where up to 83 percent[19] of respondents expressed uncertainty towards vaccines, particularly those from China or Russia. Such public uncertainty is a potential obstacle to the intended objective of vaccination programmes, which is to enable herd immunity and ultimately reduce Covid-19 into something far less deadly. Southeast Asia, along with the rest of Asia, still has a long way to go before each country manages to vaccinate at least 60 percent of its population[20]. Delays in vaccination campaigns will only further place many people at risk.
REVIVING INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
The rate at which a population can be vaccinated is also closely related to the hope of restoring large-scale population flows between countries. As a result, the term ‘vaccine passports’ has generated interest among policymakers. Nevertheless, governments should avoid presuming that the current pandemic will end soon,[21] especially when one considers the growing number of Covid-19 mutations[22] that have emerged from countries such as the United Kingdom, South Africa, Brazil and the Philippines.[23] This has unfortunately contributed to a resurgence in infection rates throughout many parts of Asia,[24] leaving no room for complacency. The matter is again complicated by inconclusive views of whether a vaccinated person can still infect others, along with the possibility of false-negative[25] test results if a person is tested too early. This follows reports revealing that previously vaccinated persons can still be infected,[26] although the severity of symptoms is reduced.
More considerations regarding vaccine passports emerge when we recall the varied nature of Covid-19 vaccines. Can a unified global vaccine passport materialise? Will every vaccinated person be eligible for such a passport no matter what vaccine he or she was given? And who or which organisation will have the final say over the legitimacy of vaccine passports? How is the relationship of vaccines to Covid-19 variants to be handled? How will travel restrictions apply to persons who are unable to receive the vaccine for safety and medical reasons? Finally, will the use of the vaccine passport not discriminate against persons who consciously object to being vaccinated?
These considerations evoke an age-old conundrum between the interests of the individual and that of the public. Hence, the eventual implementation of vaccine passports will need to strike a balance between enabling another ‘new normal’ for cross-border travel and an equitable system that does not create new victims among those who do not qualify for such passports. Nevertheless, what is apparent is that the nature of international travel will lead to greater bio-policing between and within nations. The subsequent impact this will have on the future of migration and other population flows remain uncertain.
THE RISE OF VACCINE DIPLOMACY
Finally, vaccine diplomacy being practised by countries such as China[27] and India[28] has become increasingly obvious. Both have actively supplied many poorer nations around the world with much-needed vaccines, particularly expanding China’s presence beyond Asia to Africa, South America and Middle East.[29] This has also been mirrored in Southeast Asia, where China and India, and even Russia, have been playing a supportive role in vaccination campaigns. Apart from sales, the Chinese have also proactively donated vaccines to Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines.[30] Not to be outdone, India has donated 1.5 million vaccines to Myanmar[31] as part of what they have dubbed ‘Vaccine Friendship’. In addition, there have been similar advances from Russia with its offer to share knowledge of their Sputnik-5 vaccine with Malaysia.[32]
Given such circumstances, the current pandemic will likely affect how Southeast Asian countries evaluate their relationship with these ascending ‘vaccine powers’. A vaccine-dependent relationship between Southeast Asia and China, India or Russia may emerge and become a significant factor in influencing geopolitical relations in the region, at least during the pandemic. However, some have suggested that such a possibility is at best limited due to regional wariness towards, for example, current Chinese overtures, which have been the most apparent. But it is also important to note that only one country in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, has explicitly rejected Chinese vaccines[33]. On the other hand, up to seven Southeast Asian countries are actively employing them in their respective vaccination efforts.[34]
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Needless to say, the pandemic has negatively affected Southeast Asia in many ways. Poverty levels have risen;[35] domestic violence has increased;[36] the number of suicides has grown;[37] families remain separated;[38] and many lives have been tragically lost. Lockdowns and border closures have also been devastating for the poor,[39] as recent reports[40] show that the poor are far more likely to catch Covid-19 and die from it partly due to less-than-ideal living conditions while suffering from economic constraints. This is one reason why collaborative policies towards developing a vaccine passport to facilitate travel and employment possibilities should be taken seriously, although never hastily.
As the vaccines do their work, the next step would be to re-establish international travel, with the use of a tiered and nuanced approach to the processing of travellers and migrants within the region. On top of already established protocols such as ‘safe corridors’, bilateral and multilateral agreements on the type of vaccine certificates acceptable to travel between borders are now needed. This could be followed by the development of a unified vaccine passport recognition database within Southeast Asia, so that regional travel can be gradually resumed as efficiently as possible without compromising safety. The final stage would be to establish phased quarantine measures over time, such as recent efforts by Thailand[41] in its plan to fully re-open its borders by the start of 2022.
Concurrently, while travel with vaccine passports sans quarantine may be established for persons who have been inoculated, persons who either reject vaccines or are unable to receive them due to safety reasons should not be penalised for either their personal choice or medical condition. One reasonable way to enable travel for non-vaccinated persons is that they can only travel to countries in the region that eventually attain sufficient herd immunity through ongoing vaccinations. This can be supplemented with mandatory swab tests as suggested in the recently proposed ‘Singapore-Batam-Bintan travel corridor’.[42] Additionally, it is also important for public policies regarding the deterrence and control of infections to ultimately defer to medical and scientific experts in relevant fields. Hence, the wearing of face masks may become an indelible but necessary feature of public life, at least for the near future, as they have proven to be effective protection.
Despite ongoing efforts by countries like Vietnam[43] and Thailand,[44] no single country in Southeast Asia, to date, has been able to successfully produce a ‘home-made’ vaccine that can rival anything either being distributed by vaccine powers from the global north, or alternate vaccine sources such as India, China or Russia. This is explicable as vaccine research and production often requires vast economic resources, scientific expertise, and partnerships. But so long as the status quo remains, each of the countries in Southeast Asia will remain dependent on vaccine power nations for current and future pandemics. In terms of policy, therefore, it is important for Southeast Asia to consider a more concrete and united approach in combating the current pandemic, or even future ones, through the establishment of a combined vaccine production protocol to benefit the region as a whole.[45] This can only emerge if we heed recent calls to work towards ‘vaccine multilateralism’, as raised by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong during the 37th ASEAN Summit in November 2020.[46] Politically, this will limit vaccine dependencies on external powers that may lead to the creation of a ‘medical suzerainty’ of sorts based on unequal access to vaccines.
Southeast Asia has made some headway in its collective response towards Covid-19 for prevention and detection, and the next step for the region to take is to progress towards vaccine independence. And because there will always be non-vaccinated persons, collective medical efforts led by ASEAN should also begin to examine other treatment options in the fight against Covid-19 beyond the use of vaccines. This can be established as part of a larger regional public health organisation, supported by ASEAN. This new body can co-ordinate the sharing of regional public health information, provide public education on pandemic response practices and also work towards a regional network employing improved contact-tracing technology. One key reason for this is that contact tracing technologies in Southeast Asia have not been fully developed and are limited within each respective country. Learning from the relative successes of Vietnam and Singapore, other Southeast Asian countries that have significantly struggled – such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia that have experienced at least three waves of infections – could further refine their contact tracing capabilities to ensure far swifter containment of infections in the future.
The hard lessons from this pandemic highlight the importance of regional collaboration in the face of an enemy that is literally invisible. Although it is tempting for countries in Southeast Asia to gaze inwards and defend their own nationalistic interests in times of crisis, lessons learned in coping with climate change or even specifically the regional haze problem, suggest that it is wiser to do otherwise. The fight against Covid-19 can only be won in collaboration, not in discordance.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/58, 29 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] “What is Herd Immunity and How Can We Achieve It With COVID-19?” – https://www.jhsph.edu/covid-19/articles/achieving-herd-immunity-with-covid19.html. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 10 April, 2020
[2] “‘Vaccine passports’: Will I need one for going out, work and travel?” – https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-55718553 . BBC News, 27 February 2021
[3] “Is Sinovac’s early shipment to Singapore ‘unusual’ or just part of China’s vaccine diplomacy?” – https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3123163/sinovacs-early-shipment-singapore-unusual-or-just-part. South China Morning Post, 25 February 2021
[4] “Covid-19 vaccination in Singapore to begin on Dec 30, starting with healthcare workers – https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/covid-19-vaccination-singapore-begin-dec-30-starting-healthcare-workers. The Straits Times, 27 December 2020
[5] “Indonesia Starts Mass COVID Vaccinations Over Vast Territory” – https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/indonesia-starts-mass-covid-vaccinations-over-vast-territory. The Diplomat, 14 January 2021
[6] “COVAX vaccine roll-out Timor Leste” – https://www.gavi.org/covax-vaccine-roll-out/timor-leste. GAVI -The Vaccine Alliance, 5 April 2021
[7] “Vaccine nationalism: Rich nations must also care for the poor” – https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vaccine-nationalism-rich-nations-must-also-care-poor. The Interpreter, 10 February 2021
[8] “More than 85 poor countries will not have widespread access to coronavirus vaccines before 2023” – https://www.eiu.com/n/85-poor-countries-will-not-have-access-to-coronavirus-vaccines. Economist Intelligence Unit, 27 January 2021
[9] “The Observer view on the dangers of vaccine nationalism” – https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/21/the-observer-view-on-the-dangers-of-vaccine-nationalism. The Guardian, 21 March 2021
[10] “Is China’s COVID-19 Diplomacy Working in Southeast Asia?” – https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/is-chinas-covid-19-diplomacy-working-in-southeast-asia. The Diplomat, 20 February 2021
[11] “Does It Matter Which COVID-19 Vaccine You Get?” – https://www.webmd.com/coronavirus-in-context/video/vaccines-which-one. WebMD, 29 January 2021
[12] “Five Pressing Questions About COVID-19 Vaccines Answered” – https://www.ebsco.com/blogs/health-notes/five-pressing-questions-about-covid-19-vaccines-answered. EBSCO Health Notes, 23 February 2021
[13] “Turkish study revises down Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine efficacy to 83.5%” – https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-turkey-sinovac-int-idUSKBN2AV18P. Reuters, 3 March 2021
[14] “Covid-19: Two in critical condition and two more deaths within days of Sinovac jab – Health Dep’t to investigate if vaccine link” – https://hongkongfp.com/2021/03/08/covid-19-two-in-critical-condition-and-another-death-within-days-of-sinovac-jab-health-dept-to-investigate-if-vaccine-link. Hong Kong Free Press, 8 March 2021
[15] “Germany Restricts Use of AstraZeneca Vaccine for Under-60s” – https://www.wsj.com/articles/astrazeneca-vaccine-faces-fresh-ban-in-germany-for-under-60s-11617116231 . The Wall Street Journal, 30 March 2021
[16] “How worried should we be about blood clots linked to Astrazeneca, Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccines?” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/how-worried-should-we-be-about-blood-clots-linked-to-astrazeneca-14667334 . Channel News Asia, 22 April 2021
[17] https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/familiarity-strangest-vaccine-conspiracy-theories/617572 . The Atlantic, 11 January 2021
[18] “Nearly Half in Philippines Don’t Want Covid Vaccine, Survey Says” – https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-07/nearly-half-in-philippines-don-t-want-covid-vaccine-survey-says. Bloomberg, 7 January 2021
[19] “Some Malaysians uncertain of Covid-19 vaccine: Survey” – https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/some-malaysians-have-reservations-about-taking-covid-19-vaccine-survey. The Straits Times, 3 January 2021
[20] “Bottlenecks in S-E Asia vaccine roll-out” – https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/bottlenecks-in-s-e-asia-vaccine-roll-out. The Straits Times, 7 February 2021
[21] “The Covid Pandemic Is Not Over: The Past May Be Prologue” – https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhaseltine/2021/03/16/the-covid-pandemic-is-not-over-the-past-may-be-prologue. Forbes, 16 March 2021
[22] “Scientists underestimated the coronavirus — and are racing to keep up with evolution” – https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/03/07/scientists-underestimated-coronavirus-are-racing-keep-up-with-evolution. The Washington Post, 7 March 2021
[23] “Vaccinating the Philippines could take two years. Health workers fear it will be a hotbed of variants by then” – https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-21/philippines-fears-third-wave-of-coronavirus-as-vaccine-stalls/13250372 . ABC News, 21 March 2021
[24] “Pandemic fatigue, rise of new strains: Why Asia is struggling amid surge in Covid-19 cases” – https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/asia-struggling-amid-resurgence-in-coronavirus-infections-0 . The Straits Times, 15 April 2021
[25] “Which test is best for COVID-19?” – https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/which-test-is-best-for-covid-19-2020081020734 . Harvard Health Publishing, 5 January 2021
[26] “Singapore coronavirus case shows vaccination doesn’t rule out infection. What does that mean?” – https://www.scmp.com/coronavirus/asia/article/3129312/singapores-latest-coronavirus-case-shows-vaccination-doesnt-rule. South China Morning Post, 13 April 2021
[27] “China tilts to Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy as domestic jab programme lags” – https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121766/china-tilts-covid-19-vaccine-diplomacy-domestic-jab-programme. South China Morning Post, 15 February 2021
[28] “India’s vaccine diplomacy gets a shot in the arm under Quad alliance’s initiative” –https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/indias-vaccine-diplomacy-gets-a-shot-in-the-arm-with-alliance. The Straits Times, 13 March 2021
[29] “The Logic of China’s Vaccine Diplomacy” – https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-logic-of-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy. The Diplomat, 24 March 2021
[30] “The Logic of China’s Vaccine Diplomacy: An in-depth look at where China’s vaccines are going hints at the motivations behind the campaign – https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-logic-of-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy. The Diplomat, 24 March 2021
[31] “India says it will give Myanmar COVID-19 support despite coup” – https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-politics-india-idUSKBN2A41VE. Reuters, 4 February 2021
[32] “Russia offers to share Sputnik V vaccine production know-how with Malaysia, offering chance at vaccine independence” – https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/03/10/russia-offers-to-share-sputnik-v-vaccine-production-know-how-with-malaysia/1956548 . Malay Mail, 10 March 2021
[33] “Vietnam proves immune to China’s vaccine diplomacy campaign” – https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Vietnam-proves-immune-to-China-s-vaccine-diplomacy-campaign. Nikkei Asia, 27 March 2021
[34] “China’s Vaccine Map: More countries using Chinese vaccines” – https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-03-22/China-s-Vaccine-Map-More-countries-using-Chinese-vaccines-YOn46O9ncA/index.html. CGTN, 23 March 2021
[35] “The New Poor: ASEAN Tackles the Challenge of Rising Inequalities“ – https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/the-new-poor-asean-tackles-the-challenge-of-rising-inequalities. The Diplomat, 17 December 2020
[36] “Covid-19 pandemic-linked family violence highlights need for review to address gender inequality” – https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/covid-19-pandemic-linked-family-violence-highlights-need-for-review-to-address-gender. The Straits Times, 20 September 2020
[37] “With Southeast Asia’s highest suicide rate, Thailand grapples with mental health challenge amid pandemic” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/cnainsider/high-suicide-rate-region-thailand-grapples-mental-health-covid-14430142. Channel New Asia, 18 March 2021
[38] “Malaysians working in Singapore won’t be back for Chinese New Year” – https://www.todayonline.com/world/malaysians-working-singapore-wont-be-back-chinese-new-year. TODAY, 12 January 2021
[39] “Vulnerable and struggling: Society’s poorest families suffering through COVID-19” – https://www.unicef.org/thailand/stories/vulnerable-and-struggling-societys-poorest-families-suffering-through-covid-19. UNICEF Thailand, 20 May 2020
[40] “As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its Spread” – https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html. New York Times, 15 March 2020
[41] “Quarantine cut from April” – https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2086647/quarantine-cut-from-april. Bangkok Post, 20 March 2021
[42] “Singapore-Batam-Bintan ‘travel corridor’ meant for Singapore tourists only: Indonesian minister” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/singapore-batam-bintan-safe-travel-corridor-sandiaga-uno-14463966. Channel News Asia
[43] “Vietnam says homegrown COVID-19 vaccine to be available by fourth quarter” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/vietnam-homegrown-covid-19-vaccine-nanocovax-covivac-14426964. Channel News Asia, 17 March 2021
[44] “Thai-developed COVID-19 vaccine starts human trials” – https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/covid-19-thai-developed-domestic-vaccine-starts-human-trials-14463844. Channel News Asia, 22 March 2021
[45] “The way forward for vaccine development in Southeast Asia” – https://southeastasiaglobe.com/the-way-forward-for-vaccine-development-in-southeast-asia. Globe, 25 March 2021
[46] “Asean countries need to work together to ensure Covid-19 vaccine supply is steady, affordable: PM Lee” – https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/asean-countries-need-work-together-ensure-covid-19-vaccine-supply-steady-affordable-pm-lee. TODAY, 13 November 2020
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2021/57 “Malaysia-China Defence Relations: Disruptions Amid Political Changes and Geopolitical Tensions” by Ngeow Chow Bing
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Malaysia’s defence relations with China improved steadily in the early 1990s and especially since the 2005 MOU on Bilateral Defence Cooperation was signed.
- Under Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s defence cooperation with China reached its height in 2017, with many top-level exchanges, large-scale bilateral exercises, a breakthrough in defence industry cooperation, growing naval visits, and continued military academic exchanges. These activities were overseen by Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein.
- With the change of government in Malaysia in 2018, Malaysia-China defence ties cooled. However, a bilateral combined military exercise took place and the contract to procure Littoral Mission Ships from China continued with modifications.
- The sudden change of government in Malaysia in 2020 and the pandemic further disrupted the momentum.
- China’s actions in the South China Sea disputes further reduced enthusiasm and increased scepticism in the defence establishment in Malaysia on the value of Malaysia-China defence relations.
* Ngeow Chow Bing is Director of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya.
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia-China defence relations began in the early 1990s with a series of top-level visits, which culminated in the landmark 2005 MOU on Bilateral Defence Cooperation. The MOU provided the basic framework for both sides to undertake various forms of cooperation and exchanges, including a strategic dialogue, exchanges of officer students in respective military academies, defence industry cooperation, and combined military exercises. In 2009, Malaysia procured 16 sets of China-made FN-6, a man-portable-air-defence-system (MANPADS). In December 2014, the first combined China-Malaysia military exercise, codenamed Aman-Youyi 2014 (Peace and Friendship), took place as a table top exercise. Malaysia and China defence ties saw steady progress in the decade after the signing of the 2005 MOU, despite the ongoing South China Sea dispute in which both countries are claimants.[1]
The various aspects of Malaysia-China defence relations from 2015 to 2020 are reviewed here, including mutual visits, combined exercises, naval port calls, defence industry cooperation, and military-related think tank exchanges. It is found that Malaysia-China defence cooperation reached its height in 2017, and declined and stagnated afterwards. The progress was interrupted twice, first by the change of government following the 14th General Elections in May 2018, and second by the change of government again in late February 2020, which was further compounded by the pandemic crisis. The growing anxiety among Malaysia’s defence establishment about China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea could also result in greater reluctance in developing defence relations with China than before.
JOINT STATEMENTS IN 2016 AND 2018
In late October 2016, then Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak paid a visit to China. In the Joint Statement signed during the visit, Article 15 stated that “both sides are pleased with the renewal of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Defence Cooperation.’ Malaysia and China believed that the continuous and incremental engagements and close rapport between the defence establishments would further strengthen the existing relations. Realising the importance of expanding defence ties between Malaysia and China, both sides welcomed the signing of the ‘Framework of Cooperation on Joint Development and Construction of the Littoral Mission Ship for the Royal Malaysian Navy’ between the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence of China (SASTIND) and Ministry of Defence of Malaysia (MINDEF).”[2]
The visit took place roughly three months after the landmark South China Sea arbitral award brought by The Philippines against China, and the Najib government seemed determined to not let the arbitration case affect its pursuit of closer ties with China, including defence ties. The renewal of the MOU on Bilateral Defence Cooperation mentioned in the Joint Statement specifically referred to the foundational 2005 MOU, which had a ten-year expiration date.
Najib lost power in May 2018 and was replaced by the 94-year old Mahathir Mohamad, who strongly criticised Najib’s China policy during and before the elections. In the Joint Statement issued during Mahathir’s August 2018 visit to China, Article 11 stated that “both sides spoke positively of the sound and productive cooperation in defence, law enforcement and counter-terrorism, and agreed to advance cooperation in the above-mentioned areas, with a view to jointly maintaining regional security and stability. China and Malaysia encouraged high level engagement in defence, and reaffirmed the commitment to establish the Secured Defence Telephone Link between both defence ministries. Both sides were satisfied with the progress of the Joint Development and Construction of the Littoral Mission Ship. Both sides agreed to hold the fourth joint working group meeting on combating transnational crime. Both sides shared the same aspiration of creating a society of high integrity, and agreed to promote cooperation in good governance and anti-corruption.”[3] Defence cooperation was lumped together with law enforcement cooperation in this Joint Statement, with added emphasis on good governance and anti-corruption.
MUTUAL VISITS OF TOP DEFENCE OFFICIALS
Between 2015 to 2020, a total of 14 mutual visits of top-level defence officials took place (see Table 1).
As can be seen in Table 1, before the change of government in May 2018, there were a lot more active top-level exchanges. While most visits were timed together with the attendance at other functions (Xiangshan Forum, ADMM Plus, Najib’s visit to China, bilateral exercise), there was also a number of visits that were specifically aimed to enhance bilateral defence ties. The PLA Navy Chief Wu Shengli’s visit in November 2015[4] was possibly a follow-up to an understanding reached back in October 2013 when Hishammuddin Hussein, in his first visit to China as Defence Minister, agreed to have a formal contact channel established between Malaysia’s Naval Command Region 2 (overseeing the South China Sea) and the PLA South Sea Fleet and for the Sepanggar naval base in Sabah to be open to Chinese naval visits and supplies. Subsequent to Wu’s visit, Chinese naval escort missions and submarines indeed visited the said naval base twice (see below).[5]
Between late 2016 and the first half of 2017, there was a flurry of mutual visits by top defence officials from both sides. In November 2016, PLA Chief of Staff Fang Fenghui visited Malaysia to officiate the bilateral Exercise Aman-Youyi 2016, which marked the only time that such a senior-ranked PLA officer officiated at this event. In March 2017, Vice Chairman of CMC Xu Qiliang visited Malaysia; he was the highest-ranked PLA officer to ever visit Malaysia (Xu outranked the Minister of Defence in China). Xu met with both Prime Minister Najib and Defence Minister Hishammuddin, and secured consensus to deepen and widen areas of defence cooperation.[6] Hishammuddin reciprocated with a visit in April 2017, where he finalised the LMS agreement, announced the agreement to set up a high-level bilateral defence committee chaired by the respective Defence Ministers, and witnessed the inking of an academic MOU between the National Defence University of Malaysia (UPNM in Malay abbreviation) and Peking University. The idea of a high-level bilateral defence committee was already mooted a few months back (during Fang Fenghui’s visit to Malaysia), and it was suggested then that the committee would have four working groups, dealing with military-to-military interactions (such as bilateral exercises), defence industry, cyber defence and intelligence, and strategic defence consultation.[7]
After the change of government in May 2018, the number of bilateral visits dropped significantly. Throughout the two years of the Mahathir administration, the visits only consisted of attendance at Xiangshan Forum and the ceremony to receive the first LMS. Another change of government occurred in late February 2020, which coincided with the rapidly developing COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Understandably, activities related to defence diplomacy were scaled down. An exception was the September 2020 visit by China’s Minister of Defence Wei Fenghe. This seemed to be a hastily arranged trip with an unusual itinerary. While most media reported that Malaysia was his first stop in a regional tour (he visited Indonesia, Brunei and The Philippines after Malaysia), Wei was actually in Moscow just a day before his trip to Kuala Lumpur, attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers Meeting, and meeting his Indian counterpart over the border crisis. In Kuala Lumpur, Wei met with both Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and Defence Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, discussed the South China Sea issue, pandemic cooperation, and the strengthening of defence cooperation.[8]
DEFENCE INDUSTRY COOPERATION
Interest in Chinese weaponry has always been there among Malaysia’s political leadership, given its competitive prices, albeit somewhat less so among the professional military circles, which generally assesses China-made weapons as solid but not spectacular. In 2014, there was a preliminary agreement for Malaysia to procure the LY-80/Hongqi 16 Ground-to-Air missile system, but for unknown reasons this deal has not materialised (or is yet to materialise). Instead, somewhat more surprising was the Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) deal.
The LMS is part of the Malaysian Navy’s modernisation programme known as “15-to-5” (namely, to reduce the current 15 classes of vessels to five classes). Accordingly, 18 LMSs are to be procured under this plan, of which the first four are contracted to be built by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). In the original contract agreed to in 2017, two vessels would be constructed in China while the next two would be done in Malaysia, so that the Malaysian shipyard (Boustead Naval Shipyard) would benefit from skill and technology transfer. The total cost of the whole deal was RM1.17 billion. However, in March 2019, the Mahathir government renegotiated the contract, so that all four of the ships would be constructed in the Chinese shipyard, at a reduced price tag of RM1.047 billion.[9] The new arrangement only reduced the cost slightly, and the main factor was probably the dissatisfaction of the Mahathir government with Boustead; the company had failed to deliver another major project on time.
As of March 2021, the construction of all four LMSs has been completed and two of them have been commissioned for service, with the last two expected to follow suit sometime in 2021.[10] In October 2020, a Janes article reported that a number of deficiencies of the first LMS (KD Keris) operated by the Royal Malaysian Navy, mainly involving “sensors and combat systems” were found and reported to the Chinese contractors for rectifying and for improvement in the remaining hulls.[11] Ironically, KD Keris was deployed to monitor the China Coast Guard vessel in Luconia Shoals when apparently a “stand-off” incident occurred in November 2020.[12]
For the second batch of LMS procurement, the government of Malaysia has decided to seek other foreign partners. For the time being, another major procurement from China remains unlikely, although China-made weapon systems remain in contention in some procurement programmes. For example, the JF-17 fighter, jointly produced by China and Pakistan, and the L-15B lead-in fighter-trainer, developed by China’s Hongdu Aviation, are both contenders in Malaysia’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project.
COMBINED EXERCISES
Malaysia and China undertook the first field exercise, codenamed Aman-Youyi 2015 (Peace and Friendship 2015) in September 2015, involving 2,200 troops from both sides, with the PLA contributing around 1,160 personnel from the ground force, navy and air force (see Table 2).[13] This marked a progression from the Aman-Youyi Table-top exercise in 2014.
The Aman-Youyi 2015 was then the largest bilateral combined exercise between China and an ASEAN country.[14] Held for six days in the Strait of Malacca, the exercise focused on drill subjects such as counter-piracy, gunnery exercises, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Troops from both sides were grouped into four joint action groups (maritime, air, special operations, and disaster relief) under a bilateral joint command.[15]
Aman-Youyi 2016, held for five days in November,was scaled down from its previous edition (involving around 600 troops from both sides) but shifted its exercise focus to land-based warfare such as jungle survival, tracking mission and indoor combat. Notably, it was the first foreign exercise involving soldiers from the PLA Hong Kong Garrison. A small group of Thai officers were also invited to attend as observers.[16] In October 2018, China and Malaysia held the fourth Aman-Youyi. Eight days long with more than 1,300 troops from China, Malaysia and Thailand, the exercise had both land-based and maritime segments. Aman-Youyi 2018 took place under the Mahathir government, but certainly was planned by the preceding government. There was a plan to hold Aman-Youyi in China in 2020, but due to the pandemic, this exercise was postponed.[17]
Other than bilateral exercises, China also conducted multilateral exercises with the navies from ASEAN member-states, in October 2018 and April 2019. In both exercises, however, Malaysia was either an observer (2018)[18] or an absentee (2019).[19]
NAVAL VISITS
Table 3 lists all the publicly known visits by PLA Navy to Malaysian ports between 2015 and 2019. Most visits were part of returning trips made by the PLA Navy’s escort missions to the Gulf of Aden. These escort missions offered the PLA Navy an excellent opportunity to engage in goodwill visits to different countries after the completion of their missions, and Malaysia was a frequently visited place.
The more interesting and extraordinary developments were the two submarine visits to the sensitive Sepanggar naval base in Kota Kinabalu. The first occurred in January 2017, with the visit by a submarine and a submarine support ship. A Chinese official source claimed that they belonged to the 24th escort mission to the Gulf of Aden.[20] It was not disclosed publicly before that these Chinese Navy’s escort missions would sometimes have a submarine detachment, and the official itinerary of the 24th escort mission indeed did not show Malaysia as part of the fleet’s visit.[21] This visit was followed by a second submarine visit in September 2017. It was reported that the submarine (accompanied by a submarine support ship as well) visited, again, after completing the escort mission to the Gulf of Aden.[22]
ACADEMIC, THINK TANK, COVID-19 EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION
Exchanges of military students continued between 2015 and 2020, but it was an asymmetrical pattern with the Malaysian military students attending Chinese military institutions of higher education numbering at a total of around a hundred by 2020, vastly outnumbering their Chinese counterparts, which accumulatively only sent about a dozen military students to Malaysia’s Armed Forces Staff College and Defence College.
In 2015, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and the Embassy of China in Malaysia co-organised the first reunion of the Malaysian alumni of Chinese National Defence University, and subsequently two more reunion celebrations were held in 2016 and 2017.[23] As mentioned earlier, UPNM also signed an academic MOU with Peking University in 2017, and a batch of 10 students was sent to Peking University. However, this exchange fizzled out after the change of government in May 2018.[24]
The Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security, the think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Defence, had had some preliminary exchanges with China’s defence-related or strategic think tanks, but it failed to participate in the first China-ASEAN Defence Think Tanks Forum held on the sideline of the Xiangshan Forum in 2019. Although the pandemic crisis disrupted physical travel, it did not prevent exchanges and cooperation between the respective militaries. In May 2020, Wei Fenghe initiated a telephone call to his Malaysian counterpart Ismail Sabri and reportedly the focus of the conversation was the COVID-19 pandemic, among other issues.[25] During the September visit by Wei to Malaysia, he reportedly brought along medical supplies to donate to the MAF. The Health Service Division of the MAF also held virtual meetings with its PLA counterparts on medical cooperation in the defence sector.[26]
ASSESSING MALAYSIA-CHINA DEFENCE TIES
The above discussions show that China-Malaysia defence relations “peaked” in 2017, and experienced a decline and stagnation with the inauguration of the Mahathir government in May 2018. Was the Mahathir government then living up to its reputation of being a more “anti-China” government?[27] Compared to its predecessor, the Mahathir government certainly was more guarded on China, given that both sides had clashed on the issue of Chinese infrastructure investment in Malaysia. The Mahathir government was also subtly more assertive on the South China Sea issue vis-à-vis China.[28] Despite Mahathir’s “anti-US” rhetoric, the long established and robust (but lower profile) Malaysia-US defence relations did not suffer the kind of decline that was seen in Malaysia-China defence relations.
But other factors could have explained the phenomenon. Naturally a new government would take time to evaluate the policy legacy it inherited and sort out its preferred priorities, which would slow things down. Moreover, bureaucratic factors could be in play. Defence diplomacy was mainly coordinated and implemented through the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Defence. During the Mahathir government, the Division was tasked with coming out with the first-ever Defence White Paper, a time-consuming and intensive work that diverted resources and attention from activities and engagements considered not of upmost priority. The Mahathir government was also more insistent on prudent management of resources and likely saw some activities as dispensable. Moreover, by 2019, relations between China and Malaysia had improved significantly, following the revival of a bilateral infrastructure project.[29] Had the Mahathir government stayed in power for a full term, more progress could have happened in Malaysia-China defence relations. But the collapse of the Mahathir government and the outbreak of the pandemic derailed the momentum again.
On paper, the Muhyiddin government, which appointed two veterans of the Najib cabinet to helm the Defence and Foreign Ministries, in particular the appointment of Hishammuddin (the former Defence Minister who oversaw the “peaking” of the Malaysia-China defence ties) as the Foreign Minister, should be an advantage in rekindling Malaysia-China defence ties. But the inherently unstable government was consumed and distracted by constant domestic politicking and the pandemic, and has not had the bandwidth to accord defence diplomacy with China a high priority.
Finally, while domestic changes in Malaysia largely accounted for the slowing down of Malaysia-China defence interactions, China’s actions in the South China Sea dispute also could very well contribute to the reduced enthusiasm and increased scepticism among the defence establishment on the efficacy of developing defence relations with China. The West Capella episode in April 2020 was especially alarming to this establishment. Bilateral defence interaction is still valued as a channel of trust and confidence building, but is now met with more doubts compared to the early 2010s.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/57, 29 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] An analysis of the defence relations between Malaysia and China from 1991 to 2015 can be found in Ngeow Chow Bing, “Comprehensive Strategic Partners but Prosaic Military Ties: The Development of Malaysia-China Defence Relations 1991-2015”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 37: 2 (August 2015), pp. 269-304.
[2] See “Joint Press Statement”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, 4 November 2016, at https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/home?p_p_id=101&p_p_state=maximized&_101_struts_action=%2Fasset_publisher%2Fview_content&_101_type=content&_101_viewMode=view&_101_urlTitle=joint-press-statement.
[3] See “Joint Statement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, 20 August 2018, at https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/speeches-statements/-/asset_publisher/mN2jZPwqWjGA/content/joint-statement-between-the-government-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china-and-the-government-of-malaysia-20-august-2018-beijing.
[4] “Kota Kinabalu offered as port of call to Chinese naval ships – RMN”, Borneo Post, 10 November 2015, at https://www.theborneopost.com/2015/11/10/kota-kinabalu-offered-as-port-of-call-to-chinese-naval-ships-rmn; Geoff Wade, “Sabah, the PLA Navy and Northern Australia”, The Strategist, 18 November 2015, at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sabah-the-pla-navy-and-northern-australia.
[5] “Zhongguo haijun 861 biandui jishu tingkao Gedajinabalu (Task Force 861 docks at Kota Kinabalu)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 11 January 2017, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cemy/chn/sgxw/t1429687.htm.
[6] “Zhongyang junwei fuzhuxi Xu Qiliang fangwen Malaixiya (CMC Deputy Chair Xu Qiliang Visits Malaysia”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 31 March, 2017, at http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/sgxw/t1450452.htm; “Malaixiya zongli Najibu huijian Xu Qiliang (Malaysia’s PM Najib Meets with Xu Qiliang”, Xinhuanet, 29 March 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2017-03/29/c_1120720395.htm.
[7] “Military training with China won’t affect ties with other countries”, Malaysiakini, 24 November 2016, at https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/364087.
[8] Amy Chew, “South China Sea: China’s defence minister heads to Brunei, Philippines after visits to Malaysia and Indonesia”, South China Morning Post, 8 September 2020, at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3100602/south-china-sea-chinese-defence-minister-wei-fenghe-turns.
[9] “Defence Ministry: Nothing negative about building Littoral Mission Ships in China”, New Straits Times, 1 August 2019, at https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/08/509021/defence-ministry-nothing-negative-about-building-littoral-mission-ships.
[10] “Fourth Malaysian Navy littoral mission ship ready, naming ceremony postponed to Nov 2021”, The Malay Mail, 16 December 2020, at https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/12/16/fourth-malaysian-navy-littoral-mission-ship-ready-naming-ceremony-postponed/1932578.
[11] “Malaysia tallies deficiencies observed on first Keris-class littoral mission ship”, Janes, 22 October 2020, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/malaysia-tallies-deficiencies-observed-on-first-keris-class-littoral-mission-ship. A Malaysian navy official whom the author spoke to, however said that this kind of situation was not unusual, as this was the first delivery of a new class of asset, and should not be read into too much.
[12] “Malaysian navy vessels, Chinese ship reported in South China Sea standoff”, Free Malaysia Today, 26 November 2020, at https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/11/26/malaysian-navy-vessels-chinese-ship-reported-in-south-china-sea-standoff.
[13] Peng Yining, “China and Malaysia mark end of first joint military drill”, China Daily, 22 September 2015, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-09/22/content_21952389.htm.
[14] It was only superseded in size by the 2019 edition of Golden Dragon, the bilateral combined exercise between China and Cambodia involving around 2,800 troops. But the size of the contingent dispatched by the PLA to participate in Aman-Youyi 2015 (1160 personnel) probably remains the largest that China has ever sent to a bilateral exercise with an ASEAN country.
[15] “Shibing yanlian, hailugong chudong (Live fire exercise, with ground force, navy, air force)”, Sinchew Daily, 18 September 2015, at https://www.sinchew.com.my/content/content_1468685.html.
[16] “Malaysia, China begin joint aid and relief exercise”, Straits Times, 24 November 2016, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/malaysia-china-begin-joint-aid-and-relief-exercise.
[17] Author’s conversation with relevant officials, place and date withheld to protect anonymity.
[18] Li Wenfang, “China, ASEAN begin joint naval drill”, China Daily, 23 October 2018, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/23/WS5bce80d7a310eff303283f68.html. Five ASEAN countries dispatched their navy ships to participate in the drill (Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, The Philippines and Brunei), while four ASEAN countries only sent observers (Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Cambodia).
[19] “Opening Ceremony of ‘Joint Maritime Drill 2019’ Held in Qingdao”, China Military Online, 26 April 2019, at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-04/26/content_9490179.htm. Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and The Philippines again participated in the exercise, while Indonesia and Laos sent their observers.
[20] “Zhongguo haijun 861 biandui jishu tingkao Gedajinabalu (Task Force 861 docks at Kota Kinabalu)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 11 January 2017, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cemy/chn/sgxw/t1429687.htm.
[21] See http://www.81.cn/2018zt/2018-12/14/content_9379057.htm.
[22] “Chinese sub docks at Malaysian port for second time this year”, Reuters, 13 September 2017, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-malaysia-southchinasea-idUSKCN1BO17P. Scrutinizing the itineraries of the escort missions in 2017, the submarine and its support ship could be a detachment of the 26th escort mission.
[23] “Zhongguo zhuma dashiguan juban ‘disanci Malaixiya Zhongguo guofang daxue xueyuan zaichushou’ huodong (Chinese Embassy in Malaysia organizes ‘The Third Reunion of Malaysian Alumni of Chinese National Defence University’)”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, 19 July 2017, at http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/sgxw/t1478677.htm. These activities could ensure that ties among the alumni and their relations with China remain vibrant, and reinforce the perception of a friendly relatiotnship between the defence alumni of both sides.
[24] Author’s conversation with an academic of UPNM, 30 October 2020.
[25] “Telephone Conversation Between Honourable Dato’Sri Ismail Sabri Bin Yaakob, Minister Of Defence Malaysia And His Excellency General Wei Fenghe, Minister Of National Defense Of The People’s Republic Of China”, Press release of the Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, 15 May 2020, at http://www.mod.gov.my/en/mediamenu-2/press-release/720-telephone-conversation-between-honourable-dato-sri-ismail-sabri-bin-yaakob-minister-of-defence-malaysia-and-his-excellency-general-wei-fenghe-minister-of-national-defense-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china.
[26] “Zhongguo fangzhang fangmashi wuzi juan jundui (Chinese Defence Minister donates to Malaysia during visit)”, Oriental Daily News, 2 December 2020, at https://www.orientaldaily.com.my/news/nation/2020/12/02/378794.
[27] Richard Javad Heydarian, “Malaysia as a New Vortex of Regional Resistance against China”, Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, 17 September 2018, at https://amti.csis.org/malaysia-new-vortex-regional-resistance-china.
[28] Ian Storey, “Malaysia and the South China Sea Dispute: Policy Continuity amid Domestic Political Change”, ISEAS Perspectives, no. 18, 20 March 2020.
[29] Ngeow Chow Bing, “A change of heart? Under Mahathir, Malaysia makes bold move to embrace China”, Channel News Asia, 30 August 2019, at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/malaysia-china-relations-mahathir-pakatan-harapan-warming-ties-11833036.
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2021/56 “Thailand’s Military in 2021: Mid-Year Reshuffle, Continuing Factionalism and Rejected Reform” by Paul Chambers
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Thailand’s military in 2021 finds itself with several principal tasks: reinforcing the police against youthful anti-government protestors; solidifying monarchical control of the country; assisting the police in arresting those suspected of violating Thailand’s lèse majesté law; conducting counterinsurgency warfare against Malay-Muslim insurgents in the country’s Deep South; and securing the 2, 416-kilometer-long Thai-Myanmar border.
- While reducing the number of generals in the Thai armed forces is a stated priority, the recent mid-year military reshuffle did not further that goal.
- Partisanship influenced the reshuffle, exhibiting continued military factionalism rooted in military-academy-class and unit bonds, financial interests, family ties and personal loyalties.
- Wide-ranging proposals for military reform, covering such areas as conscription, soldiers’ welfare, military landholding, civilian control, laws bearing on national security, and procurement have been made. But few if any changes have occurred.
- In 2021, the palace continues to dominate Thailand’s military.
* Paul Chambers is Lecturer and Special Advisor for International Affairs, Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand, and, in March-May 2021, Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
2021 has thus far been an eventful year for Thailand’s armed forces. Those forces have been principally tasked with reinforcing the police against youthful anti-government protestors. Soldiers have stood behind police lines and, wearing civvies, mingled with pro-government counter-demonstrators.[1] The armed forces have also laboured to solidify monarchical control of the country, assisting the police in arresting anyone suspected of violating Thailand’s lèse majesté law. Further, the military is in its fifteenth year of counterinsurgency warfare against Malay-Muslim insurgents in the country’s Deep South. Finally, it sought to secure the 2,416-kilometer-long Thai-Myanmar border to stem both the spread of COVID-19 and the flow of people fleeing persecution into Thailand.[2]
MID-YEAR RESHUFFLE
Meanwhile, Thailand’s 1 April 2021 mid-year military reshuffle,[3] which was supposed to reflect the Ministry of Defense’s plan to cut the size of the military’s top-heavy senior officer corps, failed to see that objective materialise.[4] Indeed, in early 2021, the ministry estimated that there were 1,400 generals or their equivalents in the country’s armed forces, with 400 flag officers serving in the Army, 250 in the Navy, 190 in the Air Force, 250 at the Royal Thai Armed Forces headquarters and 300 in the Office of the Permanent Secretary of Defense. Though the military has been seeking to cut the number of generals and other flag officers by 25 per cent by 2029, planners considered making cuts of only 5-10 per cent in 2021.[5] The idea was to incrementally diminish the number of appointments of military “experts” or “specialists”, each of whom receives monthly salaries (and are considered superfluous), and then to not replace military retirees—with some officers urged into early retirement. But the 2021 mid-year reshuffle, which involved 238 personnel, included approximately 124 generals and colonels to be appointed as military experts or specialists. If anything, this outcome implies that the plan to begin trimming Thailand’s bloated cadre generals has stalled.
Nevertheless, the mid-year re-shuffle has brought a number of changes worth noting. First, Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters General Chalermpol Srisawat has advanced the careers of soldiers whom he favours. Thus, General Wattana Polchan, a member of muak daeng or “red hat” unit or Special Forces faction and a pre-cadet academy Class 21 peer of General Chalermpol, as well as commander of the Counter-Terrorism Center, was elevated to become the chief of the Armed Forces Security Center, which handles intelligence. Succeeding Wattana as counter-terrorism chief is another Chalermpol associate, General Suwit Ketsiri, of pre-cadet academy Class 23. Suwit hails from the Burapha phayak faction of Prime Minister General (ret.) Prayut Chan-ocha and Deputy Prime Minister General (ret.) Prawit Wonguwan). Like Chalermpol, he previously served as deputy commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division, Royal Guard, and in the 904 Royal Guard Special Task Force. Suwit was also deputy command for the First Army Region. He is expected to succeed Chalermpol as commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters when the latter retires in 2023.[6]
Another noteworthy element of the reshuffle was the demotion of General Rachit Arunrungsi, Army Welfare director, to the post of deputy director, Integration and Practice Office of the Internal Security Mission. In March 2020, it was publicly revealed that Rachit had allowed a boxing match to proceed at a stadium run by the Army Welfare Department despite the cabinet’s ban on state agencies holding crowded events to stanch the spread of COVID-19. Over 200 people, including Rachit, contracted COVID-19 as a result of the event.[7] Although he was initially dismissed from the stadium’s board, Rachit’s demotion came only a full year later. Rachit’s replacement as Welfare Department director is General Fuengwit Laohasurayothin, a pre-cadet Class 22 classmate and friend of Army Commander General Narongphan Jitkaewthae. Two other classmates of Narongphan have also gained in the reshuffle. General Noppadon Srichansuk, deputy director of the Royal Thai Army Ordnance Department, was appointed as the department’s director, while General Thitichai Preecha became the director of the Coordination Center 5, Army Office of Internal Security.
Yet another key appointment was that of General Dechapol Suwan. From director of the Department of Information Technology and Space Defense, he has become special adviser to the Office of the Permanent Secretary of Defense. Though his is an advisory position, Dechapol’s appointment signifies the growing importance to the Thai military of the space domain. In August 2019, Thailand launched a space operations centre tasked with consolidating Thai national security in outer space. The centre is to be the foundation for “space operations, outer space patrols, satellite communications and international engagement” in space.[8] Dechapol is a peer and pre-cadet Class 20 classmate of the former Army chief, current Deputy Secretary of the Royal Household General Apirat Kongsompong.
RAMPANT MILITARY FACTIONALISM
This latest reshuffle illustrates the push-and-pull of the factionalism that persists at different levels of Thailand’s armed forces: principally among powerful extra-military personalities, units and pre-cadet and service academy classes, but to a lesser degree involving the families and personalities of active-duty commanders. Indeed, the military has lacked factional cohesion since 2001, and such fission has intensified since the beginning of the current monarch’s reign. Today, the conflict between military extra-military personalities principally pits King Vajiralongkorn against Prawit, with less involvement from Prayut and Interior Minister General Anupong Paochinda. Prawit, Prayut and Anupong dominated military promotions from 2007 until 2016. In 2018, the king established a three-month Royal 904 military training course, whose graduates obtain a certificate and the right to wear a kho daeng or red-collared T-shirt under their uniforms. Senior officers completing the course could also be better assured of promotion. The king was at the same time creating a new faction which could encompass soldiers of diverse factional origins, including the leading factions rooted on units: the traditional Wongthewan or Royal Progeny faction, representing the 1st Division (Kings Guard), within which the king began his own military career, and the Burapha phayak or Eastern Tigers faction, representing the 2nd Division (Queen’s Guard). Prayut, Prawit and Anupong belonged to that latter faction.[9]
In the event, the monarch’s attempt to bring senior kho daeng officers cohesively under his sway has only succeeded in intensifying sub-factions. Thus, palace-preferred senior officers today tend to be not only kho daeng but also previously Wongthewan. In 2021, while this group dominates the military, as in the case of Army Commander General Narongphan, a lesser number of others favoured by Prawit, such as First Army Region Commander General Jaroenchai Hintao, remain prominent as well.
Besides extra-military personalities, a second variant of factions has been shared military units. These are the strongest types of factions because they are less limited in numbers of members, involving generations of active-duty and retired officers across time. Besides Wongthewan and Burapha phayak, other leading unit factions include the Sura dam or Black Panthers, the Muak daeng and the Tahan ma or Cavalry. Current Privy Council Chair General (ret) Surayud Chulanond belongs to the Muak daeng faction while his predecessor the late General Prem Tinsulanond was from the Cavalry. The aforementioned Suwit Ketsiri is a member of both the Burapha phayak and Cavalry Ma factions.
A third faction type is the comradery shared among members of the same graduating class — both of the pre-cadet school, officially the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School, and of service academies including the Army’s Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. The former institution is more important in the emergence of factions because its students include individuals who go on to serve in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police. (Thai coups and the juntas that they put into power have often been led by soldiers from the same class faction, as was the case in both the 1991 and 2006 coups). Thai service branch commanders also prefer to place classmates in strategic leadership positions to maximise trustworthiness.[10]
The final variant of factions oscillates around the persona of active-duty commanders. The basis of the linkages in question may be family, financial or commercial pursuits, or barami (charisma). Such cliques are small and difficult to sustain over time because they tend to be limited by kinship, financial success, social skills and time on active duty. Only commanders with relatives in the military and long postings are able to build these connections. A rare example was General Prayut, who was Army commander for four years and whose brother Preecha became permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defense.
THE STATE OF MILITARY REFORM EFFORTS
The current upswing in military factionalism in Thailand has paralleled revelations in civil society about problems endemic to the armed forces: an excessive budget, corruption, impunity and insufficient accountability and transparency. Following the March 2019 general elections, every major party in the country’s lower house of parliament save the junta’s proxy Phalang Pracharat insisted on military and police reform of one kind or another. With the coalition dominated by the Phalang Pracharat party—itself beholden to 2014-2019 junta leaders Prayut, Prawit and Anupong—and the Senate appointed by the junta, most reform proposals met a quick end in Parliament. Nevertheless, the parties continued to push for security sector reform and streamlining, with the loudest calls coming from the Future Forward Party, which morphed into the Move Forward Party after its dissolution in early 2020. That latter party has continued to advocate military reforms originally called for by Future Forward.
There have been generally eight proposed reforms. The first concerns the defence budget. Future Forward sought to reduce the budget by US$1.6 billion, while the Thaksinite Phuea Thai Party advocated diverting 10 per cent of the budget, or US$638.9 million, to assist new businesspeople. The Seri Ruam Thai Party supports transferring parts of the military budget to spending on welfare, while the Democrat Partysupports cutting all unnecessary budgetary expenses.[11]
A second proposal has been to reduce the number of armed forces personnel. Future Forward supported reducing Thailand’s 330,000 troops to 170,000, decreasing the number of generals and other flag grade officers from 1,600 to 400, and abolishing the Thai Reserve Officer Training Corps. Seri Ruam Thai has called for reducing the number of generals, advisors and experts in the military and abolishing brigades as well as the Armed Forces Headquarters. The Democrats have proposed reducing military personnel to 60-70 thousand troops. Phuea Thai has also supported personnel reductions, though it has been ambiguous about the scale of cuts that it favours.
A third proposal has been to abolish conscription. Phuea Thai, Seri Ruam Thai and the Democrats and the dissolved Future Forward have all supported this reform. They take this position because, since Thailand is not at war with any country, the country should limit itself to an all-volunteer military. In addition, some conscripts have been abused. General Pongsakorn Rodchompu, formerly of Future Forward, has specifically proposed that Thailand establish a corps of “voluntary smart soldiers” who possess a military-subsidised “professional education” that includes a curriculum on democracy, civil rights and civilian control of the military. At the same time, soldiers must be promoted based upon merit, rather than factional connections. Finally, in his view, there must be determined, civilian-led, enforceable investigations of conscripts’ deaths at the hands of other soldiers.
A fourth proposal involves reforming military landownership. The Thai military is the largest landowner in Thailand. The Future Forward Party called for utilising military land to build public housing. Phuea Thai also wants to put military land to greater social use. Seri Ruam Thai wants to use military land to build schools, hospitals, housing and public parks.
A fifth proposal is the improving of the welfare of individual military soldiers. Future Forward advocated providing scholarships for soldiers and their children, offering larger pensions as well as loans, and making available accident and family insurance. Phuea Thai has suggested providing more military education, focusing on technology, to soldiers.
A sixth proposal for reform of the Thai military is to enhance elected civilians’ control over the military. Future Forward proposed that the commanders of the service branches and of the armed forces’ headquarters be put under the Ministry of Defense. Seri Ruam Thai wants to ensure that elected prime ministers can remove members of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters’ Personnel Management Committee and better combat military corruption. The Democrat Party seeks to bring greater public transparency to the military, including the establishment of more centres at which soldiers can lodge complaints.
A seventh proposal is the reform of laws relating to national security. This proposal applies to the Martial Law Act (1914), the Emergency Decree Law (2008) and the Internal Security Act (2008). Future Forward sought to forbid the military from trying civilians in military courts. It also tried to revise Article 6 of the Martial Law Act, which allows military personnel to overrule civilian authorities. Seri Ruam Thai has called for abolishing all military courts and amending the Ministry of Defense Organization Act so that elected civilian prime ministers must endorse military reshuffle decisions—which currently involve only armed forces commanders and the king. Phuea Thai has sought to diminish the number of days that the Emergency Decree Law allows the military to detain people; the current limit is 37 days. It has also supported placing the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) under the authority of civilian agencies.
An eighth proposal regards defence procurement. Thailand’s military procurement process has traditionally been close to opaque—with no elected civilian oversight. The Future Forward Party sought to reform the process, proposing effective oversight on the part of Parliament as well as academics, other civilian groups and journalists that would see them participate in every stage of the weapons-buying process.[12] Indeed, there should be more parliamentary oversight, with civil society input, to address kickbacks that senior military and police officers receive during the procurement process.
Meanwhile, following a February 2020 massacre by a deranged Thai soldier in Nakhon Ratchasima and revelations that he had been drawn into a shady military business scheme, then-Army Commander Apirat promised immediate reforms. These included the following:
- Eliminating arrangements whereby Army officers receive commissions for leasing military land to businesspeople.
- Increasing transparency regarding public real estate assets and Army-owned businesses, to channel income to the Army’s welfare fund. The Army signed a memorandum of understanding with the Treasury Department of the Ministry of Finance, providing for the transfer of Army-owned land and businesses to the ministry.
- Requiring retired Army officers to move out of Army-owned houses.[13]
- Ending the rights of soldiers to personally own various types of weapons.
- Launching a complaint hotline for soldiers to allege Army irregularities such as corruption.
By the time Apirat retired in September 2020, these reforms had yet to materialize. The payment of commissions for leasing of property has continued. The MOU with the Treasury Department has only led to a few military-administered companies and properties being handed over to the department, and even those remain heavily influenced by the armed forces. Apirat did eventually dismiss the members of the Army board overseeing Lumpini Boxing Stadium events because of the March 2020 COVID-19 outbreak there, but the Army continues to run the stadium. Regarding welfare housing, the Army made so many exceptions to its new policy that a long list of more than 100 retired generals has remained in rent-free, Army-administered housing on the rationale that they are “contributing to society”. The complaint hotline is not anonymous. After an Army sergeant used it to reveal an allegation of army corruption, he was fired and never reinstated. The hotline programme faded away.[14]
Military reform is necessary in other areas as well. For example, there should be more transparency and elected civilians’ monitoring of military detention areas to reduce potential military torture and enforced disappearances. In addition, postings of military and police officers to the boards of corporations should be abolished. At the same time, there is no reason why the military should hold shares in private-sector firms—the TMB Bank, for example. Moreover, soldiers engaging in illegal activities should be vigorously prosecuted. Also, the military should not be allowed to use criminal defamation suits against civil society organizations which voice dissent against potential military abuses. Furthermore, organisations promoting development, such as the Five Provinces Forest Preservation Foundation (FPFPF), should not be dominated by the military. Indeed, of the 25 members on FPFPF’s board, 18 are military officials. Finally, there should a reduction in the number of tasks assigned to the military which are also already performed by civilian agencies. Duplicated responsibilities include disaster relief, teaching farmers how to farm and others.[15]
Ultimately, amidst Thailand’s 2021 mid-year armed forces reshuffle, the military finds itself highly factionalised, with enormous tasks at hand, and in need of reforms. While it is promoting its own kho daeng faction, the palace otherwise seeks to balance military factions in order to enhance its influence over the armed forces. Except perhaps for force modernisation, there is little likelihood of any military reforms sticking. No elected civilians possess the clout to compel reform, while internally-driven military reform has never been successful in Thailand. For the future, Thailand’s bloated, divided and politicised military looks likely to endure. The armed forces themselves need to more ardently push for reform, if only to improve their effectiveness in carrying out their mission.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/56, 28 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Bangkok Post, “Army Chief: No Chance at all of Coup”, 9 November 2020 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2016723/army-chief-no-chance-at-all-of-coup).
[2] Kotcha Olarn and Helen Regan, “Thailand pushes back thousands fleeing Myanmar as death toll surpasses 500”, CNN, 30 March 2021 (https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/30/asia/thailand-myanmar-refugees-intl-hnk/index.html).
[3] Kingdom of Thailand, Office of the Prime Minister, “ให้นายทหารรับราชการ” [Announcement of Military Reshuffle], Royal Gazette, Volume 138, Special Section 55 ง, 11 March 2021 (http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2564/E/055/T_0001.PDF).
[4] Thai rat, “ควันหลงย้าย 236 นายทหารกลางปี ‘บิ๊กแก้ว-บิ๊กบี้’ จัดทัพ วางตัว ลดนายพล” [The Aftermath of Moving 236 Officers Mid-Year: “Big Kaew-Big Bee” Organising an Army with Fewer Generals], 17 March 2021 (https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2052161 ).
[5] Wassana Nanuam, “Generals Face Job Cuts”, Bangkok Post, 8 March 2021 (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2079775/generals-face-job-cuts).
[6] Than setthakit, “‘ผบ.ทสส.’ ยกเครื่องงานข่าวส่ง ‘พล.ท.วัฒนะ’ คุม ศรภ.” [PBTSS Makes News Promoting Wattana to Head the Security Center], 11 March 2021 (https://www.thansettakij.com/content/politics/471800 ).
[7] Thai PBS World, “Lumpini boxing stadium’s board fired over cluster of COVID-19 infections”, 5 June 2020 (https://www.thaipbsworld.com/lumpini-boxing-stadiums-board-fired-over-cluster-of-covid-19-infections).
[8] Prashanth Parameswaran, “Thailand Launches Military Space Unit”, The Diplomat, 19 September 2019 (https://ipdefenseforum.com/2019/09/thailand-launches-military-space-unit).
[9] Prime Minister Prayut and Interior Minister General Anupong Paochinda are also members of the Queen’s Tiger Guard faction of the Thai Army; each formerly commanded the 21st Infantry Division. In contrast, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit never commanded that unit.
[10] Paul Chambers, “Cleaved Clout: Factionalism and Fissures in Thailand’s Military Today and Implications for Stability and Democratization“, unpublished manuscript, 2011.
[11] Based upon information collected by the author from the political parties.
[12] Author’s interview with General Pongsakorn Rodchompoo, former deputy leader of the Future Forward Party, Bangkok, 2 December 2021.
[13] Khaosod English, “Retired Soldiers Ordered to Vacate Army Residences — Except for Prayuth”, 14 February 2020 (https://khaosodenglish-big.staging.matichon.co.th/politics/2020/02/14/retired-soldiers-ordered-to-vacate-army-residences-except-prayut).
[14] Khaosod English, “Apirat’s Departure Leaves a Contended Legacy on ‘Army Reform’”, 1 October 2020 (https://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2020/10/01/apirats-departure-leaves-a-contended-legacy-on-army-reform).
[15] Prachatai, “10 Ways to Revolutionize the Thai Military: Exposing the Junta’s Blind Spot”, 13 November 2015 (https://prachatai.com/english/node/5611 ).
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2021/55 “Indonesia-China Vaccine Cooperation and South China Sea Diplomacy” by Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia and Klaus Heinrich Raditio
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Indonesia is among the Southeast Asian nations most heavily stricken by the Covid-19 pandemic. It is also the ASEAN country that conducts the most comprehensive vaccine cooperation with China — from clinical trials to supply to production.
- Indonesia has nevertheless tried to diversify its vaccine supply and avoid over-reliance on Chinese vaccine. Around one-third of Indonesia’s vaccine procurement is from China.
- Other ASEAN countries have also been diversifying their vaccine supply, and on the whole, China is not dominating the vaccine market despite its robust vaccine diplomacy in the region.
- Unsurprisingly, China’s vaccine diplomacy in Southeast Asia carries an expectation that the vaccine recipient countries should be more accommodating on the South China Sea (SCS) issue. However, Indonesia has demonstrated its resolve to stand firm on ASEAN’s position on the South China Sea, notwithstanding its close cooperation with China on the Covid-19 vaccine.
* Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is an independent researcher and the author of Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
INTRODUCTION
Entering into June 2020, three months after announcing its first two Covid-19 cases, Indonesia saw a continuous rise in the number of confirmed cases despite efforts to limit social and economic activities as well as citizen movement in many major cities. The country’s economy was also heading to its sharpest downturn since the 1997/8 Asian Financial Crisis, and had contracted 5.32 per cent in the second quarter of 2020.[1]
Months after the outbreak, Indonesia explored vaccine cooperation with China, South Korea, UAE and the UK.[2] In October 2020, China started to offer vaccine assistance to Southeast Asian countries, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducting vaccine diplomacy by touring Southeast Asia in October 2020 and January 2021. This made Beijing’s assistance in the region – in terms of coping with the pandemic – unrivalled by any other power. In July 2020, Xiao Yaqing, the head of the Bureau of Market Supervision and Control, during his visit to Sinopharm, urged researchers to consider the development of a Covid-19 vaccine as “an important political task”.[3]
On 13 January 2021 after marathon diplomatic efforts and bureaucratic talks between Jakarta and Beijing, President Joko Widodo became the first Indonesian to receive a dose of Sinovac Biotech’s CoronaVac. He officially kicked off the vaccine rollout in the country by receiving the jab himself, becoming the first non-Chinese leader to be inoculated with the Chinese vaccine. The country plans to inoculate more than 180 million of its 260 million population, in order to reach herd immunity. The president stressed that vaccinations were essential in order to end coronavirus transmissions, and to get the country’s economy back on track.
In this regard, some scholars[4] suggest that Sino-Indonesian vaccine cooperation may affect Jakarta’s SCS stance.[5] This paper analyses the degree of Indonesian dependency on Chinese vaccine and Jakarta’s diplomacy in the SCS. Given the close vaccine cooperation with Beijing, will Jakarta compromise its commitment to a peaceful and stable SCS in accordance with international law?
SINO-INDONESIAN VACCINE COOPERATION
To cope with the pandemic, Indonesian MoFA, in collaboration with the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises and the Ministry of Health, intensified its vaccine hunting, exploring many possibilities of conducting cooperation with foreign companies or international consortiums to ensure its access to Covid-19 vaccines. Chinese vaccine developers were among the first to give favourable responses for establishing vaccine procurement and joint production with Indonesia.[6]
Collaboration between a Chinese firm, Sinovac Biotech Ltd., and an Indonesian state-owned company, PT Bio Farma, has made substantial progress and created meaningful outputs.[7] It is the only deal between the Indonesian government and foreign vaccine manufacturers that has gone beyond vaccine procurement. In Beijing, the Indonesian embassy had sought to establish contact with Sinovac since March 2020.[8] Three months after that, Sinovac agreed to cooperate with Bio Farma in conducting clinical trials as well as vaccine manufacturing. In August 2020, a phase-three clinical trial for Sinovac’s vaccine, “CoronaVac,” was conducted in Bandung, involving 1,620 volunteers.[9] Bio Farma then secured priority access to around 40 million doses of bulk vaccine from Sinovac, to be sent before March 2021.[10] Indonesia’s initial purchase of Covid-19 vaccines from Sinovac was at that time the largest order received by a Chinese vaccine developer.[11] Bio Farma has license to produce CoronaVac and has even been designated a production hub for the region.[12] In March 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi affirmed China’s readiness to “helping Indonesia to become a hub of vaccine production for Southeast Asia.”[13]
Several factors have paved the way for this close collaboration between Bio Farma and Sinovac.[14] As stated by Djauhari Oratmangun, the Indonesian Ambassador to China, the two companies “had long been in partnership” with each other. Bio Farma is also no stranger to the process of weakening or inactivating the virus to create a vaccine. Sinovac offered its vaccine at a reasonable price. In the negotiation, the Indonesian government had reportedly asked the Chinese company to ensure the transfer of technology and to guarantee that the vaccine would meet Indonesian halal standards. Moreover, Bio Farma would carry out the vaccine’s mass production.[15]
On 6 December 2020, 1.2 million doses of the Covid-19 vaccine manufactured by Sinovac landed in Jakarta. The timing could not have been more perfect; the country was entering the ninth month of the pandemic, and its daily reported positive cases had soared beyond 4,000 since the end of September.[16] Making a public statement, President Jokowi said, “Alhamdulillah, the vaccine is available, which means that we can immediately prevent the spread of the Covid-19 outbreak.”[17] Kompas, a leading national newspaper,further praised what the president portrayed as “kabar baik.”[18] (good news) as a “victory of [Indonesia’s] diplomacy”. Indonesia had started to receive the vaccines while “100 other countries have not yet secured access to vaccines.”[19]
This development enabled Jokowi’s government to take more concrete actions in commencing massive vaccination. Indonesia became the first country besides China to issue emergency use authorisation of Sinovac’s vaccine.[20] On 11 January 2021, the BPOM approved the emergency use of Sinovac’s vaccine, since the interim results of the vaccine’s phase-three clinical trials in Bandung showed an efficacy rate of 65.3 – way above the standard required by the World Health Organization.[21] Accordingly, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council, MUI) issued a fatwa reaffirming the vaccine’s halal status, which had been declared four days earlier.[22] On 13 January 2021, the Indonesian government further proceeded by conducting the inaugural Covid-19 mass vaccinations.[23]
As seen from its Covid-19 and economic statistics, Indonesia is in an urgent situation. President Jokowi had endeavoured to expedite the mass vaccination programme since its economy continued to suffer from the pandemic.[24] The Chinese commitment to provide Indonesians with one hundred million doses of Covid-19 vaccines enabled the latter to initiate nationwide vaccination at a relatively early time. This was of great since the spread of infections was in its worst period at the beginning of 2021. On the day the President got inoculated, Indonesia reported new daily Covid-19 records with more than 11,000 new cases, 50,000 infections in the last five consecutive days, and more than 300 deaths.[25] In that context, the country’s business community enthusiastically welcomed the rollout’s commencement.[26]
On 2 March 2021, Indonesia still ranked first, third, and fifteenth in Southeast Asia, Asia, and the World respectively, where Covid-19 infections were concerned.[27] The government authorities also announced that it had just detected the first two Covid-19 B117 variant cases in the country.[28]
On the other hand, the mass vaccination programme continued to make progress, albeit slowly. Thanks to the continuous supply of Sinovac’s vaccine (Table 1), the country had seen most of its medical workers inoculated and vaccination had started for its senior citizens, merchants at public markets, clerics, teachers, journalists, athletes, public servants, government officials, military personnel and policemen.[29] The vaccination programme was however progressing at a slow pace. After around seven weeks, only around 1 per cent of the population had received their first vaccine shot.[30] For the government, nevertheless, even at such a pace, the vaccination programme was regarded to be of “no mean achievement” (capaian yang baik), especially when many other countries were still struggling to ensure access to vaccines.[31] The government’s spokesperson for Covid-19 vaccination, Reisa Broto Asmoro, conveyed: “We are grateful that Indonesia is among the group of nations that have commenced [the vaccination programme].”[32]
Table 1. The Arrival of Covid-19 Vaccines in Indonesia (as of March 2021)
| Stages | Dates | Sources/Manufacturers | Number of Doses (in million) |
| I | 6 December 2020 | Sinovac | 1.2 |
| II | 31 December 2020 | Sinovac | 1.8 |
| III | 12 January 2021 | Sinovac | 15.0[33] |
| IV | 2 February 2021 | Sinovac | 10.0[34] |
| V | 2 March 2021 | Sinovac | 10.0[35] |
| VI | 8 March 2021 | AstraZeneca (GAVI-COVAX) | 1.1 |
(Source: https://health.detik.com/berita-detikhealth/d-5492750/total-ada-40-juta-stok-vaksin-di-ri-berapa-sih-yang-sudah-disuntikkan)
Based on the timing and the vaccine’s purchase volume, Indonesia’s vaccination programme has been labelled “the first large-scale use outside of China of the Sinovac Biotech Ltd. vaccine.”[36] This leads to a portrayal of the country as being heavily reliant on China in coping with the pandemic, thereby putting its independence at risk.[37]
However, data shows that Jakarta has tried to diversify its Covid-19 vaccine sources (Table 2). Sinovac’s vaccines comprise about 38 per cent of the Indonesian government’s total firm orders of 329.5 million doses of vaccines. Moreover, the sum of firm orders and optional supplies from all secured sources (excluding those of Sinovac) amounts to 438 million (66% of the total). It would appear that the country is still far from being in danger of being dependent on China.
Table 2. Covid-19 Vaccine Sources for Indonesia’s Mass Vaccination Programme[38]
(Source: Indonesia’s Ministry of Health, 29 December 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23DK7Z5vSJA&t=207s)
Moreover, from the perspective of the Indonesian government, procuring vaccines from China and other external sources is merely a short-term strategy to curb the pandemic. In the long run, as the Minister of Research and Technology, Bambang Brodjonegoro said, “[Indonesia] still has to have the capability of developing a vaccine domestically.” In September 2020, the Indonesian government established Konsorsium Vaksin Nasional (National Vaccine Consortium), mobilising resources from the Eijkman Institute for Molecular Biology, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), the Universitas Indonesia (UI), the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Airlangga University, and Udayana University.[39] At the time of writing, the Eijkman Institute, which has been developing a Covid-19 vaccine since April 2020, is the frontrunner in homegrown vaccine development. On 16 March 2021, the head of the institute stated that the vaccine seed would be handed over to Bio Farma at the end of the month, so that the company could start pre-clinical trials as early as April 2021 and the first-phase clinical trial two months later.[40]
It is predicted that Bio Farma will start producing the vaccine no earlier than mid-2022.[42] The Indonesian government has allocated the use of the homegrown vaccine to the final stage of the mass vaccination programme, ensuring that the whole population will be vaccinated. In addition, the homegrown vaccine has been designated for use in the revaccination programme to boost the immune response of particular sections of the population.[42] This strategy aims to stop Indonesia from being completely reliant on imported vaccines, including the ones from Chinese manufacturers, in dealing with the pandemic in the long term.
ASEAN STATES’ STRATEGY TO AVOID OVERRELIANCE ON CHINA
Indonesia is not the only country in the region trying to avoid overreliance on China’s vaccine. ASEAN countries are attempting to diversify the sources of vaccine supply. The table below demonstrates that the Chinese vaccine is not the only source of supply for any Southeast Asian country.
Table 3. ASEAN Countries’ Source of Vaccine Supply
| Country | The vaccine as dealt/promised | Status |
| The Philippines | 50 m Novavax and Moderna 30 m India’s Covavax 20 m AstraZeneca 40 m COVAX 25 m Sinovac[43] | Finalised deals[44] Secured[45] 487,200 arrived on 4 Mar[46] Expected[47] Donated 600K arrived 1 Mar[48] |
| Myanmar | 1.5 m India’s AstraZeneca 30 m Covishield/AstraZeneca 300K Chinese vaccine | Donated – arrived on 22 Jan[49] Purchased from India[50] Promised by Wang Yi[51] |
| Thailand | 200K AstraZeneca[52] 26 m (joint production of AstraZeneca-Siam Bioscience)[53] 2 m Sinovac[54] | 117,600 arrived (24 Feb)[55] Planned 200K arrived (24 February)[56] |
| Cambodia | 1m Sinopharm[57] US$ 28 m grant for WHO-approved vaccine from Australia Indian’s AstraZeneca under COVAX | Donated 600K, arrived (7 Feb)[58] Promised[59] 324K Arrived (2 March)[60] |
| Laos | 300K Sinopharm 2 m Sputnik V[61] | Donated – arrived (8 Feb)[62] First batch (unspecified) arrived (21 Jan)[63] |
| Vietnam | 30 m British AstraZeneca[64] 60 m COVAX | 117,600 arrived (24 Feb)[65] Promised[66] |
| Brunei | Sinopharm British AstraZeneca COVAX | Donated (unspecified) arrived (9 Feb)[67] Secured (to inoculate 20% of population)[68] Secured (to inoculate 15% of population)[69] |
| Malaysia | 6.4 m AstraZeneca 25 m Pfizer-BioNTech[70] Sinopharm | Purchased[71] 300K arrived (21 Feb)[72] First batch (unspecified) arrived 27 Feb |
| Singapore | Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech[73] | First dose inoculated to 250K (11 Feb)[74] |
* From various sources as indicated in footnotes
Besides avoiding dependency on China, another drive for diversification is the relatively low effectiveness of the Chinese vaccine (50.4% for Sinovac, 79% for Sinopharm and 66% for CanSino).[75] While rich countries hoarded more reliable vaccines like that of Pfizer-BioNTech (95%), Moderna (95%), Novavax (89%) and AstraZeneca (62%-90%), China’s market is more focused towards developing countries. Nevertheless, India and Russia vaccine manufacturers are also aiming for developing country-markets.
JAKARTA’S SCS DIPLOMACY AMID THE PANDEMIC
ASEAN states’ diversification of vaccine supply demonstrates their reluctance to be too dependent on the Chinese vaccine, for fear of overreliance. A deadlock at the ASEAN Foreign Minister Meetings in 2012 and 2016, for instance, should not recur. In those stalemates, Cambodia did China a favour by opposing any reference to the SCS in the agreement.[76] The fact that the Chinese vaccine does not dominate the vaccine supply in Southeast Asian countries so far, to some extent, reduces the danger of discord among ASEAN states and enables Indonesia to lead ASEAN on the SCS issue.
Obviously, there is a link between the vaccine and the SCS issue. During the State of the Nation Address given on July 2020, Philippine President Duterte pleaded for the Covid-19 vaccine from Beijing. He suggested not confronting China in the SCS and decided to refuse a reestablishment of the US military base.[77] During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit in January 2021 to the Philippines, China donated 600,000 vaccines and asked Manila to show “friendly exchanges in public, like control your megaphone diplomacy a little” on the SCS issue, according to a diplomatic source.[78] In addition, Vietnam is uncomfortable with the idea that it has to depend on Chinese vaccine. Therefore, the country developed its homegrown Nano Covax vaccine for “national security purposes”, to shut China out amid the territorial dispute in the SCS.[79]
The SCS is an issue in which China is in a disadvantageous position legally and diplomatically. The area has already become a field of great power rivalry. In anticipation of the talks on the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS, China will need cooperation from ASEAN states. On the other hand, ASEAN wants to maintain peace and stability in the SCS. Indonesia is a central figure for this purpose. The country has been hosting a workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the SCS since 1990s. In September 2012, Indonesia came up with Zero Draft to advance the CoC talk.[80]
Vaccine cooperation must not muzzle the country from urging China to behave lawfully in the SCS. In 2020, when Indonesia was intensively discussing vaccine cooperation with China, Jakarta sent two diplomatic notes to the UN Secretary-General (26 May and 12 June) rejecting China’s SCS claim, quoting the 2016 Tribunal Award.[81] For Jakarta, the 2016 Tribunal Award and the 1982 UNCLOS are inseparable and prerequisites for peace and stability in the SCS.
Following the incident with Chinese fishing vessels violating Indonesia’s EEZ in the Natuna waters in January 2020, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry issued a statement against China’s SCS claim by invoking the 2016 Tribunal Award. This was the first time that a third party had done so.[82] The 2016 Tribunal Award which invalidates China’s nine-dash line is confirmation that China’s maritime rights claim and activities in the Natuna waters are unlawful. Hence, Jakarta resolutely rejected Beijing’s offer for a ‘negotiation’, on June 2020 since there were no overlapping claims.[83]
In early July 2020, China held a military drill near the Paracel Islands which are claimed by both Beijing and Hanoi, while Washington deployed two aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan to “support a free and open Indo-Pacific”.[84] Responding to the increasing tension in the SCS, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi held a virtual bilateral meeting with her Chinese counterpart on 30 July. At the event, Indonesia urged China to comply with the 1982 UNCLOS in settling disputes.[85]
The following month, at the 53rd anniversary of the establishment of ASEAN (8 August), Indonesia initiated the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement to Maintain Peace that decried “the changing geo-political dynamics” that may have “detrimental ramifications for the region”[86]. Furthermore, ASEAN Foreign Ministers also urged all parties to “resolve differences and disputes by peaceful means in accordance with international law”.[87]
On 13 January 2021, the day President Jokowi got his first shot of the Sinovac vaccine, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi met up with the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Jakarta. Retno urged China to respect the 1982 UNCLOS and maintain stability in the SCS.[88] She conveyed her message on behalf of ASEAN and stressed Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN centrality in a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.[89] Indonesia has been marshalling its ASEAN counterparts in a low profile manner to advance the progress of CoC negotiations – which is scheduled to reach a conclusion in 2021.[90] Indonesia is the most fitting actor to perform the role since it is the largest Southeast Asian state, a natural leader of ASEAN, a SCS littoral state, and not a SCS claimant.
On the margins of the 13th National People’s Congress held on 7 March 2021, Wang Yi expressed his commitment to a peaceful and stable SCS. He iterated that China would cooperate in formulating the CoC to “build consensus, enhance mutual trust, advance cooperation and maintain overall stability in the SCS”.[91] However, this commitment may not be sufficient for the region. Maintaining peace and stability in the SCS may need to find concrete form in a UNCLOS-based CoC. The boldness to urge China to respect the 1982 UNCLOS in dealing with the SCS issue is a litmus test for Indonesia and the region’s independence. Friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with China needs to be conducted without compromising regional peace and stability in accordance with the law.
CONCLUSION
Some scholars suggest that Sino-Indonesian vaccine cooperation may raise Jakarta’s dependency on Beijing and eventually lead to Jakarta compromising on its SCS stance. While this paper argues that there is a link between China’s vaccine diplomacy and the SCS issue, vaccine cooperation does not in any way soften Jakarta’s SCS stance. Sino-Indonesia vaccine cooperation is indeed asymmetrical, but it has not been entirely in favour of the former. Thanks to its early and large vaccine supply deal with Sinovac, Indonesia has been among the first countries to start a mass inoculation programme. It should also be noted that Jokowi’s government has so far maintained the commitment to diversify sources for Covid-19 vaccines, procuring a hundred million doses of vaccines from various non-Chinese manufacturers. In addition, the government has ensured the development of homegrown vaccines. This further suggests that Indonesia has been attempting to manage the potential risks which have emerged from its asymmetrical vaccine cooperation with China. In preventing itself from being heavily reliant on Beijing, Indonesia has so far refrained from putting its independence at risk in managing its overall bilateral relations with China.
This fact enables Jakarta to maintain its long-standing stance in the SCS. Indonesia resolutely maintains its pro-UNCLOS stance, and furthermore invoked the 2016 Tribunal Award that invalidates China’s SCS stance in its two diplomatic notes to the UN Secretary General in 2020 – the first third party from ASEAN to do so.
The tendency to avoid overreliance on Beijing is prevalent among ASEAN states. These countries attempt to diversify their vaccine sources. Interestingly, Vietnam is developing its homegrown vaccine for ‘national security purposes’. This fact may pave the way for Jakarta’s consolidation of ASEAN on the SCS issue. Amid the pandemic, Indonesia has been playing a leadership role in urging China to comply with the 1982 UNCLOS. This role is most fitting for Indonesia since it is the ASEAN central figure, the largest ASEAN nation, a SCS littoral state and a non-claimant state.
In the upcoming CoC talk, Indonesia must continue to solidify ASEAN’s position in formulating a UNCLOS-based CoC in the SCS.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/55, 28 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Adrian Wail Akhlas, “Indonesia’s GDP contracts deeper than expected at 5.32% in Q2,” The Jakarta Post, 5 August 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/05/indonesias-gdp-contracts-deeper-than-expected-at-5-32-in-q2.html.
[2] Kiki Siregar, “Indonesia foreign minister says vaccine cooperation with China won’t influence Jakarta’s position on South China Sea”, Channel News Asia, 7 October 2020, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesia-natuna-south-china-sea-covid-19-vaccine-retno-marsudi-13212760
[3] “肖亚庆调研新冠疫苗研发工作情况” (Xiao Yaqing inspects the recent progress of the new vaccine research and development), National Medical Product Administration, 24 July 2020, https://www.nmpa.gov.cn/yaowen/shchjgyw/20200724210701217.html
[4] Some scholars who suggest the idea are Gregory Poling (CSIS Washington DC), Evan Laksmana (CSIS Jakarta), Muhammad Zulfikar Rahmat (Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta), see footnote 7.
[5] Emma Connors, “Vaccine diplomacy a threat to South China Sea pushback”, Financial Review, 2 September 2020, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/vaccine-diplomacy-a-threat-to-south-china-sea-pushback-20200901-p55raa; Ralph Jennings, “Vaccine seen as potentially shoring up China’s image in Indonesia, the Philippines”, VOA, 1 January 2021, https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/vaccine-seen-potentially-shoring-chinas-image-indonesia-philippines; Lin Yang, “The price of Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, VOA, 12 September 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/price-beijings-vaccine-diplomacy-southeast-asia; “Indonesia looks to Joe Biden for more ‘professional stance’ on China”, Financial Times, 6 December 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/7f5eade4-03b2-40ec-beb3-a412903386e4; Amanda Hodge, “China to assist Jakarta with 5G rollout, The Australian, 15 January 2021, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/china-to-assist-jakarta-with-5g-rollout/news-story/b24d28b19bc4fe60a4744c42b49d7c27
[6] Kris Mada, “Berdiplomasi Memburu Vaksin (Diplomacy for Securing Vaccine),” Kompas (Jakarta), 3 August 2020.
[7] The Indonesian government had been considering the possibility of securing access to potential Covid-19 vaccines from other Chinese developers: Sinopharm and CanSino Biologics. However, the potentials of establishing cooperation with these two companies have not received further follow-ups because, as Indonesian Health Minister Budi Gunadi stated, their vaccines’ “prices were high and [Bio Farma] cannot use their technology.” See Hussein Abri Dongoran, “The Vaccine Race,” Tempo English, 18 January 2021, https://magz.tempo.co/read/37439/the-vaccine-race
[8] Hussein Abri Dongoran, “The Vaccine Race”
[9] An interview with an official at Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 November 2020. See also “Nasionalisme Vaksin,” Kompas (Jakarta), 20 July 2020.
[10] Dian Septiari, “Government, Bio Farma secure vaccine bulk supply from China’s Sinovac,” The Jakarta Post, 21 August 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/21/retno-bio-farma-secure-vaccine-bulk-supply-from-chinas-sinovac.html.
[11] “Perusahaan China, Sinovac, Sebut Indonesia Pembeli Terbesar Vaksin Corona (A Chinese Company, Sinovac, Stated That Indonesia is the Largest Corona Vaccine Buyer),” Kumparan, 7 September 2020, https://kumparan.com/kumparanbisnis/perusahaan-china-sinovac-sebut-indonesia-pembeli-terbesar-vaksin-corona-1u9HsWJadQr/full.
[12] Resty Woro Yuniar, “Indonesia gets the call to be coronavirus vaccine testing, production hub,” South China Morning Post, 19 November 2020, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3110580/indonesia-gets-call-be-coronavirus-vaccine-testing-production;
[13] “The People’s Republic of China is Ready to Support Indonesia to Become Vaccine Hub of the Southeast Asian Region,” Kemlu.go.id, 10 March 2021, https://kemlu.go.id/beijing/en/news/11587/the-peoples-republic-of-china-is-ready-to-support-indonesia-to-become-vaccine-hub-of-the-southeast-asian-region
[14] Hussein Abri Dongoran, “The Vaccine Race”
[15] Hussein Abri Dongoran, “The Vaccine Race”
[16] “Don’t let second wave of Covid-19 happen in Indonesia: Task force,” The Jakarta Post, 6 November 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/11/06/dont-let-second-wave-of-covid-19-happen-in-indonesia-task-force.html
[17] Dian Septiari, “First batch of COVID-19 vaccine lands in Indonesia,” The Jakarta Post, 7 December 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/12/07/first-batch-of-covid-19-vaccine-lands-in-indonesia.html.
[18] “Sambutan Presiden Jokowi untuk Kedatangan Vaksin Covid-19, 6 Desember 2020 (President Jokowi’s remarks on the arrival of Covid-19 vaccines, 6 December 2020),” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vluRG8BsN-0.
[19] Kris Mada, “Berdiplomasi Memburu Vaksin,”
[20] Adhitya Ramadhan, “Seluk-Beluk Penawar Covid-19 (Details on Covid-19 antidote),” Kompas, 18 January 2021, p. 4.
[21] Ardila Syakriah, “Indonesia allows emergency use of Sinovac vaccine,” The Jakarta Post, 11 January 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/01/11/indonesia-allows-emergency-use-of-sinovac-vaccine.html.
[22] “MUI: Vaksin Covid-19 Buatan Sinovac Halal (”MUI: Sinovac’s Covid-19 Vaccine, Halal),“ Kompas, 9 January 2021, p. 1 and 15; Vaksin Sinovac Siap Digunakan (Sinovac’s vaccines are ready to use),” Kompas, 12 January 2021, p. 1 and 15.
[23] See “LIVE: Vaksinasi Covid-19 Perdana di Indonesia, 13 January 2021, Pukul 09:00 WIB”, (LIVE: Inaugural Covid-19 vaccination in Indonesia, 13 January 2021, 9:00 a.m,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNzzege1VdQ
[24] “Rushing for A New Vaccine,” Tempo English, 18 January 2021, https://magz.tempo.co/read/37438/rushing-for-a-new-vaccine.
[25] “Covid RI Hari ini: Kasus Aktif Hingga Kematian Cetak Rekor! (Today, Indonesia reports new records for daily infections and death),” CNBC Indonesia, 13 January 2021, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20210113163656-16-215692/covid-ri-hari-ini-kasus-aktif-hingga-kematian-cetak-rekor
[26] “Pemulihan Ekonomi Terjebak Euforia Vaksin (Economic recovery is trapped in euphoria over vaccine),” Kompas, 18 January 2021, p. 9.
[27] This was based on data for 2 March 2021 in https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries
[28] Natasia Christy Wahyuni and Jayanty Nada Shofa, “Indonesia Enters One Year of Covid-19 with Two New Variant Cases,” Jakarta Globe, 2 March 2021, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-enters-one-year-of-covid19-with-two-new-variant-cases.
[29] Maria Fatima Bona, “Indonesia to Begin Phase Two of Covid Vaccination,” Jakarta Globe, 15 February 2021, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-to-begin-phase-two-of-covid-vaccination; Nicky Aulia Widadio, “Indonesia begins COVID-19 vaccinations for 5M teachers,” Anadolu Agency, 24 February 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesia-begins-covid-19-vaccinations-for-5m-teachers/2155399; “Big turnout as Indonesia holds mass COVID-19 vaccination drive for clergy,” Chanel News Asia, 25 February 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/covid-19-indonesia-big-turnout-mass-vaccination-drive-clergy-14280950; Markus Junianto Sihalo and Maria Fatima Bona, “Indonesia Begins Vaccinating Elderly Citizens, Public Sector Workers,” Jakarta Globe, 17 February 2021, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-begins-vaccinating-elderly-citizens-public-sector-workers; Ramadani Saputra, “Ready, set, go! Indonesian athletes eye tournaments after receiving vaccine,” The Jakarta Post, 28 February 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2021/02/28/ready-set-go-indonesian-athletes-eye-tournaments-after-receiving-vaccine.html;
[30] “Data Vaksinasi COVID-19 (Update per 2 Maret 2021),” Covid19.go.id, 2 March 2021, https://covid19.go.id/berita/data-vaksinasi-covid-19-update-2-maret-2021
[31] “LIVE: Kedatangan Vaksin Tahap Keenam, Bandara Soekarno Hatta, 8 Maret 2021”, 8 March 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=–Im0YSfe7U
[32] “LIVE”: Kedatangan Vaksin Tahap Keenam, Bandara Soekarno Hatta, 8 Maret 2021”
[33] The vaccine arrived in bulk
[34] The vaccine arrived in bulk
[35] The vaccine arrived in bulk
[36] Edna Tarigan and Victoria Milko, “Indonesia Starts Mass COVID Vaccinations Over Vast Territory,” The Diplomat, 14 January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/indonesia-starts-mass-covid-vaccinations-over-vast-territory
[37] “Indonesia relies on vaccine rollout as officials lose ‘control’ of pandemic,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/41f84b17-a79b-4736-b54f-cd436e583416
[38] During the press conference, Indonesian Minister of Health claimed that Jakarta had concluded deals with Sinovac, Novavax, Gavi-Covax. and AstraZeneca, and was still discussing a vaccine procurement deal with Pfizer. On 9 March 2021, Bio Farma’s spokesperson claimed that Indonesia had not yet sealed a deal with Pfizer on vaccine procurement. See, Maria Fatima Bona, “Jubir Bio Farma Tegaskan Belum Ada Nota Kesepahaman dengan Pfizer,” Beritasatu.com, 9 March 2021, https://www.beritasatu.com/kesehatan/743529/jubir-bio-farma-tegaskan-belum-ada-nota-kesepahaman-dengan-pfizer
[39] Erick Tanjung & Stephanus Aranditio, “Update Vaksin Merah Putih, Bulan Ini Disuntikan ke Hewan (Merah Putih Vaccine Update, Animals Will Be Injected This Month,” Suara , 27 Ocotber 2020, https://www.suara.com/news/2020/10/27/152940/update-vaksin-merah-putih-bulan-ini-disuntikan-ke-hewan.
[40] “Eijkman Institute Report Development of Vaccine Seeds Development,” Tempo.co, 17 March 2021, https://en.tempo.co/read/1442963/eijkman-institute-report-development-of-vaccine-seeds-development
[41] Ibid.
[42] “Menristek Harap Vaksin Merah Putih Bisa Kejar Bagian Vaksinasi Covid-19 di Indonesia” (Minister hopes Red-and-White Vaccine can take part in Indonesia’s Covid-19 vaccination), Kompas.com, 10 March 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/03/10/14242741/menristek-harap-vaksin-merah-putih-bisa-kejar-bagian-vaksinasi-covid-19-di.
[43] “Philippines secures 25m doses of Sinovac COVID vaccine”, NikkeiAsia, 11 January 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Philippines-secures-25m-doses-of-Sinovac-COVID-vaccine
[44] Gregory Poling, Simon Tran Hudes, “Vaccine Diplomacy is Biden’s First Test in Southeast Asia, CSIS, 28 January 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/vaccine-diplomacy-bidens-first-test-southeast-asia
[45] Ibid.
[46] Daphne Galvez, “First shipment of AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccines arrives in PH, Inquirer.net, 4 March 2021, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1403155/first-shipment-of-astrazeneca-covid-19-vaccines-arrive-in-ph
[47] Ibid.
[48] “Philippines finally receives first batch of COVID-19 vaccine, Voice of America, 1 March 2021, https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/philippines-finally-receives-first-batch-covid-19-vaccine
[49] “Myanmar receives first batch of COVID-19 vaccines from India”, Channel News Asia, 22 January 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-india-covid-19-vaccine-14020162
[50] Hmue Angel, “More than 380,000 in Myanmar receive COVID-19 vaccine”, Myanmar Times, 5 February 2021, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/more-380000-myanmar-receive-covid-19-vaccine.html
[51] Aung Naing Soe, “China Promises Myanmar 300,000 Vaccine Doses”, VOA, 14 January 2021, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/china-promises-myanmar-300000-vaccine-doses
[52] Panarat Thepgumpanat, “Thai regulator approves AstraZeneca vaccine for emergency use: sources”, Reuters, 21 January 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-thailand-vaccine-idUSKBN29Q194
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Zazithorn Ruengchinda, “Covid-19 vaccine by AstraZeneca arrived in Vietnam and Thailand”, ScandAsia, 28 February 2021, https://scandasia.com/first-batch-of-covid-19-vaccine-by-astrazeneca-arrived-vietnam-and-thailand
[56] “Thailand receives its first coronavirus vaccines”, The Japan Times, 24 February 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/02/24/world/science-health-world/thailand-china-vaccines
[57] “COVID-19 vaccines from China arrive in Cambodia”, Channel News Asia, 7 February 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/covid-19-vaccine-diplomacy-china-cambodia-hun-sen-14132418
[58] “COVID-19 vaccines from China arrive in Cambodia”, Channel News Asia, 7 February 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/covid-19-vaccine-diplomacy-china-cambodia-hun-sen-14132418
[59] “COVID-19 vaccines from China arrive in Cambodia”, Channel News Asia, 7 February 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/covid-19-vaccine-diplomacy-china-cambodia-hun-sen-14132418
[60] Sopheng Cheang, “First COVAX vaccines arrive in Cambodia from India, Medical Press, 2 March 2021, https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-03-covax-vaccines-cambodia-india.html
[61] “Russia delivers to Laos batch of Sputnik V vaccine”, TASS, 21 January 2021, https://tass.com/economy/1247569
[62] “Laos receives 300,000 vaccine doses from China – reports”, Reuters, 8 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-laos-vaccine-idUSKBN2A810D
[63] Ibid.
[64] “Vietnam to acquire 30 mln COVID-19 vaccine doses from Britain”, Xinhuanet, 4 January 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/04/c_139640544.htm
[65] “Vietnam says panel recommends Sputnik V, Moderna vaccine for use, Reuters, 26 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-russia-vaccine-vie/vietnam-says-panel-recommends-sputnik-v-moderna-vaccines-for-use-idUSKBN2AQ0O5
[66] “Vietnam details priorities for first phase of COVID-19 vaccinations”, Channel News Asia, 23 February 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/vietnam-covid-19-vaccine-first-phase-health-workers-diplomats-14262118
[67] “Brunei receives COVID-19 vaccine donation from China”, Xinhuanet, 11 February 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/11/c_139736129.htm
[68] Shareen Han, “COVID-19: Brunei to receive Oxford vaccine for 20% of population”, The Scoop, 29 January 2021, https://thescoop.co/2021/01/29/covid-19-brunei-to-receive-oxford-vaccine-for-20-of-population
[69] Ibid.
[70] “Malaysia secures 6.4m doses of COVID-19 vaccine to treat 40% of population”, Arab News, 23 December 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1781431/world
[71] “Malaysia secures 6.4m doses of COVID-19 vaccine to treat 40% of population”, Arab News, 23 December 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1781431/world
[72] “Malaysia’s Covid-19 vaccine roll-out will drive border reopening efforts with Singapore: Johor MB”, The Strait Times, 23 February 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-covid-19-vaccine-roll-out-will-spearhead-border-reopening-efforts-with
[73]Toh Ting Wei, “First shipment of Moderna’s Covid-19 vaccine arrives in Singapore ahead of schedule”, The Strait Times, 18 February 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/first-shipment-of-modernas-covid-19-vaccine-arrives-in-singapore-on-feb-17
[74] Tham Yuen-C, “Over 250,000 in Singapore have received first dose of Covid-19 vaccine: PM Lee”, The Straits Times, 11 February 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/over-250000-have-received-first-dose-of-covid-19-vaccine-pm-0
[75] “A Guide to Global COVID_19 Vaccine Efforts”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/guide-global-covid-19-vaccine-efforts
[76] Manuel Mogato, “ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement, Reuters, 25 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean-idUSKCN1050F6
[77] Sofia Tomacruz, “Duterte pleads with Xi Jinping: Prioritize PH for Covid-19 vaccine, Rappler, 27 July 2020, https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-pleads-xi-jinping-prioritize-philippines-covid-19-vaccine-sona-2020-speech
[78] Huizhong Wu and Kristen Gelineau, “ Chinese COVID-19 vaccine spread around the world, despite concerns and lack of data”, Los Angeles Times, 2 March 2021, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-03-02/chinese-covid-vaccines-distributed-worldwide-despite-concerns
[79] “Hanoi spurns China’s vaccine diplomacy with homemade shot”, NikkeiAsia, 28 February 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Hanoi-spurns-China-s-vaccine-diplomacy-with-homemade-shot
[80] Carlyle A. Thayer, “Indonesia’s Effort to Forge ASEAN Unity on a Code of Conduct”, Paper at the Managing Tensions in the South China Sea Conference held by CSIS on 5-6 June 2013, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Thayer_ConferencePaper.pdf
[81] “Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Malaysia in the South China Sea”, UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mys_12_12_2019.html
[82] Romel Regalado Bagares, “Indonesia’s new diplomatic bombshell vs Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea”, ABS-CBN News, 30 May 2020, https://news.abs-cbn.com/spotlight/05/30/20/analysis-indonesias-new-diplomatic-bombshell-vs-chinese-expansionism-in-the-south-china-sea
[83] Tia Asmara, “Indonesia rejects Beijing’s offer for South China Sea Talks”, Benarnews, 5 June 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/no-negotiation-06052020155450.html
[84] “US conducts exercise in South China Sea as China also carries out military drills”, The Telegraph, 4 July 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/07/04/us-conducts-exercises-south-china-sea-chinaalso-carries-military
[85] “South China Sea: Indonesia asks China to honour UNCLOS, Antara News, 1 August 2020, https://en.antaranews.com/news/153350/south-china-sea-indonesia-asks-china-to-honor-unclos
[86] “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Importance of Maintaining Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia”, 8 August 2020, https://asean.org/storage/2020/08/FINAL-ASEAN-FM-Statement-on-Peace-and-Stability-in-Southeast-Asia-Region-18.2.pdf
[87] Idem.
[88] “RI Ajak China Jaga Stabilitas di LCS” (Indonesia urged China to maintain stability in the SCS), KOMPAS, 14 January 2021, https://www.kompas.id/baca/internasional/2021/01/14/indonesia-ajak-china-jaga-stabilitas-di-laut-china-selatan
[89] Ibid.
[90] Emma Connors, “Vaccine diplomacy a threat to South China Sea pushback”, Financial Review, 2 September 2020, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/vaccine-diplomacy-a-threat-to-south-china-sea-pushback-20200901-p55raa; Lin Yang, “The price of Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy in Southeast Asia, VOA, 12 September 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/price-beijings-vaccine-diplomacy-southeast-asia
[91] “China to help Indonesia become ASEAN vaccine production centre, Minister says”, Tempo, 8 March 2021, https://en.tempo.co/read/1439961/china-to-help-indonesia-become-asean-vaccine-production-center-minister-says
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2021/54 “The Military’s Resurging Influence in Vietnam” by Le Hong Hiep
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) appears to be gaining leverage in Vietnam’s political system. Two generals, Luong Cuong and Phan Van Giang, were elected to the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) Politburo at its 13th National Congress.
- The number of military representatives in the Party’s Central Committee also increased from 20 to 23, cementing the VPA’s status as the largest voting bloc in the Committee.
- The VPA’s increasing influence reflects the CPV’s security concerns over growing tensions in the South China Sea, which enabled the VPA to gain more leverage in the Party’s top decision-making bodies. Its political position has also benefited from the growing importance of the defence industry and the commercial success of military-run businesses such as Viettel.
- The VPA’s increasing leverage may discourage reforms towards more political freedoms and lead to greater “securitisation” of certain economic policies. It may also harden Vietnam’s stance on the South China Sea, but this does not necessarily mean that Vietnam will take a more adventurous approach to the dispute.
- As the CPV continues to subject the VPA to its tight control, the military’s influence will remain within boundaries set by the Party, and may fall again in the future.
* Le Hong Hiep is Senior Fellow in the Vietnam Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
The 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), which concluded in early February 2021, resulted in several surprising personnel arrangements.[1] One of them was the election of Colonel General Phan Van Giang, Chief of General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) and Deputy Minister of Defence, and General Luong Cuong, Head of the VPA General Political Department, into the CPV’s Politburo. This is the first time in 20 years that two VPA representatives have been elected into the Politburo. In addition, the number of military representatives in the Party’s Central Committee also increased from 20 to 23, cementing the VPA’s status as the largest voting bloc in the Committee.
What explains the military’s increased representation in the CPV’s top echelons, and hence its increasing leverage? What does this trend mean for Vietnam’s political, economic and foreign policy prospects?
This paper explores these questions. It starts with a review of the military’s traditional role in Vietnamese politics before analysing the factors that have led to the VPA’s increasing influence over the past decade. The paper concludes by assessing this trend’s implications for Vietnam.
“THE PARTY COMMANDS THE GUN”
Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong famously said in 1938 that “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.”[2] The CPV follows the same principle and has always put the VPA under tight control. Party officials and ideologues frequently criticise the idea of depoliticising the VPA and turning it into a “national army” independent of the CPV, something they consider a scheme by “hostile forces” to undermine the Party’s rule.[3]
The CPV’s constitution stipulates that the VPA is subject to the Party’s “absolute, direct and comprehensive leadership”.[4] The Party exercises its control over the VPA through different mechanisms, the most important of which is the Central Military Commission (CMC) headed by the CPV general secretary himself. The CMC supervises party affairs within the VPA, and is represented at the central level by the VPA General Political Department. All units of the VPA from the top to the bottom are subject to the Party’s control, made possible by the existence of a vertical system of political units headed by political commissars.
The Party needs to maintain tight control over the VPA because the latter plays an essential role in not only national defence but also the regime’s security. Although the Party has never faced the level of threat that its Chinese counterpart did in 1989 when it mobilised soldiers and tanks to crush the pro-democracy Tiananmen Square protests, the CPV views the VPA as a critical tool for the Party to deal with imminent threats against itself. Moreover, the VPA also plays an important role in the country’s socio-economic development. Apart from running more than 20 major state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the VPA also manages 28 economic-defence zones[5] located in remote border areas. These zones, run by economic-defence corps, are part and parcel of the Party’s strategy to protect national sovereignty and promote socio-economic development in these less-developed areas.
The VPA’s importance to the country and the CPV is reflected in its strong representation in state bodies and party governance institutions. It is allocated a significant bloc of seats in the National Assembly as well as the CPV’s Central Committee and Politburo, turning it into an influential player in national politics. The VPA’s representation in these bodies was markedly strong during war time and periods of heightened national security.
For example, at the second National Congress of the Party in 1951, General Vo Nguyen Giap (Minister of National Defence) and General Nguyen Chi Thanh (Head of VPA General Political Department) were elected into the seven-man-strong Politburo.[6] They retained their seats at the third Party Congress in 1960. In addition, General Van Tien Dung (VPA Chief of General Staff) was elected as an alternate member before being promoted to full member in 1972, replacing General Thanh, who passed away in 1967. The fourth CPV Congress in 1976, held a year after the country was unified, witnessed the increased influence of the VPA with three out of 14 members of the Politburo coming from the military. They were General Vo Nguyen Giap (Minister of Defence), General Van Tien Dung (VPA Chief of General Staff), and General Chu Huy Man (Head of VPA General Political Department). The VPA continued to maintain strong influence at the fifth CPV Congress held in 1982. Specifically, General Van Tien Dung (Minister of Defence), General Chu Huy Man (Head of VPA General Political Department) and Colonel General Le Duc Anh (Deputy Minister of Defence) were elected full members of the new Politburo. In addition, Dong Sy Nguyen, who was formerly a lieutenant general and deputy minister of defence, was elected as an alternate member. The strong representation of the military can be explained by the fact that since 1979, Vietnam had been involved in prolonged armed conflicts along its border with China and in Cambodia, rendering national defence once again a top priority for the country.
After adopting economic reforms under the Doi Moi policy in 1986, withdrawing from Cambodia in 1989 and normalising relations with China in 1991, Vietnam entered into a phase of peace and development. Economic development became the top priority for the country and national defence became less of a concern. This gradually led to the declining role of the VPA in national politics, reflected in its reduced representation in the Politburo. At the CPV’s ninth National Congress in 2001, Minister of Defence Pham Van Tra was the only military figure elected into the Politburo, setting a new norm for the next twenty years.
THE LARGEST VOTING BLOC
At the 13th CPV National Congress, the norm of electing only one VPA representative into the Politburo was broken when both Colonel General Phan Van Giang and General Luong Cuong won their seats. In addition, the VPA’s representation in the Party’s Central Committee also steadily increased over the past 10 years. In 2011, 18 out of 175 full members of the Committee (10.3 per cent) came from the VPA. In 2016, when the number of the Committee’s full members expanded to 180, the number of VPA representatives also increased to 20 (11.1 per cent). At the 13th Congress, a total of 23 VPA representatives were elected into the Committee, accounting for 12.8 per cent of its membership. As a result, the VPA currently forms the largest voting bloc in the Central Committee, the Party’s paramount executive body between its national congresses. Two major factors may account for this trend.
First, rising tensions in the South China Sea tend to enhance the VPA’s bargaining power. Defending national security and sovereignty has been central to the CPV’s political legitimacy, meaning that the VPA has a bigger say whenever the country’s security and sovereignty are threatened. As discussed in the previous section, this pattern was well established in the past with the VPA gaining more influence during the Vietnam War and in the 1980s when the country faced serious security threats from China and the Khmer Rouge. China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea over the past decade[7] has deepened the CPV’s security concerns, enabling the VPA to gain not only more leverage in the Party’s top decision-making bodies but also more budgetary resources. For example, between 2010 and 2018, Vietnam’s military spending on average was equal to 2.62 per cent of its GDP.[8] In 2018, Vietnam was the 35th largest military spender in the world with a defence budget of around US$5.5 billion.[9]
Second, the VPA’s political position appears to have benefited from its expanding economic role. Apart from helping to develop the local economy in remote areas, the VPA’s economic role also extends to a wide range of activities, including manufacturing, telecommunications, information technology, banking, transportation and construction. There are two main groups of military-run businesses. The first is defence companies which mostly produce weapons and defence equipment for the VPA. They are managed by the General Department of Defence Industry under the Ministry of Defence. The second includes businesses which serve both the VPA and civilian clients. Vietnam’s 2009 Defence White Paper listed ten such major businesses,[10] the most notable of which include Viettel, a telecommunications and industrial conglomerate; Military Bank; and Sai Gon New Port, the biggest container terminal operator in Vietnam. In recent years, these companies’ commercial success and their increasing contribution to national economic development have helped enhance the VPA’s reputation and influence. Viettel, for example, has been considered a national champion in developing Vietnam’s defence industry and high-tech capabilities, especially 5G technologies. In 2016, Major General Nguyen Manh Hung, then general director of Viettel and currently minister of information and communications, was elected into the CPV Central Committee, the first time for a military business leader. At the 13th CPV Congress, Lieutenant General Tran Hong Minh, Head of the General Department of Defence Industry, also won a seat in the Central Committee.
In addition, internal competition between Luong Cuong and Phan Van Giang for the Politburo membership and the defence minister position was another important factor that led to the election of both men into the Politburo. Cuong initially had more advantage over Giang because he held a more senior rank and was elected into the Party’s Secretariat in 2016, while Giang was only a Central Committee member. Moreover, Giang, born in October 1960, was overaged and originally ineligible for Politburo membership. As such, Cuong was in a better position to become the only Politburo member representing the military, which should have paved the way for him to become the new defence minister. However, there was growing consensus within the VPA leadership that the minister position should be given to a commander rather than a political general, especially given that the outgoing minister, Ngo Xuan Lich, was himself a political general. There was reportedly fierce competition between the two men in the run-up to the 13th CPV Congress. In the end, to accommodate both sides, the Party decided to extend an age limit exemption to Giang, which enabled him to become a Politburo member and later minister of defence. Cuong, meanwhile, remains as head of the VPA General Political Department.
In 2016, there was also competition between Ngo Xuan Lich, then head of the VPA General Political Department, and Do Ba Ty, then Chief of General Staff, for the Politburo membership and defence minister position. However, only Lich was eventually elected into the Politburo. This time around, the Party’s decision to grant Politburo membership to both Cuong and Giang is therefore an indication of the VPA’s growing leverage.
GREATER IMPLICATIONS
It remains to be seen if the election of two military representatives into the CPV Politburo is just a one-off development or a new norm to be repeated in subsequent party congresses. Similarly, it is unclear if the VPA will be able to maintain its current all-time strong representation in the Party’s Central Committee in the future. However, if the South China Sea dispute intensifies and military-run businesses continue to contribute substantially to Vietnam’s economic development, VPA generals will likely be able to maintain their current level of leverage.
There is little evidence that the military’s increasing influence will lead to major changes in Vietnam’s political, economic and foreign policies. However, minor or gradual shifts may be possible. Politically, despite its increasing leverage, the VPA will remain subject to the CPV’s total control. However, normally seen as more conservative and security-minded, VPA generals, with their stronger say in both the Politburo and Central Committee, will endorse prudent approaches to political issues, which may eventually slow down certain reforms, especially those towards more political freedoms.
Economically, there are indications that the “securitisation” of certain economic policies may slow down Vietnam’s economic growth. For example, the 2020 Law on Investment mentioned the word “national defence” 12 times compared to six times in the 2014 version. In particular, the 2020 law introduced new provisions[11] to subject certain investment projects and share acquisitions, especially those by foreign investors, to the approval of the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, there have been complaints from some investors about delays in the licensing process. If the Vietnamese government does not introduce timely bylaws to provide clearer guidance and simplify the approval process, such regulations will likely worsen Vietnam’s business environment and hurt its economic growth in the long run. At the same time, while military-run businesses contribute to Vietnam’s overall economic development, their growth may crowd out private investors in certain sectors and contribute to an unlevel playing field. This is because defence companies, through their strong connections with the military and government authorities, normally enjoy an unparalleled advantage in getting access to capital, land and other policy incentives.
Finally, the VPA’s influence on Vietnam’s overall foreign policy will remain strong, but its increased leverage in domestic politics is unlikely to lead to major shifts in Vietnam’s foreign relations. The VPA’s stronger say in the CPV’s top policy-making bodies may harden Vietnam’s stance on the South China Sea, but this does not necessarily mean that Vietnam will take a more adventurous approach to the dispute. Although Vietnam is determined to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, VPA leaders, who have gone through multiple costly wars in the past, tend to favour the peaceful resolution of disputes and avoid armed conflicts where possible. This is in line with Vietnam’s focus on domestic development, which depends on its ability to maintain peace and stability. Therefore, although Vietnam fiercely opposed China’s planting of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in its exclusive economic zone in 2014, which Vietnam saw as a serious infringement, it has since adopted a more restrained approach to China’s other provocations in its South China Sea waters.
In sum, the VPA’s increasing leverage in the CPV’s top policy-making bodies may have some impact on Vietnam’s political, economic and foreign policy outlook. However, such impact will likely be moderate and limited. As the CPV continues to “command the gun”, the VPA’s influence, though increasing in recent years, will remain within boundaries set by the Party. In the future, the generals’ influence may fall again if the South China Sea dispute cools down, or if the Party’s top leadership sees potential problems arising from the VPA’s growing clout.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/54, 27 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] For an analysis of these unconventional arrangements, see Le Hong Hiep, “The CPV’s 15th Plenum: “The Art of the Possible” in Vietnamese Politics”, Fulcrum, 18 January 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/the-cpvs-15th-plenum-the-art-of-the-possible-in-vietnamese-politics/
[2] “Problems of War and Strategy”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, pp. 224-225, available at Marxists Internet Archive (transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project): https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm
[3] See, for example, “‘Phi chính trị hóa’ Quân đội – một thủ đoạn không mới, nhưng phải luôn cảnh giác”, Tạp chí Quốc phòng Toàn dân, 13 April 2018, http://tapchiqptd.vn/vi/phong-chong-dbhb-tu-dien-bien-tu-chuyen-hoa/phi-chinh-tri-hoa-quan-doi-mot-thu-doan-khong-moi-nhung-phai-luon-canh-giac/11528.html; CPV, “Nâng cao cảnh giác, đập tan âm mưu ‘phi chính trị hóa’ Quân đội, 15 March 2021, https://dangcongsan.vn/bao-ve-nen-tang-tu-tuong-cua-dang/nang-cao-canh-giac-dap-tan-am-muu-phi-chinh-tri-hoa-quan-doi-576303.html.
[4] Article 25 of the CPV constitution (in Vietnamese) available at https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/van-kien-tu-lieu-ve-dang/dieu-le-dang/dieu-le-dang-do-dai-hoi-dai-bieu-toan-quoc-lan-thu-xi-cua-dang-thong-qua-3431
[5] For a list of these economic-defence zones, see Ministry of Defence, 2019 Vietnam National Defence (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2019), pp. 125–27.
[6] Six more members were added to the Politburo in 1955-1956.
[7] Some examples of China’s growing assertiveness include its decision to plant giant oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in 2014, its construction and militarisation of seven artificial islands in the Spratlys, and its threat to attack Vietnamese outposts in the Spratlys in 2017.
[8] According to Vietnam’s 2019 defence white paper, Vietnam’s defence budget as share of GDP in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 was 2.23, 2.82, 2.88, 2.69, 2.69, 2.72, 2.64, 2.51, and 2.36 per cent, respectively.
[9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Trends In World Military Expenditure, 2018, April 2019.
[10] Ministry of Defence, Quốc Phòng Việt Nam [Vietnam’s National Defence] (Ha Noi: Ministry of Defence, 2009), p. 114.
[11] These provisions are found in articles 24, 26, 32 of the law, which is available (in Vietnamese) at http://datafile.chinhphu.vn/file-remote-v2/DownloadServlet?filePath=vbpq/2020/07/61.signed.pdf
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2021/53 ““Political Connectivity”: A New Dimension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Philippines” by Aaron Jed Rabena
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, party-to-party (P2P) relations have been forged and deepened between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and various Philippine political parties: a) For the first time in history, there was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the CPC and a major Philippine political party, Duterte’s PDP-Laban. b) The creation of a China-Philippines Political Parties Belt and Road Consultation Mechanism highlights a fresh political thrust of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) beyond its stated five pillars of cooperation comprising policy coordination, economic (trade and investment), infrastructure, and financial and people-to-people connectivity.
- P2P diplomacy gives China a new diplomatic layer to promote bilateral relations and complement confidence-building measures conducted through traditional channels.
- China’s multiparty engagement with the broader Philippine political sector enables Beijing to hedge at the sub-national level given the plurality of political bases in the Philippines.
- Beijing’s P2P diplomacy will be tested as the 2022 Philippine national elections draw near and could serve as an alternative platform for dialogue in situations where government-to-government political relations are strained.
*Aaron Jed Rabena is Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress in Manila and a member of the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR). His areas of interest include Strategic Studies, East Asian Geopolitics and Multilateral Politics, Political Risk, and Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy. Email: aaronrabena@gmail.com.
INTRODUCTION
Since Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2016, not only have government-to-government ties with China reached an all-time high in the form of “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation,” party-to-party (P2P) or inter-party ties have also become more active between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and various Philippine political parties particularly President Duterte’s political party where he concurrently serves as Chairman, the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino—Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban). This is in sharp contrast to the previous Benigno Aquino Administration which saw no formal P2P exchanges and limited high-level engagements with China given the adversarial state of bilateral ties back then, due to tensions in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea (SCS/WPS).
China’s P2P engagements are nothing new and have been used to marshal external support during the revolutionary days of the CPC, help consolidate China’s independence after the founding of the New China or the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and construct an international environment conducive to economic modernization since Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reform and opening-up.[1] It is important to underscore that in the Chinese system, the Party (CPC) not only commands the gun, as Mao Zedong put it, but also the State. This explains why state officials are Party members first and why Party congresses precede state functions such as the People’s congresses. In fact, the Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作领导小组), which was upgraded to the Committee for Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作委员会) in 2018, is under the auspices of the Party and arguably has more political power than state institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). This is because the head of the Committee for Foreign Affairs is led by Politburo member Yang Jiechi and this same committee coordinates and supervises the overseas work of all party, government and military agencies.[2]
Moreover, there are Party committees in the MOFA, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and even private corporations. Since Party authority reign at all times supreme over the state and the military, let alone that the 14-Point Basic Policy of the “Xi Jinping Thought” states “ensuring Party leadership over all work,” China’s P2P diplomacy may thus be likened to “parliamentary diplomacy.” The Party organ in charge of China’s P2P diplomacy or Party external work is the International Department of the CPC Central Committee or also known as “ID-CPC.” Among the functional roles of ID-CPC is to collect information on political developments overseas and provide policy recommendations to the Central Committee and the Politburo Standing Committee.[3]
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES OF CHINA’S PARTY-TO-PARTY DIPLOMACY
P2P diplomacy gives China a new diplomatic layer – apart from media diplomacy, think tank diplomacy and military diplomacy – to promote overall bilateral relations and complement confidence-building measures being done through traditional channels. In addition to ID-CPC and Central Committee members, China’s P2P delegations include high-level members of provincial party committees and governments. ID-CPC’s activities, on the other hand, include “conference diplomacy,” party dialogues, training/visiting programmes, and sponsorships of overseas party schools. Since President Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the CPC has doubled down on reaching out to other political parties.[4] In 2017, Xi announced that 15,000 party members from around the world ought to be brought to China within five years.[5] In this regard, ID-CPC has built a global network with more than 600 political parties in over 160 countries, and receives and sends off more than 300 delegations each year.[6]
Top priority in the CPC’s engagements are countries that are ideologically aligned with China or where China has strategic foreign policy interests.[7] Examples include the ruling parties of socialist countries (e.g., Cuban Communist Party, North Korean Workers’ Party, Communist Party of Vietnam, Lao People’s Revolutionary Party) and those in Cambodia and Sub-Saharan Africa.[8] The CPC has also engaged several political parties in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member-states and Latin America.[9] However, a study finds that the CPC is most active in Asia.[10] In Asia, the CPC has established networks with the New Komeito Party and Democratic Party of Japan,[11] and political parties in South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, and South Asia. There is even a China-Japan Ruling Party Exchange Mechanism which is similar to the China–US High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue. Concomitantly, the CPC exercises multilateral party diplomacy by actively supporting and working with organisations like the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP).
In view of these, the CPC is able to cultivate relationships and gain indirect access to “political elites,” “high-level decisionmakers,” and “power-brokers of future political leaders.”[12] As the ID-CPC describes it: “Many state leaders, before they assume office, had already been China’s friends. After they assume office, they have made active efforts in advancing friendship with China.”[13] Also, it is through P2P engagements that the CPC can familiarise itself with the role of the opposition in the domestic political life of different countries.[14] Similarly, P2P diplomacy allows China to articulate its political narratives and maximise agenda-setting powers. Specifically, China is able to “show its side of the story” in terms of its political model (developmental path and experience), ideological orientation, governance theories (e.g., Xi Jinping Thought), policy positions (i.e., on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, South China Sea, global governance reform, UN-centered international system), and policy priorities (Five-Year Plans, Belt and Road Initiative [BRI], Chinese Dream, Peaceful Rise, Harmonious World).[15]
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CHINA’S PARTY-TO-PARTY DIPLOMACY IN THE PHILIPPINES
China’s P2P diplomacy with the Philippines precedes President Duterte. Since the early 2000s, the CPC has already engaged, albeit informally, with the Liberal Party (LP), Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and the Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP).[16] However, the CPC’s P2P engagement under the Duterte Administration is unprecedented for two reasons:the establishment of formal ties through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a Philippine political party and the incorporation of P2P diplomacy within the framework of the BRI. The former can be observed in the CPC and PDP-Laban – the current ruling Party in the Philippines – inking an MOU on Exchanges and Cooperation in February 2017 to enhance high-level interaction (i.e., periodic exchange visits, cadre training cooperation, study groups, and youth and local leaders’ communications). Prior to this, in 2016, the PDP-Laban had entered into an agreement with the CPC for PDP-Laban party members to receive “policy training” at the provincial party school in Fujian.[17] Since President Duterte came to power, there has already been more than 10 occasions of interaction between the CPC and Philippine political parties. These involve PDP-Laban’s two delegations for training as party cadres and immersion programme on the CPC’s internal systems, importance of party schools, party discipline, and anti-corruption efforts.[18]
The other two delegations were led by then-Senate President and former PDP-Laban President, Senator Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, for the first BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] Political Parties Think-tanks and Civil Society Organizations Forum in Fuzhou (June 2017) and the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties in Beijing (December 2017) where an endorsement of the BRI and “Beijing Initiative” or pledge of support for China’s “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” and “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” was made.[19] During these trips, Senator Pimentel also led a delegation to Xiamen to discuss party-building cooperation with senior CPC officials and visited the CPC Central Party School in Beijing where party officials are trained on governance and public administration.[20] Notably, the delegation to Beijing included world boxing icon Senator Manny Pacquiao (now PDP-Laban President) who is known to be considering a run for higher office.
On the Chinese side, several high-profile visits to the Philippines have been made by senior CPC officials. For instance, in January 2018, upon the invitation of PDP-Laban, Meng Xiangfeng, Executive Deputy Secretary of the Work Committee for the Departments Directly Under the CPC Central Committee and Deputy Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, came to Manila and had a dialogue with PDP-Laban on China’s 19th Party Congress and gave out hundreds of copies of the first volume of President Xi’s book “The Governance of China.” Meng also had the chance to have an official meeting with President Duterte. Two months later, during the 36th anniversary celebration of PDP-Laban, ID-CPC Vice Minister Guo Yezhou was invited as guest speaker where 600 copies of the second volume of President Xi’s book were donated to PDP-Laban. Speaking of the event, Senator Pimentel remarked that it was important to “[u]nderstand the path, concept and model of China’s development” and study the CPC’s experience such as poverty alleviation efforts.[21] This messaging implies the need to draw lessons from China’s non-liberal democratic governance approaches.
In March 2019, a Chinese delegation led by ID-CPC Minister Song Tao met with President Duterte in Davao City and discussed trade, the Duterte Administration’s Build Build Build Program, and the SCS wherein President Duterte disowned the legal action of certain Filipinos against President Xi at the International Criminal Court (ICC).[22] This was followed through in September 2019 by a visit of a Chinese delegation, led by Chen Min’er (Chongqing Party Secretary and Politburo Member) and a known protégé of President Xi, to meet with representatives of PDP-Laban, Nacionalista Party (NP), National Unity Party (NUP), NPC, and Lakas-CMD in Manila. These allied political parties of PDP-Laban constitute the “supermajority” in the Philippine House of Representatives. Curiously, a major Philippine political party, the LP, which was the Party of former President Benigno Aquino – who pursued a critical China policy – was absent from the meeting.[23] Subsequently, Chen met with President Duterte and went to Davao City to meet with Davao City Mayor and the president’s daughter, Sara Duterte. In Davao, exploratory talks on two-way investment opportunities, sister city agreement, big data, smart technology and logistics cooperation were made, which in turn, is demonstrative of how the CPC links Chinese local actors (provinces/municipalities) and business interests overseas.
Then, in December 2019, PDP-Laban took part in a briefing on the Modernization of China’s System and Capacity for Governance Forum in Beijing. However, because of Covid-19, P2P engagements were forced to go virtual. Thus, in June 2020, the ID-CPC, just as it had with Indonesia and Thailand in September 2020, held the first China-Philippines Political Parties Belt and Road Consultation Mechanism.[24] And the Philippine political parties in attendance, apart from PDP-Laban, were NP, NPC, and the Partylist Coalition Foundation Inc. The Conference emphasised continued economic cooperation, BRI, maintenance of regional stability, adherence to the One-China policy, Community of Shared Future for Mankind, exchange of governance/development experience, and the role of political parties in promoting bilateral relations.
The creation of this new mechanism is arguably the most political aspect yet of the BRI as the BRI’s five pillars of cooperation only consist of policy coordination, economic (trade and investment), infrastructure, and financial and people-to-people connectivity. The PDP-Laban had additionally participated in an online International Seminar on Poverty Eradication and Responsibility of Political Parties (October 2020) and CPC Dialogue in Political Parties of Southeast Asian Countries (November 2020).[25] It was in the latter that Minister Song Tao gave updates on China’s “dual circulation” economic strategy and how the international community stands to benefit from it.
Interestingly, in September 2020, the first in-person meeting between ID-CPC and PDP-Laban represented by Minister Song and Senator Pimentel resumed and was held in Xiamen.[26] The discussions centered on Covid-19 response, economic cooperation, management of maritime disputes, multilateralism, ASEAN-China cooperation, Community of Shared Future for Mankind, BRI, and opposition to power politics. It was at this meeting that Senator Pimentel was given the third volume of President Xi’s book. Noticeably, the recurring patterns on these occasions is that, unlike the United States which often talks of liberal democratic norms (e.g., political/civil rights and democratic freedoms), China advances economic interests and presents alternative political values and preferences.
With greater interaction with the CPC and exposure to China, Senator Pimentel has recognised China as a world leader in e-commerce, digital banking, cashless society, financial technology, AI, renewable energy, railway technology, internet technology.[27] He has also been supportive of China “breaking the monopoly” of the US dollar and that the SCS/WPS disputes are not the “end all be all” of bilateral ties with China as China’s rise in various aspects of national power is already inevitable. For him, China’s rise as a “world leader” should be welcomed for he has always believed in “multi-polarity” and “multilateralism” and that China is a “friend” that “lacks the gene” to seek “hegemony.” From these instances, the CPC is already PDP-Laban’s closest international partner, which were formerly German political parties, and Senator Pimentel had even proposed the creation of a “Philippines-China Parliamentary Friendship Association.”[28]
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S PARTY-TO-PARTY DIPLOMACY FOR PHILIPPINE DOMESTIC POLITICS
It is clear that China’s discourse and soft power have led to a more favourable view of China amongst Philippine political party members, especially in the case of PDP-Laban. P2P diplomacy gives China an opportunity to further its foreign policy objectives, expand political networks, and acclimatize to local political environments. The CPC and PDP-Laban P2P ties have also positioned China to link up with political actors who hold key positions in Philippine political institutions, some of whom have close relations with President Duterte. For example, apart from Senator Pimentel who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Manny Pacquiao, other prominent members of the PDP-Laban include senators Christopher Lawrence “Bong” Go and Francis Tolentino, House Speaker Lord Allan Velasco, House Deputy Speaker Dong Gonzales Jr., Energy Secretary Alfonso Cusi (PDP-Laban Vice Chairman), Raul Lambino (Cagayan Economic Zone Authority Secretary and PDP-Laban Vice President for International Affairs), and Charito Plaza (Director-General of Philippine Economic Zone Authority). There are also more than 80 PDP-Laban members, the biggest political bloc, in the House of Representatives.
Through China’s multiparty engagement with the broader Philippine political sector, China can spot up-and-coming politicians and friendly political forces, and gets to hedge at the sub-national level given the plurality of political bases in the Philippines, thereby strengthening its political influence. This can work in China’s favour in the event of political transitions (elections or successions), intra-party factionalism, coalition formations, and democratic backsliding or domestic political turmoil. Other than PDP-Laban, among the political parties that China has engaged, the NP currently sits four senators and 42 congressmen, the NPC has three senators and 40 congressmen, Lakas-CMD has one senator and 19 congressmen and NUP has 45 congressmen.[29] It is important to note that party memberships extend all the way down to Local Government Units (LGUs) which include Provincial Governors, Provincial Board Members, City and Municipal Mayors and Councilors.
China’s P2P diplomacy is consequential as political leaders can significantly shape public discourse, and thus impact policymaking. And while China is still seen by some in the Philippines as a Cold War communist state, it should be understood that ideology is already moot as the Philippines has also opted to pursue a “strategic partnership” with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, not to mention the critics who doubt whether China is still “communist” having allegedly long-abandoned Marxism to embrace free market principles. Going forward, China’s P2P diplomacy will be tested as the 2022 Philippine national elections draw near where political turncoatism – or political butterflies who bandwagon with whichever party is likely next to be in power – is common practice. Furthermore, P2P diplomacy, like Track II Diplomacy, could be a useful alternative platform for non-official dialogues in situations where government-to-government political relations have bottomed out, as it did during the administration of President Benigno Aquino III.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/53, 26 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] See Niu Haibin, “Party Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” in Diplomacy Theory and Practice, ed. Jiemian Yang (Singapore: World Century Publishing, 2014), pp. 420- 423, 428, 430-431, 434, 443.
[2] On details of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, see “中央外事工作委员会：外事工作的新指引” [Central Committee for Foreign Affairs: New Foreign Affairs Guidelines], Overseas Network-China Forum Network, May 16, 2018, http://theory.haiwainet.cn/n/2018/0516/c3542938-31317194.html.
[3] Cabestan cited in Christine Hackenesch and Julia Bader, “The Struggle for Minds and Influence: The Chinese Communist Party’s Global Outreach,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 64, Issue 3 (2020): https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa028.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] On the number of engagements, see ibid and Ngeow Chow-Bing, “The CPC’s International Department and China’s Party-Based Diplomacy” in China’s Search for National Rejuvenation, eds. Jabin T. Jacob and The Anh Hoang. 2020 (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 160.
[7] Hackenesch and Bader. “The Struggle for Minds and Influence.”
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Quoted in ibid.
[14] Niu Haibin, “Party Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 434.
[15] On these, see Hackenesch and Bader. “The Struggle for Minds and Influence.”
[16] Jerry E. Esplanada, “Chinese communist party says it has disowned local rebels,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 27, 2011, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/21671/chinese-communist-party-says-it-has-disowned-local-rebels#ixzz6lz9YxykU.
[17] Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “PDP-Laban out to learn ideology from Communist Party of China,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 19, 2017, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/158865/pdp-laban-learn-ideology-communist-party-china#ixzz6iN2Igk38.
[18] Senator Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III. “China-Philippines Relations Today.” Speech at the 6th Zoom Forum of the Association for Philippines-China Understanding (APCU), December 3, 2020.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “PDP-Laban out to learn ideology”; “China envoy urges sharing best practices with PDP-Laban,” Philippine News Agency, December 7, 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1088178.
[21] Ian Nicolas Cigaral, “A look at the Xi Jinping book that PDP-Laban members took home,” Philippine Star, February 28, 2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/28/1792211/look-xi-jinping-book-pdp-laban-members-took-home.
[22] PND, “President Duterte welcomes Chinese Minister Song Tao,” Philippine Information Agency, March 28, 2019, https://pia.gov.ph/news/articles/1020417.
[23] Even if the LP is absent in the event, it does not necessarily mean that the CPC is not pursuing informal engagements with LP members.
[24] Based on the speech of Senator Koko Pimentel and “中国同菲律宾成立“一带一路”政党共商机制 [China and the Philippines form “Belt and Road” Party Consultation Mechanism], Xinhuanet, July 1, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-07/01/c_1126179738.htm.
[25] Speech of Senator Koko Pimentel.
[26] Central Committee International Department Information Office, “中菲执政党就维护地区和平稳定达成共识” [“Chinese and Philippine ruling parties reach consensus on regional peace and stability”], September 21, 2020, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/CA3qHod4_ZfvWkACfOUkIg?fbclid=IwAR0HN9M4GRfyA8fXtiMc7PGfgKSFWfDnuoZa_UwUZiYuRexN1MCFlVV3mEA.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] See “List of political parties in the Philippines,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_the_Philippines.
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/52 “The UMNO General Assembly and the Rocky Road Back to Putrajaya” by Norshahril Saat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Since Malaysia’s independence in 1957, UMNO (United Malays National Organization) has been the biggest Malay political party. Despite witnessing several splits throughout its history, it could always reconcile.
- In the May 2018 general election, UMNO lost power for the first time in history, but clawed back to power in March 2020 through defections from the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government. Since being back in government, UMNO was unable to convene its annual general assembly until 27-28 March 2021.
- Past UMNO presidents had used the assembly to rally party members, calling for unity and loyalty. This time, the party was split between those who prefer that UMNO severs its ties with the Muhyiddin Yassin government, and those who prefer the status quo.
- The party took three key decisions at the AGM. It unanimously agreed to: battle the next election under the Barisan Nasional coalition; sever ties with Bersatu; and shun any collaboration with DAP (Democratic Action Party) and PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat).
- Yet, UMNO’s future remains at the crossroads: what is the future of its alliance with Bersatu and PAS; who will be the prime minister candidate; and when should it pull out of the government?
*The author is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
INTRODUCTION
The 2020 UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) general assembly was held on 27 and 28 March 2021, after the meeting was postponed several times last year.[1] Adopting a hybrid format, key office holders in the party attended the meeting physically at the party headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, while the rest tuned in virtually. This format was adopted due to the Covid-19 restrictions imposed by the government. Since January this year, Malaysia has been under the state of emergency. The UMNO general assembly is the party’s largest gathering every year; it is also the largest meeting by any political party in the country. After all, UMNO, formed in 1946, is Malaysia’s oldest and largest party with 3.35 million membership card holders, and 21,883 branches throughout the country.[2]
In previous years, the assembly was the stage for UMNO leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to the president, particularly when Mahathir Mohamad and Najib Razak were helming the party between 1981 and 2003, and 2009 and 2018 respectively. Before its 2018 general election defeat, all UMNO presidents were Malaysia’s prime minister, and deputy presidents were deputy prime ministers. Although UMNO has been back in power since the Sheraton Move in February 2020, UMNO president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi is not the prime minister. Its deputy president Mohamad Hassan is not even an MP in the federal parliament.[3] The party is facing several challenges on the communication front, showing a lack of party discipline. Party leaders have been sending different messages on the party’s future before the general assembly, and more so after. Examining deeper into the nuances of the delegates’ speeches during the assembly demonstrate that not all is well within the party, and its path to recapture Putrajaya is rocky.
This paper examines the three key decisions made by the party “Working” Supreme Council (MKT) endorsed by the assembly delegates. The MKT is the highest decision-making body in UMNO.[4] The first concerns the future of UMNO’s collaboration with Bersatu (Malaysian United Indigenous Party). Currently, 35 of 38 UMNO MPs support the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government led by Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin. However, UMNO is not a formal member of the PN coalition and has stated that this support will only last until the next election is called. The second decision touches on UMNO’s pact with PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia) under the Muafakat Nasional (MN). Like UMNO, PAS is a party in the current PN government. Nevertheless, PAS has also officially joined the PN coalition. UMNO prefers to retain this Malay-unity pact with PAS, while PAS is reluctant to sever ties with Bersatu. The third was whether the party is open to working together with opposition parties PKR and DAP. Some party delegates raised the slogan “No to DAP, No to Anwar!” during the assembly.[5] There were rumours that some UMNO leaders had already begun talks with the opposition to engineer a new political arrangement. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim did not deny that such talks existed but dismissed collaboration between UMNO and the opposition as premature.[6]
TWO VISIBLE CAMPS IN UMNO
UMNO’s decision to break ties with Bersatu and the PN government happened a month before the March assembly; and the assembly was only meant to formalize it. The MKT made the decision on 19 February during a meeting in Janda Baik, Pahang. There was some confusion regarding the outcome of that Pahang meeting. Earlier, an UMNO spokesperson denied that the MKT decision was final.[7] However, in a letter dated 26 February 2021, Ahmad Zahid informed the prime minister of UMNO’s decision.[8] The Federal Territories Minister, and UMNO leader, Annuar Musa questioned why the MKT did not inform UMNO grassroots members of its decision earlier if the decision had already been made in February.[9]
Conflicting statements issued by UMNO leaders in public demonstrate that the party is fragmented, and two camps are visible: one led by UMNO ministers in the Muhyiddin Cabinet, who believed that there are merits with the UMNO-Bersatu collaboration; and the other led by MPs outside the Cabinet. The latter includes those with ongoing court cases, such as Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, secretary general Ahmad Mazlan, former prime minister Najib Razak, and MKT members Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim and Bung Moktar Radin. However, it is also inaccurate to label this group as UMNO mahkamah (the “court” faction)—which is how the group is described—for there are others without ongoing court cases but supporting the decision for UMNO to leave Bersatu. They include Nazri Aziz, Ahmad Jazlan Yaacob, and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. Moreover, they may not necessarily support Ahmad Zahid and Najib. In 2019, Nazri criticised Najib for accepting the role of advisor to BN.[10] After the assembly, Nazri slammed Ahmad Zahid as a weak leader unable to influence the ministers camp.[11] A more accurate term to describe this group is “anti-Bersatu” camp”. In fact, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was one of the first UMNO members to withdraw support for Muhyiddin, and he did not support the government budget when it was passed in December 2020. After Razaleigh’s decision to withdraw, he held a press conference with former prime minister turned opposition MP Mahathir Mohamad. In quick succession Ahmad Jazlan and Nazri also withdrew support for PN. If not for the Emergency declaration, which suspended parliamentary sitting, PN’s majority in parliament would have been tested. In March, two defections from PKR made up for the PN’s majority shortfall.
Moreover, it is unclear if the anti-Bersatu camp has a clear strategy for the party in the next election. First, they did not name their prime minister candidate. Tengku Razaleigh also has ambition to lead the party. Months after UMNO’s electoral defeat in the 2018 general election, Tengku Razaleigh ran for the UMNO presidency in a three-cornered contest against Ahmad Zahid and Khairy Jamaluddin. Second, they are unclear about engaging the minister camp. During the general assembly, Ahmad Zahid labelled an unnamed Minister a “parasite” and challenged him to resign from the Cabinet. One would think that Ahmad Zahid was referring to Federal Territories Minister Annuar Musa, and the minister indeed replied by calling Ahmad Zahid’s demand “inappropriate.”[12] Nonetheless, Ahmad Zahid did not ask the other ministers to do the same, signalling they can wait until the general election is called. It was Tengku Razaleigh who went a step further, calling all UMNO ministers to resign immediately.[13]
The anti-Bersatu camp has been consistent in their rhetoric: they do not want to play second fiddle in government. In their speeches, Ahmad Zahid and Mohammad Hassan emphasized that UMNO should be calling the shots. Ultimately, the anti-Bersatu camp was upset UMNO leaders were not given key positions in the government even though it has the highest number of seats. While Muhyiddin did not name a deputy prime minister, but four senior ministers instead, the UMNO representative is not the first among equals. Instead, Azmin Ali from Bersatu is named as the most senior, ahead of the UMNO representative.
The ministers camp is more united compared to the anti-Bersatu one. The leaders of this camp include senior minister Ismail Sabri Yaacob, who is also one of three UMNO vice-presidents. The other ministers who form part of this group include Hishammuddin Hussein, Khairy Jamaluddin, and Annuar Musa. The split between this camp and the earlier group reached its climax when Annuar Musa was removed as secretary general of Barisan Nasional (or BN, a multiethnic coalition in which UMNO leads with Chinese and Indian parties). Annuar was replaced by Ahmad Mazlan from the anti-Bersatu camp and has an ongoing court case. Ever since, Annuar has been issuing statements that are seen damaging to the other camp, including revealing a secret pact between UMNO leaders with the opposition.
Despite the rivalry between the anti-Bersatu and ministers camps, the latter had to accept UMNO grassroots’ decision in favour of the former. Out of 190 UMNO divisions nation-wide, 124 voted for UMNO to go it alone in the next elections. Ahmad Zahid and UMNO deputy president Mohamad Hassan reaffirmed this grassroots sentiment in their speeches. And since the matter was discussed and agreed upon by the MKT, there was little room for the ministers camp to maneuver during the general assembly. Unsurprisingly, the ministers remained muted throughout the meeting, and did not go against the UMNO grassroots. They began to speak only after the assembly was over. First, a number of UMNO ministers met with the prime minister after the assembly ended. All decided to stay on as ministers. Second, Science, Technology and Innovation Minister Khairy Jamaluddin called for party elections to be held before the general election to determine the party’s future.[14] Due to the strong rejection of Bersatu by UMNO grassroots, many are left guessing on which side UMNO leaders not in either camps stand. An example would be the likes of Khaled Nordin and Zamry Abdul Kader, former chief ministers of Johor and Perak respectively.
PRESERVING THE ALLIANCE WITH PAS
Another outcome of the assembly is that UMNO wants to contest the next general election under the BN banner. The BN has always been UMNO’s vehicle since the 1974 election. In the 2018 election, 13 political parties formed BN, but several Sarawak-based parties left the coalition afterwards. Today, these Sarawak-based parties form a separate coalition called GRS (Sarawak Parties Alliance) which supports PN. Another former BN party that left the coalition is peninsula-based multiracial party Gerakan; in February 2021, it decided to join the PN coalition instead. The BN is currently left with only four parties: UMNO, MCA (Malaysia Chinese Association), MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress), and PBRS (United Sabah People’s Party). Outside BN, UMNO had formed an alliance with PAS. Therefore, by declaring that it wishes to campaign under the BN banner, how PAS fits into UMNO’s scheme remains unclear.
PAS has lent its support to Muhyiddin’s PN government, and also officially joined the PN coalition. At the assembly, Ahmad Zahid’s message to PAS was unequivocal: PAS should stick with UMNO. Some UMNO party leaders were harsh towards PAS leaders. Before the assembly, Tengku Razaleigh called PAS a “political prostitute” for forging relations with PN and UMNO (through MN) at the same time, drawing strong rebuke from PAS leaders.[15] To be sure, Tengku Razaleigh, an MP from Kelantan which PAS governs, has a long history of battling the Islamic party.
In the past, MCA and MIC had questioned PAS’ conservative stance, such as the implementation of an Islamic state, and implementation of hudud laws, MCA, in particular, quizzed PAS’ proposal to amend ACT 355 to strengthen the powers of the syariah court. UMNO needs to also downplay its Malay and Islam supremacist rhetoric to ease its ties with MCA and MIC, for the two parties have to face their respective traditional voters. Since 2008, there has been a shift of non-Malay support away from BN to the DAP (Democratic Action Party) and PKR (People’s Justice Party), the more secular and multi-racial parties. Non-Malay support for the opposition is not guaranteed, as the by-election in Tanjong Piai Johor in 2019 demonstrated, and that the Chinese voters can swing back to the BN. Still, it is a long way for MCA and MIC to go before they regain voter support.
NO TO PKR AND DAP
Another clear message from delegates of the general assembly was that UMNO will not collaborate with the opposition before the next polls, echoing the MKT’s decision “No to DAP, no to Anwar Ibrahim.” This statement hit opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim the most. Before the assembly, he had not denied that discussions between him and UMNO leaders existed, while claiming that plans for collaboration were premature. Ahmad Zahid however denied that such talks ever took place.
Speculation of an UMNO-PH alliance will hit the opposition too, in particular if the talks are carried out with PKR and do not involve the DAP and Amanah (National Trust Party). Cracks in Amanah showed after some members reportedly joined PKR. Anwar and Mahathir have reignited their rivalry after PH’s fall from power in March 2020. After two decades of rivalry, the two patched up and managed to steer PH to its historic victory in 2018. As it is, Anwar Ibrahim excluded Mahathir from the opposition pact; the latter is now in political oblivion, for his party Pejuang has yet to obtain approval from the RoS (Registrar of Societies). Mahathir claims that his party will be the third force in the next election.
Bersatu leaders were also quick to jump on the bandwagon to neutralise UMNO’s stand of wanting wish to go it alone. In the unlikely scenario that UMNO allies with PH, Bersatu will likely be pushed to the sidelines for two reasons: it is blamed for PH’s downfall, and former PKR leaders such as Azmin Ali, Saifuddin Abdullah, and Zuraidah Kamaruddin have all burned bridges with Anwar Ibrahim. Muhyiddin who rarely comments on the political situation since taking over as prime minister urged UMNO leaders to calm down and to focus on battling Covid-19. Bersatu communications chief Wan Saiful Wan Jan also warned that if UMNO goes ahead with the decision to go alone, the party will be engaging in three-cornered fights with Bersatu and PAS (assuming PAS sticks with PN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH). This, according to Wan Saiful will only benefit Pakatan Harapan, as happened in the 2018 election.[16] The prime minister was quick in gathering loyalty from UMNO ministers, who confirmed that they will not resign from the cabinet as urged by Ahmad Zahid and Tengku Razaleigh.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the 2020 UMNO general assembly went without any tension. Like past general assemblies, UMNO leaders staged a show of unity, with members expressing loyalty to the president. Even the president and vice-president demonstrated a show of unity in their messaging. Yet, there were unequivocally unresolved leadership differences over party direction for the forthcoming general election. The apparent silence of UMNO ministers such as Khairy Jamaluddin, Annuar Musa, and Ismail Sabri, among others, was a sign that they had either been deliberately shut out, or they chose not to use this platform to utter their views. Annuar said that he was pleased with the outcome of the assembly only after Ahmad Zahid affirmed that UMNO would not be cooperating with DAP and PKR. His only rebuttal was against Ahmad Zahid’s challenge for a “parasite” to resign. The ministers camp only aired their views after the meeting was over.
The elephant in the room was UMNO’s pick for prime minister. Ahmad Zahid seems to be the front runner, but he may be challenged by other UMNO leaders. In particular, his ongoing trial for corruption may cause UMNO members to have second thoughts about nominating him. If he is found guilty, he will not be able to run in the next polls. Similarly, former prime minister Najib Razak may not be eligible to run, having been found guilty of corruption. Ahmad Zahid’s leadership was again questioned by the ministers camp and some from the anti-Bersatu camp, after an audio conversation between two persons sounding like Anwar and Ahmad Zahid was leaked on social media. Anwar and Ahmad Zahid denied any involvement. Annuar Musa was quick to say the recording is genuine, and recommended that the two leaders swear at a mosque if the allegation was untrue.[17] On the other hand, while Nazri gave Ahmad Zahid the benefit of the doubt over the audio recording, he insisted that Ahmad Zahid should step aside as the UMNO president.[18]
There are other UMNO leaders who have shown signs of interest in the prime minister’s post. Although Mohamad Hassan’s claim that he was the best candidate for prime minister was intended as a joke, some UMNO members reckon that he is the best man for the job. Many attributed him as the person behind MN’s success, when he was the acting UMNO president during Ahmad Zahid’s leave of absence. However, he lacks experience in federal politics, and his highest post was chief minister of Negeri Sembilan. In the same vein, 84-year-old Tengku Razaleigh said that he was the most qualified person to be prime minister in an interview with the media after the assembly.[19] Besides Mohamad Hassan and Tengku Razaleigh, other potential candidates who may be eyeing to lead UMNO are Khairy, Ismail Sabri and Hishamuddin Hussein. Age and cabinet experience favour the three candidates. Khairy has called for party election to be brought forward, before the polls. The ROS requires them to take place soon, but the Supreme Council can vote to delay them by 18 months. This will be another battle to watch between the ministers and anti-Bersatu camps, and will be played out in the MKT.
The bigger challenge for UMNO is which party it will ally with for the next election. For certain, MCA and MIC in BN are its likely partners; yet it has to find partners in Sabah and Sarawak as well. For Sabah, UMNO won the last state election but it contested together with Bersatu and other Sabah parties. UMNO was however not given the chief minister post. Even though UMNO is now part of the Sabah government, it is opposition Warisan (Sabah Heritage Party) that has the highest number of seats. If UMNO fights Bersatu in Sabah, Warisan may be the biggest winner. Thus, there is no certainty that UMNO can win and be dominant in the East Malaysian states. There is also no guarantee that Sarawak-based parties will go with UMNO or Bersatu in the next polls. While not in the PN coalition, Sarawak-based parties support the Muhyiddin Yassin government. This means that Sarawak parties have bigger bargaining power, given the UMNO-Bersatu or BN-PN rivalries.
UMNO leaders may be demanding an election soon, but given the current state of affairs and the leaders’ lack of clear strategies, it has a long way to go before it can differentiate friends from foes, within the party, and outside the party. A snap poll—which is what UMNO leaders are calling for—may not put the party at any advantage against Bersatu. To be sure, even if it manages to secure key allies, it still has a long way to communicate its strategies, ideology, and explain how it has changed after the electoral defeat in 2018.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/52, 23 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] The UMNO general assembly is the party’s annual general meeting. Any requests for postponement require approval from the Registrar of Societies (RoS). UMNO holds party elections triennially during the assembly.
[2] Bernama, “UMNO membership at 3.35 million, still biggest political party – Sec-Gen,” 28 March 2021, https://www.bernama.com/en/politics/news.php%3Fid%3D1946322
[3] Mohamad Hassan is a state legislative assemblyman in Negeri Sembilan, and former chief minister of the state.
[4] In 2018, when it became an opposition party, UMNO added the word kerja (working) to the Supreme Council or MT (Majlis Tertinggi), thus the body’s name was changed to MKT (Majlis Kerja Tertinggi). Rohaniza Idris, “UMNO tukar MT jadi Majlis Kerja Tertinggi,” BH Online, 30 July 2018, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/politik/2018/07/455776/umno-tukar-mt-jadi-majlis-kerja-tertinggi
[5] The Straits Times, “UMNO won’t work with Anwar’s PKR party in next Malaysian general election: Zahid,” 24 March 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/umno-wont-work-with-anwars-pkr-party-in-next-malaysian-general-election-zahid
[6] Nadirah H Rodzi, “Anwar holds talks with UMNO, but says it’s too early for decision,” The Straits Times, 17 March 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/anwar-holds-talks-with-umno-but-says-its-too-early-for-decision
[7] Fareez Azman, “UMNO nafi Majlis Kerja Tertinggi tolak Bersatu dan PN,” 21 February 2021
[8] Astro Awani, “Bersatu bincang keputusan MT UMNO petang ini,” 4 March 2021
[9] Utusan TV, “Annuar gesa Ahmad Zahid jelaskan benarkah telah hantar surat kepada Muhyiddin,” 3 March 2021, https://utusantv.com/2021/03/03/annuar-gesa-ahmad-zahid-jelaskan-benarkah-telah-hantar-surat-kepada-muhyiddin
[10] Yiswaree Palansamy, “Nazri to Najib: Please vacate your BN adviser role, stop being in denial,” The Malay Mail, 15 July 2019.
[11] Irwan Muhammad Zain, “Nazri kritik Zahid “kurang sifar kepimpinan”, label mnteri UMNO “pengecut” 31 March 2021, Astro Awani, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/nazri-kritik-zahid-kurang-sifat-kepimpinan-label-menteri-umno-pengecut-291016
[12] Malaysiakini, “Inappropriate for Zahid to issue resignation challenge, says Annuar,” 28 March 2021, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/568539
[13] Irwan Muhammad Zain, “Jangan tunggu lagi, letak jawatan segera-Tengku Razaleigh,” Astro Awani, 30 March 2021, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/jangan-tunggu-lagi-letak-jawatan-segera-tengku-razaleigh-290874
[14] Bernama, “Only early party election can solve UMNO’s internal disputes-Khairy,” 30 March 2021, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php%3Fid%3D1947094
[15] Roslinda Hashim, “Pas tidak faham maksud ‘pelacur’ dilabel Ku Li,” Sinar Harian, 14 March 2021, https://www.sinarharian.com.my/article/128357/BERITA/Politik/Pas-tidak-faham-maksud-pelacur-dilabel-Ku-Li
[16] Hasimi Muhammad, “Kalau pertembungan tiga penjuru yang untung adalah PH-Wan Saiful,” AstroAwani, 28 March 2021, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-politik/kalau-pertembungan-tiga-penjuru-yang-untung-adalah-ph-wan-saiful-290498
[17] Ramieza Wahid, “Annuar ‘100pct’ sure audio authentic, urges Zahid, Anwar to swear at a mosque anyway,” Malaysiakini 8 April 2021, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/569935
[18] Yiswaree Palansamy, “Nazri gives Zahid benefit of doubt over leaked audio but not on continued leadership of Umno,” Malaymail, 7 April 2021 https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/04/07/nazri-gives-zahid-benefit-of-doubt-over-leaked-audio-but-not-on-continued-l/1964494
[19] AstroAwani, “Ku Li claims he’s the best choice for PM’s post,” 2 April 2021, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/ku-li-claims-hes-best-choice-pms-post-2911358
| ISEAS Perspective is published electronically by: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 Main Tel: (65) 6778 0955 Main Fax: (65) 6778 1735 Get Involved with ISEAS. Please click here: /support | ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed. Responsibility rests exclusively with the individual author or authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission. © Copyright is held by the author or authors of each article. | Editorial Chairman: Choi Shing Kwok Editorial Advisor: Tan Chin Tiong Managing Editor: Ooi Kee Beng Editors: William Choong, Malcolm Cook, Lee Poh Onn, and Ng Kah Meng Comments are welcome and may be sent to the author(s). |
2021/51 “The Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the South China Sea and Philippines-China Relations” by Rommel C. Banlaoi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- To promote the peaceful management of conflicts in the South China Sea and strengthen friendly relations between the Philippines and China, President Rodrigo R. Duterte pursued the bilateral approach favoured by China through the establishment of the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea.
- Launched in May 2017, the BCM held five meetings before COVID-19 hit.
- The five BCM meetings achieved some important milestones in building bilateral confidence to strengthen mutual trust and practical cooperation like joint resources development.
- While the BCM has helped improve Philippines-China relations under the Duterte administration. it is uncertain if this positive momentum can be sustained in the post-Duterte period.
- The BCM has inherent limitations in resolving maritime and territorial conflicts in the South China Sea. China’s actions in the Philippine exclusive economic zone, domestic opposition in the Philippines, national positions of other claimants, involvement of other stakeholders, and actions of extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, arguably set limits to what the BCM can achieve.
*Rommel C. Banlaoi is President of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies (PACS) and a member of the Board of Directors of the China-Southeast Asia Research Center on the South China Sea (CSARC). He is a Professorial Lecturer at the Department of International Studies, Miriam College, the Philippines and an Adjunct Research Professor at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS).
INTRODUCTION
President Rodrigo Duterte pursued a paradigm shift in Philippine foreign and security policy when he vigorously enunciated a China-friendly approach.[1] Soon after taking his oath of office, President Duterte visited China in October 2016 where he had a landmark meeting with President Xi Jinping. During their meeting, both leaders agreed to peacefully deal with their political differences on the South China Sea through a bilateral consultative mechanism. President Duterte decided to set aside the issue of Philippine victory in the international arbitration and even expressed his intention to separate with its only security ally, the United States. President Xi, on other hand, promised not to apprehend Filipino fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal and committed to assist the Philippines in its economic needs.
As a result, both countries formally established the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea to peacefully manage their disputes and to strengthen their friendly relations.[2] The BCM was a game changer in the two countries’ relations since it meant that the Philippines had finally adopted a bilateral approach which China prefers. For China, bilateralism is more convenient, manageable and pragmatic.
The Philippines, on the other hand, has been internationalising the South China Sea disputes and utilising the multilateral approach in dealing with China since China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995 and the Scarborough Shoal in 2012.[3] But President Duterte’s reconciliatory policy towards China ushered in a new era of a closer friendship between the two countries.
From the lowest point of Philippine-China relations under the administration of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, the two countries have risen to new heights in bilateral ties under the Duterte administration. The BCM provides a major turnaround in Philippine-China relations.
The BCM arguably achieved some breakthroughs that contributed to the general improvement not only of Philippine-China relations but also of the calming of the overall security situation in the South China Sea. However, the BCM has limitations in actually resolving the South China Sea disputes.
ACHIEVEMENTS
As a consultative mechanism, the BCM is not a formal negotiation platform, though it can arguably contribute towards that end. It is instead part of the overall confidence building measures (CBMs) that the Philippines and China currently pursue in order to repair damaged political ties with China caused by the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and the 2013-2016 international arbitration case.
On 19 May 2017, the Philippines and China launched the BCM in Guizhou, China where they also held their first meeting. The two countries held the First BCM amidst international criticisms of China’s “expansive” construction activities in the Spratly Islands (particularly on Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs) and in the Paracel Islands (particularly on North, Tree, and Triton Islands). The First BCM was a turning point in Philippine-China relations in that it re-opened practical channels of communication between the two countries.[4] Despite international pushback against Beijing, the First BCM immensely contributed to the warming of bilateral ties between the Philippines and China, which in turn contributed to the calming of the overall security situation in the South China Sea.[5]
With the First BCM, the two countries started to meet face to face again to discuss the South China Sea issue after four bitter years of deliberately ignoring and even ridiculing each other during the administration of President Aquino III. After four years bearing grudges against each other, the two countries openly exchanged views on current regional issues and bilateral concerns on the South China Sea, and agreed to further discuss these issues and concerns and look for “acceptable approaches to deal with them.”[6]
The conclusion of the First BCM left positive signs for the improvement of Philippine-China relations as both parties committed to promote practical cooperation in the South China Sea by establishing technical working groups.[7] Rather than merely talk about their national positions, both decided to work together for conflict avoidance, for prevention of violent incidents at sea, and for win-win economic benefits through joint cooperation.
On 13 February 2018, the Second BCM was held in Manila against the backdrop of another round of strong international condemnation against China for alleged heightened “militarization” in the South China Sea. President Duterte also confronted domestic opposition to him not invoking the Philippines’ legal victory in the international arbitration case against China. He merely commented that China’s military development in the South China Sea was aimed at the United States and not at the Philippines and he even made a joke to make the Philippines a province of China like Fujian, where many of Chinese Filipinos came from.[8]
Despite international and domestic pressure against the Philippines and China, both countries leveled up the nature of the Second BCM agenda by discussing specific ways “to manage and prevent incidents at sea, promote dialogue and cooperation on maritime issues, and enhance mutual trust and confidence.” [9] They noted another achievement in their difficult but improving bilateral ties when they candidly discussed solid measures “to strengthen cooperation in areas such as marine environmental protection, fisheries, marine scientific research, and oil and gas, without prejudice to their respective positions on sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction”.[10]
It was during the second BCM that the two countries decided to convene technical working groups in the areas of fisheries, oil and gas, marine scientific research and marine environmental protection, and even political security. [11] They also committed to cooperate in order to advance “just and human treatment of all persons in distress in the South China Sea” that both countries submitted for joint proposal in the Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text adopted by China and ASEAN on 3 August 2018. The Second BCM was a huge breakthrough in the two countries’ relations as they committed to work together rather than only talk with each other.
The Philippines and China held the Third BCM in Beijing on 18 October 2018 despite persistent media reports of China’s “continuing militarization” in the South China Sea, particularly reports on the landing of China military transport planes on Mischief Reef, the deployment of advanced jamming equipment in Fiery Cross Reef, and the installation of surface air missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles in the Spratlys.[12] Domestically, opposition groups attacked President Duterte for continuously setting aside the Philippines’ victory in the arbitration case and for the alleged selling out of Philippine territories to China.
Undaunted by international and domestic pushbacks, the Philippines and China reasserted their commitment to promote practical and doable cooperation in the South China Sea during the Third BCM. They made a landmark decision, though a very controversial one, to pursue actual cooperation on joint exploration and development of maritime oil and gas. This decision eventually led to the signing on 20 November 2018 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in Oil and Gas Development announced during the visit to the Philippines of President Xi Jinping who declared the establishment of comprehensive strategic cooperation between the two countries.[13] Though international observers and opposition groups in The Philippines criticised the MOU, both parties assured their public that the signing of the MOU was done “without prejudice to the respective legal positions of both governments.[14]
In the Third BCM, both countries “reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea.”[15] They also reiterated their commitment “to maintain freedom of international commerce and other peaceful uses of the sea, addressing territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned and the exercise of self-restraint, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.[16]
The Philippines and China held the Fourth BCM in Manila on 2-3 April 2019. This took place amidst controversies over alleged proliferation of Chinese maritime militias near the Pag-Asa Island. But during the Fourth BCM, they committed “to cooperate and to continue to find ways forward to strengthen mutual trust and confidence”.[17]
Though both countries acknowledged the persistence of their political differences on how to deal with the ground realities in the South China Sea, they stressed during the Fourth BCM “that the relevant differences between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea [are] only part of the bilateral ties and should not affect the mutually beneficial cooperation in other fields.” They also underscored “the importance of maintaining and promoting regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea.” More importantly, both parties reasserted “their commitment to address their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to or threatening with force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned.”[18]
The Fifth BCM was held on 28 October 2019 in Beijing. This took place while China and Vietnam were having a standoff in the Paracels over the issue of oilrigs in the area. The two countries stressed the continuing importance of the BCM “as a platform for regular dialogue that can play a significant role in the enhanced and stable development of bilateral relations and peace and stability in the South China Sea.”[19]
The Fifth BCM made another concrete innovation in Philippine-China relations when both parties finally established two working groups: 1) the Working Group on Political Security, Fisheries Cooperation; and, 2) the Working Group on Marine Scientific Research and Marine Environmental Protection. They regarded the creation of these two working groups as serious bilateral efforts to actually implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) and provide vital inputs for the conclusion of the negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. These two working groups have also demonstrated that the two countries are not only sitting on the consultation tables but also doing something more tangible.
It was during the Fifth BCM that the Philippines and China convened the First Meeting of The Philippine-China Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development as required by the MOU. In this meeting, both parties clarified their respective national positions on the issue. They also exchanged frank views on how to implement the MOU in accordance with their respective domestic requirements.
After the meeting, both parties still felt the strong need to discuss the following issues and to really have meaningful joint cooperation in the development of oil and gas in the South China Sea: 1) Legal framework for cooperation arrangements; 2) Scope of cooperation areas; 3) Taxation processes; and, 4) Dispute settlement mechanism.[20]
The Committee decided to hold their second meeting in early 2020 to continue their discussions. The COVID-19 pandemic interrupted the process, however, and also put on hold their planned BCM meetings in 2020.
During the pandemic, President Duterte pointedly lifted the moratorium on oil and gas exploration in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) in October 2020.[21] This removed one legal obstacle in the implementation of the MOU on oil and gas development conceived by the BCM.
LIMITATIONS
The BCM arguably contributed to the improvement of Philippine-China relations under Duterte administration, but it is uncertain whether it will be sustained in the post-Duterte period.
Domestically, the BCM received strong public criticisms because of the perception that China had hijacked the agenda. Moreover, only people in the government shared the optimism created by the BCM. Filipinos still carry strong anti-China sentiments despite the achievements of the BCM. In a survey conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS) released in July 2020, China continues to suffer a low trust rating from Filipinos.
Filipinos’ thrust deficit towards Beijing makes it difficult for the next Philippine administration to advocate a China-friendly policy, especially if the next government does not have the same popularity presently enjoyed by President Duterte. Considering that the BCM is an executive effort rather than a state commitment, sustaining it after the Duterte administration will be an enormous challenge for the two countries.
Since the BCM is a bilateral effort, applying its various plans of cooperation in the South China Sea is problematic because of the involvements of other claimants and stakeholders, especially in the Spratlys. Claimants and stakeholders conduct their own unilateral and multilateral activities in the South China Sea and these can obstruct the implementation of the BCM’s cooperative plans.
The Philippines and China, however, can implement its planned cooperation activities (like joint fishery management, marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, oil and gas development, and joint search and rescue operations) in their territorial waters or in the Scarborough Shoal where only the two countries are directly involved. Cooperative principles of the BCM may be applied in the Spratlys if China and the Philippines are able to build a solid network of multilateral cooperative mechanisms with other claimants there. The BCM may also be applied in the wider South China Sea region if placed in the context of the ongoing China-ASEAN negotiation on the COC. In short, the implementation of BCM is inexorably constrained by regional realities and security dynamics among claimants.
The involvement of extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, also sets limits on what the BCM can achieve. Beyond the concept of freedom of navigation, the United States also has interests in fishery management, marine environmental protection, search and rescue operations, and oil and gas development in the South China Sea.[22] Thus, without the appreciation, if not full support, of the United States, the Philippines and China will find it cumbersome to implement the cooperative plans of the BCM.
Finally, the BCM does not have the intention to resolve the South China Sea disputes. The primary objective of the BCM is to facilitate bilateral cooperation and to contribute to preventive diplomacy in the South China Sea. Thus, the BCM only provides initial steps in a thousand mile journey towards eventual resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea.
CONCLUSION
From their five consultative meetings, the BCM has promoted pragmatic cooperation through the establishment of working groups and steering committees in order to actually implement joint activities and joint development in the South China Sea. However, domestic opposition in the Philippines, regional realities and China-US rivalry can undermine these achievements, particularly in the post-Duterte period.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/51, 22 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Duterte Presidency: Shift in Philippines-China Relations” in Yang Razali Kassim, ed., The South China Sea Disputes: Flashpoints, Turning Points and Trajectories (New Jersey and London: World Scientific, 2017), pp. 357-362.
[2] Lye Liang Fook, “The China-Philippine Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the South China Sea: Prospects and Challenges,” ISEAS Perspective, 7 March 2018.
[3]Steve Chan, “Multilateralism in the East and South China Sea Disputes” in his China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 179-194.
[4]Joint Press Release for the First Meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the SCS (Guizhou, China, 19 May 2017).
[5] Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Bilateral Approach to Maritime Security Cooperation and Risk Management: Lessons Learned from Philippines-China BCM on the SCS” (Paper presented at the Symposium on Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance held in Haikou, China on 5-6 November 2020).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Rodrigo R. Duterte, Speech delivered at the Chinese Business Club, 19 February 2018.
[9] Joint Press Release for the Second Meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the SCS (Manila, Philippines 13 February 2018).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018. Annual Report to Congress (16 March 2018).
[13] “Philippines, China Ink MOU on Oil and Gas Development”, The Philippine Star, 20 November 2018.
[14] Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (Manila, Philippines 20 November 2018).
[15]Joint Press Release for the Third Meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the SCS (Beijing, China 18 October 2018).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Joint Press Release for the Fourth Meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the SCS (Manila, Philippines 2-3 April 2019).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Joint Press Release for the Fifth Meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the SCS (Manila, Philippines 28 October 2019).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Oil And Gas Development in West Philippine Sea and South China Sea Conflict,” Eurasia Review, 22 October 2020.
[22] Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, 18 February 2021.
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2021/50 “Assessing Digital Economy Policies in Six Southeast Asian Countries” by Joey Erh
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The various digital economy policies across Southeast Asian countries can be evaluated and benchmarked on six main components – connectivity, digital literacy and skills, privacy and cybersecurity regulations, transformation, creation and regional collaboration.
- The six countries analysed each have policies covering these components but they vary in policy focus. More developed digital economies such as Malaysia and Singapore focus on the retraining, reskilling and provision of relevant equipment. Less developed digital economies like Indonesia and the Philippines primarily focus on infrastructure development.
- Each has enacted some form of Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) and cybersecurity law. However, Vietnam and Indonesia do not have dedicated PDPAs while Indonesia and Malaysia do not have dedicated cybersecurity laws. Enacting such laws will help to close potential loopholes.
- Policies to help industries transform digitally are present in all countries with a strong focus on e-commerce adoption. All have overarching plans, five of which include digitalisation strategies for key industries.
- Efforts to encourage entrepreneurship as a career have had little impact on society’s acceptance of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. Malaysia achieved the highest score of 41.5 (34th) in Southeast Asia in the Global Entrepreneurship sub-index for attitudes.
- International digital economy collaboration also appears to be lacking with most countries having ASEAN agreements as their only form of collaboration.
* Joey Erh is Research Officer with the Regional Economic Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Her research interests include innovation of firms, labour and productivity and international economics.
INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of the Internet and of high-speed computing capabilities has resulted in a new form of economy: the digital economy.[1] The digital economy revolution in ASEAN has been marked by impressive growth rates. Google estimated that the value of the Southeast Asian (SEA) internet economy grew by a whopping 40% from 2018 to 2019, recording an average of 33% compound average growth rate (CAGR) (Google et al., 2019a). Southeast Asians are also among the most active mobile internet users in the world (Google et al., 2019a).
Digital adoption has been accelerated because of the COVID-19 pandemic; in 2020, 40 million people in the six largest ASEAN digital economies went online for the first time, pushing the online population of the region up to 70% (Google et al., 2020). Currently, the internet economy stands strong at USD $100 billion gross merchandise value, and is projected to hit over $300 billion by 2025 (Google et al., 2020).
The future prospect of the digital economy in this region is highly dependent on the policies enacted by the government, and there is fear that poor planning and weak implementation of policies will impede its development. In this article six selected ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam,[2] are benchmarked against certain critical aspects in digital economy policymaking.[3]
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT
Given the myriad of policies implemented to develop the digital economy, a common framework is essential to ease comparison between countries. Several frameworks such as the framework by Digital Economy for Africa Initiative (D4EA) (World Bank, 2020a) and the Connect, Harness, Innovate and Protect (CHIP) framework (World Bank, 2020b) have been introduced by the World Bank. Reviewing these frameworks and studying policies implemented by countries reveal a few common elements. These are summarised in Table 1.
Policies implemented should cover six vital components, but depending on their stage of development, countries may differ in their priority areas. The first three (connectivity; digital skills and literacy; and privacy and cybersecurity regulations) are highly related to the digitalisation penetration rate and should be prioritised by countries just beginning to enter the digital economy. The following three (transformation; creation; and regional collaboration) are important for countries that have achieved some success in the first three components.
Table 1: Digital Economy Framework
| Component | Sub-components | |
| 1 | Connectivity | Broadband InfrastructureInternet Device ownershipBroadband affordability |
| 2 | Digital Literacy and Skills | Digital LiteracyDigital Skills |
| 3 | Privacy and Cybersecurity Regulations | Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA)Cybersecurity Laws |
| 4 | Transformation | Digital transformation of businessesE-government |
| 5 | Creation | Ease of doing businessInnovationLocal Entrepreneurship and Innovative culture |
| 6 | Collaboration | Bilateral AgreementsTrade AgreementsRegional partnerships |
Source: Author’s collation from D4EA, CHIP and review of implemented policies
Connectivity
To access the digital economy, one needs an internet-enabled device and broadband connectivity. Smartphones are by far the cheapest and most readily available internet access point for many. However, smartphone ownership is highly correlated to income (ITU, 2019); developed nations have higher smartphone penetration rates (Deloitte, 2017). While fixed broadband and mobile broadband appear to have identical functions of enabling internet connectivity, the former carries much more traffic and offers higher speed and reliability than the latter (OECD, 2015), making it indispensable for the adoption of digital solutions and for transformations to smart cities[4].
Digital Literacy and Skills
Many incorrectly assume that the tech-savvy younger population are digitally literate. However, digital literacy includes not only the ability to gather and create, but to evaluate content on digital platforms. Thus, a more nuanced assessment of digital literacy needs to be considered. As digital technology improves and the adoption rate increases, the redundancy rate of unskilled workers rises as the demand for skilled workers increases. Other than encouraging continuous reskilling and training within the workforce, relevant preparations are also required for the next generation to meet the future needs of the economy.
Privacy and Cybersecurity Regulations
As with physical and financial assets, the key asset of the digital economy, namely data, needs to be regulated to avoid misuse. Other than implementing legal regulations, active enforcement and surveillance by government personnel are also required to ensure adherence and deterrence.
Transformation
Digital transformation of organisations aims to optimise operations through increasing convenience, efficiency and productivity of processes through the use of digital technology. The two main groups that require transformation are businesses and government agencies. For businesses, the digitalisation journey can be categorised into three stages: basic, intermediate, and advanced (See Table 2 for details).[5]
Companies in the basic stage have adopted the use of computers for basic functions, and most of their sales are conducted offline. As they progress through the stages, companies use computers and the internet for more advanced functions and most of their sales go online. A major hindrance to digitalisation adoption is the high outlay needed to acquire the relevant infrastructure as well as the retraining of staff and hiring of skilled workers. This step can often be crippling for micro, small and medium sized firms (MSMEs).
Table 2: Digitalisation Journey Stages and Characteristics
| Stage | Characteristics |
| Basic | Internet usageComputer usageWeb presenceAlmost all sales done offline |
| Intermediate | Use of E-paymentsE-commerce participationSome level of data analytics usedOffline sales still take up the majority |
| Advanced | Use of Internet of Things (IoT)Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)Use of software as a service (SaaS)/cloud-based servicesHigh usage of data analyticsMajority of sales conducted online |
Source: Author’s collation from (Tan & Ng, 2019) and (Deloitte, 2019)
The digitalisation of government, also known as e-government, has been traditionally defined as ‘the use of ICTs to improve the efficiency of government agencies and providing government services online’.[6] It embodies the idea of creating a “one-stop shop” (UN, 2018) and increases the convenience for users. Over the years, the definition has expanded to include citizen (G2C), business (G2B) and inter-agency (G2G) interactions, open government data and using ICT to enable innovation.[7] Some examples of the various government-to-entity interactions are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Examples of Government to Entity Interactions
| Interaction | Examples |
| Government to Consumer (G2C) | National Digital IdentityeTax filingOnline votingDigital health records |
| Government to Business (G2B) | Government contractingeTax filingBusiness registration |
| Government to government (G2G) | Intranet sitesCross-agency interactions |
Source: Author
Creation
Firms have created a plethora of novel goods and services with the advent of the internet, ranging from sharing platforms to online content. These not only benefit consumers by providing a greater spectrum of goods and services but have also expanded the digital economy and created high value-added jobs. To foster the creation of such tech start-ups, the business environment of the country needs to be conducive for start-ups. Such policies would also attract foreign start-ups and firms, talents and investors which would create even more jobs and also transfer valuable skillsets to locals. In order to have a steady pipeline of local entrepreneurs in the country, an innovation and entrepreneurship culture should be promoted, especially among students. E-commerce[8] platforms and digital financial services are two prominent sectors amongst the nascent businesses. With the growth trajectory of these two sectors expected to be nothing short of exponential[9], they are a stronghold in the digital economy. To fully reap the benefits, governments need specific policies to develop these sectors.
Bilateral and Regional Collaboration
Collaboration across countries in the region should be encouraged to maximise opportunities and economies of scale. This may take the form of interoperability of finance and payment platforms, collaboration of companies in the digital economy, the sharing of digital economy governance frameworks, or be in the form of digital economy partnership agreements such as the Singapore-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between and the New Zealand-Singapore-Australia Digital Economy Agreement (SADEA).
DIGITAL ECONOMY POLICIES IN ASEAN COUNTRIES
ASEAN countries have been implementing various policies in the hope of fully maximising benefits from the digital economy. Appendix Table 1 provides a summary and a non-exhaustive list of policies that have been adopted.
ASEAN – Different Stages of Development
Generally, digital economy policies in the six ASEAN economies cover all areas of the digital economy framework (Table 1). Given that these countries are at different stages of digital economy development, they vary in the extent of their policy coverage, intensity and implementation. More developed digital economies such as Malaysia and Singapore appear to focus more on the provision of relevant tools and skills for firms, while countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines are more focused on the provision of infrastructure for connectivity.
Internet Device Ownership
Smartphone prices have been steadily dropping but upfront costs remain a major barrier to smartphone ownership (GSMA & Dalberg, 2017). Thus, the Singaporean, Malaysian and Vietnamese governments have implemented smartphone subsidies for low-income or senior citizens to increase smartphone adoption rates[10]. Indonesia and the Philippines seem to be lacking in such government-led initiatives.
Broadband Connectivity
Mobile broadband subscription rates are high in these six countries, but most have low fixed-broadband subscription rates[11]. Potential factors affecting fixed-broadband subscription rates include digital infrastructure, which affects internet speeds and geographical coverage, and affordability of the service. Vietnam, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia’s governments have been investing significantly in developing their digital infrastructure to support greater connectivity with projects such as the Net Pracharat Project (Thailand), National Broadband Plan (Philippines) and Palapa Ring (Indonesia). Other than the provision of free Wi-Fi in public spaces, Vietnam, Indonesia and The Philippines do not have any government-led initiatives to improve the affordability of broadband subscriptions. On the other hand, countries like Singapore, and Thailand have implemented broadband subscription subsidies for the low-income or elderly population. Malaysia does not lack investment in infrastructure. However, market structure-related issues in its fixed broadband market have adversely impacted not only the price of the service, but fixed broadband deployment, internet speed and quality. Although the Malaysian government has already introduced Mandatory Standard on Access Pricing (MSAP) to address the affordability issue, greater reforms to encourage competition need to be adopted in this sector to rectify other issues faced by Malaysians.
Digital Literacy and Skills
For almost all the countries, there are government policies and programmes in place to foster digital literacy amongst the young and working population such as incorporating it into education curriculums, providing additional training for workers or public education for the general population. However, apart from Singapore and Thailand[12], the elderly population appears to be neglected in this regard. On the other hand, all the governments are working towards retraining the current workforce and building human capital relevant to the future demands of the workforce by introducing or subsidising digital skills training, providing free online courses, and encouraging higher education in related subjects.
Personal Data Protection and Cybersecurity Acts
While all the countries have some form of personal data protection regulation, unlike the other countries that have introduced dedicated Personal Data Protection Acts (PDPA), Vietnam and Indonesia have no single privacy law but still recognises the right to personal privacy through other regulations. The same situation applies to Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s cybersecurity laws; there is no dedicated law passed. Although existing laws may help protect citizens against cyber risks and personal data transgressions, the introduction of an “umbrella law” will help to close potential loopholes and ensure relevance in this fast-paced world.
National Digitalisation Strategies
Governments in these countries have been actively encouraging digital transformation in the workplace through digitalisation strategies, subsidies for digital skills training and the purchase of relevant infrastructure. In particular, there seems to be significant emphasis on encouraging companies to adopt e-commerce[13]. Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have an overarching model with some digitalisation strategies for key industries[14] which is unlike the case for The Philippines[15] which seems to have an overarching policy, but no industry-specific strategy. There is no right way to administer policy as each country has its own characteristics and capacities, but governments should decide on the method that enables them to reap the greatest benefits given their existing resources. At the same time, all the countries have adopted policies that digitalise governments and promote e-government initiatives. Of the six, Singapore emerges with the highest Digital Adoption Index for government (World Bank, 2016a).[16]
Creation and Entrepreneurship
To promote local tech start-ups and to attract foreign tech start-ups to setup base in their countries, all countries appear to have adopted a comprehensive range of policies that include tax incentives, grants and subsidies, incubation programmes and relevant skill training. However, what differentiates them are other characteristics that are not directly addressed by start-up related policies. For example, Vietnam’s high corruption rate is seen as the most impactful obstacle for business operations and has a significant negative relationship to business environment satisfaction.(Maruichi & Abe, 2019).
Initiatives and policies that foster entrepreneurship culture have been implemented in all the countries to encourage local start-ups. However, the effectiveness of these activities appears to be quite limited. According to the Global Entrepreneurship sub-index for attitudes[17], Malaysia scored the highest amongst the six with a score of 41.5, the 34th position globally. This is however a far cry from Hong Kong that scored 68.4 at the 10th position. Given that acceptance of entrepreneurship as a career path requires a significant paradigm shift, it is entirely possible that these policies simply require more time for their impact to be actualised.
Regional Collaboration
Except for Singapore, regional collaboration with regards to the digital economy appears to be lacking. Singapore has digital economy partnership agreements such as the Singapore-Chile-New Zealand and Singapore-Australia agreements while the other countries appear to only collaborate within the region through ASEAN agreements. Examples include the ASEAN ICT Masterplan 2020, ASEAN framework on PDPA and ASEAN agreement on Electronic Commerce. Although there are many ASEAN agreements, most of them are non-legally binding. A possible move forward is for ASEAN to put greater emphasis on the implementation of future digital economy related agreements to foster stronger collaborative ties.
Another important area of collaboration is the cross-border transfer of data within the region. However, countries have been imposing ‘data localisation rules’ and citing reasons such as international variations in PDPA stringency and quality of infrastructure as justifications for imposing ‘data localisation rules’. Such requirements have been shown to have significant negative economic impact (Bauer et al., 2014). To circumvent this, countries may recognise APEC’s Cross-Border Privacy Rule (CBPR) certification as a legitimate transfer mechanism in their constitution or in trade agreements. Of the six countries, only the Philippines and Singapore are CBPR participants. Alternatively, trade agreements may explicitly allow cross-border data flow amongst members. An example is the recent Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which has a clause specifying this.
CONCLUSION
The rapid growth in the digital economy has helped countries grow their economy and improved public welfare. It is crucial that countries adopt comprehensive and relevant policies to ride the digitalisation wave. The proposed policy framework guides and highlights areas in the digital economy which policymakers should pay attention to.
The six main digital economies of ASEAN generally have policies covering the aspects of the framework proposed. However, there appears to be a lack of regional collaboration efforts across the countries. To rectify this, ASEAN could lead by setting up agreements with specific countries for collaboration. In addition, the degree of coverage and specificity of their plans and strategies vary across the countries, which would affect the development rates of their digital economies. All in all, countries should look closely at their current state-of-play and their available resources and implement relevant policies for their digital economy to take off.
ISEAS Perspective 2021/50, 21 April 2021
ENDNOTES
[1] There is no consistent definition of the digital economy across international organisations and countries, due to its dynamic and novel nature (UNCTAD, 2019). However, all existing definitions recognise that the digital economy involves the production of goods and services with digital technologies, such as digital products or activities as factors of production or output. Thw definition of the digital economy used here involves the production of goods and services with digital technologies.
[2] The six countries are selected based on their high growth rates of e-commerce. Indonesia and Vietnam are leading the rest with growth rates of more than 40% annually, while Malaysia, Thailand Singapore and Philippines are steadily growing at 20 to 30% (Google et al., 2019a).
[3] For more on the digitalisation movement in ASEAN, ASEAN Focus recently published an issue focusing on Digitalisation in ASEAN. See /wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ASEANFocus-December-2020.pdf
[4] “Fixed Broadband Industry Report 2020 – Fixed Broadband Development Becomes Important for 5G” from https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/02/06/1980852/0/en/Fixed-Broadband-Industry-Report-2020-Fixed-Broadband-Development-Becomes-Important-for-5G.html#:~:text=It%20is%20well%20recognized%20that,the%20backbone%20for%205G%20infrastructure. Assessed on 20 January 2021
[5] Adopted from (Tan & Ng, 2019) and (Deloitte, 2019)
[6] “E-government” from https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/about/unegovdd-framework. Assessed on 20 January 2021
[7] “E-government” from https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/about/unegovdd-framework. Assessed on 20 January 2021
[8] Lurong Chen and Lydia Ruddy at ERIA have proposed a policy framework for digital connectivity to support the development of e-commerce in ASEAN. The article can be accessed from: https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/policy-brief/Improving-Digital-Connectivity-Policy-Priority-for-ASEAN-Digital.pdf
[9] E-commerce has had a 62% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) from 2015 to 2018 (Google et al., 2019a) while digital finance is expected to grow by more than 20% annually through 2025 (Google et al., 2019b)
[10] Singapore has the programmes ‘Mobile Access for Seniors’ and ‘NEU PC Plus’. Malaysia had the ‘Youth Communication Package’ in 2013 and an income-based smartphone subsidy. Vietnam intends to have a universal smartphone programme to increase smartphone adoption rates. See “Vietnam to Universalise Cheap Smartphones to Boost e-Government” from http://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-to-universalize-cheap-smartphones-to-entire-population-311236.html#:~:text=Vietnam%20will%20have%20a%20universal,achieving%20smartphone%20penetration%20of%20100%25.&text=Smartphones%20will%20be%20made%20affordable,will%20have%2010%20basic%20apps. Assessed 28 January 2021.
[11] Singapore is the only country out of the six which has high fixed-broadband connectivity.
[12] Singapore’s ‘Seniors Go Digital’ and Thailand’s digital skills training as part of the Thailand Digital Economy and Society Development Plan.
[13] Malaysia’s Go-ecommerce, Indonesia’s IKM e-smart program, Vietnam’s national e-commerce development, Philippine’s e-commerce roadmap.
[14] Thailand: Thailand Digital Government Development Plan (2017-2021) that covers several broad industries. Vietnam: National Digital Transformation Roadmap 2025 (Decision 749/QD-TTg 2020). Singapore: Industry Digital plans. Indonesia: Making Indonesia 4.0 focus sector aspirations. Malaysia: The Malaysia Digital Economy Blueprint 2021
[15] Philippines: MSME support through SETUP
[16] The Digital Adoption Index (DAI) for government is the average of three other sub-indices which measures core administrative systems, online public services and digital identification (World Bank, 2016b)
[17] The entrepreneurial attitude sub-index measures the “general attitude of a country’s population towards recognising opportunities, knowing entrepreneurs personally, attaching high status to entrepreneurs, accepting the risks associated with a business start-up, and having the skills to successfully launch businesses”. (Szerb et al., 2020)
[18] Recently the Indonesian government began providing internet subsidies to students and teachers for online classes because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to the pandemic, no government initiatives were found to promote broadband affordability. See ‘Ministry provides Rp7.2 trillion in phone credit, data packages to support distance learning’ from https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/27/ministry-provides-rp-7-2-trillion-in-phone-credit-data-packages-to-support-distance-learning.html. Accessed 4 February 2021.
[19] See “Kembangkan Ekosistem Digital untuk Mitigasi Risiko Disrupsi” from https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/20944/kembangkan-ekosistem-digital-untuk-mitigasi-risiko-disrupsi/0/berita. Accessed on 4 Feburary 2021.
[20] See “Indonesia’s Initiatives to Meet Human Resources Requirements” from https://opengovasia.com/indonesias-initiatives-to-meet-human-resources-requirement/. Accessed on 4 February 2021.